BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024
for
IFX_CCI_00006Ah, IFX_CCI_00006Bh,
IFX_CCI_00006Ch design step S12 with firmware
80.311.04.1, optional NRG™ SW v05.03.4097,
optional HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib v01.30.0695,
optional SCL v2.15.000, optional ACL v3.34.000,
optional ACL v3.35.001, optional RCL v1.10.007,
optional HCL v1.13.002 and user guidance
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.47
BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024 (*)
Smartcard Controller
IFX_CCI_00006Ah, IFX_CCI_00006Bh, IFX_CCI_00006Ch design step
S12 with firmware 80.311.04.1, optional NRG™ SW v05.03.4097,
optional HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib v01.30.0695, optional SCL
v2.15.000, optional ACL v3.34.000, optional ACL v3.35.001, optional
RCL v1.10.007, optional HCL v1.13.002 and user guidance
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
valid until: 27 August 2028
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bonn, 1 October 2024
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Director-General
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result................................................................................8
6. Publication...................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy...........................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................15
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................17
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................17
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................27
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................28
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................28
13. Definitions................................................................................................................28
14. Bibliography.............................................................................................................30
C. Excerpts from the Criteria.............................................................................................32
D. Annexes........................................................................................................................33
5 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
6 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
The certification was conducted by invoking the CCRA CC:2022 transition policy,
specifically the exception mechanism for prolonged issuance of CC 3.1 R5 certificates.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
7 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IFX_CCI_00006Ah, IFX_CCI_00006Bh, IFX_CCI_00006Ch design step S12
with firmware 80.311.04.1, optional NRG™ SW v05.03.4097, optional HSL v3.52.9708,
UMSLC lib v01.30.0695, optional SCL v2.15.000, optional ACL v3.34.000, optional ACL
v3.35.001, optional RCL v1.10.007, optional HCL v1.13.002 and user guidance has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product IFX_CCI_00006Ah, IFX_CCI_00006Bh, IFX_CCI_00006Ch
design step S12 with firmware 80.311.04.1, optional NRG™ SW v05.03.4097, optional
HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib v01.30.0695, optional SCL v2.15.000, optional ACL
v3.34.000, optional ACL v3.35.001, optional RCL v1.10.007, optional HCL v1.13.002 and
user guidance was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 25 September 2024. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
8 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024 Certification Report
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 1 October
2024 is valid until 27 August 2028. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product IFX_CCI_00006Ah, IFX_CCI_00006Bh, IFX_CCI_00006Ch design step S12
with firmware 80.311.04.1, optional NRG™ SW v05.03.4097, optional HSL v3.52.9708,
UMSLC lib v01.30.0695, optional SCL v2.15.000, optional ACL v3.34.000, optional ACL
v3.35.001, optional RCL v1.10.007, optional HCL v1.13.002 and user guidance has been
included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-15
85579 Neubiberg
9 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
10 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00006Ah,
IFX_CCI_00006Bh, IFX_CCI_00006Ch design step S12 with firmware 80.311.04.1,
optional NRG™ SW v05.03.4097, optional HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib v01.30.0695,
optional SCL v2.15.000, optional ACL v3.34.000, optional ACL v3.35.001, optional RCL
v1.10.007, optional HCL v1.13.002 and user guidance.
The TOE provides a 32-bit ARMv7-M CPU-architecture. The major components of the core
system are the CPU (Central Processing Unit), an MPU (Memory Protection Unit), a
Nested Vectored Interrupt Controller (NVIC), and an Instruction Stream Signature (ISS).
The dual interface controller is able to communicate using either the contact-based or the
contactless interface.
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particular security relevant applications
and as a developing platform for smart card operating systems. The term smartcard
embedded software is used in the following for all operating systems and applications
stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the smartcard embedded
software.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2.
Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_DPM Device Phase Management:
The life cycle of the TOE is split up into several phases. Different operation
modes help to protect the TOE during each phase of its lifecycle.
SF_PS Protection against Snooping:
The TOE uses various means to protect from snooping of memories and
busses and prevents single stepping.
SF_PMA Protection against Modifying Attacks:
This TOE implements protection against modifying attacks of memories,
alarm lines and sensors.
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks:
The memory model of the TOE provides two distinct, independent levels
and the possibility to define up to eight memory regions with different
access rights enforced by the Memory Protection Unit (MPU).
