SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP4
Security Target
1.4
Version:
Released
Status:
2023-12-05
Last Update:
Public
Classification:
Trademarks
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Classification Note
Public
Revision History
Changes to Previous Revision
Author(s)
Date
Revision
Incorporate BSI comments
SUSE supported
by atsec
consultants
2023-12-05
1.4
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 8
1.1 Security Target Identification ..................................................................................... 8
1.2 TOE Identification ...................................................................................................... 8
1.3 TOE Type ................................................................................................................... 8
1.4 TOE Overview ............................................................................................................ 8
1.5 TOE Description ......................................................................................................... 8
1.5.1 Physical Boundary ............................................................................................ 8
1.5.2 TOE Security Functionality ................................................................................ 9
1.5.2.1 Security audit ........................................................................................... 9
1.5.2.2 Cryptographic support ............................................................................. 9
1.5.2.3 User data protection .............................................................................. 10
1.5.2.4 Identification and authentication ........................................................... 10
1.5.2.5 Security Management ............................................................................ 10
1.5.2.6 Protection of the TSF .............................................................................. 10
1.5.2.7 TOE Access ............................................................................................ 10
1.5.2.8 Trusted Path/Channels ........................................................................... 10
1.5.3 TOE Operational Environment ........................................................................ 10
1.5.4 Product Functionality Excluded from the Scope of the Evaluation .................. 11
2 CC Conformance Claim ................................................................................ 12
2.1 Protection Profile Tailoring and Additions ................................................................ 12
2.1.1 Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems ([OSPP]) ............... 12
2.1.2 Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH) ([SSH]) ......................................... 12
3 Security Problem Definition ........................................................................ 14
3.1 Threat Environment ................................................................................................. 14
3.1.1 Threats countered by the TOE ........................................................................ 14
3.2 Assumptions ............................................................................................................ 14
3.2.1 Intended usage of the TOE ............................................................................. 14
4 Security Objectives .................................................................................... 15
4.1 Objectives for the TOE ............................................................................................ 15
4.2 Objectives for the Operational Environment ........................................................... 15
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale .................................................................................. 16
4.3.1 Coverage ........................................................................................................ 16
4.3.2 Sufficiency ...................................................................................................... 16
5 Extended Components Definition ................................................................ 18
6 Security Requirements ............................................................................... 19
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements ................................................................... 19
6.1.1 Security audit (FAU) ........................................................................................ 21
6.1.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation (Refined) ........................................ 21
6.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS) .......................................................................... 21
6.1.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (Refined) ............................ 21
6.1.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (Refined) ....................... 21
6.1.2.3 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction ................................... 22
6.1.2.4 FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption (Refined)
............................................................................................................................. 22
6.1.2.5 FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation - Hashing (Refined) ................. 23
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6.1.2.6 FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation - Signing (Refined) .................. 23
6.1.2.7 FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation - Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication (Refined) ..................................................................................... 23
6.1.2.8 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation ............................................... 23
6.1.2.9 FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Sensitive Data ............................................ 24
6.1.2.10 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol ................................................... 24
6.1.2.11 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Protocol ................................................... 25
6.1.2.12 FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS Client Protocol ................................................... 25
6.1.2.13 FCS_SSH_EXT.1 SSH Protocol .............................................................. 25
6.1.2.14 FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Protocol - Client ................................................ 26
6.1.2.15 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Protocol - Server ............................................... 27
6.1.3 User data protection (FDP) ............................................................................. 27
6.1.3.1 FDP_ACF_EXT.1 Access Controls for Protecting User Data ..................... 27
6.1.4 Identification and authentication (FIA) ........................................................... 27
6.1.4.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling (Refined) ............................. 27
6.1.4.2 FIA_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms (Refined) .................... 27
6.1.4.3 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation ......................................... 28
6.1.4.4 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication ................................. 28
6.1.5 Security management (FMT) .......................................................................... 29
6.1.5.1 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Management of security functions behavior ............... 29
6.1.5.2 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Specification of Management Functions ...................... 29
6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT) ............................................................................. 30
6.1.6.1 FPT_ACF_EXT.1 Access controls ............................................................. 30
6.1.6.2 FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 Address Space Layout Randomization ........................ 30
6.1.6.3 FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 Stack Buffer Overflow Protection ............................... 30
6.1.6.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1 Boot Integrity ................................................................ 30
6.1.6.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update ............................................................ 31
6.1.6.6 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Trusted Update for Application Software ...................... 31
6.1.7 TOE access (FTA) ............................................................................................ 31
6.1.7.1 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners ................................................ 31
6.1.8 Trusted path/channels (FTP) ........................................................................... 31
6.1.8.1 FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Trusted channel communication .................................... 31
6.1.8.2 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path ......................................................................... 32
6.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale ........................................................... 32
6.2.1 Coverage ........................................................................................................ 32
6.2.2 Sufficiency ...................................................................................................... 33
6.3 Security Assurance Requirements ........................................................................... 35
6.3.1 ALC Life-cycle support .................................................................................... 35
6.3.1.1 ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates ............................................... 35
6.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ........................................................... 36
7 TOE Summary Specification ........................................................................ 37
7.1 TSS Security Assurance Evaluation Activity ............................................................ 37
7.1.1 Timely security updates (ALC_TSU_EXT.1) ...................................................... 37
7.2 TOE Security Functionality ...................................................................................... 37
7.2.1 Audit ............................................................................................................... 37
7.2.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation (Refined) ......................................... 37
7.2.2 Cryptography .................................................................................................. 39
7.2.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation ............................................ 40
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7.2.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment ....................................... 41
7.2.2.3 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction .................................... 41
7.2.2.4 FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption ........... 41
7.2.2.5 FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation - Hashing ................................. 42
7.2.2.6 FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation - Signing (Refined) ................... 42
7.2.2.7 FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation - Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication (Refined) ...................................................................................... 42
7.2.2.8 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation ................................................ 42
7.2.2.9 FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Sensitive Data ............................................. 43
7.2.2.10 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol .................................................... 44
7.2.2.11 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Support for Supported Groups
Extension ............................................................................................................. 45
7.2.2.12 FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication ........... 45
7.2.2.13 FCS_SSH_EXT.1 SSH Protocol ............................................................... 46
7.2.2.14 FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Protocol - Client ................................................. 47
7.2.2.15 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Protocol - Server ................................................ 47
7.2.3 User data protection ....................................................................................... 48
7.2.3.1 FDP_ACF_EXT.1 Access Controls for Protecting User Data ...................... 48
7.2.4 Identification and authentication .................................................................... 49
7.2.4.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling (Refined) .............................. 49
7.2.4.2 FIA_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms (Refined) ..................... 49
7.2.4.3 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation .......................................... 50
7.2.4.4 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication .................................. 50
7.2.5 Security management .................................................................................... 51
7.2.5.1 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Management of security functions behavior ................ 51
7.2.5.2 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Specification of Management Functions ....................... 51
7.2.6 Protection of the TSF ...................................................................................... 51
7.2.6.1 FPT_ACF_EXT.1 Access controls .............................................................. 51
7.2.6.2 FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 Address Space Layout Randomization ......................... 52
7.2.6.3 FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 Stack Buffer Overflow Protection ................................ 52
7.2.6.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1 Boot Integrity ................................................................. 62
7.2.6.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update ............................................................. 65
7.2.6.6 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Trusted Update for Application Software ....................... 65
7.2.7 TOE access ..................................................................................................... 65
7.2.7.1 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners ................................................. 65
7.2.8 Trusted path/channels .................................................................................... 65
7.2.8.1 FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Trusted channel communication ..................................... 65
7.2.8.2 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path .......................................................................... 66
8 Abbreviations, Terminology, and References ............................................... 67
8.1 Abbreviations .......................................................................................................... 67
8.2 Terminology ............................................................................................................. 70
8.3 References .............................................................................................................. 72
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List of Tables
Table 1: Hardware platforms .............................................................................................. 9
Table 2: TOE operational environment ............................................................................. 10
Table 3: Non-evaluated functionalities ............................................................................. 11
Table 4: NIAP TDs for OSPP .............................................................................................. 12
Table 5: NIAP TDs for SSH ................................................................................................ 13
Table 6: Mapping of security objectives to threats and policies ....................................... 16
Table 7: Mapping of security objectives for the Operational Environment to assumptions,
threats and policies ................................................................................................... 16
Table 8: Sufficiency of objectives countering threats ....................................................... 16
Table 9: Sufficiency of objectives holding assumptions ................................................... 17
Table 10: SFRs for the TOE ............................................................................................... 19
Table 11: Management functions (OSPP) ......................................................................... 29
Table 12: Mapping of security functional requirements to security objectives ................. 32
Table 13: Security objectives for the TOE rationale ......................................................... 33
Table 14: Cryptographic algorithm table .......................................................................... 39
Table 15: TLS implementation notes ................................................................................ 44
Table 16: SSH implementation notes ............................................................................... 46
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1 Introduction
1.1 Security Target Identification
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP4 Security Target
Title:
1.4
Version:
Released
Status:
2023-12-05
Date:
SUSE LLC
Sponsor:
SUSE LLC
Developer:
BSI
Certification Body:
BSI-DSZ-CC-1213
Certification ID:
SLES, operating system
Keywords:
1.2 TOE Identification
The TOE is SUSE Linux Enterprise Server Version 15 SP4.
1.3 TOE Type
The TOE type is general purpose operating system.
1.4 TOE Overview
The Security Target (ST) serves as the basis for the Common Criteria (CC) evaluation and identifies
the Target of Evaluation (TOE), the scope of the evaluation, and the assumptions made
throughout. This document will also describe the intended operational environment of the TOE,
and the functional and assurance requirements that the TOE meets.
The TOE is the SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP4 general purpose operating system (GPOS).
The TOE is a highly-configurable Linux-based operating system which has been developed to
provide a good level of security as required in commercial environments. Details about the
supported security functions are outlined in section 1.5. For supporting a secure channel to
remote entities, the TOE offers TLS that can be used for different use cases. The TOE includes
an SSH server that allows remote administration which implies that the ST claims compliance
with the SSH package.
The tested version of the TOE is:
● SLES 15 SP4
1.5 TOE Description
This section provides a general description of the TOE, including physical boundaries, security
functions, and relevant TOE documentation and references.
1.5.1 Physical Boundary
The Target of Evaluation is based on the following system software:
● SUSE Linux Enterprise Server version 15 SP4
The TOE and its documentation are supplied on ISO images distributed via the SUSE Portal. The
TOE includes a package holding the additional user and administrator documentation.
In addition to the installation media, the following documentation is provided:
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● Evaluated Configuration Guide published by SUSE, Version 4.0
● Manual pages for all applications, configuration files and system calls
The hardware applicable to the evaluated configuration is listed in table 1. The analysis of the
hardware capabilities as well as the firmware functionality is covered by this evaluation to the
extent that the following capabilities supporting the security functionality are analyzed and
tested:
● Memory separation capability
● Unavailability of privileged processor states to untrusted user code (like the hypervisor
state or the SMM)
● Full testing of the security functionality on all listed hardware systems
microArch
Processor
Marketing Name
Cascade Lake
Intel x86_64
Delta D20x-M1-PC-32-8-96GB-1TB-2x1G
AMD EPYC 1st Generation
AMD x86_64
Gigabyte R181-Z90
z15
IBM System Z
IBM Z System z15
Power 10
IBM POWER
IBM Power10 9080-HEX
ARMv8.2-A
ARM 64 Bit
Gigabyte R181-T90
Table 1: Hardware platforms
The TOE also includes of the TOE documentation providing information for installing, configuring,
and maintaining the evaluated configuration.
● SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP4 Evaluated Configuration Guide, Version 4.0
1.5.2 TOE Security Functionality
The TOE provides the security functions conforms to the requirements defined in section 2.
1.5.2.1 Security audit
The TOE generates audit events for all start-up and shut-down functions, and all auditable events
as specified by the requirements defined in section 2. Audit events are generated for the following
audit functions:
● Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions
● Authentication events (Success/Failure)
● Use of privileged/special rights events (Successful and unsuccessful security, audit, and
configuration changes)
● Privilege or role escalation events (Success/Failure)
Each audit record contains the date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if
applicable), and outcome (success or failure) of the event.
1.5.2.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes the OpenSSL version 1.1.1 cryptographic libraries for performing userspace
cryptographic operations. In addition, the Linux kernel crypto API performs the cryptographic
operations performed by the kernel. In addition, the TOE uses software noise sources for entropy
generation. The TOE implements TLSv1.2 for secure communications with remote servers.
The TOE implements SSHv2 for allowing secure remote administration.
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1.5.2.3 User data protection
The TOE implements access controls which can be configured to prevent unprivileged users from
accessing files and directories owned by other users. The configuration of the access control
mechanism is left to the owner of the file system object.
1.5.2.4 Identification and authentication
All users including administrators must be authenticated to the TOE prior to carrying out any
actions, including management operations. The TOE supports password-based authentication,
authentication based on SSH-keys as well as X.509 certificate-based authentication. The TOE
will lock out user accounts after a defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts to
that user account has been met.
1.5.2.5 Security Management
The TOE can perform management functions. The administrator has full access to carry-out all
management functions offered by the TOE. The user is allowed a limited set of administrative
operations for his own user account.
1.5.2.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements the following protection of TSF data functions.
● Access controls
● Address space layout randomization (ASLR) with 11 bits (stack) and 28 bits (text segment
start address) of entropy
● Stack buffer overflow protection
● Verification of integrity of the boot-chain
● Trusted software updates using digital signatures
1.5.2.7 TOE Access
The TOE displays an advisory warning message regarding unauthorized use of the OS prior to
establishment of a user session.
1.5.2.8 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE supports TLS v1.2 for trusted channel communications. The TOE uses TLS to securely
communicate with the SUSE Customer Center. Applications may invoke the TOE-provided TLS
to securely communicate with remote servers.
The TOE offers an SSH server which uses the SSHv2 protocol allowing remote administration.
