Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 19FMV3919-37:1
Dokument ID 7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2491
Enligt säkerhetsskyddslagen (2018:585)
SEKRETESS
Enligt offentlighets- och
Sekretesslagen (2009:400)
2021-04-07
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Defence Material Administration
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - DriveLock Agent
Issue: 1.0, 2021-apr-07
Authorisation: Ulf Noring, Lead Certifier , CSEC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 5
3 Security Policy 6
3.1 Device Control 6
3.2 Application Control 6
3.3 Audit Generation 7
3.4 TOE Management 7
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 9
4.1 Usage Assumptions 9
4.2 Environmental Assumptions 9
4.3 Clarification of Scope 10
5 Architectural Information 11
6 Documentation 13
7 IT Product Testing 14
7.1 Developer Testing 14
7.2 Evaluator Testing 14
7.3 Penetration Testing 14
8 Evaluated Configuration 15
9 Results of the Evaluation 17
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 19
11 Glossary 20
12 Bibliography 21
12.1 General 21
12.2 Documentation 21
Appendix A Scheme Versions 22
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 22
A.2 Scheme Notes 22
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the software DriveLock Agent 2019.2 (Device and
Application Control) SP 1 and accompanying guidance documentation.
The TOE is an application and device control software-only TOE for use on work-
station PCs running a Windows 10 (64bit) operating system. Its main functions are:
● Blocking unwanted devices from use, therefore preventing unwanted data import or
export and potential system compromise by malicious devices.
● Blocking unwanted applications from executing, preventing system degradation and
other undesirable effects that could be caused by these applications.
● Auditing events that trigger the security functions mentioned above.
The DriveLock Agent 2019.2 application also supports file and drive encryption, but
that functionality has not been evaluated, only the functionality mentioned above.
Please refer to chapter 2.4.2 of the [ST] for more details.
The certified version of the TOE is available to registered customers only, after pur-
chasing a license. Registered customers have access to non-public information in the
DriveLock Support Portal
(accessible at https://my.drivelock.support/wm/kb.html). Knowledgebase article
KBA00341 contains information on and links to the TOE and its documentation.
The TOE is provided as a downloadable ISO image. The knowledgebase article men-
tioned above also contains a SHA2 hash value of the ISO file which can be used to
verify the integrity of the ISO file. In addition, the article lists the SHA2 hashes of the
principal installation archives inside the ISO file.
The ST does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile.
There are six assumptions being made in the ST regarding the secure usage and envi-
ronment of the TOE. The TOE relies on these to counter the six threats and comply
with the organisational security policy (OSP) in the ST. The assumptions, threats and
OSP are described in chapter 4, Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.
The evaluation has been performed by atsec information security AB in their premises
in Danderyd, Sweden. The evaluation was completed on 2021-03-17. The evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Common Criteria (CC), ver-
sion. 3.1 release 5.
atsec information security AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria
under the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. atsec in-
formation security AB is also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body according
to ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria.
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The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results
confirm the security claims in the Security Target (ST) and the Common Methodology
for evaluation assurance level EAL 3 augmented by ALC_FLR.3.
The technical information in this report is based on the Security Target (ST) and the
Final Evaluation Report (FER) produced by atsec information security AB.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the cer-
tificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organ-
isation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
As specified in the security target of this evaluation, the invocation of cryptographic
primitives has been included in the TOE, while the implementation of these primi-
tives has been located in the TOE environment. Therefore the invocation of crypto-
graphic primitives has been in the scope of this evaluation, while correctness of im-
plementation of cryptographic primitives has been excluded from the TOE. Correct-
ness of implementation is done through third party certification NIST Cryptographic
Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) certificates # C785, # C796, # C797, # C798
mentioned in chapter 6.2.2 Cryptographic Algorithm Validation of the Windows 10
Security Target [WIN10ST], which the DriveLock Agent Security Target refers to.
Users of this product are advised to consider their acceptance of this third party af-
firmation regarding the correctness of implementation of the cryptographic primi-
tives.
