Certification Report
Version 1.0
04 August 2026
CSA_CC_25004
For
Marvell LS2 HSM,
Hardware version: CN9310410-03 C,
Firmware version: MARVELL-LS2-FW-10.24-0780.
Bootloader version: MARVELL-LS2-UBOOT-
10.24-0702-R01-SB or MARVELL-LS2-UBOOT-
10.24-0702-R02-SB
From
Marvell Semiconductor, Inc.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 2
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Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 3
Foreword
Singapore is a Common Criteria Certificate Authorizing Nation, under the
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA). The current list of signatory
nations and approved certification schemes can be found at the CCRA portal:
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Singapore Common Criteria Scheme (SCCS) is established for the info-
communications technology (ICT) industry to evaluate and certify their IT products
against the requirements of the Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation (CC), CC:2022 Revision 1 (ISO/IEC 15408:2022) and
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
CEM:2022 Revision 1 (ISO/IEC 18045:2022) in Singapore.
The SCCS is owned and managed by the Evaluation Authority under the ambit of
Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA).
The SCCS certification signifies that the target of evaluation (TOE) under
evaluation has been assessed and found to provide the specified IT security
assurance. However, certification does not guarantee absolute security and
should always be read with the particular set of threats sought to be addressed
and assumptions made in the process of evaluation.
This certification is not an endorsement of the product.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 4
Amendment Record
Version Date Changes
1.0 04 August 2026 Released
NOTICE
The Cyber Security Agency of Singapore makes no warranty of any kind with
regard to this material and shall not be liable for errors contained herein or
for incidental or consequential damages in connection with the use of this
material.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 5
Executive Summary
This report is intended to assist the end-user of the product in determining the
suitability of the product in their deployed environment.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Marvell LS2 HSM, Hardware version:
CN9310410-03 C, Firmware version: MARVELL-LS2-FW-10.24-0780,
Bootloader version: MARVELL-LS2-UBOOT-10.24-0702-R01-SB or
MARVELL-LS2-UBOOT-10.24-0702-R02-SB and has undergone the CC
certification procedure at the Singapore Common Criteria Scheme (SCCS). The
TOE comprises of the following components:
Identifier Version
Hardware CN9310410-03 C
Firmware MARVELL-LS2-FW-10.24-0780
Bootloader MARVELL-LS2-UBOOT-10.24-0702-R01-SB*
MARVELL-LS2-UBOOT-10.24-0702-R02-SB*
*R01 and R02 use the same bootloader code but differ
in the private key used to sign the bootloader image,
hence the different naming.
Table 1 - TOE components identifier
The list of guidance documents to use with the product in its certified
configuration is as follows.
Name Version Method of
Delivery
Marvell LS2 HSM Preparative
Procedures
Version 6.0 Electronic
Delivery
Marvell LS2 HSM User Guidance Version 1.6 Electronic
Delivery
Marvell LiquidSecurity 2 SDK API Guide 10.24-0780 Electronic
Delivery
Marvell LS2 HSM Adapter SDK User
Guide
Release 10.24-
0780 Rev.1.1
Electronic
Delivery
Marvell LS2 HSM Hardware Installation
Guide
Rev.3 Electronic
Delivery
Table 2 - List of guidance documents
The LS2 Hardware Security Module (hereafter referred to as TOE) by Marvell
is a high-performance purpose-built security solution for key management and
crypto acceleration. The module is deployed in a PCIe slot to provide crypto
and protocol acceleration in a secure manner to the system host. It is typically
deployed in a server or an appliance to provide crypto offload for the keys stored
on the HSM. The module’s functions are accessed over the PCIe interface via
an API defined by the module.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 6
The HSM is a hardware multi-chip embedded cryptographic module with
firmware programmed on the HSM. The module provides cryptographic
primitives to accelerate SOGIS approved algorithms to support use cases
including PKI, Code Signing, Document Signing, Root of Trust, and TLS. The
cryptographic functionality includes asymmetric (RSA/EC) and symmetric
(AES) ciphers, signatures, and random number generation, along with protocol-
specific complex instructions to support TLS 1.2. The module implements
password-based single-factor authentication. The physical boundary of the
module is the outer perimeter of the card itself.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by SGS Brightsight B.V., an
approved CC test laboratory, at the assurance level CC EAL 4 augmented with
AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced Methodical Vulnerability Analysis) and ALC_FLR.3
(Systematic Flaw Remediation) and completed on 04 June 2026.