SF_CS Cryptographic Support:
The TOE is equipped with several hardware accelerators and software
modules to support the standard symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic
11 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
operations like RSA, EC, TDES, and AES. Additionally, the TOE is equipped
with a Hybrid Random Number Generator and a random crypto library
providing different modes of operation: hybrid random number generation,
true random number generation, and deterministic random number
generation. Furthermore, a hash crypto library provides SHA-1 and SHA-2
generation.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1.2. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IFX_CCI_00006Ah, IFX_CCI_00006Bh, IFX_CCI_00006Ch design step S12 with
firmware 80.311.04.1, optional NRG™ SW v05.03.4097, optional HSL v3.52.9708,
UMSLC lib v01.30.0695, optional SCL v2.15.000, optional ACL v3.34.000, optional
ACL v3.35.001, optional RCL v1.10.007, optional HCL v1.13.002 and user guidance
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1. HW IFX_CCI_00006Ah,
IFX_CCI_00006Bh,
IFX_CCI_00006Ch
S12 Postal transfer in cages as
complete modules, wafers, IC
cases or packages
2. FW Boot Software (BOS) 80.311.04.1 Stored on the delivered
hardware
3. FW Flash Loader (FL)
(optional)
v09.13.0006 Stored on the delivered
hardware
4. FW Performance Optimized Write
Scheme (POWS)
80.311.04.1 Stored on the delivered
hardware
5. FW Radio Frequency Application
Interface (RFAPI)
80.311.04.1 Stored on the delivered
hardware
6. SW NRG™ SW (optional) v05.03.4097 Secure download (L251 Library
File) via ishare.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
7. SW HSL (optional) v3.52.9708 Secure download (L251 Library
File) via ishare.
8. SW UMSLC v01.30.0695 Secure download (L251 Library
File) via ishare.
9. SW SCL (optional) v2.15.000 Secure download (L251 Library
File) via ishare.
10. SW ACL (optional) v3.34.000
v3.35.001
Secure download (L251 Library
File) via ishare.
11. SW RCL (optional) v1.10.007 Secure download (L251 Library
File) via ishare.
12. SW HCL (optional) v1.13.002 Secure download (L251 Library
File) via ishare.
13 DOC SLC39 32-bit Security Controller -
V23, Hardware Reference Manual
v2.0
2022-06-15
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
14 DOC SLx1/SLx3 (40 nm) Security
Controllers, Programmer’s
Reference Manual
v5.4
2022-12-21
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
15 DOC SLC39 32-bit Security Controller -
V23, Security Guidelines
v1.00-2942
2023-01-05
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
16 DOC SLx3 (40nm) Security Controllers,
Production and Personalization
Manual
v09.13
2023-02-01
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
17 DOC 32-bit Security Controller
Crypto2304T V3, User Manual
(optional)
v3.0
2024-06-21
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
18 DOC HSL for SLCx7 V23b, Hardware
Support Library (optional)
v3.52.9708
2022-06-22
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
19 DOC UMSLC library for SLCx7V23b User
Mode Security Life Control
v01.30.0695
2022-07-04
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
20 DOC SCL37-SCP-v440-C40 Symmetric
Crypto Library for SCP-v440
AES/DES/MAC (optional)
v2.15.000
2023-03-06
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
21 DOC ACL37-Crypto2304T-C40
Asymmetric Crypto Library for
Crypto2304T RSA/ECC/Toolbox
(optional)
v3.34.000
2024-08-16
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
22 Doc ACL37-Crypto2304T-C40
Asymmetric Crypto Library for
Crypto2304T RSA/ECC/Toolbox
(optional)
v3.35.001
2024-06-06
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
23 DOC RCL37-X-C40 Random Crypto
Library for SCP-v440 & RNG-v3
DRBG/HWRNG 32-bit Security
Controller, User interface manual
(optional)
v1.10.007
2020-06-16
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
13 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
24 DOC HCL37-CPU-C40 Hash Crypto
Library for CPU SHA 32-bit Security
Controller, User interface manual
(optional)
v1.13.002
2020-05-07
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
As the TOE is under control of the user software, the TOE Manufacturer can only
guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure. It is in the responsibility of the
Composite Product Manufacturer to include mechanisms in the implemented software
(developed by the IC Embedded Software Developer) which allows detection of
modifications after the delivery.
In detail, regarding identification:
The hexadecimal values listed behind the “IFX_CCI_” are part of the TOE name
IFX_CCI_00006Ah, IFX_CCI_00006Bh, IFX_CCI_00006Ch. These identifiers are used by
the developer only for this TOE. Different underlying basic hardware configurations are
achieved only by the means of blocking; the actual hardware is always present and thus
identical but may not be accessible to the user. The design step of the TOE is indicated by
byte 11 and 12 of the GCIM. The GCIM is described in [11, 5.6].
