National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
For
Cisco Catalyst Switches (2960S, 2960C, 3560V2 and
3750V2) running IOS 15.0.(2)SE4
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10588-2014
Dated: February 7, 2014
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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Table of Contents
1.1 Executive Summary................................................................1
1.2 Evaluation Details...................................................................4
1.3 Identification...........................................................................5
1.4 TOE Threats, Assumptions, and Organizational Security Policies 6
1.5 Architectural Information .......................................................6
1.6 Physical Boundaries................................................................7
1.7 Documentation........................................................................7
1.8 Security Policy........................................................................8
1.9 Independent Testing..............................................................10
1.10 Evaluated Configuration.....................................................11
1.11 Results of the Evaluation ....................................................11
1.12 Validator Comments/Recommendations ............................12
1.13 Annexes...............................................................................12
1.14 Security Target....................................................................12
1.15 Acronym List ......................................................................12
1.16 Bibliography .......................................................................13
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List of Tables
Table 1 ST and TOE identification........................................................................................ 5
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1.1 Executive Summary
The evaluation of Cisco Catalyst Switches 2960S, 2960C, 3560V2 and 3750V2 running IOS
15.0.(2)SE4 (hereafter referenced as Cisco Cat 2k/3kV2 Switches) was performed by Leidos, in the
United States and was completed in December 2013. The evaluation was carried out in accordance
with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. The
criteria against which the Cisco Cat 2k/3kV2 Switches TOE was judged are described in the
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, revision 3. The
evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation was available in the
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation versions 3.1, revision 3.
Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory determined that the product satisfies the evaluation
assurance level (EAL) 1 as defined within the Common Criteria (CC) and the NDPP. The product,
when configured as specified in the installation guides and user guides, satisfies all of the security
functional requirements stated in the Cisco Catalyst Switches (2960S, 2960C, 3560V2 and 3750V2)
running IOS 15.0(2) SE4 Security Target, version 1.0, February 5, 2014.
This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. In this case the
TOE is Cisco Catalyst Switches (2960S, 2960C, 3560V2 and 3750V2) running Cisco IOS
15.(2)SE4 software.
The TOE hardware includes the following appliances:
1. Cisco Catalyst 2960S Switches
Figure 3: Cisco Catalyst 2960-S Series Switches
Table 3: Configurations of Cisco Catalyst 2960-S Series Switches
Switch Model Description Uplinks
Catalyst 2960-S Switches with 1 Gigabit Uplinks and 10/100/1000
Ethernet Connectivity
Cisco Catalyst 2960S-
48TS-S
48 Ethernet 10/100/1000 2 1GbE ports
Cisco Catalyst 2960S-
24TS-S
24 Ethernet 10/100/1000 2 1GbE SFP ports
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2. Cisco Catalyst 2960-C Switches
Figure 4: The Cisco Catalyst 2960-C Series Configurations
Table 4: Configurations of Cisco Catalyst 2960-C Series Switches
Catalyst 2960-
C Switch
Model
Description PoE Output
Ports and
available PoE
Power
Uplinks MACsec
Cisco Catalyst
2960C-8TC-L
8 x 10/100
Fast Ethernet
N/A 2 x 1G
copper
or 1G SFP
N/A
Cisco Catalyst
2960C-8TC-S
8 x 10/100
Fast Ethernet
N/A 2 x 1G
copper
or 1G SFP
N/A
Cisco Catalyst
2960CPD-8TT-
L
8 x 10/100 Fast
Ethernet
N/A 2 x 1G
(PoE+
input)
N/A
Cisco Catalyst
2960C-8PC-L
8 x 10/100 Fast
Ethernet
8 PoE, 124W 2 x 1G
copper
or 1G SFP
N/A
Cisco Catalyst
2960CPD-8PT-
L
8 x 10/100 Fast
Ethernet
8 PoE, Upto
22.4W
2 x 1G
(PoE+
input)
N/A
Cisco Catalyst
2960C-12PC-L
12 x 10/100 Fast
Ethernet
12 PoE, 124W 2 x 1G
copper
or 1G SFP
N/A
Cisco Catalyst 8 x 10/100/1000 N/A 2 x 1G N/A
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Catalyst 2960-
C Switch
Model
Description PoE Output
Ports and
available PoE
Power
Uplinks MACsec
2960CG-8TC-L Gigabit
