NXP SN300 B2 Series - Secure
Element
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Rev. 0.9 — 9 May 2023 Preliminary evaluation document
NSCIB-2200030-01 COMPANY PUBLIC
Document information
Information Content
Keywords NXP, ASE, SN300 B2 Single Chip Secured (NFC) Controller Series,
Single Chip Secure Element and NFC Controller, Common Criteria, EAL5
augmented
Abstract This document is the Security Target of the SN300 B2 Series - Secure
Element, developed and provided by NXP Semiconductors. The TOE
complies with Evaluation Assurance Level 5 of the Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 with augmentations.
NXP Semiconductors NXP SN300 B2 Series - Secure Element
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Revision History
Revision
number
Date Description
0.9 2023-05-09 Derived from full Security Target v0.9
Revision history
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1 ST Introduction (ASE_INT)
1.1 ST Reference
"SN300 B2 Series - Secure Element", Security Target Lite, Revision 0.9, 9 May 2023.
1.2 TOE Reference
Content Version
Product Type Secure Element subsystem of the IC hardware platform SN300x2 with IC
Dedicated Support Software and documentation describing usage of the TOE
TOE name NXP SN300 B2 Series - Secure Element
TOE version(s) SN300_SE B2.1.001 JB
Table 1. TOE Reference
1.3 TOE Overview
1.3.1 Usage and Major Security Features of the TOE
The SN300 B2 Single Chip Secured (NFC) Controller Series
1
combines on a single
die an Embedded Secure Element and a NFC Controller. The two subsystems are
called "SN300_SE" and "SN300_NFC". The NFC Controller is not part of the TOE.
The Embedded Secure Element SN300_SE is based on a Flash-based secure
microcontroller platform. A high frequency clocked ARM Cortex M33 core along with
state of the art cryptographic hardware coprocessors brings secured applications to a
new level in performances and security. The TOE is integral part of the SN300 B2 IC.
Note that SN300 B2 without any Security IC Embedded Software for the TOE is available
for NXP internal use only.
Secure Element Hardware:
The TOE incorporates an high frequency clocked ARM Cortex M33 processor
augmented with its dedicated coprocessor (SYM-lite), a secure copy machine (SMA),
and a Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) coprocessor, which are all connected to a
bus system. This bus system gives access to memories, hardware peripherals and
communication interfaces. The PKC coprocessor provides large integer arithmetic
operations, which can be used by Security IC Embedded Software for asymmetric-
key cryptography. Hardware peripherals include coprocessors for symmetric-key
cryptography and for calculation of error-detecting codes, and also a random number
generator. On-chip memories are Flash memory, ROM and RAMs. The Flash memory
can be used to store data and code of Security IC Embedded Software. It is designed for
reliable non-volatile storage.
The security functionality of the TOE is designed to act as an integral part of a security
system composed of hardware and Security IC Embedded Software to strengthen it
as a whole. Several security mechanisms of the TOE are completely implemented in
and controlled by the SN300 B2 Secure Element. Other security mechanisms must be
1 The commercial name of the SN300 B2 series is SN300x2. The "x" in SN300x2 indicates the type of
the SN300 B2 series (representing e.g. the NFC Controller configuration, which is not relevant for the
configuration of the TOE)
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treated by Security IC Embedded Software. All security functionality is targeted for use in
a potential insecure environment, in which the TOE maintains
• correct operation of the security functionality
• integrity and confidentiality of data and code stored to its memories and processed in
the device
This is ensured by the construction of TOE and its security functionality.
The following list contains the main features of the TOE:
• hardware to perform computations on multiprecision integers, which are suitable for
public-key cryptography
• hardware to calculate the Data Encryption Standard with up to three keys
• hardware to calculate the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with different key
lengths
• hardware to support Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB),
Output Feedback (OFB) and Counter (CTR) modes of operation for symmetric-key
cryptographic block ciphers
• hardware to support Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation for symmetric-key
cryptographic block ciphers
• hardware to calculate Cyclic Redundancy Checks (CRC)
• hardware to serve with True Random Numbers
In addition, the hardware embeds sensors, which ensure proper operating conditions
of the device. Integrity protection of data and code involves error correction and error
detection codes, EMFI detector, light sensing and other security functionality. Memory
encryption and masking mechanisms are implemented to preserve confidentiality of data.
The IC hardware is shielded against physical attacks.
Note that this Security Target addresses only the hardware part of an integral security
system. The secure operation of cryptographic functionality given above requires
availability of the Cryptographic Library which is not part of this TOE. Therefore Security
Services and Security Features using this cryptographic functionality need to be
evaluated in the composite product together with Cryptographic Library as part
of the Security IC Embedded Software. As a consequence, for the cryptographic
functionality the scope of this evaluation is confined to protection against physical
manipulation.
All security functional requirements applicable to this Security Target are given in
Section 6.
1.3.2 TOE Type
The TOE is a Security Integrated Circuit Platform for operating systems and applications
with high security requirements.
1.3.3 Security During Development and Production
The Security IC product life cycle is scheduled in phases, which are defined in the
Protection Profile [7].
Phase 2 IC Development, phase 3 IC Manufacturing as well as phase 4 IC Packaging of
this life cycle are part of this Security Target. The TOE Delivery is at the end of phase 4.
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The development environment of SN300_SE B2 always ranges from phase 2 IC
Development to TOE Delivery. All other phases are part of the operational environment.
This addresses Application Note 1 in in the Protection Profile [7].
In phase 2 IC Development of SN300_SE B2 access to sensitive design data of
SN300_SE B2 is restricted to people, who are involved in the development of the
product.
In phase 3 IC Manufacturing the TOE as integral part of SN300 B2 IC are produced and
tested on wafers. In this phase NXP also serves as Composite Product Manufacturer by
optionally storing Security IC Embedded Software to the Flash of SN300_SE B2. The
NXP Trust Provisioning Service ensures confidentiality and integrity of any customer data
in this phase. This incudes secure treatment and insertion of data and code received
from the customer as well as random or derived data, which are generated by NXP.
In phase 4 IC Packaging SN300 B2 ICs including the TOE are embedded into packages.
The delivery processes between all involved sites provide accountability and traceability
of the dies. Authentic delivery of the TOE is supported by its NXP Trust Provisioning
Service.
1.3.4 Required non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware
Besides the SN300_SE the SN300 B2 Single Chip Secured (NFC) Controller comprises
a NFC controller subsystem (SN300_NFC) and a shared Power Management Unit
(SN300_PMU).
The SN300_SE requires full function of the SN300_PMU to power-up, which is controlled
by software of the SN300_NFC subsystem. The components are depicted in Figure 1.
The TOE does not include communication drivers in the IC Dedicated Support Software.
Those need to be part of the Security IC Embedded Software.
1.4 TOE Description
The SN300 B2 Single Chip Secured (NFC) Controller is build upon two subsystems:
"SN300_SE" and "SN300_NFC". Both subsystem use a shared Power Management Unit
("SN300_PMU").
TOE boundaries is depicted in Figure 1. The TOE is described in more detail in the
following sections.
