Apple macOS 26 Tahoe: FileVault
Security Target
Version: 1.1
Status: Final
Date: 2026-06-29
Validation ID: 11696
Classification: Public
Prepared for: Apple Inc.
Prepared by: atsec information security corporation
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Trademarks
Apple’s trademarks applicable to this document are listed in https://www.apple.com/legal/intellectual-
property/trademark/appletmlist.html
Other company, product, and service names may be trademarks or service marks of others.
Copyright
© 2026 Apple Inc., One Apple Park Way, Cupertino, CA 95014
All rights reserved.
Legal Notice
This document is provided AS IS with no express or implied warranties. Use the information in this
document at your own risk.
This document may be reproduced or distributed in any form without prior permission provided the
copyright notice is retained on all copies. Modified versions of this document may be freely distributed
provided that they are clearly identified as such, and this copyright is included intact.
Revision History
Version Date Author(s) Changes to Previous Revision
1.0 2026-02-20 atsec First version
1.1 2026-06-29 atsec Editorial update & address vendor comments. Added TD1042,
TD1046.
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 6
1.1 SECURITY TARGET IDENTIFICATION.....................................................................................................................6
1.2 TOE IDENTIFICATION.........................................................................................................................................6
1.3 TOE TYPE ........................................................................................................................................................6
1.4 TOE OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................................6
1.5 TOE DESCRIPTION ............................................................................................................................................6
1.5.1 Architecture ............................................................................................................................................6
1.5.1.1 Apple silicon........................................................................................................................................................6
1.5.1.2 Secure Enclave................................................................................................................................................... 7
1.5.2 TOE Physical Boundary.........................................................................................................................7
1.5.3 TOE Security Functionality ...................................................................................................................7
1.5.3.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)........................................................................................................................... 7
1.5.3.2 User Data Protection (FDP)..............................................................................................................................8
1.5.3.3 Security Management (FMT) ...........................................................................................................................8
1.5.3.4 Protection of the TSF........................................................................................................................................8
1.5.4 TOE Guidance ........................................................................................................................................8
1.5.5 TOE Operational Environment..............................................................................................................8
2 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM......................................................................................................... 9
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION.............................................................................................. 11
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES.............................................................................................................12
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION.....................................................................................13
6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................................14
6.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ..........................................................................................................14
6.1.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS) .............................................................................................................14
6.1.1.1 FCS_AFA_EXT.1 – Authorization Factor Acquisition.................................................................................... 14
6.1.1.2 FCS_AFA_EXT.2 – Timing of Authorization Factor Acquisition ................................................................. 14
6.1.1.3 FCS_CKM.1(b) – Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Key)........................................................... 14
6.1.1.4 FCS_CKM.1(c) – Cryptographic Key Generation (Data Encryption Key) .................................................. 14
6.1.1.5 FCS_CKM.4(a)/AA – Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management)........................................... 15
6.1.1.6 FCS_CKM.4(a)/EE – Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management) ........................................... 15
6.1.1.7 FCS_CKM.4(b) – Cryptographic Key Destruction (TOE-Controlled Hardware)....................................... 15
6.1.1.8 FCS_CKM.4(d) – Cryptographic Key Destruction (Software TOE, 3rd
Party Storage) ............................ 16
6.1.1.9 FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a) – Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction Timing)............ 16
6.1.1.10 FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b) – Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power Management)........ 16
6.1.1.11 FCS_CKM_EXT.6 – Cryptographic Key Destruction Types ...................................................................... 16
6.1.1.12 FCS_COP.1(a) – Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification) ........................................................ 16
6.1.1.13 FCS_COP.1(b) – Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)....................................................................17
6.1.1.14 FCS_COP.1(c)/AA – Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)..................................................17
6.1.1.15 FCS_COP.1(c)/EE – Cryptographic Operation (Message Authentication)...............................................17
6.1.1.16 FCS_COP.1(d) – Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrapping)......................................................................17
6.1.1.17 FCS_COP.1(f) – Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)....................................... 18
6.1.1.18 FCS_COP.1(g) – Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) ................................................................... 18
6.1.1.19 FCS_KYC_EXT.1 – Key Chaining (Initiator) ................................................................................................ 18
6.1.1.20 FCS_KYC_EXT.2 – Key Chaining (Recipient) ............................................................................................ 18
6.1.1.21 FCS_PCC_EXT.1 – Cryptographic Password Construct and Conditioning............................................. 19
6.1.1.22 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 – Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)................................................. 19
6.1.1.23 FCS_SNI_EXT.1 – Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation)........ 19
6.1.1.24 FCS_VAL_EXT.1/AA – Validation.................................................................................................................20
6.1.1.25 FCS_VAL_EXT.1/EE – Validation .................................................................................................................20
6.1.2 User Data Protection (FDP) ................................................................................................................ 21
6.1.2.1 FDP_DSK_EXT.1 – Protection of Data on Disk............................................................................................. 21
6.1.3 Security Management (FMT).............................................................................................................. 21
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6.1.3.1 FMT_MOF.1 – Management of Security Functions Behavior ..................................................................... 21
6.1.3.2 FMT_SMF.1/AA – Specification of Management of Functions................................................................... 21
6.1.3.3 FMT_SMF.1/EE – Specification of Management of Functions ................................................................... 21
6.1.3.4 FMT_SMR.1 – Security Roles.........................................................................................................................22
6.1.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT)................................................................................................................22
6.1.4.1 FPT_FUA_EXT.1 – Firmware Update Authentication ..................................................................................22
6.1.4.2 FPT_KYP_EXT.1 – Protection of Key and Key Material ..............................................................................22
6.1.4.3 FPT_PWR_EXT.1 – Power Saving States .....................................................................................................23
6.1.4.4 FPT_PWR_EXT.2 – Timing of Power Saving States ...................................................................................23