1.5.3 TOE Operational Environment
The following environmental components interoperate with the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
Description
Component
See Table 1
Hardware platform
Server that allows the TOE to download updates
SUSE Customer Center
Table 2: TOE operational environment
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1.5.4 Product Functionality Excluded from the Scope of the
Evaluation
Additional mechanisms and functions that would interfere with the operation of the security
functions are disallowed in the evaluated configuration and the Evaluation Configuration Guide
provides instructions to the administrator on how to disable them. Note: TOE mechanism which
provide additional restrictions to the above claimed security functions are allowed in the evaluated
configuration. For example, the eCryptFS cryptographic file system provided with the TOE and
permitted in the evaluated configuration even though they have not been subject to this
evaluation. The eCryptFS provides further restrictions on, for example, the security function of
discretionary access control mechanism for file system objects and therefore cannot breach the
security functionality as the discretionary access control rules of the "lower" file system are still
enforced. The following table enumerates mechanisms that are provided with the TOE but which
are excluded from the evaluation:
Exclusion discussion
Functions
eCryptFS is not allowed to be used in the evaluated configuration. The
encryption capability provided with this file system is therefore
unavailable to any user.
eCryptFS
Ext4 file-based encryption is not allowed to be used in the evaluated
configuration. The encryption capability provided with this file system
is therefore unavailable to any user.
Ext4 file-based encryption
The mandatory access control functionality offered by the SMACK LSM
is not assessed by the evaluation and disabled in the evaluated
configuration.
SMACK
The mandatory access control functionality offered by the SELinux
LSM is not assessed by the evaluation and disabled in the evaluated
configuration.
SELinux
The TOE provides the stunnel application which can be used to
establish SSL and TLS tunnels with remote peers. This application
however was excluded from evaluation assessment.
SSL / TLS tunnels
Table 3: Non-evaluated functionalities
Note: Packages and mechanisms not covered with security claims and subsequent assessments
during the evaluation or disabling the respective functionality in the evaluated configuration
result from resource constraints during the evaluation but does not imply that the respective
package or functionality is implemented insecurely.
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2 CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target is CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 extended.
This Security Target claims conformance to the following Protection Profiles and PP packages:
● [OSPP]☝: Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems. Version 4.2.1 as of
2019-04-22; exact conformance.
● [SSH]☝: Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH). Version 1.0 as of 2021-05-13; exact
conformance.
Common Criteria [CC] version 3.1 revision 5 is the basis for this conformance claim.
2.1 Protection Profile Tailoring and Additions
2.1.1 Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems
([OSPP])
Table 4 contains the NIAP Technical Decisions (TDs) for this protection profile at the time of the
evaluation and a statement of applicability to the evaluation.
Applicable?
TD description
NIAP TD
Yes
Updates to FIA_X509_EXT.1 for Exception
Processing and Test Conditions
TD0715
Yes
OS 4.2.1 Conformance Claims section
updated to allow for MOD_WLAN_CLI_v1.0
TD0680
Yes
Conformance claims for OS PP v4.2.1
TD0649
Yes
FCS_COP.1 requirements for Secure Shell
TD0630
Yes
Conformance claim sections updated to
allow for MOD_VPNC_V2.3
TD0600
Yes
SHA-1 is no longer mandatory
TD0578
Yes
Cryptographic selections and updates for
OS PP
TD0501
Yes
X.509v3 certificates when using digital
signatures for Boot Integrity
TD0493
Yes
Clarification for FPT_TUD_EXT
TD0463
Yes
Updated TLS Ciphersuites for OS PP
TD0441
Yes
Platform-Provided Verification of Update
TD0386
Yes
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 selection
TD0365
Table 4: NIAP TDs for OSPP
2.1.2 Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH) ([SSH])
Table 5 contains the NIAP Technical Decisions (TDs) for this PP-Module at the time of the
evaluation and a statement of applicability to the evaluation.
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Applicable?
TD description
NIAP TD
Yes
TD0777: Clarification to Selections for
Auditable Events for FCS_SSH_EXT.1
TD0777
Yes
TD0732: FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3 Test 2
Update
TD0732
Yes
Choice of 128 or 256 bit size in AES-CTR
in SSH Functional Package.
TD0695
Yes
Addressing Ambiguity in FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
Tests
TD0682
Table 5: NIAP TDs for SSH
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Threat Environment
3.1.1 Threats countered by the TOE
T.NETWORK_ATTACK
PP Origin: OSPP
An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network
infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with applications and services
running on or part of the OS with the intent of compromise. Engagement may consist of
altering existing legitimate communications.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP
PP Origin: OSPP
An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network
infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged between
applications and services that are running on or part of the OS.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK
PP Origin: OSPP
An attacker may compromise applications running on the OS. The compromised application
may provide maliciously formatted input to the OS through a variety of channels including
unprivileged system calls and messaging via the file system.
T.LIMITED_PHYSICAL_ACCESS
PP Origin: OSPP
An attacker may attempt to access data on the OS while having a limited amount of time
with the physical device.
3.2 Assumptions
3.2.1 Intended usage of the TOE
A.PLATFORM
PP Origin: OSPP
The OS relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This underlying
platform is out of scope of this PP.
A.PROPER_USER
PP Origin: OSPP
The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software in compliance
with the applied enterprise security policy. At the same time, malicious software could
act as the user, so requirements which confine malicious subjects are still in scope.
A.PROPER_ADMIN
PP Origin: OSPP
The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers
the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
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4 Security Objectives
4.1 Objectives for the TOE
O.ACCOUNTABILITY
PP Origin: OSPP
Conformant OSes ensure that information exists that allows administrators to discover
unintentional issues with the configuration and operation of the operating system and
discover its cause. Gathering event information and immediately transmitting it to another
system can also enable incident response in the event of system compromise.
O.INTEGRITY
PP Origin: OSPP
Conformant OSes ensure the integrity of their update packages. OSes are seldom if ever
shipped without errors, and the ability to deploy patches and updates with integrity is
critical to enterprise network security. Conformant OSes provide execution
environment-based mitigations that increase the cost to attackers by adding complexity
to the task of compromising systems.
O.MANAGEMENT
PP Origin: OSPP
To facilitate management by users and the enterprise, conformant OSes provide consistent
and supported interfaces for their security-relevant configuration and maintenance. This
includes the deployment of applications and application updates through the use of
platform-supported deployment mechanisms and formats, as well as providing mechanisms
for configuration and application execution control.
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE
PP Origin: OSPP
To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of credentials in the event of loss of physical
control of the storage medium, conformant OSes provide data-at-rest protection for
credentials. Conformant OSes also provide access controls which allow users to keep
their files private from other users of the same system.
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
PP Origin: OSPP
To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet modification) network attack
threats, conformant OSes provide mechanisms to create trusted channels for CSP and
sensitive data. Both CSP and sensitive data should not be exposed outside of the platform.
4.2 Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.PLATFORM
PP Origin: OSPP
The OS relies on being installed on trusted hardware.
OE.PROPER_USER
PP Origin: OSPP
The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software within
compliance of the applied enterprise security policy. Standard user accounts are
provisioned in accordance with the least privilege model. Users requiring higher levels
of access should have a separate account dedicated for that use.
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OE.PROPER_ADMIN
PP Origin: OSPP
The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers
the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
4.3.1 Coverage
The following table provides a mapping of TOE objectives to threats and policies, showing that
each objective counters or enforces at least one threat or policy, respectively.
Threats / OSPs
Objective
T.NETWORK_ATTACK
T.LOCAL_ATTACK
O.ACCOUNTABILITY
T.NETWORK_ATTACK
T.LOCAL_ATTACK
O.INTEGRITY
T.NETWORK_ATTACK
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP
O.MANAGEMENT
T.LIMITED_PHYSICAL_ACCESS
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE
T.NETWORK_ATTACK
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
Table 6: Mapping of security objectives to threats and policies
The following table provides a mapping of the objectives for the Operational Environment to
assumptions, threats and policies, showing that each objective holds, counters or enforces at
least one assumption, threat or policy, respectively.
Assumptions / Threats / OSPs
Objective
A.PLATFORM
OE.PLATFORM
A.PROPER_USER
OE.PROPER_USER
A.PROPER_ADMIN
OE.PROPER_ADMIN
Table 7: Mapping of security objectives for the Operational Environment to
assumptions, threats and policies
4.3.2 Sufficiency
The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives are suitable to counter
each individual threat and that each security objective tracing back to a threat, when achieved,
actually contributes to the removal, diminishing or mitigation of that threat.
Rationale for security objectives
Threat
The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.PROTECTED_COMMS
as this provides for integrity of transmitted data.
T.NETWORK_ATTACK
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Rationale for security objectives
Threat
The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.INTEGRITY as this
provides for integrity of software that is installed onto the system from
the network.
The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.MANAGEMENT as
this provides for the ability to configure the OS to defend against
network attack.
The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.ACCOUNTABILITY
as this provides a mechanism for the OS to report behavior that may
indicate a network attack has occurred.
The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by
O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides for confidentiality of transmitted
data.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP
The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.MANAGEMENT
as this provides for the ability to configure the OS to protect the
confidentiality of its transmitted data.
The objective O.INTEGRITY protects against the use of mechanisms
that weaken the TOE with regard to attack by other software on the
platform.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK
The objective O.ACCOUNTABILITY protects against local attacks by
providing a mechanism to report behavior that may indicate a local
attack is occurring or has occurred.
The objective O.PROTECTED_STORAGE protects against unauthorized
attempts to access physical storage used by the TOE.
T.LIMITED_PHYSICAL_ACCESS
Table 8: Sufficiency of objectives countering threats
The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives for the environment
are suitable to cover each individual assumption, that each security objective for the environment
that traces back to an assumption about the environment of use of the TOE, when achieved,
actually contributes to the environment achieving consistency with the assumption, and that if
all security objectives for the environment that trace back to an assumption are achieved, the
intended usage is supported.
Rationale for security objectives
Assumption
The operational environment objective OE.PLATFORM is realized
through A.PLATFORM.
A.PLATFORM
The operational environment objective OE.PROPER_USER is realized
through A.PROPER_USER.
A.PROPER_USER
The operational environment objective OE.PROPER_ADMIN is realized
through A.PROPER_ADMIN.
A.PROPER_ADMIN
Table 9: Sufficiency of objectives holding assumptions
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5 Extended Components Definition
The extended components definitions are defined in the documents specified in Section 2 "CC
Conformance Claim".
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6 Security Requirements
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The table below summarizes the SFRs for the TOE and the operations performed on the
components according to CC part 1. Operations in the SFRs use the following convention:
● Iterations (Iter.) are identified by appending a suffix to the original SFR.
● Refinements (Ref.) added to the text are shown in italic text, deletions are shown as
strikethrough text.
● Assignments (Ass.) are shown in bold text.
● Selections (Sel.) are shown in bold text.
Operations
Source
Base
security
functional
component
Security functional
requirement
Security
functional class
Sel.
Ass.
Ref.
Iter.
Yes
Yes
No
No
OSPP
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data
Generation (Refined)
FAU - Security
audit
Yes
No
No
No
OSPP
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key
Generation (Refined)
FCS -
Cryptographic
support
Yes
No
No
No
OSPP
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key
Establishment (Refined)
Yes
No
No
No
OSPP
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic
Key Destruction
Yes
No
No
Yes
OSPP
FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic
Operation -
Encryption/Decryption (Refined)
Yes
No
No
Yes
OSPP
FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic
Operation - Hashing (Refined)
Yes
No
No
Yes
OSPP
FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic
Operation - Signing (Refined)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
OSPP
FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic
Operation - Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication (Refined)
Yes
No
No
No
OSPP
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit
Generation
No
No
No
No
OSPP
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of
Sensitive Data
Yes
No
No
No
OSPP
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client
Protocol
Yes
No
No
No
OSPP
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client
Protocol
No
No
No
No
OSPP
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS Client
Protocol
Yes
Yes
No
No
SSH
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 SSH Protocol
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Operations
Source
Base
security
functional
component
Security functional
requirement
Security
functional class
Sel.
Ass.
Ref.
Iter.
Yes
No
No
No
SSH
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Protocol -
Client
Yes
No
No
No
SSH
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Protocol -
Server
No
No
No
No
OSPP
FDP_ACF_EXT.1 Access Controls
for Protecting User Data
FDP - User data
protection
Yes
Yes
No
No
OSPP
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure
handling (Refined)
FIA - Identification
and
authentication
Yes
Yes
No
No
OSPP
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple
Authentication Mechanisms
(Refined)
Yes
Yes
No
No
OSPP
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate
Validation
Yes
No
No
No
OSPP
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate
Authentication
No
No
No
No
OSPP
FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Management of
security functions behavior
FMT - Security
management
Yes
Yes
No
No
OSPP
FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Specification of
Management Functions
No
Yes
No
No
OSPP
FPT_ACF_EXT.1 Access controls
FPT - Protection of
the TSF
Yes
Yes
No
No
OSPP
FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 Address Space
Layout Randomization
Yes
No
No
No
OSPP
FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 Stack Buffer
Overflow Protection
Yes
No
No
Yes
OSPP
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Boot Integrity
Yes
No
No
No
OSPP
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update
No
No
No
No
OSPP
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Trusted Update
for Application Software
No
No
No
No
OSPP
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access
banners
FTA - TOE access
Yes
Yes
No
No
OSPP
FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Trusted channel
communication
FTP - Trusted
path/channels
Yes
No
No
No
OSPP
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
Table 10: SFRs for the TOE
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6.1.1 Security audit (FAU)
6.1.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
PP Origin: SSH
The OS shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:
FAU_GEN.1.1
a. Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions;
b. All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c. ● Authentication events (Success/Failure);
● Use of privileged/special rights events (Successful and unsuccessful
security, audit, and configuration changes);
● Privilege or role escalation events (Success/Failure);
● Administrator or root-level access events (Success/Failure)
● FCS_SSH_EXT.1: None
The OS shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
FAU_GEN.1.2
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable),
and outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST, none.
