PUBLIC
Version 1.0
25/09/2025
KATIM X3M on KATIM OS 13
SECURITY TARGET LITE
PUBLIC
Table of Contents
1 Security Target Introduction ..............................................................................................................5
1.1 Security Target Reference..........................................................................................................................5
1.2 TOE Reference...........................................................................................................................................6
1.3 TOE Overview............................................................................................................................................6
1.4 TOE Description.........................................................................................................................................6
1.4.1 TOE Architecture.........................................................................................................................................................6
1.4.2 TOE Documentation....................................................................................................................................................9
2 Conformance Claims ........................................................................................................................10
2.1 Conformance Rationale...........................................................................................................................12
3 Security Problem Description ...........................................................................................................13
3.1 Threats....................................................................................................................................................13
3.2 Assumptions............................................................................................................................................14
3.3 Organizational Security Policies...............................................................................................................14
4 Security Objectives...........................................................................................................................15
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ...............................................................................................................15
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment..............................................................................17
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale ..................................................................................................................17
5 Extended Components Definition .....................................................................................................21
6 Security Requirements .....................................................................................................................24
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements ....................................................................................................24
6.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)..................................................................................................................................................27
6.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS).....................................................................................................................................30
6.1.3 User Data Protection (FDP) .......................................................................................................................................37
6.1.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA).....................................................................................................................38
6.1.5 Security Management (FMT).....................................................................................................................................43
6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)........................................................................................................................................50
6.1.7 TOE Access (FTA).......................................................................................................................................................52
6.1.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP).....................................................................................................................................53
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements.....................................................................................................54
6.2.1 Development (ADV) ..................................................................................................................................................54
6.2.2 Guidance Documents (AGD) .....................................................................................................................................54
6.2.3 Life-cycle support (ALC).............................................................................................................................................56
6.2.4 Tests (ATE).................................................................................................................................................................57
6.2.5 Vulnerability assessment (AVA) ................................................................................................................................57
7 TOE Summary Specification..............................................................................................................58
7.1 Security Audit..........................................................................................................................................58
7.1.1 PP_MDF_V3.3:FAU_GEN.1, MOD_BT_V1.0:FAU_GEN.1/BT, MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FAU_GEN.1/WLAN....................58
7.1.2 PP_MDF_V3.3:FAU_SAR.1.........................................................................................................................................58
7.1.3 PP_MDF_V3.3:FAU_STG.1.........................................................................................................................................59
7.1.4 PP_MDF_V3.3:FAU_STG.4.........................................................................................................................................59
PUBLIC
7.2 Cryptographic support.............................................................................................................................59
7.2.1 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM.1 ........................................................................................................................................59
7.2.2 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FCS_CKM.1/WPA......................................................................................................................59
7.2.3 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM.2/UNLOCKED.....................................................................................................................59
7.2.4 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM.2/LOCKED..........................................................................................................................59
7.2.5 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FCS_CKM.2/WLAN....................................................................................................................60
7.2.6 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM_EXT.1 ................................................................................................................................60
7.2.7 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM_EXT.2 ................................................................................................................................60
7.2.8 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM_EXT.3 ................................................................................................................................60
7.2.9 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM_EXT.4 ................................................................................................................................60
7.2.10 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM_EXT.5 ................................................................................................................................60
7.2.11 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM_EXT.6 ................................................................................................................................60
7.2.12 MOD_BT_V1.0:FCS_CKM_EXT.8 ...............................................................................................................................61
7.2.13 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT.........................................................................................................................61
7.2.14 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_COP.1/HASH ..............................................................................................................................61
7.2.15 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_COP.1/SIGN................................................................................................................................61
7.2.16 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_COP.1/KEYHMAC .......................................................................................................................61
7.2.17 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_COP.1/CONDITION.....................................................................................................................61
7.2.18 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1..............................................................................................................................63
7.2.19 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_IV_EXT.1.....................................................................................................................................63
7.2.20 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.................................................................................................................................63
7.2.21 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_SRV_EXT.1..................................................................................................................................64
7.2.22 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_STG_EXT.1..................................................................................................................................64
7.2.23 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_STG_EXT.2..................................................................................................................................64
7.2.24 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_STG_EXT.3..................................................................................................................................64
7.2.25 PKG_TLS_V1.1:FCS_TLS_EXT.1 ..................................................................................................................................64
7.2.26 PKG_TLS_V1.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1................................................................................................................................64
7.2.27 PKG_TLS_V1.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.2................................................................................................................................64
7.2.28 PKG_TLS_V1.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT. 4 ...............................................................................................................................65
7.2.29 PKG_TLS_V1.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.5................................................................................................................................65
7.2.30 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN............................................................................................................65
7.2.31 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FCS_TLSC_EXT.2/WLAN............................................................................................................65
7.2.32 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FCS_WPA_EXT.1.......................................................................................................................65
7.3 User data protection ...............................................................................................................................65
7.3.1 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_ACF_EXT.1.................................................................................................................................65
7.3.2 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_ACF_EXT.1.2..............................................................................................................................67
7.3.3 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_ACF_EXT.2.................................................................................................................................67
7.3.4 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_DAR_EXT.1 ................................................................................................................................67
7.3.5 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_DAR_EXT.2 ................................................................................................................................67
7.3.6 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_IFC_EXT.1 ..................................................................................................................................67
7.3.7 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_STG_EXT.1.................................................................................................................................68
7.3.8 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_UPC_EXT.1/APPS.......................................................................................................................68
7.3.9 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_UPC_EXT.1/BLUETOOTH ...........................................................................................................68
7.4 Identification and authentication ............................................................................................................68
7.4.1 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_AFL_EXT.1...................................................................................................................................68
7.4.2 MOD_BT_V1.0:FIA_BLT_EXT.1..................................................................................................................................69
7.4.3 MOD_BT_V1.0:FIA_BLT_EXT.2..................................................................................................................................69
7.4.4 MOD_BT_V1.0:FIA_BLT_EXT.3..................................................................................................................................69
7.4.5 MOD_BT_V1.0:FIA_BLT_EXT.4..................................................................................................................................69
7.4.6 MOD_BT_V1.0:FIA_BLT_EXT.6..................................................................................................................................69
7.4.7 MOD_BT_V1.0:FIA_BLT_EXT.7..................................................................................................................................69
7.4.8 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FIA_PAE_EXT.1 .........................................................................................................................69
7.4.9 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_PMG_EXT.1.................................................................................................................................69
7.4.10 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_TRT_EXT.1 ..................................................................................................................................69
PUBLIC
7.4.11 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_UAU.5.........................................................................................................................................69
7.4.12 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_UAU.6/CREDENTIAL, PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_UAU.6/LOCKED..........................................................70
7.4.13 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_UAU.7.........................................................................................................................................70
7.4.14 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_UAU_EXT.1.................................................................................................................................70
7.4.15 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_UAU_EXT.2.................................................................................................................................70
7.4.16 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_X509_EXT.1, MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN........................................................70
7.4.17 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_X509_EXT.2, MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN, MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.6
70
7.4.18 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_X509_EXT.3 ................................................................................................................................71
7.5 Security management..............................................................................................................................71
7.5.1 PP_MDF_V3.3:FMT_MOF_EXT.1, PP_MDF_V3.3:FMT_SMF.1..................................................................................71
7.5.2 MOD_WLANC_v1.0:FMT_SMF.1/WLAN ...................................................................................................................71
7.5.3 MOD_BT_V1.0:FMT_SMF_EXT.1/BT.........................................................................................................................71
7.5.4 PP_MDF_V3.3:FMT_SMF_EXT.2 ...............................................................................................................................71
7.6 Protection of the TSF...............................................................................................................................72
7.6.1 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_AEX_EXT.1..................................................................................................................................72
7.6.2 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_AEX_EXT.2..................................................................................................................................72
7.6.3 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_AEX_EXT.3..................................................................................................................................72
7.6.4 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_AEX_EXT.4..................................................................................................................................72
7.6.5 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_JTA_EXT.1 ..................................................................................................................................72
7.6.6 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_KST_EXT.1..................................................................................................................................72
7.6.7 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_KST_EXT.2..................................................................................................................................72
7.6.8 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_KST_EXT.3..................................................................................................................................73
7.6.9 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_NOT_EXT.1.................................................................................................................................73
7.6.10 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_STM.1.........................................................................................................................................73
7.6.11 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_TST_EXT.1..................................................................................................................................73
7.6.12 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_TST_EXT.2/PREKERNEL, MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FPT_TST_EXT.3/WLAN .......................................74
7.6.13 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.................................................................................................................................74
7.6.14 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_TUD_EXT.2.................................................................................................................................74
7.6.15 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_TUD_EXT.3.................................................................................................................................74
7.7 TOE access...............................................................................................................................................74
7.7.1 PP_MDF_V3.3:FTA_SSL_EXT.1 ..................................................................................................................................74
7.7.2 PP_MDF_V3.3:FTA_TAB.1.........................................................................................................................................74
7.7.3 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FTA_WSE_EXT.1 .......................................................................................................................75
7.8 Trusted path/channels ............................................................................................................................75
7.8.1 MOD_BT_V1.0:FTP_BLT_EXT.1 .................................................................................................................................75
7.8.2 MOD_BT_V1.0:FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR ...........................................................................................................................75
7.8.3 MOD_BT_V1.0:FTP_BLT_EXT.3/LE ............................................................................................................................75
7.8.4 MOD_BT_V1.0:FTP_BLT_EXT.2 .................................................................................................................................75
7.8.5 PP_MDF_V3.3:FTP_ITC_EXT.1:..................................................................................................................................75
7.8.6 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FTP_ITC.1/WLAN: .....................................................................................................................75
PUBLIC
1 Security Target Introduction
This section outlines the identification of the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE), including the ST conventions,
conformance claims, and the structure of the document. The TOE is KATIM X3M running KATIM OS 13, provided by KATIM LLC,
and it is evaluated as a Mobile Device.
The Security Target contains the following additional sections:
• Conformance Claims (Section 2)
• Security Problem Description (Section 3)
• Security Objectives (Section 4)
• Extended Components Definition (Section 5)
• Security Requirements (Section 6)
• TOE Summary Specification (Section 7)
Table 1. Acronyms and Terminology
API Application Programming Interface
CC Common Criteria
MDM Mobile Device Management
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TEE Trusted Execution Environment
TOE Target of Evaluation
UI User Interface
Typographic Conventions
The following conventions have been applied in this document:
• Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be applied to
functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
– Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the ST, iteration is
indicated by a parenthetical number placed at the end of the component. For example, FDP_ACC.1(1) and
FDP_ACC.1(2) indicate that the ST includes two iterations of the FDP_ACC.1 requirement.
– Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using bold and are
surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment]). Note that an assignment within a selection would be identified in
italics and with embedded bold brackets (e.g. [[selected-assignment]]).
– Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated using bold
italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection]).
– Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions, and strike-
through, for deletions (e.g., “… all objects …” or “… some big things…”).
• Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as captions.
1.1 Security Target Reference
Table 2. Security Target Reference
ST-Lite Title KATIM X3M on KATIM OS 13 – Security
Target Lite
ST-Lite Version 1.0
ST-Lite Date September 25, 2025
PUBLIC
1.2 TOE Reference
Table 3. TOE Reference
TOE Identification KATIM X3M on KATIM OS 13
TOE Developer KATIM LLC
Evaluation Sponsor KATIM LLC
1.3 TOE Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is KATIM X3M mobile device running KATIM OS 13.
Table 4. Operating System (OS) Information
OS version Kernel Version SecurityPatch
Level
KATIM OS 13 5.15 May 5, 2025.
Table 5. Device information
Product Hardware Model # SoC Kernel
KATIM X3M DP103 Qualcomm Snapdragon® 8 gen 2
(QCM8550)
5.15
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) provides standard telecommunication functionalities, such as initiating and receiving voice calls,
and sending and receiving SMS messages, in addition to comprehensive network connectivity capabilities, supporting
both 802.11ax Wi-Fi and multi-generation cellular technologies (3G WCDMA, 4G TDD & FDD LTE, 5G NR Sub 6 GHz NSA/SA).
Furthermore, the TOE facilitates secure network access by supporting client certificate-based authentication for connecting to
WPA2/WPA3 networks via 802.1ax/EAP-TLS protocols, and also establishes connectivity with cellular base stations for mobile
data communication.
Additionally, the TOE exposes an Application Programming Interface (API) that integrates with the KATIM OS
framework, enabling OS services for mobile applications, and also providing mobile device management (MDM) capability for
MDM agents to perform device management operations via the KATIM OS MDM API.
1.4 TOE Description
TOE is designed as a mobile product for enterprise use. To ensure compliance with the evaluated security configuration, the
following settings must be enforced via the KATIM OS Management API:
1. Enforce lock screen password
2. Disable Smart Lock
3. Encryption for Wi-Fi and Bluetooth credentials must be activated using the NIAP mode DPM API
4. Installation of applications from unknown sources must be prohibited
5. Security logging must be enabled
6. Administrator-installed, connectivity-enabled applications must use NIAPSEC library for Sensitive Data Protection,
Hostname Checking, Revocation Checking, and TLS Cipher-suite restriction
Adherence to these settings ensures that the device meets the Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals
(PP_MDF_V3.3) requirements. Refer to the Administrative Guide on how to configure the above settings.
1.4.1 TOE Architecture
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) offers a comprehensive Application Programming Interface (API) that enables mobile applications
to interact with the device’s system resources. It allows users to either approve or deny applications based on the API
permissions requested during installation, or dynamically manage these permissions at runtime.
To ensure data security, the TOE implements Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) for Data-At-Rest (DAR) protection, which
encompasses both user data and application-specific data stored within the user’s partition. The TOE employs a hierarchical key
PUBLIC
management system that utilizes a Root Encryption Key (REK) combined with the user’s password to safeguard all cryptographic
keys utilized within the system.
Additionally, the TOE is equipped with a discrete hardware secure element, to provide an isolated hardware anchor
for cryptographic key storage (Keymaster) and to enforce password authentication with authentication throttling.
The TOE is also compatible with Mobile Device Management (MDM) solutions (not included within the scope of this evaluation),
enabling enterprises to control the device configuration and enforce organization-wide security policies. MDM can be used to
impose restrictions on device features (e.g. disabling the camera), enforce security settings (e.g., maximum number of login
attempts), and retrieve audit logs for compliance purposes. An MDM system typically comprises two components: the MDM
Agent installed on the device with administrative privileges, and the MDM Server, which issues policy enforcement
commands to the agent.
Note:
The MDM system, including both the Agent and Server, is external to the TOE and thus not considered within the
scope of this evaluation.
The TOE’s architecture is organized into multiple execution levels, progressing from the hardware layer, through boot loader, to
the TEE, Linux kernel and finally the KATIM OS user space. This layered design provides a structured API interface that allows
applications to leverage the underlying cryptographic functions and security mechanisms provided by the TOE.
1.4.1.1 Physical Boundaries
The physical boundary of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is defined by the outer perimeter of its hardware enclosure. The
TOE runs the KATIM operating system (OS), utilizing Qualcomm Snapdragon® 8 gen 2 processor. While the TOE includes
mechanisms to regulate application behavior, it does not encompass the user applications that run on top of the KATIM OS.
The MDM agent - which comes pre-installed by KATIM - can be used to restrict the device functionality according to
organizational policies.
For network communication, the TOE connects to 802.11-2012 wireless access points and mobile data networks. Through these
network connections, the TOE can interact with MDM servers, enabling administrative control and policy enforcement over the
device. Guidance documentation listed in Section 1.4.2 is also included in the TOE scope.
1.4.1.2 Logical Boundaries
This section summarizes the security functions provided by the TOE:
• Security audit
• Cryptographic support
• User data protection
• Identification and authentication
• Security management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE access
• Trusted path/channels
Security Audit
The TOE implements two primary logging mechanisms, SecurityLog and Logcat, which store logs in circular memory buffers within
KATIM OS. These logs can be accessed and retrieved by an MDM agent for further processing, such as storing the log data in non-
volatile memory or transmitting it to an MDM server. These logging functionalities are designed to meet the requirements
specified by FAU_GEN.1 in the PP_MDF_V3.3 Protection Profile. For detailed information and specifics, refer to the Security Audit
in section 6.1.
Cryptographic Support
The TOE incorporates several cryptographic libraries, to support a wide array of cryptographic operations, including asymmetric
key generation and key agreement, symmetric key generation, encryption and decryption, cryptographic hashing, and keyed-hash
PUBLIC
message authentication. These cryptographic operations are backed by compliant random bit generation, key derivation, salt
generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and secure destruction of keys and protected data.
These foundational cryptographic functions are utilized to implement security protocols such as TLS, EAP-TLS, and HTTPS, as well
as to provide encryption for data-at-rest, including the generation and protection of data and key encryption keys. Additionally,
many of these cryptographic services are made available to applications running on the TOE, enabling application developers to
ensure their applications adhere to the security requirements of the PP_MDF_V3.3 Protection Profile.
User Data Protection
The TOE regulates access to system services for hosted applications, ensuring the protection of critical resources such as the Trust
Anchor Database. In addition, the TOE employs encryption to safeguard user and other sensitive data, ensuring the data remains
secure even in the event of device loss. The root encryption key derivation process depends on both the SoC of the TOE as well as
the independent secure element to prevent single points of failure.
Identification and Authentication
The TOE includes several identification and authentication features. From the user's perspective, a Password Authentication Factor
is required to unlock the device, with the exception of FCC-mandated functions, such as emergency calls, or non-sensitive actions
like selecting a keyboard input method or taking screenshots. Even after the device is unlocked, the TOE mandates re-entering
the password to modify the password itself. To enhance security, passwords are masked during input and are restricted by a
configurable limit on failed attempts, after which the device will wipe its contents to safeguard data. Passwords can be composed
of upper and lower-case letters, numbers, and special characters, with support for up to 16-character passwords.
The TOE also functions as an 802.1X supplicant, supporting the use and validation of X.509v3 certificates for secure exchanges via
EAP-TLS, TLS, and HTTPS protocols.
Security Management
The TOE offers all necessary interfaces for managing the security functions outlined in this Security Target, along with additional
functionalities commonly found in mobile devices. While many features are accessible to the end users, certain security and
management functions are restricted to administrators who manage the device through a MDM solution once the TOE is
enrolled. Upon unenrollment from the MDM, the TOE will automatically remove all Enterprise applications and clear MDM
policies, ensuring the device returns to its original state.
Protection of the TFS
The TOE incorporates a range of mechanisms to safeguard its reliability and the integrity of its security features. It ensures that
sensitive data, such as cryptographic keys, remain protected by preventing their access or export via the application processor’s
hardware. Specifically, the TOE blocks all read access to the Root Encryption Key (REK) and confines all keys derived from the REK
into the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Application software is only permitted to use REK-derived keys by reference and
can only receive the results of operations involving these keys.
Additionally, the TOE provides a built-in timing mechanism to ensure accurate and reliable time data, which is essential for
functions like audit log accountability. It enforces protections for memory pages (read, write, execute) and leverages security
measures such as address space layout randomization and stack-based buffer overflow protections to mitigate the risk of
exploiting application vulnerabilities. The TOE also safeguards itself from unauthorized modifications and isolates application
memory spaces from each other to protect against unauthorized access by other applications.
