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Reference: 2019-32-INF-3664- v1
Target: Limitada al expediente
Date: 25.03.2022
Created by: CERT10
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
Dossier # 2019-32
TOE Huawei GaussDB 200 version 6.5.1 build e3690037
Applicant 440301192203821 - Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
References
[EXT-5296] Certification request
[EXT-7074] Evaluation technical report
Certification report of the product Huawei GaussDB 200 version 6.5.1 build e3690037, as requested
in [EXT-5296] dated 12/07/2019, and evaluated by DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U., as
detailed in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-7074] received on 15/07/2021.
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...........................................................................................................................3
TOE SUMMARY...................................................................................................................................4
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................4
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS...........................................................................................5
IDENTIFICATION.....................................................................................................................................6
SECURITY POLICIES.................................................................................................................................6
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .........................................................................6
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS..................................................................................6
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY ...............................................................................7
ARCHITECTURE.......................................................................................................................................7
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE ....................................................................................................................7
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE...................................................................................................................8
DOCUMENTS..........................................................................................................................................8
PRODUCT TESTING.................................................................................................................................9
PENETRATION TESTING......................................................................................................................9
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION .............................................................................................................10
EVALUATION RESULTS .........................................................................................................................10
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM...............................................11
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................................................11
GLOSSARY.............................................................................................................................................11
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....................................................................................................................................12
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)..............................................................12
RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS...............................................................................................................13
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)......................................................13
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA).....................................................................13
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product Huawei
GaussDB 200 version 6.5.1 build e3690037.
The TOE is a DBMS. It provides a relational database engine providing mechanisms for access
control, identification and authentication, and security audit. It mainly focuses on online data
analysis-processing scenarios with large data volumes. This TOE is a software-only TOE.
Developer/manufacturer: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Sponsor: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd..
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF: DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U.
Protection Profile: [DBMSPP]: Protection Profile for Database Management Systems (Base
Package), Version 2.12 dated March 23rd, 2017. BSI-CC-PP-0088-V2.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 R5 –
EAL2 + ALC_FLR.2.
Evaluation end date: 21/10/2021
Expiration Date1: 22/03/2027
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL2 (augmented with ALC_FLR.2)
have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory DEKRA Testing and Certification
S.A.U. assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are
satisfied for the EAL2 (augmented with ALC_FLR.2), as defined by the Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 R5 and the Common Methodology for
Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 R5.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product Huawei GaussDB 200 version 6.5.1 build e3690037, a positive resolution is proposed.
1
This date refers to the expiration date of the certificate recognition within the scope of the mutual recognition
arrangements signed by this Certification Body.
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TOE SUMMARY
The TOE is a DBMS. It provides a relational database engine providing mechanisms for access
control, identification and authentication, and security audit. It mainly focuses on online data
analysis processing scenarios with large data volumes. The TOE can restrict the access of authorized
users to the TOE, implement free access control on objects controlled by the DBMS based on users
or roles, and can clarify users' responsibilities by their behaviour. This TOE is a software-only TOE.
The database provides the following functions:
 Supports standard SQL.
Supports standard SQL92 and SQL2003, GBK and UTF-8 character sets, SQL standard
functions, analytical functions, and SQL Procedural Language.
 Provides database storage management.
Supports tablespaces and online scaling.
 Provides component management and high availability (HA) of data nodes.
Supports atomicity, consistency, isolation, and durability (ACID) features of database
transactions, recovery from single node failure, and load balancing.
 Provides data analysis capabilities.
Supports full-text index, unified management of structured and semi-structured data,unified
SQL access, and collaborative analysis between homogeneous clusters across data centers.
 Supports APIs.
Supports standard JDBC 4.0 and ODBC 3.5.
 Provides security functions.
Provides functions including security audit, user data protection, identity identification and
authentication, security management, data backup and restoration, and session
management, ensuring database security.
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level EAL2 and the
evidences required by the additional component ALC_FLR.2, according to Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 R5.
