Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0363-2006
for
Smart card reader SPR532
Firmware version 5.09
from
SCM Microsystems GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5455, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-330 V3.31
BSI-DSZ-CC-0363-2006
Smart card reader SPR532
Firmware version 5.09
from
SCM Microsystems GmbH Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) extended by the advice of the Certification Body for components beyond
EAL4 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL3 augmented by
ADO_DEL.2 – Detection of modification
ADV_IMP.1 – Subset of the implementation of the TSF
ADV_LLD.1 – Descriptive low-level design
ALC_TAT.1 – Well-defined development tools
AVA_MSU.3 – Analysis and testing for insecure states
AVA_VLA.4 – Highly resistant
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, December 22nd
2006
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-5455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0363-2006 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0363-2006
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0363-2006 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.35
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0363-2006
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
This evaluation contains the components AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 that are
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For
mutual recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance families are
relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0363-2006 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product smart card reader SPR532, firmware version 5.09 has undergone
the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product smart card reader SPR532, firmware version 5.09
was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
SCM Microsystems GmbH
Oskar-Messter-Str. 13
85737 Ismaning, Germany
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on December 22nd
2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0363-2006
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-20.
The product smart card reader SPR532, firmware version 5.09 has been
included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly
(see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained
from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
SCM Microsystems
Oskar-Messter-Str. 13
85737 Ismaning, Germany
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0363-2006 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0363-2006
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 8
3 Security Policy 10
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 10
5 Architectural Information 12
6 Documentation 13
7 IT Product Testing 13
8 Evaluated Configuration 15
9 Results of the Evaluation 15
10 Comments/Recommendations 17
11 Annexes 17
12 Security Target 17
13 Definitions 17
14 Bibliography 19
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0363-2006 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The SPR532 smart card reader represents universal smart card reader devices,
which can communicate with processor cards compliant to ISO 7816 [14] (T=0,
T=1) and EMV2004 [15] through different application interfaces (CT-API [16],
PC/SC [17]). Data transmission protocols for memory cards (I2
C, 2-wire, 3-wire
protocol) are also supported.
SPR532 readers have a keypad with silicone keys in order to guarantee a
secure PIN entry. The reader recognizes the commands sent by the host
(typically a PC) to the smart card and inserts the numbers entered over the
keypad as a PIN into the appropriate places of the command. Only the fact that
a numeric key was pressed is communicated to the host. The PIN never leaves
the reader towards the host.
The SPR532 smart card reader family offers the possibility to update the
firmware in a secure manner in order to be prepared for future requirements.
This functionality can also be used to update the firmware of already delivered
smart card readers SPR532 to the new functionality incorporated in the
firmware version 5.09 without bying new hardware. The mechanism consists of
a digital signature of the firmware that is verfied by the smart card reader
SPR532 before the new firmware is stored in the EEPROM. The verification of
the signature with the asymmetrical RSA algorithm and a bit length of 1024
guarantees the integrity and authenticity of the firmware during the upload of the
firmware into the smart card reader. The manufacturer SCM Microsystems
ensures the secure generation and administration for the production of the
necessary secure signature key. SCM guarantees that each new version of the
TOE receives a new version number and is clearly identifiable by means of this
number.
SPR532 smart card readers are usable in many market segments because of
their multi-functionality. As class 2 readers the SPR532 readers also allow to
enter identification data (PIN) and convey it securely to secure signature
creation devices (smart cards with dedicated signature application) according to
§2 number 10 SigG [8]. Therefore the readers can also be used for applications
in accordance with the signature law and signature regulation. Moreover, they
can be used for the transmission of the hash value from the application to the
signature card and for the provision of a signature from the card for use in
signature applications. Thus, they represent a partial component for signature
applications, which require a security confirmation to be able to be used for
qualified electronic signatures under §2 number 3 SigG [8]. For the use of the
TOE in accordance with SigG and SigV [9], only signature applications and
smart cards can be used that were evaluated and confirmed in the SigG
context. The web pages of the Bundesnetzagentur list the evaluated and
confirmed products (see www.bundesnetzagentur.de).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0363-2006
SPR532 smart card readers fulfill the special requirements under §15
paragraph 2 number 1a (no disclosure or storage of identification data) and
paragraph 4 (recognizability of security-relevant changes) to SigV [9].
