TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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Version
2022-02
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Certification Report
Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System Version Extra
Exploration, version 301.1.3
Sponsor and developer: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
D2 Huawei Bantian Base
Shenzhen City
P.R. China
Evaluation facility:
UL TS B.V.
De Heyderweg, 2
Leiden, 2314XZ
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0466049-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0466049
Author(s): Jordi Mujal
Date: 18 December 2023
Number of pages: 11
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.3.1 Assumptions 6
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 6
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 7
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 7
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 7
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 8
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 8
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 8
2.9 Evaluation Results 8
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 8
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Huawei
Reliable Telecomm Operating System Version Extra Exploration, version 301.1.3. The developer of
the Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System Version Extra Exploration, version 301.1.3 is
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd located in Shenzhen, China and they also act as the sponsor of the
evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when
judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a highly-configurable self-developed microkernel-architecture operating system for
embedded device. It has the capability to provide services to multiple users, local or remote, at the
same time. After a successful login, users gain access to a general computing environment which
allows launching user applications, issuing user commands at shell level, creating and accessing files.
The TOE provides adequate mechanisms to separate users and protect their data.
The TOE has been evaluated by UL TS B.V. located in Leiden, The Netherlands. The evaluation was
completed on 18 December 2023 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of
IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System
Version Extra Exploration, version 301.1.3, the security requirements, and the level of confidence
(evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements.
Consumers of the Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System Version Extra Exploration, version
301.1.3 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to
give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification
report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.2 (Flaw Reporting
Procedures).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating
System Version Extra Exploration, version 301.1.3 from Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd located in
Shenzhen, China.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Software
RTOS_V2X_301.1.3.rootfs
301.1.3
RTOS_V2X_301.1.3.kernel
RTOS_V2X_301.1.3.dtb
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the Huawei Reliable
Telecomm Operating System Version Extra Exploration, version 301.1.3. For details, see section 2.5
“Documentation” of this report.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE provides the following key security features:
• Security Audit
• Cryptographic support
• Identification and Authentication
• User Data Protection
• Security Management
• Trusted Channel
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 3.4.5.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST] of the TOE can be depicted as
follows (grey boxes are not part of the TOE):
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2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
CC Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System Version Extra
Exploration 301.1 AGD_OPE
1.7
CC Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System Version Extra
Exploration 301.1 AGD_PRE
2.1
CC Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System Version Extra
Exploration 301.1 ALC_CMS_manpage-v0.3.tar.gz
0.3
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed comprehensive testing on functional specification and subsystem level. The
evaluator selected a sample of the developer test cases to repeat. The selected sample exercised all
TSFIs and subsystems of the TOE.
The evaluator created additional test cases test to supplement coverage of SFRs, TSFI and
subsystem interactions. These test cases were also developed to further exercise the behaviour of
critical functionality.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
In combination with the search for known vulnerabilities (referred to as "public domain vulnerabilities")
the evaluator performed an independent vulnerability analysis of the TOE documentation as follows:
• The security architecture of the TOE was analysed and understood based on the [ADV_ARC]
document.
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• The SFRs defined in [ST] were analysed and for each, a deep understanding of the SFR was
gained based on all the evidence provided for ADV.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 3 weeks. During that test campaign, 100% of the
total time was spent on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was
the same as described in the [ST].
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of site certificates and Site Technical Audit Reports.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating
System Version Extra Exploration, version 301.1.3.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents, and Site Technical Audit Report(s) for the site(s)
[STAR_KERNEL] and [STAR_RTOS] 2.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Huawei Reliable Telecomm
Operating System Version Extra Exploration, version 301.1.3, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3
conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 4 augmented with ALC_FLR.2. This implies that
the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
2 The Site Technical Audit Report contains information necessary to an evaluation lab and
certification body for the reuse of the site audit report in a TOE evaluation.
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The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none.
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3 Security Target
The CC Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System Version Extra Exploration 301.1 Security
Target, version 6.0, 14 December 2023. [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
OS Operating System
SoC System on Chip
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II
and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System Version Extra Exploration
301.1.3 Evaluation Technical Report, version 1.0, 14 December 2023.
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[ST] CC Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System Version Extra Exploration
301.1 Security Target, version 6.0, 14 December 2023.
[STAR_KERNEL] Site Technical Audit Report HongMeng Kernel Software Site – SITE.KERNEL,
version 1.0, 14 December 2023.
[STAR_RTOS] Site Technical Audit Report RTOS Software Site – SITE.RTOS, version 1.0,
14 December 2023.
(This is the end of this report.)