The Evaluation Authority monitored each evaluation to ensure a harmonised
procedure and interpretation of the criteria has been applied.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 7
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following
TOE Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality
Cryptographic Functions such as:
• Digital signature generation and verification
• Message digest generation
• Message authentication code generation and verification
• Encryption and decryption (symmetric and asymmetric)
• Key generation (symmetric and asymmetric)
• Key agreement and distribution
• Key derivation
• Generation of shared secret values
• Cryptographic support for one-time password and other non-PKI
based authentication mechanisms
• Random number generation
Key Management
Backup
Audit
Self-protection
Secure channels
Authentication & authorization
Partitions - Cryptographic keys are stored and managed inside containers
called partitions.
Table 3: TOE Security Functionalities
Please refer to the Security Target [1] for more information.
The assets to be protected by the TOE has been defined. Based on these
assets, the TOE Security Problem Definition has been defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisation Policies. These are outlined in Chapter
3 of the Security Target [1].
This Certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in Chapter
5.3 of this report.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate applies only to the specific version and
release of the IT product in its evaluated configuration. This certificate is not an
endorsement of the IT product by SCCS, and no warranty of the IT product by
SCCS, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 8
Table of Contents
1 CERTIFICATION .......................................................................................9
1.1 PROCEDURE..........................................................................................9
1.2 RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS...................................................................9
2 VALIDITY OF THE CERTIFICATION RESULT .......................................10
3 IDENTIFICATION .................................................................................... 11
4 SECURITY POLICY ................................................................................13
5 ASSUMPTIONS AND SCOPE OF EVALUATION...................................13
5.1 ASSUMPTIONS .....................................................................................13
5.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE.....................................................................15
5.3 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION.................................................................16
5.4 NON-EVALUATED FUNCTIONALITIES .......................................................16
5.5 NON-TOE COMPONENTS .....................................................................17
6 ARCHITECTURE DESIGN INFORMATION............................................18
7 DOCUMENTATION .................................................................................18
8 IT PRODUCT TESTING ..........................................................................19
8.1 DEVELOPER TESTING (ATE_FUN)........................................................19
8.1.1 Test Approach and Depth............................................................19
8.1.2 Test Configuration .......................................................................19
8.1.3 Test Results ................................................................................19
8.2 EVALUATOR TESTING (ATE_IND)..........................................................19
8.2.1 Test Approach and Depth............................................................19
8.2.2 Test Configuration .......................................................................20
8.2.3 Test Results ................................................................................20
8.3 PENETRATION TESTING (AVA_VAN)......................................................20
8.3.1 Test Approach and Depth............................................................20
9 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION ..........................................................22
10 OBLIGATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE USAGE OF
THE TOE .......................................................................................................23
11 LIST OF APPLICABLE SCCS PUBLICATIONS..................................23
12 ACRONYMS.........................................................................................24
13 BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................25
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 9
1 Certification
1.1 Procedure
The Evaluation Authority conducts the certification procedure according to the
following criteria:
▪ Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
November 2022 CC:2022 Revision 1 [2] [3] [4] [5] [6];
▪ Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), November
2022 CEM:2022 Revision 1 [7]; and
▪ SCCS scheme publications [8] [9] [10]
1.2 Recognition Agreements
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based
on the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement had been ratified on 2 July
2014. The arrangement covers certificates with claims of compliance against
collaborative protection profiles (cPPs) or evaluation assurance levels (EALs)
1 through 2 and ALC_FLR. Hence, the certification for this TOE is partially
covered by the CCRA.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement mark printed on the certificate
indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement
by all signatory nations listed on the CC web portal
(https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org).