6.1.4.5 FPT_TST_EXT.1 – TSF Testing .....................................................................................................................23
6.1.4.6 FPT_TUD_EXT.1/AA – Trusted Update........................................................................................................23
6.1.4.7 FPT_TUD_EXT.1/EE – Trusted Update.........................................................................................................24
6.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS.......................................................................................................... 24
6.2.1 ASE Security Target Evaluation..........................................................................................................25
6.2.1.1 ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification........................................................................................................25
7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION............................................................................................... 26
7.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONALITY ..................................................................................................................... 26
7.1.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS) ............................................................................................................ 26
7.1.1.1 FCS_AFA_EXT.1 – Authorization Factor Acquisition, FCS_PCC_EXT.1 –Cryptographic Password
Construction and Conditioning...................................................................................................................................28
7.1.1.2 FCS_AFA_EXT.2 – Timing of Authorization Factor Acquisition..................................................................28
7.1.1.3 FCS_CKM.1(b) – Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric Keys), FCS_CKM.1(c) – Cryptographic
Operation (Data Encryption Key) ...............................................................................................................................28
7.1.1.4 FCS_CKM.4(a) – Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management), FCS_CKM.4(b) –
Cryptographic Key Destruction (TOE-Controlled Hardware), FCS_CKM.4(d) – Cryptographic Key Destruction
(Software TOE, 3rd
Party Storage), FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a) – Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction
(Destruction Timing), FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b) – Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction
Timing), FCS_CKM_EXT.6 – Cryptographic Key Destruction Types ....................................................................28
7.1.1.5 FCS_COP.1(a) – Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification) ..........................................................29
7.1.1.6 FCS_COP.1(b) – Cryptographic Operation (Hashing).................................................................................29
7.1.1.7 FCS_COP.1(c) – Cryptographic Operation (Message Authentication)......................................................29
7.1.1.8 FCS_COP.1(d) - Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrapping) .......................................................................29
7.1.1.9 FCS_COP.1(f) – Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption) ........................................30
7.1.1.10 FCS_COP.1(g) – Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption)....................................................................30
7.1.1.11 FCS_KYC_EXT.1 – Key Chaining (Initiator), FCS_KYC_EXT.2 – Key Chaining (Recipient)...................30
7.1.1.12 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 – Random Bit Generation ................................................................................................30
7.1.1.13 FCS_SNI_EXT.1 – Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation).........30
7.1.1.14 FCS_VAL_EXT.1 – Validation........................................................................................................................30
7.1.2 User Data Protection (FDP)................................................................................................................ 30
7.1.2.1 FDP_DSK_EXT.1 – Protection of Data on Disk .............................................................................................30
7.1.3 Security Management (FMT)..............................................................................................................31
7.1.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT) ................................................................................................................31
7.1.4.1 FPT_KYP_EXT.1 – Protection of Key and Key Material ............................................................................... 31
7.1.4.2 FPT_FUA_EXT.1 – Firmware Update Authentication, FPT_TUD_EXT.1 – Trusted Update.................... 31
7.1.4.3 FPT_PWR_EXT.1 – Power Saving States, FPT_PWR_EXT.2 – Timing of Power Saving States............. 31
7.1.4.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1 – TSF Testing...................................................................................................................... 31
A. DEVICES COVERED BY THIS EVALUATION........................................................................ 32
B. ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY............................................................................... 34
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List of Tables
Table 1: TOE Operational Environment..................................................................................................................8
Table 2: NIAP Technical Decisions for CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E..............................................................................9
Table 3: NIAP Technical Decisions for CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E ............................................................................10
Table 4: Assurance Requirements.......................................................................................................................24
Table 5: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (USR cryptographic implementation).................................27
Table 6: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (KRN cryptographic implementation).................................27
Table 7: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (SKS cryptographic implementation)..................................27
Table 8: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (SE cryptographic implementation)....................................27
Table 9: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (DMA cryptographic implementation)............................... 28
Table 10: Hardware Platforms..............................................................................................................................32
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1 Introduction
1.1 Security Target Identification
Title: Apple macOS 26 Tahoe: FileVault Security Target
Version: 1.1
Status: Final
Date: 2026-06-29
Sponsor: Apple Inc.
Developer: Apple Inc.
Validation Body: NIAP
Validation ID: 11696
Keywords: FileVault, Full Drive Encryption, Encryption Engine, Authorization Acquisition
1.2 TOE Identification
The TOE is Apple macOS 26 Tahoe: FileVault.
1.3 TOE Type
The TOE type is Full Drive Encryption (Authorization Acquisition and Encryption Engine).
1.4 TOE Overview
The TOE is Apple macOS 26 Tahoe: FileVault which is a Full Drive Encryption (FDE) solution including both
Authorization Acquisition (AA) and Encryption Engine (EE) components. The TOE is a built-in security
feature providing data-at-rest protection on Apple Mac computers with Apple silicon. It is a hybrid FDE
implementation based on a single vendor’s combination of hardware and software.
The Mac computers run Apple macOS operating system. The TOE is part of the macOS operating system,
which leverages the Apple silicon System on Chip (SoC). Included in the Apple silicon SoC are Apple
Secure Enclave and Direct Memory Access (DMA) Storage Controller. The Secure Enclave is a dedicated
secure subsystem where all FDE cryptographic key handling occurs. The DMA Storage Controller provides
a dedicated AES-XTS crypto engine built into the DMA path between the storage and main memory,
making data encryption with AES-XTS efficient. A special channel from the Secure Enclave securely
transfers necessary keying material to the AES-XTS engine.
The macOS version used in evaluation testing is 26.3.
1.5 TOE Description
This section provides a general description of the TOE, including architecture, physical boundaries,
security functions, and relevant TOE documentation and references.
1.5.1 Architecture
1.5.1.1 Apple silicon
The Apple silicon SoC includes:
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• the application processor, which is the main processor of the TOE device and runs the macOS
operating system;
• the Secure Enclave, which contains the Secure Enclave Processor (SEP) running the sepOS
operating system; and
• the DMA Storage Controller, which performs the storage encryption.
The EE component is instantiated in the Secure Enclave and the DMA Storage Controller. The AA
component is instantiated in the application processor (Login Window) and the Secure Enclave. The
Secure Enclave provides security related functionality for EE (other than encryption/decryption of storage
data), as well as all of the cryptographic functionality for AA (i.e., PBKDF2 and AES-CBC). The DMA Storage
Controller provides a dedicated AES-XTS crypto engine built into the DMA path between storage and main
memory of the host platform. The Login Window of the AA component is implemented as the pre-boot
component on the storage drive. It captures the user password and passes it to the Secure Enclave.