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Figure 1. Place in the system
1.4.1 Secure Element Subsystem
The SN300 B2 Single Chip Secured (NFC) Controller is a hardware platform designed to
meet the developing needs of the mobile communications market. It embeds a Secure
Element Subsystem (SN300_SE), supported by an integrated NFC Controller Subsystem
(SN300_NFC) and Power Management Unit (SN300_PMU).
The toplevel block diagram of the SN300_SE is depicted in Figure 2.
The hardware part of the SN300_SE is referred to as Secure Element Hardware in the
following.
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Figure 2. Block Diagram of the Secure Element Hardware
1.4.1.1 Hardware Description
The SN300 B2 Secure Element implements ROM, Flash, System RAM, PKC RAM and a
Buffer RAM for Flash erase/programming and for Flash read caching. All these memories
are accessible over the bus system on data/address busses. The hardware controls
write, read and execute access to the memories over the bus system against system
operation modes. Context information is attached to all bus transactions throughout the
whole system. Any peripheral on the bus can use the context information to check if
access is allowed for the actual context, apply context specific cyphering or to assign
associated errors or interrupts to a particular context.
The SN300 B2 Secure Element implements a wide range of hardware components. It
embeds the Fast Accelerator for Modular Exponentiation of 3rd Generation (Fame3.5),
which can be utilized by the software to accelerate computations required for public-key
cryptography like such related to RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).
The Secure Generic Interface (SGI) is a symmetric crypto engine that serves the IC
Security Embedded Software with interfacing to a DES coprocessor, an AES coprocessor
and a GCM coprocessor.
The SYM-Lite is a CPU co-processor providing the IC Security Embedded Software with
crypto-supporting general purpose operations over sensitive data, outside - but under
control of - the CPU.
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The Secure Copy Machine (SMA) is a secure DMA. Purpose of the SMA is to copy data
between memories and between memories and peripherals in a secure way.
Two CRC coprocessors each serve with checksum computation based on CRC
generation polynomials CRC-8, CRC-16 and CRC-32. The Random Number Generator
generates true random numbers, which are compliant to AIS31 and FIPS 140-3
2
.
SN300 B2 Secure Element also implements a watchdog counter with time-out
mechanism that can be utilized by the software to abort irregular program executions,
and provides a CPU Guard with several security functionality, which can be utilized by
the software to secure its execution.
The Hardware components can be controlled by the IC Security Embedded Software via
Special Function Registers, which are accessible over the bus system on two separate
busses. One peripheral control bus is provided for I/O communication. The secure
peripheral bus serves protected internal communication.
The SN300 B2 Secure Element implements complex security functionality to protect code
and data during processing and while stored to the device. This includes appropriate
memory encryptions and masking schemes to preserve confidentiality. This also includes
error detection codes (the Flash Secure Fetch Plus) to protect the integrity of memory
contents. Additionally, manifold light sensing with EMFI detector is integrated to detect
perturbations which can lead to integrity violation. Active shielding is present and
operating conditions are monitored by sensors on temperature, power supplies and
frequencies.
The TOE hardware operates with a power supply provided by the shared Power
Management Unit ("SN300_PMU"). The device can be set into sleep and power-down
modes, which have different levels of reduced availability of hardware components with
appropriately reduced power consumption.
1.4.1.2 IC Dedicated Support Software
The IC Dedicated Support Software of the SN300_SE comprises:
• Test software named FactoryOS
• Boot software named BootOS
• Memory Driver software named Flash Driver Software
BootOS, FactoryOS and Flash Driver Software are stored to ROM. Patches to the
BootOS are stored to Flash.
The BootOS is executed during start-up after power-on or reset of the TOE. It sets up the
device and its configuration, and finally jumps to a start address in either Mission Mode
or Test Mode (if not finally locked).
The FactoryOS is used during manufacturing to load the whole software stack into Flash.
The FactoryOS also provides controlled access to different levels of testing capabilities
of SN300 B2 Secure Element. Full testing capabilities are under restricted access to
NXP for production testing of the TOE and also for in-depth analysis of field returns.
In addition, limited testing capabilities are accessible to NXP for basic analysis of field
returns, which target to preserve the product in its original condition. Beyond that, the
FactoryOS provides some basic functional testing of the SN300 B2 Secure Element
and also with a readout of the TOE IC hardware identification flags (if enabled via OEF
option). The FactoryOS implements security functionality to protect from unauthorized
2 Note: FIPS 140-3 compliance is not in scope of this Common Criteria evaluation.
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access and ensures that also authorized access cannot compromise confidentiality of
content stored to access controlled Flash areas as well as System Pages. Factory OS
implements security functionality against unauthorized access in the field.
Flash Driver Software provides a Hardware Abstraction Layer that is stored to ROM. It
supports basic operation of the Flash memory to enable usage of the Flash during Boot
Mode and Test Mode.
1.4.2 Interfaces of the TOE
Electrical interface
The electrical interface of the TOE are the lines between the I/O interface of the
SN300_SE and the communication pads, that are exclusively used by the SN300_SE
subsystem. The interface can be configured to establish communication with the TOE via
the following interfaces:
• Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI)
• 2x I
2
C interfaces
• I
3
C interface (shared pins with second I
2
C interface)
• ISO/IEC 7816 compliant interface by use of ISO/IEC 7816 UART
• SPMI Interface
• GPIO interface by use of Special Function Registers
The TOE also provides an electrical interface to the SN300_PMU subsystem, which
connects power supply voltage input and ground as reference voltage, and an interface
to the Power-Clock-Reset Module of the SN300_NFC subsystem. Communication
between SN300_SE and SN300_NFC supported by System Mailbox interface.
Logical interface
Figure 3 illustrates the logical interface to the Security IC Embedded Software internal
interfaces not drawn).
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Figure 3. Logical interface of SN300 B2
The logical interface of the TOE accessible to the Security IC Embedded Software
provides the following communication channels:
• Secure System Mailbox interface for data exhange with SN300_NFC subsystem
• CPU Instruction set and Register interface acc. to [12]
• Special Function Registers interface acc. to [11]
• Flash Driver PI, which is accessible to Security IC Embedded Software
All logical interfaces other than the Secure System Mailbox interface are accessible via
the electrical interfaces SPI, I
2
C, I
3
C, UART, SPMI and GPIO.
Physical interface
The chip surface must be considered as an interface of the TOE as well. This interface
could be exposed to environmental stress or physically manipulated by an attacker.
1.5 TOE Identification
1.5.1 Evaluated Hardware Configurations
Each configuration of the TOE consists of a physical configuration (i.e. hardware
component incl. ROM code and related documentation) and a logical configuration (i.e.
Software components and configuration data stored to Flash memory).
The definition of the configuration identifiers of SN300_SE is detailed in Table 2.
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Name Symbol Description
Series srs Series identifier in NXP product family
IC version xy.z.zzz x: base layer identifier of the development type
y: fixed metal masks identifier of the development type
z.zzz: customizable metal masks identifier of the development
type, includes the IC Dedicated Software stored to ROM
NXP software w w: NXP software combination identifier of the development type
(fixed to "J" for SN300 B2 Series)
NXP hardware
configuration
v Version identifier of the NXP hardware configuration, identifies
the version of configuration data stored to Flash (combination of
Factory Page, System Control Page, System Update Page and
System Patch Page)
Table 2. Configuration identifiers of the TOE
The symbols in the second column in Table 2 build the product name of a TOE
configuration according to the following rule:
• srs_SE xy.z.zzz wv
3
Evaluated physical configuration of the TOE is
• SN300_SE B2.1.001
All components of SN300_SE B2.1.001 that are common for any logical configuration are
listed in Table 3 with their respective version numbers.
