BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
for
Infineon Security Controller M7892 A21 with
optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013,
SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and
with specific IC dedicated software (firmware)
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.61
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
Infineon Security Controller M7892 A21 with optional RSA2048/4096
v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries
and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware)
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 6 February 2012
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
5 / 44
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................16
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................17
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................17
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................18
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................18
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................19
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................20
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................20
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................21
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................21
11 Security Target............................................................................................................22
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................22
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................22
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................24
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................26
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................29
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................39
6 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL 4 resp. E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
7 / 44
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https:// www.bsi.bund.de /zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement. This evaluation
contains the components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually recognised in
accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL 4
components of these assurance families are relevant
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Infineon Security Controller M7892 A21 with optional RSA2048/4096
v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with specific
IC dedicated software (firmware) has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Infineon Security Controller M7892 A21 with optional
RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries
and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware) was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 24 January 2012. The TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
8 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product Infineon Security Controller M7892 A21 with optional RSA2048/4096
v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with specific
IC dedicated software (firmware) has been included in the BSI list of the certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111. Further copies of this
Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the product. The Certification
Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.
7
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
9 / 44
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
This page is intentionally left blank.
10 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
11 / 44
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Infineon Security Controller M7892 A21 with optional
RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries
and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware). The TOE is a member of the
Security Controller family SLE70 and provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture. The TOE
consists of a core system, memories, co-processors, peripherals, security modules and
analogue peripherals. The major components of the core system are the two CPUs
(Central Processing Units), the MMU (Memory Management Unit) and MED (Memory
Encryption/Decryption Unit). The co-processor block contains the processors for RSA/EC
and DES/AES processing, while the peripheral block contains the random number
generation and the external interfaces service. The peripheral block contains also the
timers and a watchdog. All data of the memory block is encrypted and all memory types
are equipped with an error detection code (EDC), the SOLID FLASH™ in addition with an
error correction code (ECC). The security modules serve for operation within the specified
range and manage the alarms.
This dual interface controller is able to communicate using either the contact based or the
contactless interface. The implemented dual interface provides a maximum flexibility in
using following communication protocols: ISO 7816, ISO 14443 Type A and Type B,
ISO/IEC 18092 NFC passive mode, Mifare compatible Interface as well as further
communication modes, allowing also the implementation of user defined concepts for
conctact based or contactless communication. The flexibility of the communication
interfaces enable for example also the use cases involving external analogue modems,
which are typically deemed for applications running in mobile devices. Please note that
these external parts are of course not part of this TOE.
The TOE implements a full 16 MByte linear addressable memory space for each privilege
level, a simple scalable Memory Management concept and a scalable stack size. The
flexible memory concept consists of ROM- and Flash-memory as part of the non volatile
memory (NVM), respectively SOLID FLASH™. The block diagram of the TOE is shown in
[6], Figure 1. The TOE comprises as one part the hardware of the smart card security
controller in various configurations. According to the BPU option, a non limited number of
configurations of the TOE may occur in the field. The number of various configurations
depends on the order and purchase contract only. For more details please refer to the
Security Target [6], chapter 1.1.
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particularly security relevant
applications and for its previous use as developing platform for smart card operating
systems according to the life cycle model from [8]. The term Smartcard Embedded
Software is used in the following for all operating systems and applications stored and
executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the Smartcard Embedded Software. The
Smartcard Embedded Software itself is not part of the TOE.
All products based on M7892 A21 are identically from module design, layout and footprint,
but are different in their possibilities to connect to different types of antennas or in their
ability to be implemented in special packages for different form factors. The TOE is
represented and made out of different mask sets with the TOE internal and security
irrelevant differences described in the Security Target Lite [6], chapter 1.1. There are
additional differences between the products of this TOE realised by blocking of different
modules (memory sizes, interface options, cryto moduls).