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 10
2 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the TOE as indicated.
The Certificate is valid till 3 August 20311.
In cases of changes to the certified version of the TOE, the validity may be
extended to new versions and releases provided the TOE sponsor applies for
Assurance Continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the revised TOE,
in accordance with the requirements of the Singapore Common Criteria
Scheme (SCCS).
The owner of the Certificate is obliged:
▪ When advertising the Certificate or the fact of the product’s certification,
to refer to and provide the Certification Report, the Security Target and
user guidance documentation herein to any customer of the product for
the application and usage of the certified product;
▪ To inform the SCCS immediately about vulnerabilities of the product that
have been identified by the developer or any third party; and
▪ To inform the SCCS immediately in the case that relevant security
changes in the evaluated life cycle has occurred or the confidentiality of
documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure where the certification of the
product has assumed this confidentiality being maintained, is no longer
valid.
1 Certificate validity could be extended by means of assurance continuity. Certificate could also
be revoked under the conditions specified in CCC SP-101-3 Publication #3 [8]. Potential users
should check the SCCS website (https://www.csa.gov.sg/our-programmes/certification-and-
labelling-schemes/singapore-common-criteria-scheme/product-list) for the up-to-date status
regarding the certificate’s validity.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 11
3 Identification
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is: Marvell LS2 HSM, Hardware version:
CN9310410-03 C, Firmware version: MARVELL-LS2-FW-10.24-0780,
Bootloader version: MARVELL-LS2-UBOOT-10.24-0702-R01-SB or
MARVELL-LS2-UBOOT-10.24-0702-R02-SB.
The following table identifies the TOE deliverables.
Identifier Version
Hardware CN9310410-03 C
Firmware MARVELL-LS2-FW-10.24-0780
Bootloader MARVELL-LS2-UBOOT-10.24-0702-R01-SB*
MARVELL-LS2-UBOOT-10.24-0702-R02-SB*
*R01 and R02 use the same bootloader code but differ
in the private key used to sign the bootloader image,
hence the different naming.
Table 4 - TOE Deliverables
The guide for receipt and acceptance of the above-mentioned TOE are
described in the set of guidance documents below.
Name Version Method of
Delivery
Marvell LS2 HSM Preparative Procedures Version 6.0 Electronic
Delivery
Marvell LS2 HSM User Guidance Version 1.6 Electronic
Delivery
Marvell LiquidSecurity 2 SDK API Guide 10.24-0780 Electronic
Delivery
Marvell LS2 HSM Adapter SDK User Guide Release
10.24-0780
Rev.1.1
Electronic
Delivery
Marvell LS2 HSM Hardware Installation
Guide
Rev.3 Electronic
Delivery
Table 5 - Guidance Document (part of TOE deliverables)
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 12
Additional identification information relevant to this Certification procedure as
follows:
TOE Marvell LS2 HSM
Hardware version: CN9310410-03 C
Firmware version: MARVELL-LS2-FW-10.24-0780.
Bootloader version: MARVELL-LS2-UBOOT-10.24-0702-
R01-SB or MARVELL-LS2-UBOOT-10.24-0702-R02-SB
Security Target Marvell LS2 HSM Security Target v1.18, 20-02-2026
Developer Marvell Semiconductor, Inc.
Address of
Developer
5488 Marvell Lane
Santa Clara, CA 95054
Sponsor Marvell Semiconductor, Inc.
Address of
Sponsor
5488 Marvell Lane
Santa Clara, CA 95054
Evaluation
Facility
SGS Brightsight B.V.