The IT product smart card reader SPR532, firmware version 5.09 was
evaluated by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed
on 24 October 2006. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, and vendor and distributor is
SCM Microsystems GmbH
Oskar-Messter-Str. 13
85737 Ismaning, Germany
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL3 augmented. The following table shows the augmented assurance
components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL3 TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+: ADO_DEL.2 Delivery and operation. – Detection of modification
+: ADV_IMP.1 Development - Subset of the implementation of the TSF
+: ADV_LLD.1 Development - Descriptive low-level design
+: ALC_TAT.1 Life cycle support - Well-defined development tools
+: AVA_MSU.3 Vulnerability Assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure states
+: AVA_VLA.4 Vulnerability Assessment - Highly resistant
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 conformant as shown in the following tables.
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0363-2006 Certification Report
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_RIP.2 Subset residual information protection
FTA TOE access
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the Security Target chapter
5.1.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.PINCMD The firmware in the reader checks the commands sent to the
reader by means of the command structure compliant to the USB
smart card reader specification. If commands for Verification or
Modification of the PIN are recognized and if the command, which
has to be forwarded to the smart card, contains one of the
following instruction bytes:
• VERIFY (ISO/IEC 7816-4): INS=0x20
• CHANGE REFERENCE DATA (ISO/IEC 7816-4): INS=0x24
• ENABLE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT (ISO/IEC 7816-4):
INS=0x28
• DISABLE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT (ISO/IEC 7816-4):
INS=0x26
• RESET RETRY COUNTER (ISO/IEC 7816-4): INS=0x2C
• UNBLOCK APPLICATION (EMV2004): INS=0x18
it will be switched into the mode for secure PIN entry over the
integrated keypad. The RS232 version of the reader emulates the
protocol, which is specified for the USB smart card reader, so for
both host interface versions an identical data stream will be
processed by the security functions.
The security function SF.PINCMD recognizes the command for
PIN entry, sent by the host software, and inserts the PIN data
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0363-2006
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
entered over the keypad to the corresponding place in the
command to the smart card. As well, only the fact that one of the
numeric keys is pressed is reported to the host. During the PIN
entry the corresponding LEDs display the mode of secure PIN
entry.
The exchange of the PIN takes place only between smart card and
TOE over the card reader interface. This interface is inside the
TOE and from manipulation protected by the security seal.
SF.CLMEM The memory area for the PIN data will be reworked after transfer of
the command to the smart card, after removing the card, after
cancellation by the user, after a timeout during PIN entry, during
switch on process and after defined reset commands from the
host.
SF.SECDOWN The verification of a signature of the firmware with the asymmetric
RSA algorithm and a bit length of 1024 guarantees the integrity
and authenticity of the firmware during loading of a new firmware
into the smart card reader. The hash value over those firmware,
which will be loaded, is determined based on the algorithm SHA-1
with a length by 160 bits. The verification of the integrity and
authenticity takes place in the TOE via comparison of the
determined hash value and the hash value as a component of the
decoded signature. The public key for this operation is stored in the
TOE.
Security measure The housing is sealed by means of a falsification secure security
sticker, which will be destroyed during removal and thus can be
used only once. Thus the user can recognize by the condition of
the safety seal that no manipulations at the hardware were made.
Table 3: Security Functions of the TOE
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1 and 6.2.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘high’ (SOF-high) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [6, chapter 6.1].
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The values that must be protected are identification data (PIN) of the user as
well as the firmware and hardware of the smart card reader itself.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0363-2006 Certification Report
Those assets are threatened by an attacker with high attack potential. The
following threads are identified in the Security Target:
Thread Summary
T.REVEAL The attacker could try to intercept the communication between host and
smart card and/or smart card reader over a Trojan horse (virus), if the
PIN is entered into the host equipment. Or the attacker could try to attain
a PIN code outside of the commands planned for it.
T.STORE Storing identification data in the TOE also poses a danger of attack
because these data could be obtained from the TOE by an attacker, if the
attacker came into the possession of the TOE and would have the
technical facility.
T.DOWNLOAD By manipulations during the download, a modified or unauthorized
firmware could be loaded into the reader, which could contain capabilities
for uncovering the PIN.
