National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for
Microsoft Windows Server 2016, Microsoft Windows Server
2012 R2, and Microsoft Windows 10 Hyper-V
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10823-2017
Dated: November 20, 2017
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Paul Bicknell
Sheldon Durrant
Jerome Myers
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Leidos
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary...................................................................................................................1
2 Identification..............................................................................................................................4
2.1 Threats...............................................................................................................................4
2.2 Organizational Security Policies.......................................................................................5
3 Architectural Information ..........................................................................................................6
4 Assumptions...............................................................................................................................7
4.1 Clarification of Scope .......................................................................................................7
5 Security Policy...........................................................................................................................8
5.1 Security Audit...................................................................................................................8
5.2 Cryptographic Support......................................................................................................8
5.3 User Data Protection.........................................................................................................8
5.4 Identification and Authentication .....................................................................................8
5.5 Security Management .......................................................................................................8
5.6 Protection of the TSF........................................................................................................9
5.7 Session Locking................................................................................................................9
5.8 Trusted Path/Channels ......................................................................................................9
6 Documentation.........................................................................................................................10
7 Independent Testing.................................................................................................................11
8 Evaluated Configuration ..........................................................................................................12
9 Results of the Evaluation .........................................................................................................13
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................................14
11 Annexes....................................................................................................................................15
12 Security Target.........................................................................................................................16
13 Abbreviations and Acronyms ..................................................................................................17
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................21
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List of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation Details............................................................................................................. 2
Table 2: ST and TOE Identification................................................................................................ 4
Table 3: TOE Security Assurance Requirements ......................................................................... 13
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1 Executive Summary
This report is intended to assist the end-user of this product and any security certification agent for that
end-user to determine the suitability of this Information Technology (IT) product in their environment.
End-users should review the Security Target (ST), (which is where specific security claims are made) as
well as this Validation Report (VR) (which describes how those security claims were evaluated, tested,
and any restrictions that may be imposed upon the evaluated configuration) to help in that determination.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 4 and the
Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of Microsoft Windows Server 2016, Microsoft Windows Server 2016 Datacenter edition,
Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2, Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 Datacenter edition, and
Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise Edition (64-bit version) Hyper-V.
The following hardware platforms were used during testing:
 Surface Book
 Dell OptiPlex 3040
 HP ProDesk 600 G2
This report presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is
not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. Government and no
warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and
configuration of the product as evaluated and as documented in the ST.
The evaluation of Microsoft Windows Server 2016, Microsoft Windows Server 2016 Datacenter edition,
Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2, Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 Datacenter edition, and
Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise Edition (64-bit version) Hyper-V was performed by Leidos Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, Maryland, in the United States and was completed in
November 2017. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Common
Criteria and Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 3.1, revision 4 and the
assurance activities specified in Protection Profile for Server Virtualization, version 1.1, September 14,
2015. The evaluation was consistent with NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
(CCEVS) policies and practices as described on their web site (www.niap-ccevs.org).
The Leidos evaluation team determined that Microsoft Windows Server 2016, Microsoft Windows Server
2016 Datacenter edition, Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2, Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2
Datacenter edition, and Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise Edition (64-bit version) Hyper-V is conformant
to the claimed Protection Profile (PP) and, when installed, configured and operated as specified in the
evaluated guidance documentation, satisfied all of the security functional requirements stated in the ST.
The information in this VR is largely derived from the publically available Assurance Activities Report
(AAR) and the associated proprietary test report produced by the Leidos evaluation team.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, examined evaluation evidence,
provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the evaluation results
produced by the evaluation team. The validation team found that the evaluation results showed that all
assurance activities specified in the claimed PP had been completed successfully and that the product
satisfied all of the security functional and assurance requirements as stated in the ST. Therefore the
validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and
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the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical
report are consistent with the evidence produced.
Table 1: Evaluation Details
Item Identifier
Evaluated Product Microsoft Windows Server 2016, Microsoft Windows Server 2016
Datacenter edition, Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2, Microsoft
Windows Server 2012 R2 Datacenter edition, and Microsoft Windows
10 Enterprise Edition (64-bit version) Hyper-V
Sponsor & Developer Michael Grimm
Microsoft Corporation
CCTL Leidos
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive
Columbia, MD 21046
Completion Date November 2017
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
Interpretations There were no applicable interpretations used for this evaluation.