TSS Link: TSS for FAU_GEN.1
6.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)
6.1.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0501
The OS shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm
FCS_CKM.1.1
● RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater
that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature
Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.3
● ECC schemes using "NIST curves" P-256, P-384 and P-521 that
meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard
(DSS)", Appendix B.4
● FFC schemes using safe primes that meet the following: NIST
Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for
Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes"
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_CKM.1
6.1.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0501
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The OS shall implement functionality to perform cryptographic key
establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment
method:
FCS_CKM.2.1
● Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meets the
following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3,
"Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography"
● Finite field-based key establishment schemes that meets NIST
Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, "Recommendation for
Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography"
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_CKM.2
6.1.2.3 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0365
The OS shall destroy cryptographic keys and key material in accordance with
a specified cryptographic key destruction method
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1
● For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a
❍ removal of power to the memory
● For non-volatile memory that consists of
❍ destruction of all key encrypting keys (KEKs) protecting the
target key according to FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1, where none of the
KEKs protecting the target key are derived
❍ the invocation of an interface provided by the underlying
platform that
➤ instructs the underlying platform to destroy the
abstraction that represents the key
The OS shall destroy all keys and key material when no longer needed.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.2
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_CKM_EXT.4
6.1.2.4 FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption
(Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0630
The OS shall perform encryption/decryption services for data in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm
FCS_COP.1.1(1)
● AES-CBC (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A)
● AES-CTR (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A)
● AES-XTS (as defined in NIST SP 800-38E)
and
● AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D)
and cryptographic key sizes
● 128-bit
● 256-bit.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_COP.1(1)
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6.1.2.5 FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation - Hashing (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0578
The OS shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm
FCS_COP.1.1(2)
● SHA-256
● SHA-384
● SHA-512
and message digest sizes
● 256 bits
● 384 bits
● 512 bits
that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-4.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_COP.1(2)
6.1.2.6 FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation - Signing (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
The OS shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and
verification) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
FCS_COP.1.1(3)
● RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater
that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature
Standard (DSS)", Section 4
● ECDSA schemes using "NIST curves" P-256, P-384 and P-521 that
meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard
(DSS)", Section 5
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_COP.1(3)
6.1.2.7 FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation - Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
The OS shall perform keyed-hash message authentication services in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512 with key sizes 256 bits, 384 bits, 512 bits and message digest
FCS_COP.1.1(4)
sizes 256 bits, 384 bits, 512 bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 198-1
The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code and FIPS Pub 180-4 Secure
Hash Standard.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_COP.1(4)
6.1.2.8 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
PP Origin: OSPP
The OS shall perform all deterministic random bit generation (DRBG) services
in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-90A using CTR_DRBG (AES).
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The deterministic RBG used by the OS shall be seeded by an entropy source
that accumulates entropy from a software-based noise source with a
minimum of 256 bits of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength
(according to NIST SP 800-57) of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2
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TSS Link: TSS for FCS_RBG_EXT.1
Application Note CTR DRBG:
For the German Schema, the SFR is "translated" into an AIS 20/31 compliant SFR following the
FCS_RNG.1 definition. Therefore, this application note states the SFR as part of this application
note:
FCS_RNG.1.1: The TSF shall provide a deterministic random number generator conforming to
SP800-90A CTR_DRBG with AES-256 core using a derivation function without prediction resistance
that implements:
a) DRG2.1: If initialized with a random seed using high-resolution time stamps of block
device access events, human interface device events and interrupt events as seed
source, the internal state of the RNG shall have a minentropy of 256 bits.
b) DRG2.2: The DRNG provides forward secrecy.
c) DRG2.3: The DRNG provides backward secrecy.
The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet:
a) DRG.2.4: The RNG is initialized with a random seed of 384 bits, is reseeded after at most
2**48 generate requests with 256 bits, and has the output property such that 2**19
strings of bit length 128 are mutually different with probability of greater than 1-2**-10.
b) DRG.2.5: Statistical test suites cannot practically distinguish the random numbers from
output sequences of an ideal RNG. The random numbers must pass test procedure A.
6.1.2.9 FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Sensitive Data
PP Origin: OSPP
The OS shall implement functionality to encrypt sensitive data stored in
non-volatile storage and provide interfaces to applications to invoke this
functionality.
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_STO_EXT.1
6.1.2.10 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0441
The product shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) supporting the following
cipher suites
FCS_TLSC_EXT
.1.1
● TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
● TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
● TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5288
● TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5288
● TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
● TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in
RFC 5289
● TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in
RFC 5289
● TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
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● TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
● TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
.
The product shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference
identifier according to RFC 6125.
FCS_TLSC_EXT
.1.2
The product shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is
invalid
FCS_TLSC_EXT
.1.3
● with no exceptions.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
6.1.2.11 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Protocol
PP Origin: OSPP
The product shall present the Supported Groups Extension in the Client Hello
with the supported groups
FCS_TLSC_EXT
.2.1
● secp256r1
● secp384r1
● secp521r1
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_TLSC_EXT.2
6.1.2.12 FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS Client Protocol
PP Origin: OSPP
The product shall support mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates.
FCS_TLSC_EXT
.4.1
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_TLSC_EXT.4
6.1.2.13 FCS_SSH_EXT.1 SSH Protocol
PP Origin: SSH
The TOE shall implement SSH acting as a client, server in accordance with
that complies with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 4256, 5647, 5656, 6668,
8268, 8332, 8709 and no other standard.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the
following authentication methods:
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.2
● “password” (RFC 4252)
● “publickey” (RFC 4252):
❍ rsa-sha2-256 (RFC 8332)
❍ rsa-sha2-512 (RFC 8332)
❍ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 (RFC 5656)
❍ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 (RFC 5656)
and no other methods.
The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than
2^18 bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall protect data in transit from unauthorised disclosure using the
following mechanisms:
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.4
● aes128-cbc (RFC 4253)
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● aes256-cbc (RFC 4253)
● aes128-gcm@openssh.com (RFC 5647)
● aes256-gcm@openssh.com (RFC 5647)
and no other mechanisms.
The TSF shall protect data in transit from modification, deletion, and insertion
using:
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.5
● hmac-sha2-256 (RFC 6668)
● hmac-sha2-512 (RFC 6668)
● implicit
and no other mechanisms.
The TSF shall establish a shared secret with its peer using:
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.6
● diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 (RFC 8268)
● diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 (RFC 8268)
● diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 (RFC 8268)
● ecdh-sha2-nistp256 (RFC 5656)
● ecdh-sha2-nistp384 (RFC 5656)
● ecdh-sha2-nistp521 (RFC 5656)
and no other mechanisms.
The TSF shall use SSH KDF as defined in
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.7
● RFC 4253 (Section 7.2)
● RFC 5656 (Section 4)
to derive the following cryptographic keys from a shared secret: session keys.
The TSF shall ensure that
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.8
● a rekey of the session keys
occurs when any of the following thresholds are met:
● one hour connection time
● no more than one gigabyte of transmitted data, or
● no more than one gigabyte of received data.
Application Note: If the TOE-attempted rekey is not accepted or completed by the remote
peer, the connection is terminated.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_SSH_EXT.1
6.1.2.14 FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Protocol - Client
PP Origin: SSH
The TSF shall authenticate its peer (SSH server) using:
FCS_SSHC_EXT
.1.1
● using a local database by associating each host name with a
public key corresponding to the following list:
❍ rsa-sha2-256 (RFC 8332)
❍ rsa-sha2-512 (RFC 8332)
❍ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 (RFC 5656)
❍ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 (RFC 5656)
as described in RFC 4251 section 4.1.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_SSH_EXT.1
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6.1.2.15 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Protocol - Server
PP Origin: SSH
The TSF shall authenticate itself to its peer (SSH Client) using:
FCS_SSHS_EXT
.1.1
● rsa-sha2-256 (RFC 8332)
● rsa-sha2-512 (RFC 8332)
● ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 (RFC 5656)
● ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 (RFC 5656)
.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_SSH_EXT.1
6.1.3 User data protection (FDP)
6.1.3.1 FDP_ACF_EXT.1 Access Controls for Protecting User Data
PP Origin: OSPP
The OS shall implement access controls which can prohibit unprivileged users
from accessing files and directories owned by other users.
FDP_ACF_EXT.1.1
TSS Link: TSS for FDP_ACF_EXT.1
6.1.4 Identification and authentication (FIA)
6.1.4.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
The OS shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer
within 1 and 2^32 - 1 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related
to events with authentication based on user name and password.
FIA_AFL.1.1
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts for an
account has been met, the OS shall: Account Lockout.
FIA_AFL.1.2
TSS Link: TSS for FIA_AFL.1
6.1.4.2 FIA_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0649
The OS shall provide the following authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1
● authentication based on username and password
● for use in SSH only, SSH public key-based authentication as
specified by the Functional Package for Secure Shell
to support user authentication.
The OS shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
FIA_UAU.5.2
● Authentication based on username and password: is performed
for SSH password-based as well as console login requests with
credentials stored by the OS.
● Authentication based on SSH keys: is performed SSH key-based
login requests with SSH keys stored by the OS.
TSS Link: TSS for FIA_UAU.5
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6.1.4.3 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0715
The OS shall implement functionality to validate certificates in accordance
with the following rules:
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1
● RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation
● The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate
● The OS shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the
basicConstraints extension, that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA
certificates, and that any path constraints are met.
● The TSF shall validate that any CA certificate includes "Certificate Signing"
as a purpose the key usage field
● The OS shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using CRL
as specified in RFC 8603, an OCSP TLS Status Request Extension
(OCSP stapling) as specified in RFC 6066 with the exception of
the secure boot process where no viable network link is yet
present
● The OS shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the
following rules:
❍ Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity
verification shall have the Code Signing Purpose (id-kp 3 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
❍ Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server
Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
❍ Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client
Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the
EKU field.
❍ S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature
shall have the Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
❍ OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP
Signing Purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.
❍ Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration
Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in
the EKU field. (conditional)
The OS shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints
extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2
TSS Link: TSS for FIA_X509_EXT.1
6.1.4.4 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
PP Origin: OSPP
The OS shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support
authentication for TLS and HTTPS connections.
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1
TSS Link: TSS for FIA_X509_EXT.2
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6.1.5 Security management (FMT)
6.1.5.1 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Management of security functions behavior
PP Origin: OSPP
The OS shall restrict the ability to perform the function indicated in the
"Administrator" column in FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1 to the administrator.
FMT_MOF_EXT
.1.1
TSS Link: TSS for FMT_MOF_EXT.1
6.1.5.2 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Specification of Management Functions
PP Origin: OSPP
The OS shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1
User
Administrator
Management Function
#
X
M
Enable/disable screen lock, session timeout
1
X
M
Configure screen lock, session inactivity timeout
2
X
X
Import keys/secrets into the secure key storage
3
-
X
Configure local audit storage capacity
4
-
X
Configure minimum password length
5
-
X
Configure minimum number of special characters in password
6
-
X
Configure minimum number of numeric characters in password
7
-
X
Configure minimum number of uppercase characters in password
8
-
X
Configure minimum number of lowercase characters in password
9
-
X
Configure lockout policy for unsuccessful authentication attempts
through limiting number of attempts during a time period
10
-
X
Configure host-based firewall
11
-
-
Configure name/address of directory server with which to bind
12
-
-
Configure name/address of remote management server from
which to receive management settings
13
-
X
Configure name/address of audit/logging server to which to send
audit/logging records
14
-
X
Configure audit rules
15
-
X
Configure name/address of network time server
16
-
X
Enable/disable automatic software update
17
-
X
Configure Wi-Fi interface
18
-
-
Enable/disable Bluetooth interface
19
-
-
Enable/disable no other external interfaces
20
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User
Administrator
Management Function
#
-
-
No other management functions to be provided by the
TSF
21
Table 11: Management functions (OSPP)
Application Note: M—Mandatory support by the specified role. X—Supported by the specified role. Grey/Hyphen—Not
supported by the specified role.
TSS Link: TSS for FMT_SMF_EXT.1
6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
6.1.6.1 FPT_ACF_EXT.1 Access controls
PP Origin: OSPP
The OS shall implement access controls which prohibit unprivileged users from
modifying:
FPT_ACF_EXT.1.1
a) Kernel and its drivers/modules
b) Security audit logs
c) Shared libraries
d) System executables
e) System configuration files
f) TSF-data including permission bits, ACLs
g) Third-party applications
The OS shall implement access controls which prohibit unprivileged users from
reading:
FPT_ACF_EXT.1.2
a) Security audit logs
b) System-wide credential repositories
c) no other objects
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_ACF_EXT.1
6.1.6.2 FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 Address Space Layout Randomization
PP Origin: OSPP
The OS shall always randomize process address space memory locations with
11 (stack memory), 28 (start address of text segments) bits of entropy
except for no exceptions.
FPT_ASLR_EXT
.1.1
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_ASLR_EXT.1
6.1.6.3 FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 Stack Buffer Overflow Protection
PP Origin: OSPP
The OS shall employ stack-based buffer overflow protections.
FPT_SBOP_EXT
.1.1
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_SBOP_EXT.1
6.1.6.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1 Boot Integrity
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0493
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The OS shall verify the integrity of the bootchain up through the OS kernel
and
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1
● no other executable code
prior to its execution through the use of
● a digital signature using an X509 certificate with hardware-based
protection
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_TST_EXT.1
6.1.6.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0386
Applied TDs: TD0463
The OS shall provide the ability to check for updates to the OS software itself
and shall use a digital signature scheme specified in FCS_COP.1(3) to validate
the authenticity of the response.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
The OS shall cryptographically verify updates to itself using a digital
signature prior to installation using schemes specified in FCS_COP.1(3).
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_TUD_EXT.1
6.1.6.6 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Trusted Update for Application Software
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0463
The OS shall provide the ability to check for updates to application software
and shall use a digital signature scheme specified in FCS_COP.1(3) to validate
the authenticity of the response.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1
The OS shall cryptographically verify the integrity of updates to applications
using a digital signature specified by FCS_COP.1(3) prior to installation.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_TUD_EXT.2
6.1.7 TOE access (FTA)
6.1.7.1 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners
PP Origin: OSPP
Before establishing a user session, the OS shall display an advisory warning
message regarding unauthorized use of the OS.
