National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Extreme Networks Fabric Engine Switches v9.1.100
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11656-2026
Dated: June 2, 2026
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jerome Myers
Meredith Martinez
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Reed Eberly
Ryan Hagedorn
Will Micknick
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Description................................................................................................. 3
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.3 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 3
3.4 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 5
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 5
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 5
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 6
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 6
4.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 6
4.6 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 7
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 7
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 7
5.1 Assumptions........................................................................................................ 7
5.2 Clarification of scope.......................................................................................... 7
5.3 TOE Excluded Functionality .............................................................................. 8
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 8
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 9
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 9
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 9
8 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 9
9 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 9
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 9
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) ............................................................ 10
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 10
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)................................... 10
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 11
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 11
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 11
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .............................................................. 12
11 Annexes................................................................................................................. 12
12 Security Target...................................................................................................... 12
13 Glossary ................................................................................................................ 12
14 Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 13
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Extreme Fabric Engine Switches v9.1.100
solution provided by Extreme Networks, Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report (VR) is not an
endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no
warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in June 2026. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security
Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative
Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 06 December 2023 (NDcPP30e) with
the Functional Package for SSH, Version 1.0, 13 May 2021 (SSH10).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Extreme Fabric Engine Switches v9.1.100.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Extreme Networks
Fabric Engine Switches v9.1.100 Security Target, version 0.5, May 28, 2026 and analysis
performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
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Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Extreme Fabric Engine Switches v9.1.100
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 06 December
2023 (NDcPP30e) with the Functional Package for SSH, Version 1.0, 13 May
2021 (SSH10)
ST Extreme Networks Fabric Engine Switches v9.1.100 Security Target, version 0.5,
May 28, 2026
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Extreme Fabric Engine Switches v9.1.100,
version 0.2, May 28, 2026
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Extreme Networks, Inc.
Developer Extreme Networks, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Jerome Myers and Meredith Martinez
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The TOE is the Extreme Networks Fabric Engine Switches v9.1.100. The TOE is a
standalone network device that facilitates Data Link Layer data transfer between network
nodes connected to its physical ports. TOE consists of a hardware appliance with embedded
firmware. The TOE evaluated configuration is one instance of one of those listed models
running Fabric Engine 9.1.100.
All TOE appliances are shipped ready for immediate access through a Command Line
Interface [CLI], with some basic features enabled by default. However, to ensure secure use,
the product must be configured prior to being put into a production environment as specified
in the user guidance. The CLI is a text based interface which is accessible from a directly
connected terminal or via a remote terminal using SSH. All of the remote management
interfaces are protected using encryption.
3.1 TOE Description
The TOE links the Mocana v6.5.2f 32-bit libraries for cryptographic operations using non-
PAA operations only with the Mocana GCM 64k feature enabled. Each model includes an
out of band management port that is Intel-based and a set of in band network interfaces that
are all Broadcom-based. Therefore, all models have equivalent network interfaces.
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.3 TOE Architecture
The basic architecture of each TOE appliance begins with a hardware appliance with physical
network connections. Within the hardware appliance the TOE is designed to control and
enable access to the available hardware functions (e.g., program execution, device access,
facilitate basic routing and switching functions).
There are normally two management interfaces – a browser-based management UI accessed
via TLS/HTTPS and a CLI accessed locally or via SSH. However, to meet the requirements
listed in this Security Target, the browser-based management UI must be disabled as
described by guidance. Thus, in the evaluated configuration only the CLI can be used for
management.
The TOE Boundary is outlined in the following figure:
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Figure 1: TOE Boundary
3.4 Physical Boundaries
The physical boundary of the TOE is the Extreme Networks Fabric Engine Switches running
software version 9.1.100, which includes:
• The appliance hardware
• RJ-45/RS-232 management ports
• USB port
• Embedded software/firmware installed on the appliance
• CLI management interface
Each TOE appliance runs a version of the Extreme proprietary OS and has physical network
connections to its environment to facilitate routing and switching of network traffic. The
TOE appliance can also be the destination of network traffic, where it provides interfaces for
its own management. The TOE may be accessed and managed through a management
workstation or terminal in the environment which can be remote from or directly connected
to the TOE.