In addition to the hardware part, the TOE consists of firmware parts and software parts:
The firmware part of the TOE is identified also via the GCIM: Bytes 31 to 34 contain the
firmware identifier. The optional software consists of the libraries ACL, SCL, HSL, RCL,
HCL, and NRG. The UMSLC library is always part of the TOE.
These libraries are identified by their version numbers. The user can identify the versions
by calculating the hash value of the provided library files and compare them to the hash
values provided in [6] Chapter 9 – 15.
In detail, regarding delivery:
TOE Delivery is uniquely used to indicate
● after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) if the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn
wafers (dice) or,
● after Phase 4 (or before Phase 5) if the TOE is delivered in form of packaged
products.
According to the PP [8], chapter 1.2.3 the TOE or parts of it are delivered between the
following three parties:
● IC Embedded Software Developer,
● TOE Manufacturer (compromises all roles before TOE delivery),
● Composite Product Manufacturer (compromises all roles after TOE delivery except
the end consumer).
Therefore, three different delivery procedures have to be taken into consideration:
1. Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance)
from the TOE Manufacturer to the IC Embedded Software Developer.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024 Certification Report
2. Delivery of the IC Embedded Software (ROM / Flash data, initialisation and
prepersonalisation data) from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the TOE
Manufacturer.
3. Delivery of the final TOE from the TOE Manufacturer to the Composite Product
Manufacturer. After phase 3 the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers,
after phase 4 in form of modules (with or without inlay antenna).
The TOE is delivered via the logistics sites:
● DHL Singapore (Distribution Center Asia),
● KWE Shanghai,
● K&N Großostheim (Distribution Center Europe).
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application, thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithm (Triple-DES and AES) to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data
by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide different
random number generators.
The RSA library is used to provide a high-level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto@2304T and includes
countermeasures against SPA, DPA, and DFA attacks. The EC library is used to provide a
high-level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography implemented on the hardware
component Crypto@2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA, and DFA
attacks. The optional Hash Crypto Library provides a high-level interface for performing
cryptographic hash functions and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA, and DFA
attacks. The RCL provides a high-level interface for obtaining random data. This can be
deterministic data from an AES CTR_DRBG or non-deterministic data that is provided by
the underlying hardware. The RCL includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA, and DFA
attacks.
Besides that, the TOE can come with the optional Hardware Support Library (HSL)
providing a simplified interface for NVM management and provides the possibility to write
tearing safe into the NVM.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during AES, Triple-DES, RSA, and EC cryptographic functions
performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations, and against abuse of functionality. Hence, the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the
TOE, and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the
TOE.
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Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter
6 and 7 of the Security Target [6] and [9].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: OE.Resp-Appl, OE.Process-Sec-IC, OE.Lim_Block_Loader,
OE.Loader_Usage, OE.TOE_Auth, and OE.Prevent_Masquerade.
The objective OE.Resp-Appl states that the IC embedded software developer shall treat
user data (especially keys) of the composite product appropriately. The IC embedded
software developer gets sufficient information on how to protect user data adequately in
the security guidelines [13].
The ST includes the following security objectives for the operational environment, which
are relevant for the Composite Product Manufacturer: OE.Process-Sec-IC,
OE.Lim_Block_Loader, OE.Loader_Usage, OE.TOE_Auth, and OE.Prevent_Masquerade.
The objective OE.Process-Sec-IC requires the protection of the TOE, as well as of its
manufacturing and test data, up to the delivery to the end-consumer. As defined in [6],[9]
chapter 1.4.5, the TOE can be delivered to the composite product manufacturer after
phase 3 or after phase 4. However, the single chips are identical in all cases. This means
that the test mode is deactivated and the TOE is locked in the user mode. Therefore, it is
not necessary to distinguish between these forms of delivery. Since Infineon has no
information about the security requirements of the implemented IC embedded software, it
is not possible to define any concrete security requirements for the environment of the
composite product manufacturer.
The objective OE.TOE_Auth requires that the environment has to support the
authentication and verification mechanism and has to know the corresponding
authentication reference data. The composite product manufacturer receives sufficient
information with regard to the authentication mechanism in [14], chapter 2.1.5. Please note
that this objective is only valid in case the Flash Loader is ordered with mutual
authentication (i.e., option External Authentication is unavailable).