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation: Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
PP Protection Profile for Server Virtualization, Version 1.1, September 14,
2015 (SV PP)
Evaluation Class None
Disclaimer The information contained in this Validation Report is not an
endorsement of the Microsoft Windows Server 2016, Microsoft
Windows Server 2016 Datacenter edition, Microsoft Windows Server
2012 R2, Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 Datacenter edition, and
Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise Edition (64-bit version) Hyper-V by
any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of Microsoft
Windows Server 2016, Microsoft Windows Server 2016 Datacenter
edition, Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2, Microsoft Windows
Server 2012 R2 Datacenter edition, and Microsoft Windows 10
Enterprise Edition (64-bit version) Hyper-V is either expressed or
implied.
Evaluation Personnel Gregory Beaver
Dawn Campbell
Gary Grainger
Robert Russ
Amit Sharma
Kevin Steiner
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Item Identifier
Validation Personnel Paul Bicknell: Senior Validator
Sheldon Durrant: Lead Validator
Jerome Myers: Lead Validator
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under
this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called Common
Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment
Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency
across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation contract
with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation,
the product is added to NIAP’s Product Compliant List (PCL).
The following table identifies the evaluated Security Target and TOE.
Table 2: ST and TOE Identification
Name Description
ST Title Microsoft Windows Server 2016, Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2, Microsoft Windows 10
Hyper-V Security Target
ST Version 0.07
Publication
Date
November 17, 2017
Vendor and ST
Author
Microsoft
TOE
Reference
Microsoft Windows Server 2016, Microsoft Windows Server 2016 Datacenter edition, Microsoft
Windows Server 2012 R2, Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 Datacenter edition, Microsoft
Windows 10 Enterprise Edition (64-bit version) Hyper-V
TOE Software
Version
 Microsoft Windows Server 2016
 Microsoft Windows Server 2016 Datacenter edition
 Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2
 Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 Datacenter edition
 Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise Edition (64-bit version)
Keywords Virtualization, Hypervisor
2.1 Threats
The ST identifies the following threats that the TOE and its operational environment are intended to
counter:
 If it is possible for data to leak between domains when prohibited by policy, then an adversary on
one domain or network can obtain data from another domain. Such cross-domain data leakage
can, for example, cause classified information, corporate proprietary information, or medical data
to be made accessible to unauthorized entities.
 A malicious party attempts to supply the Administrator with an update to the product that may
compromise the security features of the TOE.
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 Malware running on the physical host must not be able to undetectably modify Virtualization
System components while the system is running or at rest. Likewise, malicious code running
within a virtual machine must not be able to modify Virtualization System components.
 An administrator may unintentionally install or configure the TOE incorrectly, resulting in
ineffective security mechanisms.
 Vulnerabilities in 3rd party software can lead to VMM compromise. Where possible, the VS
should mitigate the results of potential vulnerabilities or malicious content in third-party code.
 Failure of security mechanisms could lead to unauthorized intrusion into or modification of the
VMM or bypass of the VMM altogether.
 The hosting of untrusted or malicious domains by the VS cannot be permitted to compromise the
security and integrity of the platform on which the VS executes.
 A user may gain unauthorized access to the TOE data and TOE executable code. A malicious
user, process, or external IT entity may masquerade as an authorized entity in order to gain
unauthorized access to data or TOE resources. A malicious user, process, or external IT entity
may misrepresent itself as the TOE to obtain identification and authentication data.
 A threat of weak cryptography may arise if the VMM does not provide sufficient entropy to
support security-related features that depend on entropy to implement cryptographic algorithms.
 The Virtualization System itself is generally part of a larger enterprise network and must be
updated and patched as a normal part of enterprise network operations. Such basic network
hygiene is more difficult if the enterprise network is unmanageable
2.2 Organizational Security Policies
There are no Organizational Security Policies for the protection profile.
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3 Architectural Information
The TOE is a software solution that consists of Microsoft Windows Server 2016, Microsoft Windows
Server 2016 Datacenter edition, Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2, Microsoft Windows Server 2012
R2 Datacenter edition, Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise Edition (64-bit version) Hyper-V.
The following hardware platforms were used during testing:
 Surface Book
 Dell OptiPlex 3040
 HP ProDesk 600 G2
The TOE includes hypervisor and virtualization subsystem, known as “Hyper-V” in the Microsoft
Windows Server 2016 operating system, the Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 operating system, the
Microsoft 10 operating system, supporting operating system services, and those applications necessary to
manage, support and configure the operating system and virtualization subsystem.
