Cyberoam Technologies Pvt. Ltd.
Cyberoam Firmware v10.5.3
Security Target
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL): EAL4+
Document Version: 1.4
Prepared for: Prepared by:
Cyberoam Technologies Pvt. Ltd.
Corsec Security, Inc.
901, Silicon Tower, Off. C.G. Road
Ahmedabad 380 006
India
13135 Lee Jackson Memorial Hwy., Suite 220
Fairfax, VA 22033
United States of America
Phone: +91 79 66065606 Phone: +1 703 267 6050
Email: Sales@Cyberoam.com Email: info@corsec.com
http://www.cyberoam.com http://www.corsec.com
Security Target, Version 1.4 July 10, 2013
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© 2013 Cyberoam Technologies Pvt. Ltd.
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................4
1.1 PURPOSE................................................................................................................................................................4
1.2 SECURITY TARGET AND TOE REFERENCES......................................................................................................4
1.3 PRODUCT OVERVIEW..........................................................................................................................................5
1.4 TOE OVERVIEW...................................................................................................................................................8
1.4.1 TOE Environment................................................................................................................................................13
1.5 TOE DESCRIPTION............................................................................................................................................13
1.5.1 Physical Scope.......................................................................................................................................................14
1.5.2 Logical Scope ........................................................................................................................................................17
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ..................................................................................................19
3 SECURITY PROBLEM ..........................................................................................................20
3.1 THREATS TO SECURITY......................................................................................................................................20
3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ..........................................................................................................20
3.3 ASSUMPTIONS.....................................................................................................................................................21
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES......................................................................................................22
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE..............................................................................................................22
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT..................................................................22
4.2.1 IT Security Objectives.........................................................................................................................................22
4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives ...............................................................................................................................23
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS ..............................................................................................24
5.1 EXTENDED TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS...........................................................................24
5.2 EXTENDED TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE COMPONENTS..............................................................................24
6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ..............................................................................................25
6.1 CONVENTIONS...................................................................................................................................................25
6.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................................................25
6.2.1 Class FAU: Security Audit..................................................................................................................................27
6.2.3 Class FDP: User Data Protection....................................................................................................................29
6.2.4 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication................................................................................................30
6.2.5 Class FMT: Security Management.................................................................................................................31
6.2.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF.....................................................................................................................32
6.2.7 Class FTA: TOE Access ......................................................................................................................................33
6.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS...........................................................................................................34
7 TOE SECURITY SPECIFICATION......................................................................................35
7.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONALITY.....................................................................................................................35
7.1.1 Security Audit........................................................................................................................................................36
7.1.2 User Data Protection..........................................................................................................................................37
7.1.3 Identification and Authentication....................................................................................................................37
7.1.4 Security Management........................................................................................................................................37
7.1.5 Protection of the TSF..........................................................................................................................................38
7.1.6 TOE Access............................................................................................................................................................38
8 RATIONALE..........................................................................................................................39
8.1 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS RATIONALE.............................................................................................................39
8.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE..................................................................................................................39
8.2.1 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Threats ....................................................................................39
8.2.2 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Policies .....................................................................................40
8.2.3 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Assumptions...........................................................................40
8.3 RATIONALE FOR EXTENDED SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ......................................................41
8.4 RATIONALE FOR EXTENDED TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS...............................................41
8.5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ...........................................................................................................42
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8.5.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE Objectives............................................42
8.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale...............................................................................................45
8.5.3 Dependency Rationale.......................................................................................................................................45
9 ACRONYMS ..........................................................................................................................47
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 – HARDWARE DEPLOYMENT CONFIGURATION OF THE TOE ..........................................................................9
FIGURE 2 – VIRTUAL DEPLOYMENT CONFIGURATION OF THE TOE.............................................................................. 10
FIGURE 3 – PHYSICAL TOE BOUNDARY............................................................................................................................. 15
FIGURE 4 – VIRTUAL TOE BOUNDARY............................................................................................................................... 16
List of Tables
TABLE 1 – ST AND TOE REFERENCES....................................................................................................................................4
TABLE 2 – TOE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................................................................ 13
TABLE 3 – CC AND PP CONFORMANCE............................................................................................................................ 19
TABLE 4 – THREATS ............................................................................................................................................................... 20
TABLE 5 – ASSUMPTIONS ...................................................................................................................................................... 21
TABLE 6 – SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE............................................................................................................... 22
TABLE 7 – IT SECURITY OBJECTIVES.................................................................................................................................... 23
TABLE 8 – NON-IT SECURITY OBJECTIVES......................................................................................................................... 23
TABLE 9 – TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS................................................................................................ 25
TABLE 10 – AUDITABLE EVENTS........................................................................................................................................... 27
TABLE 11 – ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS............................................................................................................................ 34
TABLE 12 – MAPPING OF TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONALITY TO SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS................ 35
TABLE 13 – COMMON FIELDS .............................................................................................................................................. 36
TABLE 14 – THREATS: OBJECTIVES MAPPING..................................................................................................................... 39
TABLE 15 – ASSUMPTIONS: OBJECTIVES MAPPING ............................................................................................................ 41
TABLE 16 – OBJECTIVES: SFRS MAPPING ............................................................................................................................ 42
TABLE 17 – FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS DEPENDENCIES.............................................................................................. 45
TABLE 18 – ACRONYMS AND TERMS .................................................................................................................................. 47
Security Target, Version 1.4 July 10, 2013
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© 2013 Cyberoam Technologies Pvt. Ltd.
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1 Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), and the ST organization. The
TOE is the Cyberoam Firmware v10.5.3, and will hereafter be referred to as the TOE throughout this
document. The TOE is a software-only Unified Threat Management (UTM)/firewall that runs on the
Cyberoam hardware series appliances or in a virtual environment. The TOE offers identity-based
comprehensive security to organizations against multiple security services, such as worms, viruses,
malware, data loss, identity theft; threats over applications; threats over secure protocols such as HTTPS1
;
and traffic management capabilities.
1.1 Purpose
This ST is divided into nine sections, as follows:
 Introduction (Section 1) – Provides a brief summary of the ST contents and describes the
organization of other sections within this document. It also provides an overview of the TOE
security functionality and describes the physical and logical scope for the TOE, as well as the ST
and TOE references.
 Conformance Claims (Section 2) – Provides the identification of any Common Criteria (CC),
Protection Profile, and Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) package claims. It also identifies
whether the ST contains extended security requirements.
 Security Problem (Section 3) – Describes the threats, organizational security policies, and
assumptions that pertain to the TOE and its environment.
 Security Objectives (Section 4) – Identifies the security objectives that are satisfied by the TOE
and its environment.
 Extended Components (Section 5) – Identifies new components (extended Security Functional
Requirements (SFRs) and extended Security Assurance Requirements (SARs)) that are not
included in CC Part 2 or CC Part 3.
 Security Requirements (Section 6) – Presents the SFRs and SARs met by the TOE.
 TOE Security Specification (Section 7) – Describes the security functions provided by the TOE
that satisfy the security functional requirements and objectives.
 Rationale (Section 8) - Presents the rationale for the security objectives, requirements, and SFR
dependencies as to their consistency, completeness, and suitability.
 Acronyms (Section 9) – Defines the acronyms and terminology used within this ST.
1.2 Security Target and TOE References
Table 1 below shows the ST and TOE references.
Table 1 – ST and TOE References
ST Title Cyberoam Technologies Pvt. Ltd. Cyberoam Firmware v10.5.3 Security Target
ST Version Version 1.4
ST Author Corsec Security, Inc.
ST Publication Date 7/10/2013
TOE Reference Cyberoam Firmware v10.5.3
1
HTTPS – Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
2
It should be noted that throughout the ST, whenever referencing “administrator” starting with a lower case “a”, refers
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1.3 Product Overview
Cyberoam UTM delivers enterprise-class network security with stateful inspection firewall, virtual private
network (VPN), Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), and host of other security features, offering the Human
Layer 8 identity-based controls and Layer 7 application controls. It ensures high levels of network security,
network connectivity, continuous availability and secure remote access with controlled network access to
road warriors, telecommuters, partners, customers.
Current corporate policies surrounding network security often neglect the most critical and weak security
component: the human element. Cyberoam UTM’s Layer 8 Technology treats user identity as the 8th layer
or the “human layer” in the network protocol stack. This allows administrators2
to uniquely identify users,
control the Internet activity of these users in the network, and enable policy-setting and reporting by
username.
Cyberoam Unified Threat Management appliances offer multiple features integrated in a single appliance to
offer a complete balance of security, connectivity, and productivity to organizations, ranging from large
enterprises to small and branch offices. The Layer 8 technology penetrates through each and every security
module of the Cyberoam UTM. All security features can be centrally configured and managed from a
single firewall page with complete ease. Layer 8 binds security features to create a single, consolidated
security unit and enables the administrator to change security policies dynamically while accounting for
user movement - joiner, leaver, rise in hierarchy etc.