Ethernet
copper
or 1G SFP
3. Cisco Catalyst 3560V2 and 3750V2 Switches
Figure 5: The Cisco Catalyst 3560V2 and 3750V2 Series Configurations – Front and back view
Table 5: The Cisco Catalyst 3560 and 3750 V2 Series Configurations
Model Description
3560V2-24TS 24 Ethernet 10/100 ports and 2 Small Form-Factor Pluggable
(SFP)-based Gigabit Ethernet ports; 1 rack unit (RU)
3560V2-48TS 48 Ethernet 10/100 ports and 4 SFP-based Gigabit Ethernet
ports; 1RU
3560V2-24PS 24 Ethernet 10/100 ports with PoE and 2 SFP-based Gigabit
Ethernet ports; 1 RU
3560V2-48PS 48 Ethernet 10/100 ports with PoE and 4 SFP-based Gigabit
Ethernet ports; 1RU
3560V2-24TS-
SD
24 Ethernet 10/100 ports and 2 SFP-based Gigabit Ethernet
ports; 1RU, DC power supply
3750V2-24TS 24 Ethernet 10/100 ports and 2 Small Form-Factor Pluggable
(SFP) Gigabit Ethernet ports; 1 rack unit (RU)
3750V2-48TS 48 Ethernet 10/100 ports and 4 SFP Gigabit Ethernet ports;
1RU
3750V2-24PS 24 Ethernet 10/100 ports with Power over Ethernet (PoE)
and 2 SFP Gigabit Ethernet ports; 1 RU
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Model Description
3750V2-48PS 48 Ethernet 10/100 ports with PoE and 4 SFP Gigabit
Ethernet ports; 1RU
3750V2-24FS 24 Ethernet 100FX SFP ports and 2 SFP Gigabit Ethernet
ports; 1 RU; Transceivers are optional and not
included with the base switch
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the testing laboratory
in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This Validation Report
is not an endorsement of Cisco Catalyst Switches 2k/3kV2 by any agency of the US Government
and no warranty of the product is either expressed or implied.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, examined evaluation evidence,
provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work
units and verdicts of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the
product satisfies all of the security functional and assurance requirements stated in the Security
Target (ST). The evaluation also showed that the product met all the security requirements and
Assurance Activities contain in a Protection Profile. Therefore the validation team concludes that
the testing laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results
are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Final Evaluation Technical
Report for Cisco Catalyst Switches 2k/3kV2 ETR parts 1 and 2 and the associated test report
produced by Leidos.
1.2 Evaluation Details
Item Identifier
Evaluated Product Cisco Catalyst Switches (2960S, 2960C, 3560V2 and 3750V2)
Sponsor & Developer Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
CCTL Leidos
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive
Columbia, MD 21046
Completion Date February 2014
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Revision 3, September 2009
Interpretations There were no applicable interpretations used for this evaluation.
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
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Evaluation: Version 3.1, Revision 3, September 2009
PP U.S. Government Security Requirements for Network Devices
(pp_nd_v1.1) version 1.0, 8 June 2012
Evaluation Class Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1 consistent with NDPP Assurance
Requirements
Disclaimer The information contained in this Validation Report is not an
endorsement of the Cisco Catalyst Switches 2k/3kV2 by any agency of
the U.S. Government and no warranty of Cisco Catalyst Switches
2k/3kV2 is either expressed or implied.
Evaluation Personnel Kevin Micciche
Christopher Keenan
Tony Apted
Validation Personnel Paul Bicknell
Brad O’Neill
1.3 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation Methodology
(CEM) for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1 through EAL 4 in accordance with National
Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation. Note that assurance
requirements outside the scope of EAL 1 through EAL 4 are addressed at the discretion of the
CCEVS.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security
evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful
completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products List.
The following table serves to identify the evaluated Security Target and TOE.
Table 1 ST and TOE identification
ST Title Cisco Catalyst Switches (2960S, 2960C, 3560V2 and 3750V2)
Running IOS 15.0(2)SE4 Security Target, Revision 1.0, February 5,
2014
TOE Identification Cisco Catalyst Switches (2960S, 2960C, 3560V2 and 3750V2)
TOE Hardware Cisco Catalyst Switches 2960S, 2960C, 3560V2 and 3750V2)
TOE Software Cisco IOS 15.0(2)SE4
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1.4 TOE Threats, Assumptions, and Organizational Security
Policies
All Threats to the TOE, Assumptions, and Organization Security Polices are consistent with those
contained in: [NDPPv1.1].