The TOE includes self-test and integrity-checking functions for both software and firmware, enabling it to detect any failures or
potential corruption. If a self-test fails, the TOE will not enter an operational state. The TOE also verifies the digital signatures of
all new software or firmware images before installation, ensuring that updates do not introduce malicious or unintended changes.
This digital signature verification process also applies to applications, requiring that all applications must have a valid signature
before installation.
TOE Access
PUBLIC
The TOE can be locked either manually by the user or automatically after a configured period of inactivity, both causing the display
of the device to be obscured. Additionally, the TOE has the capability to display an administrator-defined advisory message banner
upon the first unlock following a reboot, which can be configured using the MDM API of the TOE. The TOE is also capable of
attempting to connect to wireless networks according to the configured settings.
Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE supports secure communication channels with trusted network devices through the use of IEEE 802.11-2012, 802.1X,
EAP-TLS, TLS, and HTTPS protocols.
1.4.2 TOE Documentation
Document version Unique identifier (sha256)
End User Guide 1.1 a33ba6d55b2d332b38d364dbdc1cc9b0601083cd1fb45683776a8f10db2f488a
Administrative Guide 1.3 09599bf86a6872e3108fc0b8037798d87205738919f44ece05bdbd1bfbc2b35d
PUBLIC
2 Conformance Claims
This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version 2022,
Revision 1, November 2022
– CC Part2 Extended
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 2022,
Revision 1, November 2022
– CC Part3 Extended
• PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Bluetooth, and WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 11 October 2022
(CFG_MDF-BT-WLANC_V1.0)
– The PP-Configuration includes the following components:
• Base-PP: Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.3, 12 September 2022
(PP_MDF_V3.3)
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (MOD_BT_V1.0)
• PP-Module: PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 31 March 2022 (MOD_WLANC_V1.0)
• Technical Decisions (TD) as of December 19, 2024:
Table 6. Technical Decisions
Module TD ID TD
Descripti
on
Applied Rationale
PP_MDF_V3.3 TD0724 Format
corrections for
FAU_GEN.1
Yes
TD0704 Part 3 (Extended)
in CC
Conformance
Claims
Yes
TD0689 RFC Update in
FIA_X509_EXT.1
Yes
TD0677 Correction to Symbol
in FCS_RBG_EXT.1
Test EA
Yes
MOD_BT_V1.0 TD0707 Formatting
corrections
Yes
TD0685 BTmissing
multipleSFR-
to- Obj
mappings
Yes
TD0671 PP-Module
updated to
allow for new
PP and PP-
Module
Versions
Yes
TD0650 Conformance
claimsections
updated to allow
for
No Conformance with
MOD_VPNC_V2.3
not claimed
PUBLIC
MOD_VPNC_V2.
3 and 2.4
TD0645 Bluetooth audit
details
Yes
TD0640 Handling BT
devices that do not
support encryption
Yes
TD0600 Conformance
claim sections
updated to allow
for
MOD_VPNC_V2.3
No Conformance with
MOD_VPNC_V2.3
not claimed
MOD_WLANC_
V1.0
TD0837 Updates to allow-
lists
Yes
TD0797 Addition of
FCS_WPA_EXT to
ECD
Yes
TD0710 WPA version
restrictions
Yes
TD0703 Removal of
FIA_X509_EXT.2/
WLAN evaluation
activities for
revocation
checking
Yes
TD0667 Move Set Wireless
Freq Band to
Optional/Objective
Yes
PKG_TLS_V1.1 TD0779 Updated Session
Resumption
Support
No 'TLS as a server' not
selected
in FCS_TLS_EXT. 1.1
TD0770 TLSS.2 connection
with no client cert
No 'TLS as a server' not
selected
in FCS_TLS_EXT. 1.1
TD0726 Corrections to
(D)TLSS SFRs
No 'TLS as a server' and
'DTLS as a server'
not selected
in FCS_TLS_EXT. 1.1
TD0739 PKG_TLS_V1.1 has
2 different
publication dates
Yes
TD0513 CA Certificate
loading
Yes
PUBLIC
TD0499 Testing with
pinned certificates
Yes Pinned certificates
not supported
TD0469 Modification of
test activity
for
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1
test 4.1
No 'TLS as a server' not
selected
in FCS_TLS_EXT. 1.1
TD0442 Updated TLS
Ciphersuites
Yes
2.1 Conformance Rationale
This ST conforms to the PP_MDF_V3.3/MOD_BT_V1.0/MOD_WLANC_V1.0/PKG_TLS_V1.1, with Use Case H.2 (Enterprise-owned
device for specialized, high security use) selected from PP_MDF_V3.3. For clarity, this combined set will be referred to as
MDF/BT/WLANC/TLS. As previously outlined, the security problem definition, security objectives, and security requirements have
been extracted from the PP.
This Security Target claims conformance to CC:2022 and to a Protection Profile based on CC v3.1, as specified in (CCMC-2023-04-
001 - Transition Policy to CC:2022 and CEM:2022).
The maintainer of the PPs for which this ST claims conformance has not stipulated transition details. This ST is prepared to pass
the CC:2022 ASE class if it is to ignore the conformance claim to the CC v3.1 Protection Profile and treat the Security Target as
stand-alone.
No points of conflict have been identified. Particularly:
- The changes in the involved components (both SFRs and SARs) have been analyzed and no needed adjustments have
been identified. The writing changes are only minor that do not imply an impact on the assurance level. Some changes in
the dependencies have also been identified but they do not imply any conflict due to the fact that either the dependencies
are already solved, or they do not apply due to the particular definition of the security problem in the Protection Profiles,
Modules and Packages.
- Extended components haven't been replaced by components in CC:2022 Part 2 because no direct mapping from CC:2022
Part 2 components to the defined extended components have been found.
- All the evaluation methods and activities specified in the used Protection Profiles, Modules and Packages, have been used
as-is (see section 5.2 of this ST). It has been identified that there is no need for adaptation according to (CC:2022 Part 4)
guidelines.
The level of assurance is not reduced by using this approximation.
PUBLIC
3 Security Problem Description
3.1 Threats
Mobile devices are subject to the threats of traditional computer systems along with those entailed by their mobile nature. The
threats considered in this document are those of network eavesdropping, network attacks, physical access, malicious or flawed
applications, persistent presence, and backup as detailed in Table 7.
Table 7. Security threats
Module Threat Name Threat
PP_MDF_V3.3 T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP An attacker is positioned on a wireless communications channel
or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may
monitor and gain access to data exchanged between the Mobile
Device and other endpoints.
T.NETWORK_ATTACK An attacker is positioned on a wireless communications channel
or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may
initiate communications with the Mobile Device or alter
communications between the Mobile Device and other
endpoints to compromise the Mobile Device. These attacks
include malicious software update of any applications or system
software on the device. These attacks also include malicious web
pages or email attachments, which are usually delivered to
devices over the network.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker, with physical access, may attempt to access user
data on the Mobile Device including credentials. These physical
access threats may involve attacks, which attempt to access the
device through external hardware ports, impersonate the user
authentication mechanisms, through its user interface, and
through direct and possibly destructive access to its storage
media. Note: Defending against device re-use after physical
compromise is out of scope for this Protection Profile.
T.MALICIOUS_APP Applications loaded onto the Mobile Device may include
malicious or exploitable code. This code could be included
intentionally or unknowingly by the developer, perhaps as part of
a software library. Malicious apps may attempt to exfiltrate data
to which they have access. They may also conduct attacks against
the platform’s system software, which will provide them with
additional privileges and the ability to conduct further malicious
activities. Malicious applications may be able to control the
device's sensors (GPS, camera, microphone) to gather
intelligence about the user's surroundings even when those
activities do not involve data resident or transmitted from the
device. Flawed applications may give an attacker access to
perform network-based or physical attacks that otherwise would
have been prevented.
T.PERSISTENT_PRESENCE Persistent presence on a device by an attacker implies that the
device has lost integrity and cannot regain it. The device has likely
lost this integrity due to some other threat vector, yet the
continued access by an attacker constitutes an on-going threat.
In this case, the device and its data may be controlled by an
adversary as well as by its legitimate owner.
MOD_WLANC_V1.0 T.TSF_FAILURE Security mechanisms of the TOE generally build up from a
primitive set of mechanisms (e.g., memory management,
privileged modes of process execution) to more complex sets of
mechanisms. Failure of the primitive mechanisms could lead to a
PUBLIC
compromise in more complex mechanisms, resulting in
a compromise of the TSF.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS A user may gain unauthorized access to the TOE data and TOE
executable code. A malicious user, process, or external IT entity
may masquerade as an authorized entity to gain
unauthorized access to data or TOE resources. A malicious user,
process, or external IT entity may misrepresent itself as the TOE
to obtain identification and authentication data.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIONS Malicious remote users or external IT entities may take actions
that adversely affect the security of the TOE. These actions may
remain undetected and thus their effects cannot be effectively
mitigated.
3.2 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in Table 8 are assumed to exist in the TOE’s Operational Environment. These include both practical
realities in the development of the TOE security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Table 8. Security assumptions
Module Assumption Name Assumption
PP_MDF_V3.3 A.CONFIG It is assumed that the TOE’s security functions are configured
correctly in a manner to ensure that the TOE security policies will
be enforced on all applicable network traffic flowing among the
attached networks.
A.NOTIFY It is assumed that the mobile user will immediately notify the
administrator if the Mobile Device is lost or stolen.
A.PRECAUTION It is assumed that the mobile user exercises precautions to
reduce the risk of loss or theft of the Mobile Device.
A.PROPER_USER Mobile Device users are not willfully negligent or hostile and use
the device within compliance of a reasonable Enterprise security
policy.
MOD_WLANC_V1.0 A.NO_TOE_BYPASS Information cannot flow between the wireless client and the
internal wired network without passing through the TOE.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all
administrator guidance in a trusted manner.
3.3 Organizational Security Policies
There are no additional OSPs to be defined
PUBLIC
4 Security Objectives
The security objectives defined are tailored for mobile devices and are therefore applicable to the KATIM X3M running KATIM OS
13, as the TOE.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
Table 9 describes the relevant security objectives for the operational environment of the TOE.
Table 9. Security objectives for the TOE
Module Security Objective Name Security Objective
PP_MDF_V3.3 O.PROTECTED_COMMS To address the network eavesdropping
(T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP) and network
attack (T.NETWORK_ATTACK) threats described in
Section 3.1 Threats, concerning wireless transmission
of Enterprise and user data and configuration data
between the TOE and remote network entities,
conformant TOEs will use a trusted communication
path. The TOE must be capable of communicating
using mutually authenticated TLS, EAP-TLS, HTTPS,
802.1X, and 802.11-2012. The TOE may optionally
communicate using these standard protocols: IPsec,
mutually-authenticated DTLS, or Bluetooth. These
protocols are specified by RFCs that offer a variety of
implementation choices. Requirements have
been imposed on some of these choices (particularly
those for cryptographic primitives) to provide
interoperability and resistance to cryptographic attack.
While conformant TOEs must support all of the choices
specified in the ST including any optional SFRs defined
in this PP, they may support additional algorithms and
protocols. If such additional mechanisms are not
evaluated, guidance must be given to
the administrator to make clear the fact that they were
not evaluated.
O.STORAGE To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of user
data in the event of loss of a Mobile Device
(T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS), conformant TOEs will use data-
at-rest protection. The TOE will be capable of
encrypting data and keys stored on the device and will
prevent unauthorized access to encrypted data.
O.CONFIG To ensure a Mobile Device protects user and enterprise
data that it may store or process, conformant TOEs will
provide the capability to configure and apply security
policies defined by the user and the Enterprise
Administrator. If Enterprise security policies
are configured these must be applied in precedence of
user specified security policies.
O.AUTH To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of user
data in the event of loss of a Mobile Device
(T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS), users are required to enter an
authentication factor to the device prior to accessing
protected functionality and data. Some non-sensitive
functionality (e.g., emergency calling, text notification)
PUBLIC
can be accessed prior to entering the authentication
factor. The device will automatically lock following a
configured period of inactivity in an attempt to ensure
authorization will be required in the event of the
device being lost or stolen.
Authentication of the endpoints of a trusted
communication path is required for network access to
ensure attacks are unable to establish unauthorized
network connections to undermine the integrity of the
device.
Repeated attempts by a user to authorize to the TSF
will be limited or throttled to enforce a delay between
unsuccessful attempts.
O.INTEGRITY To ensure the integrity of the Mobile Device is
maintained conformant TOEs will perform self-tests to
ensure the integrity of critical functionality,
software/firmware and data has been maintained. The
user shall be notified of any failure of these self-tests.
This will protect against the threat T.PERSISTENT.
To address the issue of an application containing
malicious or flawed code (T.MALICIOUS_APP), the
integrity of downloaded updates to software/firmware
will be verified prior to installation/execution of the
object on the Mobile Device. In addition, the TOE will
restrict applications to only have access to the system
services and data they are permitted to interact with.
The TOE will further protect against malicious
applications from gaining access to data they are not
authorized to access by randomizing the
memory layout.
MOD_WLANC_V1.0 O.AUTH_COMM The TOE will provide a means to ensure that it is
communicating with an authorized access point and
not some other entity pretending to be an authorized
access point, and will provide assurance to the access
point of its identity.
O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_FUNCTIONS The TOE will provide or use cryptographic functions
(i.e., encryption/decryption and digital
signature operations) to maintain the confidentiality
and allow for detection of modification of data that
are transmitted outside the TOE and its host
environment.
O.SELF_TEST The TOE will provide the capability to test some subset
of its security functionality to ensure it is operating
properly.
O.SYSTEM_MONITORING The TOE will provide the capability to generate audit
data.
O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION The TOE will provide mechanisms to allow
administrators to be able to configure the TOE.
O.WIRELESS_ACCESS_POINT_CONNECTION The TOE will provide the capability to restrict the
wireless access points to which it will connect.
PUBLIC
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Table 10 describes the relevant security objectives for the operational environment of the TOE.
Table 10. Security objectives for operational environment
Module Security Objective Name Security Objective
PP_MDF_V3.3 OE.CONFIG TOE administrators will configure the Mobile Device security functions correctly
to create the intended security policy
OE.NOTIFY The Mobile User will immediately notify the administrator if the Mobile Device
is lost or stolen.
OE.PRECAUTION The mobile device user exercises precautions to reduce the risk of loss or theft
of the Mobile Device.
OE.DATA_PROPER_USER Administrators take measures to ensure that mobile device users are adequately
vetted against malicious intent and are made aware of the expectations for
appropriate use of the device.
MOD_WLANC_V1.0 OE.NO_TOE_BYPASS Information cannot flow between external and internal networks located in
different enclaves without passing through the TOE.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE administrators are trusted to follow and apply all administrator guidance in
a trusted manner.
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
Table 11 describes how the assumptions, threats, and organizational security policies map to the security objectives.
Table 11. Security Objectives Rationale
Module Threat, Assumption, or OSP Security Objectives Rationale
PP_MDF_V3.3 T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP O.PROTECTED_COMMS The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by
O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides
the capability to communicate using one (or
more) standard protocols as a means to maintain
the confidentiality of data that are transmitted
outside of the TOE.
O.CONFIG The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by
O.CONFIG as this provides a secure configuration of
the mobile device to protect data that it processes.
O.AUTH The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by
O.AUTH as this provides authentication of
the endpoints of a trusted communication path.
T.NETWORK_ATTACK O.PROTECTED_COMMS The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered
by O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides
the capability to communicate using one (or
more) standard protocols as a means to maintain
PUBLIC
the confidentiality of data that are transmitted
outside of the TOE.
O.CONFIG The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered
by O.CONFIG as this provides a secure configuration
of the mobile device to protect data that it processes.
O.AUTH The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered
by O.AUTH as this provides authentication of
the endpoints of a trusted communication path.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS O.STORAGE The threat T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS is countered
by O.STORAGE as this provides the capability
to encrypt all user and enterprise data
and authentication keys to ensure the confidentiality
of data that it stores.
O.AUTH The threat T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS is countered
by O.AUTH as this provides the capability
to authenticate the user prior to accessing
protected functionality and data.
T.MALICIOUS_APP O.PROTECTED_COMMS The threat T.MALICIOUS_APP is countered
by O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides
the capability to communicate using one (or
more) standard protocols as a means to maintain
the confidentiality of data that are transmitted
outside of the TOE.
O.CONFIG The threat T.MALICIOUS_APP is countered
by O.CONFIG as this provides the capability
to configure and apply security policies to ensure
the Mobile Device can protect user and enterprise
data that it may store or process.
O.AUTH The threat T.MALICIOUS_APP is countered
by O.AUTH as this provides the capability
to authenticate the user and endpoints of a trusted
path to ensure they are communicating with
an authorized entity with appropriate privileges.
O.INTEGRITY The threat T.MALICIOUS_APP is countered
by O.INTEGRITY as this provides the capability
to perform self-tests to ensure the integrity of
critical functionality, software/firmware and data has
been maintained.
T.PERSISTENT_PRESENCE O.INTEGRITY The threat T.PERSISTENT_PRESENCE is countered by
O.INTEGRITY as this provides the capability
to perform self-tests to ensure the integrity of
critical functionality, software/firmware and data has
been maintained.
PUBLIC
A.CONFIG OE.CONFIG The operational environment objective OE.CONFIG is
realized through A.CONFIG.
A.NOTIFY OE.NOTIFY The operational environment objective OE.NOTIFY
is realized through A.NOTIFY.
A.PRECAUTION OE.PRECAUTION The operational environment
objective OE.PRECAUTION is realized
through A.PRECAUTION.
A.PROPER_USER OE.DATA_PROPER_USER The operational environment
objective OE.DATA_PROPER_USER is realized
through A.PROPER_USER.
MOD_WLANC_
V1.0
T.TSF_FAILURE O.SELF_TEST The threat T.TSF_FAILURE is mitigated by
O.SELF_TEST as this defines a mechanism for
ensuring the reliability of the TSF by detecting
potential failure conditions.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS O.AUTH_COMM The threat T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS is mitigated in
part by O.AUTH_COMM by ensuring the authenticity
of any remote endpoint that the TSF connects to.
O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_FUN
CTIONS
The threat T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS is mitigated in
part by O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_FUNCTIONS by ensuring
the confidentiality and integrity of data in transit to
protect against man-in-the-middle attacks.
O.TOE_ADMINISTRATIO
N
The threat T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS is mitigated in
part by O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION by using the TOE
platform's authentication mechanism to ensure that
only authorized administrators can configure the
TOE's behavior.
O.WIRELESS_ACCESS_POI
NT_CONNECTION
The threat T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS is mitigated in
part by this objective because it provides a
mechanism to restrict the remote entities that the
TOE is permitted to communicate with.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIONS O.SYSTEM_MONITORING The threat T.UNDETECTED_ACTIONS is mitigated
by O.SYSTEM_MONITORING by enforcing an
auditing mechanism that can be used to track
security-relevant TOE behavior.
A.NO_TOE_BYPASS OE.NO_TOE_BYPASS The operational environment objective
OE.NO_TOE_BYPASS is realized through
A.NO_TOE_BYPASS.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN The Operational Environment objective OE.TRUSTED
ADMIN is realized through A.TRUSTED_ADMIN.