With granular controls and advanced networking features, Cyberoam UTM offers enterprise-class security
and high flexibility with protection against blended threats, malware, Trojans, denial of service (DoS),
distributed denial of service (DDoS), IP3
spoofing attacks, spam, intrusions and data leakage. Cyberoam
can be managed through the Web Admin Console, CLI4
, or SNMP5
agent.
Web Admin Console
The Web Admin Console is a web-based graphical interfaced used to configure and manage the Cyberoam
appliance.
CLI
The CLI console provides a collection of tools to administer, monitor, and control certain Cyberoam
components through a serial connection, mostly for advanced trouble shooting.
SNMP
SNMP allows administrators to monitor the status of Cyberoam and receive notification of critical events
as they occur on the network.
Local Authentication
The TOE provides administrator level authentication that can be performed using the local database on the
TOE.
External Authentication
Cyberoam provides administrator level authentication that can be performed using an external ADS6
server,
LDAP7
server or RADIUS8
server.
2
It should be noted that throughout the ST, whenever referencing “administrator” starting with a lower case “a”, refers
to all administrators and their corresponding permission detailed in section 7.1.4. “Administrator”, starting with an
upper case “A”, refers to the Administrator role detailed in section 7.1.4. An authorized administrator refers to a TOE
user that has been assigned a legitimate role and valid credentials. .
3
IP – Internet Protocol
4
CLI – Command Line Interface
5
SNMP – Simple Network Management Protocol
6
ADS – Active Directory Services
7
LDAP – Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
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Firewall
Cyberoam’s stateful and deep packet inspection firewall allows identity-based policy creation for its
multiple security features through a single interface, giving ease of management and high security with
flexibility. Cyberoam UTM Firewall protects organizations from DoS, DDoS and IP/MAC9
Spoofing
attacks.
VPN
Cyberoam offers secure remote access to organizations with the flexibility to choose from IPSec10
, L2TP11
,
PPTP12
, and SSL13
VPN technologies over its UTM appliances. Cyberoam enables identity-based access
policies to prevent unauthorized network access over VPN, besides controlling ‘who accesses what’ over
VPN.
Intrusion Prevention System
Cyberoam Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) protects against network and application attacks through
thousands of automatically updated signatures that enable protection against latest vulnerabilities. It offers
security against intrusions, malware, Trojan, DoS and DDoS attacks, malicious code transmission, blended
threats and more.
Anti-Virus & Anti-Spyware
Cyberoam’s Gateway Anti-Virus and Anti-Spyware protects against malware, including viruses, worms,
spyware, backdoors, Trojans, and keyloggers over web, email, and Instant Messaging. With a database of
millions of signatures updated periodically, it scans malware over incoming/outgoing traffic to reduce the
window of vulnerability in organizations.
Anti Spam
The Gateway Anti-Spam offers real-time spam protection over all email protocols - SMTP14
, POP315
,
IMAP16
, providing protection against blended threats involving spam, malware, botnets, phishing, and
more. Cyberoam’s signature-less Rapid Pattern Detection technology detects and blocks emerging spam
outbreaks for zero-hour spam protection. It also offers 98% spam protection with 1 in a million false
positive rate.
Outbound Spam Protection
The Outbound Spam Protection blocks outbound spam in real-time in service provider networks. It enables
detection of locally generated outbound spam and spam that is part of a global outbreak, putting an end to
IP address blacklisting and loss of corporate reputation, besides identifying the spammer source to
eliminate the real source of spam.
Web Filtering
Cyberoam’s award-winning Web Filtering blocks access to harmful, inappropriate, and dangerous websites
through its comprehensive uniform resource locator (URL) databases with millions of URLs grouped into
82+ categories. Cyberoam enables identity-based web access policies, preventing data and productivity
loss, and rightly replacing expensive, best-of-breed web filters.
Bandwidth Management
Cyberoam Bandwidth Management enables prioritization of applications and users for bandwidth
allocation that ensures assured application quality of service (QoS) for business critical applications,
8
RADIUS – Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
9
MAC – Media Access Control
10
IPSec – Internet Protocol Security
11
L2TP – Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol
12
PPTP – Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol
13
SSL – Secure Socket Layer
14
SMTP – Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
15
POP3 – Post Office Protocol 3
16
IMAP – Internet Message Access Protocol
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prevents congestion and bandwidth abuse in networks. Cyberoam enables committed and burstable
bandwidth that results in assured bandwidth to critical users and automatic assignment of idle bandwidth to
other applications.
Application Visibility & Control
Cyberoam offers Application Visibility and Control to enable application control to accelerate business
critical applications, stagger non-critical applications, selectively accelerate socio-business applications,
and block undesirable applications to achieve the twin goals of Application QoS and optimal bandwidth
utilization. Application controls can be based on users and job roles, time, and network policies.
Web Application Firewall
Cyberoam’s Web Application Firewall on its UTM appliances secures websites and web applications in
organizations against attacks like SQL17
injection, cross-site scripting, and more, including the Open Web
Application Security Project’s Top 10 vulnerabilities. The Cyberoam Web Application Firewall is deployed
to intercept the traffic to and from the web servers to provide an added layer of security against attacks
before they can reach the Web applications.
3G18
/ WiMAX19
Connectivity
Cyberoam UTM appliances support 3G and WiMAX WAN connectivity, offering assured security and
connectivity over wireless wide area network (WAN) links for continuous business processes. Automatic
failover from a wireline to wireless link ensures high availability in WAN connectivity in case the wireless
WAN link fails.
Instant Messaging (IM) Archiving & Controls
Cyberoam’s IM Archiving and Controls enable identity-based policies to control access to IM applications,
providing visibility and archiving facility that meets regulatory compliance requirements. It enables
controls over file transfer, voice and video chat that prevent data leakage over IMs, phishing, malware,
viruses and other malicious attacks.
Multiple Link Management
As part of the WAN features of Cyberoam, Multiple Link Management provides reliable WAN
connectivity while supporting WAN redundancy – giving assured access to business applications involved
in collaboration, Cloud and software as a service deployments. Automated Load Balancing of multiple ISP
links, link failover, and user-identity-based routing delivers higher return on investment and minimizes
overload in organizations.
On-Appliance Reporting
Cyberoam’s on-appliance reporting gives user identity-based logs and reports on the UTM appliance itself,
providing real-time information on who is doing what in the network, including dynamic Wi-Fi
environments. This supports regulatory compliance requirements and instant security action, besides
eliminating the need to invest in a separate reporting solution, minimizing investment cost and operational
expense.
IPv6 Ready
Cyberoam is “IPv6 Ready” Gold logo certified by the international IPv6 Forum. The Gold logo assures that
Cyberoam’s UTM appliances are IPv6 Ready and can identify and process IPv6 traffic, which makes
Cyberoam appliances future-ready for the move to IPv6 technology.
Wi-Fi Appliances
Cyberoam enables identity-based Wi-Fi access that enhances network and data security, and protects
remote offices and public hotspots from intrusions, identity theft through MAC spoofing, DoS attacks and
17
SQL – Structured Query Language
18
3G – Third Generation
19
WiMAX – Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
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malware entry. The appliances support 802.11n/b/g wireless standards while combining the features of a
router along with offering Cyberoam’s complete set of UTM features.
Virtual Appliances
Cyberoam provides a virtual appliance that allows companies to reduce hardware ownership and cost by
deploying the Cyberoam firmware in a virtual environment. Cyberoam supports the following virtual
environments and platforms:
 VMware Workstation 7.0/8.0
 VMware vSphere
 VMware ESX/ESXi 3.5/4.0/4.1/5.0
 Hyper-V
 Citrix XenServer 5.6 SP2/6.0
 Open Source Xen 3.4.3/4.1
 VMware Player 3.0/4.0
 Virtual Box
 Microsoft Virtual PC
1.4 TOE Overview
The TOE Overview summarizes the usage and major security features of the TOE. The TOE Overview
provides a context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the TOE type, describing the product, and
defining the specific evaluated configuration.
The TOE is the firmware that runs on the Cyberoam series hardware and virtual appliances. The TOE is
installed on a network whenever firewall services are required, as depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2 below.
The TOE can be deployed in Gateway or Bridge mode in both configurations. This allows the TOE to be
used as a firewall; as well as a gateway for routing traffic. To control Internet access entirely through the
TOE, the entire Internet bound traffic from the local area network (LAN) network must first pass through
the TOE. The TOE is software-only with the Cyberoam hardware or virtual appliance as part of the TOE
environment.
The firewall rules functionality protects the network from unauthorized access and typically guards the
LAN and DMZ20
networks against malicious access. Firewalls rules may also be configured to limit the
access to harmful sites for LAN users.