FTA_TAB.1.1
TSS Link: TSS for FTA_TAB.1
6.1.8 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
6.1.8.1 FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Trusted channel communication
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0649
The OS shall use
FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1
● TLS as conforming to FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
● SSH as conforming to the Functional Package for Secure Shell
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to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and authorized IT
entities supporting the following capabilities: management server, update
server, application initiated TLS, SSH peer that is logically distinct from
other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end
points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of
modification of the channel data.
TSS Link: TSS for FTP_ITC_EXT.1
6.1.8.2 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
PP Origin: OSPP
The OS shall provide a communication path between itself and remote, local
users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides
assured identification of its endpoints and protection of the communicated
data from modification, disclosure.
FTP_TRP.1.1
The OS shall permit local users to initiate communication via the trusted
path.
FTP_TRP.1.2
The OS shall require use of the trusted path for all remote administrative
actions.
FTP_TRP.1.3
TSS Link: TSS for FTP_TRP.1
6.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
6.2.1 Coverage
The following table provides a mapping of SFR to the security objectives, showing that each
security functional requirement addresses at least one security objective.
Objectives
Security functional requirements
O.ACCOUNTABILITY
FAU_GEN.1
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_CKM.1
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_CKM.2
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
O.PROTECTED_COMMS,
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE
FCS_COP.1(1)
O.INTEGRITY,
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_COP.1(2)
O.INTEGRITY,
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_COP.1(3)
O.INTEGRITY,
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_COP.1(4)
O.PROTECTED_COMMS,
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE
FCS_STO_EXT.1
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
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Objectives
Security functional requirements
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_SSH_EXT.1
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE
FDP_ACF_EXT.1
O.INTEGRITY
FIA_AFL.1
O.INTEGRITY
FIA_UAU.5
O.INTEGRITY,
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FIA_X509_EXT.1
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FIA_X509_EXT.2
O.MANAGEMENT
FMT_MOF_EXT.1
O.MANAGEMENT
FMT_SMF_EXT.1
O.INTEGRITY
FPT_ACF_EXT.1
O.INTEGRITY
FPT_ASLR_EXT.1
O.INTEGRITY
FPT_SBOP_EXT.1
O.INTEGRITY
FPT_TST_EXT.1
O.INTEGRITY
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
O.INTEGRITY
FPT_TUD_EXT.2
O.MANAGEMENT
FTA_TAB.1
O.ACCOUNTABILITY,
O.INTEGRITY,
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FTP_ITC_EXT.1
O.MANAGEMENT
FTP_TRP.1
Table 12: Mapping of security functional requirements to security objectives
6.2.2 Sufficiency
The following rationale provides justification for each security objective for the TOE, showing
that the security functional requirements are suitable to meet and achieve the security objectives.
Rationale
Security objectives
[OSPP] FAU_GEN.1: Supports the objective by requiring that critical
event information be gathered by the TOE.
O.ACCOUNTABILITY
[OSPP] FTP_ITC_EXT.1: Supports the objective by ensuring that audit
information can be securely transmitted to remote systems for analysis.
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Rationale
Security objectives
[OSPP] FPT_SBOP_EXT.1, FPT_ASLR_EXT.1: Supports the objective by
requiring that OS applications be hardened against buffer overflow
attacks.
O.INTEGRITY
[OSPP] FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Supports the objective by requiring that the
OS be able to check for critical updates.
[OSPP] FPT_TUD_EXT.2: Supports the objective by requiring that the
OS verify updates before applying them.
[OSPP] FCS_COP.1(2): Supports the objective by requiring the TSF to
implement hash algorithms that are used in support of protected
communications.
[OSPP] FCS_COP.1(3): Supports the objective by requiring the TSF to
implement digital signature algorithms that are used in support of
protected communications.
[OSPP] FCS_COP.1(4): Supports the objective by requiring the TSF to
implement HMAC algorithms that are used in support of protected
communications.
[OSPP] FPT_ACF_EXT.1: Supports the objective by requiring the TSF
restrict unprivileged users from changing critical components.
[OSPP] FIA_X509_EXT.1: Supports the objective by requiring the TSF
to validate certificates using industry standards.
[OSPP] FPT_TST_EXT.1: Supports the objective by requiring the TSF to
verify executable code critical to its operation.
[OSPP] FTP_ITC_EXT.1: Supports the objective by requiring the OS to
provide a trusted channel for critical communication.
[OSPP] FIA_AFL.1: Supports the objective by requiring the TSF to
respond accordingly when the number of failed authentication attempts
reaches a specified threshold.
[OSPP] FIA_UAU.5: Supports the objective by requiring the OS to
provide standard authentication mechanisms.
[OSPP] FMT_MOF_EXT.1: Supports this objective by requiring the TOE
to restrict the ability to perform certain management functions to a
privileged user.
O.MANAGEMENT
[OSPP] FMT_SMF_EXT.1: Supports this objective by requiring the TOE
to implement specific management functions.
[OSPP] FTA_TAB.1: Supports this objective by requiring the TOE to
implement a trusted path between the itself and users.
[OSPP] FTP_TRP.1: Supports this objective by requiring a trusted path
between users and the OS.
[OSPP] FCS_STO_EXT.1: Supports this objective by requiring the OS
to provide encrypted storage.
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE
[OSPP] FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Supports this objective by requiring the OS
to generate random bits according to industry standards.
[OSPP] FCS_COP.1(1): Supports this objective requiring the OS to
perform encryption according to industry stands.
[OSPP] FDP_ACF_EXT.1: Supports this objective by requiring the OS to
implement access controls.
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Rationale
Security objectives
[OSPP] FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Supports this objective by requiring the OS
to generate random bits according to industry standards.
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
[OSPP] FCS_CKM.1: Supports this objective by requiring the TSF to
generate asymmetric cryptographic keys to industry standards.
[OSPP] FCS_CKM.2: Supports this objective by requiring the TSF to
perform key establishment according to industry standards.
[OSPP] FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Supports this objective by requiring the TSF
to destroy key material according to industry standards.
[OSPP] FCS_COP.1(1): Supports this objective by requiring the TSF to
encrypt data according to industry standards.
[OSPP] FCS_COP.1(2): Supports this objective by requiring the TSF to
hash data according to industry standards.
[OSPP] FCS_COP.1(3): Supports this objective by requiring the TSF to
cryptographically sign data according to industry standards.
[OSPP] FCS_COP.1(4): Supports this objective by requiring the TSF to
perform keyed hashes according to industry standards.
[OSPP] FIA_X509_EXT.1: Supports the objective by requiring the TSF
to validate certificates using industry standards.
[OSPP] FIA_X509_EXT.2: Supports this objective by requiring the TSF
to validate TLS and related encrypted connections with x509
certificates.
[OSPP] FTP_ITC_EXT.1: Supports the objective by requiring the OS to
provide a trusted channel for critical communication.
[ST] FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2, FCS_TLSC_EXT.4,
FCS_SSH_EXT.1, FCS_SSHC_EXT.1, FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 define the ability
of the TOE to act as a TLS client and SSH client/server as a method of
enforcing protected communications.
Table 13: Security objectives for the TOE rationale
6.3 Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements (SARs) for the TOE are defined in the OSPP protection
profile; and defined in CC assurance package.
6.3.1 ALC Life-cycle support
6.3.1.1 ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
Developer action elements:
The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how timely security
updates are made to the OS.
ALC_TSU_EXT
.1.1D
The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how users are notified
when updates change security properties or the configuration of the product.
ALC_TSU_EXT
.1.2D
Content and presentation elements:
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The description shall include the process for creating and deploying security
updates for the OS software.
ALC_TSU_EXT
.1.1C
The description shall include the mechanisms publicly available for reporting
security issues pertaining to the OS.
ALC_TSU_EXT
.1.2C
Evaluator action elements:
The evaluator will confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_TSU_EXT
.1.1E
6.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
SAR rationales are provided by the PPs to which this ST conforms. Section 2 contains the list of
PPs.
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7 TOE Summary Specification
7.1 TSS Security Assurance Evaluation Activity
7.1.1 Timely security updates (ALC_TSU_EXT.1)
The entire TOE (and in fact the entire SLES distribution) is subject to an extensive update process.
The update process starts when SUSE is informed about defects. Depending on the severity
(security incidents are considered to be severe), fixes are developed, tested and released with
updated RPM packages.
Guaranteed response times depend on the selected service level agreement which is outlined
in https://www.suse.com/support/handbook/.
SUSE generally does not disclose, discuss, or confirm security issues until a full investigation is
complete and any necessary patches or releases are available. Further details about the security
release process can be obtained at https://www.suse.com/support/security/ Once an issue has
been confirmed and a patch has been made available, references containing technical details
on the patches are made available and Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs), etc. are
released.
SUSE distributes information about security issues in its products through its "SUSE Update
Advisory" page. (https://www.suse.com/support/update/)
The entire update process is handled by SUSE and covers all packages shipped as part of the
SLES distribution from which the TOE is a subset.
Potential security vulnerabilities can be reported by following the procedures on the "SUSE
Security Contacts" page (https://www.suse.com/support/security/contact/). This includes sending
an email to "security@suse.com" or "security@suse.de" and includes the ability to encrypt
information using the SUSE Security Team PGP key.
7.2 TOE Security Functionality
7.2.1 Audit
7.2.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
PP Origin: SSH
SFR Link: FAU_GEN.1
Audit events are generated for the following audit functions.
● Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions
● Authentication events (Success/Failure)
● Use of privileged/special rights events (Successful and unsuccessful security, audit, and
configuration changes)
● Privilege or role escalation events (Success/Failure)
● Administrator or root-level access events (Success/Failure)
Each audit record contains the following information.
● Date and time
● Type of event
● Subject identity (if applicable)
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● Outcome (success or failure)
The Lightweight Audit Framework (LAF) is designed to be an audit system for Linux compliant
with the requirements from Common Criteria. LAF is able to intercept all system calls as well as
retrieving audit log entries from privileged user space applications. The subsystem allows
configuring the events to be actually audited from the set of all events that are possible to be
audited. Those events are configured in a specific configuration file and then the kernel is notified
to build its own internal structure for the events to be audited.
Audit functionality
The Linux kernel implements the core of the LAF functionality. It gathers all audit events, analyzes
these events based on the audit rules and forwards the audit events that are requested to be
audited to the audit daemon executing in user space.
Audit events are generated in various places of the kernel. In addition, a user space application
can create audit records which needs to be fed to the kernel for further processing.
The audit functionality of the Linux kernel is configured by user space applications which
communicate with the kernel using a specific netlink communication channel. This netlink channel
is also to be used by applications that want to send an audit event to the kernel.
The kernel netlink interface is usable only by applications possessing the following capabilities:
● CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL: Performing management operations like adding or deleting audit
rules, setting or getting auditing parameters;
● CAP_AUDIT_WRITE: Submitting audit records to the kernel which in turn forwards the
audit records to the audit daemon.
Based on the audit rules, the kernel decides whether an audit event is discarded or to be sent
to the user space audit daemon for storing it in the audit trail. The kernel sends the message to
the audit daemon again using the above mentioned netlink communication channel. The audit
daemon writes the audit records to the audit trail. An internal queuing mechanism is used for
this purpose. When the queue does not have sufficient space to hold an audit record the TOE
switches into single user mode, is halted, all processes are stopped that generate audit records,
or the audit daemon executes an administrator-specified notification action depending on the
configuration of the audit daemon. This ensures that audit records do not get lost due to resource
shortage and the administrator can backup and clear the audit trail to free disk space for new
audit logs.
Access to audit data by normal users is prohibited by the discretionary access control function
of the TOE, which is used to restrict the access to the audit trail and audit configuration files to
the system administrator only.
The system administrator can define the events to be audited from the overall events that the
Lightweight Audit Framework using simple filter expressions. This allows for a flexible definition
of the events to be audited and the conditions under which events are audited. The system
administrator is also able to define a set of user IDs for which auditing is active or alternatively
a set of user IDs that are not audited.
The system administrator can select files to be audited by adding them to a watch list that is
loaded into the kernel.
The audit trail is stored in files that are readable by the root user only.
Audit trail
An audit record consists of one or more lines of text containing fields in a “keyword=value”
tagged format. The following information is contained in all audit record lines:
● Type: indicates the source of the event, such as SYSCALL, PATH, USER_LOGIN, or LOGIN
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● Timestamp: Date and time the audit record was generated
● Audit ID: unique numerical event identifier
● Login ID (“auid”), the user ID of the user authenticated by the system (regardless if the
user has changed his real and / or effective user ID afterwards)
● Effective user ID: the effective user ID of the process at the time the audit event was
generated
● Success or failure (where appropriate)
● Process ID of the subject that caused the event (PID)
This information is followed by event specific data. In some cases, such as SYSCALL event records
involving file system objects, multiple text lines will be generated for a single event, these all
have the same time stamp and audit ID to permit easy correlation.
The audit trail is stored in ASCII text. The TOE provides tools for managing ASCII files that can
be used for post-processing of audit data. These tools include:
● less - reads the ASCII audit data
● ausearch - allows selective extraction of records from the audit trail using defined
selection criteria
● sort - The audit records are listed in chronological order by default. The sort utility can
be used together with ausearch to use a different sorting order.
The audit trail is stored in files which are accessible by root only.
7.2.2 Cryptography
The security features that use cryptography in this ST are the following.
● SSH
● Secure boot and integrity protection
● TLS client
● Trusted update
● Disk Encryption
The cryptographic modules used to implement the above security features are the following.
● OpenSSL (user space)
● Linux Kernel Crypto API (kernel space)
● libgcrypt (support for GPG)
Also the disk encryption is performed by the kernel using the kernel crypto API.
The integrity verification of updates is performed using GPG using libgcrypt.
All other mechanisms rely on OpenSSL for the cryptographic primitives.
Table 14 lists the algorithms discussed in the following subsections.