Evaluated logical configuration of the TOE stored to flash memory is
• SN300_SE B2.1.001 JB
All components that are specific for SN300_SE B2.1.001 JB are listed in Table 4 with
their respective version numbers.
TOE identification methods are described in [10].
Category Component Identifica
tion
Delivery form
IC Hardware base layer and fixed metal masks B2.1.001 Package
FactoryOS 2.4.4 On-chip software. Stored to the ROM of
the TOE
BootOS (ROM) 2.4.2 On-chip software. Stored to the ROM of
the TOE
IC Dedicated
Support Software
Flash Driver Software 2.4.5 On-chip software. Stored to the ROM of
the TOE
Documentation,
User Guidance
SN300_SE B2 Information on
Guidance and Operation
[8] Electronic Document (PDF via NXP
Docstore)
SN300V2,R2; Single Chip
Secured (NFC) controller,
Product data sheet
[9] Electronic Document (PDF via NXP
Docstore)
Documentation,
Product Data Sheet
SN300V2 TOE Identification (for
B2.1.001), Data sheet addendum
[10] Electronic Document (PDF via NXP
Docstore)
Table 3. Components of SN300_SE B2.1.001 common for any logical configuration
3 This naming scheme is reflected in the Type ID for TOE identification given in [10]: "srs xy.z" refers to
byte 0 of the Type ID, "w" to byte 1 and "v" to byte 2.
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Category Component Identifica
tion
Delivery form
SN300_SE Programmers's
Manual (for revision B0 to B2),
Application Note
[11] Electronic Document (NXP internal
Document)
Documentation,
Application Note
ARM® Cortex®-M33 Processor
Technical Reference Material
[12] Electronic Document (www.arm.com)
Table 3. Components of SN300_SE B2.1.001 common for any logical configuration ...continued
Category Component Identifica
tion
Delivery form
Factory Page 220620 On-chip configuration page. Stored to
the FLASH area of the TOE
System Control Page 220620 On-chip configuration page. Stored to
the FLASH area of the TOE
System Update Page 220620 On-chip configuration page. Stored to
the FLASH area of the TOE
Configuration Data
System Patch Page v245_
s5_v0
On-chip configuration page. Stored to
the FLASH area of the TOE
Table 4. Components of SN300_SE B2.1.001 specific for JB
Logical configuration options are provided for each physical configuration of SN300_SE,
which do not modify the physical scope. Evaluated logical configuration options are all or
a subset of the order entry options available in the electronic Order Entry Form [13].
Table 5 identifies these evaluated logical configuration options.
Name of order entry option Evaluated values
SNSE_SWOPT_RAM_INIT_SIZE 0..6144
SNSE_SWOPT_RECONSTRUCT_PUF NO / RECON /
RECON_LOCK
SNSE_SWOPT_USE_PUF YES / NO
SNSE_SWOPT_ALLOW_SUP_TABLE YES / NO
SNSE_SWOPT_ALLOW_SUP_SENSOR YES / NO
SNSE_SWOPT_ENABLE_CHMODE YES / NO
SNSE_SWOPT_ENABLE_AUTHCMD YES / NO
SNSE_SWOPT_AUTH_REENABLE_TESTMODE YES / NO
Table 5. Evaluated logical configuration options
The TOE is integral part of the SN300 B2 IC. Order information is given in [9].
Information on how to identify the logical configuration options of the SN300_SE after
TOE Delivery and the delivery method used for SN300 B2 IC are described in [10].
Note that SN300 B2 IC without any Security IC Embedded Software for the TOE is
available for NXP internal use only.
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1.6 Evaluated Package Types
The TOE as integral part of SN300 B2 IC is delivered as a packaged device. The security
of the TOE does not rely on the way the pads are connected to the package. Hence the
security functionality of the TOE is not affected by the package type supplied.
The only available package type is "Wafer Level Chip Scale Package" (WLCSP). This
package is a thin fine-pitch ball grid array package. All (enabled) pins of the TOE are
externally accessible. Any additional security provided by the plastic package is ignored
for the security of the TOE.
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2 Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL)
This chapter is divided into the following sections: "CC Conformance Claim", "PP Claim",
and "Conformance Claim Rationale".
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target claims conformance to version 3.1 of Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation according to
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001, April 2017 [1].
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002, April 2017 [2].
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017 [3].
The following methodology will be used for the evaluation:
• Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017 [4].
This Security Target claims to be CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant.
Section 6 of this Security Target defines the extended Security Functional Requirements,
and also demonstrates that they are consistent with the above conformance claims.
This Security Target claims conformance to the assurance package EAL5 augmented.
The augmentations to EAL5 are
• AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis”
• ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures”
• ALC_FLR.1 “Basic flaw remediation”
• ASE_TSS.2 “TOE summary specification with architectural design summary”
As demonstrated in Section 7, this claim includes or exceeds the minimum assurance
level for the Protection Profile identified in Section 2.2.
2.2 PP Claim
This Security Target claims conformance to the following Protection Profiles.
2.2.1 Security IC Platform (BSI-PP-0084-2014)
This Security Target claims strict conformance to Security IC Platform Protection Profile
[7].
The TOE as defined in the Protection Profile is the Security IC including IC Dedicated
Software without Security IC Embedded Software.
2.3 Conformance Claim Rationale
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2.3.1 Security IC
Security IC is the type of TOE defined in Section 1.3.2 of this Security Target. Its
components are detailed in Section 1.4 of this Security Target. These descriptions are
consistent with the TOE definition in section 1.2.2 of the Protection Profile [7] .
2.3.1.1 SPD Statement for Security IC Component
The security problem definition in Section 3 of this Security Target includes all threats,
organizational security policies and assumptions which are identified in the Protection
Profile [7], and this without any restrictions or modifications.
2.3.1.2 Security Objectives Statement for Security IC Component
The statement of security objectives in the ST presented in Section 4 includes all security
objectives as presented in the Protection Profile [7] .
2.3.1.3 Security Functional Requirements Statement for Security IC Component
The Security Functional Requirements for the Security IC component are copied from the
Protection Profile [7] .
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3 Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD)
The following sections list the assets, threats, organisational security policies and
assumptions of the TOE.
These are listed separately for each component to allow tracing of the conformance to
the corresponding Protection Profile.
3.1 SPD related to the IC Protection Profile
3.1.1 Assets related to the IC Protection Profile
Assets are security-relevant elements to be directly protected by the TOE. Confidentiality
of assets is always intended with respect to un-trusted people or software, as various
parties are involved during the first stages of the smart card product life-cycle. Details
concerning the threats are given in Section 3.1.2 hereafter.
Assets have to be protected, some in terms of confidentiality and some in terms of
integrity or both integrity and confidentiality. These assets might get compromised by the
threats that the TOE is exposed to.