Figure 1: Major Components of the TOE
1.5.1.2 Secure Enclave
The Secure Enclave is a dedicated secure subsystem integrated into the Apple silicon SoC. It is isolated
from the application processor to provide an extra layer of security and is designed to keep sensitive user
data secure even when the application processor's kernel becomes compromised.
The Secure Enclave contains the SEP, which runs sepOS. sepOS is bundled with macOS. The Secure
Enclave also includes a hardware True Random Number Generator (TRNG) and a hardware AES-CBC
engine. The TRNG and AES-CBC engine are directly connected to the SEP and are only accessible through
the SEP.
Each Secure Enclave is provisioned during fabrication with its own 256-bit Unique ID (UID). This UID is
used as a key by the TOE device, not accessible by other parts of the system, and not known to Apple.
1.5.2 TOE Physical Boundary
The TOE includes both hardware and software running on the Mac computers listed in Table 10: Hardware
Platforms.
1.5.3 TOE Security Functionality
The TOE provides the security functions required by the conformance claims defined in Section 2.
1.5.3.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
The TOE includes version 26 of the Apple corecrypto cryptographic implementations and is supported by
the onboard Apple Secure Enclave hardware for performing user space, kernel space, and Secure Enclave
cryptographic operations. In addition, it uses a hardware-based noise source for entropy generation. The
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Apple DMA Storage Controller hardware implements the AES-XTS cryptographic algorithm supported for
data-at-rest encryption.
1.5.3.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
The TOE encrypts all user data using AES-XTS-256.
1.5.3.3 Security Management (FMT)
The TOE can perform management functions. The administrator has full access to carry out all
management functions, whereas the user has limited privileges.
1.5.3.4 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements the following protection of TOE Security Functionality (TSF) data:
• Protection of keys and key material.
• Compliant power saving states that purge security-relevant data upon entry.
• Cryptographic self-tests at start-up of the TOE.
• Trusted software updates using digital signatures.
The macOS operating system retrieves the update package from the Apple Update Server and forwards
the package to the AA component. The TOE validates the digital certificate for the package before it is
installed.
1.5.4 TOE Guidance
The following TOE guidance document in PDF format is publicly available on the NIAP Product Compliance
List (PCL) alongside this Security Target:
• Apple macOS 26 Tahoe: FileVault Common Criteria Guide (CCGUIDE)
1.5.5 TOE Operational Environment
The following environmental components interoperate with the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
Table 1: TOE Operational Environment
Component Description
Hardware platform See Table 10: Hardware Platforms
Apple Update Server Server that allows the TOE to download updates
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2 CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target (ST) is CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant. Common Criteria (CC) version
3.1 revision 5 is the basis for this conformance claim.
This ST claims exact conformance to the following Protection Profiles (PPs):
• PP-Configuration for Full Drive Encryption - Authorization Acquisition and Full Drive Encryption -
Encryption Engine, Version 1.0 (CFG_CPP_FDE_AA-CPP_FDE_EE_V1.0).
This PP-Configuration includes the following components:
o collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Authorization Acquisition,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201 (CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E);
o collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version 2.0
+ Errata 20190201 (CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E).
The following table contains the NIAP Technical Decisions (TDs) for the collaborative Protection Profile for
Full Drive Encryption - Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0E (CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E) at the time of the
evaluation and a statement of applicability to the evaluation.
Table 2: NIAP Technical Decisions for CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
TD Description Applicable
?
Non-applicability Rationale
TD1046 FIT Technical Decision: Addition of AES-XTS in
FCS_COP.1(g)
Yes
TD1042 FIT Technical Decision: Replacing FIPS 186-4 with
186-5
Yes
TD0929 FIT Technical Decision: Clarification to
FCS_PCC_EXT.1.1
Yes
TD0769 FIT Technical Decision for FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1 Yes
TD0767 FIT Technical Decision for FMT_SMF.1.1 Yes
TD0766 FIT Technical Decision for FCS_CKM.4(d) Test Notes Yes
TD0765 IT Technical Decision for FMT_MOF.1 Yes
TD0760 FIT Technical Decision for FCS_SNI_EXT.1.3,
FCS_COP.1(f)
Yes
TD0759 IT Technical Decision for FCS_AFA_EXT.1.1 Yes
TD0606 FIT Technical Recommendation for Evaluating a NAS
against the FDE AA and FDEE
Yes
TD0458 FIT Technical Decision for FPT_KYP_EXT.1 evaluation
activities
Yes
The following table contains the TDs for the collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption -
Encryption Engine, Version 2.0E (CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E) at the time of the evaluation and a statement of
applicability to the evaluation.
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Table 3: NIAP Technical Decisions for CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
TD Description Applicable
?
Non-applicability Rationale
TD1046 FIT Technical Decision: Addition of AES-XTS in
FCS_COP.1(g)
No The ST does not claim
FCS_COP.1(g) in
CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E.
TD1042 FIT Technical Decision: Replacing FIPS 186-4 with
186-5
Yes
TD0769 FIT Technical Decision for FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1 Yes
TD0766 FIT Technical Decision for FCS_CKM.4(d) Test Notes Yes
TD0606 FIT Technical Recommendation for Evaluating a NAS
against the FDE AA and FDEE
Yes
TD0464 FIT Technical Decision for FPT_PWR_EXT.1 compliant
power saving states
Yes
TD0460 FIT Technical Decision for FPT_PWR_EXT.1 non-
compliant power saving states
Yes
TD0458 FIT Technical Decision for FPT_KYP_EXT.1 evaluation
activities
Yes
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3 Security Problem Definition
The threats, assumptions, and organizational security policies (OSPs) are defined in the documents
specified in Section 2 "CC Conformance Claim". This Security Target includes by reference the Security
Problem Definition (composed of threats, assumptions, and organizational security policies) from
CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E and CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E.
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4 Security Objectives
The Security Objectives for the TOE and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment are defined
in the documents specified in Section 2 "CC Conformance Claim". This Security Target includes by
reference the Security Objectives from CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E and CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E.
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5 Extended Components Definition
All extended SFR components are defined in the PPs claimed in Section 2.
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6 Security Requirements
6.1 Security Functional Requirements
The following conventions are used to indicate the operations performed within the ST on security
requirement components:
• Selections are shown in bold text and are surrounded by square brackets.