Usage
Capabilities
Algorithm
SFR
TLS client mutual authentication
2048, 3072, 4096
RSA KeyGen
FCS_CKM.1
SSH mutual authentication
TLS client key establishment and
mutual authentication
P-384, P-521, P-256
ECDSA KeyGen
SSH key establishment and
mutual authentication
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Usage
Capabilities
Algorithm
SFR
TLS client key establishment
safe primes compliant to
SP800-56A rev. 3
FFC schema KeyGen
SSH key establishment
TLS client key establishment
P-384, P-521
ECC Key Establishment
(KAS-ECC)
FCS_CKM.2
SSH key establishment
TLS client key establishment
safe primes compliant to
SP800-56A rev. 3
FFC Key Establishment
(KAS-FFC)
SSH key establishment
TLS client
256-bit (which implies
512 bits for AES-XTS)
AES-CBC, AES-GCM,
AES-XTS
FCS_COP.1(1)
SSH client / server
Disk encryption
Secure boot
SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
FCS_COP.1(2)
TLS client
Trusted update
SSH client / server
Secure boot
2048, 3072, 4096 with:
SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
RSA SigGen/SigVer
FCS_COP.1(3)
TLS client
Trusted update
SSH client / server
TLS client
P-384, P-521 with:
SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
ECDSA SigGen/SigVer
SSH client / server
TLS client
HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384,
HMAC-SHA-512
FCS_COP.1(4)
SSH client / server
TLS client
AES
CTR_DRBG
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
SSH client / server
Table 14: Cryptographic algorithm table
7.2.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_CKM.1
The TOE supports generation of 2048-bit, 3072-bit, and 4096-bit RSA keys conforming to FIPS
PUB 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Appendix B.3. The TOE supports the generation of
RSA keys for use in mutual authentication of TLS, SSH sessions.
The TOE supports NIST curves P-256, P-384, and P-521 for key generation conforming to FIPS
PUB 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4. TLS, SSH sessions use these curves
for ECDH key establishment and for ECDSA-based client authentication.
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The TOE supports FFC-DH using Safe-Primes as defined by the NIST Special Publication 800-56A
Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes".
Please refer to Table 14 for details.
7.2.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_CKM.2
The TOE supports cryptographic key establishment using the following schemes.
● Elliptic curve-based key establishment with NIST curves P-256, P-384, and P-521 as
specified in NIST SP 800-56A rev 3, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography"
● Finite field-based key establishment schemes that meets NIST Special Publication
800-56A Revision 3, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography" using safe primes as defined in SP800-56A rev 3.
Elliptic curve-based key establishment is used when ECDHE ciphersuites are negotiated for TLS
sessions. For SSH support, ECDH-based key establishment is supported.
For SSH support, DH-based key establishment is supported.
Please refer to Table 14 for details.
7.2.2.3 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_CKM_EXT.4
Ephemeral cryptographic key material is held in RAM and is cleared by removing power from
the RAM.
For non-volatile memory, the life of a TLS certificate / key and SSH key pairs is indefinite. A user
or administrator can manually destroy them. To erase long-term key material held in files the
TOE provides the tool fstrim. After a deletion of a file with sensitive data, this tool uses the SSD
TRIM command to inform the SSD to discard unused blocks bypassing wear leveling. In addition,
the tool shred is available that overwrites files multiple times with random data. This tool can
be used for HDD to delete data.
As the LUKS header only holds the wrapped master volume key, it is not subject to clearing
requirements. The KEK wrapping the master volume key as well as the user passphrase from
which the KEK is derived are held in volatile store and thus are subject to the associated clearing
mechanism. The unwrapped master volume key is also only held in volatile store subject to the
same clearing mechanism. With the destruction of the master volume key that is used to protect
the encrypted disk, all data on that disk are cryptographically erased.
7.2.2.4 FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_COP.1(1)
The TOE supports AES encryption using 256-bit keys in the following modes.
● CBC as specified in NIST SP 800-38A (for TLS, SSH)
● GCM as specified in NIST SP 800-38D (for TLS, SSH)
● XTS as specified in NIST SP 800-38E (for disk encryption)
Please refer to Table 14 for details.
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7.2.2.5 FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation - Hashing
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_COP.1(2)
The TOE supports cryptographic hashing services conforming to FIPS Pub 180-4. The hashing
algorithms are used for signature services and HMAC services.
The following hashing algorithms supported: SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. The message
digest sizes supported are: 256 bits, 384 bits, and 512 bits.
Please refer to Table 14 for details.
7.2.2.6 FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation - Signing (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_COP.1(3)
The TOE provides cryptographic signature generation and verification in accordance with the
following cryptographic algorithms.
● RSA digital signature algorithm conforming to FIPS Pub 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard
(DSS)", Section 4. The RSA key sizes supported are: 3072 bits, and 4096-bit.
● Elliptical curve digital signature algorithm conforming to FIPS Pub 186-4, "Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)", Section 5. The TOE supports curves P-384, and P-521.
Please refer to Table 14 for details.
7.2.2.7 FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation - Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_COP.1(4)
The TOE supports keyed-hash message authentication conforming to FIPS Pub 198-1 "The
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code" and FIPS Pub 180-4 "Secure Hash Standard" with
the following algorithms
● HMAC-SHA-256
● HMAC-SHA-384
● HMAC-SHA-512
The TOE supports key sizes 8 bits and higher for all HMAC algorithms.
Please refer to Table 14 for details.
7.2.2.8 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_RBG_EXT.1
The TOE uses a CTR_DRBG(AES) to generate random bits. The DRBG is seeded by an entropy
source that accumulates entropy from a software-based noise (interrupts) source accessed via
the kernel interface of getrandom. In addition, the userspace software-based noise source of
the Jitter RNG version 3.4.1 is used. Both noise sources provide data with a minimum of 384 bits
of entropy each to initially seed the DRBG and with 256 bits of entropy to reseed the DRBG. The
data from both noise sources are concatenated and the concatenated bit stream is given to the
DRBG seed/reseed function.
Please refer to Table 14 for details.
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7.2.2.9 FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Sensitive Data
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_STO_EXT.1
The TOE stores the following sensitive data.
● Usernames and passwords are used for authentication are maintained by local directory
services in files protected by the operating system. The file with user names is write
protected except for the root user. The credential store is read/write protected except
for the root user.
● Trusted Certificates are used for establishing TLS, SSH sessions and are stored in files
protected by the operating system. Per-user SSH keys are read-writable only for the
owning user.
● Private Keys used for establishing TLS, SSH sessions and are stored in files protected
by the operating system. Per-user SSH keys are read-writable only for the owning user.
The TOE offers a storage location in /etc/pki for private keys and certificates. User keys and
certificates applicable to the SSH communication are stored in the user's home directory in the
.ssh subdirectory. This subdirectory is only considered valid if its permission are set such that
only the owner can access the files.
The TOE provides disk encryption for partitions. All partition including the root partition can be
encrypted. In case of encryption of the root partition, the kernel and the initial RAM disk files
must be stored on an unencrypted partition. These two files together with the boot loader
configuration file cannot be stored protected by dm-crypt.
Confidentiality protected data storage
File system objects are stored on block devices, such as partitions on hard disk. The Linux
operating systems offers the use of an additional layer between the file systems and the physical
block device to encrypt and decrypt any data transmitted between the file system and the block
device. The dm_crypt functionality uses the Linux device mapper to provide such encryption
and decryption operation that is transparent to the file system and therefore to the user.
Before mounting the block device that is protected by the dm_crypt encryption scheme, the
owner of the encrypted block device has to provide a passphrase. This passphrase is used to
decrypt the symmetric volume key which is injected into the kernel. Using that volume key, the
kernel is now able to decrypt (to unlock) the data on the device and provides access to data
stored on that device. At this point, the file system can be mounted as the file system can now
be read.
Once the dm_crypt protected device is unlocked and mounted, it is accessible as any other file
system. When it is unmounted and locked (i.e. the kernel is informed to discard the volume key),
all data on the device is inaccessible. Even administrative users like the root user are not able
to access any data any more. When an administrator would access the raw hardware hosting
the block device, only encrypted data can be read.
For the cryptographic operation, the creator of the dm_crypt block device can select the cipher.
When creating the dm_crypt block device, the volume key is obtained from the Linux random
number generator and stored on the block device encrypted with the user's passphrase. The
key derivation mechanism from the user's password is based on the LUKS mechanism.
The encryption and decryption operation of the device is implemented by the kernel. To unlock
the encrypted volume key stored on the protected block device, the cryptsetup application
performs the following steps:
1. obtain the user's passphrase
2. apply the LUKS key derivation mechanism on the passphrase
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3. read the encrypted volume key from the device
4. decrypt the volume key with the key derived from the user's passphrase
5. inject the decrypted volume key into the kernel and set up the mapping between the
block device and the volume key
Using the cryptsetup tool, the volume key can also be transferred by encrypting it with another
passphrase which can be given to another user. The transfer follows the same steps outlined
for the unlocking operation, but instead of injecting the decrypted volume key into the kernel,
cryptsetup fetches the new passphrase from the user, applies the LUKS mechanism on that
passphrase, encrypts the volume key with the derived key and stores the encrypted volume key
in a separate area on the device. At this point, the volume key is now stored encrypted in two
separate places.
Similarly, the cryptsetup tool can be used to erase the storage location of one encrypted volume
key which implies that the user owning the passphrase of the affected encrypted volume key is
not able to unlock the block device any more.
The random number generator used to generate the key material is specified with FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
The installer with the exception of IBM Z System allows the configuration of the full disk encryption
schema where the entire disk is protected, except the /boot partition.
7.2.2.10 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
The TOE provides TLSv1.2 to allow users from a remote host to establish a secure channel to
the TOE. The TLS protocol performs the support authentication as part by verifying the RSA
certificates. The TOE can be configured using a bi-directional certificate verification where the
server side (implemented by the libvirt daemon) validates the client certificate.
The following table documents implementation details concerning the OpenSSL implementation’s
compliance to the relevant standards. It addresses areas where the standards permit different
implementation choices such as optional features.
Implementation Details
Description
Reference
The evaluated configuration always uses server certificates.
Client certificates are used to allow the server to
authenticate the client.
Handshake protocol
overview: certificates
RFC 5246
section 7.3
OpenSSL uses data from the Linux kernel random number
generator, a persistent entropy pool file, and volatile system
statistics to seed the PRNG.
Random Number Generation
and Seeding
RFC 5246
appendix D.1
The evaluated configuration supports verification of
certificate chains.
Certificates and
authentication
RFC 5246
appendix D.2
The ciphers supported in the evaluated configuration are
listed in FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 for the TLS protocol.
Cipher suites
RFC 5246
appendix D.3
The OpenSSL implementation supports the backwards
compatible protocol, but this is disabled in the evaluated
configuration. It permits use of TLSv1.2 exclusively.
SSLv2, SSLv3, TLSv1.0,
TLSv1.1 Backward
Combatibility
RFC 5246
appendix E
Table 15: TLS implementation notes
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The TOE supports the generation of the RSA key pair used by the server. The key generation
mechanism uses the Linux kernel random number generator. The evaluated configuration also
allows the use of an externally-generated certificate. A widely accepted Certification Authority
might be used to generate and/or sign such a certificate (allowing a wide community trusting
this CA to validate the certificate). In a closed community it might also be sufficient to have one
server within the community to act as a CA. The OpenSSL library provides the functions to set
up such a CA, but those functions are not subject of this Security Target.
The key material used for by TLS is obtained from the getrandom system call and is fed into the
state random number generator.
The TOE implements TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) client functionality supporting the following cipher
suites.
● TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
● TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
● TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288
● TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288
● TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
● TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
● TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
● TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
● TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
● TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
The TOE also supports the following TLS 1.2 cipher suites not specified in [OSPP]☝.
● TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
● TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
● TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
● TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
The TOE verifies that server certificate is valid according to FIA_X509_EXT.1 and that the presented
identifier matches the reference identifier according to RFC 6125. The reference identifiers
supported are DNS and IP addresses in the SAN. Wildcards are supported. The TOE does not
support certificate pinning. The TOE does not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate
is invalid.
The TOE supports mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates. When configured, the TOE
will send a Certificate and Certificate Verify message in response to a Certificate Request message
from a TLS server. It also implements session renegotiation.
7.2.2.11 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Support for Supported Groups
Extension
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_TLSC_EXT.2
The TOE, by default, presents the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension in the Client Hello with
the following NIST curves: secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1. In addition, the safe primes
from RFC7919 are supported as well.
7.2.2.12 FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_TLSC_EXT.4
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The TOE supports mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates. When configured, the TOE
will send a Certificate and Certificate Verify message in response to a Certificate Request message
from a TLS server.
7.2.2.13 FCS_SSH_EXT.1 SSH Protocol
PP Origin: SSH
SFR Link: FCS_SSH_EXT.1
The TOE provides the Secure Shell Protocol Version 2 (SSH v2.0) to allow users from a remote
host to establish a secure connection and perform a logon to the TOE.
The following table documents implementation details concerning the OpenSSH implementation’s
compliance to the relevant standards. It addresses areas where the standards permit different
implementation choices such as optional features.
Implementation Details
Description
Reference
The OpenSSH implementation is capable of interoperating
with clients and servers using the old 1.x protocol. That
functionality is explicitly disabled in the evaluated
configuration, it permits protocol version 2.0 exclusively.
Compatibility with old SSH
versions
RFC 4253
chapter 5
OpenSSH supports the OPTIONAL "zlib" compression method.
Compression
RFC 4253
section 6.2
The ciphers supported in the evaluated configuration are
listed in FCS_SSH_EXT.1 for the SSH protocol.
Encryption
RFC 4253
section 6.3
This REQUIRED authentication method is supported by
OpenSSH but can be disabled by the administrator of the
OpenSSH daemon.
Public Key Authentication
Method: "publickey"
RFC 4252
chapter 7
This SHOULD authentication method is supported by
OpenSSH but can be disabled by the administrator of the
OpenSSH daemon.
Password Authentication
Method: "password"
RFC 4252
chapter 8
The OpenSSH implementation supports the optional
password change mechanism in the evaluated configuration.
Password change request and
setting new password
RFC 4252
chapter 8
This OPTIONAL authentication method is disabled in the
evaluated configuration.
Host-Based Authentication:
"hostbased"
RFC 4252
chapter 9
Table 16: SSH implementation notes
The TOE supports the generation of RSA, DSA (for DH operation) as well as ECDSA key pairs.
These key pairs are used by OpenSSH for the host keys as well as for the per-user keys. When
a user registers his public key with the user he wants to access on the server side, a key-based
authentication can be performed instead of a password-based authentication. The key generation
mechanism uses the random number generator of the underlying cryptographic library. The
evaluated configuration permits the import of externally-generated key pairs.