The assets and emanating high-level security concerns SC1 to SC4 in section 3.1 of the
Protection Profile [7] entirely apply to this Security Target.
• SC1 - Integrity of user data of the Composite TOE and of Security IC Embedded
Software, while being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE’s
protected memories
• SC2 - Confidentiality of user data of the Composite TOE and of Security IC Embedded
Software, while being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE’s
protected memories
• SC3 - Correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for Security IC
Embedded Software
• SC4 - Deficiency of Random Numbers
3.1.2 Threats related to the IC Protection Profile
The threats defined in section 3.2 of the Protection Profile [7] are listed in Table 6. They
entirely apply to this Security Target.
Name Title
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing
T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation
T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage
T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage
T.RND_HW Deficiency of Random Numbers
Table 6. Threats defined in the Protection Profile
The threat T.RND_HW explicitly includes deficiencies of hardware (true) random
numbers and corresponds to the thread T.RND in [7].
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3.1.3 OSPs related to the IC Protection Profile
The organizational security policies defined in section 3.3 of the Protection Profile [7] are
listed in Table 7. They entirely apply to this Security Target.
Name Title
P.Process-TOE Identification during TOE Development and Production
Table 7. Organizational security policies defined in the Protection Profile
3.1.4 Assumptions related to the IC Protection Profile
The assumptions defined in section 3.4 of the Protection Profile [7] are listed in Table 8.
They entirely apply to this Security Target.
Name Title
A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
A.Resp-Appl Treatment of user data of the Composite TOE
Table 8. Assumptions defined in the Protection Profile
The Security IC Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate “Treatment of user
data of the Composite TOE” as specified in A.Resp-Appl. Note that SN300 B2 without
any Security IC Embedded Software is available for NXP internal use only. Furthermore,
any Security IC Embedded Software is exclusively provided under control of NXP.
The Security IC Embedded Software might enable additional specific Security Services
that are not defined in this Security Target. The corresponding requirements for the
Security IC Embedded Software shall be defined in the Security Target of the Composite
TOE.
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4 Security Objectives
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
4.1.1 Security Objectives related to the IC Protection Profile
The security objectives for the Secure Element Hardware are defined in section 4.1 of the
Protection Profile [7]. They are listed in Table 9 and apply entirely to this Security Target.
Name Title
O.Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
O.Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
O.Phys-Probing Protection against Physical Probing
O.Phys-Manipulation Protection against Physical Manipulation
O.Leak-Inherent Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
O.Leak-Forced Protection against Forced Information Leakage
O.RND_HW Random Numbers
O.Identification TOE Identification
Table 9. Security objectives for the TOE defined in the Protection Profile
The objective O.RND_HW explicitly includes deficiencies of hardware (true) random
numbers and corresponds to the objective O.RND in [7].
4.1.2 Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software
The security objective for the Security IC Embedded Software defined in section 4.2 of
the Protection Profile [7] is listed in Table 10. It entirely applies to this Security Target.
Name Title
OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of user data of the Composite TOE
Table 10. Security objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software defined in the
Protection Profile
This Security Target does not add security objectives for the Security IC Embedded
Software.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
4.2.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment related to the IC
Protection Profile
The security objectives for the operational environment in section 4.3 of the Protection
Profile [7] are listed in Table 11. They entirely apply to this Security Target.
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Name Title
OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product manufacturing
Table 11. Security objectives for the operational environment defined in the Protection
Profile
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
In this section each threat, Organizational Security Policy, and assumption identified in
Section 3 is traced to the security objectives with a rationale.
The security objectives for the TOE defined in Section 4.1 are traced back to the threats
countered by them, and to the organisational security policies enforced by them. The
security objectives for the operational environment defined in Section 4.2 are traced back
to the assumptions they uphold.
4.3.1 Security Objective Rationale related to the IC Protection Profile
4.3.1.1 Rationale for Threats
Table 12 traces the security objectives for the TOE in Section 4.1.1 back to the threats
countered by them and the organisational security policies enforced by them.
Name of threat Name of security
objective
Rationale
T.Malfunction O.Malfunction
T.Abuse-Func O.Abuse-Func
T.Phys-Probing O.Phys-Probing
T.Phys-Manipulation O.Phys-Manipulation
T.Leak-Inherent O.Leak-Inherent
T.Leak-Forced O.Leak-Forced
T.RND_HW O.RND_HW
For all these threats the corresponding
objectives are stated in a way, which directly
corresponds to the description of the threat
(refer to Section 3.2 of PP [7]). It is clear from
the description of each objective (refer to
Section 4.1 of PP [7]), that the corresponding
threat is removed if the objective is valid. More
specifically, in every case the ability to use the
attack method successfully is countered, if the
objective holds.
Table 12. Tracing of security objectives to threads
4.3.1.2 Rationale for OSPs
This section traces the security objectives for the TOE in Section 4.1.1 back to the
organizational security policies they uphold.
Organizational Security Policies for Secure Element Hardware:
P.Process-TOE
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Objective Rationale
O.Identification O.Identification requires that the TOE has to support the possibility of
a unique identification. The unique identification can be stored on the
TOE. Since the unique identification is generated by the production
environment the production environment must support the integrity of the
generated unique identification. The technical and organisational security
measures that ensure the security of the development environment
and production environment are evaluated based on the assurance
measures that are part of the evaluation. The material produced and
processed by the TOE Manufacturer and the associated development
and production environments are subject of the evaluation. Therefore,
the organisational security policy P.Process-TOE is covered by this
objective, as far as organisational measures are concerned.
4.3.1.3 Rationale for Assumptions
This section traces the security objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software in
Section 4.1.2 and the security objectives for the operational environment in Section 4.2.1
back to the assumptions they uphold.
A.Resp-Appl
Name of security
objective
Rationale
OE.Resp-Appl This security objective taken from Protection Profile [7] requires the
Security IC Embedded Software to implement the measures assumed
in assumption A.Resp-Appl. That assumption is considered fulfilled, as
the concrete requirements for the Security IC Embedded Software are
defined in this Security Target.
A.Process-Sec-IC
Name of security
objective
Rationale
OE.Process-Sec-IC Since OE.Process-Sec-IC requires the Composite Product Manufacturer
to implement those measures assumed in A.Process-Sec-IC, the
assumption is covered by this objective.
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5 Extended Components Definition (ASE_ECD)
5.1 Extended Components Definition related to the IC Protection Profile
The extended components defined in chapter 5 of the Protection Profile [7] are listed in
Table 13. They entirely apply to this Security Target.
Name Title
FCS_RNG Generation of random numbers
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
FAU_SAS FAU_SAS Audit data storage
FDP_SDC Stored data confidentiality
Table 13. Extended components defined in the Protection Profile
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6 Security Functional Requirements (ASE_REQ)
6.1 Security Functional Requirements related to the IC Protection Profile
6.1.1 Security Functional Requirements
Security functional requirements from the Protection Profile [7] are applied to this
Security Target as described in Section 6.1.1.1 .
6.1.1.1 Security Functional Requirements from Protection Profile
Table 14 lists the security functional requirements for the TOE, which are defined in
section 6.1 of the Protection Profile [7]. They entirely apply to this Security Target.
