Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Belkin Secure KM Switches with Audio
(Models F1DN10{2,4,8}K-3 Version 30303-00C4)
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10638-2016
Dated: March 24, 2016
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory National Security Agency
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Chris Thorpe
Daniel Faigin
Ken Stutterheim
Tony Chew
Brad O’Neill
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CSC Global Cybersecurity, Security Testing & Certification Lab
Computer Sciences Corporation
7459A Candlewood Drive
Hanover, Maryland 21076
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report is intended to assist the end-user of this product and any security certification
Agent for the end-user with determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product in their environment. End-users should review both the Security Target
(ST), which is where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this
Validation Report (VR), which describes how those security claims were evaluated.
This report documents the assessment by the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of the Belkin Secure KM Switch, the Target of
Evaluation (TOE), performed by CSC Global Cybersecurity, Security Testing &
Certification Lab. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the
conformance results. This report is not an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the
U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by CSC Global Cybersecurity, Security Testing &
Certification Lab of Hanover, MD in accordance with the United States evaluation
scheme and completed on February 26, 2016. The information in this report is largely
derived from the ST, the Assurance Activity Report, the Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) and the functional testing report. The evaluation was performed to conform to the
requirements of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Revision 4, dated September 2012; and the Common Evaluation
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1, Revision 4, September
2012; and the NIAP Peripheral Sharing Switch Protection Profile (PSSPP) version 3.0.
The Belkin Secure Peripheral Sharing Switches (PSS) allows the secure sharing of a
single set of peripheral components such as keyboard and Mouse/Pointing devices among
multiple computers through standard USB interfaces.
The Evaluation Team performed an analysis of the NIAP Technical Decisions and
determined that Technical Decision TD0083 applies to this TOE.
The TOE is also compliant with all International interpretations with effective dates on or
before April 28, 2015.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
2. IDENTIFICATION
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform
trusted product evaluations. Under this program, commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) and NIAP approved Protection Profiles in accordance with National
Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation conduct security
evaluations.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security
evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated;
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product;
 The conformance result of the evaluation;
 Any Protection Profile to which the product is conformant;
 The organizations participating in the evaluation.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Target of Evaluation Belkin Secure KM
Protection Profile
NIAP Peripheral Sharing Switch for Human Interface Devices Protection
Profile, Version 3.0, February 13, 2015
Security Target
Belkin Secure KM Security Target, January 2016, v3.27, Document ID
HDC11605
Dates of evaluation April 28, 2015 – February 26, 2016
Evaluation Technical Report Belkin Evaluation Technical Report, Belkin Secure KM Switch, Document
version 1.0 (0.3 on cover), February 26, 2016 (Evaluation Sensitive)
Assurance Activity Report Belkin Assurance Activity Report, Belkin Secure KM Switch, Document
version 1.0, February 26, 2016
Conformance Result
This evaluation has the following CC conformance claims::
 Part 2 extended
 Part 3 conformant
Common Criteria version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version
3.1, Revision 4, September 2012:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1: Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2012-09-001,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB-2012-09-002,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2012-09-003,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) version
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012.
Sponsor Belkin Corporation
Developer Belkin Corporation
Evaluators
CSC Global Cybersecurity, Security Testing & Certification Lab: Brian
Pleffner, John F. Daniels, Cheryl Dugan, Brittany Conti
Validation Team
The Aerospace Corporation: Daniel Faigin, Tony Chew, Kenneth Stutterheim
The MITRE Corporation: Chris Thorpe, Brad O’Neill
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
3. SECURITY POLICY
The TOE implements the Data Separation Security Function Policy (SFP) as outlined in
Section 4 of the claimed Protection Profile. Isolated USB device emulators are used for
the keyboard and mouse. There is one USB device emulator per each connected
computer. The use of isolated USB device emulators assures that connected computers
will not interact electrically or logically with shared TOE or peripheral resources. Data
exchange from computer emulators to device emulators is uses a proprietary protocol
called UNIDIR. The UNIDIR protocol is limited to basic HID transactions. No other data
may flow between emulators as it is not supported by the limited protocol. Keyboard and
mouse (KM) data flows are not combined or connected to any other TOE data flow. The
keyboard and mouse functions are completely isolated from all other functions (audio,
control etc.). There are no shared microcontrollers or any other electronic components.