T.SEAL By manipulation of the seal and following manipulation of the hardware
after opening the reader the attacker can intercept the communication
between reader and smart card.
Table 4: Threats to the TOE
Organisational policies are not formulated in the Security Target.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The results of the evaluation are valid for the following version of the TOE:
smart card reader SPR532, firmware version 5.09.
The necessary information regarding the installation and start-up of the TOE are
provided in the user guidance [11] and [10]. The upload of a firmware version
into a smart card reader SPR532 other than 5.10 is not a matter of configuration
but a change of the TOE that is not in the scope of this evaluation and
certificate.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The SPR532 smart card readers are suitable both for office and for private use.
Due to their multi-functionality, the readers can support additional uses beyond
signature applications, such as secure home banking. In general, the end user
is informed about his or her responsibility during the use of the TOE. In detail,
the following assumptions are mentioned in the Security Target [6, chapter 3.1]:
Assumption Summary
A_USER.VERSION Regular check of the version of the software.
A_USER.UNOBSERV Unobserved input of the PIN.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0363-2006
Assumption Summary
A_USER.KEYPAD Usage of the integrated keypad to enter the authentication data.
A_USER.LED Verification of LEDs while entering the PIN.
A_USER.SEAL Observation of the security seal.
A_USER.STORE Communication of rules for the handling of PIN and smart card.
A_USER.USAGE Responsible usage of the TOE in the designated environment.
A_USER.ISO_EMV Usage of smart cards that are compliant to the ISO [14] – and EMV
[15] - Standard.
A_USER.FWLOAD Download of certified firmware only.
A_USER.SIG_APP Application of the TOE for qualified electronic signatures only together
with evaluated and confirmed signature application components.
Table 5: Assumptions about the operational environment of the TOE
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
smart card reader SPR532, firmware version 5.09
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW Smart card reader SPR532
with serial RS232 and USB
cable connector
Part number
904712
packed in a blister foil bag
2 SW Firmware 5.09 • together with the hardware
• on the installation CD-ROM
(see below)
• download from
http://scmmicro.com/security
/pcs_product_drivers.html
3 DOC User manual (english) 1.22 pdf-document or printed form
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0363-2006 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
4 DOC Bedienungsanleitung
(german)
1.21 pdf-document or printed form
5 DOC SPR532 DLL API Document 1.5 pdf-document
6 DOC/S
W
Installation CD including the
software to check the version
number of the firmware and
to conduct the firmware
download
CD-ROM
Table 6: Deliverables of the TOE
The content of the installation CD (no. 6 in Table 6) apart from the items 2, 3,
and 4 mentioned in Table 6 is not part of the evaluation and thus not included in
this certificate.
2.1 Delivery of the firmware including the hardware
Every reader is packed seperately in a blister foil bag that is closed with a
yellow sticker. From the production site the readers are delivered in bulk cartons
either directly to the customer or to subcontractors of the vendor. The
subcontractors arrange the single readers into end user packages according to
the requirements of the customer. Each end user package will contain at least
the installation CD including the deliverables 2, 3 and 4 listed in Table 6. The
deliverable no. 5 in Table 6 is only intended for application developers. This
document is available upon request from the vendor.
The end user can clearly identify the TOE by the part number 904712 printed on
the bottom label of the TOE. Furthermore, the bottom label shows the id of the
certification procedure (BSI-DSZ-CC-0363) that allows the end user to retrieve
the certification report from the web-pages of BSI. The next figure shows an
example of the label with the part number encircled.
Figure 1: Example of bottom label
2.2 Delivery of the firmware without hardware
In addition to the delivery of the TOE including the hardware it is possible to
download the new firmware version alone together with the Windows tools
(USB, RS232) for the firmware update from the internet side
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0363-2006
http://scmmicro.com/security/pcs_product_drivers.html. In this case, the items
2, 3, and 4 of Table 6 belong to the TOE.