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2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2019015
Name and version of the
certified IT product
DriveLock Agent 2019.2 (Device and Application
Control) SP 1
Security Target Identification DriveLock Agent 2019.2 (Device and Application
Control) Security Target, Joachim Schneider, 2021-
03-17, document version 1.32
EAL EAL 3 + ALC_FLR.3
Sponsor DriveLock SE
Developer DriveLock SE
ITSEF atsec information security AB
Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 5
CEM version 3.1 revision 5
QMS version 1.22.3
Scheme Notes Release 17.0
Recognition Scope CCRA, SOGIS, EA/MLA
Certification date 2021-04-07
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3 Security Policy
The TOE provides the following security functionality:
 Device Control
 Application Control
 Audit Generation
 TOE Management
3.1 Device Control
Device Control enables the TOE administrator to control which devices can be used
on a workstation by which user. The rules are defined by deploying a policy that es-
sentially uses a white-list approach. To enforce these rules the TOE contains a kernel-
mode component (driver) that is aware of a device being connected before that device
becomes operational. Whenever a device is connected to the system, the operating sys-
tem processes a sequence of PnP (Plug-and-Play) events to install and activate the de-
vice. Device Control intercepts some of these events and evaluates if the device should
become accessible, based on the policy data and the current Windows user. If the re-
sult of this evaluation is that the device shall not be permitted, Device Control pre-
vents completion of the required PnP activities, forcing the device activation to fail.
As a result, the device remains unable to interact with the system and thus inaccessible
to system and users. If the device is permitted, the installation and activation of the
device by the Windows PnP manager proceeds normally and the device becomes
available to the system and thus to the user.
3.2 Application Control
Application Control enables the operator to control which executables are permitted to
run on a workstation and what permitted executables are allowed to access. A white-
list based policy defines the permitted executables. The criterion to permit an executa-
ble image is a match of the cryptographic hash calculated over the executable contents
to an entry in a hash database. Multiple whitelist rules can be defined; additional pa-
rameters control the applicability of a specific whitelist rule, e.g. the currently logged-
on Windows user.
To enforce the operator-defined policy the TOE contains a kernel-mode component
that monitors any requests to create a new process or load an executable file (e.g. a
DLL). Whenever such an event occurs the TOE evaluates if the executable image
about to be loaded is permitted by its policy or not. If the executable is not permitted,
the request is aborted by the TOE, preventing the executable from running.
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If an executable is permitted to run, the TOE administrator can additionally control the
access of the resulting process to files or registry keys. Processes can be explicitly al-
lowed or denied access to such resources. The TOE kernel mode components intercept
access attempts and block them if they are not permissible according to the defined
policy. Note that access is permitted unless a rule exists that forbids it. Explicitly al-
lowing access is only required if access to a resource is generally not allowed by a
rule, and an exception is required for a specific process, overriding the general rule.
Selectable rule priorities are used to unambiguously define such situations.
3.3 Audit Generation
The TOE generates audit records of various events related to its security functions (see
7.1.2 in [ST] for details). An operator-defined audit policy controls which events are
recorded and where they are sent. This audit trail is buffered locally using the event
log facilities provided by the operating system. In addition, events can be sent to other
destinations, like the DriveLock Enterprise Service, SMTP, or SNMP addresses. The-
table below details the most relevant audit events in relation to the security functions
of this summary.
Function Event(s)
Device Control Device arrival and reaction of the TSF (blocked
or allowed)
Device removal
Device access reconfiguration due to Windows
user change
Application Control Attempts to execute and reaction of the TSF
(blocked or allowed)
Attempts to access files or registry keys and reac-
tion of the TSF (blocked or allowed)
Problems accessing TSF data (hash database) or
policy data
Audit Generation Agent service start-up and shutdown
TOE Management Problems accessing the Enterprise Service
Missing TSF data (policies)
Problems with connection security (TLS, certifi-
cates, etc.)
Problems with received TSF data update packag-
es
Review of the audit data recorded is possible in the DriveLock Control Center (not part of the TOE),
where a variety of filtering options is available.
3.4 TOE Management
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The administration of the TOE takes place on a central server (DriveLock Enterprise
Service), using the Management Console. All management data is maintained by the
server in a database. All these components are not part of the TOE.
The TOE receives its configuration and policy data over a network connection to an
intranet web service running on the server. This connection is a secure channel that
ensures confidentiality and authenticity. The secure channel is provided by the TOE
environment. To protect the integrity of the local TSF data all policy data received via
this channel must be digitally signed with a specific key, otherwise the data is rejected.
This key is deployed as part of the initial configuration of the TOE by the TOE admin-
istrator. The cryptographic functions for signature verification are provided by the
TOE environment. The TOE also verifies that the received policy data is newer than
the data it is intended to replace. This ensures that an attacker cannot reuse outdated
but validly signed policy updates to undo later policy changes.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes two assumptions on the usage of the TOE.
A.POLICY
Policy definition and maintenance:
It is assumed that the TOE administrator defines and deploys suitable policies for
Device Control, Application Control, and Audit, carefully following the available
guidance for the TOE. It is also assumed that the administrator keeps the policies cur-
rent and that policy rules are configured to apply to the intended users and computers.