Firewall rules provide centralized management of security policies. From a single firewall rule, you can
define and manage an entire set of TOE security policies. Firewall rules control traffic passing through the
TOE. Depending on the instruction in the rule, the TOE decides on how to process the access request.
When the TOE receives the request, it checks for the source address, destination address, TCP or UDP
protocol, and port number and tries to match it with the firewall rule. It also keeps track of the state of
connection and denies any traffic that is not part of the connection state.
The TOE provides extensive logging capabilities for traffic, system and network protection functions.
Detailed log information and reports provide historical as well as current analysis of network activity to
help identify security issues and reduce network abuse. These logs can be viewed through the Web Admin
Console.
The TOE also provides the following management functionalities:
 System administration and configuration;
 Firewall rules management;
 Configure user authentication ;
 Users management;
20
DMZ – Demilitarized Zone
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 Management of the following Traffic Information Flow Control SFP security attributes:
 Subject IP address
 Traffic Source IP address
 Traffic Destination IP address
 Traffic TCP or UDP transport protocols
 Traffic port number
Figure 1 and Figure 2 shows the details of the deployment configurations of the TOE:
Figure 1 – Hardware Deployment Configuration of the TOE
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Figure 2 – Virtual Deployment Configuration of the TOE
A high-level overview of the different types of features and functionalities included in the TOE are listed
below:
Web Admin Console
The Web Admin Console is a web-based graphical interfaced used to configure and manage the Cyberoam
appliance.
Local Authentication
The TOE provides administrator level authentication that can be performed using the local database on the
TOE.
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© 2013 Cyberoam Technologies Pvt. Ltd.
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Firewall
Cyberoam’s stateful and deep packet inspection firewall allows identity-based policy creation for its
multiple security features through a single interface, giving ease of management and high security with
flexibility. Cyberoam UTM Firewall protects organizations from DoS, DDoS and IP/MAC Spoofing
attacks.
The following are the Product Physical/Logical Features and Functionality that are not included in the
TOE:
CLI
The CLI console provides a collection of tools to administer, monitor, and control certain Cyberoam
components through a serial connection, mostly for advanced trouble shooting.
SNMP
SNMP allows administrators to monitor the status of Cyberoam and receive notification of critical events
as they occur on the network.
External Authentication
Cyberoam provides administrator level authentication that can be performed using an external ADS server,
LDAP server or RADIUS server.
VPN
Cyberoam offers secure remote access to organizations with the flexibility to choose from IPSec, L2TP,
PPTP, and SSL VPN technologies over its UTM appliances. Cyberoam enables identity-based access
policies to prevent unauthorized network access over VPN, besides controlling ‘who accesses what’ over
VPN.
Intrusion Prevention System
Cyberoam Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) protects against network and application attacks through
thousands of automatically updated signatures that enable protection against latest vulnerabilities. It offers
security against intrusions, malware, Trojan, DoS and DDoS attacks, malicious code transmission, blended
threats and more.
Anti-Virus & Anti-Spyware
Cyberoam’s Gateway Anti-Virus and Anti-Spyware protects against malware, including viruses, worms,
spyware, backdoors, Trojans, and keyloggers over web, email, and Instant Messaging. With a database of
millions of signatures updated periodically, it scans malware over incoming/outgoing traffic to reduce the
window of vulnerability in organizations.
Anti Spam
The Gateway Anti-Spam offers real-time spam protection over all email protocols - SMTP, POP3, IMAP
providing protection against blended threats involving spam, malware, botnets, phishing, and more.
Cyberoam’s signature-less Rapid Pattern Detection technology detects and blocks emerging spam
outbreaks for zero-hour spam protection. It also offers 98% spam protection with 1 in a million false
positive rate.
Outbound Spam Protection
The Outbound Spam Protection blocks outbound spam in real-time in service provider networks. It enables
detection of locally generated outbound spam and spam that is part of a global outbreak, putting an end to
IP address blacklisting and loss of corporate reputation, besides identifying the spammer source to
eliminate the real source of spam.
Web Filtering
Cyberoam’s award-winning Web Filtering blocks access to harmful, inappropriate, and dangerous websites
through its comprehensive uniform resource locator (URL) databases with millions of URLs grouped into
Security Target, Version 1.4 July 10, 2013
Cyberoam Firmware v10.5.3 Page 12 of 49
© 2013 Cyberoam Technologies Pvt. Ltd.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
82+ categories. Cyberoam enables identity-based web access policies, preventing data and productivity
loss, and rightly replacing expensive, best-of-breed web filters.
Bandwidth Management
Cyberoam Bandwidth Management enables prioritization of applications and users for bandwidth
allocation that ensures assured application quality of service (QoS) for business critical applications,
prevents congestion and bandwidth abuse in networks. Cyberoam enables committed and burstable
bandwidth that results in assured bandwidth to critical users and automatic assignment of idle bandwidth to
other applications.
Application Visibility & Control
Cyberoam offers Application Visibility and Control to enable application control to accelerate business
critical applications, stagger non-critical applications, selectively accelerate socio-business applications,
and block undesirable applications to achieve the twin goals of Application QoS and optimal bandwidth
utilization. Application controls can be based on users and job roles, time, and network policies.
Web Application Firewall
Cyberoam’s Web Application Firewall on its UTM appliances secures websites and web applications in
organizations against attacks like SQL injection, cross-site scripting, and more, including the Open Web
Application Security Project’s Top 10 vulnerabilities. The Cyberoam Web Application Firewall is deployed
to intercept the traffic to and from the web servers to provide an added layer of security against attacks
before they can reach the Web applications.
3G / WiMAX Connectivity
Cyberoam UTM appliances support 3G and WiMAX WAN connectivity, offering assured security and
connectivity over wireless wide area network (WAN) links for continuous business processes. Automatic
failover from a wireline to wireless link ensures high availability in WAN connectivity in case the wireless
WAN link fails.
Instant Messaging (IM) Archiving & Controls
Cyberoam’s IM Archiving and Controls enable identity-based policies to control access to IM applications,
providing visibility and archiving facility that meets regulatory compliance requirements. It enables
controls over file transfer, voice and video chat that prevent data leakage over IMs, phishing, malware,
viruses and other malicious attacks.
Multiple Link Management
As part of the WAN features of Cyberoam, Multiple Link Management provides reliable WAN
connectivity while supporting WAN redundancy – giving assured access to business applications involved
in collaboration, Cloud and software as a service deployments. Automated Load Balancing of multiple ISP
links, link failover, and user-identity-based routing delivers higher return on investment and minimizes
overload in organizations.
On-Appliance Reporting
Cyberoam’s on-appliance reporting gives user identity-based logs and reports on the UTM appliance itself,
providing real-time information on who is doing what in the network, including dynamic Wi-Fi
environments. This supports regulatory compliance requirements and instant security action, besides
eliminating the need to invest in a separate reporting solution, minimizing investment cost and operational
expense.
Cyberoam i-View
This feature provides logs and reports outside of the Web Admin Console. These same logs and reports are
available in the Web Admin Console.
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IPv6 Ready
Cyberoam is “IPv6 Ready” Gold logo certified by the international IPv6 Forum. The Gold logo assures that
Cyberoam’s UTM appliances are IPv6 Ready and can identify and process IPv6 traffic, which makes
Cyberoam appliances future-ready for the move to IPv6 technology.
Wi-Fi Appliances
Cyberoam enables identity-based Wi-Fi access that enhances network and data security, and protects
remote offices and public hotspots from intrusions, identity theft through MAC spoofing, DoS attacks and
malware entry. The appliances support 802.11n/b/g wireless standards while combining the features of a
router along with offering Cyberoam’s complete set of UTM features.
NTP
Synchronizing time with an extneral NTP server is excluded from the evaluation and not allowed in the
evaluated configuration.
1.4.1 TOE Environment
The TOE environment consists of the Cyberoam hardware or virtual platform. The TOE minimum
requirements are listed below in Table 2 for both deployment methods. A management console for
managing the TOE is required in both configurations.
Table 2 – TOE Minimum Requirements
Category Hardware Requirement Virtual Requirement
Platform CR15i, CR15wi, CR25ia, CR25wi,
CR35ia, CR35wi, CR50ia, CR100ia,
CR200i, CR300i, CR500ia, CR700ia,
CR1000i, CR 1000ia, CR1500i, CR1500ia
General purpose computer with:
 CPU – 1Ghz
 RAM – 2GB RAM
 Number of Interfaces – Minimum
3
 HDD – 2
 1st
HDD – 4GB
 2nd
HDD – 80GB
 Running VMware ESX 4.1or later
Management
Console
General purpose computer with:
 Internet Explorer 7.0 and higher
 Firefox Mozilla 3 and higher
 Recommended minimum screen
resolution for utilizing the
management console is 1024 X
768 and 32-bit true-color
For HTTPS management sessions.