No other external interfaces are coupled to the keyboard and mouse data flow paths.
a. Wireless keyboards are not allowed per applicable user guidance.
b. Wireless mice are not allowed per applicable user guidance.
c. TOE Keyboard and mouse USB console ports are interchangeable.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
4. ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION
4.1. Logical Scope and Boundary
Secure KMs are used to enable a single user having a single set of peripherals to operate
in an environment having multiple isolated computers. KM switches keyboard, mouse,
audio, and other peripheral devices to one user selected computer.
The following subsections summarize the various KM TOE features and services that
were verified in the current evaluation.
4.1.1. Keyboard and mouse security
Isolated keyboard and mouse USB device emulators per connected computer to prevent
direct interface between the TOE shared peripheral devices and connected computers.
TOE uses host (computer) emulators to interface with connected keyboard and mouse
peripheral devices, thus isolating external peripherals from TOE internal circuitry and
from connected computers.
Keyboard user data is not stored on TOE non-volatile memory. All USB stacks are
implemented in the TOE using SRAM (Static Random Access Memory) – a volatile
memory that clears data once TOE is powered down.
4.1.2. TOE external interface security
The TOE supports only the following external interfaces protocols:
• USB keyboard and mouse;
• Analog audio output;
• Power (AC or DC)
4.1.3. Audio Subsystem security
The TOE audio data flow path is electrically isolated from all other functions and
interfaces to prevent signaling data leakages to and from the audio paths.
4.1.4. User control and monitoring security
TOE is controlled and monitored by the user through front panel illuminated push-
buttons and switches. These controls and indications are coupled to the TOE system
controller function.
4.1.5. Tampering protection
Always-on anti-tampering system mechanically coupled to the TOE enclosure to detect
and attempt to access the TOE internal circuitry.
TOE is equipped with special holographic Tampering Evident Labels that located in
critical location on the TOE enclosure.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
4.1.6. Self-testing and Log
TOE is equipped with self testing function that operating at TOE power up prior to
normal use. The self-test function is running independently at each one of the TOE
microcontrollers following power up.
TOE is equipped with event log non-volatile memory that stores information about
abnormal security related events.
4.2. Administrative and User configuration of the KM TOE
The KM TOE enable user configuration of various operational parameters. This access
may be performed using one of the following methods (as further explained in the
relevant TOE user guidance):
1. Using predefined keyboard shortcuts;
2. Using connected computer and text editor application; and
3. Using special USB configuration loading cable and special configuration utility
software.
The KM TOE enable administrator configuration of various operational and security
parameters. Access requires password authentication. This access may be performed
using one of the following methods (as further explained in the relevant TOE
administrator guidance):
1. Using connected computer and text editor application; and
2. Using special USB configuration loading cable and special configuration utility
software.
4.3. Physical Scope and Boundary
The TOE is a peripheral sharing switch configured as a KM.
The physical boundary of the TOE consists of:
• One BELKIN Secure KM Switch, typically consisting of a system controller
board and power supply;
• The firmware embedded inside the TOE that is permanently programmed into the
TOE multiple microcontrollers;
• The log, state and settings data stored in the TOE;
• The TOE power supply that is shipped with the product (or integrated inside some
of the products having 4 ports or more);
• The TOE computer interface cables that are shipped with the product;
The TOE also includes the user documentation identified elsewhere in this ST. The latest
version of the documentation may be found at the Belkin website:
http://belkinbusiness.com/support-resources/.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
The evaluated TOE configuration does not include any peripherals or computer
components, but does include supplied computer interface cables attached to the TOE.
4.3.1. Evaluated Environment
This table identifies hardware components and indicates whether or not each component
is in the TOE or Environment.
Evaluated TOE and Environment Components
TOE / Environment Component Description
TOE Selectable product from table 2 above. TOE Hardware
Environment Standard USB or PS/2 Mouse Console USB
user mouse port
Environment Standard USB or PS/2 keyboard Console USB
user keyboard
port
TOE Belkin KVM Cables (as needed):
P/N Description
CWR05117 KVM Cable short (1.8 m), USB Type-A to USB
Type-B, Black
Cables for
connection of
computers to
TOE computers
TOE Special Administrator Configuration Loading Cable (as needed):
P/N Description
HWR06579 USB Type-A to USB Type-A Configuration
Loading Cable, 1.8m, Black
USB-A to USB-
A Config.