• Assignments are shown in italic text and are surrounded by square brackets. The assignments
within a selection are shown in bold italics.
• Iterations are identified by appending a suffix to the original SFR.
• Refinements added to the text are shown in underlined text, deletions are shown as strikethrough
text.
6.1.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
6.1.1.1 FCS_AFA_EXT.1 – Authorization Factor Acquisition
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FCS_AFA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall accept the following authorization factors [
• a submask derived from a password authorization factor
conditioned as defined in FCS_PCC_EXT.1.
]
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.1
6.1.1.2 FCS_AFA_EXT.2 – Timing of Authorization Factor Acquisition
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FCS_AFA_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall reacquire the authorization factor(s) specified in
FCS_AFA_EXT.1 upon transition from any Compliant power saving state
specified in FPT_PWR_EXT.1 prior to permitting access to plaintext data.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.2
6.1.1.3 FCS_CKM.1(b) – Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Key)
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_CKM.1.1(b) The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys using a Random Bit
Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and specified cryptographic key
sizes [256 bit] that meet the following: [no standard].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.3
6.1.1.4 FCS_CKM.1(c) – Cryptographic Key Generation (Data Encryption Key)
Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
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FCS_CKM.1.1(c) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation method [
• generate a DEK using the RBG as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1
] and specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bits].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.3
6.1.1.5 FCS_CKM.4(a)/AA – Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power
Management)
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FCS_CKM.4.1(a)/AA The TSF shall [erase] cryptographic keys and key material from volatile
memory when transitioning to a Compliant power saving state as defined by
FPT_PWR_EXT.1 that meets the following: [a key destruction method
specified in FCS_CKM.4(d)].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.4
6.1.1.6 FCS_CKM.4(a)/EE – Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power
Management)
Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_CKM.4.1(a)/EE The TSF shall [erase] cryptographic keys and key material from volatile
memory when transitioning to a Compliant power saving state as defined by
FPT_PWR_EXT.1 that meets the following: [a key destruction method
specified in FCS_CKM_EXT.6].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.4
6.1.1.7 FCS_CKM.4(b) – Cryptographic Key Destruction (TOE-Controlled
Hardware)
Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_CKM.4.1(b) The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [
• For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a
o single overwrite consisting of
§ zeroes
o removal of power to the memory,
] that meets the following: [no standard].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.4
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6.1.1.8 FCS_CKM.4(d) – Cryptographic Key Destruction (Software TOE, 3rd
Party Storage)
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FCS_CKM.4.1(d) The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [
• For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a
o single overwrite consisting of
§ zeroes
o removal of power to the memory,
] that meets the following: [no standard].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.4
6.1.1.9 FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a) – Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction
(Destruction Timing)
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1(a) The TSF shall destroy all keys and key material when no longer needed.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.4
6.1.1.10 FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b) – Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction
(Power Management)
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1(b) The TSF shall destroy all key material, BEV, and authentication factors stored
in plaintext when transitioning to a Compliant power saving state as defined
by FPT_PWR_EXT.1.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.4
6.1.1.11 FCS_CKM_EXT.6 – Cryptographic Key Destruction Types
Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_CKM_EXT.6.1 The TSF shall use [FCS_CKM.4(b)] key destruction methods.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.4
6.1.1.12 FCS_COP.1(a) – Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification)
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
Applied TDs: TD1042
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FCS_COP.1.1(a) The TSF shall perform [cryptographic signature services (verification)] in
accordance with a [
• RSA Digital Signature Algorithm with a key size (modulus) of
4096-bit;
] that meet the following [
• FIPS PUB 186-5, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Section 5,
using PKCS #1 v2.2 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature
scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3, for RSA schemes
]
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.5
6.1.1.13 FCS_COP.1(b) – Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_COP.1.1(b) The TSF shall perform [cryptographic hashing services] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-256, SHA-384] that meet the
following: [ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.6
6.1.1.14 FCS_COP.1(c)/AA – Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FCS_COP.1.1(c)/AA
The TSF shall perform cryptographic [keyed-hash message authentication]
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-256]
and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [ISO/IEC
9797-2:2011, Section 7 "MAC Algorithm 2"].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.7
6.1.1.15 FCS_COP.1(c)/EE – Cryptographic Operation (Message Authentication)
Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_COP.1.1(c)/EE The TSF shall perform cryptographic [message authentication] in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-256] and
cryptographic key sizes [256 bits used in [HMAC]] that meet the following:
[ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 "MAC Algorithm 2”].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.7
6.1.1.16 FCS_COP.1(d) – Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrapping)
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_COP.1.1(d) The TSF shall perform [key wrapping] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [AES] in the following modes [KW] and the
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cryptographic key size [256 bits] that meet the [AES as specified in ISO/IEC
18033-3, [NIST SP 800-38F]].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.8
6.1.1.17 FCS_COP.1(f) – Cryptographic Operation (AES Data
Encryption/Decryption)
Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_COP.1.1(f) The TSF shall perform [data encryption and decryption] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [AES used in [XTS] mode] and
cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [AES as specified
in ISO /IEC 18033-3, [XTS as specified in IEEE 1619]].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.9
6.1.1.18 FCS_COP.1(g) – Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption)
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
Applied TDs: TD1046
FCS_COP.1.1(g) The TSF shall perform [key encryption and decryption] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [AES used in [CBC] mode] and
cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [AES as specified
in ISO /IEC 18033-3, [CBC as specified in ISO/IEC 10116]].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.10
6.1.1.19 FCS_KYC_EXT.1 – Key Chaining (Initiator)
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a key chain of: [
• one, using a submask as the BEV
] while maintaining an effective strength of [256 bits] for symmetric keys and
an effective strength of [not applicable] for asymmetric keys.
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide at least a [256 bit] BEV to [the EE] [
• after the TSF has successfully performed the validation
process as specified in FCS_VAL_EXT.1/AAFCS_VAL_EXT.1
]
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.11
6.1.1.20 FCS_KYC_EXT.2 – Key Chaining (Recipient)
Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_KYC_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall accept a BEV of at least [256 bits] from [the AA].
