National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Extreme Networks, Inc.
NetIron Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare
R06.3.00aa
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10998-2019
Dated: September 24, 2019
Version: 0.1
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
Extreme Networks NetIron 06.3.00aa Validation Report Version 0.1, September 24, 2019
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Paul Bicknell
Jenn Dotson
Randy Heimann
Clare Olin
Chris Thorpe
The MITRE Corporation
Bedford, MA
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Cornelius Haley
Wasif Sikder
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................1
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................1
3 Architectural Information...................................................................................................2
3.1 TOE Description.........................................................................................................3
3.2 TOE Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................3
3.3 Physical Scope of the TOE.........................................................................................3
4 Security Policy....................................................................................................................4
4.1 Cryptographic support................................................................................................4
4.2 Identification and authentication ................................................................................4
4.3 Security management .................................................................................................4
4.4 Protection of the TSF..................................................................................................4
4.5 TOE Access................................................................................................................5
4.6 Trusted channels.........................................................................................................5
5 Assumptions .......................................................................................................................5
6 Clarification of Scope.........................................................................................................5
7 Documentation ...................................................................................................................6
8 IT Product Testing..............................................................................................................6
8.1 Developer Testing ......................................................................................................6
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................6
9 Evaluated Configuration.....................................................................................................6
10 Results of the Evaluation....................................................................................................7
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)....................................................................7
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)......................................................................7
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD).........................................................7
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC).............................................8
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE).........................8
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN) ................................................................8
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results .................................................................................9
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations............................................................................9
12 Annexes ..............................................................................................................................9
13 Security Target ...................................................................................................................9
14 Glossary..............................................................................................................................9
15 Bibliography.....................................................................................................................10
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Extreme Networks, Inc. NetIron Family Devices
with Multi-Service IronWare R06.3.00aa. It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of
the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either
expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in August 2019. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part
2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative
Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 24 September 2018 (NDcPP21).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the NetIron Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare
R06.3.00aa.
The TOE identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of
the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions
of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the
testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the
product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the
Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s
findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Extreme Networks,
Inc. NetIron Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R06.3.00aa Security Target,
Version 0.4, September 9, 2019 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
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Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Product Compliant
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
ï‚· The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
ï‚· The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
ï‚· The conformance result of the evaluation.
ï‚· The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
ï‚· The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Extreme Networks, Inc. NetIron Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare
R06.3.00aa
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 24 September
2018
ST Extreme Networks, Inc. NetIron Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare
R06.3.00aa (NDcPP21) Security Target, Version 0.4, September 9, 2019
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Extreme Networks, Inc. NetIron Family Devices
with Multi-Service IronWare R06.3.00aa, version 0.3, September 24, 2019
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Extreme Networks, Inc.
Developer Extreme Networks, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
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The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Extreme Networks, Inc. NetIron Family Devices with
Multi-Service IronWare R06.3.00aa.
The TOE is composed of a hardware appliance with embedded software installed on a
management processor. The embedded software is a version of Extreme’s proprietary Multi-
Service IronWare software. The software controls the switching and routing network frames
and packets among the connections available on the hardware appliances.
3.1 TOE Description
The basic architecture of each TOE appliance begins with a hardware appliance with physical
network connections. Within the hardware appliance, the Extreme IronWare OS is designed
to control and enable access to the available hardware functions (e.g., program execution,
device access, facilitate basic routing functions). IronWare OS enforces applicable security
policies on network information flowing through the hardware appliance.
During normal operation, IP packets are sent to the management IP address or through the
appliance over one or more of its physical network interfaces, which processes them
according to the system’s configuration and state information dynamically maintained by the
appliance. This processing typically results in the frames or packets being forwarded out of
the device over another interface. The TOE will process other packets destined for itself
(control path packets) based on the requirements of the given protocol (i.e., SSH).
3.2 TOE Evaluated Configuration
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Extreme Networks, Inc. NetIron Family Devices with
Multi-Service IronWare R06.3.00aa including the following series and models:
ï‚· Extreme NetIron MLXe Series Hardware Platforms
o BR-MLXE-4-AC,BR-MLXE-8-AC,BR-MLXE-16-AC with management card
BR-MLX-MR2-X
o BR-MLXE-32-AC with management card BR-MLX-MR2-32-X
ï‚· Extreme NetIron CER 2000 Series Hardware Platforms
o BR-CER-2024C-4X-RT
o BR-CER-2024F-4X-RT.
While there are different models in the TOE, they differ primarily in physical form factor,
number and types of connections and slots, and relative performance. There are some
functional differences among the families, but they each provide the same security
characteristics as claimed in this security target.
3.3 Physical Scope of the TOE
Each TOE appliance runs a version of the Extreme’s software and has physical network
connections to its environment to facilitate routing and switching of network traffic. The TOE
appliance can also be the destination of network traffic, where it provides interfaces for its
own management.
The TOE may be accessed and managed through a PC or terminal in the environment which
can be remote from or directly connected to the TOE.