Hyper-V enables the computer administrator to specify “partitions” that have separate address spaces
where they can load an operating system and applications operating in parallel of the (host) operating
system that executes in the root partition of the computer. An operating system executing in a partition
has access to virtualized peripheral devices that is controlled by Hyper-V. An operating system may either
access devices using the same I/O related instructions as on a real system or it may use a specific interface
offered by Hyper-V, called the VMBus, to communicate with Hyper-V for access to peripheral devices.
In the first case the operating system can only access the devices virtualized by Hyper-V. When using the
VMBus interface, an operating system in a guest partition must have “enlightenments” that establish the
VMBus communication and then use those “synthetic” devices accessible via VMBus. Note that the
“enlightenments” within a guest operating system is part of the TOE, but not part of the TSF.
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4 Assumptions
The ST identifies the following assumptions about the use of the product:
 The platform has not been compromised prior to installation of the Virtualization System.
 Physical security commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains is assumed to
be provided by the environment.
 TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all administrator guidance.
4.1 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation.
Note that:
1. As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the
security claims made, with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities specified in the
claimed PPs and performed by the evaluation team).
2. This evaluation covers only the specific operating system editions and software versions
identified in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process. For
example, functionality that is offered in Windows 10 Home edition was not evaluated.
3. The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified
in the claimed PP. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the product were not
covered by this evaluation. Any additional non-security related functional capabilities of the
product, even those described in the ST, were not covered by this evaluation.
4. This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that were
not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an
“obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the
TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
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5 Security Policy
The TOE enforces the following security policies as described in the ST.
5.1 Security Audit
Windows has the ability to collect audit data, review audit logs, protect audit logs from overflow, and
restrict access to audit logs. Audit information generated by the system includes the date and time of the
event, the user identity that caused the event to be generated, and other event specific data. Authorized
administrators can review audit logs and have the ability to search and sort audit records. Authorized
administrators can also configure the audit system to include or exclude potentially auditable events to be
audited based on a wide range of characteristics. In the context of this evaluation, the protection profile
requirements cover generating audit events, selecting which events should be audited, and providing
secure storage for audit event entries.
5.2 Cryptographic Support
Windows provides validated cryptographic functions that support encryption/decryption, cryptographic
signatures, cryptographic hashing, cryptographic key agreement (which is not studied in this evaluation),
and random number generation. The TOE additionally provides support for public keys, credential
management and certificate validation functions and provides support for the National Security Agency’s
Suite B cryptographic algorithms. Windows also provides extensive auditing support of cryptographic
operations, the ability to replace cryptographic functions and random number generators with alternative
implementations1
, and a key isolation service designed to limit the potential exposure of secret and private
keys. In addition to using cryptography for its own security functions, Windows offers access to the
cryptographic support functions for user-mode and kernel-mode programs. Public key certificates
generated and used by Windows authenticate users and machines as well as protect both user and system
data in transit.
 IPsec: Windows implements IPsec to provide protected, authenticated, confidential, and tamper-
proof networking between two peer computers.
 TLS: Windows implements TLS to provide protected, authenticated, confidential, and tamper-
proof networking between two peer computers.
5.3 User Data Protection
In the context of this evaluation Windows protects computer virtualization capabilities.
5.4 Identification and Authentication
In the context of this evaluation, Windows provides the ability to use, store, and protect X.509 certificates
that are used for IPsec and TLS authenticates the administrator to the computer.
5.5 Security Management
Windows includes several functions to manage security policies. Policy management is controlled
through a combination of access control, membership in administrator groups, and privileges.
1
This option is not included in the Windows Common Criteria evaluation.
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5.6 Protection of the TSF
Windows provides a number of features to ensure the protection of TOE security functions. Windows
protects against unauthorized data disclosure and modification by using a suite of Internet standard
protocols including IPsec, IKE, and TLS. Windows ensures process isolation security for all processes
through private virtual address spaces, execution context, and security context. The Windows data
structures defining process address space, execution context, memory protection, and security context are
stored in protected kernel-mode memory. Windows includes self-testing features that ensure the integrity
of executable program images and its cryptographic functions. Finally, Windows provides a trusted
update mechanism to update Windows binaries itself.
5.7 Session Locking
In the context of this evaluation Windows allows an authorized administrator to configure the system to
display a logon banner before the logon dialog.
5.8 Trusted Path/Channels
Windows uses the IPsec suite of protocols to provide a Virtual Private Network Connection (VPN)
between itself, acting as a VPN client, and a VPN gateway in addition to providing protected
communications for HTTPS and TLS.