General purpose computer with:
 Internet Explorer 7.0 and higher
 Firefox Mozilla 3 and higher
 Recommended minimum screen
resolution for utilizing the
management console is 1024 X
768 and 32-bit true-color
For HTTPS management sessions.
Environmental
Component
External syslog server
Uninterruptible power supply (UPS)
External syslog server
Uninterruptible power supply (UPS)
In addition, the TOE needs cable and connectors that allow all of the TOE and environmental components
to communicate with each other.
1.5 TOE Description
This section primarily addresses the physical and logical components of the TOE included in the
evaluation.
The TOE can be configured for HTTPS web-based administration from a management console. To
connect to the Web Admin Console, the administrator must input a username and password. The Web
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Admin Console supports multiple languages, but by default appears in English. The Web Admin Console
provides the following management functionalities for an Administrator and Security Admin:
 Add users
 Set time
 Configure syslog server
 Configure firewall rules
 Configure lock-out, logout, and block administrator sessions
 View Logs (Administrator and Audit Admin only)
The firewall rules functionality protects the network from unauthorized access and typically guards the
LAN and DMZ networks against malicious access. Firewalls rules may also be configured to limit the
access to harmful sites for LAN users.
The responsibility of the firewall is to grant access from Internet to DMZ or Service Network according to
the Rules and Policies configured. It also keeps track of the state of connection and denies any traffic that
is not part of the connection state.
Firewall rules provide centralized management of security policies. From a single firewall rule, you can
define and manage an entire set of TOE security policies.
Firewall rules control traffic passing through the TOE. Depending on the instruction in the rule, the TOE
decides on how to process the access request. When the TOE receives the request, it checks for the source
address, destination address, TCP or UDP protocol, and port number and tries to match it with the firewall
rule.
The TOE provides extensive logging capabilities for traffic, system, and network protection functions.
Detailed log information and reports are available locally through the Web Admin Console until a system
shutdown for analysis of current network activity. An external syslog server is required in the TOE
environment to provide historical analysis of network activity to help identify security issues and reduce
network abuse.
For further information about the TOE security functionality, please refer to section 1.5.2.
1.5.1 Physical Scope
Figure 3 illustrates the physical scope and the physical boundary of the overall solution and ties together all
of the components of the TOE.
The TOE is a firewall which runs on a Cyberoam UTM series hardware or a virtual appliance. The TOE is
installed on a network whenever a firewall/UTM services are required as depicted in the Figure 3 and
Figure 4 below. The essential components for the proper operation of the TOE in the evaluated
configuration are:
 Cyberoam Firmware v10.5.3
The TOE is downloaded from Cyberoam’s download center. The download center provides a Cyberoam
Firmware v10.5.3 link that downloads an encrypted binary file for either the Cyberoam hardware or virtual
appliance. The encrypted file will not have an extension, but will include the TOE version. The file is
downloaded to the location specified by the authorized user. This file includes the firmware and any
configurations specific to the appliance on which it will be installed. Only the Cyberoam hardware or
virtual appliance is capable of decrypting, verifying, and installing the encrypted file.
If the intended installation is a virtual configuration, an older version of the Cyberoam firmware is initially
downloaded in a pre-activated .ovf file format, upon which the TOE binary firmware can be installed.
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Figure 3 – Physical TOE Boundary
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Figure 4 – Virtual TOE Boundary
1.5.1.1 TOE Firmware
The TOE consists of the firmware that runs on the Cyberoam firewall hardware or virtual appliance.
1.5.1.2 Guidance Documentation
The following guides are required reading and part of the TOE:
 Cyberoam UTM Onlinehelp Version – 1.0 – 10.5.3 – 05/07/2013
 Cyberoam Unified Threat Management Failsafe Troubleshooting for Hardware Appliance Version
10, Document Version 10.5.3 – 05/07/2013
 Cyberoam Unified Threat Management Failsafe Troubleshooting for Virtual UTM Appliance
Version 10, Document Version 10.5.3 – 05/07/2013
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 Cyberoam Unified Threat Management User Guide Version 10, Document Version 10.5.3 –
05/07/2013
 Cyberoam Unified Threat Management Release Notes Version 10.5.3, Document Version 1.04-
05/07/2013
 Cyberoam Firmware v10.5.3 Guidance Documentation Supplement v0.9, July 03, 2013
 Cyberoam Virtual UTM Appliance VMware ESX/ESXi Installation Guide Version 10, Document
version 10.04.0255-26/03/2013
 Cyberoam Unified Threat Management QUICK START GUIDE CR500ia Appliance, Document
version PL QSG 500ia/96000/10.02.0.0.473/05252013
These documents can be downloaded from http://docs.cyberoam.com and are sent with the TOE as part of a
documentation CD21
.
The following Knowledge Base article is also required reading and part of the TOE:
 Cyberoam Unified Threat Management How To – Add an External Certificate Authority to
Cyberoam, 10.5.3-05.07.2013, Knowledge Base Article
This article can be found at kb.cyberoam.com.
1.5.2 Logical Scope
The logical boundary of the TOE will be broken down into the following security classes which are further
described in sections 6 and 7 of this ST. The logical scope also provides the description of the security
features of the TOE. The security functional requirements implemented by the TOE are usefully grouped
under the following Security Function Classes:
 Security Audit
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TOE Security Functionality (TSF)
 TOE Access
1.5.2.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit records for startup and shutdown of the audit functions, rejected and blocked
traffic, administrator account activity, firewall rule modification, firewall activity, and login attempts. An
Administrator or Audit Admin can view, sort, search, and order the audit records based on different factors
that vary between administrator logs and invalid traffic log files. Audit records are available in the local
audit log only until a reboot or system shutdown occurs. All audit records are maintained and stored in the
external syslog server. The TOE protects audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion and
modification. In addition, the TOE can be configured to send audit data to a syslog server.
1.5.2.2 User Data Protection
The TOE controls network traffic via the Traffic Information Flow Control Security Functional Policy
(SFP). The Traffic Information Flow SFP relies on source and destination IP addresses, TCP or UDP
protocol, port numbers, and rules defined in the Traffic Information Flow Control Lists to determine how to
treat the network traffic. The rules determine whether traffic should be accepted through the TOE to its
destination, passage rejected through the network, or dropped.
1.5.2.3 Identification and Authentication
Users are required to successfully identify and authenticate with the TOE prior to any actions on the TOE.
Username, password, and role are stored locally in the TOE and are compared against the username and
21
CD – Compact Disk
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password entered by a user before assigning a role and allowing access. The TOE provides a way of
preventing unauthorized users from gaining access to the TOE by configuring a settable number of
unsuccessful login attempts from an IP address, before the address is locked out by the TOE.
1.5.2.4 Security Management
The TOE offers a Web Admin Console that administrators can use to configure and manage TOE settings
and the Traffic Information Flow Control SFP. The TOE supports the roles of Administrator, Audit
Admin, Crypto Admin, HAProfile, Custom, and Security Admin roles. Administrator and Security Admin
roles have the ability to modify and delete the restrictive default security attributes for the Traffic
Information Flow Control SFP. The HAProfile role’s functionality is excluded from the evaluation. The
Custom role covers any profiles created by an administrator.
1.5.2.5 Protection of the TOE Security Functionality
The TSF provides a reliable timestamp for operations in the TOE.
1.5.2.6 TOE Access
An Administrator and Security Admin can configure the TOE to lock an interactive session after an
administrative-configurable amount of minutes of inactivity, 3 minutes being the default value. The TOE
can terminate management sessions after one to 99 minutes of inactivity. The default time for termination
is 10 minutes. An Administrator and Security Admin can configure the TOE to display a warning message
regarding unauthorized use of the TOE before an authentication session occurs.
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2 Conformance Claims
This section and Table 3 provide the identification for any CC, Protection Profile (PP), and EAL package
conformance claims. Rationale is provided for any extensions or augmentations to the conformance
claims. Rationale for CC and PP conformance claims can be found in Section 8.1.
Table 3 – CC and PP Conformance
Common Criteria
(CC) Identification
and Conformance
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Revision 3, July 2009; CC Part 2 conformant; CC Part 3 conformant; PP claim
none; Parts 2 and 3 Interpretations of the CEM as of 7/10/2013 were reviewed,
and no interpretations apply to the claims made in this ST.
PP Identification None
Evaluation
Assurance Level
EAL4+ augmented with Flaw Remediation ALC_FLR.2
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3 Security Problem
This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used and the
manner in which the TOE is expected to be employed. It provides the statement of the TOE security
environment, which identifies and explains all:
 Known and presumed threats countered by either the TOE or by the security environment
 Organizational security policies with which the TOE must comply
 Assumptions about the secure usage of the TOE, including physical, personnel and connectivity
aspects
3.1 Threats to Security
This section identifies the threats to the IT22
assets against which protection is required by the TOE or by
the security environment. The threat agents are divided into two categories:
 Attackers who are not TOE users: They have public knowledge of how the TOE operates and are
assumed to possess an enhanced basic skill level, limited resources to alter TOE configuration
settings or parameters and no physical access to the TOE.