The TOE contains a functionality that can be used to update already delivered
smart card readers SPR532 to new firmware version. This functionality consists
of the mathematical verification of the signature of the firmware during the
upload of a new version to guarantee the integrity and authenticity of the
certified firmware. As the part number 904712 mentioned in Table 6 refers only
to newly produced smart card readers SPR532 with the firmware 5.09, the part
number of smart card readers to be updated to the new firmware version is
typically different. The combination of the certified firmware version 5.09 with
smart card readers labelled with the following part numbers is also included in
this certificate:
• smart card reader SPR532 labelled with the part number 903391 and
certified with the certification id TUVIT-DSZ-CC-9209
The information regarding the certification id and the part number is always
printed on a bottom label of a smart card reader similar to the one shown in
Figure 1. For details on the different deliverables refer to chapter 2.
3 Security Policy
The TOE is intended to be used for the application of qualified electronic
signatures according to the German Signature Law ([8]). To apply a qualified
electronic signature, a signatory must authenticate himself by possession of a
secure signature creation device and knowledge of the signature PIN.
Consequently, the security policy of the TOE focusses on the protection of the
firmware, the signature PIN and the integrity of the hardware.
The security objectives of the TOE are the non-proliferation of the PIN apart
from passing it to the smart card, the integrity-protection of the firmware and the
signalling of manipulation of the hardware.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions already listed in Table 5 in a short form are presented here as
an excerpt from the Security Target.
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4.1 Usage assumptions
Assumption Summary
A_USER.VERSION It is assumed that the user verifies routinely with a software tooll
provided by the manufacturer, whether the version number of the TOE
agrees with the confirmed version, before use of the smart card reader.
A_USER.UNOBSERV The user must enter his or her identification data unobserved.
A_USER.KEYPAD It is assumed that the user enters his or her identification data using
the keypad of the TOE.
A_USER.LED While the PIN is being entered on the keypad of the reader, the status
of the LED verifies that the mode of the secure PIN input is active.
A_USER.SEAL The user routinely has to examine that the security seal is intact.
A_USER.STORE The rules to the secure keeping and non-proliferation of the PIN are
communicated to the user by the publisher of the smart card.
A_USER.USAGE The TOE is laid out for use in private and office environments. In an
office environment, the SPR532 smart card reader should be arranged
in such a way that the usage is avoided by unauthorized users. That
means that the smart card reader is set up in such a manner that its
usage is possible for authorized persons only and that a working
environment protected from manipulation attempts has to be
guaranteed. An unobserved input of identification data (PIN) is to be
ensured by suitable measures at the place of work.
A_USER.ISO_EMV For applications requesting a secure PIN input the user has to use only
processor smart cards compliant to ISO 7816 [14] or EMV [15].
A_USER.FWLOAD The user may download firmware versions of the TOE from the Internet
site of the manufacturer, the supplier or the distributor as well as from
intranet sites of a company. It is assumed that it is clearly
communicated during the download of the firmware from an external
source, whether or not the firmware is CC certified. It is assumed that
the user will download CC certified firmware versions only. It is
assumed that the user knows that he or she will loose the CC certified
and SigG/SigV confirmed status of the product, if he or she downloads
any non CC certified firmware version to the TOE.
Table 7: Usage Assumptions
4.2 Environmental assumptions
Assumption Summary
A_USER.SIG_APP It is assumed that for the use of the TOE in accordance with
SigG/SigV, only applications and smart cards that were evaluated and
confirmed in the SigG context are used.
Table 8: Environmental assumptions
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0363-2006
4.3 Clarification of scope
Threats that are only countered by settings in the IT-environment were not
detected in course of the evaluation and thus not depicted in the Security
Target. Nevertheless, the assumptions listed in Table 7 and Table 8 support the
TOE to reach its security objectives and assist the security functions to counter
the threats mentioned in chapter 1.4.
For a more detailed description of the security function, security functions and a
rationale how the single threats are countered by the combination of
assumptions and security functions see the Security Target [6].
5 Architectural Information
The TOE comprises hard- and software and is delivered either as a complete
smart card reader or as a firmware version alone (see chapter 2). Apart from
the security sealing the hardware does not provide any security relevant
features and can be separated as follows:
• Microcontroller with internal volatile and non-volatile memory, USB-controller
and smart card controller
• USB-interface or RS232-interface including cable and connector
• display unit consistings of LEDs in different colors
• smart card interface
The firmware that provides the main security functions is composed of different
subsystems. These subsystems and their functionality are listed in the next
table.
