National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme
Validation Report
Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
Aruba Mobility Controller with ArubaOS 8.6
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-11110-2021
Dated: 02/05/2021
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Sheldon Durrant
Linda Morrison
Lisa Mitchell
Jenn Dotson
Clare Olin
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Khai Van
Katie Sykes
Andrew Ding
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 3
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 5
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 7
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 7
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 7
4.3 User Data Protection........................................................................................... 7
4.4 Firewall ............................................................................................................... 7
4.5 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 7
4.6 Security management.......................................................................................... 8
4.7 Packet Filtering................................................................................................... 8
4.8 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 8
4.9 TOE Access ........................................................................................................ 8
4.10 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 9
5 Assumptions, Threats, and Clarification of Scope.................................................... 10
5.1 Clarification of Scope ....................................................................................... 10
6 Documentation.......................................................................................................... 11
7 IT Product Testing .................................................................................................... 12
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................. 12
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................. 12
8 Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 13
9 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 15
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 15
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)............................................................ 15
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 15
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................... 16
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 16
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 16
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 17
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 18
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 19
12 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 20
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 21
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 22
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Aruba Mobility Controller Series with ArubaOS
8.6 solution provided by Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company. It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report
is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government,
and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in February 2021. The information in this report is largely derived from the
proprietary Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by
Gossamer Security Solutions and summarized in the publicly available Assurance Activity
Report (AAR) for this evaluation. The evaluation determined that the product is both
Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance
requirements of the PP-Configuration for Network Devices, Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls,
and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version 1.0, 2020-03-06 which includes the
following components:
 collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 24 September
2018 (NDcPP21)
 PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.3, 27 September 2019
(STFFW13)
 PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version 1.0, 2019-09-17
(VPNGW10)
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Aruba Mobility Controller with ArubaOS 8.6. The TOE
is a multi-purpose network device with stateful traffic filter firewall and VPN gateway
capabilities.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
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correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Aruba Mobility
Controller with ArubaOS 8.6 (NDcPP21/STFFW13/VPNGW10) Security Target, Version
1.0, 02/05/2021 and analysis performed by the validation team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Aruba Mobility Controller with ArubaOS 8.6
(Specific models identified in Section 3.1)
Protection Profile
PP-Configuration for Network Devices, Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, and
Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version 1.0, 2020-03-06 which
includes the following components:
 collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 24
September 2018 (NDcPP21)
 PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.3, 27
September 2019 (STFFW13)
 PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version 1.0,
2019-09-17 (VPNGW10)
ST Aruba Mobility Controller with ArubaOS 8.6 (NDcPP21/STFFW13/VPNGW10)
Security Target, Version 1.0, 02/05/2021
Evaluation Technical
Report
Aruba Mobility Controller with ArubaOS 8.6, Version 0.4, 02/05/2021
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Item Identifier
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
Developer Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators Sheldon Durrant, Linda Morrison, Lisa Mitchell, Jenn Dotson, Clare Olin
The MITRE Corporation
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
Aruba Mobility Controllers (MCs) are hardware appliances consisting of a multicore
network processor, Ethernet interfaces, and required supporting circuitry and power supplies
enclosed in a metal chassis. Aruba Virtual Mobility Controllers (VMCs) consist of a 64-bit
virtualized software-based managed platform on virtual machine (VM) architecture. The
Aruba VMC operates on x86 platforms in a hypervisor environment.
The ArubaOS software running on the MCs and VMCs consists of two main components:
 Control Plane (CP) – implements functions which can be handled at lower speeds
such as Mobility Controller system management (CLI and Web GUI), VMC system
management (CLI and Web GUI), user authentication (e.g. RADIUS), Internet Key
Exchange (IKE), auditing/logging (syslog), Wireless IDS (WIDS), and termination
of protocols operating at the system level (e.g. SSH, TLS, NTP, etc.). The Control
Plane runs the Linux operating system along with various user-space applications
(described below).
 Data Plane (DP) - implements functions that must be handled at high speeds such as
high-speed switching functions (forwarding, VLAN tagging/enforcement, bridging),
termination of 802.11 associations/sessions, tunnel termination (IPsec), stateful
firewall and deep packet inspection functions, and cryptographic acceleration. The
Data Plane runs a lightweight, proprietary real-time OS which is known as “SOS”
(an acronym which used to mean “SiByte Operating System” for an earlier generation
of Mobility Controller that used the SiByte CPU). On the Mobility Controller
hardware appliances, SOS runs on separate CPU cores. On the Virtual Mobility
Controller appliances, SOS is a process running under Linux.