 TOE users: They have extensive knowledge of how the TOE operates and are assumed to possess
a high skill level, moderate resources to alter TOE configuration settings or parameters and
physical access to the TOE. (TOE users are, however, assumed not to be willfully hostile to the
TOE.)
Both are assumed to have a low level of motivation and moderate time to perform an attack. The IT assets
requiring protection are the TSF23
and user data saved on or transitioning through the TOE and the hosts on
the protected network. Removal, diminution and mitigation of the threats are through the objectives
identified in Section 4 Security Objectives. Table 4 below lists the applicable threats.
Table 4 – Threats
Name Description
T.AUDACC TOE users or an attacker may not be accountable for the actions that
they conduct, thus allowing an attacker to escape detection.
T.MEDIAT An attacker may send impermissible information through the TOE
which results in the exploitation of resources on the internal network.
T.NOAUTH An attacker may attempt to bypass the security of the TOE so as to
access and use security functions and/or non-security functions
provided by the TOE.
T.REPEAT An attacker may repeatedly try to guess authentication data used for
performing I&A functionality in order to use this information to launch
attacks on the TOE.
3.2 Organizational Security Policies
This Security Target defines no Organizational Security Policies.
22
IT – Information Technology
23
TSF – TOE Security Functionality
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3.3 Assumptions
This section describes the security aspects of the intended environment for the evaluated TOE. The
operational environment must be managed in accordance with assurance requirement documentation for
delivery, operation, and user guidance. Table 5 lists the specific conditions that are required to ensure the
security of the TOE and are assumed to exist in an environment where this TOE is employed.
Table 5 – Assumptions
Name Description
A.GENPUR The TOE only stores and executes security-relevant applications and
only stores data required for its secure operation.
A.NETCON The TOE environment provides the network connectivity required to
allow the TOE to perform its intended function.
A.NOEVIL TOE users are non-hostile and follow all administrator guidance.
A.PHYSEC The TOE is physically secure.
A.PUBLIC The TOE does not host public data.
A.REMACC TOE users may only access the TOE locally.
A.SINGEN Information cannot flow among the internal and external networks
unless it passes through the TOE.
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4 Security Objectives
Security objectives are concise, abstract statements of the intended solution to the problem defined by the
security problem definition (see Section 3). The set of security objectives for a TOE form a high-level
solution to the security problem. This high-level solution is divided into two part-wise solutions: the
security objectives for the TOE, and the security objectives for the TOE’s operational environment. This
section identifies the security objectives for the TOE and its supporting environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The specific security objectives for the TOE are listed in Table 6 below.
Table 6 – Security Objectives for the TOE
Name Description
O.ACCOUNT The TOE must provide accountability for information flows through
the TOE and for TOE users' use of security functions related to audit.
O.AUDREC The TOE must provide a means to record a readable audit trail of
security-related events, with accurate dates and times, and a means
for TOE users to search, sort, and order the audit trail based on
relevant attributes.
O.AUTHENTICATE The TOE must uniquely identify and authenticate the claimed identity
of all TOE users, before granting an administrator access to TOE
functions and data or, for certain specified services, to a connected
network. The TOE must ensure that TOE users cannot endlessly
attempt to login and authenticate with the wrong credentials.
O.LIMEXT The TOE must provide the means for TOE users to control and limit
access to TOE security functions by an authorized external IT entity.
O.MEDIATE The TOE must mediate the flow of all information between clients
and servers located on internal and external networks governed by
the TOE, disallowing passage of non-conformant protocols.
O.SECFUN The TOE must provide functionality that enables TOE users to use
the TOE security functions, and must ensure that only TOE users are
able to access such functionality.
O.TIME The TOE must provide a reliable time stamp.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational
Environment
This section describes the environmental objectives.
4.2.1 IT Security Objectives
Table 7 below lists the IT security objectives that are to be satisfied by the environment.
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Table 7 – IT Security Objectives
Name Description
OE.TRAFFIC The TOE environment must be implemented such that the TOE is
appropriately located within the network to perform its intended
function.
4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives
Table 8 below lists the non-IT environment security objectives that are to be satisfied without imposing
technical requirements on the TOE. That is, they will not require the implementation of functions in the
TOE hardware and/or software. Thus, they will be satisfied largely through application of procedural or
administrative measures.
Table 8 – Non-IT Security Objectives
Name Description
NOE.GENPUR The TOE only stores and executes security-relevant applications and
only stores data required for its secure operation.
NOE.NOEVIL TOE users are non-hostile and follow all administrator guidance.
NOE.PHYSEC The physical environment must be suitable for supporting a computing
device in a secure setting.
NOE.PUBLIC The TOE does not host public data.
NOE.REMACC TOE users may only access the TOE locally.
NOE.SINGEN Information cannot flow among the internal and external networks
unless it passes through the TOE.
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5 Extended Components
This section defines the extended SFRs and extended SARs met by the TOE. These requirements are
presented following the conventions identified in Section 6.1.
5.1 Extended TOE Security Functional
Components
There are no extended TOE security functional components defined for this evaluation.
5.2 Extended TOE Security Assurance
Components
There are no extended TOE security assurance components defined for this evaluation.
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6 Security Requirements
This section defines the SFRs and SARs met by the TOE. These requirements are presented following the
conventions identified in Section 6.1.
6.1 Conventions
There are several font variations used within this ST. Selected presentation choices are discussed here to
aid the Security Target reader.
The CC allows for assignment, refinement, selection and iteration operations to be performed on security
functional requirements. All of these operations are used within this ST. These operations are performed
as described in Part 2 of the CC, and are shown as follows:
 Completed assignment statements are identified using [italicized text within brackets].
 Completed selection statements are identified using [underlined text within brackets].
 Refinements are identified using bold text. Any text removed is stricken (Example: TSF Data)
and should be considered as a refinement.
 Extended Functional and Assurance Requirements are identified using “EXT_” at the beginning of
the short name.
 Iterations are identified by appending a letter in parentheses following the component title. For
example, FAU_GEN.1(a) Audit Data Generation would be the first iteration and FAU_GEN.1(b)
Audit Data Generation would be the second iteration.
6.2 Security Functional Requirements
This section specifies the SFRs for the TOE. This section organizes the SFRs by CC class. Table 9
identifies all SFRs implemented by the TOE and indicates the ST operations performed on each
requirement.
Table 9 – TOE Security Functional Requirements
Name Description S A R I
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation 

FAU_SAR.1 Audit review  
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review  
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage 

FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control  
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes  
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling 

FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action  
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action  
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior 

FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes 

FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization 

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions  
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Name Description S A R I
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles  
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps  
FTA_SSL.1 TSF-initiated session locking  
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination  
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners  
Note: S=Selection; A=Assignment; R=Refinement; I=Iteration
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6.2.1 Class FAU: Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_GEN.1.1
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events, for the [not specified] level of audit; and
c) [Other specifically defined auditable events – see Table 10 below].
Table 10 – Auditable Events
Type of Log Auditable Events
Firewall Rules Logs Firewall traffic allowed
Firewall traffic denied
Invalid Traffic Logs Invalid traffic denied
Invalid Fragmented Traffic Denied
Administration Logs Add operation
Update operation
Delete operation
Admin login logout
FAU_GEN.1.2
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome
(success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the PP/ST, [no other information].
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_SAR.1.1
The TSF shall provide [Administrator or Audit Admin] with the capability to read [audit data
collected since the last reboot, excluding the audit shutdown event] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2
The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_SAR.3.1
The TSF shall provide the ability to apply [searches, sorting, ordering] of audit data based on
[Table 13].
Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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FAU_STG.1.1
The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2
The TSF shall be able to [prevent] unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records in the
audit trail.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
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6.2.3 Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_IFC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Traffic Information Flow Control SFP] on [
a) SUBJECTS: external IT entities that send or receive information through the TOE;
b) INFORMATION: traffic flowing through the TOE, and;
c) OPERATIONS: ACCEPT, DROP, REJECT].
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_IFF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Traffic Information Flow Control SFP] based on the following types of
subject and information security attributes: [
SUBJECT (external IT entities) attributes:
1. IP address
INFORMATION (traffic) attributes:
1. Source IP address;
2. Destination IP address;
3. TCP and UDP transport protocols; and
4. Port number].
FDP_IFF.1.2
The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information
via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [ACCEPT rules contained in the authorized
administrator-defined Traffic Information Flow Control SFP List].
FDP_IFF.1.3
The TSF shall enforce the [no additional flow rules].
FDP_IFF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules: [ACCEPT
rules contained in the authorized administrator-defined Traffic Information Flow Control List].