The TOE can be configured to forward its audit records to an audit server (i.e., a syslog
server) that is provided by the environment. This is generally advisable given the limited
audit log storage space on the evaluated appliances. The TOE sets its internal clock using
administrative commands issued at the CLI interface or can use an NTP server.
The evaluation assumes the Operational Environment of the TOE includes the following:
• The SSH client that is used to access the management interface
• The management workstation that hosts the SSH client
• Syslog server for external storage of audit records
• NTP server for synchronizing system time
• Certificate Authority and OCSP servers to support X.509
• DNS server (optional not depicted in Figure 1)
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The scope of the evaluation is limited to the requirements levied upon the TOE in the ST –
all other functionality is outside the scope of the evaluation.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The Network Appliances provide extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE generates a
comprehensive set of audit logs that identify specific TOE operations. For each event, the
TOE records the date and time of each event, the type of event, the subject identity, and the
outcome of the event. Auditable events include: failure on invoking cryptographic
functionality such as establishment, termination and failure of a TLS session; establishment,
termination and failure of an SSH session; all use of the user identification mechanisms; any
use of the authentication mechanism; any change in the configuration of the TOE, changes
to time, initiation of TOE update, indication of completion of TSF self-test, termination of a
remote session; and initiation and termination of a trusted channel.
The TOE is configured to transmit its audit messages to an external syslog server.
Communication with the syslog server is protected using TLS. The logs for all appliances
can be viewed the CLI. The records include the date/time the event occurred, the event/type
of event, the user ID associated with the event, and additional information of the event and
its success and/or failure.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE utilizes CAVP-tested cryptographic implementations to provide key management,
random bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-
hashing features in support of higher level cryptographic protocols. This cryptography is
used to support the following features:
• TLS client in support of secure channel with remote syslog server,
• SSH server in support of secure CLI remote management interface,
• X.509 certificate validation, and
• NTP support.
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4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOEs
administrator interfaces (local CLI, and remote CLI). The TOE requires Administrators to
authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. In the
Common Criteria evaluated configuration, the TOE requires a minimum password length be
configured between 8 and 32 characters, as well as a minimum RSA key length of 2048 bits.
The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database.
4.4 Security management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE
configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. Management can take
place over a variety of interfaces including:
• Local console command line administration;
• Remote command line administration via SSHv2;
The TOE provides multiple interfaces to perform administration. While in the CLI command
mode, the administrator has access to six distinct modes, or privileges, that provide access to
a specific set of commands. Depending on RBAC configuration, not every administrative
account would have access to all modes. The CLI modes are as follows:
• User EXEC Mode: Initial mode of access.
• Privileged EXEC Mode: User mode and password combination determines
access level.
• Global Configuration Mode: Use this mode to make changes to the running
configuration.
• Interface Configuration Mode: Use this mode to modify or configure logical
interface, VLAN or a physical interface.
• Router Configuration Mode: Use this mode to modify protocol settings.
• Application Configuration Mode: Use this mode to access the applications.
The system allows administrators to view audit records in EXEC mode.
All administrative functionality is accessed via the CLI. The TOE audits all administrative
access. The TOE displays login banners and inactivity timeouts to terminate idle
administrative sessions after a set period of inactivity.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification, authentication, and access controls restrictions to management and
configuration functionality to Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of private keys and
plaintext passwords by any user. The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date
and time are used as a timestamp that is part of each audit record generated by the TOE.
Administrators can update the TOE’s clock manually or can configure the TOE to
synchronize with an external time source. The TOE performs testing to verify correct
operation of the security appliances themselves. The TOE verifies all software updates via
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digital signature (2048-bit RSA/SHA-256) and requires administrative intervention prior to
the software updates being installed on the TOE to avoid the installation of unauthorized
firmware.