1.5 Architectural Information
The TOE consists of one or more physical devices; the Catalyst Switch with Cisco IOS software.
All of the Catalyst Switches run the same version of the IOS 15.0(2)SE4 (FIPS Validated) software
which enforces the security functions being claimed regardless of the model. The Catalyst Switch
has two or more network interfaces and is connected to at least one internal and one external
network. The Cisco IOS configuration determines how packets are handled to and from the
switches’ network interfaces. The switch configuration will determine how traffic flows received
on an interface will be handled. Typically, packet flows are passed through the internetworking
device and forwarded to their configured destination. BGPv4, EIGRP, EIGRPv6 for IPv6, PIM-
SMv2, and OSPFv2, OSPFv3 for IPv6 and RIPv2, Routing protocols are used on all of the Catalyst
Switch models.
The TOE can optionally connect to an NTP server on its internal network for time services. Also, if
the Catalyst Switch is to be remotely administered, then the management station must be connected
to an internal network, a secure IPsec tunnel must be used to connect to the switch. A syslog server
can also be used to store audit records. A remote authentication server can also be used for
centralized authentication. If these servers are used, they must be attached to the internal (trusted)
network. The internal (trusted) network is meant to be separated effectively from unauthorized
individuals and user traffic; one that is in a controlled environment where implementation of
security policies can be enforced.
The following figure provides a visual depiction of an example TOE deployment.
Figure 1: TOE Deployment Example
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1.6 Physical Boundaries
The Target of Evaluation includes the following components:
• Cisco Catalyst 2960S Switches
• Cisco Catalyst 2960C Switches
• Cisco Catalyst 3560V2 Switches
• Cisco Catalyst 3750V2 Switches
• All Switches run IOS 15.0.(2)SE4
• TOE Guidance
1.7 Documentation
Cisco offers a number of guidance documents along with a CC-specific supplemental document
describing the installation process for the TOE as well as guidance for subsequent use and
administration of the applicable security features.
Cisco ASR 1006
PWR
STATUS
ASR1000 SIP10
PWR
STATUS
ASR1000 SIP10
PWR
STAT STBY
ASR1000-ESP20
ACTV
PWR
STAT STBY
ASR1000-ESP20
ACTV
STAT
ASR1000-RP1
STBY
ACTV
MIN
MAJ
CRIT
A
C
0
CM1
PWR
HD
USB
BF
DISK
1
0
CARRIER LINK
BITS CON AUX
MGMT ETHERNET
CM1
STAT
ASR1000-RP1
STBY
ACTV
MIN
MAJ
CRIT
A
C
0
CM1
PWR
HD
USB
BF
DISK
1
0
CARRIER LINK
BITS CON AUX
MGMT ETHERNET
CM1
PWR
STATUS
ASR1000 SIP10
1
0
1
0
2
1
0
2
1
0
P
P
R
R
Cisco
ETH
ACT
PWR
SLOT 0
0
SLOT 1
0
SLOT 2
0
0K 1 1 1
1700
SERIES
ROUTER
COL
Peer
=TOE Boundary
Mgt .
Workstation
IPSec
Connecion
Catalyst 2k/3kV2 Switch
Cisco
ETH
ACT
PWR
SLOT 0
0
SLOT 1
0
SLOT 2
0
0K 1 1 1
1700
SERIES
ROUTER
COL
Peer
Syslog
Server
AAA Server
NTP Server
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The documentation for the TOE is:
• Cisco Catalyst 2960S, 2960C, 3560C, 3560X, 3750X, 3560v2, and 3750v2 switches Common
Criteria User Guidance and Preparative Guidance, version 1.5, 31 January 2014
• Cisco IOS Command Reference
• Cisco IOS configuration Fundamentals
• Cisco IOS configuration Guide
The security target used is:
 Cisco Catalyst Switches (2960S, 2960C, 3560V2 and 3750V2) Running IOS 15.0(2)SE4
Security Target, version 1.0, February 5, 2014
1.8 Security Policy
Security audit
The TOE generates a comprehensive set of audit logs that identify specific TOE operations.
Auditable events include; modifications to the group of users that are part of the authorized
administrator roles, all use of the user identification mechanism, any use of the authentication
mechanism, any change in the configuration of the TOE, any matching of packets to access control
entries in ACLs when traversing the TOE; and any failure of a packet to match an access control
list (ACL) rule allowing traversal of the TOE.
The TOE is configured to store the audit logs on an external syslog server. Communication with the
syslog server is protected using IPsec and the TOE can determine when communication with the
syslog server fails. If that should occur, the TOE can be configured to block new permit actions.