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FCS_KYC_EXT.2.2 The TSF shall maintain a chain of intermediary keys originating from the BEV
to the DEK using the following method(s): [
• symmetric key generation as specified in FCS_CKM.1(b)
• key wrapping as specified in FCS_COP.1(d)
] while maintaining an effective strength of [256 bits] for symmetric keys and
an effective strength of [not applicable] for asymmetric keys.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.11
6.1.1.21 FCS_PCC_EXT.1 – Cryptographic Password Construct and Conditioning
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
Applied TDs: TD0929
FCS_PCC_EXT.1.1 A password used by the TSF to generate a password authorization factor shall
enable at least [255] characters in the set of {upper case characters, lower
case characters, numbers, and [all other 8-bit special characters]} and shall
perform Password-based Key Derivation Functions in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-[SHA-256], with [an iteration
count of 1] and [at least 50,000] subsequent rounds of AES operations
with a device key and PBKDF2 output per FCS_COP.1(g) or
FCS_COP.1(e)], and output cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet
the following: [NIST SP 800-132].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.1
6.1.1.22 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 – Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in
accordance with [[NIST SP 800-90A]] using [CTR_DRBG (AES)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that
accumulates entropy from [
• [1] hardware-based noise source(s)
]
with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security
strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 "Security Strength Table
for Hash Functions", of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.12
6.1.1.23 FCS_SNI_EXT.1 – Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and
Initialization Vector Generation)
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
Applied TDs: TD0760
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FCS_SNI_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall [use salts that are generated by [DRBG as specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1]].
FCS_SNI_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall use [no nonces].
FCS_SNI_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall [ create IVs in the following manner
• CBC: IVs shall be non-repeating and unpredictable;
• XTS: No IV. Tweak values shall be non-negative integers,
assigned consecutively, and starting at an arbitrary non-
negative integer;
]
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.13
6.1.1.24 FCS_VAL_EXT.1/AA – Validation
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1/AA The TSF shall perform validation of the [BEV] using the following method(s):
[
• key wrap as specified in FCS_COP.1(d)
]
FCS_VAL_EXT.1.2/AA The TSF shall require validation of the [BEV] prior to [forwarding the BEV to
the EE].
FCS_VAL_EXT.1.3/AA The TSF shall [
• require power cycle/reset the TOE after [10] of consecutive
failed validation attempts.
]
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.14
6.1.1.25 FCS_VAL_EXT.1/EE – Validation
Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1/EE The TSF shall perform validation of the [BEV] using the following method(s):
[
• key wrap as specified in FCS_COP.1(d)
]
FCS_VAL_EXT.1.2/EE The TSF shall require validation of the [BEV] prior to [allowing access to TSF
data after exiting a Compliant power saving state].
FCS_VAL_EXT.1.3/EE The TSF shall [
• require power cycle/reset the TOE after [10] of consecutive
failed validation attempts.
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]
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1.14
6.1.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
6.1.2.1 FDP_DSK_EXT.1 – Protection of Data on Disk
Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform Full Drive Encryption in accordance with
FCS_COP.1(f), such that the drive contains no plaintext protected data.
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall encrypt all protected data without user intervention.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.1
6.1.3 Security Management (FMT)
6.1.3.1 FMT_MOF.1 – Management of Security Functions Behavior
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify the behaviour of] the functions
[use of Compliant power saving state] to [authorized users].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.3
6.1.3.2 FMT_SMF.1/AA – Specification of Management of Functions
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
Applied TDs: TD0767
FMT_SMF.1.1/AA The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
[
a) forward request to change the DEK to the EE
b) forwarding requests to cryptographically erase the DEK to the EE
c) allowing authorized users to change authorization values or set of
authorization values used within the supported authorization method
d) initiate TOE firmware/software updates
e) [no other functions]
].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.3
6.1.3.3 FMT_SMF.1/EE – Specification of Management of Functions
Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
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FMT_SMF.1.1/EE The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
[
a) change the DEK, as specified in FCS_CKM.1, when re-provisioning or
when commanded
b) erase the DEK, as specified in FCS_CKM.4(a)/EE FCS_CKM.4(a)
c) initiate TOE firmware/software updates
d) [no other functions]
].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.3
6.1.3.4 FMT_SMR.1 – Security Roles
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [authorized user].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.3
6.1.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
6.1.4.1 FPT_FUA_EXT.1 – Firmware Update Authentication
Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FPT_FUA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall authenticate the source of the firmware update using the digital
signature algorithm specified in FCS_COP.1(a) using the RTU that contains the
[public key].
FPT_FUA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall only allow installation of update if the digital signature has been
successfully verified as specified in FCS_COP.1(a).
FPT_FUA_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall only allow modification of the existing firmware after the successful
validation of the digital signature, using a mechanism as described in
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2/EE FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2.
FPT_FUA_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall return an error code if any part of the firmware update process fails.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.2
6.1.4.2 FPT_KYP_EXT.1 – Protection of Key and Key Material
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
TD applied: TD0458
FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall [
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• only store keys in non-volatile memory when wrapped, as specified
in FCS_COP.1(d), or encrypted, as specified in FCS_COP.1(g) or
FCS_COP.1(e)
• only store plaintext keys that meet any one of the following criteria
o the plaintext key is not part of the key chain as specified in
FCS_KYC_EXT.1
].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.1
6.1.4.3 FPT_PWR_EXT.1 – Power Saving States
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
Applied TDs: TD0464
FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall define the following Compliant power saving states: [G2(S5)].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.3
6.1.4.4 FPT_PWR_EXT.2 – Timing of Power Saving States
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FPT_PWR_EXT.2.1 For each Compliant power saving state defined in FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1, the TSF
shall enter the Compliant power saving state when the following conditions occur:
user-initiated request, [shutdown].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.3
6.1.4.5 FPT_TST_EXT.1 – TSF Testing
Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [during initial start-up (on
power on)] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [
a) authenticity and integrity check of software/firmware
b) Known Answer Tests (KATs)
i. AES-CBC encrypt
ii. RSA signature verification
iii. HMAC-SHA-256 MAC generation
iv. PBKDF2 key derivation
v. CTR_DRBG health test
].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.4
6.1.4.6 FPT_TUD_EXT.1/AA – Trusted Update
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Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide [authorized users] the ability to query the current version of
the TOE [software, firmware].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2/AAThe TSF shall provide [authorized users] the ability to initiate updates to TOE
[software, firmware].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3/AAThe TSF shall verify updates to the TOE software using a [digital signature as
specified in FCS_COP.1(a)] by the manufacturer prior to installing those updates.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.2
6.1.4.7 FPT_TUD_EXT.1/EE – Trusted Update
Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1/EE The TSF shall provide [authorized users] the ability to query the current version of
the TOE [software, firmware].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2/EE The TSF shall provide [authorized users] the ability to initiate updates to TOE
[software, firmware].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3/EE The TSF shall verify updates to the TOE [software, firmware] using an a
[authenticated firmware update mechanism as described in
FPT_FUA_EXT.1] by the manufacturer prior to installing those updates.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.2
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements
The Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) are included by reference from CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E and
CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E. The table below summarizes the SARs for TOE evaluation.