12 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report
In the field, the IC Embedded Software Developer can clearly identify a product in question
by the Generic Chip Ident Mode (GCIM). For clear differentiation between the mask sets,
each of it has assigned an individual value in the data output of the Generic Chip
Identification Mode (GCIM). All differences between the products of the TOE lead
consequently to different output data of the GCIM for clear identification. Details are
depicted in the user guidance hardware reference manual [16].
The M7892 A21 product allows for a maximum of configuration possibilities following the
market needs. For example, a M7892 A21 product can come in one project with the fully
available SOLID FLASH™ or in another project with any other SOLID FLASH™-size
below the physical implementation size, or with a different RAM size. And more, the user
has the free choice, whether he needs the symmetric co-processor SCP, or the
asymmetric co-processor Crypto2304T, or both, or none of them. In addition, the user
decides, whether the TOE comes with a free combination of software libraries or without
any.
The degree of freedom of the chip configuration is predefined by Infineon Technologies AG
and made available via the order tool. Beside predefined fix TOE configurations, which can
be ordered as usual, this TOE implements optionally the so called Billing-Per-Use (BPU)
ability, also as order option. If offered, this solution enables the user to tailor a product on
stock himself to the required configuration.
The user software can be implemented in various options depending on the user’s choice.
Thereby the user software, or parts of it, can be downloaded into the SOLID FLASH™,
either during production of the TOE or at customer side. In the latter case, the user
downloads his software or the final parts of it at his own premises, using the Flash Loader
software. For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and Security Target Lite
[7], chapter 1 and table 3.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-
CC-PP-0035-2007 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 7. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Features:
TOE Security Features Addressed issue
SF_DPM Device Phase Management
SF_PS Protection against Snooping
SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
13 / 44
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
TOE Security Features Addressed issue
SF_CS Cryptographic Support
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 8.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.1.2.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 4.2.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Infineon Security Controller M7892 A21 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC
v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with specific IC
dedicated software (firmware)
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of delivery
1 HW M7892 Smart Card IC
A21 (produced
in Dresden)
Complete module, package,
with or without inlay
mounting, in form of plain
wafers, in an IC case or in
bare dies.
2 FW Flash Loader
FW Identifier
78.015.14.0
Stored in reserved area of
User ROM on the IC (patch
in NVM)
3 FW
STS Self Test Software (the IC
Dedicated Test Software)
FW Identifier
78.015.14.0
Stored in Test ROM on the IC
(patch in NVM)
4 FW
RMS Resource Management
System (the IC Dedicated Support
Software)
FW Identifier
78.015.14.0
Stored in reserved area of
User ROM on the IC (patch
in NVM)
5 FW SAM library
FW Identifier
78.015.14.0
Stored in reserved area of
User ROM on the IC (patch
in NVM)
6 SW
NVM image (including Embedded
Software and crypto libraries)
–
Stored in Flash memory on
the IC
14 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of delivery
7 SW RSA library (optional)
RSA2048
v1.02.013
RSA4096
v1.02.013
Object code in electronic
form
8 SW EC library (optional) EC v1.02.013
Object code in electronic
form
9 SW SHA-2 library (optional) SHA-2v1.01
Object code in electronic
form
10 SW Toolbox (optional)
Toolbox
v1.02.013
Object code in electronic
form
11 DOC
AMM Advanced Mode for Mifare-
Compatible Technology Addendum
to M7892 Hardware Reference
Manual
2011-11-18 Hardcopy or pdf-file
12 DOC
M7892 Controller Family for
Security Applications Hardware
Reference Manual
2011-12-12 Hardcopy or pdf-file
13 DOC M7892 Errata Sheet 2011-12-12 Hardcopy or pdf-file
14 DOC
M7892 Controller Security
Guidelines User Manual
2011-12-12 Hardcopy or pdf-file
15 DOC
SLE 70 Family Programmer’s
Reference User’s Manual
2011-08-19 Hardcopy and pdf-file
16 DOC
SLE70 Asymmetric Crypto Library
for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC /
Toolbox (1.02.013)
2011-06-07 Hardcopy and pdf-file
17 DOC Crypto@2304T User Manual 2010-03-23 Hardcopy and pdf-file
18 DOC
SLx70 Family Secure Hash
Algorithm SHA-2 (SHA 256/224,
SHA 512/384) Library Version
V1.01
2009-11 Hardcopy and pdf-file
19 DOC
SLx 70 Family Production and
Personalization User’s Manual
2011-10-20 Hardcopy and pdf-file
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
A processing step during production testing incorporates the chip-individual features into
the hardware of the TOE. The individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by its serial
number. The serial number comprises the lot number, the wafer number and the
coordinates of the chip on the wafer. Each individual TOE can therefore be traced
unambiguously and thus assigned to the entire development and production process.