Name Title
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
Table 14. Security Functional Requirements from the Protection Profile
FPT_FLS.1 requests the TSF to preserve a secure state when the TOE is exposed to
operating conditions which may not be tolerated according to FRU_FLT.2. The TOE
detects such operating conditions and forces itself into a secure state as long as these
conditions are valid. This secure state is enforced by security feature SF.OPC as
described in Section 8.2. This addresses Application Note 14 in the Protection Profile
[7]. The TOE does not generate audit data for FRU_FLT.2 and/or FPT_FLS.1. This
addresses Application Note 15 in the Protection Profile [7].
FPT_PHP.3 requests the TSF to resist physical manipulation and physical probing by
responding automatically such that the security functional requirements are always
enforced. The TOE implements two types of such automatic responses. One type of
response is permanent and implicitly hampers exploitability or already incidence of
physical attacks. The other type of response is conditional upon a failed check and
explicitly detects physical attacks. Such type of response stops operation of the TOE or
the attacked parts of it. This addresses Application Note 19 in the Protection Profile [7].
On some further Security Functional Requirements from the Protection Profile
[7] operations are made. Table 15 gives an overview on the Security Functional
Requirements that were subject to refinement, selection, assignment and/or iteration
operations in this Security Target.
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Name Title
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality
FDP_SDI.2:
• FDP_SDI.2/FLT
Stored data integrity monitoring and action
FCS_RNG.1:
• FCS_RNG.1/PTG.2
Random number generation
Table 15. Security Functional Requirements from the Protection Profile with operations
done in this Security Target
Iteration operations are notified by a slash, which is appended to the name of the security
functional requirement and followed by an identifier. Selection and assignment operations
are denoted in italics. Refinements are denoted just as described in the Protection Profile
[7]. Note that this convention only applies to the current chapter.
This Security Target performs selection and assignment operations on FAU_SAS.1
according to Application Note 17 in the Protection Profile [7].
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the test process before TOE
Delivery with the capability to store the Initialisation
Data, Pre-personalisation Data and other user data
4
in
the Flash memory
5
.
This Security Target performs one assignment operation on FDP_SDC.1 according to
Application Note 18 in the Protection Profile [7].
FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDC.1.1 The TSF shall ensure the confidentiality of the
information of the user data while it is stored in the Flash
memory, the System RAM, the PKC RAM and the Buffer
RAM
6
.
This Security Target performs one iteration operation on FDP_SDI.2, which complies
with section 8.1 in CC Part 1 [1], and also performs two assignment operations on that
iteration according to Application Note 18 in the Protection Profile [7].
FDP_SDI.2/FLT Stored data integrity monitoring and action - Faults
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1/FLT The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers
controlled by the TSF for modification, deletion,
4 [selection: the Initialisation Data, Pre-personalisation Data, [assignment: other data]]
5 [assignment: type of persistent memory]
6 [assignment: memory area]
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repetition or loss of data
7
on all objects, based on
the following attributes: integrity check information
associated with the data including code stored to the
Flash memory, the ROM, the System RAM, the PKC
RAM and the Buffer RAM
8
.
FDP_SDI.2.2/FLT Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall
correct the error or trigger a security reset or raise a non-
maskable interrupt
9
.
This Security Target performs an iteration operation on FCS_RNG.1, which complies
with section 8.1 in CC Part 1 [1]. It also performs two assignment operations according to
Application Note 21 in the Protection Profile [7]. The operations follow the example and
its Application Note 44 in section 7.5.1 of the Protection Profile [7] in consideration of the
updated documents [6] and [5].
FCS_RNG.1/PTG.2 Random number generation - PTG.2
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Note: This security functional requirement complies with
PTG.2 in [5]
FCS_RNG.1.1/PTG.2 The TSF shall provide a physical
10
random number
generator that implements:
{
(PTG.2.1) A total failure test detects a total failure of
entropy source immediately when the RNG has started.
When a total failure is detected, no random numbers will
be output.
(PTG.2.2) If a total failure of the entropy source occurs
while the RNG is being operated, the RNG prevents the
output of any internal random number that depends on
some raw random numbers that have been generated
after the total failure of the entropy source.
(PTG.2.3) The online test shall detect non-tolerable
statistical defects of the raw random number sequence
(i) immediately when the RNG has started, and (ii) while
the RNG is being operated. The TSF must not output
any random numbers before the power-up online test
has finished successfully or when a defect has been
detected.
(PTG.2.4) The online test procedure shall be effective
to detect non-tolerable weaknesses of the random
numbers soon.
(PTG.2.5) The online test procedure checks the
quality of the raw random number sequence. It is
triggered continuously. The online test is suitable
for detecting non-tolerable statistical defects of the
7 [assignment: integrity errors]
8 [assignment: memory area]
9 [assignment: action to be taken]
10 [selection: physical, hybrid physical, hybrid deterministic]
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statistical properties of the raw random numbers within
an acceptable period of time.
}
11
FCS_RNG.1.2/PTG.2 The TSF shall provide octets of bits or packages of 32
bits
12
that meet
{
(PTG.2.6) Test procedure A does not distinguish the
internal random numbers from output sequences of an
ideal RNG.
(PTG.2.7) The average Shannon entropy per internal
random bit exceeds 0.997.
}
13
6.1.2 Security Requirements Rationale
6.1.2.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements
The Security Objectives for the TOE are mapped to the Security Functional
Requirements in Table 16 .
It indicates the sufficient necessity and rationality of security requirements, that is, each
security objective has at least one security functional requirement corresponding to it,
and each security functional requirement solves at least one security objective, which is
sufficient and necessary for security objectives.
Security Objective for
the TOE
Security Functional Requirement of the TOE
O.Malfunction FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
FRU_FLT.2, FTP_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.3
O.Abuse-Func
FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1
FPT_PHP.3
O.Phys-Probing
FDP_SDC.1
FDP_SDI.2/FLT
O.Phys-Manipulation
FPT_PHP.3
O.Leak-Inherent FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1 , FDP_IFC.1
FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1
O.Leak-Forced
FPT_PHP.3
Table 16. Mapping of the Security Objectives for the TOE to the Security Functional
Requirements for the TOE
11 [assignment: list of security capabilities]
12 [selection: bits, octets of bits, numbers [assignment: format of the numbers]]
13 [assignment: a defined quality metric]
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Security Objective for
the TOE
Security Functional Requirement of the TOE
FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1
FCS_RNG.1/PTG.2
FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.3
O.RND_HW
FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1 , FDP_IFC.1
O.Identification FAU_SAS.1
Table 16. Mapping of the Security Objectives for the TOE to the Security Functional
Requirements for the TOE ...continued
The green colored cells in Table 16 show how the Protection Profile [7] maps its security
objectives for the TOE to the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE, see section
6.3.1 and section 7.4.2. of the Protection Profile [7]. Section 6.3.1 of the Protection Profile
[7] also gives the rationale for the mappings colored in green.
6.1.3 Security Requirements Dependencies
6.1.3.1 Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements
The dependencies of the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE are given in
Table 17.