The logs can be viewed on the TOE using the appropriate IOS commands. The records include the
date/time the event occurred, the event/type of event, the user associated with the event, and
additional information of the event and its success and/or failure.
Cryptographic support
The TOE provides cryptography support for secure communications and protection of information
when configured in FIPS mode. The crypto module is FIPS 140-2 SL2 validated (certificate number
1940). The cryptographic services provided by the TOE include: symmetric encryption and
decryption using AES; digital signature using RSA; cryptographic hashing using SHA1; keyed-
hash message authentication using HMAC-SHA1, and IPsec for authentication and encryption
services to prevent unauthorized viewing or modification of data as it travels over the external
network. The TOE also implements IPsec secure protocol for secure remote administration. In the
evaluated configuration, the TOE must be operated in FIPS mode of operation per the FIPS
Security Policy (certificate 1940).
User Data Protection
The TOE ensures that packets transmitted from the TOE do not contain residual information from
previous packets. Packets that are not the required length use zeros for padding so that residual data
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from previous traffic is never transmitted from the TOE.
Identification and authentication
The TOE performs authentication, using Cisco IOS platform authentication mechanisms, to
authenticate access to user and privileged command modes. All users wanting to use TOE services
are identified and authenticated prior to being allowed access to any of the services. Once a user
attempts to access the management functionality of the TOE the TOE prompts the user for a user
name and password. Only after the administrative user presents the correct identification and
authentication credentials will access to the TOE functionality be granted.
The TOE can be configured to display an advisory banner when administrators log in and also to
terminate administrator sessions after a configured period of inactivity.
The TOE also supports authentication of other routers using router authentication supported by
BGPv4, EIGRP, EIGRPv6 for IPv6, PIM-SMv2, and OSPFv2, OSPFv3 for IPv6 and RIPv2. Each
of these protocols supports authentication by transmission of MD5-hashed password strings, which
each neighbor router uses to authenticate others. It is noted that per the FIPS Security Policy, that
MD5 is not a validated algorithm during FIPS mode of operation. For additional security, it is
recommended router protocol traffic also be isolated to separate VLANs.
Security management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration
and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration occurs either through a
secure session via IPsec, a terminal server directly connected to the Catalysis Switch (RJ45), or a
local console connection (serial port). The TOE provides the ability to perform the following
actions:
• allows authorized administrators to add new administrators,
• start-up and shutdown the device,
• create, modify, or delete configuration items,
• create, modify, or delete information flow policies,
• create, modify, or delete routing tables,
• modify and set session inactivity thresholds,
• modify and set the time and date,
• and create, delete, empty, and review the audit trail
All of these management functions are restricted to the authorized administrator of the TOE. The
TOE switch platform maintains administrative privilege level and non-administrative access. Non-
administrative access is granted to authenticated neighbor routers for the ability to receive updated
routing tables per the information flow rules. There is no other access or functions associated with
non-administrative access. The administrative privilege levels include:
• Administrators are assigned to privilege levels 0 and 1. Privilege levels 0 and 1 are defined
by default and are customizable. These levels have a very limited scope and access to CLI
commands that include basic functions such as login, show running system information,
turn on/off privileged commands, logout.
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• Semi-privileged administrators equate to any privilege level that has a subset of the
privileges assigned to level 15; levels 2-14. These levels are undefined by default and are
customizable.
• Privileged administrators are equivalent to full administrative access to the CLI, which is
the default access for IOS privilege level 15.
Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification, authentication and access controls to limit configuration to authorized administrators.
The TOE provides secure transmission when TSF data is transmitted between the TOE and other IT
entities, such as remote administration and secure transmission of the audit logs via IPsec. The
TOE is also able to detect replay of information and/or operations. The detection applied to network
packets that are terminated at the TOE, such as trusted communications between the administrators
to TOE, IT entity (e.g., authentication server) to TOE. If replay is detected, the packets are
discarded.
In addition, the TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time is used as
the time stamp that is applied to TOE generated audit records. Alternatively, an NTP server can be
used to synchronize the date-timestamp. Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct
operation of the switch itself and that of the cryptographic module.
Resource utilization
The TOE provides the capability of controlling and managing resources so that a denial of
service will not occur. The resource allocations are configured to limit the number of concurrent
administrator sessions.
TOE Access
The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an authorized administrator configurable
time- period. Once a session has been terminated, the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to
establish a new session.