Loading Cable
Environment Standard amplified stereo speakers or analog headphones Audio output
console port
Environment Standard PC, Server, portable computer, tablet, thin-client or zero-
client device running any operating system; or KVM extender
connected to remote platform.
Connected
computers
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
Typical TOE Installation
4.3.2. KM TOE details
Evaluated KM Products
No Model P/N Description
Eval.
Version
2-Port
F1DN102K-3 CGA06860 Belkin secure 2-port Flip KM w/audio, PP 3.0 30303-00C4
4-Port
F1DN104K-3 CGA10174 Belkin secure 4-port KM w/audio, PP 3.0 30303-00C4
8-Port
F1DN108K-3 CGA10183 Belkin secure 8-port KM Switch w/audio, PP 3.0 30303-00C4
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
5. ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
5.1. Assumptions
The ST identified the following security assumptions:
Table: Secure Usage Assumptions
Assumption Definition
A.NO_TEMPEST It is assumed that the computers and peripheral devices
connected to the TOE are not TEMPEST approved.
A.NO_SPECIAL_ANALOG_CAPABILITIES It is assumed that the computers connected to the TOE
are not equipped with special analog data collection
cards or peripherals such as: Analog to digital
interface, high performance audio interface, Digital
Signal Processing function, and analog video capture
function.
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the
TOE and the data it contains, is assumed to be
provided by the environment.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators and users are trusted to follow and
apply all guidance in a trusted manner.
A.TRUSTED_CONFIG Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational
environment will follow the applicable security
configuration guidance.
5.2. Threats
The ST identified the following threats addressed by the TOE:
Table: Threats
Threat Definition
T.DATA_LEAK A connection via the PSS between computers may
allow unauthorized data flow through the PSS or its
connected peripherals.
T.SIGNAL_LEAK A connection via the PSS between computers may
allow unauthorized data flow through bit-by-bit
signaling.
T.RESIDUAL_LEAK A PSS may leak (partial, residual, or echo) user data
between the intended connected computer and another
unintended connected computer. More specifically, a
PSS may leak user keyboard entries to a PSS-
connected computer other than the selected computer
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
in real-time or at a later time.
T.UNINTENDED_SWITCHING A threat in which the user is connected to a computer
other than the one to which they intended to be
connected.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DEVICES The use of an unauthorized peripheral device with a
specific PSS peripheral port may allow unauthorized
data flows between connected devices or enable an
attack on the PSS or its connected computers.
T.AUTHORIZED_BUT_UNTRUSTED_
DEVICES
The use of an authorized peripheral device with the
PSS may still cause unauthorized data flows between
connected devices or enable an attack on the PSS or
its connected computers. Such threats are possible due
to known or unknown device vulnerabilities or due to
additional functions within the authorized peripheral
device.
T.MICROPHONE_USE
Microphone connected to the TOE used for audio
eavesdropping or to transfer data across an air-gap
through audio signaling.
T.AUDIO_REVERSED
Audio output device used by an attacker as a low-gain
microphone for audio eavesdropping. This threat is an
abuse of the computer and TOE audio output path to
reverse the analog data flow from the headphones to
the computer. The computer then amplifies and filters
the weak signal, and then digitizes and streams it to
another location.
T.LOGICAL_TAMPER An attached device (computer or peripheral) with
malware, or otherwise under the control of a malicious
user, could modify or overwrite code embedded in the
TOE’s volatile or non-volatile memory to allow
unauthorized information flows between connected
devices.
T.PHYSICAL_TAMPER A malicious human agent could physically tamper
with or modify the TOE to allow unauthorized
information flows between connected devices.
T.REPLACEMENT A malicious human agent could replace the TOE
during shipping, storage, or use with an alternate
device that does not enforce the TOE security policies.
T.FAILED Detectable failure of a PSS may cause an unauthorized
information flow, weakening of PSS security
functions, or unintended switching.
5.3. Organizational Security Policies
The Protection Profile claimed identifies no Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) to
which the TOE must comply.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
5.4. Security Objectives
The following table, Security Objectives for the TOE, identifies the security objectives of
the TOE. These security objectives reflect the stated intent to counter identified threats
and/or comply with any security policies identified.
Security Objective Definition as applied to KM type TOE
O.COMPUTER_INTERFACE_ISOLATION The TOE must prevent unauthorized data flow to assure that
the TOE and/or its connected peripheral devices would not be
exploited in an attempt to leak data. The TOE computer
interface shall be isolated from all other TOE computer
interfaces while TOE is powered.
