National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Ampex Software Full Drive Encryption
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11621-2025
Dated: August 18, 2025
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
Ampex Software Full Drive Encryption Validation Report Version 0.2, August 11, 2025
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jerome Myers
Meredith Martinez
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Tammy Compton
Dip Pudasaini
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 3
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 4
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 5
3.1 TOE Description................................................................................................. 5
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 6
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 6
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 6
4.1 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 6
4.2 User data protection............................................................................................ 6
4.3 Security management.......................................................................................... 6
4.4 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 7
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 7
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 8
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 8
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 8
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 8
8 Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................. 8
9 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 9
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 9
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) .............................................................. 9
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)................................................. 9
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................... 10
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 10
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 10
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 11
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .............................................................. 11
11 Annexes................................................................................................................. 11
12 Security Target...................................................................................................... 11
13 Glossary ................................................................................................................ 11
14 Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 12
1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Ampex Software Full Drive Encryption solution
provided by Ampex Data Systems Corporation. It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of
the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either
expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
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completed in August 2025. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part
2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative
Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata
20190201, February 1, 2019 and collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption
Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Ampex Software Full Drive Encryption.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Ampex Software
Full Drive Encryption Security Target, Version 0.5, August 11, 2025 and analysis performed
by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
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• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Ampex Software Full Drive Encryption0
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019 and collaborative Protection
Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata
20190201, February 1, 2019
ST Ampex Software Full Drive Encryption Security Target, Version 0.5, August 11,
2025
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Ampex Software Full Drive Encryption, Version
0.2, August 11, 2025
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Ampex Data Systems Corporation
Developer Ampex Data Systems Corporation
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Jerome Myers and Meredith Martinez, The Aerospace Corporation
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The TOE provides software Full Drive Encryption of removable drives within the computing
system in which it operates.
3.1 TOE Description
The Ampex SW FDE is a software package that installs into a computing system running
Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL). The Product protects independent data drives (as
opposed to the system (OS) drive) and accepts a user passphrase or an authorization factor
from an external USB Drive, validates the authorization/authentication factor, and if correct
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utilizes it to unlock the Data Encryption Key used to encrypt/decrypt derive the removable
drive.
The TOE has been tested on two different computing platforms both running Red Hat
Enterprise Linux 8.8 executing on an Intel Xeon D-1746TER (Ice Lake/Sunny Cove) CPU.
One of the computing platforms included the hardware component (the SMU) which allows
use of a USB drive authentication factor, while the other platform lacks such hardware and
accepts only a password authentication factor top unlock the FDE.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The Product contains software that, once installed, leverages RHEL OS components to
provide FDE protection for persistent data stored to a removable drive.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is software but inherits the physical perimeter of the computing platform upon
which it executes.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Security management
4. Protection of the TSF
4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes cryptographic functionality for key management, user authentication, and
block-based encryption including symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption,
cryptographic hashing, keyed-hash message authentication, and password-based key
derivation. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key
derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key
destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to encrypt Data-At-Rest
(including the generation and protection of keys and key encryption keys) used by the TOE.
4.2 User data protection
The TOE performs Full Drive Encryption on all partitions on the removable drive (so that no
plaintext exists) and does so without user intervention.
4.3 Security management
The TOE provides each of required management services to manage the full drive encryption
using a locally accessed Command Line Interface (CLI).
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4.4 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and
integrity of its security features. It protects key and key material and includes functions to
perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is
failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fail, the TOE will not go into an operational
mode.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
• collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
That information has not been reproduced here and the FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E
should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Full Drive Encryption Protection Profiles and performed by
the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific Full
Drive Encryption models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and
therefore should not be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as
evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
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• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E and applicable
Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the
TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Ampex Data Systems Corporation SW Encryption Layer Certifiable Encryption,
Document No. 8470200-010, Revision 1.2.0, Date Created July 15, 2025
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is
configured as evaluated.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Ampex
Software Full Drive Encryption, Version 0.2, August 11, 2025 (DTR), as summarized in the
evaluation Assurance Activity Report (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E including the
tests associated with optional requirements. The AAR, in sections 3.4.1 lists the tested
devices, provides a list of test tools, and has diagrams of the test environment.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is the Ampex Software Full Drive Encryption (Ampex SW FDE) version 1.10
software package running on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.8.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Ampex Software
Full Drive Encryption TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the
FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Ampex Software Full Drive Encryption
product that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E related
to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
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conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E and
recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
On 8/11/2025, the evaluator searched the (National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search, ref NVD), MITRE CVE Database, National
Vulnerability Database, and CVE details (https://www.cve.org/,
https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search, and https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-
search.php, ref CVE), Known Vulnerability Exploit Catalog (https://www.cisa.gov/known-
exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog, ref KEV), Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/, ref VND), Rapid7 Vulnerability Database
(https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities, ref Rapid7), Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative
(http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories, ref ZDI), Tenable Network Security
(http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search, ref TEN), Offensive Security Exploit
Database (https://www.exploit-db.com/, ref EDB) on 8/11/2025 (from 1/1/2022) with the
following search terms: "Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.8 (Ootpa)", "drive encryption", "disk
encryption", "key destruction", "key sanitization", "Key caching", "Password caching",
"Ampex", "Linux 4.18", "openssl 1.1.1k", "LUKS2", "Libgcrypt", "kernel cryptography”.
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The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
All validator comments are addressed in other sections of this document.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Ampex Software Full Drive Encryption Security Target,
Version 0.5, August 11, 2025.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
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• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
[5] collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019.
[6] Ampex Software Full Drive Encryption Security Target, Version 0.5, August 11,
2025 (ST).
[7] Assurance Activity Report for Ampex Software Full Drive Encryption, Version 0.2,
August 11, 2025 (AAR).
[8] Detailed Test Report for Ampex Software Full Drive Encryption, Version 0.2, August
11, 2025 (DTR).
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Ampex Software Full Drive Encryption, Version
0.2, August 11, 2025 (ETR)