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by M7892 A21. Another characteristic of the
TOE are the chip identification data. These chip identification data is accessible via the
Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM). This GCIM outputs amongst other identifiers for
the platform, chip mode, ROM code, chip type, design step, fabrication facility, wafer, die
position, and firmware. The TOE may be handled in different production sites but the
silicon of this TOE is produced in Dresden, Germany only. To distinguish the different
15 / 44
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
production sites of various products in the field, the site is coded into the Generic Chip
Ident Mode (GCIM) data. Additionally, dedicated RMS functions [16], chapter 8.21, allow a
customer to extract the present hardware configuration and the original Chip Identifier
Byte, which was valid before blocking.
In addition to the hardware part, the TOE consists of firmware parts and software parts.
The software parts are differentiated into: the cryptographic libraries RSA, EC and SHA-2
and the supporting libraries Toolbox and Base. RSA, EC, SHA-2 and Toolbox provide
certain functionality via an API to the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Base Library is
only used internally by the RSA, EC and Toolbox libraries and has no user interface. If
none of the three libraries RSA, EC and Toolbox is delivered, also the Base Library is not
on board. The SHA-2 library does not use the Base Library.
The firmware parts are the RMS library, the Service Algorithm Minimal (SAM), the STS
firmware for test purpose [7], chapter 2.2.2, providing some functionality via an API to the
Smartcard Embedded Software, the Flash Loader for downloading user software to the
NVM and the Mifare compatible software interface. The STS is implemented in a
separated Test-ROM being part of the TOE. The firmware is stored in the ROM which is
not accessible for the user, i.e. the TOE has no user ROM. The Smartcard Embedded
Software, i.e. the operating system and applications are not part of the TOE. For the
version number of firmware and software parts of the TOE refer to table 2.
The RSA library is used to provide a high level interface to the RSA cryptography
implemented on the hardware component Crypto2304T. The RSA library is delivered as
object code and in this way integrated in the user software.
The EC library is used to provide a high level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography. The
routines are used for ECDSA signature generation, ECDSA signature verification, ECDSA
key generation and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement. The EC library is
delivered as object code and in this way integrated in the user software.
The SHA-2 library provides the calculation of a hash value of freely chosen data input in
the CPU. The SHA-2 library is delivered as object code and is in this way available for the
user software.
The toolbox library does not provide cryptographic support or additional security
functionality as it provides only the following basic long integer arithmetic and modular
functions in software, supported by the cryptographic coprocessor
The Base Library provides the low level interface to the asymmetric cryptographic
coprocessor and has no user available interface. The base library does not provide any
security functionality, implements no security mechanism, and does not provide additional
specific security functionality. For more details please refer to Security Target [6] and
Security Target Lite [7], chapter 2.2.2.
The cryptographic libraries RSA, EC and SHA-2 are delivery options. Therefore the TOE
may come with free combinations of or without these libraries. In the case of coming
without one or any combination of these libraries the TOE does not provide the Additional
Specific Security Functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA) and/or Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (EC) and/or SHA-2.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
16 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report
Symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithms (Triple-DES and AES), to ensure the
confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication
protocols and it will provide a random number generation of appropriate quality.