ASSURANCE CLASS ASSURANCE COMPONENT
ADV ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.2
ADV_TDS.1
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AGD AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ALC ALC_CMC.2
ALC_CMS.2
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_FLR.2
ASE ASE_CCL.1
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_SPD.1
ASE_TSS.1
ATE ATE_COV.1
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
AVA AVA_VAN.2
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements, according to the
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 R5:
FAU: Security Audit FAU_GEN.1. Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2. User identity association
FAU_SEL.1. Selective audit
FDP: User Data Protection FDP_ACC.1. Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1. Security attribute based access control
FDP_RIP.1. Subset residual information protection
FIA: Identification and
Authentication
FIA_ATD.1. User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.1. Timing of authentication
FIA_UID.1. Timing of identification
FIA_USB_(EXT).2. Enhanced user-subject binding
FMT: Security Management FMT_MOF.1. Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1. Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3. Static attribute initialization
FMT_MTD.1. Management of TSF data
FMT_REV.1(1). Revocation (user attributes)
FMT_REV.1(2). Revocation (subject, object attributes)
FMT_SMF.1. Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1. Security roles
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FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_TRC.1. Internal TSF consistency
FTA: TOE Access FTA_MCS.1. Basic limitation on multiple concurrent sessions
FTA_TAH_(EXT).1. TOE access information
FTA_TSE.1. TOE session establishment
IDENTIFICATION
Product: Huawei GaussDB 200 version 6.5.1 build e3690037
Security Target: Huawei GaussDB 200 6.5.1 Security Target (version: 0.7, date: 2021-07-02).
Protection Profile: [DBMSPP]: Protection Profile for Database Management Systems (Base
Package), Version 2.12 dated March 23rd, 2017. BSI-CC-PP-0088-V2.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 R5 –
EAL2 + ALC_FLR.2.
SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product Huawei GaussDB 200 version 6.5.1 build e3690037 shall implement a set of
security policies assuring the fulfilment of different standards and security demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target, section 4.4 (“Organizational
Security Policies”).
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the security properties
and functionalities compiled by the security target. These assumptions have been applied during
the evaluation in order to determine if the identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its
operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not
be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE.
The detail of these assumptions is documented in the Security Target, section 4.5 (“Assumptions”).
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The following threats do not suppose a risk for the product Huawei GaussDB 200 version 6.5.1 build
e3690037, although the agents implementing attacks have the attack potential according to the
basic attack potential of EAL2+ ALC_FLR.2 and always fulfilling the usage assumptions and the
proper security policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product security
properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
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The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are those defined in the Database
Management Systems Protection Profile and they are documented in the Security Target, section
4.3 (“Threats”).
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some of the
objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are those defined in the
Protection Profile and they are documented in the Security Target, section 5.2 (“Operational
Environment Security Objectives”).
ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
The TOE consists of the following subsystems:
 Kernel Subsystem provides interfaces for external applications, authorizes and
authenticates external requests, optimizes global execution plans, distributes the execution
plans to Datanode instances, stores service data, executes data query tasks, and returns
execution results.
 Cluster Management Subsystem provides management interfaces and tools for routine
cluster O&M and configuration management. It manages and monitors the running status of
functional units and physical resources in the distributed system, ensuring stable running of
the entire system.
The following list describes the logical scope of the TOE. For details about each function, see the
section 8.1 TOE Security Function in the Security Target.
 Security Audit. Audit entries are generated for security related events. Audit policies may be
created to generate logs based on details such as the user, the object being accessed, event
type or success or failure of the operation.
 User Data Protection. The TOE provides a discretionary access control policy to provide
access control between users and database objects (such as tables, columns, views, triggers,
functions, and procedures) or metadata. Residual Information Protection (RIP) is used to
ensure that the previous content of a resource is no longer available once the resource is
allocated to a table, row, or other database object.
 Identification and Authentication. Users must be identified and authenticated prior to TOE
access. Authentication modes are configured to implement the access control policy.
 Security Management. The TOE provides the management function by executing SQL
statements on the client and using server tools. The management function allows
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administrators to configure audit and access control options (including granting and
revoking permissions), and the security attributes of users and roles.
 Protection of the TSF. The TSF is protected through backup and restoration solutions and
data reliability assurance mechanisms, ensuring fault recovery consistency and replication
consistency.
 TOE Access. The Session Handling mechanism, which limits the possibilities of users to
establish sessions with the TOE and maintains a separate execution context for every
operation. Also the Memory Management functionality belongs to the area of Session
Handling and ensures that any previous information in memory is made unavailable before
the memory is used either by overwriting the memory explicitly with a certain pattern or by
overwriting the memory completely with new information.
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
This TOE is a software-only TOE and physically consists of GaussDB 200 packages and related
guidance documents. These software packages and guidance documents are provided in the DVD-
ROM.
