National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Infinera Corporation Transcend Network
Management System Server 18.10.3
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-11319-2022
Dated: December 12, 2022
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
Infinera Corporation Transcend Network Validation Report Version 1.0, December 12, 2022
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Sheldon Durrant
Lauren Hardy
Randy Heimann
Linda Morrison
Clare Parran
The MITRE Corporation
Farid Ahmed
Russell Fink
Anne Gugel
Michael Smeltzer
Richard (Rip) Toren
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Raymond Smoley
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.............................................................................................................. 1
2 Identification......................................................................................................................... 2
3 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope................................................................................. 3
4 Architectural Information..................................................................................................... 4
4.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms............................................................................................. 4
4.2 TOE Architecture ......................................................................................................... 4
4.3 Physical Boundaries ..................................................................................................... 5
5 Security Policy...................................................................................................................... 6
5.1 Cryptographic support.................................................................................................. 6
5.2 User data protection...................................................................................................... 6
5.3 Security management ................................................................................................... 6
5.4 Privacy.......................................................................................................................... 6
5.5 Protection of the TSF.................................................................................................... 7
5.6 Trusted path/channels................................................................................................... 7
6 Documentation ..................................................................................................................... 8
7 Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................................... 9
8 IT Product Testing.............................................................................................................. 10
8.1 Developer Testing ...................................................................................................... 10
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing....................................................................... 10
9 Results of the Evaluation.................................................................................................... 11
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).................................................................... 11
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)...................................................................... 11
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)......................................................... 11
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)............................................. 12
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)......................... 12
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN) ................................................................ 12
9.1 Summary of Evaluation Results ................................................................................. 14
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations............................................................................ 15
11 Annexes .............................................................................................................................. 16
12 Security Target ................................................................................................................... 17
13 Glossary.............................................................................................................................. 18
14 Bibliography....................................................................................................................... 19
List of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers ..................................................................................................... 2
Table 2: Glossary........................................................................................................................ 18
Infinera Corporation Transcend Network Validation Report Version 1.0, December 12, 2022
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)
Validation team of the evaluation of Infinera Transcend Network Management System Server
solution provided by Infinera Corporation. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications,
and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of
Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common Criteria
Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was completed in
December 2022. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical
Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security Solutions. The
evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3
Extended and meets the assurance requirements of the Protection Profile for Application
Software, Version 1.4, 07 October 2021 (ASPP14) with the Functional Package for Transport
Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019 (PKGTLS11) and the Functional Package for
SSH, Version 1.0, 13 May 2021 (SSH10).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infinera Corporation Transcend Network Management
System Server 18.10.3. The TOE identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of
the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of
the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The Validation team monitored the activities of the Evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and successive
versions of the ETR. The Validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product
satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security
Target (ST). Therefore, the Validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are
accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of
the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Infinera Corporation
Transcend Network Management System Server 18.10.3 Security Target, version 1.5, December
9, 2022 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment
Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The TOE: the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The ST, describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Infinera Transcend Network Management System Server 18.10.3
Protection Profile Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, 07 October 2021
(ASPP14) with the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS),
Version 1.1, 01 March 2019 (PKGTLS11) and the Functional Package for SSH,
Version 1.0, 13 May 2021 (SSH10)
ST Infinera Corporation Transcend Network Management System Server 18.10.3
Security Target, version 1.5, December 9, 2022
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Infinera Corporation Transcend Network
Management System Server 18.10.3, version 0.3, December 9, 2022
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended, CC Part 3 Extended
Sponsor Infinera Corporation
Developer Infinera Corporation
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Sheldon Durrant, Lauren Hardy, Randy Heimann, Linda Morrison, Clare Parran,
Anne Gugel, Farid Ahmed, Michael Smeltzer, Russel Fink, Richard Toren
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
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3 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, 07 October 2021 (ASPP14)
• Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019
(PKGTLS11)
• Functional Package for SSH, Version 1.0, 13 May 2021 (SSH10)
That information has not been reproduced here and the ASPP14/PKGTLS11/SSH10 should be
consulted if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
ASPP14/PKGTLS11/SSH10 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions
can be drawn about their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities
specified in the Application Software Protection Profile with the TLS Package and SSH
Package and performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific
Software Application models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and
therefore should not to be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as
evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that
were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM
defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of
understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the ASPP14/PKGTLS11/SSH10 and applicable Technical Decisions. Any
additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this
evaluation.