The RSA library is used to provide a high level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto2304T and includes
countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The EC library is used to provide a
high level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography implemented on the hardware
component Crypto2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA
attacks. The SHA-2 library provides the calculation of a hash value of freely chosen data
input in the CPU.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: protection during packaging, finishing and personalization, usage of
hardware platform and treatment of user data. The augmented organizational security
policy P.Add-Functions, coming from the additional security functionality of the
cryptographic libraries, the augmented assumption A.Key-Function, related to the usage of
key-depending function, and the threat memory access violation T.Mem-Access, due to
specific TOE memory access control functionality, have been added. Details can be found
in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.3.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is an integrated circuits (IC) providing a platform to a smart card operating
system and smart card application software. A top level block diagram and a list of
subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target [6], chapter
2.1.
The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture. The major components of the core
system are the two CPUs (Central Processing Units), the MMU (Memory Management
Unit) and MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The two CPUs control each other in
order to detect faults and serve by this for data integrity. The TOE implements a full 16
MByte linear addressable memory space for each privilege level, a simple scalable
Memory Management concept and a scalable stack size. The flexible memory concept
consists of ROM- and Flash-memory as part of the non volatile memory (NVM),
respectively SOLID FLASH™. For the SOLID FLASH™ memory the Unified Channel
Programming (UCP) memory technology is used. This TOE has no user available ROM.
The symmetric coprocessor (SCP) combines both AES and Triple-DES with dual-key or
triple-key hardware acceleration. The Asymmetric Crypto Co-processor, called
Crypto2304T in the following, is an optimized version of the Crypto@1408 used in the
SLE88-family with performance improvements for RSA-2048 bit (4096-bit with CRT) and
Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptography.
The software part of the TOE consists of the cryptographic RSA-, EC- and the SHA-2
libraries and the supporting Toolbox and Base libraries. If RSA or EC or Toolbox or
combinations hereof are part of the shipment, automatically the Base Library is included.
17 / 44
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
Part of the evaluation are the RSA straight operations with key length from 1024 Bits to
2048 Bits, and the RSA CRT operations with key lengths of 1024 Bits to 4096 Bits. Note
that key lengths below 1024 Bits are not included in the certificate.
The Flash Loader is a firmware located in the IFX-ROM (Read-Only Memory) and allows
downloading the user software or parts of it to the SOLID FLASH™ memory. After
completion of the download the Flash Loader can be permanently deactivated by the user.
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 1.2 and 2.2.2.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into six categories:
1. technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology against
the specification and to get the technology parameters used in simulations of the
circuitry (this testing is not strictly related to Security Functionalities);
2. tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the
analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE;
3. regression tests of the hardware within a simulation environment based on special
software dedicated only for the regression tests;
4. regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software and for the
IC Dedicated Support Software on emulator versions of the TOE and within a
software simulation of chip in special hardware;
5. characterisation and verification tests to release the TOE to production:
a) used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different operating
conditions and varied process parameters (often also referred to as characterisation
tests);
b) special verification tests for Security Functionalities which were done with
samples of the TOE (referred also as developers security evaluation) and which
include also layout tests by automatic means and optical control, in order to verify
statements concerning the layout;
6. functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct
functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3).
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developers
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. The tests of the developer were repeated by sampling, by
18 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report
repetition of complete regression tests and by software routines developed by the
evaluators and computed on samples with an evaluation operating system. For the
developer tests repeated by the evaluators other test parameters were used and the test
equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout
measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections both in design data
and on the final product.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities using bespoke equipment and expert
know how. The penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and
attacks which do not modify the TOE physically. The penetration tests results confirm that
the TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack potential in the intended environment for
the TOE.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● Smartcard IC M7892 A21.
Depending on the blocking configuration a M7892 product can have different user
available configuration as described in Security Target Lite [7], chapter 1.1. For example, a
M7892 A21 product can come in one project with the fully available SOLID FLASH™ or in
another project with any other SOLID FLASH™-size below the physical implementation
size, or with a different RAM size. And more, the user has the free choice, whether he
needs the symmetric co-processor SCP, or the asymmetric co-processor Crypto2304T, or
both, or none of them. In addition, the user decides, whether the TOE comes with a free
combination of software libraries or without any. And, to be even more flexible, various
interface options can be chosen as well.