The objective OE.Prevent_Masquerade is valid in case the Flash Loader is ordered with
External Authentication (EA) instead of mutual authentication. In this case, customers
need to take care that no masquerading attacks can be performed. The objective replaces
OE.Prevent_Masquerade. A description of the External Authentication is given in [14]
chapter 2.1.5 and the ST highlights the risks of masquerading attacks when using this
order option of the flash loader:
The objective OE.Prevent_Masquerade requires measures by customers to ensure the
authenticity of the TOE.
The objective OE.Loader_Usage requires that the authorised user has to support the
trusted communication with the TOE by protecting the confidentiality and integrity of the
loaded data and he has to meet the access conditions defined by the flash loader. [14]
chapter 4 provides sufficient information regarding this topic.
The objective OE.Lim_Block_Loader requires the composite product manufacturer to
protect the loader against misuse, to limit the capability of the loader and to terminate the
loader irreversibly after the intended usage. The permanent deactivation of the flash loader
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024 Certification Report
is described in [14] chapter 2.1.2.2. This objective for the environment originates from the
“Package 1:Loader dedicated for usage in secured environment only”. However, this TOE
also implements “Package 2: Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only” and
thus the flash loader can also be used in an unsecure environment and is able to protect
itself against misuse if the authentication and download keys are handled appropriately.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE hardware consists basically of a core, a memory system, and peripherals. There
are two separate bus entities: a memory bus and a peripheral bus for high-speed
communication with the peripherals. In more detail, the TOE hardware can be further
divided into Major core components: CPU, MPU, NVIC,ISS, Memory system components:
ROM, Cache, RAM, NVM, ICS, Memory bus and peripherals such as SPAU, SCP,
RNG,CRC module.
Further, more detailed information is readily available in the Security Target [6] and [9]
Chapter 1.4.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into the following categories:
● Simulation Tests (Design Verification),
● Qualification/Verification Tests, and
● Production Tests.
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer by using the library of
programs, tools, and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluators or at the
developer’s site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment, and to verify
the tests performed by the developer. For the developer tests, repeated by the evaluators,
other test parameters were used and the test equipment was varied. Security features of
the TOE realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the evaluators
during layout inspections both in design data and on the final product.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing, the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
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the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities. The penetration tests considered
both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks, which do not modify the TOE
physically. The penetration test results confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with
high attack potential in the intended environment for the TOE.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● Smartcard IC IFX_CCI_00006Ah, IFX_CCI_00006Bh, IFX_CCI_00006Ch S12
(Global Foundries Fab 7)
Depending on the blocking configuration a product can have different user available
configuration by order or by BPU (please refer to [6] and [9] section 1.1, for an
identification of the components, which can be blocked via BPU).
As stated and detailed in the ETR [7], developer and evaluator tested the TOE in those
configurations/identifiers in which the TOE is delivered and which are described in the
Security Target [6] and [9].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 1,
Durchführungder Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers,
Version 14, 2017-10-11,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 14,
Anforderungenan Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für
Evaluationen nachCC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 2010-08-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 19,
Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation
Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 9, 2014-
11-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 20,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministischeZufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15, Herausgeber:
Zertifizierungsstelle des BSI im Rahmen des Zertifizierungsschemas,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 23,
Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler, Version 4, 2017-03-15,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 25, Anwendungen
derCC auf integrierte Schaltungen, Version 9, 2017-03-15,
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024 Certification Report
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 26,
Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen, Version 10,
2017-07-03,
● Special Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 1.4, 2011-06-
