Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006
for
IBM Tivoli Identity Manager
Version 4.6
from
IBM Corporation
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006 ZS-01-01-F-329 V3.21
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006
IBM Tivoli Identity Manager
Version 4.6
from
IBM Corporation Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by CEM supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw
remediation”, Version 1.1, February 2002 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for
compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Protection Profile BSI-PP-0024-2006
Functionality: BSI-PP-0024-2006 conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL3 augmented by ALC_FLR.1 – Basic Flaw Remediation
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the
evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 16. February 2006
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006 ZS-01-01-F-329 V3.21
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December
1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006 Certification Report
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
• Part 1, Version 0.6
• Part 2, Version 1.0
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG)
of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 29 October 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1838, 2019
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22 September 2000 in the Bundes-
anzeiger p. 19445
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006 Certification Report
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM Tivoli Identity Manager, Version 4.6 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product IBM Tivoli Identity Manager, Version 4.6 was
conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The atsec information security
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor and distributor is:
IBM Corporation
600 Anton Blvd
Costa Mesa, CA 92626, USA
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 16. February 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006 Certification Report
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-30.
The product IBM Tivoli Identity Manager, Version 4.6 has been included in the
BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
IBM Corporation
600 Anton Blvd
Costa Mesa, CA 92626, USA
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006 Certification Report
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 9
3 Security Policy 10
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 11
5 Architectural Information 13
6 Documentation 15
7 IT Product Testing 16
8 Evaluated Configuration 19
9 Results of the Evaluation 21
10 Comments/Recommendations 23
11 Annexes 24
12 Security Target 25
13 Definitions 26
14 Bibliography 29
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the IBM Tivoli Identity Manager (also refered
as ITIM hereafter). It is compliant to the Identity Management Protection Profile
(IMPP), Version Number 1.17, 12 January 2006, BSI registration ID: BSI-PP-
0024-2006 [9].
The IBM Tivoli Identity Manager (ITIM) provides a solution for central
management of users and their accounts on different systems in a network.
Each employee of an organization is represented by an identity within the ITIM
server. Within ITIM, there exist a way of interacting with services (i.e. the
systems) in a network infrastructure to manage accounts on these services.
This interaction is provided by ITIM connectors that direct the management of
accounts to so-called adapters. By defining within ITIM which identity shall have
access to which of the services managed by ITIM, ITIM is able to provide
appropriate information for account creation for that identity to each of these
services, or managed resources.
Identities within ITIM can be grouped by membership to Organizational Roles,
or roles. Such Organizational Roles are intended to reflect the roles that exist
within an organization that uses ITIM for identity management. Organizational
Roles are used by Provisioning Policies to determine which identities accounts
on which managed resources. A Provisioning Policy defines a number of
services and attributes a user shall have on these services (e.g. membership of
groups on the service) and is associated with dedicated Organizational Roles.
An identity may be member of an ITIM Group, or group. This requires an
identity to be entitled to the ITIM service, i.e. to have an account on the ITIM
server (this is not the case per se for the identities managed by ITIM). ITIM
Groups specify the kind of access a user has on ITIM. Fine grained access
control is then performed by evaluating ACIs (Access Control Item, i.e. ITIM
specific access control policies) that delegate specified rights to ITIM Groups.
The IT product IBM Tivoli Identity Manager, Version 4.6 was evaluated by atsec
information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 02. February
2006. The atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor and distributor is
IBM Corporation
600 Anton Blvd
Costa Mesa, CA 92626, USA
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006 Certification Report
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL3 (Evaluation Assurance Level 3 augmented by ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw
remediation). For the evaluation of the CC component ALC_FLR.1 the mutually
regognised CEM supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1,
February 2002 ([6]) was used.
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 conformant as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
SFRs from CC Part 2 for the TOE, contained in IMPP
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted Audit Review
FDP_ACC.1 (ETC) Subset access control
FDP_ACC.2 (ACF) Complete access control
FDP_ACF.1 (ACF) Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1 (ETC) Security attribute based access control
FDP_ETC.2 Export of user data with security attributes
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_ATD.1 (ACF) User attribute definition
FIA_ATD.1 (ETC) User attribute definition
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 (ACF) Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MSA.3 (ETC) Static attribute initialisation
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006
SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.1.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
SFRs from CC Part 2 for the TOE environment, contained in
IMPP
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.2.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
F.I&A Identification and authentication
The TOE identifies users (including administrators) by user
name and authenticates them by password.
F.Authorization Authorization (access control)
The ITIM server performs authorization for user actions,
commonly referred to as requests, based on Access Control
Item (ACI).
F.Auditing Auditing
The TOE is capable of auditing internal events (e.g. the
modification of provisioning policies or the creation of new
users) by generating audit information for all transactions that
is stored in a data base provided by the IT environment.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006 Certification Report
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
F.Provisioning Provisioning
The TOE provides, by means of connectors and adapters for
managed resources, user credentials to managed resources.