O.COMPUTER_INTERFACE_ISOLATION_
TOE_UNPOWERED
The same level of isolation defined in the dataflow objectives
must be maintained at all times, including periods while TOE
is unpowered.
O.USER_DATA_ISOLATION User data such as keyboard entries should be switched (i.e.,
routed) by the TOE only to the computer selected by the user.
The TOE must provide isolation between the data flowing from
the peripheral device to the selected computer and any non-
selected computer.
O.NO_USER_DATA_RETENTION The TOE shall not retain user data after it is powered down.
O.PURGE_TOE_KB_DATA_WHILE_
SWITCHING
The TOE shall purge all user keyboard data from computer
interfaces following channel switching and before interacting
with the new connected computer.
O.NO_DOCKING_PROTOCOLS The use of docking protocols such as DockPort, USB docking,
Thunderbolt etc. is not allowed in the TOE.
O.NO_OTHER_EXTERNAL_INTERFACES The TOE may not have any wired or wireless external interface
with external entities (external entity is an entity outside the
TOE evaluated system, its connected computers and peripheral
devices).
O.NO_ANALOG_AUDIO_INPUT Shared audio input peripheral functions (i.e., analog audio
microphone input or line input) are not allowed in the TOE.
O.UNIDIRECTIONAL_AUDIO_OUT The TOE shall be designed to assure that reverse audio signal
attenuation will be at least 30 dBv measured with 200 mV and
2V input pure sinus wave at the extended audio frequency
range including negative swing signal. The level of the reverse
audio signal received by the selected computer shall be
minimal to assure that the signal level generated by
headphones will be well under the noise floor level.
O.COMPUTER_TO_AUDIO_ISOLATION The TOE audio dataflow shall be isolated from all other TOE
functions. Signal attenuation between any TOE computer
interface and any TOE audio interface shall be at least 45 dBv
measured with 2V input pure sinus wave at the extended audio
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
frequency range including negative swing signal.
O.AUTHORIZED_SWITCHING The TOE shall allow only authorized switching mechanisms to
switch between connected computers and shall explicitly
prohibit or ignore unauthorized switching mechanisms.
O.NO_AMBIGUOUS_CONTROL Only one switching method shall be operative at any given
time to prevent ambiguous commands.
O.CONTINUOUS_INDICATION The TOE shall provide continuous visual indication of the
computer to which the user is currently connected.
O.KEYBOARD_AND_MOUSE_TIED The TOE shall ensure that the keyboard and mouse devices are
always switched together
O.NO_CONNECTED_COMPUTER_
CONTROL
The TOE shall not allow TOE control through a connected
computer.
O.PERIPHERAL_PORTS_ISOLATION The TOE shall prevent data flow between peripheral devices of
different SPFs and the TOE peripheral device ports of different
SPFs shall be isolated.
O.DISABLE_UNAUTHORIZED_
PERIPHERAL
The TOE shall only allow authorized peripheral device types
(See Annex C) per peripheral device port; all other devices
shall be identified and then rejected or ignored by the TOE.
O.DISABLE_UNAUTHORIZED_
ENDPOINTS
The TOE shall reject unauthorized peripheral devices
connected via a USB hub. Alternatively, the TOE may reject
all USB hubs.
O.KEYBOARD_MOUSE_EMULATED The TOE keyboard and pointing device functions shall be
emulated (i.e., no electrical connection other than the common
ground is allowed between peripheral devices and connected
computers).
O.KEYBOARD_MOUSE_
UNIDIRECTIONAL
The TOE keyboard and pointing device data shall be forced to
unidirectional flow from the peripheral device to the switched
computer only.
O.TAMPER_EVIDENT_LABEL The TOE shall be identifiable as authentic by the user and the
user must be made aware of any procedures or other such
information to accomplish authentication. This feature must be
available upon receipt of the TOE and continue to be available
during the TOE deployment.
The TOE shall be labeled with at least one visible and one
invisible unique identifying tamper-evident marking that can
be used to authenticate the device. The TOE manufacturer
must maintain complete list of manufactured TOE articles and
their respective identification markings’ unique identifiers.