FDP_IFF.1.5
The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [DROP, REJECT
rules contained in the authorized administrator-defined Traffic Information Flow Control List].
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
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6.2.4 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_AFL.1.1
The TSF shall detect when [an administrator-configurable positive integer within [1 and 5]] of
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [authorized TOE administrator access from
the same IP in an administrator-configurable 1-120 seconds].
FIA_AFL.1.2
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [met], the TSF shall
[block any administrator account from that IP address for an administrator-configurable
timeframe of 1-60 minutes].
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: No dependencies
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6.2.5 Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MOF.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [enable, disable, modify the behavior of] the functions [
 System administration and configuration;
 Firewall rules management;
 Configure users24
authentication; and
 Users management]
to [authorized administrators with sufficient permission level].
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Traffic Information Flow Control SFP] to restrict the ability to
[[create], modify, and delete] the security attributes [
SUBJECT (external IT entities) attributes:
1. IP address
INFORMATION (traffic) attributes:
1. Source IP address;
2. Destination IP address;
3. TCP and UDP transport protocols; and
4. Port number]
to [Administrator and Security Admin roles].
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.3.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Traffic Information Flow Control SFP] to provide [restrictive] default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2
The TSF shall allow the [Administrator and Security Admin roles] to specify alternative initial
values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMF.1.1
 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [
 System administration and configuration;
 Firewall rules management;
 Configure user authentication; and
 Users management
 Management of the following Traffic Information Flow Control SFP security attributes:
24
It should be noted that throughout the Security Target, user represents all TOE users and administrators.
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 Subject IP address
 Traffic Source IP address
 Traffic Destination IP address
 Traffic transport protocol type
 Traffic port number].
Dependencies: No Dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles [Administrator, Audit Admin, Crypto Admin, HAProfile, Custom,
and Security Admin].
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
6.2.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_STM.1.1
The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
Dependencies: No dependencies
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6.2.7 Class FTA: TOE Access
FTA_SSL.1 TSF-initiated session locking
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FTA_SSL.1.1
The TSF shall lock an interactive session after a [configurable time interval of authorized
administrator inactivity at the Web Admin Console from 1 to 99 minutes, defaulting to 3 minutes]
by:
a) Clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current contents unreadable;
b) Disabling any activity of the user’s data access/display devices other than unlocking the
session.
FTA_SSL.1.2
The TSF shall require the following events to occur prior to unlocking the session: [authorized
administrator must re-enter password].
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FTA_SSL.3.1
The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [configurable time interval of administrator
inactivity at the Web Admin Console from 1 to 99 minutes, defaulting to 10 minutes].
Dependencies: No dependencies
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FTA_TAB.1.1
Before establishing a user session, the TSF shall display an authorized administrator-specified
advisory warning message regarding unauthorized use of the TOE.
Dependencies: No dependencies
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6.3 Security Assurance Requirements
This section defines the assurance requirements for the TOE. Assurance requirements are taken from the
CC Part 3 and are EAL4 augmented with ALC_FLR.2. Table 11 – Assurance Requirements summarizes
the requirements.
Table 11 – Assurance Requirements
Assurance Requirements
Class ASE: Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Class ALC : Life Cycle Support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance
procedures and automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM Coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_FLR.2 Basic Flaw Remediation
Class ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture Description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
Class AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Class ATE: Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: Basic Design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.3 Focused Vulnerability analysis
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7 TOE Security Specification
This section presents information to detail how the TOE meets the functional requirements described in
previous sections of this ST.
7.1 TOE Security Functionality
Each of the security requirements and the associated descriptions correspond to a security functionality.
Hence, each security functionality is described by how it specifically satisfies each of its related
requirements. This serves to both describe the security functionality and rationalize that the security
functionality satisfies the necessary requirements. Table 12 lists the security functionality and their
associated SFRs.
Table 12 – Mapping of TOE Security Functionality to Security Functional Requirements
TOE Security Functionality SFR ID Description
Security Audit FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
User Data Protection FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
Identification and Authentication FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any
action
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any
action
Security Management FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions
behavior
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management
functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Protection of TOE Security
Functions
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
TOE Access FTA_SSL.1 TSF-initiated session locking
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners
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7.1.1 Security Audit
The Security Audit function provides the TOE with the functionality for generation, storage, and viewing
of audit records. As administrators manage and configure the TOE, their activities are tracked by recording
audit records into the logs. All security-relevant configuration changes are recorded to ensure
accountability of the administrator’s actions. All logs contain the time, device, type of event, log ID, and
priority. Firewall log files additionally contain component, action, username, firewall rule, incoming
interface, outgoing interface, source IP, and destination IP.
The TOE generates log files with information about security related events for administrator review to
monitor network security and activity, identify security risks, and address these risks. These events are
maintained in the local logs until the system is shutdown or rebooted. Records are also sent to an external
syslog server, which maintains and stores the audit records.
A log file is a list of events, along with information about those events. An event is an activity that occurs
on the TOE. For example, TOE’s denying of a packet based on a policy set is an event. The TOE also
captures information about allowed events to give a more complete picture of the activities on the network.
The TOE audit events are generated in the form of logs which are generated and saved in several types of
log messages. The log message types are:
 Firewall rules – Log records of the entire traffic for firewall
 Invalid traffic log – Log records of the dropped traffic that do not follow the protocol standards,
invalid fragmented traffic, and traffic whose packets the TOE is not able to relate to any
connection
 Administration log – Administrator logins and changes to configuration parameters and access
rules
The TOE administrator has the ability to view all audit events generated since the last system reboot on the
local audit logs, as well as search and sort the audit data. Audit events that precede a system power loss
can only be viewed on the external syslog server. This includes the audit record of the shutdown of the
audith function. The local logs can be searched based on common fields for all events, as well as access
firewall rule fields. They can be sorted and ordered based on any of the fields listed in Table 13 below.
The TOE protects the stored audit records from unauthorized deletion and modification.
The TOE audit records contain the following information:
Table 13 – Common Fields
Field Content
Date Date (yyyy-mm-dd) when the event occurred
Time Time (hh:mm:ss) when the event occurred
Timezone Time zone of Cyberoam Appliance
Device_name Model Number of the Cyberoam Appliance (syslog only)
Device_id Unique Identifier of the Cyberoam Appliance (syslog
only)
Log_id Unique 12 characters code (syslog only)
Log_type Type of event occurred in Cyberoam
Log_component Component responsible for logging
Log_subytpe Sub type of event occurred in Cyberoam
Priority Severity level of the event
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Field Content
Message_id Message identifier for event (local logs only)
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FAU_GEN.1, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.3,
FAU_STG.1.
7.1.2 User Data Protection
The security policy of an organization in the context of computer networking is a set of rules to protect the
computer networks of an organization and the information that goes through it. By default, the TOE denies
all packets that are not specifically allowed. The TOE enables the administrator of the TOE to add a
policy. Through the use of policies, the administrator configures a set of firewall rules that tell the TOE to
allow or deny traffic based upon factors such as source and destination of the packet, port number, as well
as the transport protocol type. Transport protocol that can be filtered are TCP and UDP.
The User Data Protection function implements functionality for TOE security functions and TOE security
functional policies related to protecting user data. The user data that the TOE is protecting is the
information passing through the TOE. This functionality is provided by the application of firewall access
rules. The Traffic Information Flow Control Security Functional Policy enforces rules on subjects that
send traffic through the TOE, or receive traffic flowing through the TOE. The rules in the security policy
determine whether traffic should be accepted from the sender to the receiver, passage rejected, or dropped
based on the following security attributes: source IP address, destination IP address, port number, and TCP
and UDP protocols.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FDP_IFC.1, FDP_IFF.1.
7.1.3 Identification and Authentication
The Identification and Authentication functionality establishes and verifies a claimed user’s identity. The
TOE requires successful identification and authentication of all users before allowing access to any
management functionality of the Web Admin Console. This ensures that the user has the appropriate
privileges associated with the assigned profile. Only authenticated users are allowed access to the TOE and
TOE security functions. Users must be identified and authenticated prior to performing any TSF-mediated
actions on the TOE. For each user, the TOE stores the following security attributes locally: username,
password, and profile. When a TOE user enters a username and password at the Web Admin Console, the
information is passed to the TOE, where it is verified against the username and password stored in the
TOE. If the provided username and password match, the TOE administrator is assigned the roles
associated with that username.
The TOE will lock out all user accounts from an IP address if a user fails to enter the proper credentials
after an administrator-configurable number of failed login attempts.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2.