A.TRUSTEDADMIN
Trustworthy administrators:
It is assumed that the administrators of the TOE are trustworthy and sufficiently famil-
iar with the TOE to minimize the risk inadvertent misconfiguration, and do not inten-
tionally subvert the TOE’s operation.
4.2 Environmental Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes four assumptions on the operational environment of
the TOE.
A.EVENTLOG
Operating system event log:
It is assumed that the operating system event log is properly configured to receive and
retain the TOE-generated audit records until they can be analyzed by the TOE admin-
istrator(s).
A.OSLOGON
Operating system logon:
It is assumed that user identification and authentication is performed by the operating
system and that the TOE can query the current Windows user to determine access
rights and associate user identities with its audit records where applicable.
A.RELIABLETIME
Reliable time source:
It is assumed that the TOE and its environment have access to the correct time by us-
ing the operating system functions intended for this purpose.
A.SECURECONN
Secure connection to the administrative backend:
It is assumed that a secure network connection is available to the TOE to connect to its
server.
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4.3 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target contains six threats, which have been considered during the eval-
uation.
T.DATAEXPORT
A user AG.USER exports local data AS.LOCALDATA from the workstation to a re-
movable device which is unknown and/or not allowed. Alternatively, a permitted pro-
cess AG.LEGITPROCESS accesses local data it is not allowed to access.
T.DATAIMPORT
A user AG.USER imports data from a removable device which is unknown or not al-
lowed to connect to the workstation, modifying the data AS.LOCALDATA stored on
the workstation.
T.DEGRADESYS
An illicit process AG.ILLICITPROCESS degrades the AS.RESOURCES, such as per-
formance (e.g. real-time capability) or resources (e.g. storage capacity) of the work-
station by using these for its own purposes.
T.CORRUPTSYS
An illicit process AG.ILLICITPROCESS manipulates or sabotages the execution of
the legitimate processes AS.LEGITPROCESS on the workstation, compromising sys-
tem integrity AS.INTEGRITY. Alternatively, an illicit process
AG.ILLICITPROCESS denies legitimate users AG.USER access to the workstation
(AS.RESOURCES) or its data (AS.LOCALDATA). Finally, a permitted process
AG.LEGITPROCESS modifies files or settings it is not allowed to access.
T.CORRUPTTSFD
A malicious user AG.USER or process AG.ILLICITPROCESS modifies the TSF data
(AS.TSFDATA) to manipulate or degrade the security functions of the TOE.
Alternatively, a malicious user AG.USER impersonates the server and supplies unau-
thorized updates to the TSF data.
T.HOSTILEDEVICE
An attacker AG.OUTSIDER connects (or induces an unknowing AG.USER to do so)
a manipulated device to the system to gain control (e.g. a USB cable secretly posing as
a keyboard), compromising system integrity (AS.INTEGRITY) or accessing work-
station data (AS.LOCALDATA).
The Security Target contains one Organisational Security Policy (OSP), which has
been considered during the evaluation.
OSP.AUDIT
Events relevant to the management and enforcement of the TOE security policies shall
be recorded as specified by the operator.
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5 Architectural Information
The TOE is a software application for Windows 10 and consists of user-mode and
kernel-mode components.
The kernel-mode components (drivers) implement most of the TOE security function
interaction with the operating system. They are implemented as filter drivers and in-
serted in various operating system driver stacks. From there, the TOE drivers can in-
fluence the outcome of various operating system calls or events, e.g. prevent activa-
tion of a device or prevent the creation of a process.
The user-mode components reside in a user-mode service. They implement the inter-
action with the user and the backend, such as the administration interface over which
the TOE receives its policy and configuration data, or the mechanism forwarding the
audit trail entries to the destination(s) configured for these entries. The user-mode ser-
vice also passes policy and configuration data to the drivers. For specific functions the
policy enforcement by the driver(s) is supported by a user mode component as well,
e.g. where a policy decision would be very difficult to make in kernel-mode code.
As seen below, the primary security functions of the TOE are implemented as combi-
nations of a kernel mode driver and a matching user mode component:
• Device Control: This component enforces device filtering, i.e. control over access to
devices and ports.
• Application Control: This component controls execution of executable files, and ac-
cess to system resources by running processes.
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The TOE also contains additional components that run in user mode only:
• Audit Generation: This component collects and routes all audit events logged by the
other components.
• Administration Interface: This component implements a bidirectional interface with
a DriveLock Enterprise Service. It retrieves configuration updates from and sends au-
dit data to the server.