Completion
Date of
Evaluation
04 June 2026
Evaluation
Authority
Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA)
Address of
Evaluation
Authority
92 Punggol Way, Tower 92, #07-163
Singapore 829854
Certificate ID CSA_CC_25004
Certificate
Validity
5 years from date of issuance
Table 6: Additional Identification Information
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 13
4 Security Policy
The TOE’s Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional
Requirements listed and implemented by the TOE.
The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional
classes:
• Cryptographic Support
• Identification and Authentication
• User Data Protection
• Trusted Path/Channel
• Protection of the TSF
• Security Management
• Security Audit
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policy can be found
in Chapter 5 of the Security Target [1].
5 Assumptions and Scope of Evaluation
5.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target [1] and some aspects of Threats
and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These
aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE
environment and are listed in the tables below:
Environmental
Assumptions
Description
OE.ExternalData
Protection of data
outside TOE
control
Where copies of data protected by the TOE are
managed outside of the TOE, client applications and
other entities shall provide appropriate protection for
that data to a level required by the application context
and the risks in the deployment environment. This
includes protection of data that is exported from, or
imported to, the TOE (such as audit data and encrypted
keys).
In particular, any backups of the TOE and its data shall
be maintained in a way that ensures appropriate
controls over making backups, storing backup data, and
using backup data to restore an operational TOE. The
number of sets of backup data shall not exceed the
minimum needed to ensure continuity of the TSP
service. The ability to restore a TOE to an operational
state from backup data shall require at least dual person
control (i.e. the participation and approval of more than
one authenticated administrator).
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 14
OE.Env
Protected
operating
environment
The TOE shall operate in a protected environment that
limits physical access to the TOE to authorized
Administrators. The TOE software and hardware
environment (including client applications) shall be
installed and maintained by Administrators in a secure
state that mitigates against the specific risks applicable
to the deployment environment, including (where
applicable):
• Protection against loss or theft of the TOE or any
of its externally stored assets
• Inspections to deter and detect tampering
(including attempts to access side-channels, or
to access connections between physically
separate parts of the TOE, or parts of the
hardware appliance)
• Protection against the possibility of attacks
based on emanations from the TOE (e.g.
electromagnetic emanations) according to risks
assessed for the operating environment
• Protection against unauthorised software and
configuration changes on the TOE and the
hardware appliance
• Protection to an equivalent level of all instances
of the TOE holding the same assets (e.g. where
a key is present as a backup in more than one
instance of the TOE).
OE.DataContext
Appropriate use of
TOE functions
Any client application using the cryptographic functions
of the TOE shall ensure that the correct data are
supplied in a secure manner (including any relevant
requirements for authenticity, integrity and
confidentiality). For example, when creating a digital
signature over a DTBS the client application shall
ensure that the correct (authentic, unmodified) DTBS/R
is supplied to the TOE, and shall correctly and securely
manage the signature received from the TOE; and when
certifying a public key the client application shall ensure
that necessary checks are made to prove possession of
the corresponding private key. The client application
may make use of appropriate secure channels provided
by the TOE to support these security requirements.
Where required by the risks in the operational
environment a suitable entity (possibly the client
application) shall perform a check of the signature
returned from the TOE, to confirm that it relates to the
correct DTBS. Client applications shall be responsible
for any required logging of the uses made of the TOE
services, such as signing (or sealing) events. Similar
requirements shall apply in local use cases where no
client application need be involved, but in which the
TOE and its user data (such as keys used for
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 15
signatures) need to be configured in ways that will
support the need for security requirements such as sole
control of signing keys. Appropriate procedures shall be
defined for the initial creation of data and continuing
operation of the TOE according to the specific risks
applicable to the deployment environment and the ways
in which the TOE is used.
OE.Uauth
Authentication of
application users
Any client application using the cryptographic services
of the TOE shall correctly and securely gather
identification and authentication/authorization data from
its users and securely transfer it to the TOE (protecting
the confidentiality of the authentication/authorization
data as required) when required to authorize the use of
TOE assets and services.