O.ANTI_TAMPERING The TOE shall be physically enclosed so that any attempts to
open or otherwise access the internals or modify the
connections of the TOE would be evident. This shall be
accomplished through the use of an always-on active anti-
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
tampering system that serves to permanently disable the TOE
should its enclosure be opened. The TOE shall use an always-
on active anti-tampering system to permanently disable the
TOE in case physical tampering is detected.
O.ANTI_TAMPERING_BACKUP_POWER The anti-tampering system must have a backup power source
to enable tamper detection while the TOE is unpowered.
O.ANTI_TAMPERING_BACKUP_FAIL_
TRIGGER
A failure or depletion of the anti-tampering system backup
power source shall trigger TOE to enter tampered state.
O.ANTI_TAMPERING_INDICATION The TOE shall have clear user indications when tampering is
detected.
O.ANTI_TAMPERING_PERMANENTLY_
DISABLE_TOE
Once the TOE anti-tampering is triggered, the TOE shall
become permanently disabled. No peripheral-to-computer data
flows shall be allowed.
O.NO_TOE_ACCESS The TOE shall be designed so that access to the TOE firmware,
software, or its memory via its accessible ports is prevented.
O.SELF_TEST The TOE shall perform self-tests following power up or
powered reset.
O.SELF_TEST_FAIL_TOE_DISABLE Upon critical failure detection the TOE shall disable normal
operation of the whole TOE or the respective failed
component.
O.SELF_TEST_FAIL_INDICATION The TOE shall provide clear and visible user indications in the
case of a self-test failure.
Notes:
1. Objectives O.UNIDIRECTIONAL_VIDEO, O.UNIDIRERCTIONAL_EDID and
O.DISPLAYPORT_AUX_FILTERING are not applicable for the models covered
by this security target in accordance with the referenced PP, as they does not
support video.
5.5. Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The following security objectives for the environment are to be addressed by the
Operational Environment by technical means.
Environment Security Objective Definition
OE. NO_TEMPEST The operational environment will not require the use of
TEMPEST approved equipment.
OE.
NO_SPECIAL_ANALOG_CAPABILITIES
The operational environment will not require special
analog data collection cards or peripherals such as:
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
Analog to digital interface, high performance audio
interface, Digital Signal Processing function, and analog
video capture function.
OE.PHYSICAL The operational environment will provide physical
security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and
the data it contains.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN The operational environment will ensure that
appropriately trained and trusted TOE Administrators
and users are available to administer, configure and use
the TOE.
5.6. Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions
that need clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and
clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
1. As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated
configuration meets the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance.
The level of assurance for this evaluation is defined within the Protection Profile
for Peripheral Sharing Switches.
2. Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not
specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were
not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM
defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum
of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
3. The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the
functionality specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related
functional capabilities included in the product were not covered by this
evaluation.
4. The evaluated configuration of the TOE includes the products identified in
Section 4.3.2 using the identified version in the same section for each product.
The TOE includes all the code that enforces the policies identified.
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6. DOCUMENTATION
The following guidance documents are provided with the TOE upon delivery in
accordance with the PP:
1. Belkin. Advanced Secure 2-port Flip KM Switch User Manual. F1DN102K-3 –
Advanced Secure 2-Port Keyboard and Mouse (KM) Switch, PP PSS 3.0.
Document Number HDC10382, Rev D, 13 August 2015
2. Belkin. Secure 4/8 port KM Switch User Manual. Models: F1DN104K-3 –
Advanced Secure 4-Port Keyboard / Mouse (KM) Switch, PP PSS 3.0;
F1DN108K-3 – Advanced Secure 8-Port Keyboard / Mouse (KM) Switch, PP
PSS 3.0. Document Number HDC10389 Rev. D, 13 August 2015
3. Belkin. Belkin KM Configuration Manual. Document Number HDC10960, Rev
C. 28 January 2016. Covers models F1DN104K-3, F1DN108K-3.
4. Belkin. Belkin Administrator Guide, Document Number HDC10957, Rev. C. 13
August 2015
All documentation delivered with the product is relevant to and within the scope of the
TOE. The product documentation can be downloaded from Belkin website:
http://belkinbusiness.com/support-resources/ at any time.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
7. IT PRODUCT TESTING
This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team.
7.1. Evaluation team independent testing
The evaluation team conducted independent testing at the Belkin facilities in Huntsville,
Alabama. The evaluation team installed and configured the TOE according to vendor
installation instructions and the evaluated configuration as identified in the Security
Target. The testing configuration and the testing results were documented in the
Assurance Activity Report (AAR) and the Test Report (TR) identified in the
Bibliography.