F.Data_Feed Service Reconciliation and Identity Feeds
The TOE provides the capability of gathering account
information from managed resources. Reconciliation retrieves
and compares user information stored on a managed
resource with the corresponding data stored in the Tivoli
Identity Manager database.
For more details please refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 6.1.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘medium’ (SOF-medium) for the
F.I&A security function (as indicated in the Security Target [7], chapter 6).
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the IMPP, all threats and
OSPs defined there (refer to [9], chapter 3.2 and 3.3) are applied for the TOE as
well. The defined threats and policies are summarized below.
Threats:
• T.BYPASS (bypassing the TSF)
• T.COM_ATT (intercepting the communication / manipulation of transmitted
data)
• T.UNAUTHORIZED (access to information by an unauthorised user)
Organizational Security Policies:
• P.ACCOUNTABILITY (accountability of the user for security-relevant
transactions)
• P.FEED (Proper association between data imported into the TOE and
corresponding data already existent in the TOE)
• P.PROVISION (Restrictions for provisioning of accounts)
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The configuration requirements for the TOE are defined in chapter 2.8 of the
Security Target [7] and are summarised here (for the complete information
please refer to the Security Target):
• Only adapters that are part of the evaluated configuration of the TOE (i.e.
the adapters identified are allowed to be used). No other adapters in the IT
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environment may be connected to the TOE, including LDAP or vendor
specific adapters.
• The ITIM server component of the TOE is installed and operated on a
dedicated Web Application Server that communicates via network
connections with clients, adapters and the resources in the IT environment
(e.g. LDAP registry, RDBMS) as supportive to the TOE.
• Only the English user interface (and guidance) is to be used.
• The TOE must not be operated in a multi-tenant setup.
• The usage of low-level APIs (as opposed to the exported API) to extend the
functionality of the TOE’s Core Services by plugging in user-specific
extensions is prohibited.
• The Web Application Server and MQSeries are installed on one dedicated
machine that is physically and logically protected. Clustering is disabled.
• The Directory Server and RDBMS are installed either together on one or
separated on two systems. They are for dedicated use by the TOE only and
configured accordingly (e.g. restricted network availability). The underlying
machine(s) are dedicated to run only these applications.
• All network communication is protected, either by cryptographic (SSL / TLS)
or organizational (restricted network access) means.
• Access to network sockets opened by adapters for configuration with the
agentCfg tool is restricted to “root” users, or administrators, on the local
operating system hosting the adapter. High quality passwords must be set
for the adapter configuration.
• Single Sign-On is not supported.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The assumptions about the operating environment required for the evaluated
configuration are defined in chapter 2.8 of the Security Target [7]. They are
summarised below (for the complete information please refer to the Security
Target):
• The underlying operating environment for the ITIM server is IBM WebSphere
Application Server 5.1 as specified in section 2.7, the JDK as distributed with
this WebSphere version and the embedded JMS engine, as delivered with
the single-server installation process for the TOE.
• The underlying operating systems for the adapters that are part of the
evaluated configuration are
ƒ Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition for the Windows AD Adapter
ƒ Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition for the Oracle Database
Adapter for Windows
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006 Certification Report
• The interface provided by the IT environment for the Oracle Database
Adapter for Windows is the Oracle Client Software version 9i.
• IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 5.2 with Fix Pack 2 as LDAP v3
compatible directory server.
• The Relational Database Management System (or, transaction database) is
either
ƒ IBM DB2 Universal Database Enterprise Edition server and IBM DB2
runtime client, Version 8.2
ƒ Oracle Version 9i
ƒ Microsoft SQL Server 2000
• Mozilla 1.7 and Microsoft Internet Explorer 6.0 with Service Pack 1 for
access to the presentation services (i.e. the user and administration
interface), using the Java Runtime Environment provided with them.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IBM Tivoli Identity Manager, Version 4.6
The TOE consists of IBM Tivoli Identity Manager (ITIM) Server, ITIM Oracle
Database Adapter for Windows, and ITIM Windows AD Adapter. For the
evaluated configuration, the TOE is only provided as installation image via
IBM’s Passport Advantage distribution channel. Therefore, all relevant
documentation for the TOE including user and administrator guidance and
guidance for the secure installation and configuration of the TOE, is provided
online at IBM’s web site (see also chapter 6 of this report and documents [10] to
[16]). Additional guidance where to find the appropriate documents on IBMs
web sites can be found in [16].
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3 Security Policy
The TOE decides in its notion of subjects between persons and users. While
the TOE Security Functions (TSF) are primarily focused on users of the TOE,
the TSP also aim at protecting information related to identities that are not users
of the TOE itself. The different subjects are as follows:
A person (or, identity) is identified by name and further information associated
with her or him, e.g. aliases and membership of an Organizational Role.
Persons are part of an Organization or Organizational Unit within the
organizational hierarchy managed by the TOE.