The TOE also provides the administrator with the ability to display a notification of use
banner on the CLI management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE establishes a trusted path between the appliance and the CLI, syslog server, NTP
server and if configured, an external authentication server using IPsec.
1.9 Independent Testing
The purpose of this activity was to determine whether the TOE behaves as specified in the design
documentation and in accordance with the TOE security functional requirements specified in the ST
for an NDPPv1.1 EAL1 evaluation.
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Independent testing took place at the CCTL location in Columbia, Maryland from March 2013 and
again in January 2014.
The evaluators received the TOE in the form that normal customers would receive it, installed and
configured the TOE (in three distinct but representative configurations) in accordance with the
provided guidance, and exercised the Team Test Plan on equipment configured in the testing
laboratory.
This effort involved installing and configuring the Cisco Catalyst Switches 2k/3kV2 components in
their respective tiers on a representative subset of the supported operating systems. Subsequently,
the evaluators exercised all the tests cases. The tests were selected in order to ensure that each of
the test assertions defined by the NDPPv1.1 was covered.
Also, the evaluators devised independent tests to ensure that start-up and shutdown operations were
audited, to verify the claimed methods of audit storage, to verify that administrator actions were
audited, to verify that users are identified and authenticated, to verify use and restrictions of the
management functions, to verify protected communication between the TOE and the trusted
components of the operational environment, to verify trusted path and to verify protected update of
the TOE software.
Given the complete set of test results from the test procedures exercised by the evaluators, the
testing requirements for NDPPv1.1 are fulfilled.
1.10Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is Cisco Catalyst Switches 2k/3kV2 installed and configured according to the Cisco Cat
2k/3kV2 Common Criteria Preparative and Operational Guide as well as the Installation Guide for
the respective Cisco Catalyst Switches models included in the TOE.
1.11Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Team conducted the evaluation in accordance with the CC, the CEM, the
NDPPv1.1 and the CCEVS.
The results of the assurance requirements are summarized in this section. The details of the
evaluation results are recorded in the Evaluation Technical Report (proprietary) and Test Summary
Report provided by the CCTL. A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting
verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted
based upon version 3.1 R3 of the CC and the CEM. Additionally the evaluators performed the
assurance activities specified in the Network Devices Protection Profile (NDPP). The evaluation
determined the Cisco Catalyst Switches 2k/3kV2 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs
contained the PP.
Below lists the assurance requirements the TOE was required to be evaluated at Evaluation
Assurance Level 1. All assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict. The
following components are taken from CC part 3:
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• ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
• AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
• AGD_PRE.1 Preparative user guidance
• ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
• ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
• ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
• ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
• ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction
• ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
• ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
• ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
• ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
• AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability analysis
1.12Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validators note that the TOE utilizes a non-FIPS approved algorithm (MD5) in the meeting of
the Trusted Update SFR (i.e., FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3) that does not meet the intent of the ND PP as
expressed in an Application note. However, NIAP management has decided to accept this
implementation for this evaluation and plans to clarify the intent of the SFR in future versions of
the ND PP. The validators also note that the vendor has indicated that future version of the product
will not be relying on MD5 to meet the SFR.
1.13Annexes
Not applicable.
1.14 Security Target
Cisco Catalyst Switches (2960S, 2960C, 3560V2 and 3750V2) Running IOS 15.0(2)SE4 Security
Target, version 1.0, February 5, 2014
1.15Acronym List
CC Common Criteria
CCTL CC Testing Laboratory
CI Configuration Item
CM Configuration Management
CMP Configuration Management Plan
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
CVS Concurrent Versioning System
DoD Department of Defense
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FSP Functional Specification
GUI Graphical User Interface
HLD High-level Design
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ID Identity/Identification
IP Internet Protocol
IT Information Technology
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSA National Security Agency
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSS TOE Summary Specification
1.16Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction,
Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
Functional Requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009.
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009.
[5] Cisco Catalyst Switches (2960S, 2960C, 3560V2 and 3750V2) Running IOS 15.0(2)SE4
Security Target, version 1.0, February 5, 2014
[6] Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme - Guidance to CCEVS Approved
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories, Version 2.0, 8 Sep 2008.
[7] Evaluation Technical Report For Cisco Catalyst Switches (2960S, 2960C, 3560V2 and
3750V2) Running IOS 15.0(2)SE4, parts 1 and 2 (and associated AAR and test report),
version 1.0, January 2014.