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4 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the Security
Target.
The Transcend Network Management System (TNMS) is designed to provide end-to-end
network and service management across multiple technologies and equipment vendors. For
purposes of this evaluation, the TNMS Server is a software application that accepts management
instructions via secure communication with a TNMS Client and then securely transfers
management instructions to configured network entities.
Note that the full TNMS system consists of client and server components, this evaluation is
limited only to the server components since the Protection Profile for Application Software,
Version 1.4, 07 October 2021 (ASPP14) does not support the evaluation of distributed
application solutions.
4.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 7 below.
4.2 TOE Architecture
Software Requirements:
The TNMS Server is a pair of Java applications designed to run in the following operational
environment:
• Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 7.9 (64 bit) / CentOS 7.9 (64 bit) on a 64 bit Intel Xeon
processor
• Amazon Corretto (OpenJDK) JDK/JRE 11.0.6
The TNMS Server TOE includes the following components that are co-located (and are depicted
in Figure 1 below):
• Server component: The server component of the TNMS Server implements a TLS server
that accepts TLS connections from a TNMS Client, operates on instructions sent from the
TNMS Client and then uses mediator APIs as necessary to communicate with network
entities to implement those instructions.
• Mediator component: The mediator component of the TNMS Server offers APIs used by
the server component that enable it to securely communicate, using SSH (Java Secure
Channel - JSch) as a client, with configured network entities via the mediator.
The TOE components communicate with each other through inter-process communication. The
secure communication features all utilize Bouncy Castle (installed with the TNMS Server) for
cryptographic operations.
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TOE Architecture
4.3 Physical Boundaries
The TNMS Server TOE is a pair of Java applications (server and mediator) running on Amazon
Corretto (OpenJDK) JDK/JRE version 11.0.6 operating in a RHEL / CentOS 7.9 (64 bit)
environment. The only external services the TOE depends on are a Certificate Authority for
X509 certificate validation services, the TNMS Client with which the TNMS Server is
configured to work, an Oracle database (that is installed on the same host platform and accessed
locally), and network entities that are managed by the TNMS via secure communication from the
mediator application.
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5 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Security management
4. Privacy
5. Protection of the TSF
6. Trusted path/channels
5.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE uses Automated Cryptographic Validation Test System (ACVTS)-validated
cryptographic algorithm implementations, provided by the Bouncy Castle cryptographic module
installed with the TOE, to support asymmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, signature
generation and verification and establishment of trusted channels to protect data in transit. The
TOE implements a TLS server to securely communicate with a TNMS Client, implements a SSH
client to securely communicate with managed network entities, and implements functionality to
securely store key data related to secure communications. The TOE also relies on the underlying
Java platform to generate entropy that is used as input data for the TOE’s deterministic random
bit generator (DRBG).
5.2 User data protection
The TOE does not access any hardware resources or sensitive information repositories other than
network access. No sensitive data outside of secure credentials is stored in non-volatile memory.
Inbound and outbound network communications are restricted to those that are TOE-initiated to
configured network elements, responding to incoming TNMS Clients TLS connections for
remote management, and checking for updates.
5.3 Security management
After installation, an administrator manages the TOE through a TNMS client, and the TOE stores
administrator configurations in its database stored in the platform file system.
When configured with default credentials or no credentials, the TOE restricts its functionality
and only allows the ability to set new credentials. By default, the TOE is configured with file
permissions to protect itself and its data from unauthorized access.
5.4 Privacy
The TOE does not transmit personally identifiable information (PII) over any network interfaces.
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5.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects itself against exploitation by implementing address space layout randomization
(ASLR) and by not allocating any memory region for both write and execute permission. The
TOE uses standard platform APIs and includes a number of third party libraries used to perform
its functions.
The TOE includes mechanisms to check for updates and to query the current version of the
application software. TOE software is digitally signed and distributed using the platform-
supported package manager. The TOE does not update its own binary code in any way and when
removed, all traces of the TOE application software are deleted.
5.6 Trusted path/channels
The TOE protects communications between itself and managed network entities using SSH and
between itself and the TNMS Client using TLS.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Infinera Transcend Network Management System Server 18.10.3 Administrative
Guidance for Common Criteria, Version 1.1, December 6, 2022
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied upon when
configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified
in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to download the
configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated.