SFR of the TOE Dependencies Fullfilled by SFRs
FRU_FLT.2 FPT_FLS.1 FPT_FLS.1
FPT_FLS.1 none N/A
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.1
FPT_PHP.3 none N/A
FDP_ITT.1 FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFC.1
FPT_ITT.1 none N/A
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1 N/A, see sec. 6.3.2 in PP [7]
FAU_SAS.1 none N/A
FDP_SDC.1 none N/A
FDP_SDI.2/FLT none N/A
FCS_RNG.1/PTG.2 none N/A
Table 17. Dependencies of the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
6.1.3.2 Security Requirements are Internally Consistent
The statement on internal consistency of security requirements in section 6.3.4 of the
Protection Profile [7] entirely applies to this Security Target.
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7 Security Assurance Requirements (ASE_REQ)
7.1 Security Assurance Requirements related to the IC Protection Profile
The Security Assurance Requirements for the Secure Element Hardware are listed in
Table 18. These Security Assurance Requirements are augmented from the Protection
Profile [7] to EAL5+ with additional Security Assurance Requirements ASE_TSS.2,
AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DVS.2 and ALC_FLR.1.
Name Title compared to PP [7]
ADV_ARC.1 Security architectural description as in PP
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification
with additional error information
augmented from PP to EAL5
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF as in PP
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals added for EAL5
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design augmented from PP to EAL5
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance as in PP
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures as in PP
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
as in PP
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage augmented from PP to EAL5
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures as in PP
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures as in PP
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation not in PP, added for EAL5+
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model as in PP
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards augmented from PP to EAL5
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims as in PP
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition as in PP
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction as in PP
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives as in PP
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements as in PP
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition as in PP
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural
design summary
augmented from PP to EAL5+
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage as in PP
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design augmented from PP
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing as in PP
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample as in PP
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis as in PP
Table 18. Security Assurance Requirements for the Secure Element Hardware
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All refinements in section 6.2.1 of the Protection Profile [7] to security assurance
requirements in Table 18, which are augmented from the Protection Profile, are
discussed below in their applicability to this Security Target. This addresses Application
Note 23 in the Protection Profile [7].
Refinements regarding ADV_FSP
Refinement no. 215 to ADV_FSP.4 in the Protection Profile [7] is not relevant for this
Security Target since the TOE does not embed IC Dedicated Test Software.
The Factory OS is not considered as IC Dedicated Test Software but instead as IC
Dedicated Support Software since it is not only used to support testing of the TOE
during production and does provide security functionality to be used after TOE delivery,
which both contradicts to abstract 12 on page 8 of the Protection Profile [7]. However,
the Factory OS provides testing capabilities for production testing and analysis of field
returns, which is under restricted access to NXP and not for usage by the Composite
Product Manufacturer. Therefore, these testing capabilities are considered as "test tool",
which don't have to be described in the Functional Specification, but only be evaluated
against their abuse after TOE delivery. Apart from that the Factory OS provides some
basic functional testing of Secure Element Hardware and also with a readout of the
identification flags of Secure Element Hardware from System Page Common, which must
be described in the Functional Specification.
Refinements no. 216, no. 217 and no. 218 to ADV_FSP.4 in the Protection Profile [7] are
entirely applicable to ADV_FSP.5 since the refinements clarify the scope of the functional
specification, and ADV_FSP.5 adds to this scope in accordance with the refinements.
Refinements regarding ALC_CMS
Refinement no. 199 to ALC_CMS.4 in the Protection Profile [7] is a clarification of
the configuration item "TOE implementation representation". Although NXP as the
TOE manufacturer is providing the Security IC Embedded Software, this item is not
relevant for the configuration list, as the Security IC Embedded Software is developed
independently from the TOE.
Compared to ALC_CMS.4 component ALC_CMS.5 only adds the requirement for a new
configuration items to be included in the configuration list. (ALC_CMS.5.1C). Therefore
the refinement in the PP regarding ADV_CMS.4 can be applied without changes and is
valid for ADV_CMS.5.
7.2 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements
This Security Target augments from EAL4 to EAL5 in order to meet increasing assurance
expectations on the resistance to attackers with high attack potential.
This Security Target augments EAL5 with ALC_FLR.1 to cover policies and procedures
that are applied to track and correct flaws and to support surveillance of the TOE.
Furthermore, ASE_TSS.2 is chosen to give architectural information on the security
functionality of the TOE, which enhances comprehensibility.
The assurance level EAL5 is an elaborated pre-defined level of the CC, part 3 [3]. The
assurance components in an EAL level are chosen in a way that they build a mutually
supportive and complete set of components. The additional requirements chosen for
augmentation do not add any dependencies, which are not already fulfilled for the
corresponding requirements contained in EAL5. Therefore, the components AVA_VAN.5,
ALC_DVS.2, ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1 serve additional assurance to EAL5, but the
mutual support of the requirements is still guaranteed.
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7.3 Dependencies of Security Assurance Requirements
The dependencies of the Security Assurance Requirements are given in Table 19. They
are derived from Appendix C of CC [3] . The table indicates whether the SAR is directly
or indirectly required. Only applicable dependencies from the highest level assurance
components are considered.
Name Directly required Indirectly required
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_FSP.1, ADV_TDS.1 ADV_FSP.2
ADV_FSP.5 ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.1 ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1
ADV_IMP.1 ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1 ADV_FSP.4
ADV_INT.2 ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1 ADV_FSP.4,
ADV_TDS.4 ADV_FSP.5 ADV_IMP.1
AGD_OPE.1 ADV_FSP.1 none
AGD_PRE.1 none none
ALC_CMC.4 ALC_CMS.1, ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1 none
ALC_CMS.5 none none
ALC_DEL.1 none none
ALC_DVS.2 none none
ALC_FLR.1 none none
ALC_LCD.1 none none
ALC_TAT.2 ADV_IMP.1 ADV_TDS.3
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.1 none
ASE_ECD.1 none none
ASE_INT.1 none none
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_SPD.1 none
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_SPD.1
ASE_SPD.1 none none
ASE_TSS.2 ADV_ARC.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.1 ADV_FSP.1, ADV_TDS.1, ASE_ECD.1
ATE_COV.2 ADV_FSP.2, ATE_FUN.1 ADV_TDS.1
ATE_DPT.3 ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4, ATE_FUN.1 ADV_FSP.5, ARE_COV.1
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_COV.1 ADV_FSP.2, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2 ADV_FSP.2, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_
PRE.1, ATE_COV.1, ATE_FUN.1
ADV_TDS.1
AVA_VAN.5 ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP4, ADV_IMP.1,
ADV_TDS.3, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_
PRE.1, ATE_DPT.1
ALC_TAT.1, ATE_FUN.1
Table 19. Dependencies of the Security assurance requirements
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8 TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
8.1 Introduction
The Security Functions (SF) and Security Services (SS) introduced in this section realize
the SFRs of the TOE. Each SF/SS consists of components spread over several TOE
modules to provide a security functionality and fulfill SFRs.
8.2 Security Functionality of the SN300 B2 Secure Element
The TOE Security Functionality (TSF) of the SN300 B2 Secure Element is composed
of Security Services (SS) and Security Features (SF). They together fulfill the Security
Functional Requirements for the TOE, which are identified in Section 6.1.1.