• User Interface: This component runs as a separate application and mainly provides
status information to the current user. Its other functionality, e.g. management of en-
crypted drives and containers, is not part of this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documentation comprise the TOE guidance:
INSTALL_GUIDE DriveLock Installation Guide 2019.2
ADMIN_GUIDE DriveLock Administration Guide 2019.2
CC_GUIDE DriveLock 2019.2, Manual Supplement
for Certification Compliant Operation
CONTROL_CENTER DriveLock Control Center User Guide
2019.2
EVENTS DriveLock Events, List of DriveLock
Events 2019.2 SP1
USER_GUIDE DriveLock 2019.2
REL_NOTES DriveLock Release Notes 2019.2 SP1
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
The developer employed a manual test approach which covers all the security relevant
subsystems of the TOE. The developer provided test evidence that indicates that all
tests in the test plan have been successfully executed with a "Passed" result.
7.2 Evaluator Testing
The developer performed manual testing of the TOE. The evaluators developed addi-
tional manual tests. In total, 9 out of 20 developer tests were executed by the evalua-
tors. The selected tests were not only repeated, but also augmented by the evaluator to
widen the test scope and to validate the effectiveness of these tests. The evaluator also
devised three manual tests focusing on edge case functionality such as legacy device
access control. All evaluator test cases and sample developer tests were completed
successfully.
7.3 Penetration Testing
The evaluator examined the TOE using a combination of attack scenarios that cover
the following:
● Application Control
● Security Architecture
● General Networking Configuration
During the penetration testing the following TOE subsystems were subject to testing:
● Application Control
● TOE Management
The approach was a combination of fuzzing, architectural timing, load and close ex-
amination. The TOE withstood all penetration efforts.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is a Windows 10 64-bit software application. For the evaluated configura-
tion the method Centrally Stored Policy must be used. In addition, the centrally stored
policies need to be signed before they are deployed, i.e. the server connection must be
set up using a configuration certificate All other deployment methods available were
not evaluated and cannot be used.
Configuration signing uses certificates. The certificates are a security critical compo-
nent for this mechanism and should generally fulfill at least the following require-
ments:
Algorithm: RSA
Key Length: 4096 bits
Integrity Hash: SHA256
Validity: ≤ 4 years
To guard against the use of outdated versions of the SSL and TLS protocols, the DES-
server shall be configured to use only TLS 1.2. This is achieved by setting the string
value securityProtocols under HKLM/SOFTWARE/CenterTools/DES to the value
Tls12.
● Agent Hardening settings:
❍ Agent Service Permissions: Other permissions than Query Service Information
shall only be allowed for TOE administrators
❍ Run Agent in Non-stoppable mode
❍ Start DriveLock Agent in safe mode
❍ Agent Remote Control Settings: Enable HTTPS
❍ Agent Remote Control Settings: Enforce HTTPS
❍ Password to uninstall DriveLock is suitable complex and strong
❍ Disable Offline Unlock requests
● Audit of the following events needs to be configured: 105, 108, 456, 639, 522, 523,
294, 130, 129, 473, 474, 600, 221, 222
For the configuration of the Enterprise Service Connection the following aspects need
to be considered for a certification compliant installation:
❍ Permissions: These must be set to allow only TOE administrators to change the
Enterprise Service configuration.
❍ Updates: Automatic updates must be disabled. An Agent update would replace the
certified software version with a newer version, which is likely not certified.
❍ Network settings: The Use SSL for connections from agent to the server optionmust
be checked (enabled) to secure the connections. Note that SSL is used as a generic
term here, designating both the SSL and TLS protocols.
● Drive locking must be enabled (and appropriate whitelist rules defined) for at least
these drive types:
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❍ Floppy disk drives
❍ CD-ROM/DVD drives
❍ USB connected drives
❍ Firewire (IEEE-1394) bus connected drives
❍ SD bus connected drives
❍ Other removable drives
❍ Fixed disks, because e.g. an external drive connected to an eSATA port may be de-
tected as a fixed disk
● Locking must be enabled (and rules defined) for these ports and devices:
❍ Serial and parallel ports
❍ Bluetooth transmitters
❍ Infrared interfaces
❍ PCMCIA controllers
❍ Human Interface Devices (to thwart Bad USB and related attacks)
❍ Mobile phones (as they usually provide data export and import to/from their stor-
age)
❍ Modems
❍ Media Player devices
❍ SD Host Controllers
❍ Tape Drives
❍ PCMCIA and flash memory devices
● If the system event log is used to store the audit events generated by the TOE, the
event log size on the workstation must be configured large enough for the selected re-
view period.
● The workstation must be configured to require user authentication before any access
to the system. This is required to correctly identify the current user for rule evaluation
and association of audit events with users. If manual user logon is not feasible due to
operational concerns, unauthorized access to the workstation must be prevented by
other means.