08,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 31,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS), AIS 32,
CCInterpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema, Version 7, 2011-06-08,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 34, Evaluation
Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CC v2.3 & v3.1) and EAL6 (CC
v3.1), Version 3, 2009-09-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 35, Öffentliche
Fassung eines Security Target (ST-lite), Version 2, 2007-11-12
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS
36,Kompositionsevaluierung, Version 5, 2017-03-15,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 37,
Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen, Version 3, 2010-05-
17,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 38, Reuse of
evaluation results, Version 2, 2007-09-28,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 41, Guidelines for
Pps and STs, Version 2, 2011-01-31,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 46,
Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende
Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-12-04,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 47,
Regelungen zu Site Certification, Version 1.1, 2013-12-04
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-
2014 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102 v
2022-01' (https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context)
only.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Stdandard of
Implementation
Key
Size in
Bits
Comments Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Symmetric Co-Processor (SCP)
1 Cryptographic
primitive
TDES [NIST SP800-67],
[ISO18033-3]
112,
168
- Yes (for |
k|=168
bit)
2 Cryptographic
primitive
AES [FIPS197],
[ISO18033-3]
128,
192,
256
- Yes
3 Confidentiality TDES #1 in ECB mode
for encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 112,
168
- No
4 Confidentiality TDES #1 in CBC
mode for encryption
and decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 112,
168
- Yes (for |
k|=168
bit)
5 Confidentiality #2 in ECB mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128,
192,
256
- No
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Stdandard of
Implementation
Key
Size in
Bits
Comments Security
Level
above
100 Bits
6 Confidentiality #2 in CBC mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128,
192,
256
- Yes
Symmetric Cryptographic Libraries
7 Cryptographic
primitive
TDES [NIST SP800-67] 112,
168
- Yes (for |
k|=168
bit)
8 Cryptographic
primitive
AES [FIPS197] 128,
192,
256
- Yes
9 Confidentiality #7 in ECB mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 112,
168
- No
10 Confidentiality #7 in CBC mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 112,
168
Yes (for |
k|=168
bit)
11 Confidentiality #7 in CTR mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 112,
168
Yes (for |
k|=168
bit)
12 Confidentiality #7 in CFB mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 112,
168
- Yes (for |
k|=168
bit)
13 Integrity
protection
#7 in CMAC mode for
MAC generation and
verification
[NIST SP800-38B] 112,
168
- Yes (for |
k|=168
bit)
14 Integrity
protection
#7 in Retail MAC
(Algorithm 3) for MAC
generation and
verification
[ISO9797-1] 112 - No
15 Confidentiality #8 in ECB mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128,
192,
256
- No
16 Confidentiality #8 in CBC mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128,
192,
256
- Yes
17 Confidentiality #8 in CTR mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128,
192,
256
- Yes
18 Confidentiality #8 in CFB mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128,
192,
256
- Yes
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Stdandard of
Implementation
Key
Size in
Bits
Comments Security
Level
above
100 Bits
19 Integrity
protection
#8 in CMAC mode for
MAC generation and
verification
[NIST SP800-38B] 128,
192,
256
- Yes
Asymmetric Cryptographic Library (ACL) v3.34.000 and v3.35.001
20 Confidentiality RSA Encryption [PKCS #1, 5.1.1]
[IEEE_P1363, 8.2.2]
512 –
4224
- 2048 bit
Sec.Lev.
> 100bit
21 Confidentiality RSA Decryption [PKCS #1, 5.1.2]
[IEEE_P1363,
8.2.1 (I) / 8.2.3]
512 –
2112
- 2048 bit
Sec.Lev.
> 100bit
22 Confidentiality RSA Decryption with
CRT
[PKCS #1, 5.1.2]
[IEEE_P1363,
8.2.1 (II) / 8.2.3]
512 –
4224
- 2048 bit
Sec.Lev.
> 100bit
23 Authenticity RSA Signature
generation
[PKCS #1, 5.2.1]
[IEEE_P1363,
8.2.1 (I) / 8.2.4]
512 –
2112
- 2048 bit
Sec.Lev.
> 100bit
24 Authenticity RSA Signature
generation with CRT
[PKCS #1, 5.2.1]
[IEEE_P1363,
8.2.1 (II) / 8.2.4]
512 –
4224
- 2048 bit
Sec.Lev.
> 100bit
25 Authenticity RSA Signature
verification
[PKCS #1, 5.2.2]
[IEEE_P1363, 8.2.5]
512 –
4224
- n/a
26 Key generation RSA key generation
returning CRT key
components dp, dq
and qinv (prime
generation not
included)
[PKCS #1, 3.1 / 3.2]
[IEEE_P1363, 8.1.3.
1]
512 –
4224
Method CRT <2048bit
No
>=2048bit
Yes
27 Key generation RSA key generation
returning key
representation n and d
(prime generation not
included)
[PKCS #1, 3.1 / 3.2]
[IEEE_P1363, 8.1.3.
1]
512 –
2112
Method n_d n/a
28 Key generation RSA key generation
returning key
representation p, q
and d (prime
generation included)
[IEEE_P1363, 8.1.3.
1]
512 –
2047
Method p_q_d;
Prime generation
method follows
[FIPS186-4,
B.3.3] with
random primes
instead of
“primes with
condition”
No
29 Key generation RSA key generation
returning key
representation p, q
[IEEE_P1363, 8.1.3.