The TOE supports the following security functions of the SSH v2.0 protocol:
● Establishing a secure communication channel using the following cryptographic functions
provided by the SSH v2.0 protocol:
❍ Encryption as defined in section 6.3 of [RFC4253]☝ - the DH/ECDH forming the
basis for the key agreement and thus the symmetric / MAC keys are generated
using the random number generator of the underlying cryptographic library;
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❍ Diffie-Hellman key agreement used in conjunction with the key derivation
function as defined in section 7.2 of [RFC4253]☝ supplemented by [RFC5656]☝
chapter 4;
❍ The keyed hash function for integrity protection as defined in section 6.4 of
[RFC4253]☝.
Note: The protocol supports more cryptographic algorithms than the ones listed above.
Those other algorithms are not covered by this evaluation and should be disabled or
not used when running the evaluated configuration.
● Performing user authentication using the standard password-based authentication
method the TOE provides for users (password authentication method as defined in
chapter 5 of [RFC4252]☝).
● Performing user authentication using a RSA, or ECDSA key-based authentication method
(public key authentication method as defined in chapter 5 of [RFC4252]☝).
● Checking the integrity of the messages exchanged and close down the connection in
case an integrity error is detected.
The OpenSSH applications of sshd, ssh and ssh-keygen use the OpenSSL random number
generator seeded by the getrandom system call to generate cryptographic keys. OpenSSL
provides different DRNGs depending whether the FIPS 140-2 mode is enabled in the system.
The cryptographic implementations ensure that sensitive data is appropriately zeroized before
releasing the associated memory.
The TOE supports the following authentication mechanisms with SSH:
● Password-based authentication
● Key-based authentication with RSA keys and ECDSA keys.
The TOE maintains a counter for each SSH packet which is increased by the number of received
bytes. If the counter reaches the threshold of 262144 bytes, the connection is closed.
After processing at most 2^30 bytes covering both sent and received data or the last re-key is
more than 1 hour ago, the TOE initiates a re-keying, when the option RekeyLimit is set
appropriately.
The SSH implementation supports the following ciphers:
● Symmetric ciphers: aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc, aes128-gcm@openssh.com,
aes256-gcm@openssh.com
● Asymmetric ciphers: rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
● MAC: hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512, AES GCM
● Key agreement: diffie-hellman-group14-sha256, diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-nistp384,
ecdh-sha2-nistp521
The aforementioned statements apply equally to the SSH client and server implementation.
7.2.2.14 FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Protocol - Client
PP Origin: SSH
SFR Link: FCS_SSHC_EXT.1
The TOE provides an SSH client which supports the SSH server authentication using RSA, and
ECDSA.
7.2.2.15 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Protocol - Server
PP Origin: SSH
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SFR Link: FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
The TOE provides an SSH server which supports the SSH client authentication using RSA, and
ECDSA.
7.2.3 User data protection
7.2.3.1 FDP_ACF_EXT.1 Access Controls for Protecting User Data
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FDP_ACF_EXT.1
The TOE uses the BtrFS file system which provides access control to data. File system object
attributes includes manipulation of metadata (e.g., change, access, modify time), as well as
owner and permission data (e.g., group-ids for allowing multiple users to have the same access
privileges, user-ids for individual access privileges, and permissions that can be assigned per
user or group). The TOE provides the following file system security schemes: AppArmor access
control, POSIX access control lists (ACLs), Unix (BSD) permissions.
These security schemes fit together as follows (rules are processed in the following order).
1. If the AppArmor rules forbids the requested access, the request is denied.
2. If an access control entry exists on the file, it is evaluated and used to determine access
rights.
3. Otherwise, if the user ID matches the owner of the file, the "user" permissions (also
called "owner" permissions) are used.
4. Otherwise, if the group ID matches the group for the file, the "group" permissions are
used.
5. Otherwise, the "other" permissions are used.
AppArmor
The TOE supports the use of AppArmor to limit an app’s ability to access files. These limits
override any permissions the app might otherwise have. AppArmor rules are subtractive, not
additive. Therefore, the file system permissions represent the maximum access an app might
be allowed if AppArmor also permits that access.
POSIX ACLs
The TOE supports ACLs, which are data structures that provide much more detailed control over
permissions than Unix permissions. For example, ACLs allow the system administrator to specify
that a specific user can delete a file but cannot write to it. An ACL consists of an ordered list of
ACEs (access control entries), each of which associates a user or group with a set of permissions
and specifies whether each permission is allowed or denied. ACEs also include attributes related
to inheritance.
Each ACL on a directory can contain any combination of the following inheritance flags.
● Inherited (this ACE was inherited)
● File Inherit (this ACE should be inherited by files created within this directory)
● Directory Inherit (this ACE should be inherited by directories created within this directory)
● Inherit Only (this ACE should not be checked during authorization)
● No Propagate Inherit (this ACE should be inherited only by direct children; that is, the
ACE should lose any Directory Inherit or File Inherit bit when inherited)
When it creates a new file, the kernel goes through the entire access control list of the parent
directory and copies to the file's ACL any ACEs that are marked for file inheritance. Similarly,
when it creates a new subdirectory, the kernel copies to the subdirectory's ACL any ACEs that
are marked for directory inheritance.
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If a file is copied and pasted into a directory, the kernel replicates the contents of the source file
into a new file at the destination. Because it is creating a new file, the system checks the ACL
of the parent directory and adds any inherited ACEs to whatever ACEs were in the original file.
If a file is moved into a directory, on the other hand, the original file is not replicated and no
ACEs are inherited. In this case, the parent directory's ACEs are added to the moved file only if
the administrator specifically propagates ACEs from the parent directory through contained files
and subdirectories. Similarly, once a file has been created, changing the ACL of the parent
directory does not affect the ACL of contained files and subdirectories unless the administrator
specifically propagates the change.
The order in which ACEs are placed in an ACL—and therefore the order in which they are evaluated
to determine permissions—is as follows:
1. Explicitly specified deny associations
2. Explicitly specified allow associations
Inherited associations, in the same order in which they appeared in the parent. Since ACEs can
be inherited, administrators can control the fine-grained permissions of files created in a directory
by assigning inheritable ACEs to the directory. Doing so saves the work of assigning ACEs to
each file individually. In addition, because ACEs can apply to groups of users, administrators can
assign permissions to groups rather than having to specify permissions for each individual.
Applying access security to directories and groups rather than to files and individuals saves
administrator time and gives better file system performance in many circumstances.
Unix Permissions
Each file system object has a set of UNIX permissions defined by three attributes
● UID, short for user ID. Commonly referred to as the File’s Owner.
● GID, short for group ID.
● Flags that include permission bits and other related attributes.
The flags for a file or directory are a 16-bit value that is often represented as a three-digit or
four-digit octal value (with the top four or seven bits dropped). The Owner, Group, and Other bit
sets contain three bits: read, write, execute (rwx for short).
7.2.4 Identification and authentication
7.2.4.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FIA_AFL.1
The TOE will detect when an administrator configurable integer within 1 and 2^32 - 1 unsuccessful
authentication attempts for authentication based on username and password attempts as well
as SSH-based authentication attempts have been met. Once the specified number of unsuccessful
authentication attempts for an account has been met, the TOE will lock out the account.
7.2.4.2 FIA_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FIA_UAU.5
The TOE supports authentication based on username/password.
For password-based authentication, the user account contains a username and a password. A
random salt is created for the password which is used to derive a SHA2-512 hash value that is
stored in the /etc/shadow file. When a user logs into the system, the TOE uses the entered
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password and the randomly generated salt and compares this with the stored value. If they
match, then the user is granted access to the system. If the values do not match, then the user
is not granted access.
The TOE supports authentication with SSH-keys. The public key is stored with the SSH server
that a user wants to use for the key-based authentication. Similarly, an SSH client authenticates
the remote SSH server's public key against his local database of public keys. SSH-key-based
authentication is specified in RFC4252.
7.2.4.3 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FIA_X509_EXT.1
When an X.509 certificate is presented as part of the TLS connection establishment, the TOE
verifies the certificate path, and certification validation process by verifying the following rules
● RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation
● The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate marked as a trust
anchor in the user or platform’s keychain
● All CA certificates contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag is set to TRUE
and (if present) path constraints are met
● All CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the key usage field
● Certificate revocation status is checked using OCSP stapling as well as CRL. The certificate
is accepted if it's revocation status cannot be determined.
The TOE validates the extendedKeyUsage field depending on the specific usage of the certificate
as follows.
● Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall
have the Code Signing Purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
● Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp
1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
● Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp
2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
● S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email
Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
● OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing Purpose
(id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.
● Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA)
purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field. (conditional)
X.509 certificates are validated when imported into the TOE's trusted certificate store, during
session establishment with a peer and prior to presenting a certificate to the peer during trusted
channel implementation using TLS for mutual authentications.
The TOE implements X.509 certificate chain validation following RFC5280 and OCSP following
RFC6066 and CRL as specified in RFC8603.
7.2.4.4 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FIA_X509_EXT.2
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates for performing mutual authentication for TLS in HTTPS
connections.
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7.2.5 Security management
7.2.5.1 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Management of security functions behavior
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FMT_MOF_EXT.1
See the TSS for FMT_SMF_EXT.1.
7.2.5.2 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Specification of Management Functions
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FMT_SMF_EXT.1
The TOE supports the following roles: Administrator and User. The Administrator is a member
of the local admin group or an applied configuration profile, and the User is an unprivileged
account.
The Administrator has access to the following management functions.
● Enable/disable screen lock
● Configure screen lock inactivity timeout
● Import keys/secrets into the secure key storage (for the system)
● Configure local audit storage capacity
● Configure minimum password Length
● Configure minimum number of special characters in password
● Configure minimum number of numeric characters in password
● Configure minimum number of uppercase characters in password
● Configure minimum number of lowercase characters in password
● Configure lockout policy for unsuccessful authentication attempts through limiting
number of attempts during a time period
● Configure host-based firewall
● Configure name/address of the logging server (syslog) to which to send logging records
● Configure audit rules
● Configure name/address of network time server
● Enable/disable automatic software update
● Configure Wi-Fi interface
Access to the administrator-only management functions is restricted by means of appropriate
permission bits applied to the configuration files that hold the respective configuration data.
The User has access to the following management functions.
● Enable/disable screen lock
● Configure screen lock inactivity timeout when locked through the screen saver
● Import keys/secrets into the secure key storage (for the user)
● Configure Wi-Fi interface (if not restricted by an Administrator)
7.2.6 Protection of the TSF
7.2.6.1 FPT_ACF_EXT.1 Access controls
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FPT_ACF_EXT.1
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The TOE provides access control policy through file permissions protecting system files preventing
users from modifying protected files and folders. Appropriate permission settings protect the
following parts of the system from unauthorized modification.
● Kernel / initial RAM disk / boot loader configuration:
❍ /boot
● Kernel drivers and modules
❍ /lib/modules
● Shared libraries
❍ /usr/lib
❍ /usr/lib64
❍ /lib
❍ /lib64
● Applications
❍ /bin
❍ /sbin
❍ /usr/sbin
❍ /usr/bin
● Security audit logs
❍ /var/log/audit
● System configuration files
❍ /etc
● TSF-data
❍ /var except /var/tmp which is a link to /tmp
● System-wide credentials repositories
❍ /etc/group (world-readable)
❍ /etc/passwd (world-readable)
❍ /etc/gshadow
❍ /etc/shadow
❍ /etc/security/opasswd
The TOE prevents unprivileged users from reading Security audit logs. System-wide credential
repositories are write-protected for unprivileged users. In addition, the repository holding the
user passwords is read/write protected for unprivileged users.
7.2.6.2 FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 Address Space Layout Randomization
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FPT_ASLR_EXT.1
The TOE always randomizes process address memory locations with 11 bits (stack) and 28 bits
(text segment) of entropy.
7.2.6.3 FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 Stack Buffer Overflow Protection
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FPT_SBOP_EXT.1
The TOE protects all TOE binaries from stack-based buffer overflow attacks using.
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● ASLR to randomize the locations of the stack, preventing attackers from jumping to
specific data that has been written to the stack.
● Stack canaries to detect if the stack has been overwritten when returning from a function.