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The TOE can be configured to forward its audit records to an external syslog server in the
network environment. This is generally advisable given the limited audit log storage space on
the evaluated appliances.
NetIron utilizes TLS protected TACACS+ and RADIUS authentication.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic Support
2. Identification and Authentication
3. Security Management
4. Protection of the TSF
5. TOE Access
6. Trusted Channels
4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE has CAVP-tested algorithms that provide key management, random bit generation,
encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-hashing features in
support of higher level cryptographic protocols including SSH and TLS.
4.2 Identification and authentication
The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions
mediated by the TOE, with the exception of passing network traffic in accordance with its
configured switching/routing rules. It provides the ability to both assign attributes (user
names, passwords and privilege levels) and to authenticate users against these attributes. The
TOE utilizes x509.3 certificates to authenticate TLS services providing service to the TOE,
and performs certificate status verification using OCSP protocol.
4.3 Security management
The TOE provides Command Line Interface (CLI) commands to access the wide range of
security management functions to manage its security policies. All administrative activity and
functions including security management commands are limited to authorized users (i.e.,
administrators) only after they have provided acceptable user identification and authentication
data to the TOE. The security management functions are controlled through the use of
privileges associated with roles that can be assigned to TOE users. Among the available
privileges, only the Super User can actually manage the security policies provided by the TOE
and the TOE offers a complete set of functions to facilitate effective management since the
Super User allows for complete read-and-write access to the system.
4.4 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features design to protect itself to ensure the reliability and
integrity of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as stored
passwords and cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible even by an administrator. It
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also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available
(e.g., for log accountability).
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing. It
also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that
the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or
other unexpected changes in the TOE.
4.5 TOE Access
The TOE can be configured to display a message of the day banner when an administrator
establishes an interactive session and subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined
inactivity timeout value after which the inactive session (local or remote) will be terminated.
4.6 Trusted channels
The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using SSHv2 for CLI
access. In each case, both integrity and disclosure protection is ensured. If the negotiation of
an encrypted session fails or if the user does not have authorization for remote administration,
the attempted connection will not be established.
The TOE protects communication with a log server and authentication server (TACACS+ and
RADIUS) using TLS connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification.
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
ï‚· collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 24 September
2018 (NDcPP21)
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP21 should be consulted if there
is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP21 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the
product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the
devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness.
6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
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ï‚· As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the NDcPP21 and performed by the evaluation team).
ï‚· This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
ï‚· This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
ï‚· The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the NDcPP21 and applicable Technical Decisions. Any
additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this
evaluation.
7 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
ï‚· Configuration Guide, Extreme NetIron Configuration guide for Common Criteria
NDcPP 2.1, 06.3.00aa, Supporting NetIron OS 06.3.00aa, August 2019
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Assurance Activity Report (NDcPP21) for Extreme
Networks, Inc. NetIron Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R06.3.00aa, Version
0.3, September 24, 2019 (AAR).
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP21 including the tests associated with
optional requirements.
9 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration is NetIron Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare
R06.3.00aa.
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10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the NetIron Family
Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R06.3.00aa TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the
SARs contained in the NDcPP21.
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the NetIron Family Devices with Multi-Service
IronWare R06.3.00aa products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product
security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained
in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
assurance activities specified in the NDcPP21 related to the examination of the information
contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
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conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP21 and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a
public search for vulnerabilities.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) from the NIST website to
ensure no publicly known security flaws are identified for the TOE. The evaluator performed
this search on August 13th, 2019. The following search terms were used:
ï‚· Extreme
ï‚· MLX
ï‚· IronWare
ï‚· NetIron
ï‚· Radius
ï‚· TACACS+
ï‚· SSH
ï‚· TLS
The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any residual vulnerability. The validator
reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and justification
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was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of
the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the. Common Criteria Supplemental
User Guide. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later were evaluated.
Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was
not assessed as part of this evaluation. Other functionality provided by devices in the
operational environment, such as the audit server, need to be assessed separately and no
further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
12 Annexes
Not applicable
13 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Extreme Networks, Inc. NetIron Family Devices with
Multi-Service IronWare R06.3.00aa (NDcPP21) Security Target, Version 0.4, September 9,
2019.
14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
ï‚· Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
ï‚· Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
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ï‚· Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
ï‚· Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
ï‚· Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
ï‚· Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under
the CC.
ï‚· Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
ï‚· Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme.
15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 24 September 2018
(NDcPP21)
[5] Extreme Networks, Inc. NetIron Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare
R06.3.00aa (NDcPP21) Security Target, Version 0.4, September 9, 2019 (ST).
[6] Assurance Activity Report (NDcPP21) for Extreme Networks, Inc. NetIron Family
Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R06.3.00aa, Version 0.3, September 24, 2019
(AAR).
[7] Detailed Test Report (NDcPP21) for NetIron Family Devices with Multi-Service
IronWare R06.3.00aa, Version 0.3, September 24, 2019 (DTR).
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for Extreme Networks, Inc. NetIron Family Devices with
Multi-Service IronWare R06.3.0aa, Version 0.3, September 24, 2019 (ETR)