Table 4: Assurance Requirements
Requirement Class Requirement Components
Development (ADV) Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance Documents (AGD) Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life-cycle Support (ALC) Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Security Target (ASE) Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)
Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
Security objectives for the operational environment
(ASE_OBJ.1)
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Stated security requirements (ASE_REQ.1)
Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Tests (ATE) Independent testing – Sample (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)
6.2.1 ASE Security Target Evaluation
6.2.1.1 ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Developer action elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1D
The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1C
The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each SFR, including a proprietary Key
Management Description (Appendix E), and [Entropy Essay].
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ASE_TSS.1.2E
The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is consistent with the TOE overview and
the TOE description.
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7 TOE Summary Specification
7.1 TOE Security Functionality
As per the conformance claims defined in Section 2, the TOE supports the following security features:
• Cryptographic support
• User data protection
• Security management
• Protection of the TSF
7.1.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
The TOE uses the following cryptographic implementations:
• USR: Apple corecrypto Module 26 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]
• KRN: Apple corecrypto Module 26 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software, SL1]
• SKS: Apple corecrypto Module 26 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2]
• SE: Secure Enclave hardware onboard Apple silicon
• DMA: Storage Controller AES-XTS Engine hardware onboard Apple silicon
The USR, KRN, and SKS cryptographic implementations execute on the following operational
environments:
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M2
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M2 Pro
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M2 Max
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M2 Ultra
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M3
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M3 Pro
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M3 Max
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M3 Ultra
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv9.2-A) M4
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv9.2-A) M4 Pro
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv9.2-A) M4 Max
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv9.3-A) M5
The SE cryptographic implementation executes on the following operational environments:
• Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M2
• Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M2 Pro
• Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M2 Max
• Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M2 Ultra
• Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M3
• Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M3 Pro
• Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M3 Max
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• Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M3 Ultra
• Apple M Series (ARMv9.2-A) M4
• Apple M Series (ARMv9.2-A) M4 Pro
• Apple M Series (ARMv9.2-A) M4 Max
• Apple M Series (ARMv9.3-A) M5
The tables below show the cryptographic services used by the TOE and provided by the cryptographic
implementations, describing the algorithms, their supported key sizes, applicable standard and purpose.
The tables also include the certificates obtained from the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
(CAVP) in the evaluated configuration for each of the cryptographic algorithms.
Table 5: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (USR cryptographic implementation)
SFR Algorithm Capabilities Standard CAVP cert.
FCS_COP.1(a) RSA SigVer Modulus: 4096 bits
Hash: SHA2-384
Padding: PKCS#1 v1.5
[FIPS186-5] A7643
FCS_COP.1(b) SHA2-384 Byte-oriented mode [FIPS180-4] A7645
Table 6: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (KRN cryptographic implementation)
SFR Algorithm Capabilities Standard CAVP cert.
FCS_COP.1(a) RSA SigVer Modulus: 4096 bits
Hash: SHA2-384
Padding: PKCS#1 v1.5
[FIPS186-5] A7635
FCS_COP.1(b) SHA2-384 Byte-oriented mode [FIPS180-4] A7637
Table 7: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (SKS cryptographic implementation)
SFR Algorithm Capabilities Standard CAVP cert.
FCS_COP.1(a) RSA SigVer Modulus: 4096 bits
Hash: SHA2-384
Padding: PKCS#1 v1.5
[FIPS186-5] A7652
FCS_COP.1(b) SHA2-256, SHA2-
384
Byte-oriented mode [FIPS180-4] A7652
FCS_COP.1(c)/AA HMAC-SHA2-256 Byte-oriented mode [FIPS198-1] A7653
FCS_COP.1(c)/EE HMAC-SHA2-256 Byte-oriented mode [FIPS198-1] A7653
FCS_COP.1(d) AES-KW 256 bits
encrypt, decrypt
[SP800-38F] A7647, A7650
FCS_PCC_EXT.1 PBKDF2 HMAC-SHA2-256 [SP800-132] A7649
Table 8: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (SE cryptographic implementation)
SFR Algorithm Capabilities Standard CAVP cert.
FCS_COP.1(g) AES-CBC 256 bits
encrypt
[SP800-38A] A3496, A6547
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FCS_RBG_EXT.1 CTR_DRBG AES-256 [SP800-90Ar1] A3490, A6548,
A6924
Table 9: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (DMA cryptographic implementation)
SFR Algorithm Capabilities Standard CAVP cert.
FCS_COP.1(f) AES-XTS 256 bits
encrypt, decrypt
[SP800-38E] CCTL Tested
7.1.1.1 FCS_AFA_EXT.1 – Authorization Factor Acquisition, FCS_PCC_EXT.1 –
Cryptographic Password Construction and Conditioning
The TOE accepts the password authorization factor from the user. Passwords of up to and including 255
characters are supported and can be comprised of any combination of uppercase characters, lowercase
characters, numbers, and any other 8-bit special character.
To condition a user password, the Secure Enclave implements PBKDF2 as specified in NIST SP 800-132,
following “Option 2b” defined in section 5.4 of the standard. It uses the HMAC-SHA-256 function as the
pseudorandom function (PRF).
The inputs to PBKDF2 are:
• The 128-bit per-user salt generated by the TRNG.
• The user password without any pre-processing.
• An iteration count of one.
The output is a 256-bit intermediate value.
Next, this intermediate value is encrypted once using the System Measurement Device Key (SMDK) to bind
it. Finally, the result is repeatedly encrypted with the AES-CBC-256 hardware cipher using the 256-bit
Secure Enclave Unique ID (UID) as the encryption key to generate 256 bits of data with each loop iteration.