The following list enumerates the binaries which are exempt from the stack buffer overflow
protection:
● /usr/bin/extlinux
● /usr/bin/gethostip
● /usr/bin/isohybrid
● /usr/bin/memdiskfind
● /usr/bin/syslinux
● /usr/bin/syslinux-mtools
● /usr/bin/fc-list
● /usr/bin/fc-pattern
● /usr/bin/fc-query
● /usr/bin/fc-scan
● /usr/bin/clear
● /usr/bin/tabs
● /usr/bin/bzip2recover
● /usr/bin/xxd
● /usr/bin/grub2-editenv
● /usr/bin/grub2-emu
● /usr/bin/grub2-file
● /usr/bin/grub2-fstest
● /usr/bin/grub2-glue-efi
● /usr/bin/grub2-menulst2cfg
● /usr/bin/grub2-mkfont
● /usr/bin/grub2-mkimage
● /usr/bin/grub2-mklayout
● /usr/bin/grub2-mknetdir
● /usr/bin/grub2-mkpasswd-pbkdf2
● /usr/bin/grub2-mkrelpath
● /usr/bin/grub2-mkrescue
● /usr/bin/grub2-mkstandalone
● /usr/bin/grub2-mount
● /usr/bin/grub2-render-label
● /usr/bin/grub2-script-check
● /usr/bin/grub2-syslinux2cfg
● /usr/bin/python3.6
● /usr/bin/python3.6m
● /usr/bin/dbus-uuidgen
● /usr/bin/checkmedia
● /usr/bin/line
● /usr/bin/rev
● /usr/bin/ruby
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● /usr/bin/ruby.ruby2.5
● /usr/bin/mandb
● /usr/bin/ausyscall
● /usr/bin/suseconnect
● /bin/fsync
● /bin/usleep
● /usr/sbin/cracklib-unpacker
● /usr/sbin/regdbdump
● /usr/sbin/mklost+found
● /usr/sbin/fatresize
● /usr/sbin/partprobe
● /usr/sbin/ebtables-legacy
● /usr/sbin/ebtablesu
● /usr/sbin/grub2-bios-setup
● /usr/sbin/grub2-install
● /usr/sbin/grub2-macbless
● /usr/sbin/grub2-ofpathname
● /usr/sbin/grub2-probe
● /usr/sbin/grub2-sparc64-setup
● /usr/sbin/mdevctl
● /usr/sbin/findfs
● /usr/sbin/pivot_root
● /usr/sbin/accessdb
● /usr/sbin/postdrop
● /usr/sbin/postfix
● /usr/sbin/postkick
● /usr/sbin/postlock
● /usr/sbin/postlog
● /sbin/blogger
● /sbin/fstab-decode
● /usr/lib/perl5/5.26.1/$(uname -m)-linux-thread-multi/auto/Fcntl/Fcntl.so
● /usr/lib/perl5/5.26.1/$(uname -m)-linux-thread-multi/auto/File/DosGlob/DosGlob.so
● /usr/lib/perl5/5.26.1/$(uname -m)-linux-thread-multi/auto/Devel/Peek/Peek.so
● /usr/lib/perl5/5.26.1/$(uname -m)-linux-thread-multi/auto/Encode/Byte/Byte.so
● /usr/lib/perl5/5.26.1/$(uname -m)-linux-thread-multi/auto/Encode/CN/CN.so
● /usr/lib/perl5/5.26.1/$(uname -m)-linux-thread-multi/auto/Encode/EBCDIC/EBCDIC.so
● /usr/lib/perl5/5.26.1/$(uname -m)-linux-thread-multi/auto/Encode/JP/JP.so
● /usr/lib/perl5/5.26.1/$(uname -m)-linux-thread-multi/auto/Encode/KR/KR.so
● /usr/lib/perl5/5.26.1/$(uname -m)-linux-thread-multi/auto/Encode/Symbol/Symbol.so
● /usr/lib/perl5/5.26.1/$(uname -m)-linux-thread-multi/auto/Encode/TW/TW.so
● /usr/lib/perl5/5.26.1/$(uname -m)-linux-thread-multi/auto/Filter/Util/Call/Call.so
● /usr/lib/perl5/5.26.1/$(uname -m)-linux-thread-multi/auto/I18N/Langinfo/Langinfo.so
● /usr/lib/perl5/vendor_perl/5.26.1/$(uname
-m)-linux-thread-multi/auto/Locale/gettext/gettext.so
● /lib/modules/5.14.21-150400.22-default/vdso/vdso64.so
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● /lib64/ld-2.31.so
● /lib64/libmvec-2.31.so
● /lib64/libgcc_s.so.1
● /lib64/libtinfow.so.6.1
● /lib64/security/pam_deny.so
● /lib64/multipath/libprioalua.so
● /lib64/multipath/libprioconst.so
● /usr/lib64/libx86emu.so.3.1
● /usr/lib64/libwayland-egl.so.1.0.0
● /usr/lib64/liburing.so.2.1.0
● /usr/lib64/liburcu-common.so.6.1.0
● /usr/lib64/libbrotlicommon.so.1.0.7
● /usr/lib64/libX11-xcb.so.1.0.0
● /usr/lib64/liblttng-ust-fd.so.0.0.0
● /usr/lib64/libstdc++.so.6.0.29
● /usr/lib64/libxentoolcore.so.1.0
● /usr/lib64/xenfsimage/iso9660/fsimage.so
● /usr/lib64/xenfsimage/ufs/fsimage.so
● /usr/lib64/ldb2/modules/ldb/ldb.so
● /usr/lib64/ldb2/modules/ldb/mdb.so
● /usr/lib64/ldb2/modules/ldb/skel.so
● /usr/lib64/ldb2/modules/ldb/tdb.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libebt_arpreply.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libebt_dnat.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libebt_redirect.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libebt_snat.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libip6t_DNPT.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libip6t_HL.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libip6t_LOG.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libip6t_REJECT.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libip6t_SNAT.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libip6t_SNPT.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libip6t_ah.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libip6t_eui64.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libip6t_frag.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libip6t_hl.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libip6t_ipv6header.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libip6t_rt.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libip6t_srh.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libipt_CLUSTERIP.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libipt_ECN.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libipt_LOG.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libipt_REJECT.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libipt_TTL.so
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● /usr/lib64/xtables/libipt_ULOG.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libipt_ah.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libipt_ttl.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_AUDIT.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_CHECKSUM.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_CONNMARK.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_CONNSECMARK.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_DSCP.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_HMARK.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_IDLETIMER.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_LED.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_NFLOG.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_NFQUEUE.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_SECMARK.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_SYNPROXY
.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_TCPMSS.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_TEE.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_TOS.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_TPROXY
.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_TRACE.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_addrtype.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_cgroup.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_cluster.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_connbytes.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_connlimit.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_connmark.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_cpu.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_dccp.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_dscp.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_ecn.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_esp.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_helper.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_ipcomp.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_ipvs.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_length.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_mac.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_mark.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_multiport.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_nfacct.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_osf.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_physdev.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_pkttype.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_policy.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_quota.so
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● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_recent.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_rpfilter.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_sctp.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_socket.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_standard.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_statistic.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_tcpmss.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_tos.so
● /usr/lib64/xtables/libxt_udp.so
● /usr/lib64/libpanel.so.6.1
● /usr/lib64/libpanelw.so.6.1
● /usr/lib64/libharfbuzz-gobject.so.0.30400.0
● /usr/lib64/libcairo-gobject.so.2.11600.0
● /usr/lib64/gawk/readdir.so
● /usr/lib64/gawk/revtwoway.so
● /usr/lib64/gconv/libCNS.so
● /usr/lib64/gconv/libGB.so
● /usr/lib64/gconv/libISOIR165.so
● /usr/lib64/gconv/libJIS.so
● /usr/lib64/gconv/libJISX0213.so
● /usr/lib64/gconv/libKSC.so
● /usr/lib64/rpm-plugins/prioreset.so
● /usr/lib64/rpm-plugins/syslog.so
● /usr/lib64/engines-1.1/capi.so
● /usr/lib64/libicudata.so.suse65.1
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/continuation.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/digest/bubblebabble.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/digest/md5.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/digest/rmd160.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/digest/sha1.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/digest/sha2.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/big5.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/cp949.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/emacs_mule.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/encdb.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/euc_jp.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/euc_kr.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/euc_tw.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/gb18030.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/gb2312.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/gbk.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_1.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_10.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_11.so
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● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_13.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_14.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_15.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_16.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_2.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_3.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_4.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_5.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_6.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_7.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_8.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_9.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/koi8_r.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/koi8_u.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/shift_jis.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/trans/big5.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/trans/chinese.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/trans/ebcdic.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/trans/emoji.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/trans/emoji_iso2022_kddi.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/trans/emoji_sjis_docomo.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/trans/emoji_sjis_kddi.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/trans/emoji_sjis_softbank.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/trans/escape.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/trans/gb18030.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/trans/gbk.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/trans/iso2022.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/trans/japanese.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/trans/japanese_euc.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/trans/japanese_sjis.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/trans/korean.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/trans/single_byte.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/trans/transdb.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/trans/utf_16_32.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/utf_16be.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/utf_16le.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/utf_32be.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/utf_32le.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/windows_1250.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/windows_1251.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/windows_1252.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/windows_1253.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/windows_1254.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/windows_1257.so
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● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/enc/windows_31j.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/fcntl.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/fiber.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/$(uname -m)64-linux-gnu/rbconfig/sizeof.so
● /usr/lib64/python3.6/site-packages/_dbus_glib_bindings.so
● /usr/lib64/gstreamer-1.0/libgstapp.so
● /usr/lib64/gstreamer-1.0/libgstpbtypes.so
● /usr/lib64/gdk-pixbuf-2.0/2.10.0/loaders/libpixbufloader-svg.so
● /usr/lib64/librsvg-2.so.2.48.0
● /usr/lib64/qemu/hw-display-virtio-vga-gl.so
● /usr/lib64/qemu/hw-display-virtio-vga.so
● /usr/lib64/qemu/ui-egl-headless.so
● /usr/lib64/qemu/hw-display-virtio-gpu-pci-gl.so
● /usr/lib64/qemu/hw-display-virtio-gpu-pci.so
● /usr/lib64/samba/libcmdline-contexts-samba4.so
● /usr/lib64/samba/libevents-samba4.so
● /usr/lib64/samba/libflag-mapping-samba4.so
● /usr/lib64/samba/libgenrand-samba4.so
● /usr/lib64/samba/libiov-buf-samba4.so
● /usr/lib64/samba/libmessages-util-samba4.so
● /usr/lib64/samba/libmsghdr-samba4.so
● /usr/lib64/samba/libserver-role-samba4.so
● /usr/lib64/samba/libsmbd-shim-samba4.so
● /usr/lib64/samba/libsocket-blocking-samba4.so
● /usr/lib64/samba/libutil-setid-samba4.so
● /usr/lib64/libsamba-errors.so.1
● /usr/lib64/ipsec/plugins/libstrongswan-aes.so
● /usr/lib64/ipsec/plugins/libstrongswan-mgf1.so
● /usr/lib64/ipsec/plugins/libstrongswan-nonce.so
● /usr/lib64/ipsec/plugins/libstrongswan-random.so
● /usr/lib64/libplc4.so
The following list enumerates the binaries on IBM System Z which are exempt from the stack
buffer overflow protection:
● /usr/bin/tclsh8.6
● /usr/bin/wish8.6
● /usr/bin/xorriso
● /usr/bin/grub2-protect
● /usr/bin/gtk-query-immodules-2.0-64
● /usr/bin/gtk-update-icon-cache-2.0
● /usr/sbin/lockdev
● /usr/sbin/ipset
● /sbin/ttyrun
● /usr/lib64/libatomic.so.1.2.0
● /usr/lib64/libstdc++.so.6.0.30
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● /usr/lib64/libavahi-glib.so.1.0.2
● /usr/lib64/engines-1.1/padlock.so
● /usr/lib64/libpytalloc-util.cpython-36m-s390x-linux-gnu.so.2.3.3
● /usr/lib64/qemu/hw-s390x-virtio-gpu-ccw.so
● /usr/lib64/libbd_part_err.so.2.0.0
● /usr/lib64/gtk-2.0/modules/libatk-bridge.so
● /usr/lib64/gtk-2.0/2.10.0/engines/libpixmap.so
● /usr/lib64/gtk-2.0/2.10.0/immodules/im-cedilla.so
● /usr/lib64/gtk-2.0/2.10.0/immodules/im-cyrillic-translit.so
● /usr/lib64/gtk-2.0/2.10.0/immodules/im-ipa.so
● /usr/lib64/samba/libsmbpasswdparser-samba4.so
● /usr/lib64/libdcerpc-samr.so.0.0.1
● /usr/lib64/libgailutil.so.18.0.1
The following list enumerates the binaries on Intel / AMD system which are exempt from the
stack buffer overflow protection:
● /usr/bin/tclsh8.6
● /usr/bin/hugeedit
● /usr/bin/wish8.6
● /usr/bin/xorriso
● /usr/bin/grub2-protect
● /usr/bin/gtk-query-immodules-2.0-64
● /usr/bin/gtk-update-icon-cache-2.0
● /usr/sbin/lockdev
● /usr/sbin/ipset
● /lib/modules/5.14.21-150400.24.60-default/vdso/vdso64.so
● /lib/modules/5.14.21-150400.24.69-default/vdso/vdso64.so
● /usr/lib64/libstdc++.so.6.0.30
● /usr/lib64/libavahi-glib.so.1.0.2
● /usr/lib64/libpytalloc-util.cpython-36m-x86_64-linux-gnu.so.2.3.3
● /usr/lib64/libbd_part_err.so.2.0.0
● /usr/lib64/gtk-2.0/modules/libatk-bridge.so
● /usr/lib64/gtk-2.0/2.10.0/engines/libpixmap.so
● /usr/lib64/gtk-2.0/2.10.0/immodules/im-cedilla.so
● /usr/lib64/gtk-2.0/2.10.0/immodules/im-cyrillic-translit.so
● /usr/lib64/gtk-2.0/2.10.0/immodules/im-ipa.so
● /usr/lib64/samba/libsmbpasswdparser-samba4.so
● /usr/lib64/libdcerpc-samr.so.0.0.1
● /usr/lib64/libgailutil.so.18.0.1
The following list enumerates the binaries on an ARM system which are exempt from the stack
buffer overflow protection:
● /usr/lib64/libpytalloc-util.cpython-36m-aarch64-linux-gnu.so.2.3.3
The following list enumerates the binaries on a POWER system which are exempt from the stack
buffer overflow protection:
● /usr/bin/spawn_console
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● /usr/bin/spawn_login
● /usr/lib64/libtss2-rc.so.0.0.0
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/continuation.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/digest/bubblebabble.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/digest/md5.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/digest/rmd160.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/digest/sha1.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/digest/sha2.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/big5.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/cp949.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/emacs_mule.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/encdb.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/euc_jp.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/euc_kr.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/euc_tw.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/gb18030.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/gb2312.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/gbk.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_1.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_10.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_11.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_13.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_14.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_15.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_16.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_2.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_3.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_4.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_5.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_6.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_7.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_8.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/iso_8859_9.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/koi8_r.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/koi8_u.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/shift_jis.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/trans/big5.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/trans/chinese.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/trans/ebcdic.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/trans/emoji.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/trans/emoji_iso2022_kddi.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/trans/emoji_sjis_docomo.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/trans/emoji_sjis_kddi.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/trans/emoji_sjis_softbank.so
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● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/trans/escape.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/trans/gb18030.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/trans/gbk.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/trans/iso2022.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/trans/japanese.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/trans/japanese_euc.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/trans/japanese_sjis.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/trans/korean.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/trans/single_byte.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/trans/transdb.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/trans/utf_16_32.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/utf_16be.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/utf_16le.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/utf_32be.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/utf_32le.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/windows_1250.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/windows_1251.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/windows_1252.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/windows_1253.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/windows_1254.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/windows_1257.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/enc/windows_31j.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/fcntl.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/fiber.so
● /usr/lib64/ruby/2.5.0/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/rbconfig/sizeof.so
● /usr/lib64/libpytalloc-util.cpython-36m-powerpc64le-linux-gnu.so.2.3.3
● /usr/lib64/ipsec/libchecksum.so
7.2.6.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1 Boot Integrity
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FPT_TST_EXT.1
When a computer with Linux is turned on, the operating system is loaded into memory by a
special program called a boot loader. A boot loader usually exists on the system's primary hard
drive, or other media device, and has the sole responsibility of loading the Linux kernel with its
required files or, in some cases, other operating systems, into memory. Each architecture capable
of running Linux uses a different boot loader.
