National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
FireEye VX Series Appliance, Version 1.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10835-2017
Dated: 01/19/18
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jean Petty
Chris Thorpe
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 5
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 6
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 6
5 Assumptions and Threats ..................................................................................................... 8
5.1 Assumptions....................................................................................................................................................8
5.2 Threats.............................................................................................................................................................9
6 Clarification of Scope.......................................................................................................... 10
7 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 11
8 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 11
9 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 12
9.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................12
9.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................12
10 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 12
10.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................13
10.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................13
10.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................13
10.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................13
10.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................14
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................14
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................14
11 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 14
12 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 15
13 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 15
14 Glossary................................................................................................................................ 15
15 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 16
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions in Section 5, the Clarification of Scope
in Section 6 and the Validator Comments in Section 11, where operational requirements and
restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the FireEye VX Series Target of Evaluation (TOE), which consists of the FireEye
VX-5500 and VX-12500 with Software Version 8.0. It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of the TOE by any
agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This
VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of the product as evaluated and
documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in January 2018. The information in this
report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report,
all written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements defined in
the U.S. Government Protection Profile for Security Requirements for Protection Profile
Compliant.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in
the NDcPP Version 1. This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as
evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based on
these findings, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate
products against Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities, which are
interpretation of CEM work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products
desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's
evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's
Product Compliance List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE FireEye VX Series Appliances, FireEye VX-5500 and VX-12500 with Software
Version 8.0
Protection Profile U.S. Government Protection Profile for Security Requirements for Network Devices,
Version 1.1 with Errata #3 (hereafter referenced as the NDcPP)
Security Target FireEye VX Security Target
Evaluation Technical
Report
VID10835 Common Criteria NDPP Assurance Activity Report, version 3.0
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor FireEye, Inc.
Developer FireEye, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
Montgomery Village, MD
CCEVS Validators Jean Petty, Chris Thorpe
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3 Architectural Information
The FireEye Network Threat Prevention Platform identifies and blocks zero-day Web exploits,
droppers (binaries), and multi-protocol callbacks to help organizations scale their advanced threat
defenses across a range of deployments, from the multi-gigabit headquarters down to remote,
branch, and mobile offices. FireEye Network with Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) technology
further optimizes spend, substantially reduces false positives, and enables compliance while
driving security across known and unknown threats.
4 Security Policy
The TOE provides the following security functions:
 Protected Communications. The TOE protects the integrity and confidentiality of
communications as follows:
o TLS connectivity with the following entities:
 External LDAP Server (with device level authentication)
 Audit Server (with device level authentication)
o SSH connectivity with the following entities:
 Management SSH Client
 Secure Administration. The TOE enables secure local and remote management of its
security functions, including:
o Local console CLI administration
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o Remote CLI administration via SSHv2
o Administrator authentication using a local database, via LDAP over TLS
o Password complexity enforcement
o Role Based Access Control - the TOE supports several types of administrative user
roles. Collectively these sub-roles comprise the “Security Administrator”
o Configurable banners to be displayed at login
o Timeouts to terminate administrative sessions after a set period of inactivity
o Protection of secret keys and passwords
 Trusted Update. The TOE ensures the authenticity and integrity of software updates
through digital signatures and requires administrative intervention prior to the software
updates being installed.
 Security Audit. The TOE keeps local and remote audit records of security relevant events.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time which can either be set manually or
synchronized with an NTP server. The TOE is configured to transmit its audit messages
to an external syslog server. Communication with the syslog server is protected using TLS.
 Self-Test. The TOE performs a suite of self-tests to ensure the correct operation and
enforcement of its security functions.
 Cryptographic Operations. The TOE provides cryptographic support for the services
described in Table 2. The related FIPS140-2 validation details are provided in Table 3.
Table 2. TOE Provided Cryptography
Cryptographic Method Use within the TOE
TLS Establishment Used to establish initial TLS session.
SSH Establishment Used to establish initial SSH session.