MOD_BT_V1.0 T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP O.PROTECTED_COMMS The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by
O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides the
capability to communicate using Bluetooth as a
PUBLIC
means to maintain the confidentiality of data that are
transmitted outside of the TOE.
T.NETWORK_ATTACK O.PROTECTED_COMMS The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by
O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides the
capability to communicate using Bluetooth as a
means to maintain the confidentiality of data that are
transmitted outside of the TOE.
PUBLIC
5 Extended Components Definition
All extended requirements in this ST originate from the MDF/BT/WLANC/TLS. These documents define the following extended
requirements listed in Table 12, and since the requirements are not redefined within the ST, the MDF/BT/WLANC/TLS should be
examined for additional details of the CC extensions.
Table 12. Extended component requirements
Module Extended Component
ID
Extended Component Name
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Support
FCS_CKM_EXT.2 Cryptographic Key Random Generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.3 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Key Destruction
FCS_CKM_EXT.5 TSF Wipe
FCS_CKM_EXT.6 Salt Generation
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS Protocol
FCS_IV_EXT.1 Initialization Vector Generation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
FCS_SRV_EXT.1 Cryptographic Algorithm Services
FCS_STG_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Storage
FCS_STG_EXT.2 Encrypted Cryptographic Key Storage
FCS_STG_EXT.3 Integrity of Encrypted Key Storage
FDP_ACF_EXT.1 Security Access Control for System Services
FDP_ACF_EXT.2 Security Access Control for System Services
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Protected Data Encryption
FDP_DAR_EXT.2 Sensitive Data Encryption
FDP_IFC_EXT.1 Subset Information Flow Control
FDP_STG_EXT.1 User Data Storage
FDP_UPC_EXT.1/APPS Inter-TSF User Data Transfer Protection (Applications)
FDP_UPC_EXT.1/BLUETOOTH Inter-TSF User Data Transfer Protection (Bluetooth)
FIA_AFL_EXT.1 Authentication Failure Handling
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management
FIA_TRT_EXT.1 Authentication Throttling
FIA_UAU_EXT.1 Authenticationfor Cryptographic Operation
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Timing of Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Validation of Certificates
PUBLIC
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.3 Request Validation of Certificates
FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Managementof SecurityFunctions Behavior
FMT_SMF_EXT.2 Specification of Remediation Actions
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Application Address Space Layout Randomization
FPT_AEX_EXT.2 Memory Page Permissions
FPT_AEX_EXT.3 Stack Overflow Protection
FPT_AEX_EXT.4 Domain Isolation
FPT_JTA_EXT.1 JTAG Disablement
FPT_KST_EXT.1 Key Storage
FPT_KST_EXT.2 No Key Transmission
FPT_KST_EXT.3 No Plaintext Key Export
FPT_NOT_EXT.1 Self-Test Notification
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing
FPT_TST_EXT.2/PREKERNEL TSF Integrity Checking (Pre-Kernel)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 TSF Version Query
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 TSF Update Verification
FPT_TUD_EXT.3 Application Signing
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF- and User-initiated Locked State
FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Trusted Channel Communication
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
MOD_BT_V1.0 FMT_SMF_EXT.1/BT Specification of Management Functions
FCS_CKM_EXT.8 Bluetooth Key Generation
FIA_BLT_EXT.1 Bluetooth User Authorization
FIA_BLT_EXT.2 Bluetooth Mutual Authentication
FIA_BLT_EXT.3 Rejection of Duplicate Bluetooth Connections
FIA_BLT_EXT.4 Secure Simple Pairing
FIA_BLT_EXT.6 Trusted Bluetooth Device User Authorization
FIA_BLT_EXT.7 Untrusted Bluetooth Device User Authorization
FTP_BLT_EXT.1 Bluetooth Encryption
FTP_BLT_EXT.2 Persistence of Bluetooth Encryption
FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR Bluetooth Encryption Parameters (BR/ EDR)
FTP_BLT_EXT.3/LE Bluetooth Encryption Parameters (LE)
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN TLS Client Protocol (EAP-TLS for WLAN)
PUBLIC
MOD_WLANC_
V 1.0
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2/WLAN TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension (EAP-TLS
for WLAN)
FCS_WPA_EXT.1 Supported WPA Versions
FIA_PAE_EXT.1 Port Access Entity Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN X.509 Certificate Authentication (EAP- TLS for WLAN)
FIA_X509_EXT.6 X.509 Certificate Storage and Management
FMT_SMF.1/WLAN Specification of Management Functions (WLAN Client)
FPT_TST_EXT.3/WLAN TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing (WLAN Client)
FTA_WSE_EXT.1 Wireless Network Access
FTP_ITC.1/WLAN Trusted Channel Communication (Wireless LAN)
PKG_TLS_V1.1 FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS Client Support for Renegotiation
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension
PUBLIC
6 Security Requirements
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that serve to
represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to scope the evaluation effort.
The SFRs are from the MDF/BT/WLANC/TLS documents. The refinements and operations already performed in the
MDF/BT/WLANC/TLS are not identified (e.g., highlighted) here, rather the requirements have been copied from the
MDF/BT/WLANC/TLS and any residual operations have been completed herein. Of particular note, the MDF/BT/WLANC/TLS made
a number of refinements and completed some of the SFR operations defined in the Common Criteria (CC) and that PP should be
consulted to identify those changes if necessary.
The SARs are from the MDF/BT/WLANC/TLS documents, and includes all the relevant SARs. The SARs are effectively refined since
requirement-specific 'Evaluation Activities' are defined in the MDF/BT/WLANC/TLS that serve to ensure corresponding evaluations
will yield more practical and consistent assurance. The MDF/BT/WLANC/TLS should be consulted for the assurance activity
definitions.
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by KATIM X3M on KATIM OS 13 TOE:
Table 13. TOE Security Functional Components
Requirement Class PP Requirement Component
FAU:Security
Audit
PP_MDF_V3.3 FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
MOD_BT_V1.0 FAU_GEN.1/BT Audit Data Generation (Bluetooth)
MOD_WLANC_V1.0 FAU_GEN.1/WLANAudit DataGeneration (Wireless LAN)
PP_MDF_V3.3 FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
PP_MDF_V3.3 FAU_STG.1 Audit Storage Protection
PP_MDF_V3.3 FAU_STG.4 Prevention of Audit Data Loss
FCS:
Cryptographic
Support
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
MOD_WLANC_V1.0 FCS_CKM.1/WPACryptographic KeyGeneration (Symmetric Keys
for WPA2/WPA3 Connections)
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_CKM.2/UNLOCKEDCryptographic Key Establishment
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_CKM.2/LOCKEDCryptographic Key Establishment
MOD_WLANC_V1.0 FCS_CKM.2/WLANCryptographic KeyDistribution (Group
Temporal Key for WLAN)
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Support
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_CKM_EXT.2Cryptographic KeyRandom Generation
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_CKM_EXT.3 Cryptographic Key Generation
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_CKM_EXT.4Key Destruction
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_CKM_EXT.5 TSF Wipe
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_CKM_EXT.6 Salt Generation
MOD_BT_V1.0 FCS_CKM_EXT.8 Bluetooth Key Generation
PUBLIC
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT Cryptographic operation
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_COP.1/HASH Cryptographic operation
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_COP.1/SIGN Cryptographic operation
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_COP.1/KEYHMAC Cryptographic operation
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_COP.1/CONDITION Cryptographic operation
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS Protocol
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_IV_EXT.1 Initialization Vector Generation
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_SRV_EXT.1 Cryptographic Algorithm Services
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_STG_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Storage
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_STG_EXT.2 Encrypted Cryptographic Key Storage
PP_MDF_V3.3 FCS_STG_EXT.3 Integrity of Encrypted Key Storage
PKG_TLS_V1.1 FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol
PKG_TLS_V1.1 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
MOD_WLANC_V1.0 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN TLS Client Protocol (EAP-TLS for WLAN)
MOD_WLANC_V1.0 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2/WLAN TLS Client Support for Supported Groups
Extension (EAP-TLS for WLAN)
PKG_TLS_V1.1 FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS Client Support for Renegotiation
PKG_TLS_V1.1 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication
PKG_TLS_V1.1 FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 TLS Client Support for Supported Groups
Extension (EAP-TLS for WLAN)
MOD_WLANC_V1.0 FCS_WPA_EXT.1 Supported WPA Versions
FDP:User Data
Protection
PP_MDF_V3.3 FDP_ACF_EXT.1 Security Access Control for System Services
PP_MDF_V3.3 FDP_ACF_EXT.2 Security Access Control for System Resources
PP_MDF_V3.3 FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Protected Data Encryption
PP_MDF_V3.3 FDP_DAR_EXT.2 Sensitive Data Encryption
PP_MDF_V3.3 FDP_IFC_EXT.1 Subset Information Flow Control
PP_MDF_V3.3 FDP_STG_EXT.1 User Data Storage
PP_MDF_V3.3 FDP_UPC_EXT.1/APPS Inter-TSF User Data Transfer Protection
(Applications)
PP_MDF_V3.3 FDP_UPC_EXT.1/BLUETOOTH Inter-TSF User
Data Transfer Protection (Bluetooth)
FIA:
Identification
and
Authentication
PP_MDF_V3.3 FIA_AFL_EXT.1 Authentication Failure Handling
MOD_BT_V1.0 FIA_BLT_EXT.1 Bluetooth User Authorization
MOD_BT_V1.0 FIA_BLT_EXT.2 Bluetooth Mutual Authentication
MOD_BT_V1.0 FIA_BLT_EXT.3 Rejection of Duplicate Bluetooth Connections
PUBLIC
MOD_BT_V1.0 FIA_BLT_EXT.4 Secure Simple Pairing
MOD_BT_V1.0 FIA_BLT_EXT.6 Trusted Bluetooth Device User Authorization
MOD_BT_V1.0 FIA_BLT_EXT.7 Untrusted Bluetooth Device User Authorization
MOD_WLANC_V1.0 FIA_PAE_EXT.1 Port Access Entity Authentication
PP_MDF_V3.3 FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management
PP_MDF_V3.3 FIA_TRT_EXT.1 Authentication Throttling
PP_MDF_V3.3 FIA_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms
PP_MDF_V3.3 FIA_UAU.6/CREDENTIAL Re-Authentication (Credential Change)
PP_MDF_V3.3 FIA_UAU.6/LOCKED Re-Authentication (TSF Lock)
PP_MDF_V3.3 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
PP_MDF_V3.3 FIA_UAU_EXT.1 Authentication for Cryptographic Operation
PP_MDF_V3.3 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Timing of Authentication
PP_MDF_V3.3 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Validation of Certificates
MOD_WLANC_V1.0 FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN X.509 Certificate Validation
PP_MDF_V3.3 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
MOD_WLANC_V1.0 FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN X.509 Certificate Authentication (EAP-TLS
for WLAN)
PP_MDF_V3.3 FIA_X509_EXT.3 Request Validation of Certificates
MOD_WLANC_V1.0 FIA_X509_EXT.6 X.509 Certificate Storage and Management
FMT:Security
Management
PP_MDF_V3.3 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior
PP_MDF_V3.3 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
MOD_BT_V1.0 FMT_SMF_EXT.1/BT Specification of Management Functions
MOD_WLANC_V1.0 FMT_SMF.1/WLAN Specification of Management Functions
(WLAN Client)
PP_MDF_V3.3 FMT_SMF_EXT.2 Specification of Remediation Actions
FPT:Protection
of the TSF
PP_MDF_V3.3 FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Application Address Space Layout Randomization
PP_MDF_V3.3 FPT_AEX_EXT.2 Memory Page Permissions
PP_MDF_V3.3 FPT_AEX_EXT.3 Stack Overflow Protection
PP_MDF_V3.3 FPT_AEX_EXT.4 Domain Isolation
PP_MDF_V3.3 FPT_JTA_EXT.1 JTAG Disablement
PP_MDF_V3.3 FPT_KST_EXT.1 Key Storage
PP_MDF_V3.3 FPT_KST_EXT.2 No Key Transmission
PP_MDF_V3.3 FPT_KST_EXT.3 No Plaintext Key Export
PP_MDF_V3.3 FPT_NOT_EXT.1 Self-Test Notification
PP_MDF_V3.3 FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
PUBLIC
PP_MDF_V3.3 FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing
PP_MDF_V3.3 FPT_TST_EXT.2/PREKERNEL TSF Integrity Checking (Pre-Kernel)
MOD_WLANC_V1.0 FPT_TST_EXT.3/WLAN TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing
(WLAN Client)
PP_MDF_V3.3 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 TSF Version Query
PP_MDF_V3.3 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 TSF Update Verification
PP_MDF_V3.3 FPT_TUD_EXT.3 Application Signing
FTA: TOE Access PP_MDF_V3.3 FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF- and User-initiated Locked State
PP_MDF_V3.3 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners
MOD_WLANC_V1.0 FTA_WSE_EXT.1 Wireless Network Access
FTP: Trusted
Path/Channels
MOD_BT_V1.0 FTP_BLT_EXT.1 Bluetooth Encryption
MOD_BT_V1.0 FTP_BLT_EXT.2 Persistence of Bluetooth Encryption
MOD_BT_V1.0 FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR Bluetooth Encryption Parameters (BR/EDR)
MOD_BT_V1.0 FTP_BLT_EXT.3/LE Bluetooth Encryption Parameters (LE)
PP_MDF_V3.3 FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Trusted Channel Communication
MOD_WLANC_V1.0 FTP_ITC.1/WLAN Trusted Channel Communication (Wireless LAN)
6.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)
6.1.1.1 PP_MDF_V3.3:FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.1.1
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
1. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions
2. All auditable events for the [not selected] level of audit
3. [All administrative actions
4. Start-up and shutdown of the OS
5. Specifically defined auditable events in Table 2 of the PP_MDF_V3.3
6. [no additional auditable events]]
Table 14. PP_MDF_V3.3 Audit Events
Requirement Audit Event Content
FCS_CKM.1 [None]
FCS_CKM_EXT.
1
[None]
FCS_CKM_EXT.
5
[None]
FCS_STG_EXT.1 [None]
FCS_STG_EXT.1 Import or destruction of key Identity of key, role and identity of
requester
FCS_STG_EXT.3 Failure to verify integrity of stored key Identity of key being verified
PUBLIC
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 [None]
FDP_DAR_EXT.2 [None]
FDP_STG_EXT.1 Addition or removal of certificate from
Trust Anchor Database
Subject name of certificate
FIA_X509_EXT.1 Failure to validate X.509v3 certificate Reason for failure of validation
FPT_NOT_EXT.1 [None] [No additional information]
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Initiation of self-test
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Failure of self-test [No additional information]
FPT_TST_EXT.2/
PREKERNEL
Start-up of TOE
FPT_TST_EXT.2/
PREKERNEL
[None] [No additional information]
FAU_GEN.1.2
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
1. Date and time of the event
2. Type of event
3. Subject identity
4. The outcome (success or failure) of the event
5. Additional information in Table 2 of the PP_MD_V3.3
6. [no additional information]
6.1.1.2 MOD_BT_V1.0:FAU_GEN.1/BT Audit Data Generation (Bluetooth)
FAU_GEN.1.1/BT
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
1. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions
2. All auditable events for the [not selected] level of audit
3. [Specifically defined auditable events in the Auditable Events table (Table 2 of the MOD_BT_V1.0)]
Table 15. MOD_BT_V1.0 Audit Events
Requirement Audit Event Content
FIA_BLT_EXT.1 Failed user authorization of Bluetooth
device.
User authorization decision (e.g., user
rejected connection, incorrect pin entry).
FIA_BLT_EXT.1 Failed user authorization for local
Bluetooth Service.
Bluetooth address and name of device.
Bluetooth profile. Identity of local service
with [service ID].
FIA_BLT_EXT.2 Initiation of Bluetooth connection. Bluetooth address and name of device.
FIA_BLT_EXT.2 Failure of Bluetooth connection. Reason for failure.
FAU_GEN.1.2/BT
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
1. Date and time of the event
2. Type of event
3. Subject identity
4. The outcome (success or failure) of the event
PUBLIC
5. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST,
[Additional information in the Auditable Events table (of the MOD_BT_V1.0)]
6.1.1.3 MOD_ WLANC_V1.0:FAU_GEN.1/WLAN Audit Data Generation (Wireless LAN)
FAU_GEN.1.1/WLAN
The TSF shall [invoke platform-provided functionality] to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
1. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions
2. All auditable events for the [not selected] level of audit
3. [all auditable events for mandatory SFRs specified in Table 2 and selected SFRs in Table 5 (of the MOD_WLANC_V1.0)]
Table 16. MOD_WLANC_V1.0 Audit Events
Requirement Audit Event Content
FCS_TLSC_EXT.
1/WLAN
Failure to establish an EAP-TLS session. Reason for failure.
Non-TOE endpoint of connection.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.
1/WLAN
Establishment/terminationof anEAP-
TLS session.
Non-TOE endpoint of connection.
FIA_X509_EXT.1
/ WLAN
Failure to validate X.509v3 certificate. Reason for failure of validation.
FIA_X509_EXT.6 Attempts to load certificates.
FIA_X509_EXT.6 Attempts to revoke certificates.
FPT_TST_EXT.3/
WLAN
Execution of this set of TSF self-tests.
FPT_TST_EXT.3/
WLAN
[None] [None]
FTA_WSE_EXT.1 All attempts to connect to access points. For each access point record the
[Certificate Check Message and the last
[2] octets] of the MAC Address
Success and failures (including reason
for failure).
FTP_ITC.1/ WLAN All attempts to establish a trusted channel. Identification of the non-TOE endpoint
of the channel.
FAU_GEN.1.2/WLAN
The [TOE platform] shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
1. Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, (if relevant) the outcome (success or failure) of the event
2. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP-
Module/ST, [Additional Audit Record Contents as specified in Table 2 and Table 5 (of the MOD_WLANC_V1.0)]
6.1.1.4 PP_MDF_V3.3:FAU_ SAR.1 Audit Review
FAU_SAR.1.1
PUBLIC
The TSF shall provide [the administrator] with the capability to read [all audited events and record contents] from the audit
records.
FAU_SAR.1.2
The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.
6.1.1.5 PP_MDF_V3.3:FAU_ STG.1 Audit Storage Protection
FAU_STG.1.1
The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2
The TSF shall be able to [prevent] unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.
6.1.1.6 PP_MDF_V3.3:FAU_ STG. 4 Prevention of Audit Data Loss
FAU_STG.4.1
The TSF shall [overwrite the oldest stored audit records] if the audit trail is full.
6.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
6.1.2.1 PP_MDF_V3.3: FCS_CKM.1 - Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [
• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of [3072-bit or greater] that meet [FIPS PUB 186-
4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.3],
• ECC schemes using [
– "NIST curves" P-384 and [P-256, P-521] that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 186-
4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.4],
].
6.1.2.2 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FCS_CKM.1/WPA - Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys for WPA2/WPA3
Connections)
FCS_CKM.1.1/WPA
The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm
[PRF-384 and [PRF-512, PRF-704] (as defined in IEEE 802.11-2012)] and specified key sizes [256 bits and [128 bits, 192 bits]]
using a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
6.1.2.3 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM.2/UNLOCKED - Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.2.1/UNLOCKED
The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method [
• [RSA-based key establishment schemes] that meet the following [NIST Special Publication 800-
56B, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography”],
• [Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes] that meet the following: [NIST Special Publication 800-
56A Revision 3, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography"]
].