4.6 TOE access
The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after a configurable period. Once a session has
been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new session. The
TOE can also display specified banner on the local and remote CLI interfaces prior to
allowing any administrative access to the TOE. The TOE allows users to manually terminate
an established management session with the TOE.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports several types of secure communications:
• Trusted paths with remote administrators over SSH,
• Trusted channels with remote IT environment syslog servers over TLS.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 06 December
2023 (NDcPP30e)
• Functional Package for SSH, Version 1.0, 13 May 2021 (SSH10)
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP30e/SSH10 should be
consulted if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP30e/SSH10 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality
included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality
provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be
drawn about their effectiveness.
5.2 Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices with
the SSH Package and performed by the evaluation team).
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• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific
Network Device models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore
should not to be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the NDcPP30e/SSH10 and applicable Technical Decisions.
Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered
by this evaluation.
5.3 TOE Excluded Functionality
The TOE supports a number of features that are not part of the core functionality. These
features are not included in the scope of the evaluation:
• Browser-based management UI accessed via TLS/HTTPS is disabled and is not
evaluated.
• The use of SNMPv3 is excluded.
• The REST and NETCONF management interfaces are not evaluated.
• Fabric Extend with IPsec is not evaluated.
• Use of the FTP server is excluded and is disabled by default.
• Integration with AAA server is not evaluated.
• Virtualized products are not included in the scope and are not evaluated.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Extreme Fabric Engine Common Criteria Configuration Guide 9.1.100, May 2026
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is
configured as evaluated.
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7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Extreme
Fabric Engine Switches v9.1.100, Version 0.2, May 28, 2026 (DTR), as summarized in the
evaluation Assurance Activity Report (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP30e/SSH10 including the tests associated
with optional requirements. The AAR, in sections 1.1 lists the tested devices, provides a list
of test tools, and has diagrams of the test environment.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE consists of the following hardware models:
Table 2: Extreme networking appliances – hardware
Platform Series Processor
Fabric Engine
9.1.100
U5320 BCM56175, BCM56274
U5420 BCM56274, BCM56275
U5520 BCM56375, BCM56376
U5720 Intel Atom C3338, C3538
U7520 Intel Atom C3758
U7720 Intel Atom C3758
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Fabric Engine
Switches v9.1.100 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the
NDcPP30e/SSH10.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
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of security requirements claimed to be met by the Extreme Fabric Engine Switches v9.1.100
products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the NDcPP30e/SSH10 related to the
examination of the information contained in the TOE Summary Specification (TSS).
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
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9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP30e/SSH10 and recorded the results
in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
On May 28, 2026, the evaluator searched the (National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search, ref NVD), MITRE CVE Database, National
Vulnerability Database, and CVE details (https://www.cve.org/,
https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search, and https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-
search.php, ref CVE), Known Vulnerability Exploit Catalog (https://www.cisa.gov/known-
exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog, ref KEV), Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/, ref VND), Rapid7 Vulnerability Database
(https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities, ref Rapid7), Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative
(http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories, ref ZDI), Tenable Network Security
(http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search, ref TEN), Offensive Security Exploit
Database (https://www.exploit-db.com/, ref EDB) with the following search terms:
“Extreme”, “VOSS”, “VSP”, “Intel Atom”, “Fabric Engine”, “Extreme Networks”,
“Mocana”, “Broadcom”, “DigiCert”.
Further details regarding the vulnerability analysis are found in Section 3.4.2 of the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
All validator comments are covered in other sections of this Validation Report.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Extreme Networks Fabric Engine Switches v9.1.100
Security Target, version 0.5, May 28, 2026.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 06 December
2023 (NDcPP30e).
[5] Functional Package for SSH, Version 1.0, 13 May 2021 (SSH10).
[6] Extreme Networks Fabric Engine Switches v9.1.100 Security Target, version 0.5,
May 28, 2026 (ST).
[7] Assurance Activity Report for Extreme Fabric Engine Switches v9.1.100, Version
0.2, May 28, 2026 (AAR).
[8] Detailed Test Report for Extreme Fabric Engine Switches v9.1.100, Version 0.2, May
28, 2026 (DTR).
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Extreme Fabric Engine Switches v9.1.100, Version
0.2, May 28, 2026 (ETR).