The output, after all AES iterations have completed, forms a 256-bit key, which is termed Password-
Derived Key (PDK). The resulting PDK is defined as the password submask and BEV in the TOE.
7.1.1.2 FCS_AFA_EXT.2 – Timing of Authorization Factor Acquisition
In order to exit the TOE from a Compliant power saving state, the user must reauthenticate with their
username and password.
7.1.1.3 FCS_CKM.1(b) – Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric Keys),
FCS_CKM.1(c) – Cryptographic Operation (Data Encryption Key)
At the time of creating a data volume, the TOE uses the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1
to generate the following 256-bit AES keys:
• A Volume Encryption Key (VEK) for encrypting the volume, which serves as the Data Encryption
Key (DEK).
• A Key Encryption Key (KEK) for protecting the VEK.
Volume and metadata contents are encrypted with the VEK, which is wrapped with the KEK.
7.1.1.4 FCS_CKM.4(a) – Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management),
FCS_CKM.4(b) – Cryptographic Key Destruction (TOE-Controlled
Hardware), FCS_CKM.4(d) – Cryptographic Key Destruction
(Software TOE, 3rd
Party Storage), FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a) –
Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction
Timing), FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b) – Cryptographic Key and Key Material
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Destruction (Destruction Timing), FCS_CKM_EXT.6 – Cryptographic
Key Destruction Types
The Secure Enclave UID is fused into the Secure Enclave. The UID is not accessible by any component
outside of the Secure Enclave and cannot be erased.
The following keys and key materials are stored in volatile memory (DRAM):
• Media Key
• System Measurement Root Key
• System Measurement Device Key
• Password-Derived Key (a.k.a. BEV)
• Root Encryption Key
• Key Encryption Key
• Volume Encryption Key
• DMA Storage Controller Key
Keys are introduced into volatile memory only when they are required to perform a specific cryptographic
operation, by unwrapping the wrapped form stored in non-volatile memory. Since the keys are being used
by the Secure Enclave to perform the operation, the Secure Enclave tracks the memory location of the key
until the operation is complete. Once a key is no longer needed for the specific operation, the key is erased
from volatile memory. The TOE erases cryptographic keys and key material from volatile memory by
performing a single overwrite of zeroes and/or by removal of power to the memory.
The TOE will destroy all key material and cryptographic keys stored in plaintext when transitioning to a
Compliant power saving state.
7.1.1.5 FCS_COP.1(a) – Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification)
Signature verification is performed as part of the following features:
• Installing firmware/software updates
• Secure boot
Installation and secure boot signature verification involves different TOE components in different layers of
the TOE and, thus, use the user space, kernel space, and SKS corecrypto implementations listed in Section
7.1.1.
The Boot ROM code contains the Apple Root CA public key, which is used to verify the digital signatures
of the bootchain. The TOE cryptographically verifies each piece of software it loads in each step of boot
procedure. Signatures are verified using RSA with a 4096-bit modulus, PKCS#1 v1.5 padding, and SHA2-
384.
7.1.1.6 FCS_COP.1(b) – Cryptographic Operation (Hashing)
The TOE uses SHA2-256 in PBKDF2 to derive the PDK and uses SHA2-384 to verify digital signatures.
7.1.1.7 FCS_COP.1(c) – Cryptographic Operation (Message Authentication)
PBKDF2 uses HMAC-SHA-256 with a key length of 256 bits, a block size of 512 bits, and an output MAC
length of 256 bits.
7.1.1.8 FCS_COP.1(d) - Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrapping)
The TOE performs key wrapping using AES in KW mode according to NIST SP 800-38F.
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7.1.1.9 FCS_COP.1(f) – Cryptographic Operation (AES Data
Encryption/Decryption)
The TOE performs data encryption / decryption using AES in XTS mode with a 256-bit key.
7.1.1.10 FCS_COP.1(g) – Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption)
The TOE performs key encryption using AES in CBC mode with a 256-bit key.
7.1.1.11 FCS_KYC_EXT.1 – Key Chaining (Initiator), FCS_KYC_EXT.2 – Key
Chaining (Recipient)
The TOE supports BEV sizes of 256 bits.
7.1.1.12 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 – Random Bit Generation
The TOE performs random bit generation as described in Section 6.1.1.22 and the proprietary Entropy
Assessment Report.
7.1.1.13 FCS_SNI_EXT.1 – Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and
Initialization Vector Generation)
The TOE generates salts and initialization vectors (IVs) using the DRBG.
For AES-XTS, the tweak value is the physical block number of the media on which the file is being written.
The number is incremented based on the block number values.
7.1.1.14 FCS_VAL_EXT.1 – Validation
The TOE uses a hardware-enforced, persistent “counter lockbox” to validate the PDK. Counter lockboxes
hold the entropy needed to unlock password-protected user data, as well as a password verifier value.
During authentication, the PDK is used to derive a new password verifier value; if the derived password
verifier value matches the stored password verifier value, authentication succeeds and the PDK is regarded
as valid. Otherwise, the PDK is invalid. This indicator of the PDK validity also serves as the authentication
result returned to macOS when authenticating a user.
The password can be used to exit a Compliant power saving state.
7.1.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
7.1.2.1 FDP_DSK_EXT.1 – Protection of Data on Disk
The TOE provides a dedicated AES-XTS crypto engine built into the DMA path between the flash storage
and the main memory of the host platform. This DMA Storage Controller is placed in the middle of the data
path between the application processor and the storage device.
The DMA Storage Controller performs the encryption/ decryption of the data prior to reaching the
application processor or the storage. When a read operation is made, the data must first be decrypted by
the DMA Storage Controller before the application processor has access to the data. When a write
operation is made, the data is first encrypted by the DMA Storage Controller and then written to storage
as a block of encrypted data. This arrangement ensures that standard methods of accessing the storage
drive via the operating system will pass through these functions.
FDE support is always enabled. When FileVault is turned on, valid user credentials are also required during
the boot process. Without valid credentials, the data volume of the TOE device remains encrypted and
protected from unauthorized access, even if the physical storage device is removed and connected to
another computer.
The entire user data volume is encrypted. The following parts of storage are not encrypted: partition table,
Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) service partition, Apple File System (APFS) container metadata,
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recovery volumes, pre-boot volumes, virtual machine (VM) volumes, system volumes (protected by the
signed system volume feature), and CoreDump partitions (if present).