6.1.2.4 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM.2/LOCKED - Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.2.1/LOCKED
PUBLIC
The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method: [
[RSA-based key establishment schemes] that meet the following: [NIST Special Publication800-
56B, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography”]
] for the purposes of encrypting sensitive data received while the device is locked.
6.1.2.5 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FCS_CKM.2/WLAN - Cryptographic Key Establishment Distribution (Group Temporal Key for
WLAN)
FCS_CKM.2.1/WLAN
The TSF shall decrypt Group Temporal Key in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method [AES Key Wrap
(as defined in RFC 3394) in an EAPOL-Key frame (as defined in IEEE 802.11-2012 for the packet format and timing
considerations] and does not expose the cryptographic keys.
6.1.2.6 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM_EXT.1 - Cryptographic Key Support
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall support [immutable hardware] REKs with a [symmetric] key of strength [256 bits].
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.2
Each REK shall be hardware-isolated from the OS on the TSF in runtime.
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.3
Each REK shall be generated by an RBG in accordance with FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
6.1.2.7 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM_EXT.2 – Cryptographic Key Random Generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.2.1
All DEKs shall be [randomly generated] with entropy corresponding to the security strength of AES key sizes of [256] bits.
6.1.2.8 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM_EXT. 3 - Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall use [
• asymmetric KEKs of [128-bits] security strength
• symmetric KEKs of [256-bit] security strength corresponding to at least the security strength of the keys encrypted
by the KEK
].
FCS_CKM_EXT.3.2
The TSF shall generate all KEKs using one of the following methods:
• Derive the KEK from a Password Authentication Factor according to FCS_COP.1.1/CONDITION and
[
• Generate the KEK using an RBG that meets this profile (as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1)
• Generate the KEK using a key generation scheme that meets this profile (as specified in FCS_CKM.1)
• Combine the KEK from other KEKs in a way that preserves the effective entropy of each factor by [concatenating the k
eys and using a KDF (as described in SP 800-108), concatenating the keys and using a KDF (as described in SP 800-
56C), encrypting one key with another]
].
6.1.2.9 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM_EXT. 4 - Key Destruction
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1
PUBLIC
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with the specified cryptographic key destruction methods:
• By clearing the KEK encrypting the target key
• In accordance with the following rules
– For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a single direct overwrite [consisting of zeros].
– For non-volatile EEPROM, the destruction shall be executed by a single direct overwrite consisting of a pseudo
random pattern using the TSF’s RBG (as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1), followed by a read-verify.
– For non-volatile flash memory, that is not wear-leveled, the destruction shall be executed
[by a block erase that erases the reference to memory that stores data as well as the data itself].
– For non-volatile flash memory, that is wear-leveled, the destruction shall be executed [by a block erase].
– For non-volatile memory other than EEPROM and flash, the destruction shall be executed by a single direct
overwrite with a random pattern that is changed before each write.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.2
• The TSF shall destroy all plaintext keying material and critical security parameters when no longer needed.
6.1.2.10 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM_EXT. 5 - TSF Wipe
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.1
The TSF shall wipe all protected data by [
• Cryptographically erasing the encrypted DEKs or the KEKs in non-volatile memory by following the requirements in
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1
• Overwriting all PD according to the following rules:
– For EEPROM, the destruction shall be executed by a single direct overwrite consisting of a pseudo random
pattern using the TSF’s RBG (as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1, followed by a read-verify.
– For flash memory, that is not wear-leveled, the destruction shall be executed
[by a block erase that erases the reference to memory that stores data as well as the data itself].
– For flash memory, that is wear-leveled, the destruction shall be executed [by a block erase].
– For non-volatile memory other than EEPROM and flash, the destruction shall be executed by a single direct
overwrite with a random pattern that is changed before each write.
].
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.2
The TSF shall perform a power cycle on conclusion of the wipe procedure.
6.1.2.11 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM_EXT. 6 - Salt Generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.6.1
The TSF shall generate all salts using an RBG that meets FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
6.1.2.12 MOD_BT_V1.0:FCS_CKM_EXT.8 - Bluetooth Key Generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.8.1
The TSF shall generate public/private ECDH key pairs every [time a connection between devices is established].
6.1.2.13 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT - Cryptographic Operation
FCS_COP.1.1/ENCRYPT
The TSF shall perform [encryption/decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: [
• AES-CBC (as defined in FIPS PUB 197, and NIST SP 800-38A) mode
• AES-CCMP (as defined in FIPS PUB 197, NIST SP 800-38C and IEEE 802.11-2012), and
• [
– AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D)
– AES-XTS (as defined in NIST SP 800-38E) mode
]
PUBLIC
] and cryptographic key sizes [128-bit key sizes and [256-bit key sizes]].
6.1.2.14 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_ COP.1/HASH - Cryptographic Operation
FCS_COP.1.1/HASH
The TSF shall perform [cryptographic hashing] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1 and [SHA-
256, SHA-384, SHA-512]] and message digest sizes [160 and [256 bits, 384 bits, 512 bits]] that meet the following: [FIPS Pub 180-
4].
6.1.2.15 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_ COP.1/SIGN - Cryptographic Operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SIGN
The TSF shall perform [cryptographic signature services (generation and verification)] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [
• [RSA schemes] using cryptographic key sizes of [2048-bit or greater] that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 186-
4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Section 4]
• [ECDSA schemes] using ["NIST curves" P-384 and [P-256, P-521]] that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 186-
4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Section 5]
].
6.1.2.16 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_ COP.1/KEYHMAC - Cryptographic Operation
FCS_COP.1.1/KEYHMAC
The TSF shall perform [keyed-hash message authentication] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-
1 and [HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512]] and cryptographic key sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] and message digest
sizes 160 and [256, 384, 512] bits that meet the following: [FIPS Pub 198-1, "The Keyed-
Hash Message Authentication Code", and FIPS Pub 180-4, "Secure Hash Standard"].
6.1.2.17 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_ COP.1/CONDITION - Cryptographic Operation
FCS_COP.1.1/CONDITION
The TSF shall perform conditioning in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-[SHA-256, SHA-512] using a
salt, and [[key stretching with scrypt]] and output cryptographic key sizes [256, 512] that meet the following: [no standard].
6.1.2.18 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_ HTTPS_EXT.1 - HTTPS Protocol
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS as defined in [the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), version 1.1].
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall notify the application and [not establish the connection] if the peer certificate is deemed invalid.
6.1.2.19 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_ IV_EXT.1 - Initialization Vector Generation
FCS_IV_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall generate IVs in accordance with [Table11: References and IV Requirements for NIST-approved Cipher Modes].
6.1.2.20 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_RBG_EXT.1 - Random Bit Generation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
PUBLIC
The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-90A using
[Hash_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2
The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy from [TSF-hardware-based noise source]
with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength (according to NIST SP 800-57) of the keys
and hashes that it will generate.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall be capable of providing output of the RBG to applications running on the TSF that request random bits.
6.1.2.21 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_SRV_EXT.1 - Cryptographic Algorithm Services
FCS_SRV_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism for applications to request the TSF to perform the following cryptographic operations: [
• All mandatory and [selected algorithms] in FCS_CKM.2/LOCKED
• The following algorithms in FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT: AES-CBC, [AES-GCM]
• All selected algorithms in FCS_COP.1/SIGN
• All mandatory and selected algorithms in FCS_COP.1/HASH
• All mandatory and selected algorithms in FCS_COP.1/KEYHMAC
• [
– All mandatory and [selected algorithms] in FCS_CKM.1
]
].
6.1.2.22 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_STG_EXT.1 - Cryptographic Key Storage
FCS_STG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide [mutable hardware, software-based] secure key storage for asymmetric private keys and
[symmetric keys, persistent secrets].
FCS_STG_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall be capable of importing keys or secrets into the secure key storage upon request of [the administrator] and
[applications running on the TSF].
FCS_STG_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall be capable of destroying keys or secrets in the secure key storage upon request of [the user, the administrator].
FCS_STG_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall have the capability to allow only the application that imported the key or secret the use of the key or secret.
Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [a common application developer].
FCS_STG_EXT.1.5
The TSF shall allow only the application that imported the key or secret to request that the key or secret be destroyed.
Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [a common application developer].
6.1.2.23 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_STG_EXT.2 - Encrypted Cryptographic Key Storage
FCS_STG_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall encrypt all DEKs, KEKs, [WPA2/WPA3 PSK, Bluetooth Keys] and [all software-based key storage] by KEKs that are [
• Protected by the REK with [
o encryption by a KEK chaining from a REK
PUBLIC
o encryption by a KEK that is derived from a REK
]
• Protected by the REK and the password with [
o encryption by a KEK chaining to a REK and the password-derived KEK
o encryption by a KEK that is derived from a REK and the password-derived KEK
]
].
FCS_STG_EXT.2.2
DEKs, KEKs, [WPA2/WPA3 PSK, Bluetooth Keys] and [all software-based key storage] shall be encrypted using one of the
following methods: [
• using a SP800-56B key establishment scheme
• using AES in the [GCM mode]
].
6.1.2.24 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_STG_EXT.3 - Integrity of Encrypted Key Storage
FCS_STG_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall protect the integrity of any encrypted DEKs and KEKs and [long-term trusted channel key material] by [
• [GCM] cipher mode for encryption according to FCS_STG_EXT.2
].
FCS_STG_EXT.3.2
The TSF shall verify the integrity of the [MAC] of the stored key prior to use of the key.
6.1.2.25 PKG_TLS_V1.1:FCS_TLS_EXT.1 - TLS Protocol
FCS_TLS_EXT.1
The product shall implement [TLS as a client].
6.1.2.26 PKG_TLS_V1.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 - TLS Client Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1
The product shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and [no earlier TLS versions] as a client that supports the cipher suites [
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
] and also supports functionality for [
• mutual authentication
• session renegotiation
].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2
The product shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier according to RFC 6125.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3
The product shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid [with no exceptions].
PUBLIC
6.1.2.27 PKG_TLS_V1.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 - TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1
The product shall support mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates.
6.1.2.28 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN - TLS Client Protocol (EAP-TLS for WLAN)
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1/WLAN
The TSF shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and [no earlier TLS versions] in support of the EAP-TLS protocol as specified in RFC
5216 supporting the following cipher suites: [
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2/WLAN
The TSF shall generate random values used in the EAP-TLS exchange using the RBG specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3/WLAN
The TSF shall use X509 v3 certificates as specified in FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.4/WLAN
The TSF shall verify that the server certificate presented includes the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.5/WLAN
The TSF shall allow an authorized administrator to configure the list of CAs that are allowed to sign authentication server
certificates that are accepted by the TOE.
6.1.2.29 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FCS_TLSC_EXT.2/WLAN TLS - Client Support for Supported Groups Extension (EAP-TLS for
WLAN)
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1/WLAN
The TSF shall present the Supported Groups extension in the Client Hello with the following NIST curves: [secp256r1, secp384r1].
6.1.2.30 PKG_TLS_V1.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 – TLS Client Support for Renegotiation
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4.1
The product shall support secure renegotiation through use of the “renegotiation_info” TLS extension in accordance with RFC
5746.
6.1.2.31 PKG_TLS_V1.1: FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 TLS - Client Support for Supported Groups Extension
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5.1
PUBLIC
The product shall present the Supported Groups Extension in the Client Hello with the supported groups [
o secp256r1
o secp384r1
].
6.1.2.32 MOD_WLANC_V1.0: FCS_WPA_EXT.1 - Supported WPA Versions
FCS_WPA_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall support WPA3 and [WPA2] security type.
6.1.3 User Data Protection (FDP)
6.1.3.1 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_ACF_EXT.1 - Security Access Control for System Services
FDP_ACF_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to restrict the system services that are accessible to an application.
FDP_ACF_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall provide an access control policy that prevents [application, groups of applications] from accessing [all] data stored
by other [application, groups of applications]. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized for such sharing by [a
common application developer (for sharing between applications)].
6.1.3.2 M PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_ACF_EXT.2 Security Access Control for System Resources
FDP_ACF_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall provide a separate [address book, calendar, [keychain]] for each application group and only allow applications
within that process group to access the resource. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized for such sharing by
[the administrator (for address book)].
6.1.3.3 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Protected Data Encryption
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1
Encryption shall cover all protected data.
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.2
Encryption shall be performed using DEKs with AES in the [XTS] mode with key size [256] bits.
6.1.3.4 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_DAR_EXT.2 Sensitive Data Encryption
FDP_DAR_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism for applications to mark data and keys as sensitive.
FDP_DAR_EXT.2.2
The TSF shall use an asymmetric key scheme to encrypt and store sensitive data received while the product is locked.
FDP_DAR_EXT.2.3
The TSF shall encrypt any stored symmetric key and any stored private key of the asymmetric keys used for the protection of
sensitive data according to [FCS_STG_EXT.2.1 selection 2].
FDP_DAR_EXT.2.4
The TSF shall decrypt the sensitive data that was received while in the locked state upon transitioning to the unlocked state
using the asymmetric key scheme and shall re-encrypt that sensitive data using the symmetric key scheme.
PUBLIC
6.1.3.5 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_IFC_EXT.1 Subset Information Flow Control
FDP_IFC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall [provide an interface which allows a VPN client to protect all IP traffic using IPsec] with the exception of IP traffic
needed to manage the VPN connection,
and [traffic needed to determine if the network connection has connectivity to the internet and responses to local ICMP echo r
equests on the local subnet], when the VPN is enabled.
6.1.3.6 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_STG_EXT.1 User Data Storage
FDP_STG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide protected storage for the Trust Anchor Database.
6.1.3.7 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_UPC_EXT.1/APPS Inter-TSF User Data Transfer Protection (Applications)
FDP_UPC_EXT.1.1/APPS
The TSF shall provide a means for non-TSF applications executing on the TOE to use [
o Mutually authenticated TLS as defined in the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), version 1.1,
o HTTPS
and [
o no other protocol
]] to provide a protected communication channel between the non-TSF application and another IT product that is logically
distinct from other communication channels, provides assured identification of its end points, protects channel data from
disclosure, and detects modification of the channel data.
FDP_UPC_EXT.1.2/APPS
The TSF shall permit the non-TSF applications to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
6.1.3.8 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_UPC_EXT.1/BLUETOOTH Inter-TSF User Data Transfer Protection (Bluetooth)
FDP_UPC_EXT.1.1/BLUETOOTH
The TSF shall provide a means for non-TSF applications executing on the TOE to use [
o Bluetooth BR/EDR in accordance with the PP-Module for Bluetooth, version 1.0,
and [
o Bluetooth LE in accordance with the PP-Module for Bluetooth, version 1.0
]] to provide a protected communication channel between the non-TSF application and another IT product that is logically
distinct from other communication channels, provides assured identification of its end points, protects channel data from
disclosure, and detects modification of the channel data.
FDP_UPC_EXT.1.2/BLUETOOTH
The TSF shall permit the non-TSF applications to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
6.1.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
6.1.4.1 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_AFL_EXT.1 Authentication Failure Handling
FIA_AFL_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall consider password and [no other mechanism] as critical authentication mechanisms.
FIA_AFL_EXT.1.2
PUBLIC
The TSF shall detect when a configurable positive integer within [0 and 10] of [non-unique] unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to last successful authentication for each authentication mechanism.
FIA_AFL_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall maintain the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts that have occurred upon power off.
FIA_AFL_EXT.1.4
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has exceeded the maximum allowed for a given
authentication mechanism, all future authentication attempts will be limited to other available authentication mechanisms,
unless the given mechanism is designated as a critical authentication mechanism.
FIA_AFL_EXT.1.5
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts for the last available authentication mechanism or single
critical authentication mechanism has been surpassed, the TSF shall perform a wipe of all protected data.
FIA_AFL_EXT.1.6
The TSF shall increment the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts prior to notifying the user that the authentication
was unsuccessful.
6.1.4.2 MOD_BT_V1.0:FIA_BLT_EXT.1 Bluetooth User Authorization
FIA_BLT_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall require explicit user authorization before pairing with a remote Bluetooth device.
6.1.4.3 MOD_BT_V1.0:FIA_BLT_EXT.2 Bluetooth Mutual Authentication
FIA_BLT_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall require Bluetooth mutual authentication between devices prior to any data transfer over the Bluetooth link.
6.1.4.4 MOD_BT_V1.0:FIA_BLT_EXT.3 Rejection of Duplicate Bluetooth Connections
FIA_BLT_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall discard pairing and session initialization attempts from a Bluetooth device address (BD_ADDR) to which an active
session already exists.
6.1.4.5 MOD_BT_V1.0:FIA_BLT_EXT.4 Secure Simple Pairing
FIA_BLT_EXT.4.1
The TOE shall support Bluetooth Secure Simple Pairing, both in the host and the controller.
FIA_BLT_EXT.4.2
The TOE shall support Secure Simple Pairing during the pairing process.
6.1.4.6 MOD_BT_V1.0:FIA_BLT_EXT.6 Trusted Bluetooth Device User Authorization
FIA_BLT_EXT.6.1
The TSF shall require explicit user authorization before granting trusted remote devices access to services associated with the
following Bluetooth profiles: [OPP, MAP].
6.1.4.7 MOD_BT_V1.0:FIA_BLT_EXT.7 Untrusted Bluetooth Device User Authorization
FIA_BLT_EXT.7.1
PUBLIC
The TSF shall require explicit user authorization before granting untrusted remote devices access to services associated with the
following Bluetooth profiles: [all Bluetooth profiles].
6.1.4.8 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FIA_PAE_EXT.1 Port Access Entity Authentication
FIA_PAE_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall conform to IEEE Standard 802.1X for a Port Access Entity (PAE) in the “Supplicant” role.
6.1.4.9 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall support the following for the Password Authentication Factor:
1. Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of [upper and lower case letters], numbers, and special
characters: [ ! @ # $ % ^ & * ( ) + = _ / - ' " : ; , ? `~ \ | < > { } [ ] ]
2. Password length up to [16] characters shall be supported.
6.1.4.10 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_TRT_EXT.1 Authentication Throttling
FIA_TRT_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall limit automated user authentication attempts by [enforcing a delay between incorrect authentication attempts]
for all authentication mechanisms selected in FIA_UAU.5.1. The minimum delay shall be such that no more than 10 attempts can
be attempted per 500 milliseconds.
6.1.4.11 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_ UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1
The TSF shall provide password and to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2
The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the [following rules:
To authenticate unlocking the device immediately after boot (first unlock after reboot):
• User passwords are required after reboot to unlock the user's Credential encrypted (CE files) and keystore keys.
To authenticate unlocking the device after device lock (not following a reboot):
• The TOE verifies user credentials (password) via the gatekeeper, which compares the entered credential to a derived
value or template.
To change protected settings or issue certain commands:
• The TOE requires password after a reboot, when changing settings (Screen lock settings), and when factory resetting.
].