The Control Plane and Data Plane are inseparable. Administrators install the MC software
by loading a single file, identified as “ArubaOS”. Administrators install the VMC by creating
a virtual machine in the ESXi client interface and then applying the VMC OVF template to
the virtual machine, identified as “ArubaOS”. Internally, the controllers unpack the ArubaOS
software image into its various components. A given ArubaOS software image has a single
version number and includes all software components necessary to operate the MC and VMC
appliances as well as the APs which are in the operating environment of the TOE.
The CP runs the Linux OS, along with various custom user-space applications which provide
the following CP functions:
 Monitors and manages critical system resources, including processes, memory, and
flash
 Manages system configuration and licensing
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 Manages an internal database used to store licenses, user authentication information,
etc
 Provides network anomaly detection, hardware monitoring, mobility management,
wireless management, and radio frequency management services
 Provides a Command Line Interface (CLI)
 Provides a web-based (HTTPS/TLS) management UI for the MCs and VMCs
 Provides authentication services for the system management interfaces (CLI, web
GUI)
 Provides IPsec key management services for VPN users, and connections with other
Aruba mobility controllers
 Provides network time protocol service, point to point tunneling protocol services for
users, layer 2 tunneling protocol services for users, SSH services for incoming
management connections, SNMP client/agent services, and protocol independent
multicast (routing) services for the controller
 Provides syslog services by sending logs to the operating environment
The Linux OS running on the CP is a version 2.6.32 kernel for the MCs and a version 3.18.26
kernel for the VMCs. Linux is a soft real-time, multi-threaded operating system that supports
memory protection between processes. Only Aruba provided interfaces are used, and the CLI
is a restricted command set. Administrators do not have access to the Linux command shell
or operating system.
All Aruba Mobility Controller and Virtual Mobility Controller models run the same
ArubaOS 8.6 software and include the same ArubaOS Crypto Module. Regardless of the
different hardware and virtual platforms, the security functionality remains the same. The
differences in the platforms are in the processing speed, throughput, memory capacity,
storage, physical interfaces, number of ports, etc., and are based on performance and
scalability requirements. All models run the same code with the only differences being the
hardware specific code for the differently scaled hardware and the virtual nature of the
hardware ports on the VMs.
The Virtual Mobility Controller uses gigabit Ethernet interfaces just as a hardware-based
mobility controller does, but these interfaces map to virtual interfaces created in the
underlying hypervisor. Those interfaces, in turn, may map directly to physical ports. The
device drivers on all VM platforms are identical because the ArubaOS is being run on a
hypervisor. Within the hypervisor, there may be slight differences in device drivers (mostly
for network interfaces), however, the device drivers are not used to enforce any TOE security
functions.
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4 Security Policy
The TOE provides the security functionality required by NDcPP21, STFFW13, and
VPNGW10 as listed below:
4.1 Security audit
The TOE is designed to be able to generate logs for a wide range of security relevant events
including start-up and shutdown of the TOE, all administrator actions, and all Protection
Profile required auditable events. The TOE can be configured to store the logs locally or
alternately configured to send the logs to a designated syslog server in the operational
environment.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes cryptographic modules that provide key management, random bit
generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature, and secure hashing and key-hashing
features in support of higher level cryptographic protocols including IPsec, SSH, and
TLS/HTTPS.
4.3 User Data Protection
The TOE ensures that any data packets passing through the TOE do not inadvertently contain
any residual information that might be disclosed inappropriately.
4.4 Firewall
The TOE performs stateful packet filtering. Filtering rules may be applied to appliance
Ethernet interfaces or to user-roles (wireless clients connecting through APs are placed into
user-roles). Stateful packet filter policies are applied to user-roles to allow fine grained
control over wireless traffic.
4.5 Identification and authentication
The TOE requires administrators to be identified and authenticated before they can access
any TOE security functions. The TOE supports role-based authentication, so user accounts
are assigned predefined roles which restrict them based on their assigned role. The TOE
maintains these administrator and user attributes which can be defined locally with user
names and passwords or can be defined in the context of RADIUS or TACACS+ services.
Authentication can be either locally or remotely through an external authentication server, or
internally. After an administrator-specified number of failed attempts, the user account is
locked out. The TOE’s password mechanism provides configuration for a minimum
password length. The TOE also protects, stores and allows authorized administrators to load
X.509.v3 certificates for use to support authentication for IPsec connections.
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4.6 Security management
The TOE provides the administrator role the capability to configure and manage all TOE
security functions including cryptographic operations, user accounts, passwords, advisory
banner, session inactivity and TOE updates. The management functions are restricted to the
administrator role. The role must have the appropriate access privileges or access will be
denied. The TOE’s cryptographic functions ensure that only secure values are accepted for
security attributes.