1]
[FIPS186-4, B.3.3]
2048 –
2112
Method p_q_d Yes
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Stdandard of
Implementation
Key
Size in
Bits
Comments Security
Level
above
100 Bits
and d (prime
generation included)
30 Key agreement RSA Diffie-Hellman
(DH) key agreement
[FIPS186-4, 5.5]
[PKCS #1, 5.2.1 /
5.1.2] [IEEE_P1363,
8.2.4 / 8.2.3]
512 -
4224
Method RSA_DH <2048bit
No
>=2048bit
Yes
31 Cryptographic
primitive
(only for ACL
v3.35.001)
Prime number
generation
- length
of
prime:
512 –
2112
Bits
Method
PRIME_GEN;
Proprietary prime
number
generation
method, which
follows
[PrimeGen]
Not rated
32 Cryptographic
primitive
Generation of probable
primes,
Miller Rabin test
[FIPS186-4, B.3.3 /
C.3.1]
length
of
prime:
512 –
2064
Bits
Method
2PRIME_GEN
[N186-4] B.3.3:
(only for
prime Bitlength
>=
1024; in case
prime
Bitlength < 1024
identical
algorithm is
used, but
considered
proprietary)
[N186-4] C.3.1
Not rated
for
Bitlength
of prime
<1024bit
33 Cryptographic
primitive
Primality test - length
of
prime:
512 –
2112
Bits
Method
PRIME_CHECK;
Proprietary
primality test
not rated
34 Cryptographic
primitive
Primality test [FIPS186-4, C.3.1 /
C.3.2]
length
of
prime:
512 –
2064
Bits
Method
PRIME_CHECK
_MASK
n/a
35 N/A Supported elliptic
curves:
 All curves in
[FIPS186-4],
[FIPS186-4]
[RFC5639]
N/A - n/a
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Stdandard of
Implementation
Key
Size in
Bits
Comments Security
Level
above
100 Bits
 All curves in
[RFC5639].
36 Cryptographic
primitive
EC point addition on
curves listed in #35
N/A 160 –
521
- n/a
37 Authenticity ECDSA signature
generation on curves
listed in #357
[ANS X9.62, 7.3]
[IEEE_P1363, 7.2.7]
160 –
521
- Yes (for |
k|≥224
bit)
38 Authenticity ECDSA signature
verification on curves
listed in #35
[ANS X9.62, 7.4.1]
[IEEE_P1363, 7.2.8]
160 –
521
- Yes (for |
k|≥224
bit)
39 Key agreement Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman (ECDH) key
agreement on curves
listed in #35
[ANS X9.63, 5.4.1]
[ISO_11770-3, D.6]
[IEEE_P1363, 7.2.1]
160 –
521
Yes (for |
k|≥224
bit)
40 Key generation Elliptic Curve key
generation on curves
listed in #35
[ANS X9.62, A.4.3]
[IEEE_P1363, A.16.
9]
160 –
521
- Yes (for |
k|≥224
bit)
41 PACE
integrated
mapping
Point encoding for the
ECDH-integrated
mapping on curves
listed in #35
[ICAO_11, B.2] 160 –
521
- N/A
Flash Loader
42 Confidentiality #2 in CCM mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38C] 128 - Yes
43 Authenticity #2 in CCM mode for
MAC verification
[NIST SP800-38C] 128 - Yes
44 Authentication Mutual authentication
protocol based on #43
[AGD_PPUM, 2.1.5] 128 - Yes
45 Authentication External authentication
protocol based on #5
[AGD_PPUM, 2.1.5] 128 - No
Random Number generation (Hardware)
46 RNG Physical RNG PTG.2 in [AIS31] N/A - n/a
47 RNG Hybrid RNG Corresponds to
PTG.3 in [AIS31]
N/A - n/a
48 RNG Deterministic RNG Corresponds to
DRG.3 in [AIS20]
N/A - n/a
7
Note that the hash calculation of ECDSA s not implemented by the library and lies in the responsibility of the user.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Stdandard of
Implementation
Key
Size in
Bits
Comments Security
Level
above
100 Bits
49 RNG Deterministic RNG Corresponds to
DRG.4 in [AIS31]
N/A - n/a
Random Crypto Library (RCL) v1.10.007
50 RNG Physical RNG PTG.2 in [AIS31] N/A The RCL acts as
interface to the
PTG.2 hardware
RNG
n/a
51 RNG Deterministic RNG Corresponds to
DRG.3 in [AIS20]
[NIST SP800-90A]
128,
256
CTR_DRBG n/a
52 RNG Deterministic RNG Corresponds to
DRG.4 in [AIS31]
[NIST SP800-90A]
128,
256
CTR_DRBG n/a
Hash Crypto Library (HCL) v1.13.002
53 Hash
calculation
SHA-1 [FIPS180-4] N/A - No
54 Hash
calculation
SHA-224 [FIPS180-4] N/A - n/a
(keyless
operation)
55 Hash
calculation
SHA-256 [FIPS180-4] N/A - n/a
(keyless
operation)
56 Hash
calculation
SHA-384 [FIPS180-4] N/A - n/a
(keyless
operation)
57 Hash
calculation
SHA-512 [FIPS180-4] N/A - n/a
(keyless
operation)
58 Hash
calculation
SHA-512/224 [FIPS180-4] N/A - n/a
(keyless
operation)
59 Hash
calculation
SHA-512/256 [FIPS180-4] N/A - n/a
(keyless
operation)
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
The Flash Loader's cryptographic strength was not assessed by BSI. However, the
evaluation according to the TOE's Evaluation Assurance Level did not reveal any
implementation weaknesses.