Subsystem Description
USB SUBSYSTEM This subsystem manages and implements all functions relating to
the processing of the standard USB commands, and the host
specific secure and non-secure commands.
RS232 SUBSYSTEM This subsystem manages and implements all functions relating to
the processing of the host specific secure and non-secure
commands.
CCID SUBSYSTEM This subsystem shall process the CCID messages received from
the USB/RS232 subsystems.
SMARTOS SUBSYSTEM This subsystem implements functions that manage the smart card
specifics for the host interface subsystems like USB, RS232.
SECUREPINPAD
SUBSYSTEM
This subsystem processes different CCID messages. It handles
the user PIN entry, formatting of the PIN to the appropriate PIN
format type selected and dispatches accordingly.
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Subsystem Description
SECUREDOWNLOAD
SUBSYSTEM
This subsystem mainly implements the SF3 SECDOWNLOAD
security function.
Table 9: Architectural description of the firmware
6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided for the end customer:
• “Klasse-2-Chipkarten-Leser SPR532 Bedienungsanleitung”, version 1.21,
03/04/2006
• “Class 2 Smart Card Reader SPR532 User Manual”, version 1.22,
03/22/2006
• SPR532 DLL API Documentation, version 1.5, 04/25/2006
Other documentation relevant for this certification procedure is listed in chapter
14.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer tests
The manufacturer tests were executed with smart card readers SPR532 with
the part number (P/N) 904712 and 903391 and the firmware version 5.09 as
defined in the Security Target [6].
For the tests the TOE is operated at an IBM compatible PC system with a 32 bit
Microsoft Windows operating system. In accordance with the test strategy of the
manufacturer the scheduled functional tests are to show the compliance of the
TOE with the security functions described in the functional specification.
The tests were executed and documented related to the security functions. A
test plan was created that includes the following items for every test:
• The goal of the single test
• The expected test result
• The description how to execute the tests
• The actual test result.
As the test coverage analysis is proving, the manufacturer tested the TOE
systematically on the level of the security functionalities from the functional
specification and the subsystems of the high level design.
The manufacturer specified functional tests for every security function. For all
tests, the expected test results matched with the actual results. No faults were
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discovered and no differences occurred concerning the described security
functionality. Consequently all security functions were tested successfully.
7.2 Evaluator tests
Independent testing of the evaluators was performed with the smart card
readers SPR532 with the part number 904712 and 903391 in combination with
the firmware version 5.09. For the tests the TOE was operated at an IBM
compatible laptop with a 32 bit Microsoft Windows operating system.
In accordance with the test strategy of the evaluator the scheduled independent
tests of the TOE are to show the fulfillment of the functional security
requirements in accordance with the Security Target and the compliance with
the described security functionality in the functional specification. Furthermore
all subsystems and interfaces are to be included in the tests in accordance with
the high level design.
For every test a test plan is created with the test goal, the used test
configuration, the described method of testing, the expected test results and the
actual test results.
The Evaluator selected and tested a sample from the manufacturer tests of the
security functions of the TOE. The sample of the Evaluator covers all security
functions of the TOE and considered the characteristics in accordance with the
functional specification. These test cases address both the normal process of
the secure pin entry and different kinds of fault situation.
The actual results matched with the expected results. No faults were discovered
and no differences occurred concerning the described security functionality. All
security functions could consequently be tested successfully.
7.3 Penetration tests
The evaluators searched for vulnerabilities by means of manufacturer
documents and test reports as well as the guidelines mentioned in the CEM [2]
and AIS 34 [4]. The evaluator also examined the security measure sealing of
the TOE with regard to the attachment and positioning of the seals for
vulnerabilities. By conducting the tests identified in the test concept the
evaluators examined the complete and correct implementation of the security
functions and searched for hidden functions or further commands.
During penetration testing the security functions of the TOE worked as
specified. Furthermore the penetration tests showed that it was not possible to
remove the security sealing without destroying it. Any vulnerabilities detected by
the evaluators were not exploitable in the intended environment. According to
the misuse analysis, no insecure state was detected.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The tests of the developer and the evaluator were conducted with devices equal
to those that can be purchased by the end user.