The init process provided with the systemd suite and is the ancestor of all userspace processes
and is process ID 1. Its main functions are to start processes and daemons based on the contents
of the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/ and /lib/systemd directories, to reap child processes,
and to react to certain signals, such as start or stop signals.
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Boot loader operation
A boot loader is a program that resides in the starting sectors of a disk, that is, the Master Boot
Record (MBR) of the hard disk. After testing the system during boot, the Basic Input-Output
System (BIOS) transfers control to the MBR if the system is set to be booted from there. Then
the program residing in MBR gets executed. This program is called the boot loader. Its duty is
to transfer control to the operating system, which will then proceed with the boot process.
The boot process consists of the following steps when the CPU is powered on or reset:
1. The firmware performs any hardware initialization steps.
2. The BIOS searches for the boot loader to boot in an order predefined by the firmware
setting. Once a valid device is found, the firmware copies the contents of its first sector
containing the boot loader into RAM, and starts executing the code just copied.
Every boot loader performs the following general steps to initialize Linux:
1. Loading the kernel image it is configured to load (the actual way of configuring the boot
loader is different for each boot loader implementation). The loading process ensures
that the kernel image is loaded to a well-defined memory location.
2. Loading the initramfs image it is configured to load. Again, this image is loaded to a
well-defined memory location.
3. The kernel is compiled such that the setup function will always be loaded into a
well-known memory location. This allows the boot loader to jump to the setup function
to transfer control to the kernel.
The system firmware supports the boot integrity as follows:
● x86: UEFI implements the starting of the boot loader. During the start, UEFI performs a
signature verification of the first stage boot loader executable called "shim boot loader"
that also holds the certificate for validating the Grub boot loader. That signature is part
of the boot loader EFI file and is signed by Microsoft since the default UEFI certificate in
every system is the Microsoft certificate. The purpose of the "shim boot loader" is to
perform the integrity check of the Grub boot loader binary and the certificate used to
verify the subsequent software images. In turn, the Grub boot loader verifies the integrity
of the kernel binary file. The loaded binary has a PKCS #7 signature at the end of the
file which is used by the secure boot process to perform signature validation.
● IBM Z: The loaded binaries have a signature associated with the file which is used by
the secure boot process to perform signature validation.
● ARM: The loaded binaries have a signature associated with the file which is used by the
secure boot process to perform signature validation.
Kernel boot process
The following initialization process is followed by the kernel. The details of the boot process are
very different for each architecture. However, the following high-level steps are followed by each
architecture.
Note, the kernel binary is compressed, except for a small code portion. That portion contains
the setup code and the decompression routines in the kernel code to allow the kernel code to
decompress itself.
The following steps are performed by the kernel after being loaded by the boot loader.
1. The setup function reinitializes the hardware devices in the computer and sets up the
environment for the execution of the kernel program. The setup function initializes and
configures hardware devices, such as the keyboard, video card, disk controller, and
floating point unit.
2. The kernel is loaded into memory, and if its a compressed image, it is decompressed.
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3. The kernel calls a second start-up (e.g. startup_32 on x86) function to set the execution
environment for process 0.
4. The kernel initializes the memory management system.
5. The kernel sets the kernel mode stack for process 0.
6. The kernel initializes the provisional Page Tables and enables paging.
7. The kernel sets up the exception handlers.
8. start_kernel completes the kernel initialization by initializing Page Tables, Memory
Handling Data Structures, the SLUB allocator, system date, and system time.
User space boot process
After the kernel is fully initialized, the user space is started up. There are the following two
phases covering the boot process:
● initramfs: This state is intended to perform any initialization work to make the root file
system available, such as loading kernel modules with special drivers needed to access
the non-volatile storage holding the root file system.
● systemd This state initializes the entire user space by loading applications and daemons
and performs any setup and configuration process necessary to get the system into the
operational state.
initramfs
The following steps are performed to initialize the initramfs:
1. After the kernel is loaded and initialized, it locates the compressed initramfs image in
memory.
2. The Linux kernel uncompresses the image.
3. The kernel performs a loopback mount of the uncompressed initramfs image to mount
it as the root file system.
4. The kernel executes the /linuxrc or /sbin/init executable. This is a copy of systemd which
executes out of the initramfs.
5. systemd does whatever it needs to do to for setting up the system to allow accessing
the root file system based on the configuration.
6. After the systemd application terminates, the kernel unmounts the initramfs, and mounts
the root file system pointed to by the “root” kernel command line parameter.
systemd
On every Unix system there is one process with the special process identifier 1. It is started by
the kernel before all other processes and is the parent process for all those other processes that
have nobody else to be child of. Due to that it can do a lot of stuff that other processes cannot
do. And it is also responsible for some things that other processes are not responsible for, such
as bringing up and maintaining userspace during boot.
systemd starts up and supervises the entire system (hence the name...). It is based around the
notion of units. In systemd, a unit refers to a resource that is managed. Each resource is defined
by a configuration file called a unit file. Example: a unit avahi.service is the unit file for the Avahi
daemon. Units are categorized by the type of their resource. The suffix portion of the unit's file
name is the type.
The generic boot sequence after the initramfs operation is finished is given in the following. The
kernel has mounted the root file system which hosts /sbin/init – note that this init application is
implemented with the systemd framework. This application is the driver of the user space boot
process.
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The kernel executes /sbin/init which finalizes the boot sequence implemented in the kernel.
1. Before executing the /sbin/init application, it resets the pid table to assign process ID
one to the init process.
2. systemd is an event-driven system as described in systemd(8).
3. The boot process driven by systemd is purely based on events. If one event is observed,
all tasks associated with that event are executed in parallel. The implemented boot
sequence with all events is outlined in bootup(7). The boot process covers the following
aspects:
a. Mounts the /proc special file system.
b. Mounts the /dev/pts special file system.
c. Generate the /etc/nologin file early in the boot process.
d. Saves and restores the system entropy tool for higher quality random number
generation.
e. Configures network interfaces.
f. Starts the system logging daemons.
g. Starts the sshd daemon.
h. Starts the cron daemon.
i. Probes hardware for setup and configuration.
j. Enables the logind daemon for authentication.
7.2.6.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FPT_TUD_EXT.1
The TOE allows the user to check for and install updates using the zypper application. Using
zypper, updates can be manually queried, downloaded and installed as well as automatically be
installed. When an update is initiated, the TOE downloads the update package and performs the
RSA 4096-bit digital signature verification. If the verification is successful, the TOE installs the
update. If the verification is unsuccessful, the TOE terminates the updates process.
7.2.6.6 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Trusted Update for Application Software
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FPT_TUD_EXT.2
See the TSS for FPT_TUD_EXT.1.
7.2.7 TOE access
7.2.7.1 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FTA_TAB.1
The TOE will display an advisory warning message regarding unauthorized use of the OS prior
to establishing a user session.
7.2.8 Trusted path/channels
7.2.8.1 FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Trusted channel communication
PP Origin: OSPP
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SFR Link: FTP_ITC_EXT.1
The TOE uses TLS as conforming to FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 to provide a trusted channel between itself
and authorized IT entities. The update server and other authenticated TLS servers are authorized
IT entities.
The TOE uses SSHv2 as conforming to FCS_SSH_EXT.1 to provide a trusted channel between
itself and authorized IT entities.
7.2.8.2 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FTP_TRP.1
The TOE provides a trusted path using the cryptographic network protocols specified in this ST
between itself and local users that provides assured identification of its endpoints. This trusted
path based on SSH is used to allow remote administrators to securely access the TOE for
administration.
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8 Abbreviations, Terminology, and References
8.1 Abbreviations
ACE
Access Control Entry
AES
Advanced Encryption Standard
app
Application
API
Application Programming Interface
ASLR
Address Space Layout Randomization
BSD
Berkeley Software Distribution
BSM
Basic Security Module
CA
Certificate Authority
CBC
Cipher Block Chaining
CC
Common Criteria
CCM
Counter with CBC-MAC
CEM
Common Evaluation Methodology
CIFS
Common Internet File System
CMC
Certificate Management over CMS
CMS
Cryptographic Message Syntax
CSP
Critical Security Parameters
CTR
Counter Mode Block Chaining
CVE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
DAR
Data At Rest
DEK
Data Encryption Key
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DEP
Data Execution Prevention
DNS
Domain Name System
DRBG
Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSS
Digital Signature Standard
ECC
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDHE
ECDH Ephemeral
EKU
extendedKeyUsage
EST
Enrollment over Secure Transport
GCM
Galois/Counter Mode
GID
Group Identifier
GPOS
General Purpose Operating System
HCI
Host Controller Interface
HMAC
Keyed-hash Message Authentication Code
HTTPS
Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
ID
Identifier or Identity
IP
Internet Protocol
KAS
Key Agreement Scheme
KEK
Key Encryption Key
MAC
Message Authentication Code
OCSP
Online Certificate Status Protocol
OID
Object Identifier
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OS
Operating System
PBKDF
Password-Based Key Derivation Function
PII
Personally Identifiable Information
PIN
Personal Identification Number
PKI
Public Key Infrastructure
POSIX
Portable Operating System Interface
PP
Protection Profile
RA
Registration Authority
RBG
Random Bit Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
RSA
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
SAN
Subject Alternative Name
SAR
Security Assurance Requirement
SCEP
Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol
SEP
Secure Enclave Processor
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
SHA
Secure Hash Algorithm
SMB
Server Message Block
SoC
System on a Chip
ST
Security Target
TLS
Transport Layer Security
TOE
Target of Evaluation
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TSF
TOE Security Functionality
TSFI
TSF Interface
TSS
TOE Summary Specification
UDID
Unique Device Identifier
UID
User Identifier
UUID
Universally Unique Identifier
XTS
XEX-based tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext stealing
8.2 Terminology
This section contains definitions of technical terms that are used with a meaning specific to this
document. Terms defined in the [CC] are not reiterated here, unless stated otherwise.
Administrator
An administrator is responsible for management activities, including setting policies that
are applied by the enterprise on the operating system. This administrator could be acting
remotely through a management server, from which the system receives configuration
policies. An administrator can enforce settings on the system which cannot be overridden
by non-administrator users.
API
A specification of routines, data structures, object classes, and variables that allows an
application to make use of services provided by another software component, such as a
library. APIs are often provided for a set of libraries included with the platform.
app
Software that runs on a platform and performs tasks on behalf of the user or owner of
the platform, as well as its supporting documentation.
AppArmor
Linux kernel LSM module that is able to implement additional restrictions for executables.
This LSM is unused in the evaluated configuration.
ASLR
An anti-exploitation feature which loads memory mappings into unpredictable locations.
ASLR makes it more difficult for an attacker to redirect control to code that they have
introduced into the address space of a process.
CC
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
CEM
Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Credential
Data that establishes the identity of a user, e.g. a cryptographic key or password.
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CSP
Information that is either user or system defined and is used to operate a cryptographic
module in processing encryption functions including cryptographic keys and authentication
data, such as passwords, the disclosure or modification of which can compromise the
security of a cryptographic module or the security of the information protected by the
module.
DAR Protection
Countermeasures that prevent attackers, even those with physical access, from extracting
data from non-volatile storage. Common techniques include data encryption and wiping.
DEP
An anti-exploitation feature of modern operating systems executing on modern computer
hardware, which enforces a non-execute permission on pages of memory. DEP prevents
pages of memory from containing both data and instructions, which makes it more difficult
for an attacker to introduce and execute code.
Developer
An entity that writes OS software. For the purposes of this document, vendors and
developers are the same.
General Purpose Operating System
A class of OSes designed to support a wide-variety of workloads consisting of many
concurrent applications or services. Typical characteristics for OSes in this class include
support for third-party applications, support for multiple users, and security separation
between users and their respective resources. General Purpose Operating Systems also
lack the real-time constraint that defines Real Time Operating Systems (RTOS). RTOSes
typically power routers, switches, and embedded devices.
Host-based Firewall
A software-based firewall implementation running on the OS for filtering inbound and
outbound network traffic to and from processes running on the OS.
OS
Software that manages physical and logical resources and provides services for
applications. The terms TOE and OS are interchangeable in this document.
PII
Any information about an individual maintained by an agency, including, but not limited
to, education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history
and information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such
as their name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother's maiden name,
biometric records, etc., including any other personal information which is linked or linkable
to an individual.
PP
An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
SAR
A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.
Sensitive Data
Sensitive data may include all user or enterprise data or may be specific application data
such as PII, emails, messaging, documents, calendar items, and contacts. Sensitive data
must minimally include credentials and keys. Sensitive data shall be identified in the OS's
TSS by the ST author.
SFR
A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
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ST
A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.
TOE
The product under evaluation. In this case, the Operating System and its supporting
documentation.
TSF
The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TSS
A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in a ST.
User
A user is subject to configuration policies applied to the operating system by
administrators. On some systems under certain configurations, a normal user can
temporarily elevate privileges to that of an administrator. At that time, such a user should
be considered an administrator.
8.3 References
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CC
3.1R5
Version
April 2017
Date
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CC
PART1V3.1R5.pdf
Location
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CC
PART2V3.1R5.pdf
Location
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CC
PART3V3.1R5.pdf
Location
Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems
OSPP
4.2.1
Version
2019-04-22
Date
https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Profile/Info.cfm?PPID=442&id=442
Location
The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol
RFC4252
January 2006
Date
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4252
Location
The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
RFC4253
January 2006
Date
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4253
Location
Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer
RFC5656
December 2009
Date
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5656
Location
Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH)
SSH
1.0
Version
2021-05-13
Date
https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Profile/Info.cfm?PPID=459&id=459
Location
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