The Security Services of the TOE are summarized in Table 20 and described in
Section 8.2.1. The Security Features of the TOE are summarized in Table 21 and
described in Section 8.2.2.
The TOE also implements security functionality, which is not part of its Security Services
and Security Features, like the cryptographic coprocessors. Such security functionality
isn't required to meet the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. Instead, it can
be used by Security IC Embedded Software to implement further Security Services and
Security Features.
Security Services Name
SS.RNG Random Number Generator
Table 20. Security Services of the SN300 B2 Secure Element
Security Features Name
SF.OPC Control of Operating Conditions
SF.PHY Protection against Physical Manipulation
SF.LOG Logical Protection
SF.FOS-USE FactoryOS use restrictions
Table 21. Security Features of the SN300 B2 Secure Element
8.2.1 Security Services of the SN300 B2 Secure Element
8.2.1.1 SS.RNG : Random Number Generator
SS.RNG serves Security IC Embedded Software with random numbers.
For this purpose SS.RNG implements a physical Random Number Generator, which
claims functionality class PTG2 of the pre-defined RNG classes in [5]. This Security
Service is suited e.g. for generation of signature key pairs, generation of session keys
for symmetric encryption mechanisms, random padding bits, zero-knowledge proofs or
generation of seeds for Digital Random Number Generation (DRNG).
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The Random Number Generator fulfills the online test requirements defined in [5] and
embeds hardware test functionality to detect hardware defects and quality issues of the
random numbers.
8.2.2 Security Features of the SN300 B2 Secure Element
8.2.2.1 SF.OPC : Control of Operating Conditions
SF.OPC controls operating conditions of the TOE. These are explicitly controlled by
security functionality that simply hampers feeding certain electrical stimulations into the
device. Such security functionality is composed of frequency filters and voltage limiters.
Operating conditions of the device are explicitly controlled also by security functionality
that actively monitors certain electrical parameters. These parameters are voltage levels
of external supply from pad and internal supplies, frequencies of internal clocks and
on-chip temperature. Such security functionality raises an error message whenever a
monitored parameter drops out of its valid range. In addition, exposure of the device to
light is explicitly controlled by security functionality that senses abnormal light over its
whole surface, raising an error message when detected.
SF.OPC also controls operating conditions implicitly. This is done by security functionality
that detects faults in code and data stored to memories and while processed in the
device. Such faults might be inserted by electrical stimulations or by exposure of the
device to energy or particles. Error detection codes are used to protect the memories
as well as the access channels over the bus system to memories and to hardware
peripherals on the control bus. Watchdogs on error detection codes run over code and
data stored to RAM, and the Secure Fetch Plus on code and data read from Flash
memory can be configured and enabled by Security IC Embedded Software.
Further on, Security IC Embedded Software can configure and enable a Secure Fetch on
CPU code and/or data accesses over the bus system and also range checks on values
in general purpose, stack pointers and link registers of the CPU as well as checks on
predefined CPU instructions for zero values in their operands or in the addresses of their
resulting data accesses to memory. In addition, Security IC Embedded Software may
protect its program flow by use of a signature watchdog on CPU code accesses over the
bus system, by use of a secure counter and by use of a watchdog timer.
In case an error message is raised the TOE either (i) aborts code execution and forces
a reset or (ii) raises an exception, which interrupts code execution and jumps to an
exception vector on which the Security IC Embedded Software can react with an
appropriate exception handler. In case of reset the TOE returns to its initial state and
provides information on the reset source to the Security IC Embedded Software. In case
of an exception the TOE provides information on the exception source to the Security IC
Embedded Software.
SF.OPC also implements security functionality that corrects errors in Flash memory.
8.2.2.2 SF.PHY : Protection against Physical Manipulation
SF.PHY protects the TOE from physical probing and physical manipulation of its
hardware, its IC Dedicated Software, its TSF data and Security IC Embedded Software
stored to its Flash memory including user data of the Composite TOE. This is achieved
by appropriate shielding techniques for all elements in the physical design of the TOE, by
redundant CPU core, by redundant routing of sensitive signals, by layout constraints on
particular placements and routings.
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Selected security functionality in analog design parts of the TOE is additionally checked
for its basic operability by a built-in selftests that run during startup of the device.
Memories and their interfaces are additionally protected against probing by appropriate
encryption of stored content and address scrambling mechanisms.
8.2.2.3 SF.LOG : Logical Protection
SF.LOG provides logical protection of the TOE that fights disclosure of confidential data
stored to and processed in the TOE through tracing of power consumption or emanation
and subsequent complex signal analysis.
Secure data transfers from memory to memory or from memories to peripherals on the
control bus are managed by the secure copy engine (SMA). All such transfers are fully
masked from source to destination across the bus infrastructure.
SYM-Lite coprocessor provides secure general purpose operations over sensitive data
outside the CPU.
The cryptographic coprocessors implement functionality that effectively reduces side
channel leakage by adding noise, inserting dummy activity and randomizations if used for
implementation of security functions under control of the Security IC Embedded Software
(not in scope of this Security Target).
8.2.2.4 SF.FOS-USE : FactoryOS use restrictions
SF.FOS-USE restricts use of the FactoryOS among three levels of testing capabilities
of the TOE. Access to the lower level of testing capabilities is not blocked. Instead,
its testing capabilities are very limited so that they cannot be exploited. The medium
level of testing capabilities is blocked by an authentication procedure. After successful
authentication to this level the TOE serves with testing capabilities to the extent that
confidentiality of content stored to its memories cannot be compromised.
The upper level of testing capabilities is blocked by two authentication checks, of which
the latter one also forces an erase of Flash windows as well as System Pages before full
testing capabilities are provided.
Commands of the FactoryOS are conditionally installed in stages and commands with
test functionality are cut to tests of basic functionality only.
SF.FOS-USE also ensures that even the corresponding administrator cannot modify the
identification data of chip after the IC card chip enters the use stage.
8.3 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
Deleted here, only available in the full version of the Security Target.
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9 Bibliography
9 . 1 Evaluation documents
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001, April
2017
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002, April 2017
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017
[5] A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Wolfgang
Killmann, T-Systems GEI GmbH, Werner Schindler, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI), Version 2.0, 18 September 2011.
[6] Evaluation of random number generators, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik, Version 0.10
[7] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, Registered
and Certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under
the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, Version 1.0, 13 January 2014.
9 . 2 Developer documents
[8] SN300_SE B2 Information on Guidance and Operation, Revision 0.3, 22.02.2023,
NXP Semiconductors
[9] SN300V2,R2; Single Chip Secured (NFC) controller, Product data sheet, Revision
1.6, 21.10.2022, DocID 735816, NXP Semiconductors
[10] SN300V2 TOE Identification (for B2.1.001), Data sheet addendum, Revision 0.2,
25.08.2022, DocID 761702, NXP Semiconductors
[11] SN300_SE Programmers's Manual (for revision B0 to B2), Application Note,
AN12729, Revision 0.5, 24.08.2022, NXP Semiconductors
[12] ARM® Cortex®-M33 Processor Technical Reference Material, Revision r1p0, ARM
Limited
[13] Order Entry Form, online document, NXP Semiconductors
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10 Legal information
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In the event that customer uses the product for design-in and use in
automotive applications to automotive specifications and standards,
customer (a) shall use the product without NXP Semiconductors’ warranty
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Security — Customer understands that all NXP products may be subject to
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Customer shall select products with security features that best meet rules,
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NXP has a Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) (reachable
at PSIRT@nxp.com) that manages the investigation, reporting, and solution
release to security vulnerabilities of NXP products.