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Where no cryptographic 100-Bit-Level assessment was given at all (i.e where ”N/A” was
stated), nevertheless the targeted CC Evaluation Assurance Level has been achieved for
those functionalities as well.
In course of the evaluation process, a source code analysis was performed to compare the
TOE implementation of the cryptographic functionality with the preconditions and steps
defined in the referenced standards. The results of this analysis, including the deviations
found by the evaluator and the conformance verification results were summarized in the
[22] report. For the deviations, which are stated to be conformant to the referenced
specifications, the evaluator confirms that the implementation is conformant with the
referenced standard in the boundary conditions and operational environment of the TOE
and in sense of equivalent process as specified by Federal Information Processing
Standards Publications, cf. [FIPS186-4]:
Equivalent process: Two processes are equivalent if, when the same values are input to
each process (either as input parameters or as values made available during the process
or both), the same output is produced.
Reference of Legislatives and Standards quoted above:
[AIS20] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 20,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15, Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik
[AIS31] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 31,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15, Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik
[ANS X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services ANS X9.62-2005, Public
Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), November 16, 2005, American
National Standards Institute.
[ANS X9.63] American National Standard for Financial Services X9.63-2011, Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry - Key Agreement and Key
Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography, December 21, 2011, American
National Standards Institute
[AGD_PPUM] see reference [14] in bibliography (section 14)
[FIPS186-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 186-4,
Digital Signature Standard (DSS), July 2013, U.S. department of
Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, Announcing the
ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), 2001-11-26, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[IEEE_P1363] IEEE P1363. Standard specifications for public key cryptography. IEEE,
2000
[ISO_9797-1] Information technology - Security techniques - Message Authentication
Codes (MACs) - Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, 1999-12,
ISO/IEC
[ISO_11770-3] ISO 11770-3: Information technology - Security techniques – Key
management Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques, ISO/IEC
11770-3:2008
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[ISO_18033-3] ISO 18033-3: Information technology - Security techniques – Encryption
algorithms – Part 3: Block ciphers, ISO/IEC 18033-3:2005
[NIST SP800-38A] NIST SP800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation,
Methods and Techniques, 2001, National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST)
[NIST SP800-38B] NIST SP800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation,
The CMAC Mode for Authentication, 2005-05, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST)
[NIST SP800-38C] NIST SP800-38C, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, 2004-05 with updates
as of 2007-07-20, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[NIST SP800-67] NIST Special Publication 800-67 – Revision 2, Recommendation for the
Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher – Revised November
2017, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
[PKCS-1] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 2.2, October 27, 2012,
RSA Laboratories
[RFC5639] RFC 5639 - Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves
and Curve Generation, IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors, March 2010 (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt)
[PrimeGen] Details about Prime Number Generation, Infineon CCS Statement, Version
0.2, 2017-12-13
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the Embedded Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes
guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the
developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which
measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the
Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or
system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively
implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite
product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document
"ETR for composite evaluation" [10].
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
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products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
The TOE is delivered to the composite product manufacturer and to the security IC
embedded software developer. The actual end-consumer obtains the TOE from the
composite product issuer together with the application that runs on the TOE.
The security IC embedded software developer receives all necessary recommendations
and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
• All security hints described in the delivered documents in [11],[12],[13],[14],[15],[16],[17],
[18],[19],[20], [21], [23] have to be considered.
The composite product manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints to
develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
• All security hints described in [14] have to be considered.
In addition, the following hint resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect
has to be considered:
• The security IC embedded software developer can deliver his software either to Infineon
to let them implement it in the TOE (in the Flash memory) or to the composite product
manufacturer to let him download the software in the Flash memory.
• The delivery procedure from the security IC embedded software developer to the
composite product manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is
required.
• The firmware flash loader requires either mutual authentication to establish a secure
channel or a one-way authentication of the user without establishing a secure channel
even though the communication is encrypted and integrity protected. This latter
configuration does not satisfy the Loader Package 2.