All possible TOE configurations equal and/or within the below specified ranges are
covered by the certificate. Note that there is no user available on-chip ROM module any
more. The user software and data are now located in a dedicated and protected part of the
SOLID FLASH™. According to the BPU option, a non limited number of configurations of
the TOE may occur in the field. The number of various configurations depends on the
order and purchase contract only.
Type Name Version number
Hardware M7892 A21 A21
Firmware FW Identifier including RMS, STS, FL, SAM and Mifare 78.015.14.0
Software RSA crypto library (optional) RSA2048 v1.02.013
RSA4096 v1.02.013
EC library (optional) EC v1.02.013
SHA-2 library (optional) SHA-2 v1.01
Toolbox (optional) Toolbox v1.02.013
Table 3: TOE Identification (Product identifiers)
19 / 44
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
The RSA (optional), EC (optional), SHA-2 (optional), Toolbox (optional), and Base Library
(optional) as separate software parts of the TOE are identified by their unique version
numbers. The user can identify these versions by calculating the hash signatures of the
provided library files. The mapping of these hash signatures to the version numbers is
provided in the Security Target Lite [7] chapter 10. The version numbers of firmware and
software are listed in Table 3.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
● The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
● Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [8],
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended,
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
20 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for: SF_CS (Cryptographic
Support). The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its
security policy:
● hash functions: SHA-2
● algorithms for the encryption and decryption: 3DES, AES, RSA and EC
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product
certification (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities
with a security level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against
attacks with high attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for
these functions it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate
for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the
'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (www.bsi.bund.de).
The Cryptographic Functionalities 2-key Triple DES (3DES), RSA 1024 provided by the
TOE achieves a security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context).
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the
TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all
aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered
by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional
configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the IC Dedicated Support
Software or Embedded Software.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
guidelines for the developer of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Embedded
Software on how to securely use the microcontroller chip and which measures have to be
implemented in the software in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security
Target of the TOE.
21 / 44
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correct and effectively implemented by the software.
Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the
evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [10].
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● All security hints described in the delivered documents [12] to [19] have to be
considered.
The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints
to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [20] have to be considered.
In addition the following hint resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect has
to be considered:
● The IC Embedded Software Developer can deliver his software either to Infineon to let
them implement it in the TOE (in ROM or Flash memory) or to the Composite Product
Manufacturer to let him download the software in the Flash memory.
The delivery procedure from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the Composite
Product Manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is required.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target Lite [7] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE)
is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version
of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
APB™ Advanced Peripheral Bus
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
API Application Programming Interface
AXI™ Advanced eXtensible Interface Bus Protocol
BPU Bill Per Use
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CI Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI)
22 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report
CIM Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI), same as CI
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
Crypto2304T Asymmetric Cryptographic Processor
CRT Chinese Reminder Theorem
DCLB Digital Contactless Bridge
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DFA Differential Failure Analysis
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECC Error Correction Code
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EDC Error Detection Code
EDU Error Detection Unit
EEPROM Electrically Erasable and Programmable Read Only Memory
EMA Electro Magnetic Analysis
Flash EEPROM Flash Memory
FL Flash Loader software
FW Firmware
GCIM Generic Chip Identification Mode
HW Hardware
IC Integrated Circuit
ICO Internal Clock Oscillator
ID Identification
IMM Interface Management Module
IRAM Internal Random Access Memory
IT Information Technology
ITP Interrupt and Peripheral Event Channel Controller