The evaluation team confirmed the technical accuracy of the setup and installation guide
during installation of the TOE. The evaluation team confirmed that the TOE version
delivered for testing was identical to the version identified in the ST.
The evaluation team used the Protection Profile test procedures as a basis for creating
each of the Independent tests as required by the Assurance Activities.
Each Assurance Activity was tested as required by the conformant Protection Profiles and
the evaluation team verified that each test passed.
7.2. Vulnerability analysis
The evaluation team performed a vulnerability analysis of the TOE evidence and a search
of publicly available information to identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE. Based
on the results of this effort, there were no identifiable vulnerabilities found at the time of
certification.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
8. RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme (CCEVS) processes and procedures. The TOE was evaluated against
the criteria contained in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1R4. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to
conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1R4.
CSC Global Cybersecurity, Security Testing & Certification Lab has determined that the
product meets the security criteria in the Security Target, which specifies conformance to
the NIAP Peripheral Sharing Switch for Human Interface Devices Protection Profile,
Version 3.0, February 13, 2015. A team of Validators, on behalf of the CCEVS
Validation Body, monitored the evaluation. The evaluation effort was finished on
February 26, 2016.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
9. VALIDATOR COMMENTS
This evaluation was one of the first evaluations performed against the updated Peripheral
Sharing Switch (PSS) Protection Profile (PP) version 3.0. The updates to the protection
profile required some significant changes to the document. During the initial evaluation
and validation processes for this updated PP, several issues necessitated review by the
PSS Technical Rapid Response Team (TRRT). The TRRT has formally posted two
technical decisions related to the PSS PP (TD0083 and TD0086) and they are posted on
the NIAP website. Only TD0083 applies to this validation. It should be noted that the
nature of a PSS presents challenges when reviewing validation evidence against detailed
assurance activities. Since most of the evidence is pictorial in nature several iterations,
between the validators and the lab, were required to agree the appropriateness of
presentation of the evidence.
In addition to the items mentioned above some additional product administration and
usability features are worth considering:
 An administrator mode is supported in the product, but its usability and features
are limited. The administrator should make sure they enable multiple users and
change default passwords.
 An audit feature is supported, but is of a limited nature given the product.
 The product uses a unique syntax where both the left and right control buttons are
pressed at the same time to invoke special modes. The notation CTRL (Left),
CTRL (Right), X or CTRL | CTRL | X is used to indicate this.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
10. ANNEXES
None
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
11. SECURITY TARGET
Belkin Corporation. Belkin Secure KM Security Target, January 2016, v3.27, Document
ID HDC11605.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
12. GLOSSARY
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL): An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP)
and approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Evaluation: The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence: Any tangible resource (information) required from the
sponsor or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE): A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security
evaluation under the CC.
 Threat: Means through which the ability or intent of a threat agent to adversely
affect the primary functionality of the TOE, facility that contains the TOE, or
malicious operation directed towards the TOE. A potential violation of security.
 Validation: The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body: A governmental organization responsible for carrying out
validation and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria
Evaluation and Validation Scheme.
 Vulnerabilities: A vulnerability is a hardware, firmware, or software flaw that
leaves an Automated Information System (AIS) open for potential exploitation. A
weakness in automated system security procedures, administrative controls, physical
layout, internal controls, and so forth, which could be exploited by a threat to gain
unauthorized access to information or disrupt critical processing.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.0
13. BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1 Revision 4,
September 2012.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Components, CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 Revision 4,
September 2012.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 Revision 4,
September 2012.
4. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012.
5. Belkin Corporation. Belkin Secure KM Security Target, January 2016, v3.27,
Document ID HDC11605.
6. CSC Global Cybersecurity, Security Testing & Certification Lab. Belkin
Evaluation Technical Report, Belkin Secure KM Switch, Document version 1.0
(0.3 on cover), February 26, 2016 (Evaluation Sensitive)
7. CSC Global Cybersecurity, Security Testing & Certification Lab. Belkin
Assurance Activity Report, Belkin Secure KM Switch, Document version 1.0,
February 26, 2016
8. CSC Global Cybersecurity, Security Testing & Certification Lab. Evaluation Test
Results, Belkin Secure KM. January 28, 2016. Version 1.2.