4.7 Packet Filtering
The TOE may be used as a VPN gateway – a device at the edge of a private network that
terminates an IPsec tunnel, which provides device authentication, confidentiality, and
integrity of information traversing a public or untrusted network. The TOE provides packet
filtering and secure IPsec tunneling. The tunnels can be established between two trusted VPN
peers as well as between remote VPN clients and the TOE. An administrator can configure
security policies that determine whether to block, allow, or log a session based on traffic
attributes such as the source and destination security zone, the source and destination IP
address, the application, user, and the service.
4.8 Protection of the TSF
The TOE has an internal hardware clock that provides reliable time stamps used for auditing.
The internal clock may be synchronized with a time signal obtained from an external trusted
NTP server. The TOE stores passwords on flash using a SHA1 hash and does not provide
any interfaces that allow passwords or keys to be read.
The TOE runs self-tests during power up and periodically during operation to ensure the
correct operation of the cryptographic functions and TSF hardware. There is an option for
the administrator to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
The TOE includes mechanisms so that the administrator can determine the TOE version and
update the TOE securely using digital signatures.
4.9 TOE Access
The TOE allows administrators to configure a session inactivity time limit for both
administrator and wireless user sessions. When the configured time period of no activity has
elapsed, the session is terminated. All users can also terminate their own sessions at any time.
A warning banner is displayed at the management interfaces (Web GUI and CLI) to advise
users on appropriate use and penalty for misuse of system.
In order to limit access to the administrative functions, the TOE can be configured to deny
wireless clients and remote VPN clients based on the time/date, IP address (location), as well
as information retained in a blacklist. The TOE assigns a private IP address (internal to the
trusted network for which the TOE is the headend) to a VPN client upon successful
establishment of a session.
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4.10 Trusted path/channels
The TOE uses IPsec to provide an encrypted channel between itself and third-party trusted
IT entities in the operating environment including Aruba access point(s), external syslog
server, external authentication server, 802.1x authentication server, NTP server and VPN
Gateway/Client. The TOE also uses IPsec to encrypt communications between TOE
components.
The TOE secures remote communication with administrators by implementing TLS/HTTPS
for remote Web UI access and SSHv2 for CLI access. In each case, both the integrity and
disclosure protection is ensured via the secure protocol. If the negotiation of a secure session
fails or if the user cannot be authenticated for remote administration, the attempted session
will not be established.
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5 Assumptions, Threats, and Clarification of Scope
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions and threats, may be found in the
following documents:
 collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 24 September
2018 (NDcPP21)
 PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.3, 27 September 2019
(STFFW13)
 PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version 1.0, 2019-09-17
(VPNGW10)
That information has not been reproduced here and those particular Protection Profiles and
PP-Modules (NDcPP21/STFFW13/VPNGW10) should be consulted if there is interest in
that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP21/STFFW13/VPNGW10 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
5.1 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
could benefit from clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and
clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the NDcPP21/STFFW13/VPNGW10 and performed by the
evaluation team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions either released or in process.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the NDcPP21/STFFW13/VPNGW10 and the applicable
Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the
TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
 Aruba OS 8.6 Supplemental Guidance (Common Criteria Configuration Guidance),
Version 1.10, February 05, 2021
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in that guide. Any additional customer documentation provided with the product,
or that which may be available online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and
therefore should not be relied upon to configure or operate the device in its evaluated
configuration. Consumers are encouraged to download the CC configuration guide from the
NIAP website.
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7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Assurance Activity Report
(NDcPP21/STFFW13/VPNGW10) for Aruba Mobility Controller with ArubaOS 8.6,
Version 1.0, 02/05/2021 (AAR). The AAR shows the test configuration, identifies the tested
platforms and lists the test tools used in the evaluation.