ECDSA Signature
Services
Used in TLS session establishment.
RSA Signature Services Used in TLS session establishment.
Used in SSH session establishment
Used in secure software update
SP 800-90 DRBG Used in TLS session establishment.
Used in SSH session establishment
SHS Used in secure software update
HMAC-SHS Used to provide TLS traffic integrity verification
Used to provide SSH traffic integrity verification
AES Used to encrypt TLS traffic
Used to encrypt SSH traffic
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Table 3 FIPS 140 Algorithm Testing References
Algorithm FIPS 140 CAVP Certificate #
RSA 2605
ECDSA 1193
SP 800-90 DRBG 1638
SHS 3904
HMAC-SHS 3172
AES 4761
CVL 1406
5 Assumptions and Threats
5.1 Assumptions
The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not
subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the device’s physical
interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the
device and the data it contains. As a result, the [NDcPP] will not include any requirements on
physical tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The [NDcPP] will not expect the
product to defend against physical access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract
data, bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device.
5.1.1 A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY
The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide
functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example, the device
should not provide a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking
functionality).
5.1.2 A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION
A standard/generic network device does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of
traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the network device to protect data that originates on or is
destined to the device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is traversing
the network device, destined for another network entity, is not covered by the NDcPP. It is assumed
that this protection will be covered by cPPs for particular types of network devices (e.g., firewall).
5.1.3 A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR
The Security Administrator(s) for the network device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the
best interest of security for the organization. This includes being appropriately trained, following
policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure
passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent when
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administering the device. The network device is not expected to be capable of defending against a
malicious Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
5.1.4 A.REGULAR_UPDATES
The network device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Administrator on a
regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
5.1.5 A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE
The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the network device are protected by
the platform on which they reside.
5.2 Threats
The threats for the Network Device are grouped according to functional areas of the device in the
sections below.
5.2.1 Communications with the Network Device
A network device communicates with other network devices and other network entities. The
endpoints of this communication can be geographically and logically distant and may pass through
a variety of other systems. The intermediate systems may be untrusted providing an opportunity
for unauthorized communication with the network device or for authorized communication to be
compromised. The security functionality of the network device must be able to protect any critical
network traffic (administration traffic, authentication traffic, audit traffic, etc.). The
communication with the network device falls into two categories: authorized communication and
unauthorized communication.
Authorized communication includes network traffic allowable by policy destined to and
originating from the network device as it was designed and intended. This includes critical network
traffic, such as network device administration and communication with an authentication or audit
logging server, which requires a secure channel to protect the communication. The security
functionality of the network device includes the capability to ensure that only authorized
communications are allowed and the capability to provide a secure channel for critical network
traffic. Any other communication with the network device is considered unauthorized
communication. (Network traffic traversing the network device but not ultimately destined for the
device, e.g. packets that are being routed, are not considered to be "communications with the
network device" – cf. A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION in section 5.1.2.)
The primary threats to network device communications addressed in [the NDcPP] focus on an
external, unauthorized entity attempting to access, modify, or otherwise disclose the critical
network traffic. A poor choice of cryptographic algorithms or the use of non-standardized
tunnelling protocols along with weak Administrator credentials, such as an easily guessable
password or use of a default password, will allow a threat agent unauthorized access to the device.
Weak or no cryptography provides little to no protection of the traffic allowing a threat agent to
read, manipulate and/or control the critical data with little effort. Non-standardized tunnelling
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protocols not only limit the interoperability of the device but lack the assurance and confidence
standardization provides through peer review.
5.2.1.1 T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS
Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the network device by nefarious means
such as masquerading as an Administrator to the device, masquerading as the device to an
Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety, or selected portions), or
performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide access to the administrative session,
or sessions between network devices. Successfully gaining Administrator access allows malicious
actions that compromise the security functionality of the device and the network on which it
resides.
5.2.1.2 T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY
Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust
against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow
attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key space and give them
unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal
effort.
