TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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Version
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Certification Report
Huawei server management software iBMC V662/V3.01.12.02
Sponsor and developer: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Huawei Base, Bantian, Longgang District,
Shenzhen, China.
Evaluation facility: Riscure
Delftechpark 49
2628 XJ Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0176341-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0176341
Author(s): Andy Brown
Date: 26 October 2020
Number of pages: 11
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS:
Foreword 3
Recognition of the certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 7
2.7 Re-used evaluation results 8
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Results of the Evaluation 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation,
the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS
agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations
International recognition
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC. Starting September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual
recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components
up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification
schemes can be found on: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is
provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by
Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy
joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification
schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on:
http://www.sogisportal.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Huawei
server management software iBMC V662/V3.01.12.02. The developer of the Huawei server
management software iBMC V662/V3.01.12.02 is Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. located in
Shenzhen, China and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification
Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security
properties of the product for their particular requirements.
Huawei Server management software iBMC is an embedded server management system that is used
to manage servers throughout their lifecycle. It provides a series of management tools for hardware
status monitoring, energy savings, and security protection. It adopts standard interfaces to build a
comprehensive ecosystem for server management.
Huawei Server management software iBMC implements various remote operation and maintenance
(O&M) tools and capabilities. It supports remote configuration, power consumption management, fault
diagnosis and fault management, allowing O&M personnel to conveniently access servers and
perform configuration, management and recovery.
Huawei Server management software iBMC can be widely used in Huawei servers for any server use-
case, such as servers in data center.
The TOE consists of a software meant to be deployed on a supporting hardware (Hi1710 or Hi1711)
which is not in the scope of the evaluation.
The main security service provided by the TOE is the protection of the remote management interfaces
including communication security, authentication and authorization access controls, and the audit /
logging of security relevant events.
The TOE has been evaluated by Riscure B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The evaluation was
completed on 26 October 2020 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of
IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Huawei server management software iBMC
V662/V3.01.12.02, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level)
at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Huawei server
management software iBMC V662/V3.01.12.02 are advised to verify that their own environment is
consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and
recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provides sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL2 augmented (EAL2+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC FLR.1 (Basic flaw remediation).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC].
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be noted that the certification results only apply
to the specific version of the product as evaluated
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Huawei server management software iBMC
V662/V3.01.12.02 from Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. located in Shenzhen, China.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Software
iBMC-V662.zip V662
iBMC-V3.01.12.02.zip V3.01.12.02
Software
signature
file
iBMC-V662.zip.asc N/A
iBMC-V3.01.12.02.zip.asc N/A
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the Huawei server
management software iBMC V662/V3.01.12.02. Details can be found in section 2.5 of this report.
Since the evaluation is an EAL2 evaluation augmented by ALC_FLR.1, the life-cycle definition
(ALC_LCD) was not in the scope and has not been assessed.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE provides all the following main security features:
 Security Audit
 Cryptographic Support
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Functionality Management • TOE Access
 Trusted Path/Channel
The protocol security to protect the communication is based on the following protocols:
 SSHv2 for an access through the CLI interface
 TLS for an access through Redfish and WebUI interfaces
 Syslog and NTP interfaces are not externally accessible but may be configured to secure the
communication with the Syslog and NTP servers; the evaluation assumes that these servers
are located in the same secured areas than the iBMC server
 Other interfaces and associated protocols are out of scope of the evaluation
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Detailed information on these
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment can be found in section 4.2 of the
[ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product
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2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE consists of the iBMC software. It runs on top of a hardware (Hi1710 or Hi1711).
Figure 5.1: TOE Overview
The overview shows the technical implementation in a traditional layered representation. The TOE’s
software architecture consists several layers dedicated to hardware management, security
functionalities management and interfaces management.