6.1.4.12 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_UAU.6/CREDENTIAL Re-Authentication (Credential Change)
FIA_UAU.6.1/CREDENTIAL
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user via the Password Authentication Factor under the conditions [attempted change to any
supported authentication mechanisms].
6.1.4.13 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_UAU.6/LOCKED Re-Authentication (TSF Lock)
FIA_UAU.6.1/LOCKED
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user via an authentication factor defined in FIA_UAU.5.1 under the conditions TSF-initiated
lock, user-initiated lock, [no other conditions].
PUBLIC
6.1.4.14 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1
The TSF shall provide only [obscured feedback to the device's display] to the user while the authentication is in progress.
6.1.4.15 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_UAU_EXT.1 Authentication for Cryptographic Operation
FIA_UAU_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall require the user to present the Password Authentication Factor prior to decryption of protected data and
encrypted DEKs, KEKs and [all software-based key storage] at startup.
6.1.4.16 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Timing of Authentication
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall allow [
• Power off/reboot
• Change volume of the different streams
• Take screenshots
• Change display brightness
• Toggle Wi-Fi (but no ability to change networks)
• Toggle Bluetooth (but no ability to manage devices)
• Turn shield mode on (but not off)
• Toggle Do Not Disturb
• Toggle flashlight
• Toggle rotation lock
• Toggle hotspot
• Toggle battery saver
• Toggle airplane mode
• Toggle day/night theme
• Toggle wireless power sharing
• Toggle nightlight (screen blue filter for eye strain)
• Toggle color inversion
• Terminate / snooze alarms
• Answer MT calls
• Make emergency MO calls
] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of
that user.
6.1.4.17 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Validation of Certificates
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
• The certificate path must terminate with a certificate in the Trust Anchor Database.
• The TSF shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension, that the CA flag is
set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and that any path constraints are met.
• The TSF shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the key usage field.
• The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [OCSP as specified in RFC 6960].
• The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
– Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing
Purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
PUBLIC
– Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
– Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA
with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the extendedKeyUsage field. [conditional]
– Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
– OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with
OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field. [conditional]
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
6.1.4.18 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/WLAN
The TSF shall validate certificates for EAP-TLS in accordance with the following rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation
• The certificate path must terminate with a certificate in the Trust Anchor Database
• The TSF shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension and that the CA flag
is set to TRUE for all CA certificates
• The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
– Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field
– Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/WLAN
The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
6.1.4.19 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [mutually authenticated TLS as
defined in the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security, HTTPS, [no other protocol]] and [no additional uses].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2
When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the revocation status of a certificate, the TSF shall
[not accept the certificate].
6.1.4.20 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN X.509 Certificate Authentication (EAP-TLS for WLAN)
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1/WLAN
The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support [[authentication for EAP-TLS exchanges]].
6.1.4.21 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_X509_EXT.3 Request Validation of Certificates
FIA_X509_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall provide a certificate validation service to applications.
FIA_X509_EXT.3.2
The TSF shall respond to the requesting application with the success or failure of the validation.
PUBLIC
6.1.4.22 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.6 Certificate Storage and Management
FIA_X509_EXT.6.1
The TSF shall [invoke [software-based key storage] to store and protect] certificate(s) from unauthorized deletion and
modification.
FIA_X509_EXT.6.2
The TSF shall [rely on [the TOE certificate management system] to load X.509v3 certificates into [software-based key storage]]
for use by the TSF.
6.1.5 Security Management (FMT)
6.1.5.1 PP_MDF_V3.3:FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the functions in [column 4 of Table 17] to the user.
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the functions [in column 6 of Table 17] to the administrator when the device is
enrolled and according to the administrator-configured policy.
6.1.5.2 PP_MDF_V3.3:FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions (M = Mandatory, I = Implemented):
Table 17. Security Management Functions
# Management Function Impl. User
Only
Admin Admin
Only
1 configure password policy:
• Minimum password length
• Minimum password complexity
• Maximum password lifetime
The administrator can configure the required password
characteristics (minimum length, complexity, and lifetime) using the
KATIM OS MDM APIs.
Length: an integer value of characters
Complexity: Unspecified, Something, Numeric, Alphabetic,
Alphanumeric, Complex.
Lifetime: an integer value of seconds (0 = no maximum)
M M M
2 configure session locking policy:
• Screen-lock enabled/disabled
• Screen lock timeout
• Number of authentication failures
The administrator can configure the session locking policy using the
KATIM OS MDMAPIs.
Screen lock timeout: an integer number of milliseconds
before the TOE locks.
M M M
PUBLIC
An integer number (0 to 9,223,372,036,854,775,807 [negative
integers and zero means no lockout]).
Authentication failures: an integer number (-2,147,483,648to
2,147,483,648[negativeintegers and zero means no limit]) of failures
before a wipe action is initiated. This only applies to password
authentication, fingerprint attempts do not increment this counter
3 enable/disable the VPN protection:
• Across device
• [no other method]
Both users (using the TOE’s settings UI) and administrator (using the
TOE’s MDM APIs) can configure a third-party VPN client and then enable
the VPN client to protect traffic. The User can set up VPN protection, but
if an admin enables VPN protection, the user cannot disable it.
M I
4 enable/disable [NFC, Bluetooth, WiFi]
enable/disable [cellular]
The administrator (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can manage NFC,
Bluetooth, and WiFi radios. In that case, the user cannot override the
administrator setting.
The cellular radio can be disabled by the administrator (using the TOE’s
MDM APIs), but the user (using the TOE’s settings UI) is able to
override this and turn the radio back on.
The TOE’s radios operate at frequencies of 2.4 GHz (NFC/Bluetooth),
2.4/5 GHz (Wi-Fi), and 850, 900, 1800, 1900 MHz (4G/LTE). The radios
are initialized during the initial power-up sequence. If the radio is
supposed to be off (by setting), it will be turned off after the initial
check.
M
M I
I I
5 enable/disable [microphone, camera]:
• Across device,
• [on a per-app basis]
An administrator can enable/disable the device’s microphone via an
MDM API. Once the microphone has been disabled, the user cannot re-
enable it until the administrator enables it.
In the user’s settings, a user can view a permission by type (i.e. camera,
microphone). The user can access this by going to the settings UI
(Settings > Privacy > Permission manager > <camera/ microphone>)
and revoking any applications.
M I I
6 transition to the locked state
Both the user and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can
transition the TOE into a locked state.
M M
7 TSF wipe of protected data
Both users (using the TOE’s settings UI) and administrators (using the
TOE’s MDM APIs) can force the TOE to perform a full wipe (factory
reset) of data.
M M
PUBLIC
8 configure application installation policy by: [
• restricting the sources of applications,
• denying installation of applications]
The administrator (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can configure the TOE
so that applications cannot be installed and can also block the use of
the Google Play Store.
M M M
9 import keys or secrets into the secure key storage
Both users and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can import
secret keys into the secure key storage.
M I
10 destroy imported keys or secrets and [no other keys or secrets] in the
secure key storage
Both users and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can destroy
secret keys in the secure key storage.
M I
11 import X.509v3 certificates into the Trust Anchor Database
Both users and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can import
X.509v3 certificates into the Trust Anchor Database.
M M
12 remove imported X.509v3 certificates and [no other X.509v3
certificates] in the Trust Anchor Database
Both users and administrators (using the MDM APIs) can remove
imported X.509v3 certificates from the Trust Anchor Database as well
as disable any of the TOE’s default Root CA certificates (in the latter
case, the CA certificate still resides in the TOE’s read-only system
partition; however, the TOE will treat that Root CA certificate and any
certificate chaining to it as untrusted).
M I
13 enroll the TOE in management
TOE users can enroll the TOE in management according to the
instructions specific to a given MDM. Presumably any enrollment
would involve at least some user functions (e.g., install an MDM agent
application) on the TOE prior to enrollment.
M
14 remove applications
Both users and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can
uninstall user and administrator installed applications on the TOE.
M M
15 update system software
Users can check for updates and cause the device to update if an
update is available. An administrator can use MDM APIs to query the
version of the TOE and query the installed applications and an MDM
agent on the TOE could issue pop-ups, initiate updates, block
communication, etc. until any necessary updates are completed
M M I
16 install applications
Both users and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can install
applications on the TOE.
M M
PUBLIC
17 remove Enterprise applications
An administrator (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can uninstall Enterprise
installed applications on the TOE.
M M
18 enable/disable display notification in the locked state of: [
• all notifications]
Notifications can be configured to display in the following formats:
• Users &amp; administrators: show all notification content
• Users: hide sensitive content
• Users & administrators: hide notifications entirely
If the administrator sets any of the above settings, the user cannot
change it.
M I I
19 enable data-at rest protection
The TOE always encrypts its user data storage
M
20 enable removable media’s data-at-rest protection
The device does not support removable media.
21 enable/disable location services:
• Across device
• [no other method]
The administrator (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can enable or disable
location services.
An additional MDM API can prohibit TOE users’ ability to enable and
disable location services.
M I I
22 enable/disable the use of [Biometric Authentication Factor] I I
23 configure whether to allow or
disallow establishment of [assignment: configurable trusted channel in
FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1 or FDP_UPC_EXT.1.1/APPS] if the peer or server
certificate is deemed invalid.
24 enable/disable all data signaling over [assignment: list of externally
accessible hardware ports]
25 enable/disable [Bluetooth tethering]
The administrator (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can enable/disable all
tethering methods (i.e. all or none disabled).
The TOE acts as a server (acting as an access point, a USB Ethernet
adapter, and as a Bluetooth Ethernet adapter respectively) in order to
share its network connection with another device.
I I I
PUBLIC
26 enable/disable developer modes
The administrator (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can disable Developer
Mode.
Unless disabled by the administrator, TOE users can enable and disable
Developer Mode.
I I I
27 enable/disable bypass of local user authentication
N/A – It is not possible to bypass local user auth for this TOE
28 wipe Enterprise data
An administrator (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can remove Enterprise
applications and their data.
I I
29 approve [selection: import, removal] by applications of X.509v3
certificates in the Trust Anchor Database
30 configure whether to allow or disallow establishment of a trusted
channel if the
TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a
certificate
31 enable/disable the cellular protocols used to connect to cellular
network base stations
32 read audit logs kept by the TSF I I
33 configure [selection: certificate, public-key] used to validate digital
signature on applications
34 approve exceptions for shared use of keys or secrets by multiple
applications
35 approve exceptions for destruction of keys or secrets by applications
that did not import the key or secret
36 configure the unlock banner
The administrator (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can specify text to
always be shown on the lock screen.
I I
37 configure the auditable items
38 retrieve TSF-software integrity verification values
39 enable/disable [selection:
• USB mass storage mode
• USB data transfer without user authentication
• USB data transfer without authentication of the connecting
system
]
40 enable/disable backup of
[selection: all applications, selected applications, selected groups of
applications, configuration data] to [selection: locally connected
system, remote system]
PUBLIC
41 enable/disable [
• Hotspot functionality authenticated by [pre- shared key],
• USB tethering authenticated by [no authentication]]
The administrator (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can disable the Wi-Fi
hotspot and USB tethering.
Unless disabled by the administrator, TOE users can configure the Wi-Fi
hotspot with a pre- shared key and can configure USB tethering (with
no authentication, though the device must be unlocked to establish the
initial tethering connection).
I I I
42 approve exceptions for sharing data between [selection: applications,
groups of applications]
43 place applications into application process groups based on
[assignment: enterprise configuration settings]
44 unenroll the TOE from management
45 enable/disable the Always On VPN protection
• Across device
• [no other method]
The administrator (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can specify whether a
VPN connection is required for the device to access any network
services. The configuration would specify the VPN connection(s)
required.
I I I
46 revoke Biometric template
47 [assignment: list of other management functions to be provided by the
TSF]
6.1.5.3 MOD_BT_V1.0:FMT_SMF_EXT.1/BT Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1/BT
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following Bluetooth management functions:
Table 18. Bluetooth Security Management Functions
# Management Function Impl. User
Only
Admi n Admi
n
Only
BT-1 Configure the Bluetooth trusted channel.
• Disable/enable the Discoverable (for BR/EDR) and
Advertising (for LE) modes;
M
BT-2 Change the Bluetooth device name (separately for
BR/EDR and LE);
BT-3 Provide separate controls for turning the BR/EDR and LE
radios on and off;
PUBLIC
BT-4 Allow/disallow the following additional wireless
technologies to be used with Bluetooth: [selection: Wi-Fi,
NFC, [assignment: other wireless technologies]];
BT-5 Configure allowable methods of Out of Band pairing (for
BR/EDR and LE);
BT-6 Disable/enable the Discoverable (for BR/EDR) and
Advertising (for LE) modes separately;
BT-7 Disable/enable the Connectable mode (for BR/EDR and LE);
BT-8 Disable/enable the Bluetooth [assignment: list of Bluetooth
service and/or profiles available on the OS (for BR/EDR and
LE)]:
BT-9 Specify minimum level of security for each pairing (for
BR/EDR and LE);
6.1.5.4 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FMT_SMF.1/WLAN Specification of Management Functions (WLAN Client)
FMT_SMF.1.1/WLAN
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
Table 19. WLAN Security Management Functions
# Management Function Impl. User
Only
Admin Admin
Only
WL-1 Configure security policy for each wireless network:
• [specify the CA(s) from which the TSF will
accept WLAN authentication server
certificate(s)]
• security type
• authentication protocol
• client credentials to be used for authentication
M M
WL-2 Specify wireless networks (SSIDs) to which the TSF may
connect.
An administrator can specify a list of wireless networks
to which the TOE may connect and can restrict the TOE
to only allow a connection to the specified networks.
M M
WL-3 Enable/disable wireless network bridging capability (for
example, bridging a connection between the WLAN and
cellular radios to function as a hotspot) authenticated
by [pre-shared key]
M M
WL-4 Enable/disable certificate revocation list checking;
WL-5 Disable ad hoc wireless client-to-client connection capability
WL-6 Disable roaming capability;
WL-7 Enable/disable IEEE 802.1X pre-authentication;
WL-8 Loading X.509 certificates into the TOE
PUBLIC
WL-9 Revoke X.509 certificates loaded into the TOE
WL-10 Enable/disable and configure PMK caching:
• set the amount of time (in minutes) PMK entries
are cached.
• set the maximum number of PMK entries that can
be cached.
WL-11 Configure security policy for each wireless network: set
wireless frequency band to [selection: 2.4 GHz, 5 GHz, 6
GHz]
6.1.5.5 PP_MDF_V3.3:FMT_SMF_EXT.2 Specification of Remediation Actions
FMT_SMF_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall offer [wipe of protected data, wipe of sensitive data, remove Enterprise applications, remove all device-
stored Enterprise resource data] upon un-enrollment and [factory reset].
6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
6.1.6.1 FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Application Address Space Layout Randomization
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide address space layout randomization ASLR to applications.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2
The base address of any user-space memory mapping will consist of at least 8 unpredictable bits.
6.1.6.2 FPT_AEX_EXT.2 Memory Page Permissions
FPT_AEX_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall be able to enforce read, write, and execute permissions on every page of physical memory.
6.1.6.3 FPT_AEX_EXT.3 Stack Overflow Protection
FPT_AEX_EXT.3.1
TSF processes that execute in a non-privileged execution domain on the application processor shall implement stack-based
buffer overflow protection.
6.1.6.4 FPT_AEX_EXT.4 Domain Isolation
FPT_AEX_EXT.4.1
The TSF shall protect itself from modification by untrusted subjects.
FPT_AEX_EXT.4.2
The TSF shall enforce isolation of address space between applications.
6.1.6.5 FPT_JTA_EXT.1 JTAG Disablement
FPT_JTA_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall [disable access through hardware] to JTAG.
PUBLIC
6.1.6.6 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_KST_EXT.1 Key Storage
FPT_KST_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall not store any plaintext key material in readable non-volatile memory.
6.1.6.7 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_KST_EXT.2 No Key Transmission
FPT_KST_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall not transmit any plaintext key material outside the security boundary of the TOE.
6.1.6.8 FPT_KST_EXT.3 No Plaintext Key Export
FPT_KST_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall ensure it is not possible for the TOE users to export plaintext keys.
6.1.6.9 FPT_NOT_EXT.1 Self-Test Notification
FPT_NOT_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall transition to non-operational mode and [no other actions] when the following types of failures occur:
• failures of the self-tests
• TSF software integrity verification failures
• [no other failures]
6.1.6.10 FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FPT_STM.1.1
The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
6.1.6.11 FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (on power on) to demonstrate the correct operation of all
cryptographic functionality.
6.1.6.12 FPT_TST_EXT.2/PREKERNEL TSF Integrity Checking (Pre-Kernel)
FPT_TST_EXT.2.1/PREKERNEL
The TSF shall verify the integrity of [the bootchain up through the Application Processor OS kernel] stored in mutable media
prior to its execution through the use of [an immutable hardware hash of an asymmetric key].
6.1.6.13 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FPT_TST_EXT.3/WLAN TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing (WLAN Client)
FPT_TST_EXT.3.1/WLAN
The [TOE platform] shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (on power on) to demonstrate the correct operation of
the TSF.
FPT_TST_EXT.3.2/WLAN
The [TOE platform] shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code when it is loaded for
execution through the use of the TSF-provided cryptographic services.
6.1.6.14 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 TSF Version Query
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
PUBLIC
The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of the TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of the hardware model of the device.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of installed mobile applications.
6.1.6.15 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 TSF Update Verification
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall verify software updates to the Application Processor system software and [[baseband processor]] using a digital
signature verified by the manufacturer trusted key prior to installing those updates.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2
The TSF shall [update only by verified software] the TSF boot integrity [key].
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.3
The TSF shall verify that the digital signature verification key used for TSF
updates [matches an immutable hardware public key].
6.1.6.16 FPT_TUD_EXT.3 Application Signing
FPT_TUD_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall verify mobile application software using a digital signature mechanism prior to installation.
6.1.7 TOE Access (FTA)
6.1.7.1 PP_MDF_V3.3:FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF- and User-initiated Locked State
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall transition to a locked state after a time interval of inactivity.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall transition to a locked state after initiation by either the user or the administrator.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall, upon transitioning to the locked state, perform the following operations:
• Clearing or overwriting display devices, obscuring the previous contents;
• [no other actions].
6.1.7.2 PP_MDF_V3.3:FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners
FTA_TAB.1.1
Before establishing a user session, the TSF shall display an advisory warning message regarding unauthorized use of the TOE.
6.1.7.3 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FTA_WSE_EXT.1 Wireless Network Access
FTA_WSE_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall be able to attempt connections only to wireless networks specified as acceptable networks as configured by the
administrator in FMT_SMF.1.1/WLAN.
PUBLIC
6.1.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
6.1.8.1 MOD_BT_V1.0:FTP_BLT_EXT.1 Bluetooth Encryption
FTP_BLT_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the use of encryption when transmitting data over the Bluetooth trusted channel for BR/EDR and [LE].
FTP_BLT_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall use key pairs per FCS_CKM_EXT.8 for Bluetooth encryption.
6.1.8.2 MOD_BT_V1.0:FTP_BLT_EXT.2 Persistence of Bluetooth Encryption
FTP_BLT_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall [terminate the connection] if the remote device stops encryption while connected to the TOE.