5.2.1.3 T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS
Threat agents may attempt to target network devices that do not use standardized secure tunnelling
protocols to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take advantage of poorly designed
protocols or poor key management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle attacks, replay
attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical
network traffic, and potentially could lead to a compromise of the network device itself.
5.2.1.4 T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS
Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to authenticate the
endpoints – e.g. a shared password that is guessable or transported as plaintext. The consequences
are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the Administrator or
another device, and the attacker could insert themselves into the network stream and perform a
man-in-the-middle attack. The result is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could be a
loss of confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the network device itself could be
compromised.
6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the NDcPP.
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 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 Consistent with the expectations of the NDcPP, this evaluation did not specifically search
for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or
vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious”
vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE,
technical sophistication and resources.
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the NDcPP. Any additional security related functional capabilities included
in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
7 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
 [ADG] FireEye FIPS 140-2 and Common Criteria Addendum, 1.1
8 TOE Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is comprised of the two models of the FireEye VX Series Appliances with network port
configurations, storage, and enclosures as shown in Table 4.
Table 4. TOE Models
VX 5500 VX 12500
Network Ports 4x 10/100/1000BASE-T Ports 4x 10/100/1000BASE-T Ports
Storage 2x 1 TB HDD 2x .9 TB HDD
Enclosure 1RU, Fits 19 inch Rack 1RU, Fits 19 inch Rack
The TOE evaluated configuration consists of one of the appliances listed above. The TOE supports
secure connectivity with several IT environment devices listed in Table 5; note that these
connected devices are not a part of the TOE and no security claims are made for these devices.
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Table 5. Devices that may be part of the IT Environment
Component Required Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance
Management Workstation
with SSH Client
Yes This includes any IT Environment Management workstation with a
SSH client installed that is used by the TOE administrator to support
TOE administration through SSH protected channels. Any SSH client
that supports SSHv2 may be used.
NTP Server No The TOE supports communications with an NTP server to synchronize
date and time.
Syslog server No The syslog audit server is used for remote storage of audit records that
have been generated by and transmitted from the TOE. The syslog
server must support communications using TLS 1.1 or TLS 1.2.
LDAP AAA Server No This includes any IT environment LDAP AAA server that provides
authentication services to TOE administrators. The LDAP server must
support communications using TLS 1.1 or TLS 1.2.
9 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in Evaluation Test Report for FireEye VX Series Appliance, which
is not publicly available. The Assurance Activities Report provides an overview of testing and
the prescribed assurance activities.
9.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
9.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance documentation
and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP. The Independent Testing activity is documented in the
Assurance Activities Report, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.
10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR). The reader of this document can assume that activities and
work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the FireEye VX Series
Appliance to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the NDcPP. Additionally the
evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP.
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10.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the FireEye VX Series Appliance that are consistent
with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the
requirements. Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities
specified in the NDcPP.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
10.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed
the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained
in the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP related to the examination of the information
contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
10.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP related to the examination of the information
contained in the operational guidance documents.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
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The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
10.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set
of tests specified by the Assurance Activities in the NDcPP and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities
in the NDcPP, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed
a public search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any
issues with the TOE.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the NDcPP, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the NDcPP, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11 Validator Comments & Recommendations
It is important to note that the TOE consists of only the FireEye VX-5500 and VX-12500 with
Software Version 8.0. The validation team suggests that the consumer pay particular attention to
the installation guidance to ensure the devices are placed into the evaluated configuration.
As was noted in the Clarification of Scope section of this report, the TOE provides more
functionality than was covered by the evaluation. Only the functionality claimed in the SFR’s in
the Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality provided by the devices needs to be
assessed separately and no further conclusions should be drawn as to their effectiveness, nor can
any claims be made relative to their security based upon this evaluation.
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12 Annexes
Not applicable.
13 Security Target
The security target for this product’s evaluation is FireEye VX Series Appliances Security
Target, Version 1.3, January 2018
14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
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15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4.