10.3 Trademarks
Notice: All referenced brands, product names, service names, and
trademarks are the property of their respective owners.
NXP — wordmark and logo are trademarks of NXP B.V.
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NXP Semiconductors NXP SN300 B2 Series - Secure Element
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Tables
Tab. 1. TOE Reference ................................................. 3
Tab. 2. Configuration identifiers of the TOE ................ 11
Tab. 3. Components of SN300_SE B2.1.001
common for any logical configuration ..............11
Tab. 4. Components of SN300_SE B2.1.001
specific for JB ................................................. 12
Tab. 5. Evaluated logical configuration options ........... 12
Tab. 6. Threats defined in the Protection Profile ......... 16
Tab. 7. Organizational security policies defined in
the Protection Profile .......................................17
Tab. 8. Assumptions defined in the Protection
Profile .............................................................. 17
Tab. 9. Security objectives for the TOE defined in
the Protection Profile .......................................18
Tab. 10. Security objectives for the Security IC
Embedded Software defined in the
Protection Profile .............................................18
Tab. 11. Security objectives for the operational
environment defined in the Protection
Profile .............................................................. 19
Tab. 12. Tracing of security objectives to threads ......... 19
Tab. 13. Extended components defined in the
Protection Profile .............................................21
Tab. 14. Security Functional Requirements from the
Protection Profile .............................................22
Tab. 15. Security Functional Requirements from the
Protection Profile with operations done in
this Security Target ......................................... 23
Tab. 16. Mapping of the Security Objectives for
the TOE to the Security Functional
Requirements for the TOE .............................. 25
Tab. 17. Dependencies of the Security Functional
Requirements for the TOE .............................. 26
Tab. 18. Security Assurance Requirements for the
Secure Element Hardware .............................. 27
Tab. 19. Dependencies of the Security assurance
requirements ....................................................29
Tab. 20. Security Services of the SN300 B2 Secure
Element ........................................................... 30
Tab. 21. Security Features of the SN300 B2 Secure
Element ........................................................... 30
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Figures
Fig. 1. Place in the system ...........................................6
Fig. 2. Block Diagram of the Secure Element
Hardware ...........................................................7
Fig. 3. Logical interface of SN300 B2 ........................ 10
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Contents
1 ST Introduction (ASE_INT) .................................3
1.1 ST Reference .................................................... 3
1.2 TOE Reference ..................................................3
1.3 TOE Overview ................................................... 3
1.3.1 Usage and Major Security Features of the
TOE ....................................................................3
1.3.2 TOE Type .......................................................... 4
1.3.3 Security During Development and
Production ..........................................................4
1.3.4 Required non-TOE Hardware/Software/
Firmware ............................................................5
1.4 TOE Description ................................................ 5
1.4.1 Secure Element Subsystem .............................. 6
1.4.1.1 Hardware Description ........................................ 7
1.4.1.2 IC Dedicated Support Software ......................... 8
1.4.2 Interfaces of the TOE ........................................ 9
1.5 TOE Identification ............................................ 10
1.5.1 Evaluated Hardware Configurations ................ 10
1.6 Evaluated Package Types ............................... 13
2 Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL) .................... 14
2.1 CC Conformance Claim ...................................14
2.2 PP Claim ..........................................................14
2.2.1 Security IC Platform (BSI-PP-0084-2014) ........14
2.3 Conformance Claim Rationale .........................14
2.3.1 Security IC .......................................................15
2.3.1.1 SPD Statement for Security IC Component .....15
2.3.1.2 Security Objectives Statement for Security
IC Component ................................................. 15
2.3.1.3 Security Functional Requirements
Statement for Security IC Component ............. 15
3 Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD) ......... 16
3.1 SPD related to the IC Protection Profile ...........16
3.1.1 Assets related to the IC Protection Profile ....... 16
3.1.2 Threats related to the IC Protection Profile ......16
3.1.3 OSPs related to the IC Protection Profile .........17
3.1.4 Assumptions related to the IC Protection
Profile ...............................................................17
4 Security Objectives ...........................................18
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ...................... 18
4.1.1 Security Objectives related to the IC
Protection Profile ............................................. 18
4.1.2 Security Objectives for the Security IC
Embedded Software ........................................ 18
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational
Environment .....................................................18
4.2.1 Security Objectives for the Operational
Environment related to the IC Protection
Profile ...............................................................18
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale ..........................19
4.3.1 Security Objective Rationale related to the
IC Protection Profile ........................................ 19
4.3.1.1 Rationale for Threats .......................................19
4.3.1.2 Rationale for OSPs ..........................................19
4.3.1.3 Rationale for Assumptions ...............................20
5 Extended Components Definition (ASE_
ECD) ....................................................................21
5.1 Extended Components Definition related to
the IC Protection Profile .................................. 21
6 Security Functional Requirements (ASE_
REQ) ................................................................... 22
6.1 Security Functional Requirements related
to the IC Protection Profile .............................. 22
6.1.1 Security Functional Requirements ...................22
6.1.1.1 Security Functional Requirements from
Protection Profile ............................................. 22
6.1.2 Security Requirements Rationale .................... 25
6.1.2.1 Rationale for the Security Functional
Requirements ...................................................25
6.1.3 Security Requirements Dependencies .............26
6.1.3.1 Dependencies of Security Functional
Requirements ...................................................26
6.1.3.2 Security Requirements are Internally
Consistent ........................................................26
7 Security Assurance Requirements (ASE_
REQ) ................................................................... 27
7.1 Security Assurance Requirements related
to the IC Protection Profile .............................. 27
7.2 Rationale for the Security Assurance
Requirements ...................................................28
7.3 Dependencies of Security Assurance
Requirements ...................................................29
8 TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS) ......... 30
8.1 Introduction ...................................................... 30
8.2 Security Functionality of the SN300 B2
Secure Element ............................................... 30
8.2.1 Security Services of the SN300 B2 Secure
Element ............................................................30
8.2.1.1 SS.RNG : Random Number Generator ............30
8.2.2 Security Features of the SN300 B2 Secure
Element ............................................................31
8.2.2.1 SF.OPC : Control of Operating Conditions .......31
8.2.2.2 SF.PHY : Protection against Physical
Manipulation .....................................................31
8.2.2.3 SF.LOG : Logical Protection ............................ 32
8.2.2.4 SF.FOS-USE : FactoryOS use restrictions .......32
8.3 TOE Summary Specification Rationale ............32
9 Bibliography ...................................................... 33
9.1 Evaluation documents ..................................... 33
9.2 Developer documents ......................................33
10 Legal information ..............................................34
Please be aware that important notices concerning this document and the product(s)
described herein, have been included in section 'Legal information'.
© NXP B.V. 2023. All rights reserved.
For more information, please visit: http://www.nxp.com
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Date of release: 9 May 2023
Document identifier: NXP-ST01-SN300B2-Jxxxx