6.1.8.3 MOD_BT_V1.0:FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR Bluetooth Encryption Parameters (BR/EDR)
FTP_BLT_EXT.3.1/BR
The TSF shall set the minimum encryption key size to [128 bits] for [BR/EDR] and not negotiate encryption key sizes smaller than
the minimum size.
6.1.8.4 MOD_BT_V1.0:FTP_BLT_EXT.3/LE Bluetooth Encryption Parameters (LE)
FTP_BLT_EXT.3.1/LE
The TSF shall set the minimum encryption key size to [128 bits] for [LE] and not negotiate encryption key sizes smaller than the
minimum size.
6.1.8.5 PP_MDF_V3.3:FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Trusted Channel Communication
FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall use
• 802.11-2012 in accordance with the [PP-Module for Wireless LAN Clients, version 1.0],
• 802.1X in accordance with the [PP-Module for Wireless LAN Clients, version 1.0],
• EAP-TLS in accordance with the [PP-Module for Wireless LAN Clients, version 1.0],
• mutually authenticated TLS in accordance with [the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), version 1.1]
• and [HTTPS] protocols to provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically
distinct from other communication channels, provides assured identification of its end points, protects channel data from
disclosure, and detects modification of the channel data.
FTP_ITC_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall permit the TSF to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for wireless access point connections, administrative
communication, configured enterprise connections, and [OTA updates].
6.1.8.6 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FTP_ITC.1/WLAN Trusted Channel Communication (Wireless LAN)
FTP_ITC.1.1/WLAN
The TSF shall use 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and a wireless
access point that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points
and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
PUBLIC
FTP_ITC.1.2/WLAN
The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/WLAN
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [wireless access point connections].
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The SARs for the TOE are the components as specified in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. Note that the SARs have effectively
been refined with the assurance activities explicitly defined in association with both the SFRs and SARs.
6.2.1 Development (ADV)
6.2.1.1 ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification
ADV_FSP.1.1D
The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.2D
The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.
ADV_FSP.1.1C
The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.2C
The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.3C
The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_FSP.1.4C
The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.1.2E
The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete instantiation of the SFRs.
6.2.2 Guidance Documents (AGD)
6.2.2.1 AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
AGD_OPE.1.1D
The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
AGD_OPE.1.1C
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and privileges that should be
controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2C
PUBLIC
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a
secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and interfaces, in particular all security
parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4C
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-
accessible functions that need to be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of
the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C
The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE (including operation following failure or
operational error), their consequences, and implications for maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be followed in order to fulfill the
security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C
The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
AGD_OPE.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
6.2.2.2 AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures
AGD_PRE.1.1D
The developer shall provide the TOE, including its preparative procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.1C
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with
the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2C
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE and for the secure
preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as
described in the ST.
AGD_PRE.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2E
The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared securely for operation.
PUBLIC
6.2.3 Life-cycle support (ALC)
6.2.3.1 ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.1.1D
The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ALC_CMC.1.1C
The TOE shall be labeled with its unique reference.
ALC_CMC.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
6.2.3.2 ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM Coverage
ALC_CMS.1.1D
The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
ALC_CMS.1.1C
The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the evaluation evidence required by the SARs.
ALC_CMS.1.2C
The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
ALC_CMS.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
6.2.3.3 ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1D
The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how timely security updates are made to the TOE.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1C
The description shall include the process for creating and deploying security updates for the TOE software.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.2C
The description shall express the time window as the length of time, in days, between public disclosure of a vulnerability and the
public availability of security updates to the TOE.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.3C
The description shall include the mechanisms publicly available for reporting security issues pertaining to the TOE.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.4C
The description shall include where users can seek information about the availability of new updates including details (e.g. CVE
identifiers) of the specific public vulnerabilities corrected by each update.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
PUBLIC
6.2.4 Tests (ATE)
6.2.4.1 ATE_IND.1 Independent Testing - Conformance
ATE_IND.1.1D
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
ATE_IND.1.1C
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.1.2E
The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.
6.2.5 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)
6.2.5.1 AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability Survey
AVA_VAN.1.1D
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1.1C
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
AVA_VAN.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.1.2E
The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.1.3E
The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is
resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack potential.
PUBLIC
7 TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the security functions:
• Security audit
• Cryptographic support
• User data protection
• Identification and authentication
• Security management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE access
• Trusted path/channels
7.1 Security Audit
7.1.1 PP_MDF_V3.3:FAU_GEN.1, MOD_BT_V1.0:FAU_GEN.1/BT,
MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FAU_GEN.1/WLAN
The TOE employs two AOSP logging mechanisms to fulfill the logging requirements outlined in Table 2 of PP_MDF_V3.3, Table 2
of the MOD_BT_V1.0, and Table 2 of the MOD_WLANC_V1.0: SecurityLog events and Logcat events:
1. SecurityLog Events:
The complete list of auditable events for SecurityLog is available at
https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/SecurityLog. These constants represent SecurityLog
keywords used for logging, accompanied by descriptions of the events and any associated data/variables included
in the audit record.
Additional event details retrievable through MDM requests can be found at: SecurityLog.SecurityEvent.
A log entry contains a keyword describing the event, the event's timestamp (date and time), and event-specific
values indicating success, failure, and other relevant information.
2. Logcat Events:
Logcat events also include date, time, and event-specific values. Additionally, they provide a user ID to identify the
individual responsible for generating the event.
Logcat entries are human-readable and do not require administrators to interpret the log structure.
Certain audit records, although logged, may not be accessible to the administrator due to specific conditions. The
audit events and corresponding reasons for inaccessibility are outlined below:
FAU_GEN.1 – Shutdown of Audit Functions: When the audit log functionality is terminated, the associated security log buffer
is deallocated, making the audit records unavailable for review by the administrator.
PP_MDF_V3.3: FAU_GEN.1 – Shutdown of the OS: Security logs are stored in volatile memory. When the system
undergoes a shutdown, the audit record indicating system shutdown is cleared, making it inaccessible.
PP_MDF_V3.3: FPT_TST_EXT.1 – Failure of Self-Test: Self-tests are executed prior to the initialization of audit
logging. Although a log indicating the success or failure of the self-test is queued for logging, it will only be
recorded once the security log system is fully initialized.
7.1.2 PP_MDF_V3.3:FAU_SAR.1
The TOE provides a Mobile Device Management (MDM) API that enables a Device-Owner MDM agent to access and read
security logs.
PUBLIC
7.1.3 PP_MDF_V3.3:FAU_STG.1
The TOE stores all security audit records in volatile memory, where access is restricted to the logd daemon. Only device owner
applications have permission to invoke the MDM API to retrieve a copy of these security logs. New logs can be appended, but
there is no supported mechanism for deleting or modifying existing logs in memory. However, the act of reading the security logs
via the API clears the log buffer at the time of retrieval. Logcat events are similarly stored in memory, with access restricted to an
administrator through an MDM API.
7.1.4 PP_MDF_V3.3:FAU_STG.4
The TOE stores SecurityLog and Logcat events in memory using circular log buffers with sizes of 10KB and 256KB, respectively.
Both log buffers operate in a circular fashion: when full, the oldest log entries are overwritten by new auditable events. These logs
remain in memory until they are either overwritten, or the device undergoes a restart.
7.2 Cryptographic support
7.2.1 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM.1
The TOE supports asymmetric key generation for all types in accordance with FIPS 186-4 through its BoringSSL crypto library. The
TOE itself does not generate any RSA/ECDSA authentication key pairs for TOE functionality (the user or administrator must load
certificates for use with WPA2/WPA3 with EAP-TLS authentication); however, the TOE provides key generation APIs to mobile
applications to allow them to generate RSA/ECDSA key pairs.
The TOE will provide a library for application developers to use for Sensitive Data Protection (SDP). This library (class) generates
asymmetric RSA keys for use to encrypt and decrypt data that comes to the device while in a locked state. Any data received for
a specified application (that opts into SDP via this library), is encrypted using the public key and stored until the device is unlocked.
The public key stays in memory no matter the state of the device (locked or unlocked). However, when the device is locked, the
private key is evicted from memory and unavailable for use until the device is unlocked. Upon unlock, the private key is re-derived
and used to decrypt data received and encrypted while locked.
7.2.2 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FCS_CKM.1/WPA
The TOE adheres to IEEE 802.11-2012 for key generation. The TOE’s wpa_supplicant provides PRF384, PRF512 and PRF704 for
derivation of 128-bit, 192-bit and 256-bit AES Temporal Keys (using the HMAC implementation provided by BoringSSL) and
employs its BoringSSL AES-256 DRBG when generating random values used in the EAP-TLS and 802.11 4-way handshake. The TOE
supports the AES-128 CCMP and AES-256 GCMP encryption modes.
The TOE has successfully completed certification (including WPA2/WPA3 Enterprise) and received Wi-Fi CERTIFIED Interoperability
Certificates from the Wi-Fi Alliance. The Wi-Fi Alliance maintains a website providing further information about the testing
program: http://www.wi-fi.org/certification.
Table 20. WiFi Alliance Certificate
Device Name Model Number Wi-Fi Alliance Certificate Numbers
KATIM X3M WFA131102
7.2.3 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM.2/UNLOCKED
The TOE supports key establishment using RSA/ECDH as part of EAP-TLS and TLS session establishment.
7.2.4 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM.2/LOCKED
The TOE provides an SDP library for applications that uses a hybrid crypto scheme based on 4096-bit RSA based key establishment.
Applications can utilize this library to implement SDP that encrypts incoming data received while the phone is locked in a manner
compliant with this requirement.
PUBLIC
7.2.5 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FCS_CKM.2/WLAN
The TOE adheres to RFC 3394 and 802.11-2012 standards and unwraps the GTK (sent encrypted with the WPA2/WPA3 KEK using
AES Key Wrap in an EAPOL-Key frame). The TOE, upon receiving an EAPOL frame, will subject the frame to a number of checks
(frame length, EAPOL version, frame payload size, EAPOL-Key type, key data length, EAPOL-Key CCMP descriptor version, and
replay counter) to ensure a proper EAPOL message and then decrypt the GTK using the KEK, thus ensuring that it does not
expose the Group Temporal Key (GTK).
7.2.6 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM_EXT.1
The TOE includes a Root Encryption Key (REK) stored in a 256-bit fuse bank within the application processor. The TOE generates
the REK/fuse value during manufacturing using its hardware PRNG. The application processor protects the REK by preventing any
direct observation of the value and prohibiting any ability to modify or update the value. The application processor loads the fuse
value into an internal hardware crypto register and the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) provides trusted applications the
ability to derive KEKs from the REK (using an SP 800-108 KDF). Additionally, when the REK is loaded, the fuses for the REK become
locked, preventing any further changing or loading of the REK value. The TEE does not allow trusted applications to use the REK
for encryption or decryption, only the ability to derive a KEK from the REK. The TOE includes a TEE application that calls into the
TEE in order to derive a KEK from the 256-bit REK/fuse value and then only permits use of the derived KEK for encryption and
decryption as part of the TOE key hierarchy. More information regarding Trusted Execution Environments may be found here:
http://www.globalplatform.org/mediaguidetee.asp.
7.2.7 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM_EXT.2
The TOE utilizes its approved RBGs to generate DEKs for the various use cases. When generating AES keys for itself (for
example, the TOE’s sensitive data encryption keys or for the Secure Key Storage), the TOE utilizes the RAND_bytes() API call from
its BoringSSL AES-256 CTR_DRBG to generate a 256-bit AES key. The TOE also utilizes that same DRBG when servicing API requests
from mobile applications wishing to generate AES keys (either 128 or 256-bit). In all cases, the TOE generates DEKs using a
compliant RBG seeded with sufficient entropy so as to ensure that the generated key cannot be recovered with less work than a
full exhaustive search of the key space.
7.2.8 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM_EXT.3
The TOE takes the user-entered password and conditions/stretches this value before combining the factor with other KEK. The
TOE generates all non-derived KEKs using the RAND_bytes() API call from its BoringSSL AES-256 CTR_DRBG to ensure a full256-
bits of strength for asymmetric/symmetric keys, respectively. The TOE also combines KEKs by encrypting one KEK with the other
as to preserve entropy.
7.2.9 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM_EXT.4
The TOE clears sensitive cryptographic material (plaintext keys, authentication, and other security parameters) from memory
when no longer needed or when transitioning to the device’s locked state (in the case of the Sensitive Data Protection keys). Public
keys (such as the one used for Sensitive Data Protection) can remain in memory when the phone is locked, but all crypto-related
private keys are evicted from memory upon device lock. No plaintext cryptographic material resides in the TOE’s Flash as the TOE
encrypts all keys stored in Flash. When performing a full wipe of protected data, the TOE cryptographically erases the protected
data by clearing the Data-At-Rest DEK. Because the OS Keystore of the TOE resides within the user data partition, the TOE
effectively cryptographically erases those keys when clearing the Data-At-Rest DEK. In turn, the TOE clears the Data-At-Rest DEK
and Secure Key Storage SEK through a secure direct overwrite (BLKSECDISCARD ioctl) of the wear-leveled Flash memory containing
the key followed by a read-verify.
7.2.10 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM_EXT.5
The TOE stores all protected data in encrypted form within the user data partition (either protected data or sensitive data). Upon
request, the TOE cryptographically erases the Data-At-Rest DEK protecting the user data partition, clears those keys from memory,
reformats the partition, and performs a power-cycle. The TOE’s clearing of the keys follows the requirements of FCS_CKM_EXT.4.
7.2.11 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_CKM_EXT.6
The TOE generates salt nonces (which are just salt values used in WPA2/WPA3) using its AES-256 CTR_DRBG.
PUBLIC
Table 21. Salt Nonces
Salt Value and Size RBG Origin Salt Storage Location
User password salt (128-bit) BoringSSL'sAES-256
CTR_DRBG
Flash filesystem
TLS client_random (256-bit) BoringSSL's AES-256
CTR_DRBG
N/A (ephemeral)
TLS pre_master_secret (384-bit) BoringSSL's AES-256
CTR_DRBG
N/A (ephemeral)
TLS ECDHE private value (256, 384) BoringSSL's AES-256
CTR_DRBG
N/A (ephemeral)
WPA2/WPA3 4-way handshake supplicant nonce
(SNonce)
BoringSSL's AES-256
CTR_DRBG
N/A (ephemeral)
7.2.12 MOD_BT_V1.0:FCS_CKM_EXT.8
The TOE generates new ECDH key pairs every time a connection with a Bluetooth device is established.
7.2.13 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT
7.2.14 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_COP.1/HASH
7.2.15 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_COP.1/SIGN
7.2.16 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_COP.1/KEYHMAC
7.2.17 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_COP.1/CONDITION
The TOE implements cryptographic algorithms in accordance with the respective NIST standards. These algorithms are in software
and hardware, depending on the implementation.
The TOE's BoringSSL Library (version fips-20220613 with both Processor Algorithm Accelerators (PAA) and without PAA) provides
the following algorithms.
Table 22. BoringSSL Cryptographic Algorithms
SFR Algorithm Keys NIST Standard
FCS_CKM.1 RSA Key Generation 2048,3072,4096 FIPS 186-4, RSA
ECDSA ECC Key
Generation
P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-4, ECDSA
ECDH Key Generation curve25519 RFC 7748
FCS_CKM.2 RSA-based
Key Exchange
Vendor affirm 800-56B
ECC-based
Key Exchange
P256, P384, P521 SP800-56A, CVLKAS ECC
FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT AES CBC, GCM 128,256 FIPS 197, SP 800-38A
FCS_COP.1/HASH SHA Hashing 1/256/384/512 FIPS 180-4
FCS_COP.1/SIGN RSA Sign/Verify 2048, 3072, 4096 FIPS 186-4, RSA
ECDSA Sign/Verify P256, P384, P521 FIPS 186-4, ECDSA
PUBLIC
FCS_COP.1
/KEYHMAC
HMAC-SHA 1/256/384/512 FIPS 198-1 & 180-4
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 DRBG Bit Generation 256 SP800-90A(Counter
mode)
The TOE currently utilizes the Linux kernel 5.15 and provides a Kernel Crypto API consisting of the following algorithms.
Table 23. Kernel Cryptographic Algorithms
SFR Algorithm Keys NIST Standard
FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT AES CBC*/XTS** 128/256 VendoraffirmFIPS 197, SP 800-38A/E
FCS_CKM_EXT.3. HKDF(HMAC- SHA512) Vendor affirm SP 800-56A (RFC5869)
* AES-CBC operates in CTS mode.
** For XTS, the keys are split into two values, a 128/256-bit encryption key and a 128/256-bit tweak key (total of 256/512 bits).
The device comes with a Wi-Fi chipset that provides AES-GCM-128/256-bit and AES-GMAC-128/256-bit encryption to meet
FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT that meet the NIST Standards FIPS 197, SP 800-38C.
Table 24. WiFi Chipset
Device Wi-Fi Chipset Cert #
KATIM X3M WCN7850 WFA131102
The QSM8550 Qualcomm platform provides the following components:
Table 25. Qualcomm Hardware Cryptographic Algorithms
Component Name Component Version Certificate Number FIPS Certificate Level
Qualcomm
Pseudo Random
Number
Generator
(PRNG)
3.1.0 4778
https://csrc.nist.gov/
projects/cryptographi
c- module-validation-
program/Certificate/
4778
Level 3
The QSM8550 application processor provides the following cryptographic algorithms in its Trusted Execution Environment. These
algorithms provide lower-level services upon which some of the security functionalities rely, and are not directly used by the
KATIM OS 13 operating system.
Table 26. TEE Cryptographic Algorithms
SFR Algorithm Algorithm NIST Standard
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 BoringSSLDRBGBit
Generation
256 SP800-90A(Counter
mode)
FCS_CKM_EXT.3 QSEE KDF NIST SP 800-108 (counter based)
The TOE’s application processor includes a source of hardware entropy that the TOE distributes throughout, and the TOE’s RBGs
make use of that entropy when seeding/instantiating themselves. The TOE’s BoringSSL library supports the TOE’s cryptographic
PUBLIC
KATIM OS Runtime methods (through KATIM OS's conscrypt JNI provider) afforded to mobile applications and supports KATIM OS
user-space processes and daemons (e.g., wpa_supplicant). The TOE stretches the user’s password to create a password-derived
key. The TOE stretching function uses a series of steps to increase the memory required for key derivation (thus thwarting GPU-
acceleration, off-line brute force, and precomputed dictionary attacks) and ensure proper conditioning and stretching of the user’s
password.
The TOE conditions the user’s password using two iterations of PBKDFv2 with HMAC-SHA-256 in addition to some ROMix
operations in an algorithm named scrypt. Scrypt consists of one iteration of PBKDFv2, followed by a series of ROMix operations,
and finished with a final iteration of PBKDFv2. The ROMix operations increase the memory required for key derivation, thus
thwarting GPU-acceleration (which can greatly decrease the time needed to brute force PBKDFv2 alone) and other custom
hardware-based brute force attacks.
The password-derived key is combined with the hardware REK in storage, preventing the ability to perform offline attacks, and
online attacks are limited due to the TOE’s configuration of the maximum no more than 10 incorrect password attempts. The use
of the password derivation function in combination with the device configuration forces the attacker to only be able to perform
an exhaustive key search to unlock the device without access to the password, and then subject to the configured limit of 10 or
less attempts before the device is wiped.