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6 Documentation
Microsoft offers a number of guidance documents along with a CC-specific supplemental document
describing the installation process for the TOE as well as guidance for subsequent use and administration
of the applicable security features.
The guidance documentation examined during the course of the evaluation and delivered with the TOE is
as follows:
 Windows 10, Server 2016, and Server 2012 R2 Server Virtualization Operational Guidance,
Version 0.61, October 30, 2017
The above document is considered to be part of the evaluated TOE. Any additional customer
documentation delivered with the TOE or made available through electronic downloads should not be
relied upon for using the TOE in its evaluated configuration.
The Security Target used is:
 Microsoft Windows Server 2016, Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2, Microsoft Windows 10
Hyper-V Security Target, Version 0.07, November 17, 2017
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7 Independent Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team. It is derived from information contained
in the following proprietary documents:
 Microsoft Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2012 R2, and Windows 10 Hyper-V Common
Criteria Test Report and Procedures for Server Virtualization PP Report, Version 1.0, Dated:
October 30, 2017
A non-proprietary version of the tests performed and samples of the evidence that was generated is
summarized in the following document:
 Microsoft Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2012 R2, and Windows 10 Hyper-V Assurance
Activity Report, Version 1.0, December 7, 2017
The purpose of the testing activity was to confirm the TOE behaves in accordance with the TOE security
functional requirements as specified in the ST for a product claiming conformance to (SV PP).
The evaluation team devised a Test Plan based on the Testing Assurance Activities specified in (SV PP).
The Test Plan described how each test activity was to be instantiated within the TOE test environment.
The evaluation team executed the tests specified in the Test Plan and documented the results in the team
test report listed above.
Independent testing took place primarily at the Leidos CCTL location in Columbia, Maryland. The
evaluation team performed limited testing at Microsoft facilities in Redmond, Washington.
The evaluators received the TOE in the form that normal customers would receive it, installed and
configured the TOE in accordance with the provided guidance, and exercised the Team Test Plan on
equipment configured in the testing laboratory.
Given the complete set of test results from the test procedures exercised by the evaluators, the testing
requirements for (SV PP) were fulfilled.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated version of the TOE consists of the following software combinations.
TOE Software Identification: The following Windows Operating System editions are included in the
evaluation:
• Microsoft Windows Server 2016
• Microsoft Windows Server 2016 Datacenter edition
• Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2
• Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 Datacenter edition
• Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise Edition (64-bit version) Hyper-V
The devices used in the test configuration were:
 Surface Book with Microsoft Windows 10 Creators Update Enterprise edition
 Surface Book with Microsoft Windows Server 2016 Datacenter edition
 Dell Optiplex 3040 with Microsoft Windows Server 2016 Standard edition
 Dell Optiplex 3040 with Microsoft Windows Server 2016 Datacenter edition
 HP ProDesk 600 G2 with Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard edition
 HP ProDesk 600 G2 with Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 Datacenter edition
The following security updates must be applied to the above Windows 10 products:
 All critical updates as of June 30, 2017
The TOE must be deployed as described in section 4 Assumptions of this document and be configured in
accordance with the
 Windows 10, Server 2016, and Server 2012 R2 Server Virtualization Operational Guidance,
Version 0.61, October 30, 2017
Per Policy Letter #22, user installation of vendor-delivered bug fixes and security patches is encouraged
between completion of the evaluation and the Assurance Maintenance Date; with such updates properly
installed, the product is still considered by NIAP to be in its evaluated configuration.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation was conducted based upon the assurance activities specified in Protection Profile for
Server Virtualization, version 1.1, September 14, 2015 (SV PP) in conjunction with version 3.1, revision
4 of the CC and the CEM. A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts
assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates
that the evaluation team performed the assurance activities in the claimed PPs, and correctly verified that
the product meets the claims in the ST.
The details of the evaluation are recorded in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), which is controlled
by the Leidos CCTL. The security assurance requirements are listed in the following table.
Table 3: TOE Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance Component ID Assurance Component Name
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem Definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
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10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
None
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11 Annexes
Not applicable.