OE.AuditSupport
Audit data review
The audit trail generated by the TOE will be collected,
maintained and reviewed by a System Auditor
according to a defined audit procedure for the TSP.
OE.AppSupport
Application
security support
Procedures to ensure the ongoing security of client
applications and their data shall be defined and followed
in the environment, and reflected in use of the
appropriate TOE cryptographic functions and
parameters, and appropriate management and
administration actions on the TOE. This includes, for
example, any relevant policies on algorithms, key
generation methods, key lengths, key access, key
import/export, key usage limitations, key activation,
cryptoperiods and key renewal, and key/certificate
revocation.
Table 7: Environmental Assumptions
Details can be found in section 4.2 of the Security Target [1].
5.2 Clarification of Scope
The scope of evaluation is limited to the claims made in the Security Target [1].
Users are reminded to set up the TOE as per guidance documents to correctly
deploy and use the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 16
5.3 Evaluated Configuration
The Marvell LS2 HSM is in the form of a PCI-e card, composed of hardware,
firmware, software. The module is deployed in a PCIe slot to provide crypto and
protocol acceleration in a secure manner to the system host. It is typically
deployed in a server or an appliance to provide crypto offload for the keys stored
on the HSM.
The module provides cryptographic primitives to accelerate SOGIS approved
algorithms to support use cases including PKI, Code Signing, Document
Signing, Root of Trust, and TLS. The cryptographic functionality includes
asymmetric (RSA/EC) and symmetric (AES) ciphers, signatures, and random
number generation, along with protocol-specific complex instructions to support
TLS 1.2. The module implements password-based single-factor authentication.
The physical boundary of the module is the outer perimeter of the card itself.
Figure 1 - Marvell LS2 HSM PCI-e Card
5.4 Non-Evaluated Functionalities
There are no non-evaluated functionalities within the scope as clarified in
section 5.2.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 17
5.5 Non-TOE Components
The TOE is a cryptographic module comprising dedicated hardware and
software, intended for installation within a larger, non-TOE system such as a
general-purpose computer or server. The TOE's operation is dependent upon
additional hardware and software components that are not within the scope of
this evaluation:
Hardware Requirement
System Architecture X86 (AMD or Intel)
PCIe Low-profile Half-height Half-length
(HHHL) PCIe Gen4x8
Virtualization support SR-IOV support enabled.
Operating System Requirement
Linux CentOS 8.3
Ubuntu 18.04-5-LTS (Bionic Beaver)
Ubuntu 20.04
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 18
6 Architecture Design Information
As described in the Security Target [1], the high-level logical architecture of
the TOE can be depicted as follows:
Figure 2 - Logical Architecture of the TOE (From [ST])
7 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as listed Table 5 - Guidance Document (part of
TOE deliverables) is being provided with the product to the customer. These
documentations contain the required information for secure usage of the TOE
in accordance with the Security Target [1].
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 19
8 IT Product Testing
8.1 Developer Testing (ATE_FUN)
8.1.1 Test Approach and Depth
The developer conducted functional testing encompassing all TSFIs and
module-to-module interactions in accordance with the ATE_FUN and ATE_DPT
requirements.
Testing was automated through a Test Automation Framework which generates
test reports automatically upon execution. In addition to functional testing, fuzz
testing was conducted by incorporating an implementation that traverses all
possible code paths using a varied set of inputs.
8.1.2 Test Configuration
The TOE used for testing is configured according to the TOE guidance
document [11].
The TOE was tested in the following configuration:
• Hardware: CN9310410-03 C
• Firmware: MARVELL-LS2-FW-10.24-0780
• Bootloader: MARVELL-LS2-UBOOT-10.24-0702-R00-SB-ES
The bootloader used for testing is identical to the one used in the TOE, differing
only in its signing key, as indicated by the "R00" and "ES" designations.