As part of the TLS, the TOE uses SHA with ciphersuites and digital signatures. The TLS ciphersuites support using SHA-1, SHA-256
and SHA-384. SHA functionality is also provided to mobile applications and can also be used as part of HMAC generation. For
mobile applications generating a MAC, the HMAC operations in a byte-oriented mode and can use SHA-1 (with a 160-bit key) to
generate a 160-bit MAC, SHA-256 (with a 256-bit key) to generate a 256-bit MAC, SHA-384 (with a 384-bit key) to generate a
384- bit MAC and SHA-512 (with a 512-bit key) to generate a 512-bit MAC. FIPS 198-1 & 180-4 dictate the block size used, and
they specify block sizes/output MAC lengths of 512/160, 512/160, 1024/384, and 1024/512-bits for HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-
256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 respectively.
7.2.18 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
The TOE supports the HTTPS protocol (compliant with RFC 2818) so that (mobile and system) applications executing on the TOE
can act as HTTPS clients and securely connect to external servers using HTTPS. Administrators have no credentials and cannot use
HTTPS or TLS to establish administrative sessions with the TOE as the TOE does not provide any such capabilities.
7.2.19 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_IV_EXT.1
The TOE generates IVs by reading from /dev/urandom for use with all keys. The TOE generates IVs for data storage encryption and
for key storage encryption. The TOE uses XTS-AES and AES-CBC mode for data encryption and AES-GCM for key storage.
7.2.20 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_RBG_EXT.1
The TOE provides a number of different RBGs including:
1. An Application Processor DRBG in hardware:
1. A SHA-256 Hash_DRBG in Qualcomm Snapdragon processors
2. An AES-256 CTR_DRBG provided by BoringSSL. This is the only accredited and supported DRBG present in the system
and available to independently developed applications. As such, the TOE provides mobile applications access (through
an KATIM OS Java API) to random data drawn from its AES-256 CTR_DRBG
The TOE initializes its AP DRBG with enough data from its AP hardware noise source to ensure at least 256-bits of entropy. The
TOE then uses its AP DRBG to seed the Linux kernel's RNG pool and an entropy daemon that uses the BoringSSL AES-256
CTR_DRBG to provide random bits for user space. The entropy daemon starts early in the boot process to ensure availability to
the rest of the system.
The TOE seeds its BoringSSL AES-256 CTR_DRBG using 384-bits of data from the entropy daemon, thus ensuring at least 256-bits
of entropy. The TOE uses its BoringSSL DRBG for all random generation including salts.
PUBLIC
7.2.21 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_SRV_EXT.1
The TOE provides applications access to the cryptographic operations including encryption (AES), hashing (SHA), signing and
verification (RSA & ECDSA), key hashing (HMAC), keyed message digests (HMAC-SHA-256), generation of asymmetric keys for key
establishment (RSA and ECDH), and generation of asymmetric keys for signature generation and verification (RSA, ECDSA). The
TOE provides access through the operating system’s Java API, through the native BoringSSL API, and through the application
processor module (user and kernel) APIs.
7.2.22 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_STG_EXT.1
The TOE provides the user, administrator and mobile applications the ability to import and use asymmetric public and private keys
into the TOE’s software-based Secure Key Storage. Certificates are stored in files using UID-based permissions and an API
virtualizes the access. Additionally, the user and administrator can request the TOE to destroy the keys stored in the Secure Key
Storage. While normally mobile applications cannot use or destroy the keys of another application, applications that share a
common application developer (and are thus signed by the same developer key) may do so. In other words, applications with a
common developer (and which explicitly declare a shared UUID in their application manifest) may use and destroy each other’s
keys located within the Secure Key Storage.
The TOE provides additional protections on keys beyond including key attestation, to allow enterprises and application developers
the ability to ensure which keys have been generated securely within the phone.
7.2.23 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_STG_EXT.2
The TOE employs a key hierarchy that protects all DEKs and KEKs by encryption with either the REK or by the REK and password
derived KEK.
The TOE encrypts Long-term Trusted channel Key Material (LTTCKM, i.e., Bluetooth and Wi-Fi keys) values using AES-256 GCM
encryption and stores the encrypted values within their respective configuration files.
All keys are 256-bits in size. The TOE generates keys using its BoringSSL AES-256 CTR_DRBG (for the Java and native layer), and the
Qualcomm Snapdragon processor SHA-256 Hash_DRBG is used by Trusted Applications in TrustZone. By utilizing only 256-bit KEKs,
the TOE ensures that all keys are encrypted by an equal or larger sized key.
In the case of Wi-Fi, the TOE utilizes the 802.11-2012 KCK and KEK keys to unwrap (decrypt) the WPA2/WPA3 Group Temporal
Key received from the access point. The TOE protects persistent Wi-Fi keys (user certificates and private keys) by storing them in
the Key Store.
7.2.24 PP_MDF_V3.3:FCS_STG_EXT.3
The TOE protects the integrity of all DEKs and KEKs (including LTTCKM keys) stored in Flash by using authenticated
encryption/decryption methods (GCM).
7.2.25 PKG_TLS_V1.1:FCS_TLS_EXT.1
7.2.26 PKG_TLS_V1.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
7.2.27 PKG_TLS_V1.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.2
The TOE provides mobile applications (through its operating system API) the use of TLS version 1.2 as a client, including support
for the selections chosen in section 6 for FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 (and the TOE requires no configuration other than using the appropriate
library APIs as described in the Admin Guidance).
When an application uses the combined APIs provided in the Admin Guide to attempt to establish a trusted channel connection
based on TLS or HTTPS, the TOE supports only Subject Alternative Name (SAN) (DNS and IP address) as reference identifiers (the
TOE does not accept reference identifiers in the Common Name[CN]). The TOE supports client (mutual) authentication (only a
certificate is required to provide support for mutual authentication).
PUBLIC
No additional configuration is needed to allow the device to use the supported cipher suites, as only the claimed cipher suites are
supported in the aforementioned library as each of the aforementioned ciphersuites are supported on the TOE by default or
through the use of the TLS library.
While the TOE supports the use of wildcards in X.509 reference identifiers (SAN only). The TOE supports certificate pinning through
operating system’s network security configuration. This configuration allows a mobile application to specify one or more certificate
public key hashes (SHA-256) along with the domain and optionally an expiry date. If the TOE cannot determine the revocation
status of a peer certificate, the TOE rejects the certificate and rejects the connection.
7.2.28 PKG_TLS_V1.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT. 4
The TOE includes the ‘renegotiation_info’ TLS extension in its TLS client hello message.
7.2.29 PKG_TLS_V1.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.5
The TOE in its evaluated configuration and, by design, supports elliptic curves for TLS (P-256 and P-384) and has a fixed set of
supported curves (thus the admin cannot and need not configure any curves).
7.2.30 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN
7.2.31 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FCS_TLSC_EXT.2/WLAN
The TSF supports TLS version 1.2 and the selected cipher suites utilizing SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-384 (see the selections in section
6 for FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN) for use with EAP-TLS as part of WPA2/WPA3. The TOE in its evaluated configuration and, by design,
supports only evaluated elliptic curves (P-256 & P-384 and no others) and has a fixed set of supported curves (thus the
admin cannot and need not configure any curves).
The TOE allows the user to load and utilize authentication certificates for EAP-TLS used with WPA3/WPA2. The operating system
UI
Settings -> Security -> Advanced settings -> Encryption & credentials -> Install a certificate -> Wi-Fi certificate
allows the user to import an RSA or ECDSA certificate for use with Wi-Fi.
7.2.32 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FCS_WPA_EXT.1
The TSF support WPA2 and WPA3 security types for Wi-Fi networks.
7.3 User data protection
7.3.1 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_ACF_EXT.1
The TOE provides a mechanism for protecting (restricting application) access to system services. This mechanism is based on
permissions that are associated with services. If an application requires a service, it needs to be granted (by the user) the
permission for that service.
The permission mechanism is two-layered. A permission assigned to a service contains two attributes: a base permission and
protection flags. Protection flags can be used for refinement of the base permission.
The TOE provides the following base permissions to applications (for API Level 33):
1. Normal - A lower-risk permission that gives an application access to isolated application-level features, with minimal risk
to other applications, the system, or the user. The system automatically grants this type of permission to a requesting
application at installation, without asking for the user's explicit approval (though the user always has the option to review
these permissions before installing).
2. Dangerous - A higher-risk permission that would give a requesting application access to private user data or control over
the device that can negatively impact the user. Because this type of permission introduces potential risk, the system
cannot automatically grant it to the requesting application. For example, any dangerous permissions requested by an
application will be displayed to the user and require confirmation before proceeding or some other approach can be
taken to avoid the user automatically allowing the use of such facilities.
PUBLIC
3. Signature - A permission that the system is to grant only if the requesting application is signed with the same certificate
as the application that declared the permission. If the certificates match, the system automatically grants the permission
without notifying the user or asking for the user's explicit approval.
4. Internal - a permission that is managed internally by the system and only granted according to the protection flags.
An example of a normal permission is the ability to vibrate the device: android.permission.VIBRATE. This permission allows an
application to make the device vibrate, and an application that does not request (or declare) this permission would have its
vibration requests ignored.
An example of a dangerous privilege would be access to location services to determine the location of the mobile device:
android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION. The TOE controls access to Dangerous permissions during the running of the
application. The TOE prompts the user to review the application’s requested permissions (by displaying a description of each
permission group, into which individual permissions map, that an application requested access to). If the user approves, then the
application is allowed to continue running. If the user disapproves, the devices continues to run, but cannot use the services
protected by the denied permissions. Thereafter, the mobile device grants that application during execution access to the set of
permissions declared in its Manifest file.
An example of a signature permission is the android.permission.BIND_VPN_SERVICE that an application must declare in order to
utilize the VpnService APIs of the device. Because the permission is a Signature permission, the mobile device only grants this
permission to an application (2nd installed app) that requests this permission and that has been signed with the same developer
key used to sign the application (1st installed app) declaring the permission (in the case of the example, the operating system
itself).
An example of an internal permission is the android.permission.SET_DEFAULT_ACCOUNT_FOR_CONTACTS, which is only granted
to system applications fulfilling the Contacts app role to allow the default account for new contacts to be set.
The TOE provides the following protection flags:
1. privileged - this permission can also be granted to any applications installed as privileged apps on the system image.
Please avoid using this option, as the signature protection level should be sufficient for most needs and works regardless
of exactly where applications are installed. This permission flag is used for certain special situations where multiple
vendors have applications built in to a system image which need to share specific features explicitly because they are
being built together.
2. system - Old synonym for 'privileged'.
3. development - this permission can also (optionally) be granted to development applications (e.g., to allow additional
location reporting during beta testing).
4. appop - this permission is closely associated with an app op for controlling access.
5. pre23 - this permission can be automatically granted to apps that target API levels below API level.
6. installer - this permission can be automatically granted to system apps that install packages.
7. verifier - this permission can be automatically granted to system apps that verify packages.
8. preinstalled - this permission can be automatically granted to any application pre-installed on the system image (not just
privileged apps) (the TOE does not prompt the user to approve the permission).
The operating system (Level 33) API (details found here https://developer.android.com/reference/packages) provides services to
mobile applications. While the operating system provides a large number of individual permissions, they are grouped into
categories or features that provide similar functionality for the simplicity of the user interaction. These groupings do not affect
the permissions themselves; it is only a way to group them together for the user presentation. Table 27 shows a series of functional
categories centered on common functionality.
Table 27. Functional Categories
Service Features Description
Sensitive I/O Devices & Sensors Location services, Audio &Video capture, Body sensors
User Personal Information &Credentials Contacts, Calendar, Call logs, SMS
PUBLIC
Metadata & Device ID Information IMEI, Phone Number
Data Storage Protection App data, App cache
System Settings & Application Management Date time, Reboot/Shutdown, Sleep, Force-close application,
Administrator Enrollment
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, USB Access Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, USB tethering, debugging and file
transfer
Mobile Device Management &amp; Administration MDM APIs
Peripheral Hardware NFC, Camera, Headphones
Security & Encryption Certificate/Key Management, Password, Revocation rules
7.3.2 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_ACF_EXT.1.2
Applications coming from the same developer can allow sharing of data between them. The developer can sign applications' APKs
with a common certificate or key and set the permissions of their application to allow data sharing in their manifest.
7.3.3 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_ACF_EXT.2
The TOE allows an administrator to control sharing of the enterprise profile address book with the normal profile. Each application
group (profile) has its own calendar as well as keychain (keychain is the collection of user [not application] keys, and only the user
can grant the user’s applications access to use a given key in the user’s keychain), thus KATIM OS’s personal and work profiles do
not share calendar appointments nor keys.
7.3.4 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_DAR_EXT.1
The TOE provides AES-256 XTS FBE encryption for all data (user data and TSF data) stored on the user data partition. TSF data
contains items relating to key storage for TSF keys that are not stored in the system’s Key Store. The TOE separately
encrypts those TSF keys and data. The TOE also has a read-only file system where system executables, libraries, and their
configuration data are stored. For encrypting the data partition on the internal Flash, the TOE uses an AES-256 bit DEK with XTS
feedback mode. Each file has a unique DEK.
7.3.5 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_DAR_EXT.2
The vendor provides the NIAPSEC library for Sensitive Data Protection (SDP) that application developers must use to opt-in for
sensitive data protection. When developers opt-in for SDP, all data that is received on the device destined for that application is
treated as sensitive. This library calls into the TOE to generate an RSA key that acts as a master KEK for the SDP encryption process.
When an application that has opted-in for SDP receives incoming data while the device is locked, an AES symmetric DEK
is generated to encrypt that data. The public key from the master RSA KEK above is then used to encrypt the AES DEK. Once the
device is unlocked, the RSA KEK private key is re-derived and can be used to decrypt the AES DEK for each piece of information
that was stored while the device was locked. The TOE then takes that decrypted data and re-encrypts it following FDP_DAR_EXT.1.
7.3.6 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_IFC_EXT.1
The TOE will route all traffic other than traffic necessary to establish the VPN connection to the VPN gateway (when the gateway’s
configuration specifies so) when the Always-On-VPN is enabled. The TOE includes an interceptor kernel module that controls
inbound and output packets. When a VPN is active, the interceptor will route all incoming packets to the VPN and conversely route
all outbound packets to the VPN before they are output.
Note that when the TOE tries to connect to a Wi-Fi network, it performs a standard captive portal check which sends traffic that
bypasses the full tunnel VPN configuration in order to detect whether the Wi-Fi network restricts Internet access until one has
authenticated or agreed to usage terms through a captive portal.
PUBLIC
The only exception to all traffic being routed to the VPN is in the instance of ICMP echo requests. The TOE uses ICMP echo
responses on the local subnet to facilitate network troubleshooting and categorizes it as a part of ARP. As such, if an ICMP echo
request is issued on the subnet the TOE is part of, it will respond with an ICMP echo response, but no other instances of traffic will
be routed outside of the VPN.
7.3.7 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_STG_EXT.1
The TOE’s Trusted Anchor Database consists of the built-in certificates residing in /system/etc/security/cacerts/ and any additional
MDM loaded certificates, which are stored in /data/misc/user/0/cacerts-added/.
The former location is on the read-only system partition. The TOE prevents applications (other than administrator/MDM agent
applications) from modifying files in the latter location using Linux file permissions. Only applications registered as an
administrator (such as an MDM Agent Application) have the ability to access these files.
7.3.8 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_UPC_EXT.1/APPS
The TOE provides APIs allowing non-TSF applications (mobile applications) the ability to establish a secure channel using TLS,
HTTPS, and Bluetooth DR/EDR and LE. Additionally, the vendor provides the NIAPSEC library for application developers to use for
Hostname Checking, Revocation Checking, and TLS Ciphersuite restriction. Application developers must utilize this library to
ensure the device behaves in the evaluated configuration. Mobile applications can use the following APIs for TLS and HTTPS:
javax.net.ssl.SSLContext: https://developer.android.com/reference/javax/net/ssl/SSLSocket
javax.net.ssl.HttpsURLConnection: https://developer.android.com/reference/javax/net/ssl/HttpsURLConnection
Bluetooth:
android.bluetooth:
http://developer.android.com/reference/android/bluetooth/package-summary.html
7.3.9 PP_MDF_V3.3:FDP_UPC_EXT.1/BLUETOOTH
The TOE provides APIs allowing non-TSF applications (mobile applications) the ability to establish a secure channel using
Bluetooth BR/EDR and Bluetooth LE. Mobile applications can use the following APIs for Bluetooth:
android.bluetooth: http://developer.android.com/reference/android/bluetooth/package-summary.html
7.4 Identification and authentication
7.4.1 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_AFL_EXT.1
The TOE keeps the number of failed password login attempts since the last successful one in non-volatile memory. If that number
reaches the predefined maximum, the TOE performs a full wipe of all user data. Only password authentication attempts are being
compared to the maximum value because only the password authentication factor is considered critical. Fingerprint unlock failed
attempts cannot cause a wipe.
The default value for the maximum number of failed login attempts is 10 and can be adjusted via the MDM API to a value between
0 and 10. During an authentication attempt, the TOE first increments the failed attempt counter, and then checks the validity of
the password by sending it to Gatekeeper.
Gatekeeper stores the attempt counter in non-volatile secure storage and increments it before validating the password. If the
password validation succeeds, the counter is reset to zero. If the validation fails and the counter value reaches the specified
maximum, the device is wiped. Since the counter is stored in non-volatile memory and incremented before validation, failed
attempt count will be preserved even if power is lost.
The device can also be unlocked by the user using their fingerprint. The TOE permits up to 5 failed fingerprint unlock attempts and
then disables the fingerprint authentication. It is enabled again only when the user enters the correct password to unlock the
device. If the phone is restarted, fingerprint sensor is disabled until the user unlocks the device with the password.
PUBLIC
7.4.2 MOD_BT_V1.0:FIA_BLT_EXT.1
The TOE requires explicit user authorization before it will pair with a remote Bluetooth device. When pairing with another device,
the TOE requires that the user either confirm that a displayed numeric passcode matches between the two devices or that the
user enter (or choose) a numeric passcode that the peer device generates (or must enter).
7.4.3 MOD_BT_V1.0:FIA_BLT_EXT.2
The TOE does not allow data transfer with unauthorized remote devices. All Bluetooth connections require initial approval by the
user in an authorization popup. Bluetooth pairing (RFCOMM connections) is done by confirming/entering a displayed numeric
passcode in the user interface. TOE support for OBEX (OBject EXchange) through L2CAP (Logical Link Control and Adaptation
Protocol) requires the user to explicitly authorize the transfer via a popup that will be displayed to the user.
7.4.4 MOD_BT_V1.0:FIA_BLT_EXT.3
The TOE keeps track of active sessions and ignores duplicate Bluetooth connection attempts from devices for which it already
has and active connection.
7.4.5 MOD_BT_V1.0:FIA_BLT_EXT.4
The TOE’s Bluetooth host and controller support Bluetooth Secure Simple Pairing and the TOE utilizes this pairing method when
the remote host also supports it.
7.4.6 MOD_BT_V1.0:FIA_BLT_EXT.6
The TOE requires explicit user authorization before granting trusted (paired) remote devices access to services associated with
the OPP and MAP Bluetooth profiles.