7.1.4 Security Management
The Security Management function specifies the management of several aspects of the TSF, including
security function behavior and security attributes. The TOE provides two built-in administrative accounts:
admin and cyberoam. Both these accounts have default passphrases pre-supplied for them, which must be
changed during the initial configuration and both fall into the Administrator profile. The TOE allows
administrators to create profiles for various administrator users. Profiles are a function of an organization’s
security needs and can be set up for special-purpose administrators in areas such as firewall administration,
network administration, and logs administration. A profile separates the TOE’s features into access control
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categories for which an administrator can enable none, read only, or read-write access. Profiles created by
an administrator fall in the Custom role. By default, the TOE provides the following five profiles:
 Administrator – super administrator with full privileges
 Audit Admin – read-write privileges for Logs & Reports only
 Crypto Admin – read-write privileges for Certificate configuration only
 HAProfile – read-only privileges. This role is assigned to Administrators accessing the Web
Admin Console when HA is configured. HA is not configured in the evaluated configuration, so
this role will not be assigned.
 Security Admin – read-write privileges for all features except Profiles and Log & Reports
Adding or deleting rules in the Traffic Information Flow Control SFP (i.e. accept, reject, or discard) is
limited only to the Administrator or Security Admin roles.
The TOE provides restrictive default values for the Traffic Information Flow Control SFP security
attributes, and allows only the Administrator or Security Admin to set different values. Also, specifying
alternative initial values for security attributes to override the default values is limited to Administrator and
Security Admin profiles.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3,
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1.
7.1.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE firmware maintains a reliable timestamp through function calls to the underlying hardware for
audit messages and applications within the TOE.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FPT_STM.1
7.1.6 TOE Access
The TOE Access function specifies requirements for controlling the establishment of an administrator’s
session, which is configured by Administrator roles with sufficient permission level. The TSF locks an
administrator’s interactive session after a configurable time interval of administrator inactivity at the Web
Admin Console, the default time interval is 3 minutes. The session is terminated after a configurable time
interval of administrator inactivity at the Web Admin Console, the default time interval is 10 minutes. If an
administrator’s session is timed out, the administrator must log back in to the TOE to perform any further
functions.
An Administrator or Security Admin can configure the TOE to display an advisory warning message
regarding unauthorized use of the TOE before an authentication session occurs.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FTA_SSL.1, FTA_SSL.3, FTA_TAB.1.
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8 Rationale
8.1 Conformance Claims Rationale
This Security Target conforms to Part 2 and Part 3 of the Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3.
8.2 Security Objectives Rationale
This section provides a rationale for the existence of each threat, policy statement, and assumption that
compose the Security Target. Sections 8.2.1, 8.2.2, and 8.2.3 demonstrate the mappings between the
threats, policies, and assumptions to the security objectives are complete. The following discussion
provides detailed evidence of coverage for each threat, policy, and assumption.
8.2.1 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Threats
Table 14 below provides a mapping of the objects to the threats they counter.
Table 14 – Threats: Objectives Mapping
Threats Objectives Rationale
T.AUDACC
TOE users or an attacker may not
be accountable for the actions that
they conduct, thus allowing an
attacker to escape detection.
O.ACCOUNT
The TOE must provide
accountability for information
flows through the TOE and for
TOE users' use of security
functions related to audit.
The O.ACCOUNT objective
addresses the T.AUDACC threat
by requiring the TOE to provide
accountability for information
flows through the TOE and for
TOE users' use of security
functions related to audit.
O.AUDREC
The TOE must provide a means
to record a readable audit trail of
security-related events, with
accurate dates and times, and a
means for TOE users to search,
sort, and order the audit trail
based on relevant attributes.
The O.AUDREC objective
addresses the T.AUDACC threat
by requiring the TOE to provide a
readable audit trail of security-
related events, thereby allowing
an Administrator or Audit Admin
to discover attacker actions.
O.TIME
The TOE must provide a reliable
time stamp.
The O.TIME objective addresses
the T.AUDACC threat by
requiring the TOE to provide
reliable timestamps for use in
audit records. An Administrator,
or Audit Admin may use the audit
records to identify attacker
actions.
T.MEDIAT
An attacker may send
impermissible information through
the TOE which results in the
exploitation of resources on the
internal network.
O.MEDIATE
The TOE must mediate the flow
of all information between clients
and servers located on internal
and external networks governed
by the TOE, disallowing passage of
non-conformant protocols.
The O.MEDIATE objective
addresses the T.MEDIAT threat
by ensuring that the TOE mediate
the flow of all information
between clients and servers
located on internal and external
networks governed by the TOE.
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Threats Objectives Rationale
T.NOAUTH
An attacker may attempt to bypass
the security of the TOE so as to
access and use security functions
and/or non-security functions
provided by the TOE.
O.AUTHENTICATE
The TOE must uniquely identify
and authenticate the claimed
identity of all TOE users, before
granting an administrator access
to TOE functions and data or, for
certain specified services, to a
connected network. The TOE
must ensure that TOE users
cannot endlessly attempt to login
and authenticate with the wrong
credentials.
The O.AUTHENTICATE
objective addresses the
T.NOAUTH threat by requiring
that the TOE uniquely identify and
authenticate the claimed identity
of all TOE users before granting
access to TOE functions and data,
or to a connected network.
O.LIMEXT
The TOE must provide the means
for TOE users to control and limit
access to TOE security functions
by an authorized external IT
entity.
The O.LIMEXT objective
addresses the T.NOAUTH threat
by requiring the TOE to provide a
means for TOE users to control
and limit access to TOE security
functions by an authorized
external IT entity.
O.SECFUN
The TOE must provide
functionality that enables TOE
users to use the TOE security
functions, and must ensure that
only TOE users are able to access
such functionality.
The O.SECFUN objective
addresses the T.NOAUTH threat
by requiring the TOE to provide
functionality that enables TOE
users to use the TOE security
functions, and ensure that only
authenticated TOE users are able
to access such functionality.
T.REPEAT
An attacker may repeatedly try to
guess authentication data used for
performing I&A functionality in
order to use this information to
launch attacks on the TOE.
O.AUTHENTICATE
The TOE must uniquely identify
and authenticate the claimed
identity of all TOE users, before
granting an administrator access
to TOE functions and data or, for
certain specified services, to a
connected network. The TOE
must ensure that TOE users
cannot endlessly attempt to login
and authenticate with the wrong
credentials.
The O.AUTHENTICATE
objective addresses the T.REPEAT
threat by requiring the TOE to
provide functionality that enables
TOE users to block a login session
after a configurable number of
failed login attempts from the
same IP.
Every Threat is mapped to one or more Objectives in the table above. This complete mapping
demonstrates that the defined security objectives counter all defined threats.
8.2.2 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Policies
There are no organizational security policies defined for this ST.
8.2.3 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Assumptions
Table 15 below gives a mapping of assumptions and the environmental objectives that uphold them.
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Table 15 – Assumptions: Objectives Mapping
Assumptions Objectives Rationale
A.GENPUR
The TOE only stores and executes
security-relevant applications and
only stores data required for its
secure operation.
NOE.GENPUR
The TOE only stores and
executes security-relevant
applications and only stores data
required for its secure operation.
The NOE.GENPUR objective
ensures that the TOE only stores
and executes security-relevant
applications and only stores data
required for its secure operation.
A.NETCON
The TOE environment provides
the network connectivity required
to allow the TOE to perform its
intended function.
OE.TRAFFIC
The TOE environment must be
implemented such that the TOE is
appropriately located within the
network to perform its intended
function.
OE.TRAFFIC upholds this
assumption by ensuring that the
environment provides the TOE
with the appropriate network
configuration to perform its
intended function.
A.NOEVIL
TOE users are non-hostile and
follow all administrator guidance.
NOE.NOEVIL
TOE users are non-hostile and
follow all administrator guidance.
The NOE.NOEVIL objective
ensures that TOE users are non-
hostile and follow all
administrator guidance.
A.PHYSEC
The TOE is physically secure.
NOE.PHYSEC
The physical environment must be
suitable for supporting a
computing device in a secure
setting.
The NOE.PHYSEC objective
ensures that the TOE is physically
secure.
A.PUBLIC
The TOE does not host public
data.
NOE.PUBLIC
The TOE does not host public
data.
The NOE.PUBLIC objective
ensures that the TOE does not
host public data.
A.REMACC
TOE users may only access the
TOE locally.
NOE.REMACC
TOE users may only access the
TOE locally.
The NOE.REMACC objective
ensures that TOE users may only
access the TOE locally.
A.SINGEN
Information cannot flow among the
internal and external networks
unless it passes through the TOE.
NOE.SINGEN
Information cannot flow among
the internal and external
networks unless it passes through
the TOE.
The NOE.SINGEN objective
ensures that information cannot
flow among the internal and
external networks unless it passes
through the TOE.
Every assumption is mapped to one or more Objectives in the table above. This complete mapping
demonstrates that the defined security objectives uphold all defined assumptions.
8.3 Rationale for Extended Security Functional
Requirements
There are no extended Security Functional Requirements in this ST.
8.4 Rationale for Extended TOE Security
Assurance Requirements
There are no extended TOE Security Assurance Requirements in this ST.