Accordingly, all testing results remain valid and applicable to the TOE.
8.1.3 Test Results
The test results provided by the developer covered all operational functions as
described in the Security Target [1].
All test results from all tested environment showed that the expected test results
are identical to the actual test results.
8.2 Evaluator Testing (ATE_IND)
8.2.1 Test Approach and Depth
The automated test cases in the developer’s test plan were repeated on Marvell
LS2 HSM.
The evaluator’s strategy for devising independent tests was based on the
following:
▪ Tests that confirm the behaviour of the TOE as per the SFRs
▪ Tests that verify the requirements of AGD_PRE.1.2E
▪ Tests that provide an alternate approach with respect to the testing strategy
presented by the developer
▪ Tests that expand on the policy enforcement concept
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 20
▪ Tests that address otherwise untested functionalities
▪ Tests that are mandated by the PP
▪ Tests that are mandated by the AIS31 standard
8.2.2 Test Configuration
The TOE was tested in the following configuration:
• Hardware: CN9310410-03 C
• Firmware: MARVELL-LS2-FW-10.24-0780
• Bootloader: MARVELL-LS2-UBOOT-10.24-0702-R00-SB-ES
The bootloader used for testing is identical to the one used in the TOE, differing
only in its signing key, as indicated by the "R00" and "ES" designations.
Accordingly, all testing results remain valid and applicable to the TOE.
8.2.3 Test Results
The developer’s test reproduced were verified by the evaluator to conform to
the expected results from the test plan.
8.3 Penetration Testing (AVA_VAN)
8.3.1 Test Approach and Depth
The AVA_VAN.5 assurance class requires the evaluator to conduct a
methodical vulnerability analysis based on publicly available source of
information and based on structured examination of the evidence while
performing previous evaluation activities (ASE, ADV, AGD, ATE).
Given the restrictions imposed by the PP (which prevents any physical attack
and any side channel attack that requires physical proximity to the TOE), the
evaluator focused on vulnerabilities related to design/architectural flaws that
would lead intended users to abuse the TOE. For this reason, the evaluator
needed to find a methodical approach to scout the TOE implementation
searching for such design/architectural flaws.
The evaluator’s strategy for performing vulnerability analysis was based on the
following:
1. Identification of areas of concern using open source publicly maintained
weakness enumeration database. Areas of concerns includes
Accessibility, Cryptography, Secure Channel, etc.
2. Iteratively, for each SFR, the evaluator formulates security relevant
questions for each identified area of concern which are then translated
into TOE specific possible vulnerabilities.
3. The evaluator then justifies whether a possible vulnerability is removed
or sufficiently mitigated by the TOE’s design/implementation, TOE’s
operating environment, functional testing evidence, or extra independent
testing.
4. Residue Potential vulnerabilities are then addressed in the context of
penetration tests and further code review.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 21
The approach chosen by the evaluator is commensurate with the assurance
component chosen (AVA_VAN.5) treating the resistance of the TOE to an attack
with the High attack potential.
Penetration Test Description
PEN.CMD_MISUSE Verify whether commands
that do not require prior user
authentication can be
exploitable in the evaluated
configuration.
PEN.PASS_BRUTEFORCE Verify the sufficiency of the
TOE’s password complexity
requirements and
implementation of lock-out
mechanism.
PEN.DOMAIN_SEPARATION Verify whether there will be
any set of commands,
misuse of commands or any
other TOE’s operational
conditions that might enable
a user of a partition get
access to another partition
that he is not authorized to
access.
PEN.SECURE_CHANNEL Verify that only the claimed
ciphers are used to
establish an E2E session.
PEN.Crypto_Attacks Verify if ECC/RSA timing
attacks are applicable and if
the TOE is vulnerable to
RSA trial divisions.
PEN.Logging Verify the proper
implementation of the TOE’s
logging functionality.