7.4.7 MOD_BT_V1.0:FIA_BLT_EXT.7
The TOE requires untrusted (unpaired) remote devices to have explicit user authorization before granting them access to
services associated with all Bluetooth profiles.
7.4.8 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FIA_PAE_EXT.1
The TOE can join WPA2-802.1X (802.11i) and WPA3-Enterprise wireless networks requiring EAP-TLS authentication, acting as a
client/supplicant (and in that role connect to the 802.11 access point and communicate with the 802.1X authentication server).
7.4.9 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_PMG_EXT.1
The TOE authenticates the user through a password that can consist of basic Latin characters (upper and lower case, numbers,
and the special characters noted in the selection (see the selections in section 6 for FIA_PMG_EXT.1)). The default password
requirements are that it must have a minimum of 4 characters but no more than 16 and that it contains at least one letter. These
defaults can be changed using the MDM API.
7.4.10 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_TRT_EXT.1
GateKeeper throttling is used to prevent brute-force password attacks. After a user enters an incorrect password GateKeeper APIs
return a value in milliseconds in which the caller must wait before attempting another validation. Any attempts before the defined
amount of time has passed will be ignored by GateKeeper. Gatekeeper also keeps a count of the number of failed validation
attempts since the last successful attempt. Based on the value of this counter the amount of time that the caller has to wait before
attempting a new password authentication increases exponentially.
7.4.11 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_UAU.5
The TOE allows the user to authenticate using a password. After boot, the first unlock screen requires the user to enter
their password to unlock the device. The fingerprint sensor is disabled until the user enters the correct password for the first time.
PUBLIC
After the device is locked in normal use, the user has the ability to unlock it either by entering their password or by using the
fingerprint authentication. Throttling of these inputs is described in section 6 for FIA_AFL_EXT.1.
Some security related user settings (e.g. changing the password, modifying, deleting, or adding stored fingerprint templates,
etc.) and actions (e.g. factory reset) require the user to enter their password before modifying these settings or executing these
actions. In these cases, fingerprint authentication is not accepted to permit these functions.
7.4.12 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_UAU.6/CREDENTIAL, PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_UAU.6/LOCKED
The TOE requires the user to enter their password in order to unlock the TOE. Additionally the TOE requires the user to confirm
their current password when accessing the
Settings > Security > Screen lock
menu in the TOE’s user interface. Only after entering their current user password can the user then elect to change their
password.
7.4.13 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_UAU.7
The TOE allows users to input their passwords from the lock screen. By default, the TOE does not display any characters of the
entered credentials. However, there is a settings option that allows for the brief momentary display of each character as it is
typed, followed by obscuring the character with a dot symbol once the next character is entered. This setting can be toggled to
accommodate user preferences.
7.4.14 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_UAU_EXT.1
The TOE’s key hierarchy requires the user's password in order to derive the KEK_* keys in order to decrypt other KEKs and DEKs.
Thus, until it has the user's password, the TOE cannot decrypt the DEK utilized by FBE to decrypt the user’s protected data.
7.4.15 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_UAU_EXT.2
The TOE, when configured to require a user password (like in the CC mode case), allows a user to perform the actions assigned in
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 (see selections in section 6 for FIA_UAU_EXT.2) without first successfully authenticating. The TOE automatically
names and saves (to the internal storage) any screen shots taken from the lock screen, and the TOE provides the user no
opportunity to name them or change where they are stored.
Beyond those actions, a user cannot perform any other actions other than observing notifications displayed on the lock screen
until after successfully authenticating. Additionally, the TOE provides the user the ability to hide the contents of notifications once
a password (or any other locking authentication method) is enabled.
7.4.16 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_X509_EXT.1, MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN
The TOE checks the validity of all imported CA certificates by checking for the presence of the basicConstraints extension and that
the CA flag is set to TRUE as the TOE imports the certificate. Additionally, the TOE verifies the extendedKeyUsage Server
Authentication purpose during WPA2/EAP-TLS negotiation. The TOE’s certificate validation algorithm examines each certificate in
the path (starting with the peer’s certificate) and first checks for validity of that certificate (e.g., has the certificate expired; or if
not yet valid, whether the certificate contains the appropriate X.509 extensions [e.g., the CA flag in the basic constraints extension
for a CA certificate, or that a server certificate contains the Server Authentication purpose in the extendedKeyUsage field]), then
verifies each certificate in the chain (applying the same rules as above, but also ensuring that the Issuer of each certificate matches
the Subject in the next rung “up” in the chain and that the chain ends in a self-signed certificate present in either the TOE’s trusted
anchor database or matches a specified Root CA), and finally the TOE performs revocation checking for all certificates in the chain.
7.4.17 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_X509_EXT.2, MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN,
MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.6
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates during EAP-TLS, TLS, and HTTPS. The TOE contains a preinstalled set of default Trusted
Credentials. The user cannot remove any of these built-in default CA certificates. The administrator/MDM can also import a new
trusted CA certificate into the Trust Anchor Database.
PUBLIC
The TOE does not establish TLS connections itself (beyond EAP-TLS used for WPA2/WPA3 Wi-Fi connections) but provides a series
of APIs to mobile applications for checking the validity of a peer certificate. The mobile application, after correctly using the
specified APIs, can be assured as to the validity of the peer certificate and be assured that the TOE will not establish the trusted
connection if the peer certificate cannot be verified (including validity, certification path, and revocation [through OCSP]). If, during
the process of certificate verification, the TOE cannot establish a connection with the server acting as the OCSP Responder, the
TOE will not deem the server’s certificate as valid and will not establish a TLS connection with the server.
The administrator explicitly specifies the trusted CA that the TOE will use for EAP-TLS authentication of the server’s certificate. For
mobile applications, the application developer will specify whether the TOE should use the operating system’s Trusted CAs, use
application-specified trusted CAs, or a combination of the two. In this way, the TOE always knows which trusted CAs to use.
The TOE, when acting as a WPA2/WPA3 supplicant uses X.509 certificates for EAP-TLS authentication. Because the TOE may not
have network connectivity to a revocation server prior to being admitted to the WPA2/WPA3 network and because the TOE cannot
determine the IP address or hostname of the authentication server (the Wi-Fi access point proxies the supplicant’s authentication
request to the server), the TOE will accept the certificate of the server.
7.4.18 PP_MDF_V3.3:FIA_X509_EXT.3
Applications that require compliant revocation checking must utilize the NIAPSEC library. This vendor provide library offers the
following functions for certificate path validation and revocation checking:
• public boolean isValid(List<Certificate> certs)
• public boolean isValid(Certificate cert)
The first function allows for validation and revocation checking of a list of certificates. The second function checks a single
certificate. Revocation checking is done using OCSP. Section 6 for FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN details how the TOE handles revocation
checking.
7.5 Security management
7.5.1 PP_MDF_V3.3:FMT_MOF_EXT.1, PP_MDF_V3.3:FMT_SMF.1
The TOE provides the management functions described in Table 18 - Security Management Functions. The table includes
annotations describing the roles that have access to each service and how to access the service. The TOE enforces administrative
configured restrictions by rejecting user configuration (through the UI) when attempted. It is worth noting that the TOE’s ability
to specify authorized application repositories takes the form of allowing enterprise applications (i.e., restricting applications to
only those applications installed by an MDM Agent).
7.5.2 MOD_WLANC_v1.0:FMT_SMF.1/WLAN
The TOE provides the management functions described in Table 20 - WLAN Security Management Functions. The TOE enforces
administrative configured restrictions by rejecting user configuration (through the UI) when attempted.
7.5.3 MOD_BT_V1.0:FMT_SMF_EXT.1/BT
The TOE provides the management functions described in Table 19 - Bluetooth Security Management Functions. The TOE enforces
administrative configured restrictions by rejecting user configuration (through the UI) when attempted.
7.5.4 PP_MDF_V3.3:FMT_SMF_EXT.2
The TOE offers MDM agents the ability to wipe protected data, wipe sensitive data, remove Enterprise applications, and remove
all device stored Enterprise resource data upon un-enrollment. The TOE offers MDM agents the ability to wipe protected data
(effectively wiping the device) at any time. Similarly, the TOE also offers the ability to remove Enterprise applications and a full
wipe of managed profile data of the TOE’s Enterprise data/applications at any time.
PUBLIC
7.6 Protection of the TSF
7.6.1 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_AEX_EXT.1
The Linux kernel of the TOE’s KATIM operating system provides address space layout randomization utilizing the
get_random_int(void) kernel random function to provide eight unpredictable bits to the base address of any user-space memory
mapping. The random function, though not cryptographic, ensures that one cannot predict the value of the bits.
7.6.2 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_AEX_EXT.2
The TOE utilizes 5.15 Linux kernel, whose memory management unit (MMU) enforces read, write, and execute permissions on all
pages of virtual memory and ensures that write and execute permissions are not simultaneously granted on all memory. The
operating system sets the ARM eXecute Never (XN) bit on memory pages and the TOE’s ARMv9 Application Processor’s Memory
Management Unit (MMU) circuitry enforces the XN bits. KATIM OS supports 'Hardware-based No eXecute (NX) to prevent code
execution on the stack and heap. The ARMv9 Architecture Reference Manual contains additional details about the MMU of ARM-
based processors: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0487/ka.
7.6.3 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_AEX_EXT.3
The TOE’s operating system provides explicit mechanisms to prevent stack buffer overruns in addition to taking advantage of
hardware-based No eXecute to prevent code execution on the stack and heap. KATIM builds the TOE (all executable binaries and
libraries) using -fstack-protector to make the stack and heap non-executable.
7.6.4 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_AEX_EXT.4
The TOE protects itself from modification by untrusted subjects using a variety of methods. The first protection employed by the
TOE is a Secure Boot process that uses cryptographic signatures to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the bootloader and
kernel using data fused into the device processor. The TOE protects its REK by limiting access to only trusted applications within
the TEE (Trusted Execution Environment). The TOE key manager includes a TEE module that utilizes the REK to protect all other
keys in the key hierarchy. All TEE applications are cryptographically signed, and when invoked at runtime (at the behest of an
untrusted application), the TEE will only load the trusted application after successfully verifying its cryptographic signature.
Additionally, the TOE’s operating system provides 'sandboxing' that ensures that each third-party mobile application executes
with the file permissions of a unique Linux user ID, in a different virtual memory space. This ensures that applications cannot
access each other’s memory space or files and cannot access the memory space or files of other applications.
7.6.5 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_JTA_EXT.1
The TOE prevents access to its processor’s JTAG interface in hardware by removing the PCB traces from the SoC pins to the JTAG
test connector. In addition, the JTAG interface is also disabled in software by the fuse configuration.
7.6.6 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_KST_EXT.1
The TOE does not store any plaintext key in its internal Flash; the TOE encrypts all keys before storing them. This ensures that
irrespective of how the TOE powers down (e.g., a user commands the TOE to power down, the TOE reboots itself, or battery
depletes), all keys stored in the internal Flash are wrapped with a KEK. Please refer to section 7.2 of the TSS for further
information (including the KEK used) regarding the encryption of keys stored in the internal Flash. As the TOE encrypts all keys
stored in Flash, upon boot-up, the TOE must first decrypt any keys in order to utilize them.
7.6.7 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_KST_EXT.2
The TOE utilizes cryptographic libraries including BoringSSL, application processor cryptography (which leverages AP hardware),
and the following system-level executables that utilize KEKs: vold, wpa_supplicant, and the KATIM OS Key Store.
1. vold and Linux kernel provides Data-At-Rest encryption of the user data partition in Flash
2. wpa_supplicant provides WPA2/WPA3 services
3. the operating system's Key Store application provides key generation, storage, deletion services to mobile applications
and to user through the UI
PUBLIC
The TOE ensures that plaintext key material is not exported by not allowing the REK to be exported and by ensuring that only
authenticated entities can request utilization of the REK. Furthermore, the TOE only allows the system-level executables access to
plaintext DEK values needed for their operation. The TSF software (the system-level executables) protects those plaintext DEK
values in memory both by not providing any access to these values and by clearing them when no longer needed (in compliance
with FCS_CKM_EXT.4).
7.6.8 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_KST_EXT.3
The TOE does not provide any way to export plaintext DEKs or KEKs (including all keys stored in the KATIM OS Key Store) as the
TOE chains or directly encrypts all KEKs to the REK.
Furthermore, the components of the device are designed to prevent transmission of key material outside the device. Each internal
system component requiring access to a plaintext key (for example the Wi-Fi driver) must have the necessary precursor(s),
whether that be a password from the user or file access to key in Flash (for example the encrypted AES key used for encryption of
the Flash data partition). With those appropriate precursors, the internal system-level component may call directly to the system-
level library to obtain the plaintext key value. The system library in turn requests decryption from a component executing inside
the trusted execution environment and then directly returns the plaintext key value (assuming that it can successfully decrypt the
requested key, as confirmed by the GCM verification) to the calling system component. That system component will then utilize
that key (in the example, the kernel which holds the key to encrypt, and decrypt reads and writes to the encrypted user data
partition files in Flash). In this way, only the internal system components responsible for a given activity have access to the
plaintext key needed for the activity, and that component receives the plaintext key value directly from the system library.
For a user’s mobile applications, those applications do not have any access to any system-level components and only have access
to keys that the application has imported into the KATIM OS Key Store. Upon requesting access to a key, the mobile application
receives the plaintext key value back from the system library through the KATIM OS API. Mobile applications do not have access
to the memory space of any other mobile application, so it is not possible for a malicious application to intercept the plaintext key
value to then log or transmit the value off the device.
7.6.9 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_NOT_EXT.1
When the TOE encounters a self-test failure or software integrity verification failure, a failure is message is displayed to the screen,
and the TOE shuts down. If the failure persists over several boot attempts, the needs to take the device to a service point for a
factory reset.
7.6.10 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_STM.1
The TOE requires time for the Package Manager (which installs and verifies APK signatures and certificates), image verifier,
wpa_supplicant, and Key Store applications. These TOE components obtain time from the TOE using system API calls [e.g., time()
or gettimeofday()]. An application (unless a system application is residing in /system/priv-app or signed by the vendor) cannot
modify the system time as mobile applications need the KATIM OS 'SET_TIME' permission to do so. Likewise, only a process with
root privileges can directly modify the system time using system-level APIs. Further, this stored time is used both for the time/date
tags in audit logs and is used to track inactivity timeouts that force the TOE into a locked state.
By default, the TOE prioritizes NTP as the time source over Cellular Carrier time because NTP is more accurate and reliable. In
situations where NTP isn't available, the framework falls back on Cellular Carrier time (obtained through the Carrier's network
time server). It is also possible to let the user set the date and time through the TOE’s user interface.
7.6.11 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_TST_EXT.1
The TOE automatically performs known answer power on self-tests (POST) on its cryptographic algorithms to ensure that they
are functioning correctly. Each component providing cryptography performs these tests. Should any of the tests fail, the TOE
displays a boot failure error message, halts the boot process, and shuts down.
Table 28. Power-on Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests
Algorithm Implemented in Description
AES encryption/decryption BoringSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated value
PUBLIC
ECDH key agreement BoringSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated value
DRBGrandombit
generation
BoringSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated value
ECDSA sign/verify BoringSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated value
HMAC-SHA BoringSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated value
RSA sign/verify BoringSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated value
SHA hashing BoringSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated value
7.6.12 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_TST_EXT.2/PREKERNEL, MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FPT_TST_EXT.3/WLAN
The TOE ensures a secure boot process in which the TOE verifies the digital signature of the bootloader software for the
Application Processor (using a public key whose hash resides in the processor’s internal fuses) before transferring control. The
bootloader, in turn, verifies the signature of the Linux kernel it loads.
7.6.13 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_TUD_EXT.1
The TOE’s user interface provides a method to query the current version of the TOE software/firmware (operating system version,
baseband version, kernel version, build number, and software version) and hardware (model and version). Additionally, the TOE
provides users the ability to review the currently installed apps (including 3rd party 'built-in' applications) and their version.
7.6.14 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_TUD_EXT.2
The TOE verifies all updates to the TOE software using a public key chaining that is rooted in the Root Public Key, a hardware
protected key whose SHA-256 hash resides inside the application processor's internal fuses. If this verification fail, the software
update will fail and the update will not be installed.
The application processor verifies the bootloader’s authenticity and integrity thus tying the bootloader and subsequent stages to
a the mentioned fixed/fused hardware root of trust.
7.6.15 PP_MDF_V3.3:FPT_TUD_EXT.3
The TOE requires applications to have a valid signature before they can be installed on the device.
The contents of the application installation package (APK) are hashed and then signed and the signature is packed with the APK.
When an application is downloaded, its signature is verified before installation.
7.7 TOE access
7.7.1 PP_MDF_V3.3:FTA_SSL_EXT.1
The TOE transitions to its locked state either immediately after the user initiates a lock by pressing the power button or after a
configurable period of inactivity. After going to the locked state, the TOE will display a lock screen to obscure the previous contents.
The TOE’s lock screen still displays notifications, battery life, signal strength, and carrier network and allows the user to perform
the functions listed in section 6 for FIA_UAU_EXT.2. The user cannot act on notifications without authenticating first.
The administrator can also force the device into the locked state through the use of an MDM.
On power up, the TOE boots to the device lock screen. At that point, the user can only make emergency calls, receive calls, enter
their password or see notifications from apps that do not require user authentication, i.e. the apps that rely on Device Encrypted
(and not Credential Encrypted) storage.
7.7.2 PP_MDF_V3.3:FTA_TAB.1
The TOE can be configured to display a message on the lock screen by an administrator using an MDM.
PUBLIC
7.7.3 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FTA_WSE_EXT.1
The TOE allows an administrator to specify (using an MDM) a list of wireless networks (SSIDs) to which the user may direct the
TOE to connect. When not enrolled with an MDM, the TOE allows the user to control to which wireless networks the TOE should
connect, but does not provide an explicit list of such networks, rather the user may scan for available wireless network (or
directly enter a specific wireless network), and then connect.
7.8 Trusted path/channels
7.8.1 MOD_BT_V1.0:FTP_BLT_EXT.1
7.8.2 MOD_BT_V1.0:FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR
7.8.3 MOD_BT_V1.0:FTP_BLT_EXT.3/LE
The TOE mandates the use of encryption over Bluetooth BD/EDR and LE connections using keys of at least 128-bits.
7.8.4 MOD_BT_V1.0:FTP_BLT_EXT.2
The TOE will terminate a connection with a remote device if the remote device stops encryption.
7.8.5 PP_MDF_V3.3:FTP_ITC_EXT.1:
The TOE provides secured (encrypted and mutually authenticated) communication channels between itself and other trusted IT
products through the use of TLS and HTTPS. The TOE provides access to HTTPS and TLS via public APIs to applications requiring
encrypted end-to-end trusted channel.
7.8.6 MOD_WLANC_V1.0:FTP_ITC.1/WLAN:
The TOE provides secured (encrypted and mutually authenticated) communication channels between itself and other trusted IT
products through the use of IEEE 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS. The TOE allows applications to initiate communication via
the trusted channel, and the TOE initiates communications via the WPA2/WPA3 (IEEE 802.11-2012, 802.1X with EAP-TLS) trusted
channel for connection to a wireless access point.