• The TOE can come with a pre-loaded image called Performance Flash Loader, which is a
non-TOE component. Using the PFL results in a non-certified product.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
3DES / TDES Triple DES
ACL Asymmetric Cryptographic Library
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AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BPU Bill per use
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office
for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CPU Central Processing Unit
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CRC cyclic redundancy check
DES Data Encryption Standard
DRNG Deterministic RNG
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
ISS Instruction Stream Signature Checking
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MPU Memory Protection Unit
NVIC Nested Vectored Interrupt Controller
NVM SOLID FLASH™ Memory
PFL Performance Flash Loader
PP Protection Profile
RAM Read-Only Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read only Memory
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCP Symmetric Cryptographic Processor
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SPAU System Peripheral Access Unit
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
8
See section 9.1 for detailed list of used AIS
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[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024, Version 5.7, 2024-08-20,
IFX_CCI_00006Ah,IFX_CCI_00006Bh, IFX_CCI_00006Ch S12 Security Target,
Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 2024-09-02, EVALUATION TECHNICAL
REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH,
(confidential document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13
January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[9] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024, Version 5.7, 2024-08-20,
IFX_CCI_00006Ah, IFX_CCI_00006Bh,IFX_CCI_00006Ch S12 Security Target Lite,
Infineon Technologies AG (sanitised public document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product
IFX_CCI_00006Ah, IFX_CCI_00006Bh,IFX_CCI_00006Ch S12, Version 3, 2023-
08-11, EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR
COMP), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
and
Addendum to ETR for composite Version 2, 2024-09-02, TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH (confidential document)
[11] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 2, 2022-06-15, SLC39 32-bit Security
Controller - V23, Hardware Reference Manual Infineon Technologies AG
[12] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 5.4, 2022-12-21, SLx1/SLx3 (40 nm)
Security Controllers, Programmer’s Reference Manual, Infineon Technologies AG
[13] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.00-2942, 2023-01-05, SLC39 32-bit
Security Controller - V23, Security Guidelines, Infineon Technologies AG
[14] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 09.13, 2023-02-01, SLx3 (40nm)
Security Controllers, Production and Personalization Manual, Infineon Technologies
AG
[15] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 3, 2024-06-21, 32-bit Security
Controller Crypto2304T V3 User Manual, Infineon Technologies AG
[16] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version v3.52.9708, 2022-06-22, HSL for
SLCx7 V23b, Hardware Support Library, Infineon Technologies AG
[17] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 01.30.0695, 2022-07-04, UMSLC
library for SLCx7V23b User Mode Security Life Control, Infineon Technologies AG
[18] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 2.15.000, 2023-03-06, SCL37-SCP-
v440-C40 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCP-v440 AES/DES/MAC, Infineon
Technologies AG
[19] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 3.34.000, 2024-08-16, ACL37-
Crypto2304T-C40 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto2304T RSA/ECC/Toolbox,
Infineon Technologies AG
[20] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.10.007, 2020-06-16, RCL37-X-C40
Random Crypto Library for SCP-v440 & RNG-v3 DRBG/HWRNG 32-bit Security
Controller, User interface manual, Infineon Technologies AG
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[21] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.13.002, 2020-05-07, HCL37-CPU-
C40 Hash Crypto Library for CPU SHA 32-bit Security Controller, User interface
manual, Infineon Technologies AG
[22] Cryptographic Standards Compliance Verification, Version 2, 2024-08-27,
TÜVInformationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[23] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 3.35.001, 2024-06-06, ACL37-
Crypto2304T-C40 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto2304T RSA/ECC/Toolbox,
Infineon Technologies AG
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1205-V2-2024
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product IFX_CCI_00006Ah, IFX_CCI_00006Bh, IFX_CCI_00006Ch design step
S12 with firmware 80.311.04.1, optional NRG™ SW v05.03.4097, optional HSL
v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib v01.30.0695, optional SCL v2.15.000, optional ACL v3.34.000,
optional ACL v3.35.001, optional RCL v1.10.007, optional HCL v1.13.002 and user
guidance (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 1 October 2024, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.3 ).
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Distribution Center name Company name and address
DHL Singapore DHL Supply Chain Singapore Ptd
Tampinese LogisPark
1 Greenwich Drive
Singapore 533865
K&N Großostheim Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10
63762 Großostheim
Germany
KWE Shanghai KWE Kintetsu World Express (China) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Pudong Airport Pilot Free Trade Zone
No. 530 Zheng Ding Road
Shanghai,
P.R. China
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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