PEN.RECOVER_PASSWORD Verify that passwords are
stored in an irreversible form
within the TOE’s memory.
PEN.ILLEGITIMATE_FW_UPDATE Verify that the TOE properly
checks the integrity of the
software image.
PEN.3rdParty_CVEs Verify if CVEs identified
during public domain
vulnerability search can be
exploited in the TOE’s
evaluated configuration.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 22
Table 8 - Penetration Test Case
The evaluator found no exploitable vulnerability in the TOE when operated in
the evaluated configuration. No residual risks were identified.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) was provided by the CCTL in
accordance with the CC, CEM and requirements of the SCCS. As a result of
the evaluation, the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
▪ All components of the EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3 and AVA_VAN.5
assurance package
This implies that the TOE satisfies the security requirements specified in the
Security Target [1].
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 23
10 Obligations and recommendations for the usage of
the TOE
The documents as outlined in Table 2 - List of guidance documents contain
necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein
have to be considered. In addition, all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and
OSPs as outlined in the Security Target [1] that are not covered by the TOE
shall be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
Potential user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within
his/her system risk management process. As attack methods and techniques
evolve over time, he/she should define the period of time whereby a re-
assessment of the TOE is required and convey such request to the sponsor of
the certificate.
Users are reminded to set up the TOE as per guidance documents to correctly
deploy and use the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
Please refer to https://www.marvell.com/portal/dashboard.html for information
pertaining to the product security support duration.
No additional recommendation was provided by the evaluators.
No additional recommendation was provided by the Evaluation Authority.
11 List of Applicable SCCS Publications
Developers and CCTLs are required to comply with the latest SCCS
Publications at the time of application.
Please list the up-to-date SCCS Publications along with their version numbers
that are being complied with at the time of application:
1) SCCS Publication 1 - Overview of SCCS, Version 8.0, 2024.
2) SCCS Publication 2 - Requirements for CCTL, Version 8.0, 2024
3) SCCS Publication 3 - Evaluation and Certification, Version 8.0, 2024
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 24
12 Acronyms
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CCTL Common Criteria Test Laboratory
CSA Cyber Security Agency of Singapore
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCCS Singapore Common Criteria Scheme
SFR Security Functional Requirement
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 25
13 Bibliography
[1] Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., “Marvell LS2 HSM Security Target v1.18,
20/02/2026”.
[2] Common Criteria Maintenance Board (CCMB), “Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction and
general model. [Document Number CCMB-2022-11-001], CC:2022
Revision 1,” November 2022.
[3] Common Criteria Maintenance Board (CCMB), “Common Criteria for
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components. [Document Number CCMB-2022-11-002], CC:2022
Revision 1,” November 2022.
[4] Common Criteria Maintenance Board (CCMB), “Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security assurance
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Revision 1,” November 2022.
[5] Common Criteria Maintenance Board (CCMB), “Common Criteria for
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specification of evaluation methods and activities. [Document Number
CCMB-2022-11-004], CC:2022 Revision 1,” November 2022.
[6] Common Criteria Maintenance Board (CCMB), “Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 5: Pre-defined
packages of security requirements. [Document Number CCMB-2022-11-
005], CC:2022 Revision 1,” November 2022.
[7] Common Criteria Maintenance Board (CCMB), “Common Methodology for
Information Technology Security Evaluation - Evaluation Methodology
[Document Number CCMB-2022-11-006], CC:2022 Revision 1,”
November 2022.
[8] Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA), “SCCS Publication 1 -
Overview of SCCS, Version 8.0,” 2024.
[9] Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA), “SCCS Publication 2 -
Requirements for CCTL, Version 8.0,” 2024.
[10] Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA), “SCCS Publication 3 -
Evaluation and Certification, Version 8.0,” 2024.
[11] Marvell, “Marvelll LS2 HSM Preparative Procedures v6.0,” 20 February
2026.
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