TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Version
2023-06
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Certification Report
JCOP 4.5 P71
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Beiersdorfstrasse 12
22529 Hamburg
Germany
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2300127-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2300127-01
Author(s): Jordi Mujal
Date: 16 January 2024
Number of pages: 14
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 9
2.6.3 Test configuration 9
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 10
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 10
2.9 Evaluation Results 10
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 10
3 Security Target 12
4 Definitions 12
5 Bibliography 14
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the JCOP
4.5 P71. The developer of the JCOP 4.5 P71 is NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in
Hamburg, Germany and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification
Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security
properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a Java Card with a GP Framework, it is a composite product consisting of a certified Micro
Controller and a software stack which is stored on the Micro Controller and which can be executed by
the Micro Controller. The TOE uses one or more communication interfaces to communicate with its
environment. The TOE includes the JCVM, JCRE, JCAPI and the GP Framework. Also included is
optional functionality and the Secure Box mechanism. Secure Box Native Libraries provide native
functions for untrusted third parties and are not part of the TOE.
The TOE was previously evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified under the accreditation of TÜV Rheinland Nederland on 02 August 2022 (CC-22-0313985).
The current evaluation of the TOE has also been conducted by SGS Brightsight B.V. and was
completed on 16 January 2024 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of
IT Security [NSCIB].
The major changes from previous evaluations are:
- The underlying HW platform was recertified.
- The Security Target of the certified TOE has been updated to include the updated HW platform and
some SFRs are rephrased.
- Guidance is updated.
The security evaluation reused the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up-
to-date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the JCOP 4.5 P71, the security requirements, and
the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the
security requirements. Consumers of the JCOP 4.5 P71 are advised to verify that their own
environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments,
observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL6 augmented (EAL6+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ASE_TSS.2 “TOE summary
specification with architectural design summary” and ALC_FLR.1 “Basic flaw remediation”.
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the JCOP 4.5 P71 from NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7122
with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto
Library (R1/R2/R3)
Customer Option: NOS-ROM
See [HW-CERT] for more details.
A1
IC Dedicated Test Software – Test Software 11.6.5
IC Dedicated Support Software
- Boot Software
- Firmware
- Library Interface
11.6.5
11.6.5
11.6.5
IC Dedicated Support Software
- Crypto Library
1.1.2
Library
- Communication Library
- CRC Library
- Memory Library
7.10.2
1.1.8
1.2.3.1
Software
JCOP 4.5 OS
OS Updater
Modules
JCOP 4.5 OS
Platform ID = J3R6000373181200
ROM ID = B3375FE9B5508BC4
Patch ID = 0000000000000000
(svn = 226072)
Variant 1
Platform Build ID = 6D20B6197D635E7C
OS Core ID = 55606FD4BEECF3CD
Variant 2
Platform Build ID = 5314F0A7BAE6B138
OS Core ID = 318CCEEB284A3AF9
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the JCOP 4.5 P71.
For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.3.3.
2.2 Security Policy
The following cryptographic algorithms are supported:
• Data Encryption Standard with 3 keys (3DES) for en-/decryption (CBC and ECB) and MAC
generation and verification (Retail-MAC, CMAC and CBC-MAC).
• Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) for en-/decryption (CBC, ECB and counter mode) and MAC
generation and verification (CMAC, CBC-MAC).
• Rivest Shamir Adleman asymmetric algorithm (RSA) and RSA CRT for en-/ decryption and
signature generation and verification.
• Modular and ECC point arithmetic functions not provided by the standard Java Card API
• RSA and RSA Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) key generation.
• Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) over GF(p) for signature generation and verification (ECDSA).
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• ECC over GF(p) key generation.
• Random number generation according to class DRG.3 or DRG.4 of AIS 20.
• Diffie-Hellman with ECDH and modular exponentiation.
• SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 hash algorithm.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
The following (non-TSF) cryptographic primitives are supported but no there is no security claim on
them:
• KoreanSEED
• AES in Counter with CBC-MAC mode (AES CCM)
• Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
• HMAC-based Key Derivation Function (HKDF)
• Elliptic Curve Direct Anonymous Attestation (ECDAA)
• ECC based on Edwards and Montgomery curves
2.4 Architectural Information
The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST] of the TOE can be depicted as
follows:
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2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
JCOP 4.5 P71, User manual for JCOP 4.5 P71, User Guidance and
Administrator Manual
Rev. 1.8 – 2023-
04-03.
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and module level,
covering all security functions and aspects of the TSF. The developer uses a set of industry standard
and proprietary test suites and tools. The TOE is tested both in its physical implementation and using
simulator and emulator platforms in order to cover all relevant aspects. During testing, the TOE is
identified by its SVN number.