● The workstation time and date need to be set correctly. This is required for proper
timestamps on audit records, and for certificate and policy update verification. The
easiest ways to achieve this is to have the workstation synchronize its clock with a
domain controller or an internet time source, which both NIST and Microsoft provide.
● The workstation needs a secure connection via TLS to the DriveLock Enterprise
Server. The TLS configuration defaults (cipher suites and priorities) of Windows 10
are suitable for this purpose; they should only be changed with good reason by experi-
enced security experts. However, to ensure that the workstation does not permit con-
nections using outdated versions of the secure connection protocols, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0,
and TLS 1.1 need to be disabled.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].
The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.
The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the follow-
ing table:
Assurance Class Name / Assurance Family Name Short name (includ-
ing component iden-
tifier for assurance
families)
Verdict
Development ADV PASS
Security Architecture ADV_ARC.1 PASS
Functional specification ADV_FSP.3 PASS
TOE design ADV_TDS.2 PASS
Guidance documents AGD PASS
Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
Life-cycle support ALC PASS
CM capabilities ALC_CMC.3 PASS
CM scope ALC_CMS.3 PASS
Delivery ALC_DEL.1 PASS
Development security ALC_DSV.1 PASS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR.3 PASS
Life-cycle definition ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Security Target evaluation ASE PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Conformance claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
Security problem definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.2 PASS
Extended components definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
Security requirements ASE_REQ.2 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Tests ATE PASS
Coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Depth ATE_DPT.1 PASS
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Functional tests ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment AVA PASS
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.2 PASS
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10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
None.
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11 Glossary
CC Common Critera
CSEC The Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
DES DriveLock Enterprise Service
DLL Dynamic-Link Library
EAL Evaluated Assurance Level
eSATA External Serial AT Attachment
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS HTTP Secure
NTP Network Time Protocol
OS Operating System
PCMCIA Personal Computer Memory Card International Association
PnP Plug and Play
PP Protection Profile
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
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12 Bibliography
12.1 General
CC Combination of CCp1, CCp2, CCp3, and CEM (see below)
CCp1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1,
version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-001
CCp2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2,
version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-002
CCp3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
3:, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-003
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-004
ST DriveLock Agent 2019.2 (Device and Application Control) Security
Target, Joachim Schneider, 2021-03-17, document version 1.32
SP-002 SP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2019-09-24, document ver-
sion 31.0
SP-188 SP-188 Scheme Crypto Policy, CSEC, 2019-01-16, document version 8.0
12.2 Documentation
INSTALL_GUIDE DriveLock Installation Guide 2019.2, DriveLock SE, 2020-
06-29
ADMIN_GUIDE DriveLock Administration Guide 2019.2, DriveLock SE,
2020-06-29
CC_GUIDE DriveLock 2019.2, Manual Supplement for Certification
Compliant Operation, DriveLock SE, 2021-03-17, document
version 1.52
CONTROL_CENTER DriveLock Control Center User Guide 2019.2, DriveLock
SE, 2020-03-21
EVENTS DriveLock Events, List of DriveLock Events 2019.2 SP1,
DriveLock SE, 2020-03-25
USER_GUIDE DriveLock 2019.2, DriveLock SE, 2020-03-21
REL_NOTES DriveLock Release Notes 2019.2 SP1, DriveLock SE, 2020-
03-21
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - DriveLock Agent
19FMV3919-37:1 1.0 2021-04-07
7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2491
22 (22)
Appendix A Scheme Versions
During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
uation and Certification scheme have been used.
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System
Version Introduced Impact of changes
1.24.1 2020-12-03 None
1.24 2020-11-19 None
1.23.2 2020-05-11 None
1.23.1 2020-03-06 None
1.23 2019-10-14 Exception given for this certification to still use SP-188
version 8.0 as changes introduced in QMS 1.23 meant
only EAL 4 and above could place cryptographic im-
plementations in the environment.
1.22.3 Application Original version
A.2 Scheme Notes
Scheme
Note
Version Title Applicability
SN-15 3.0 Demonstration of
test coverage
Clarify demonstration of test cover-
age at EAL3.
SN-18 3.0 Highlighted Re-
quirements on
the Security Tar-
get
Clarifications on the content of the
ST.
SN-22 3.0 Vulnerability
Assessment
Vulnerability assessment needs to be
redone if 30 days or more has passed
between AVA and the final version
of the final evaluation report.
SN-28 1.0 Updated proce-
dures application,
evaluation and
certification
Evaluator reports should be received
in two batches.