The TOE Binary is a database server program named gaussdb in GaussDB_200_6.5.1_SLES.tar.gz
package and its patch GaussDB_200_6.5.1_SUSE-64bit.tar.gz provided in the DVD-ROM.
File Name SHA256 Value
GaussDB_200_6.5.1_SLES.tar.gz f3790bf3d37521f2aaa13f05bfb2ee52717bf057b7a8382f2d
c3a2d729391f0a
GaussDB-200-6.5.1-SUSE-64bit.tar.gz 88a06b27aa5b8e77ed2013dec8cce91bcc70aec17a70c780d
1156dc8cf92f13e
GaussDB_200_6.5.1_SLES.tar.gz.asc -
In addition, the DVD-ROM includes a set of packages necessary to install the TOE:
File Name SHA256 Value
FusionInsight_BASE_6.5.1_SLES.tar.gz 6b4b69b2588994f616e15c31c61241f8e738b8a668
60b27f429df6a8a625f9c7
FusionInsight_Manager_6.5.1_SLES.tar.gz 96f6f55f087aa446aaa21ab00f6eb1aeddcaee2055ee
1855bc0173a3b4a1257a
FusionInsight_SetupTool_6.5.1_SLES.tar.gz e6a5936c4bdfedb523a422633ff806d760b9f7acbe1
f505e3ff019419a3fd4da
DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made available
together to the users of the evaluated version. The documents are available to download from the
DVD-ROM.
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File Name Version SHA256 Value
GaussDB 200 6.5.1 Product Documentation 09.pdf V09 ffa61309d2580c184867fb1265700aa344d42779a
3ce07cdd0b2485b812ce93b
GaussDB 200 6.5.1 Administrator Guide 02.pdf V02 e32d5b4009b31bfe3fff343b17313a1c7873f4832f
b62ab7154224f28533f2af
GaussDB 200 6.5.1 Capacity Adjustment Guide 05.docx V05 a767e08cbd71c603b20103eb04d092b0f55ce0e1
8daacdbbaf52cae989071ef4
GaussDB 200 6.5.1 Communication Matrix 02.xlsx V02 ebf6c07685a2c5fdd8eee423675c70880e41b9217
c7f3ea69dfb1cb82c72fcd6
GaussDB 200 6.5.1 Developer Guide 08.pdf V08 fad4167fc2e38f3d177006c632131926988c7612b
5ff23c7d9c8742d1f7a7624
GaussDB 200 6.5.1 Health Check Guide 01.pdf V01 ac39348a3aa5e8ac01159d2cb460131f3b261ffe7
343ea9414bba5193725cf7e
GaussDB 200 6.5.1 Security Hardening Guide 01.pdf V01 88857ed642b4f5a3e8de303a3578706e9b7383d4
a327839bcc4a6c6045bcb282
GaussDB 200 6.5.1 Security Maintenance Guide 01.pdf V01 5c085317e28a4ed8646756eadeff78d154b223cb
63447c39ea5ab5f0a3877faf
GaussDB 200 6.5.1 Software Installation 03.pdf V03 ea1ca758a453d584c1f841c71645a18964da26f92
884d9333c0a4f00d8d2cd5e
HUAWEI GaussDB 200 6.5.1 AGD_OPE V0.6.pdf V06 3673113836f215f39252dab3bc6acbf4393099942
eb113f2da977a685ba35ae3
HUAWEI GaussDB 200 6.5.1 AGD_PRE V0.7.pdf V07 8f086c3933cc5c26f43a53db246a0bd3db08f4494
53a723b6610d1abcdfd0d45
PRODUCT TESTING
The TOE has two main subsystems, the Cluster Management Subsystem and the Kernel Subsystem.
The strategy has been to test both of them (not covering each subsystem separately) by testing
their functionalities through SFR testing.
In the case of the TSFIs, there are four interfaces: gsql Interface, JDBC Interface, ODBC Interface,
Cluster Management Interface. The evaluation of these interfaces has been covered by testing the
100% of the Security Functional Requirements (SFR) specified in the [ST].
With this test strategy in conjunction with the vendors test suite, the evaluator has assured that all
the TSFIs and Subsystems have been tested correctly and completely.
PENETRATION TESTING
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational environment,
the evaluation team has devised attack scenarios for penetration tests. Within these activities, all
aspects of the security architecture, which were not covered by functional testing, have been
considered.