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
I/O Input/Output
MED Memory Encryption and Decryption
MMU Memory Management Unit
NVM Non-Volatile Memory
23 / 44
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
OS Operating system
ST Security Target
PEC Peripheral Event Channel
PP Protection Profile
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
PROM Programmable Read Only Memory
RAM Random Access Memory
RMS Resource Management System
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rives-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SAM Service Algorithm Minimal
SCP Symmetric Cryptographic Processor
SF Security Feature
SFR Special Function Register, as well as Security Functional Requirement,
the specific meaning is given in the context
SO Security Objective
SOLID FLASH™ An Infineon Trade Mark and Stands for Flash EEPROM Technology
SPA Simple Power Analysis
STS Self Test Software
SW Software
TOE Target of Evaluation
TM Test Mode (STS)
TRNG True Random Number Generator
TSC TOE Security Functions Control
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
UM User Mode (STS)
UmSLC User Mode Security Life Control
WDT Watch Dog Timer
XRAM eXtended Random Access Memory
3DES Triple DES Encryption Standards
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
24 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
25 / 44
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target M7892 A21 including optional Software Libraries RSA – EC – SHA-2
– Toolbox, Version 0.7, 2011-12-12, Infineon Technologies AG
[7] Security Target Lite M7892 A21, Version 1.2, 2011-12-13, Infineon Technologies AG
(sanitized public document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15.06.2007, registered and
certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under
reference BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
[9] Evaluation Technical Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0758, M7892 A21, Version 2, 2012-02-
03, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH – Evaluation Body for IT Security (confidential
document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product M7892 A21,
Version 2, 2012-02-03, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Evaluation Body for IT
Security (confidential document)
[11] Configuration Management Scope M7892 A21 including optional Software Libraries
RSA – EC – SHA-2 – Toolbox, Version 1.3, 2011-11-30, Infineon Technologies AG
(confidential document)
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 1, 02. December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 7, 30.Juni 2011, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 8, 08.Juni 2011, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 1, 25 September 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, 08.Juni 2011, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, 03 September 2009, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for
EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 36, Version 3, 19 October 2010, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
26 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report
[12] SLE 70 Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox User Interface,
Version 1.02.013. 2011-06-07, Infineon Technologies AG
[13] Crypto@2304T User Manual, 2010-03-23, Infineon Technologies AG
[14] SLE 70 Family Programmer’s Reference User’s Manual, 2011-08-19, Infineon
Technologies AG
[15] M7892 Errata Sheet, 2011-12-12, Infineon Technologies AG
[16] M7892 Controller Family for Security Applications Hardware Reference Manual,
Version 1.2, 2011-12-12, Infineon Technologies AG
[17] AMM Advanced Mode for Mifare-Compatible Technology Addendum to M7892
Hardware Reference Manual. Version 1.0, 2011-11-18, Infineon Technologies AG
[18] SLx 70 Family Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-2 (SHA 256/224, SHA 512/384) Library,
Version 1.01, 2009-11, Infineon Technologies AG
[19] M7892 Controllers Security Guidelines User Manual, 2011-12-12, Infineon
Technologies AG
[20] SLx 70 Family Production and Personalization User’s Manual,
2011-10-20, Infineon Technologies AG
27 / 44
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
This page is intentionally left blank.
28 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
29 / 44
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
30 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
31 / 44
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
32 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
33 / 44
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 4: Evaluation assurance level summary”
34 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
35 / 44
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
36 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
37 / 44
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
This page is intentionally left blank.
38 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target Lite provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment 39
39 / 44
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
This page is intentionally left blank.
40 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Infineon Security Controller M7892 A21 with optional RSA2048/4096
v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with specific
IC dedicated software (firmware) (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond
EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 6 February 2012, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Site Address Function
Agrate - DNP DNP Photomask Europe S.p.A.
Via C. Olivetti 2/A
20041 Agrate Brianza
Italy
Mask Production
Augsburg Infineon Technologies AG
Alter Postweg 101
86159 Augsburg
Germany
Development
Bangalore Infineon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd.