The developer uses a distributed and fully automated test environment to allow the execution of a vast
number of parallel tests. All results are logged and any unexpected results are flagged for analysis.
The overall completeness is being monitored using code coverage tools. For each tool, the developer
has investigated and documented inherent limitations that can lead to coverage being reported as less
than 100%. For all such cases, the developer provided a “gap” analysis with rationales.
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The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations,
because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
The evaluators witnessed a selection of the developer tests covering various aspects of the TOE, as
well as areas where the code coverage approach has limitations.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment.
The evaluator independent testing was focused on verifying the TOE identification mechanisms to
ensure that the preparative guidance procedures are sufficient, and on the adherence of the TOE
implementation to the Java Card and GlobalPlatform specifications for selected corner cases.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The independent vulnerability analysis was performed according to [CC] and [JIL-AM]. The ratings
have been calculated according to [JIL-AAPS]. Overall, it was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in classes ASE, ADV and AGD, the evaluator considered
whether potential vulnerabilities could already be identified due to the TOE type and/or
specified behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review was performed on the TOE.
During this attack-oriented analysis, the protection of the TOE was analysed using the
knowledge gained from all evaluation classes. This resulted in the identification of (additional)
potential vulnerabilities. This analysis used the attack methods in [JIL-AM] and rating
calculations in [JIL-AAPS].
• All potential vulnerabilities were analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that
these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities were addressed
by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that were deemed appropriate.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators in the original evaluation was 17 weeks. During that
test campaign, 47% of the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 41% on side-channel testing,
and 12% on logical tests. During this evaluation, the total test effort expended by the evaluators was 4
weeks. During that test campaign, 50% of the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 25% on
side-channel testing, and 25% on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was
the same as described in the [ST].
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the
AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. The TOE supports a wider range of key sizes (see [ST]), including
those with sufficient algorithmic security level to exceed 100 bits as required for high attack potential
(AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
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2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been reused, but vulnerability
analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of five Site Technical Audit Reports. In addition, sites involved in the
development and production of the hardware platform were re-used by composition.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number JCOP 4.5 P71.
The TOE can be identified by means of the IDENTIFY command as described [ST] section 1.3.4 and
[UG] chapter 2. The IDENTIFY command also returns information about modules present in the TOE.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to
[COMP] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document provides details of
the TOE evaluation that must be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite
evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the JCOP 4.5 P71, to be CC Part
2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 6 augmented with
ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements
specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ‘demonstrable’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP_0099].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations:
• KoreanSEED
• AES in Counter with CBC-MAC mode (AES CCM)
• Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
• HMAC-based Key Derivation Function (HKDF)
• Elliptic Curve Direct Anonymous Attestation (ECDAA)
• ECC based on Edwards and Montgomery curves
Which are out of scope as there are no security claims relating to these.
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Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
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3 Security Target
The JCOP 4.5 P71 Security Target, Rev. 2.6, 11 December 2023 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
CFB Cipher Feedback
CTR Counter
DES Data Encryption Standard
CPLC Card Production Life Cycle
CRT Chinese Remainder Theorem
CSP Cryptographic Service Provider
DES Data Encryption Standard
DRG Deterministic Random Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block cipher mode of operation)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDAA Elliptic Curve Direct Anonymous Attestation
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman
EDC Error Detection Code
EdDSA Elliptic Curve Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm
eUICC embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GF Galois Field
GP Global Platform
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GSMA Groupe Speciale Mobile Association
IM4 Image4
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MAC Message Authentication Code
MNO Mobile Network Operators
NFC Near-Field Communication
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
PP Protection Profile
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RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMB Secure Mailbox
TOE Target of Evaluation
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “NXP JCOP 4.5 P71” – EAL6+, 23-RPT-1351,
version 2.0, 20 December 2023
[ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition “NXP JCOP 4.5 P71” – EAL6+,
23-RPT-1350, version 2.0, 20 December 2023
[HW-CERT] Certification Report, NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7122 with IC
Dedicated Software and Crypto Library (R1/R2/R3) from NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH, BSI-DSZ-CC-1149-V3-2023
[HW-ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation (ETR COMP) for NXP
Secure Smart Card Controller N7122 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto
Library (R1/R2/R3), Version 2, 01 December 2023
[HW-ST] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7122 with IC Dedicated Software and
Crypto Library (R1/R2/R3) Security Target Lite, Rev. 1.8, 1 December 2023
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2, November 2022
[JIL-AMS] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[PP_0099] Java Card System - Open Configuration Protection Profile, December 2017,
Version 3.0.5, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0099-2017
[ST] JCOP 4.5 P71 Security Target, Rev. 2.6, 11 December 2023
[ST-lite] JCOP 4.5 P71 Security Target Lite, Rev. 2.6, 11 December 2023
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)