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The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test
results. No attack scenario with the attack potential Basic has been successful in the TOE’s
operational environment as defined in the security target when all security measures required by
the developer in the security guidance defined in DOCUMENTS section are applied.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The software and hardware requirements, as well as the referenced options are indicated below.
Three servers (nodes) have been used in the evaluation with the following characteristics:
Type Requirement
TOE “GaussDB_200_6.5.1_SLES.tar.gz”. The TOE Binary is a
database server program named gaussdb in the package labelled
as “GaussDB_200_6.5.1_SLES.tar.gz”
“GaussDB-200-6.5.1-SUSE-64bit.tar.gz” The TOE patch
Server Nodes 2 Control Management nodes
1 Data node
TOE operation mode OPEN mode (see section 3 Operation Mode of Huawei
GaussDB 200 6.5.1 AGD_OPE v0.6 )
CPU x86_64 Dual socket 24 cores Intel processor 2.6 GHz
Memory 256 GB
Hard disk 1.2 TB disk space
OS type and version SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 (SUSE 12) SP3, x86_64
Software Python v2.7.5
Clients gsql 6.5.1, JDBC, ODBC
Server Tools All tools listed in section 7.3 of GaussDB 200 6.5.1 Product Documentation 09.pdf)
Firewall Protection of the TOE interfaces (see section 6.7 Configuring Firewalls of Huawei GaussDB
200 6.5.1 AGD_PRE v0.7)
EVALUATION RESULTS
The product Huawei GaussDB 200 version 6.5.1 build e3690037 has been evaluated against the
Security Target: Huawei GaussDB 200 6.5.1 Security Target (version: 0.7, date: 2021-07-02).
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL2 + ALC_FLR.2 have been
assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U.
assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for
the evaluation level EAL2 + ALC_FLR.2, as defined by Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation Version 3.1 R5 and the Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation Version 3.1 R5.
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COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These have been
collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered when using the product.
 The fulfillment of the assumptions indicated in the security target is a key point as it implies
TOE environment configurations that leave some potential vulnerabilities out of the scope.
 The application of all firewall rules according to the preparative procedures are extremely
important to maintain the security in the TOE environment denying all external access to
the TOE.
 The application of the TLS encryption after the installation procedures is critical to maintain
the communication secure and safeguard the TOE assets.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U., a positive resolution is proposed.
During the evaluation, the ITSEF noticed that the TOE provides, at least, 21 non-declared
interfaces (TSFI), that is, services listening on several ports. As these accesses are not declared in
the TOE documentation and they could provide information related to the TOE, the vendor fixed
this providing firewall rules in order to mitigate these vulnerabilities. These firewall rules are
indicated in 6.7 Configuring Firewalls in document Huawei GaussDB 200 6.5.1 AGD_PRE (version
0.6, 18-03-2021).
Additionally, although GaussDB 200 supports TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2, only TLSv1.2 with some specific
ciphersuites are included in the scope of this certification. Therefore, the user should follow the
steps in section 6.8 Configuring TLS protocol in order to configure TLS accordingly.
In general,
- for a secure installation of the TOE, the user should follow the TOE guidelines (see the
Security Target, section 2.4.2.2 TOE Guide). Special attention have to be paid to the section
“6 TOE Secure Installation“ in the guide “HUAWEI GaussDB 200 6.5.1 AGD_PRE V0.7.pdf”,
and
- for a secure operation of the TOE, the user should also follow the TOE guidelines (see the
Security Target, section 2.4.2.2 TOE Guide). Special attention have to be paid to the section
“7. Security requirements“ in the guide “HUAWEI GaussDB 200 6.5.1 AGD_OPE.pdf”.
GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
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EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
OC Organismo de Certificación
TOE Target Of Evaluation
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, R5 Final,
April 2017.
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is available in the
Certification Body: Huawei GaussDB 200 6.5.1 Security Target (version: 0.7, date: 2021-07-02).
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RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under
certain conditions was agreed.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It
defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at
higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL
4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices" a
SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical
Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common
Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of
signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the
agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogis.org.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common
Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers
CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on
assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation
(ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-
2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-
2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity
(maintenance and re-certification)of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of
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certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL
4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government representatives from
the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the
website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under CCRA for all assurance components selected.