13th
Floor, Discoverer Building
International Technology Park
Whitefield Road
Bangalore, India – 560066
Software development
and testing
Bangkok – SmarTrac covered by
BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0007-2011
Smartrac Technology Ltd.,
142/121/115 Moo,
Hi-Tech industrial Estate,
Tambon Ban Laean,
Amphor Bang-Pa-In,
13160 Ayutthaya,
Thailand
Inlay antenna mounting
Bukarest Infineon Technologies Romania
Blvd. Dimitrie Pompeiu Nr. 6
Sector 2
020335 Bucharest,
Romania
Development
41 / 44
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
Site Address Function
Chanhassen Smartrac Technology US Inc.
1546 Lake Drive West
Chanhassen, MN 55317
USA
Inlay antenna mounting
Corbeil Essones - Toppan Toppan Photomask, Inc.
European Technology Center
Boulevard John Kennedy 224
91105 Corbeil Essonnes
France
Mask Production
Dresden Infineon Technologies Dresden GmbH & Co.
OHG
Königsbrücker Str. 180
01099 Dresden
Germany
Production, initialisation,
pre-personalisation
Dresden-Toppan Toppan Photomask, Inc
Rähnitzer Allee 9
01109 Dresden
Germany
Mask Production
Graz / Villach / Klagenfurt Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Development Center Graz
Babenbergerstr. 10
8020 Graz
Austria
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Siemensstr. 2
9500 Villach
Austria
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Lakeside B05
9020 Klagenfurt
Austria
Development
Großostheim – K&N Infineon Technology AG
DCE
Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10 – Building 8A
63762 Großostheim
Germany
Distribution Center
Hayward – K&N Kuehne & Nagel
30805 Santana Street
Hayward, CA 94544
U.S.A.
Distribution Center
Hsinchu - ARDT Ardentec Corporation
No. 3, Gungye 3rd Rd.,
Hsin-Chu Industrial Park, Hu-Kou,
Hsin-Chu Hsien, Taiwan 30351, R.O.C.
Taiwan 30351, R.O.C.
Wafer Testing
42 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 Certification Report
Site Address Function
Manila - Amkor Amkor Technology Philippines
Km. 22 East Service Rd.
South Superhighway
Muntinlupa City 1702
Philipines
Amkor Technology Philippines
119 North Science Avenue
Laguna Technopark, Binan
Laguna 4024
Philipines
Module Mounting
Munich Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
Infineon Technologies AG
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
81739 München (Perlach)
Germany
Development, Headquater
Munich - G&D Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Distribution Center DLC
Prinzregentenstraße 159
81677 Munich
Germany
Distribution Center
Ranzan - Toppan Toppan Printing Co., Ltd.
6-2, Hanami-Dai, Ranzan-Machi, Hiki-Gun
Saitama 355-0204
Japan
Inlay antenna mounting
Regensburg-West Infineon Technologies AG
Wernerwerkstraße 2
93049 Regensburg
Germany
Smartrac Technology GmbH,
Wernerwerkstraße 2
93049 Regensburg
Germany
Module Mounting
Inlay antenna mounting
Distribution Center
Reichshof - SmarTrac Smartrac Technology Germany
Building RW2
Gewerbeparkstr. 10
51580 Reichshof-Wehnrath
Germany
Inlay antenna mounting
Delivery
Round Rock - Toppan Toppan Printing Company America, Inc.
Round Rock Site
2175 Greenhill Drive
Round Rock, Texas 78664
Inlay antenna mounting
Singapore - DHL Exel Singapore Pte Ltd
DHL Exel Supply Chian
81, ALPS Avenue
Singapore 498803
Distribution Center
Singapore Kallang Infineon Technologies AG
168 Kallang Way
Singapore 349253
Module Mounting,
Electrical module testing
43 / 44
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012
Site Address Function
Tainan - TSMC Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing
Company Ltd.
1, Nan-Ke North Rd.
Tainan Science Park
Tainan 741-44
Taiwan
Production, initialisation,
pre-personalisation
Wuxi Infineon Technologies (Wuxi) Co. Ltd.
No. 118, Xing Chuang San Lu
Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park
Wuxi 214028, Jiangsu
P.R. China
Module Mounting
Distribution Center
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
44 / 44