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12 Security Target
Name Description
ST Title Microsoft Windows Server 2016, Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2, Microsoft Windows 10
Hyper-V Security Target
ST Version 0.07
Publication Date November 17, 2017
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13 Abbreviations and Acronyms
ACE Access Control Entry
ACL Access Control List
ACP Access Control Policy
AD Active Directory
ADAM Active Directory Application Mode
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AGD Administrator Guidance Document
AH Authentication Header
ALPC Advanced Local Process Communication
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API Application Programming Interface
APIC Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller
BTG BitLocker To Go
CA Certificate Authority
CBAC Claims Basic Access Control, see DYN
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria
CD-ROM Compact Disk Read Only Memory
CIFS Common Internet File System
CIMCPP Certificate Issuing and Management Components For Basic Robustness
Environments Protection Profile, Version 1.0, April 27, 2009
CM Configuration Management; Control Management
COM Component Object Model
CP Content Provider
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRL Certificate Revocation List
CryptoAPI Cryptographic API
CSP Cryptographic Service Provider
DAC Discretionary Access Control
DACL Discretionary Access Control List
DC Domain Controller
DEP Data Execution Prevention
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DFS Distributed File System
DMA Direct Memory Access
DNS Domain Name System
DS Directory Service
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DYN Dynamic Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB Electronic Code Book
EFS Encrypting File System
ESP Encapsulating Security Protocol
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FEK File Encryption Key
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FRS File Replication Service
FSMO Flexible Single Master Operation
FTP File Transfer Protocol
FVE Full Volume Encryption
GB Gigabyte
GC Global Catalog
GHz Gigahertz
GPC Group Policy Container
GPO Group Policy Object
GPOSPP US Government Protection Profile for General-Purpose Operating
System in a Networked Environment
GPT Group Policy Template
GPT GUID Partition Table
GUI Graphical User Interface
GUID Globally Unique Identifiers
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Secure HTTP
I/O Input / Output
I&A Identification and Authentication
IA Information Assurance
ICF Internet Connection Firewall
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
ICS Internet Connection Sharing
ID Identification
IDE Integrated Drive Electronics
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IFS Installable File System
IIS Internet Information Services
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IP Internet Protocol
IPv4 IP Version 4
IPv6 IP Version 6
IPC Inter-process Communication
IPI Inter-process Interrupt
IPsec IP Security
ISAPI Internet Server API
IT Information Technology
KDC Key Distribution Center
LAN Local Area Network
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LPC Local Procedure Call
LSA Local Security Authority
LSASS LSA Subsystem Service
LUA Least-privilege User Account
MAC Message Authentication Code
MB Megabyte
MMC Microsoft Management Console
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MSR Model Specific Register
NAC (Cisco) Network Admission Control
NAP Network Access Protection
NAT Network Address Translation
NIC Network Interface Card
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NLB Network Load Balancing
NMI Non-maskable Interrupt
NTFS New Technology File System
NTLM New Technology LAN Manager
OS Operating System
PAE Physical Address Extension
PC/SC Personal Computer/Smart Card
PIN Personal Identification Number
PKCS Public Key Certificate Standard
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In Service
RAID Redundant Array of Independent Disks
RAM Random Access Memory
RAS Remote Access Service
RC4 Rivest’s Cipher 4
RID Relative Identifier
RNG Random Number Generator
RPC Remote Procedure Call
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
RSASSA RSA Signature Scheme with Appendix
SA Security Association
SACL System Access Control List
SAM Security Assurance Measure
SAML Security Assertion Markup Language
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SAS Secure Attention Sequence
SD Security Descriptor
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SID Security Identifier
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SIPI Startup IPI
SF Security Functions
SFP Security Functional Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMB Server Message Block
SMI System Management Interrupt
SMTP Simple Mail Transport Protocol
SP Service Pack
SPI Security Parameters Index
SPI Stateful Packet Inspection
SRM Security Reference Monitor
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
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SSP Security Support Providers
SSPI Security Support Provider Interface
ST Security Target
SYSVOL System Volume
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TDI Transport Driver Interface
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TPM Trusted Platform Module
TSC TOE Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSS TOE Summary Specification
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver / Transmitter
UI User Interface
UID User Identifier
UNC Universal Naming Convention
US United States
UPN User Principal Name
URL Uniform Resource Locator
USB Universal Serial Bus
USN Update Sequence Number
v5 Version 5
VDS Virtual Disk Service
VMM Virtual Machine Manager
VPN Virtual Private Network
VS Virtualization System
WAN Wide Area Network
WCF Windows Communications Framework
WebDAV Web Document Authoring and Versioning
WebSSO Web Single Sign On
WDM Windows Driver Model
WIF Windows Identity Framework
WMI Windows Management Instrumentation
WSC Windows Security Center
WU Windows Update
WSDL Web Service Description Language
WWW World-Wide Web
X64 A 64-bit instruction set architecture
X86 A 32-bit instruction set architecture
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction, Version
3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security Functional
Requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security Assurance
Components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
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