Huawei Server management software iBMC mainly implements monitoring, troubleshooting, power
consumption management and remote operation and management. Huawei Server management
software iBMC provides a WebUI, a Redfish interface and a SSH interface to the outside world. Other
protocols such as SNMP and RMCP are disabled in the certified configuration. The security function
application manages authentication and identification of external user connecting to the TOE through
a management terminal. After authentication and identification, requests received are executed by the
Interface and Application layers, making use of services provided by the OS layer.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
Huawei Technologies Co.,Ltd., Huawei Server Management Software
iBMC AGD_PRE_User
V1.5
Huawei Technologies Co.,Ltd., Huawei Server Management Software
iBMC AGD_PRE_Production
V1.4
Huawei Technologies Co.,Ltd., Huawei Server Management Software
iBMC AGD_OPE
V1.5
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer devised 43 test cases providing evidence of coverage for the security functionality. The
evaluator sampled 4 of these developer tests. The rationale for choosing those tests is the complexity,
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the number of threats the tests are addressing, and also the number of interfaces that the tests are
using.
In addition, the evaluator devised 3 additional independent evaluator tests to further complement the
coverage.
2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing
The TOE is a server-based solution. Therefore, the vulnerability analysis is conducted using the
network attack methods, as for example covered in the Offensive Security Certified Professional
program, and is structured in the following phases:
 Information Gathering and Potential Vulnerability Identification: understand network structures,
server properties using port scanning, detection of running services etc. and conducting public
vulnerability searches to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 Exploitation: get some first unprivileged access e.g. by manipulating file upload mechanisms,
SQL injections, password attacks, cross-site scripting etc.
 Privilege escalation: escalate to extended / root privileges to gather further information on
operating system properties, application services, file-system structures to get deeper into the
system and break security features.
The vulnerability analysis takes information from the design assessment of the TOE into account.
However, an EAL2 evaluation is more explorative in nature than a full white-box evaluation where also
implementation details and source code are available for inspection, so specific emphasis is placed
upon the information gathering activities.
To rate the difficulties to exploit potential vulnerabilities the evaluation uses the standard rating
methodology from the Common Criteria Standard [CCDBMB.CCP3]. The reason for this choice is that
the standard rating focusses on the efforts of creating / identifying a potential exploit which is the most
important factor as exploits for this type of products usually have to be deployed remotely and
therefore scale quite well. Thus, there is no reason for applying a specific rating scheme which for
example explicitly splits identification and exploitation efforts.
2.6.3 Test Configuration
Two instances of the TOE were provided by the developper:
 A server running iBMC v662 (product name Huawei 2288 V5)
 A server running iBMC v3.01.12.02 (product name Huawei TaiShan 200)
A single instance of the TOE was used for remote testing, the Huawei TaiShan 200 server running
iBMC version 3.01.12.02. In the discovery phase part of the Vulnerability analysis was conducted on
both servers provided. No discrepancies were found.
In addition, the witnessing session performed as part of ALC_CMS allowed the assessment of the
differences between v662 and v3.01.12.02 of iBMC. It was concluded that the testing performed on
v3.01.12.02 also valid on v662 of iBMC.
2.6.4 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
2.7 Re-used evaluation results
There is no re-use of evaluation results in this certification.
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2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Huawei server management software
iBMC V662/V3.01.12.02. A user can identify the TOE using the WebUI, as the version is displayed on
the Home page. Alternatively, the CLI command ipmcget -d version may be used to identify the TOE.
These identification methods are described in section 4.1.2 of [AGD_OPE].
2.9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR].
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Huawei server management
software iBMC V662/V3.01.12.02, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant and to meet the
requirements of EAL 2 augmented with ALC_FLR.1. This implies that the product satisfies the security
requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE. The TOE
needs to be operated in a segregated network that only allows for access via the remote interfaces
and by physically protected interfaces (OE.NetworkSegration and OE.PhysicalProtection). Personnel
working as authorized administrators are expected to be carefully selected for trustworthiness and
trained for proper operation of the TOE (OE.NoEvil). Also note that the certified configuration is limited
to a specified TLS 1.2 cipher suites.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
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3 Security Target
The CC Security Target for Huawei Server Management Software iBMC, Issue 1.8, 2020-08-03 [ST] is
included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
CC Common Criteria
CCRA Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of IT
Security CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
PP Protection Profile
SSH Secure Shell
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, April 2017.
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report Huawei server management software iBMC
V662/V3.01.12.02, 20200075-D3, Version 1.1, 20 October 2020.
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5, 28
March 2019.
[ST] CC Security Target for Huawei Server Management Software iBMC, Issue 1.8,
2020-08-03.
(This is the end of this report).