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to the vendor provided Common Criteria
Configuration Guidance document and performed the test activities specified in the
NDcPP21/STFFW13/VPNGW10 including the tests associated with optional requirements.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the Aruba Mobility Controller with ArubaOS version
8.6 with the following required software licenses installed:
 Policy Enforcement Firewall
 RFprotect
 Advanced Cryptography
The TOE includes the following hardware and virtual appliance models:
Mobility Controller Hardware Appliances
Product Model Part Number(s) CPU
Aruba 9004 Mobility Controller R1B25A Intel Atom C3508 (Denverton)
Aruba 7005 Mobility Controller JW636A Broadcom XLP208 (MIPS64)
Aruba 7008 Mobility Controller JX932A Broadcom XLP208 (MIPS64)
Aruba 7010 Mobility Controller JW703A Broadcom XLP208 (MIPS64)
Aruba 7024 Mobility Controller JW707A Broadcom XLP208 (MIPS64)
Aruba 7030 Mobility Controller JW711A Broadcom XLP208 (MIPS64)
Aruba 7205 Mobility Controller JW740A Broadcom XLP316 (MIPS64)
Aruba 7210 Mobility Controller JW746A Broadcom XLP416 (MIPS64)
Aruba 7220 Mobility Controller JW754A Broadcom XLP432 (MIPS64)
Aruba 7240 Mobility Controller JW762A Broadcom XLP432 (MIPS64)
Aruba 7240XM Mobility Controller JW830A Broadcom XLP432 (MIPS64)
Aruba 7280 Mobility Controller JX914A Broadcom XLP780 (MIPS64)
Mobility Controller Virtual Appliances
 MC-VA-50
 MC-VA-250
 MC-VA-1k
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VM Platforms
The Mobility Controller Virtual Appliances are deployed on ESXi version 6.5.0. The
following virtual machine platforms are included in the evaluated configuration:
Name CPU Memory
HPE EdgeLine EL8000 Intel Xeon Gold 6212U
(Cascade Lake)
128GB
Klas Telecom VoyagerVM3 Intel Xeon D (Coffee Lake) 96GB
IAS VPN Gateway Module
Classic Plus
Intel Core i7 (Skylake) 32GB
Pacstar 451/3 Intel Xeon D (Coffee Lake) 32GB
Pacstar 451/3 Intel Xeon E3 (Coffee
Lake)
32GB
DTECH M3-SE-SVR4 Intel Xeon E3 v5-1505L
(Skylake)
32GB
DTECH M3x Intel Core i5 (Skylake) 32GB
GTS NXGEN-L11/12 Intel Core i7 (Coffee Lake) 16GB
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR as characterized in the publicly available
Assurance Activity Report for this evaluation. The reader of this document can assume that
all assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Aruba Mobility
Controller with ArubaOS version 8.6 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs
contained in the NDcPP21/STFFW13/VPNGW10.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Aruba Mobility Controller with ArubaOS
version 8.6 products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security
function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the NDcPP21/STFFW13/VPNGW10 related
to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
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to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP21/STFFW13/VPNGW10 and
recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities and fuzz testing. None of the public search for
vulnerabilities or the fuzz testing uncovered any residual vulnerability.
The evaluation team performed a public search for vulnerabilities in order to ensure there are
no publicly known and exploitable vulnerabilities in the TOE from the following sources:
 National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search)
 Vulnerability Notes Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/)
 Rapid7 Vulnerability Database (https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities)
 Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative (http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories )
 Exploit / Vulnerability Search Engine (http://www.exploitsearch.net)
 SecurITeam Exploit Search (http://www.securiteam.com)
 Tenable Network Security (http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search)
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 Offensive Security Exploit Database (https://www.exploit-db.com/)
The search was performed on 01/16/2021 with the following search terms: aruba tcp", "aruba
mobility controller", "arubaos", "aruba ipsec", "aruba ssh", "aruba tls", "arubaos openssl",
"arubaos uboot", "aruba vmc", "aruba vpn", "esxi", “sos”, “sibyte”, “linux OS v2.6.32
kernel”, “linux OSv3.18.26 kernel”.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated
configuration of the device(s). The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the
security functional requirements specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality
implemented by the SFRs within the Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality
provided by the devices, to include software or hardware that was not part of the evaluated
configuration, needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness. Other functionality provided by devices in the operational environment,
such as the audit server or authentication server, need to be assessed separately and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
Consumers employing the devices must follow the configuration instructions provided in the
Configuration Guidance documentation listed in Section 6 to ensure the evaluated
configuration is established and maintained.
For the TOE to be operated in the Common Criteria Mode the following software licenses
must be installed on the device:
 Policy Enforcement Firewall
 RFprotect
 Advanced Cryptography
Note that authentication testing was not performed using TACACs, nor was testing
performed on each individual VM platform included in the evaluated configuration; rather,
equivalencies were claimed for those devices utilizing the VM and evaluated software.
The TOE's SSH server has a hardcoded function to shut down any invalid SSH session
establishment after 2 tries. This function does not affect the TOE's ability to keep track of
the number of authentication tries.
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11 Annexes
Not applicable
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12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Aruba Mobility Controller with ArubaOS 8.6 Security
Target (NDcPP21/STFFW13/VPNGW10), Version 1.0, 02/05/2021.
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, September 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, September 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, September 2017.
[4] Aruba Mobility Controller with ArubaOS 8.6 Security Target
(NDcPP21/STFFW13/VPNGW10), Version 1.0, 02/05/2021
[5] Assurance Activity Report (NDcPP21/STFFW13/VPNGW10) for Aruba Mobility
Controller with ArubaOS 8.6, Version 1.0, 02/05/2021 (AAR).
[6] Aruba OS 8.6 Supplemental Guidance (Common Criteria Configuration Guidance),
Version 1.10, February 2021 (Admin Guide)