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8.5 Security Requirements Rationale
The following discussion provides detailed evidence of coverage for each security objective.
8.5.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE
Objectives
Table 16 below shows a mapping of the objectives and the SFRs that support them.
Table 16 – Objectives: SFRs Mapping
Objective Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
O.AUDREC
The TOE must provide a means to
record a readable audit trail of
security-related events, with
accurate dates and times, and a
means for TOE users to search,
sort, and order the audit trail
based on relevant attributes.
FAU_GEN.1
Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.1 meets this objective
by providing an audit trail listing all
security-relevant actions on the
TOE and on the information
passing through the TOE.
FAU_SAR.1
Audit review
FAU_SAR.1 meets this objective
by ensuring that an Administrator
or Audit Admin are able to read
and interpret all audit information
from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.3
Selectable audit review
FAU_SAR.3 meets this objective
by ensuring the an Administrator
or Audit Admin can search, sort,
and order the audit data based on
time, log comp, action, username,
Firewall rule, in interface, out
interface, source IP, and
destination IP.
FAU_STG.1
Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.1 meets this objective
by ensuring the TOE restricts the
ability to modify or delete the
audit trail to an Administrator or
Audit Admin and to detect any
such behavior by auditing all
management operations.
FPT_STM.1
Reliable time stamps
FPT_STM.1 meets this objective
by ensuring the TOE provides a
reliable time stamp.
O.AUTHENTICATE
The TOE must uniquely identify
and authenticate the claimed
identity of all TOE users, before
granting an administrator access to
TOE functions and data or, for
certain specified services, to a
connected network. The TOE
must ensure that TOE users
FIA_AFL.1
Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1 meets this objective by
ensuring that TOE users cannot
endlessly attempt to login and
authenticate with the wrong
credentials. After some
configurable number of failed login
attempts from the same IP, the IP
address is blocked from
authenticating again.
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Objective Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
cannot endlessly attempt to login
and authenticate with the wrong
credentials.
FIA_UAU.2
User authentication before any
action
FIA_UAU.2 meets this objective
by requiring that all TOE users be
successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated
actions on behalf of those TOE
users.
FIA_UID.2
User identification before any
action
FIA_UID.2 meets this objective by
requiring that all TOE users be
successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated
actions on behalf of those TOE
users.
O.LIMEXT
The TOE must provide the means
for TOE users to control and limit
access to TOE security functions
by an authorized external IT entity.
FMT_MOF.1
Management of security functions
behavior
FMT_MOF.1 meets this objective
by restricting the ability to access
and perform security functions to
TOE users with sufficient
permission level.
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management
functions
FMT_SMF.1 meets this objective
by requiring that the TOE
provides specification of
Management Functions for TOE
users.
O.MEDIATE
The TOE must mediate the flow of
all information between clients and
servers located on internal and
external networks governed by the
TOE, disallowing passage of non-
conformant protocols.
FDP_IFC.1
Subset information flow control
FDP_IFC.1 meets this objective by
specifying the rules by which
subjects will accept, reject, or
drop information to flow to and
from other subjects.
FDP_IFF.1
Simple security attributes
FDP_IFF.1 meets this objective by
specifying the rules by which
subjects will accept, reject, or
drop information to flow to and
from other subjects.
FMT_MSA.1
Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1 meets this objective
by enforcing the Traffic
Information Flow Control
Security Functional Policy, which
restricts the ability create or
delete security attributes in the
Traffic Information Flow Control
List to an Administrator or
Security Admin.
FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialization
FMT_MSA.3 meets this objective
by ensuring that the Traffic
Information Flow Control
Security Functional Policy has a
permissive default policy that can
be changed only by an
Administrator or Security Admin.
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Objective Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
O.SECFUN
The TOE must provide
functionality that enables TOE
users to use the TOE security
functions, and must ensure that
only TOE users are able to access
such functionality.
FIA_UAU.2
User authentication before any
action
FIA_UAU.2 meets this objective
by requiring that all TOE users be
successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated
actions on behalf of those TOE
users.
FMT_MOF.1
Management of security functions
behavior
FMT_MOF.1 meets this objective
by restricting access and
performance of TOE security
functions to TOE users with
sufficient permission level.
FMT_MSA.1
Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1 meets this objective
by enforcing the Traffic
Information Flow Control
Security Functional Policy, which
restricts the ability to create or
delete security attributes in the
Traffic Information Flow Control
List to Administrator or Security
Admin.
FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialization
FMT_MSA.3 meets this objective
by enforcing the Traffic
Information Flow Control
Security Functional Policy to
provide restrictive default values
for security attributes.
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management
functions
FMT_SMF.1 meets this objective
by requiring that the TOE
provides specification of
Management Functions for TOE
users.
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FMT_SMR.1 meets this objective
by defining the permission levels
available to TOE users.
FTA_SSL.1
TSF-initiated session locking
FTA_SSL.1 meets the objective by
ensuring that the TOE restricts
TOE users gaining access to the
TOE by configuring a settable
number of unsuccessful login
attempts for the TOE users'
accounts, before they are locked
out.
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Objective Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
FTA_SSL.3
TSF-initiated termination
FTA_SSL.3 meets this objective by
terminating an interactive session
after a configurable time interval
of TOE user inactivity at the
Management Console. The TOE
users must then login again to
access the TOE.
FTA_TAB.1
Default TOE access banners
FTA_TAB.1 meets this objective
by allowing the Administrator or
Security Admin to configure the
TOE by displaying an access
banner warning against
unauthorized access.
O.TIME
The TOE must provide a reliable
time stamp.
FPT_STM.1
Reliable time stamps
FPT_STM.1 meets this objective
by ensuring the TOE provides a
reliable time stamp.
8.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
EAL4+ was selected because it is best suited to addressing the stated security objectives. EAL4+
challenges vendors to use best (rather than average) commercial practices. EAL4+ allows the vendor to
evaluate their product at a detailed level, while still benefitting from the Common Criteria Recognition
Agreement. The chosen assurance level is appropriate for the threats defined in the environment.
The augmentation of ALC_FLR.2 was chosen to give greater assurance of the developer’s on-going flaw
remediation process.
8.5.3 Dependency Rationale
The SFRs in this ST satisfy all of the required dependencies listed in the Common Criteria, applicable PPs,
and SFRs explicitly stated in this ST. Table 17 lists each requirement to which the TOE claims
conformance and indicates whether the dependent requirements are included. As the table indicates, all
dependencies have been met.
Table 17 – Functional Requirements Dependencies
SFR ID Dependencies Dependency
Met
Rationale
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 
FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.1 
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1 
FDP_IFF.1 FMT_MSA.3 
FDP_IFC.1 
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UID.1 NO Although FIA_UID.1 is
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SFR ID Dependencies Dependency
Met
Rationale
not included, FIA_UID.2,
which is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1 is included.
This satisfies this
dependency.
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 NO Although FIA_UID.1 is
not included, FIA_UID.2,
which is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1 is included.
This satisfies this
dependency.
FIA_UID.2 No dependencies Not applicable
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_MSA.1 FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_SMF.1 
FDP_IFC.1 
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MSA.1 
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies Not applicable
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 NO Although FIA_UID.1 is
not included, FIA_UID.2,
which is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1 is included.
This satisfies this
dependency.
FPT_STM.1 No dependencies Not applicable
FTA_SSL.1 FIA_UAU.1 NO Although FIA_UID.1 is
not included, FIA_UID.2,
which is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1 is included.
This satisfies this
dependency.
FTA_SSL.3 No dependencies Not applicable
FTA_TAB.1 No dependencies Not applicable
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9 Acronyms
This section and Table 18 define the acronyms used throughout this document.
Table 18 – Acronyms and Terms
Acronym Definition
3G Third Generation
CC Common Criteria
CD Compact Disk
CLI Command Line Interface
CM Configuration Management
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
DoS Denial of Service
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GUI Graphical User Interface
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IM Instant Messengers
IMAP Internet Message Access Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
IPS Intrusion Prevention System
IPSec Internet Protocol Security
IPv6 Internet Protocol Version 6
IT Information Technology
L2 Layer 2
L2TP Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol
L7 Layer 7
L8 Layer 8
LAN Local Area Network
LCD Liquid Crystal Display
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MAC Media Access Control
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Acronym Definition
NTP Network Time Protocol
OS Operating System
PDF Portable Document Format
POP3 Post Office Protocol 3
PP Protection Profile
PPPoE Point-to-point over Ethernet
PPTP Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol
QoS Quality of Service
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Functional Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SQL Structured Query Language
SSH Secure Shell
SSL Secure Socket Layer
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSP TOE Security Policy
UPS Uninterruptible power supply
URL Uniform Resource Locator
USB Universal Serial Bus
UTM Unified Threat Management
VPN Virtual Private Network
WAN Wide Area Network
WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
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