This certificate extends only to the following tested and evaluated version of the
TOE:
smart card reader SPR532, firmware version 5.09
The sites for the development of the firmware and the final assembly of the TOE
constitute an integral part of this evaluation. Thus it is compulsory that the TOE
is developed and manufactured by
• SCM Microsystems (India) Pvt. Ltd, Chennai, India and
• PT BESA Engineering, P. Batam, Indonesia.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL3+. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]).
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL3
augmented by ADO_DEL.2, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_LLD.1, ALC_TAT.1,
AVA_MSU.3, AVA_VLA.4) are summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Authorisation controls ACM_CAP.3 PASS
TOE CM coverage ACM_SCP.1 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Informal functional specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Subset of the implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_MSU.3 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Highly resistant AVA_VLA.4 PASS
Table 10: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 conformant
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL3
augmented by ADO_DEL.2, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_LLD.1, ALC_TAT.1,
AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for
(i) the TOE Security Function SF.SECDOWN (SF.3)
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the smart card reader
SPR532, firmware version 5.09 (see chapter 2 for the identification of the TOE).
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The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational documents [10] - [12] contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In
addition to that the Security Target [6] contains information that may be useful
for the customer.
The security function SF.SECDOWN (SF.3) is based on the algorithms RSA-
1024 and SHA-1 that the Bundesnetzagentur considers to be suitable for the
creation of qualified electronic signatures. The algorithms must be replaced as
soon as the chosen parameters or implemention reveal any vulnerability and
are there therefore not suitable to guarantee the integrity and authenticity of the
firmware anymore. According to the assessement of the Bundesnetzagentur
[18] the algorithm RSA-1024 is valid until the end of 2007, and the hash function
SHA-1 may be used only until the end of 2009 for the creation of qualified
electronic signatures. At the latest if the validity period for one of these
algorithms expires a replacement with stronger algorithms is recommended.
11 Annexes
None.
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [6] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CCID Chip Card Interface Device
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ICC Integrated Chip Card
IT Information Technology
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PIN Personal Identification Number
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
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SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0363-2006, Version 1.21, 06/06/2006, Security
Target to reach the evaluation level Common Criteria EAL3+ for the class
2 smart card reader SPR532, SCM Microsystems
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, 1.4, 10/20/2006, CC Evaluation of
SmartCardReader SPR532 (confidential document)
[8] Gesetz über Rahmenbedingungen für elektronische Signaturen
(Signaturgesetz – SigG) in der Fassung vom 16.05.2001 (BGBl. volume
2001 part I No. 22 p. 876)
[9] Verordnung zur elektronischen Signatur (Signaturverordnung – SigV) in
der Fassung vom 16.11.2001 (BGBl. volume 2001 part I No. 59 p. 3074)
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[10] Klasse-2-Chipkarten-Leser SPR532 Bedienungsanleitung, Version 1.21,
03/04/2006, SCM Microsystems GmbH
[11] Class 2 Smart Card Reader SPR532 User Manual, Version 1.22,
03/23/2006, SCM Microsystems GmbH
[12] SPR532 DLL API Document, Version 1.5, 04/25/2006, SCM
Microsystems GmbH
[13] Device Class Specification for USB Chip/Smart Card Interface Devices,
Revision 1.00, March 20, 2001
[14] DIN ISO 7816 - 1 Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with
contacts – Physical Characteristics
DIN ISO 7816 - 2 Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with
contacts - Dimensions and locations of the contacts
DIN ISO 7816 - 3 Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with
contacts - electrical characteristics and transmission protocols
DIN ISO 7816 - 4 Information technology - Identification cards -
Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts - Inter - industry commands for
interchange
DIN ISO 7816 – 8 Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with
contacts – Security related interindustry commands
[15] EMV 2000 Book 1 - Application independent ICC to Terminal Interface
requirements, Version 4.0, December 2000
[16] Anwendungsunabhängiges CardTerminal Application Programming
Interface (CT-API) für Chipkartenanwendungen, Revision 1.1,
10/14/1998
[17] Interoperability Specification for ICCs and Personal Computer Systems,
PC/SCWorkgroup, Version 1.0, Dezember 1997
[18] Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz
und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen), 02.
Januar 2006, published 23. March 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger No. 58,
S. 1913-1915
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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