7.1.3 Security Management (FMT)
The TOE supports only one Compliant power saving state: G2(S5): the system is powered down. This
behavior cannot be modified by users.
The DEK can be erased and changed by erasing the appropriate volume in Disk Utility. This forces the TOE
to cryptographically erase and generate a new DEK.
The password can be changed by navigating to System Settings > Users & Groups > Select the appropriate
user > Change Password.
The updates to the TOE software/firmware are all bundled together as part of macOS updates. An
administrator can check for and install updates by navigating to System Settings > General > Software
Update.
7.1.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
7.1.4.1 FPT_KYP_EXT.1 – Protection of Key and Key Material
All symmetric keys stored in non-volatile memory are cryptographically wrapped using AES-KW.
7.1.4.2 FPT_FUA_EXT.1 – Firmware Update Authentication, FPT_TUD_EXT.1 –
Trusted Update
TOE updates are contained within the macOS update package, provided by the Apple Update Server. The
update package is cryptographically signed by Apple, using RSA with a 4096-bit modulus, PKCS#1 v1.5
padding, and SHA2-384. The Boot ROM code contains the Apple Root CA public key, which serves as the
Root of Trust for Update (RTU).
7.1.4.3 FPT_PWR_EXT.1 – Power Saving States, FPT_PWR_EXT.2 – Timing of
Power Saving States
The TOE supports only one Compliant power saving state: G2(S5): the system is powered down. This state
is entered by shutting down the TOE device.
7.1.4.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1 – TSF Testing
Secure Boot
When the TOE device is turned on, the boot process starts with executing code from read-only memory
referred to as Boot ROM. This immutable code, known as the hardware root of trust, is laid down during
chip fabrication and is implicitly trusted. Each following step of the boot process contains components that
are cryptographically signed by Apple to enable integrity checking. The boot process proceeds only after
verifying the integrity of the software at every step, which creates a chain of trust rooted in hardware.
Self-tests
Self-tests are performed by the cryptographic implementations included in the TOE. At start-up, the
cryptographic implementations perform Known Answer Tests (KATs) to ensure the correctness of the
cryptographic functions. These tests include the following:
• AES-CBC encrypt
• RSA signature verification
• HMAC-SHA-256 MAC generation
• PBKDF2 key derivation
• CTR_DRBG health test
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A. Devices Covered by this Evaluation
The evaluated configuration includes the following Apple devices:
Table 10: Hardware Platforms
Marketing Name Model Identifier Processor
(Micro Architecture)
Security
Chip
MacBook Pro (14-inch, M5) Mac17,2 M5 (ARMv9.3-A) SEP v3.0
MacBook Air (15-inch, M4, 2025) Mac16,13 M4 (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0
MacBook Air (13-inch, M4, 2025) Mac16,12 M4 (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0
Mac Studio (2025) Mac16,9 M4 Max (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0
Mac Studio (2025) Mac15,14 M3 Ultra (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
MacBook Pro (14-inch, 2024) Mac16,8 M4 Pro (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0
Mac16,6 M4 Max (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0
Mac16,1 M4 (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0
MacBook Pro (16-inch, 2024) Mac16,7 M4 Pro (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0
Mac16,5 M4 Max (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0
iMac (24-inch, 2024, Two ports) Mac16,3 M4 (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0
Mac16,2 M4 (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0
Mac mini (2024) Mac16,11 M4 Pro (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0
Mac16,10 M4 (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0
MacBook Air (15-inch, M3, 2024) Mac15,13 M3 (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
MacBook Air (13-inch, M3, 2024) Mac15,12 M3 (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
MacBook Pro (14-inch, Nov 2023) Mac15,10 M3 Max (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
Mac15,8 M3 Max (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
Mac15,6 M3 Pro (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
Mac15,3 M3 (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
MacBook Pro (16-inch, Nov 2023) Mac15,11 M3 Max (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
Mac15,9 M3 Max (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
Mac15,7 M3 Pro (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
iMac (24-inch, 2023, Four ports) Mac15,5 M3 (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
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iMac (24-inch, 2023, Two ports) Mac15,4 M3 (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
Mac Pro (-/Rack 2023) Mac14,8 M2 Ultra (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
MacBook Air (15-inch, 2023) Mac14,15 M2 (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
Mac Studio (2023) Mac14,14 M2 Ultra (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
Mac14,13 M2 Max (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
MacBook Pro (16-inch, 2023) Mac14,6 M2 Max (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
Mac14,10 M2 Pro (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
MacBook Pro (14-inch, 2023) Mac14,5 M2 Max (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
Mac14,9 M2 Pro (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
Mac mini (M2 Pro, 2023) Mac14,12 M2 Pro (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
Mac mini (M2, 2023) Mac14,3 M2 (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
MacBook Pro (13-inch, M2, 2022) Mac14,7 M2 (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
MacBook Air (M2, 2022) Mac14,2 M2 (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0
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B. Abbreviations and Terminology
AA
Authorization Acquisition
AES
Advanced Encryption Standard
APFS
Apple File System
BEV
Border Encryption Value
CBC
Cipher Block Chaining
DEK
Data Encryption Key
DMA
Direct Memory Access
EE
Encryption Engine
EFI
Extensible Firmware Interface
FDE
Full Drive Encryption
FIPS
Federal Information Processing Standards
IV
Initialization Vector
KEK
Key Encryption Key
KW
Key Wrap
LLB
Low-Level Bootloader
NIAP
National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST
National Institute of Standards and Technology
OSP
Organizational Security Policy
PBKDF
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Password-Based Key Derivation Function
PDK
Password-Derived Key
PKCS
Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PRF
Pseudorandom Function
PSS
Probabilistic Signature Scheme
ROM
Read-only Memory
RSA
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
SEP
Secure Enclave Processor
sepOS
SEP Operating System
SoC
System on Chip
SKS
Secure Key Store
SMDK
System Measurement Device Key
SMRK
System Measurement Root Key
SP
Special Publication
TD
Technical Decision
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TRNG
True Random Number Generator
UID
Unique ID
VEK
Volume Encryption Key
XTS
XEX (xor–encrypt–xor) Tweakable Block Ciphertext Stealing