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7 Evaluated Configuration
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Transcend Network Management System (TNMS) Server
version 18.10.3. The TNMS Server is a pair of Java applications designed to run in the following
operational environment:
• Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 7.9 (64 bit) / CentOS 7.9 (64 bit) on a 64-bit Intel
Xeon processor
• Amazon Corretto (OpenJDK) JDK/JRE 11.0.6
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is derived
from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Infinera Corporation
Transcend Network Management System Server, Version 0.3, December 9, 2022 (DTR), as
summarized in the evaluation Assurance Activity Report (AAR).
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The Evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the ASPP14/PKGTLS11/SSH10 including the tests
associated with optional requirements. The AAR, in sections 1.1 lists the tested devices, provides
a list of test tools, and has diagrams of the test environment.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented
in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all assurance
activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding Evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 Rev 5. The evaluation determined the Transcend Network
Management System Server TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the
ASPP14/PKGTLS11/SSH10.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Infinera Transcend Network Management System
Server 18.10.3 product that is consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The Validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
Evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The Evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The Evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in
the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the Evaluators performed the
assurance activities specified in the ASPP14/PKGTLS11/SSH10 related to the examination of
the information contained in the TSS.
The Validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
Evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The Evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
Evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing phases
of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
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The Validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
Evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The Evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The Evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The Validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the Evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
Evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The Evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the assurance activities in the ASPP14/PKGTLS11/SSH10 and recorded the results
in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The Validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
Evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The Evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the Evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a
public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
The Evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) on 12/01/2022 with the following search terms:
• Infinera
• Infinera Corporation
• Transcend Network
Management
System
• TNMS
• ASM
• AXL Software Radius
• Angular
• Animal Sniffer
Annotations
• Apache ActiveMQ
• Apache Commons
• Apache Groovy
• Apache HttpClient
• Apache
HttpComponents
Core
• Apache Kafka
• Apache Log4j
• Apache Tomcat
• Apache XML
• Apache Xalan
• Apache Xerces2
• log4j
• AspectJ
• AsyncHttpClient
• AutoValue
Annotations
• Avalon Framework
• Bouncy Castle TLS
• Batik
• Bootstrap (Twitter)
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• Bouncy Castle
• CDIs
• Castor
• Checker Qual
• Common
Annotations
• Dagger
• Db4o
• Disruptor
• Elsa Serialization
• Expression Language
• Extended StAX
• FindBugs jsr305
• GeoServer
• Goldman Sachs
• Gson
• Guice
• Guava
• H2 Database Engine
• Hamcrest
• HawtJNI Runtime
• Hibernate
• HyperSQL Database
Engine
• Install Anywhere
• J2EE Connector
Architecture
• J2EE Management
• J2ObjC Annotations
• JAVAX RMI
• JAXB
Implementation
• JAXB Runtime
• JBoss EJB client
• JBoss Logging
• JBoss Marshalling
• JBoss Remoting
• JBoss classfilewriter
• JCL 1.2 Implemented
Over SLF4J
• JDOM
• JFreeChart
• JFreeReport
• JFtp
• JGraphT
• JSON Web Token
• JSch
• JUL to SLF4J bridge
• JUnit
• JZlib
• JacORB
• Jackson
• Jakarta Annotations
• Jakarta JCS
• Jakarta XML
• Jansi
• Java Architecture for
XML Binding
• Java
Communications
• Java DMK
• Java Mail
• Java Servlet
• Java gRPC
• Java inject from the
JSR-330 Expert
Group
• Java Interceptors
• JavaBeans Activation
• JavaHelp
• JavaServer Pages
TagLib
Implementation
• Java Authentication
and Authorization
Service
• Javassist
• Jcommander
• Jetbrains
• Jline
• Jscape
• Koloboke Collections
• Kotlin Stdlib
• MapStruct
• Metrics Core
• Metrics Integration
• ModeShape
• Monfox TL1
• Netty Project
• OW2 Utilities
• OpenCensus
• OpenFusion CORBA
Services
• Openmap
• Oracle Database
JDBC Drivers
• Oracle Deinstallation
• Oracle Fast Infoset
• Oracle iStack
• Picocli
• Protocol Buffer Java
• Protocol Buffers
• Quartz
• Querydsl
• Reactor
Components
• Remoting-jmx
• SLF4J
• SNMP4J
• SmoothieMap
• SnakeYAML
• Spring
• Spring Boot
• Spring Framework
• Spring Security
• Stax2
• Stormpot
• Super CSV
• TXW Runtime
• Thymeleaf
• Trove for Java
• Tyrex
• Undertow Core
• VT Crypt
• VT Dictionary
• VT Password
• Weld Core
• Wildfly
• Woodstox
• XML Commons
External
Components XML
Extensions
• Xerces
• XmlSchema Core
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• aosphere-cdi
• aosphere-runtime
• aosphere-socketio
• cglib
• codegen
• perfmark
• reflections
• JBoss Marshalling
river
• spring-boot-actuator
• swingx
• syslog4j
• thymeleaf-extras-
springsecurity4
• thymeleaf-layout-
dialect
• thymeleaf-spring4
• ucp
• unbescape
• wasync
• webdavlib
• wildfly-common
• xenocom
• concurrent
• com.typesafe:config
• dom4j
• edtFTPj
• error-prone
annotations
• exp4j
• fast-serialization
• google-gson
• image4j
• grpc-context
• istack commons
• jQuery
• jacorb
• javax.ejb
• javax.transaction
• jgraph
• jgraphx
• jmxremote_optional
repackaged as
module
• jmxtrans
• jt-classbreaks
• kotlin-argparser
• mysema-commons-
lang
• level db
• logkit
• net.sourceforge.stre
amsupport:java9-
concurrent-backport
• objenesis
• ognl
• ojdbc
• ojdbc8
• xnio-api.
The Validators reviewed the work of the Evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
Evaluation team was justified.
9.1 Summary of Evaluation Results
The Evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the
ST are met. Additionally, the Evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the
claims in the ST.
The Validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the Evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the Evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly
verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The Validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Infinera Transcend Network
Management System Server 18.10.3 Administrative Guidance for Common Criteria, Version
1.1, December 6, 2022. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later were
evaluated.
Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was
not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by devices in the
operational environment, need to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be
drawn about their effectiveness.
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11 Annexes
Not applicable
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12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Infinera Corporation Transcend Network Management
System Server 18.10.3 Security Target, Version 1.5, December 9, 2022.
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
Term Definition
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) An IT security evaluation facility accredited by
the National Voluntary Laboratory
Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved
by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct
Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Conformance The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous
way that a given implementation is correct with
respect to the formal model.
Evaluation The assessment of an IT product against the
Common Criteria using the Common Criteria
Evaluation Methodology to determine whether
or not the claims made are justified; or the
assessment of a protection profile against the
Common Criteria using the Common
Evaluation Methodology to determine if the
Profile is complete, consistent, technically
sound and hence suitable for use as a statement
of requirements for one or more TOEs that may
be evaluated.
Evaluation Evidence Any tangible resource (information) required
from the sponsor or developer by the evaluator
to perform one or more evaluation activities.
Feature Part of a product that is either included with the
product or can be ordered separately.
Target of Evaluation (TOE) A group of IT products configured as an IT
system, or an IT product, and associated
documentation that is the subject of a security
evaluation under the CC.
Validation The process carried out by the CCEVS
Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
Validation Body A governmental organization responsible for
carrying out validation and for overseeing the
day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme.
Table 2: Glossary
Infinera Corporation Transcend Network Validation Report Version 1.0, December 12, 2022
Management System Server 18.10.3
19
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction
and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, 07 October 2021 (ASPP14).
[5] Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019
(PKGTLS11).
[6] Functional Package for SSH, Version 1.0, 13 May 2021.
[7] Infinera Corporation Transcend Network Management System Server 18.10.3 Security
Target, Version 1.5, December 9, 2022 (ST).
[8] Assurance Activity Report for Infinera Corporation Transcend Network Management
System Server 18.10.3, Version 0.3, December 9, 2022 (AAR).
[9] Detailed Test Report for Infinera Corporation Transcend Network Management System
Server 18.10.3, Version 0.3, December 9, 2022 (DTR).
[10] Evaluation Technical Report for Infinera Corporation Transcend Network Management
System Server, Version 0.3, December 9, 2022 (ETR)
[11] Infinera Transcend Network Management System Server 18.10.3 Administrative
Guidance for Common Criteria, Version 1.1, December 6, 2022 (AGD).