An user (or, ITIM user) is a person having an account on the TOE, i.e. the
person has been provisioned with an account for the ITIM service. He is able to
access the TOE’s user or administrative interfaces, to authenticate against the
TOE, and is subject to access control and auditing performed by the TOE. The
term user includes all users of the TOE regardless of their role.
A group (or, ITIM group) is a concept to represent a number of dedicated users
by membership. Groups relate to the ITIM service and can be subject of Access
Control Item. All users that are members of a group which is subject to an ACI
are therefore subject to that ACI.
An organizational role is a similar concept than a group, representing a number
of persons (as opposed to users). It is used for people management, e.g. when
it comes to the definition of provisioning policies. Association of a person with a
role may be achieved e.g. by position of the person in the organization’s
hierarchy. All persons that are assigned to an organizational role which is
subject to a Provisioning Policy are subject to this Provisioning Policy.
Persons can be provisioned with accounts on a remote service, or on the ITIM
service. While the latter makes a user out of a person in terms of the TOE
Security Policy, the term account does not refer to a not further specified
resource (e.g., a Windows machine or Oracle Database), but to the concept of
service entitlement and provisioning in general.
Before a person can be associated with ITIM groups or organizational roles,
there needs to exist an identity in ITIM representing the person. Upon creation,
identities are assigned to an Organization or subordinated elements within a
organization tree (i.e. business units). ITIM provides the concept of
Organizations, which can be organized on lower hierarchies by defining
Locations, Organizational Units, Administrative Domains, and Business Partner
Organizations.
A more detailed description/definition of the Security Policy enforced by the
TOE is given in the Security Target [7], chapter 2.2 and 2.5.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
Based on the Organisational Security Policies to which the TOE complies the
following usage assumptions arise:
• P.ACCOUNTABILITY (accountability of the user for security-relevant
transactions)
• P.FEED (Proper association between data imported into the TOE and
corresponding data already existent in the TOE)
• P.PROVISION (Restrictions for provisioning of accounts)
Based on the personnel assumptions the following usage conditions consist:
• A.ADMIN (The system administrative personnel are well trained to securely
and trustworthy administer all aspects of TOE operation)
• A.USER (Users of the TOE will protect their passwords used for
authentication against the TOE)
For a detailed description of the usage assumptions refer to the Security Target
[7], especially chapter 3.1 and 3.3.
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by
the Security Target have to be met (for more details, please refer to Security
Target [7], chapter 3.1.2):
• A.PHYS_PROT (The machines providing the runtime environment for the
TOE need to be protected against unauthorized physical access and
modification)
• A.AGENT (It is assumed that the runtime environment for an adapter
operates as specified with respect to the interfaces exposed to the TOE for
exchange of account information)
• A.DIRECTORY (The directory server used by the TOE provides protection
mechanisms against unauthorized access to TSF data stored in the
directory)
• A.RDBMS (The RDBMS used by the TOE provides protection mechanisms
against unauthorized access to TSF data stored in the data base)
• A.SERVER (The machines providing the runtime environment for all parts of
the TOE other than adapters are assumed to be used solely for this purpose
and are not used to run other application software except those required for
the management and maintenance of the underlying system and hardware.
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4.3 Clarification of scope
The threat listed below has to be averted in order to support the TOE security
capabilities but is not addressed by the TOE itself. It has to be addressed by the
operating environment of the TOE (for detailed information about the threats
and how the environment can cover them refer to the Security Target [7],
chapter 3.2).
• TE.COM_ATT (An attacker intercepts communication between the TOE and
an external entity or between different parts of the TOE)
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5 Architectural Information
The target of evaluation (TOE) is the IBM Tivoli Identity Manager (ITIM),
Version 4.6.
The IBM Tivoli Identity Manager (ITIM) provides a solution for central
management of users and their accounts on the different systems in a network.
Each employee of an organization is represented by an identity within the ITIM
server. ITIM has a way of interacting with services (i.e. the systems) in a
network infrastructure to manage accounts on these services. This interaction is
provided by ITIM connectors that direct the management of accounts to so-
called adapters: software that sits either directly on the remote system, e.g. on
the operating system, interacting with the user management mechanisms of the
operating system, or on a central adapter server with network interfaces to the
managed system. By defining within ITIM which identity shall have access to
which of the services managed by ITIM, ITIM is able to provide appropriate
information for account creation for that identity to each of these services, or
managed resources.
In the following picture, a basic overview of the ITIM architecture is given.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0237-2006 Certification Report
The ITIM server component is completely based on the Java 2 Platform,
Enterprise Edition (J2EE) technology. The ITIM server component relies on
services in the IT environment provided by the J2EE framework as implemented
by the Web Application Server. There are different services provided by the
Web Application Server, including J2EE services and interfaces to these
services, HTTP and HTTPS, interfaces, Java Transaction Service (JTS),
Remote Method Invocation (RMI) APIs, and more. For a complete description of
the ITIM server including these services, please refer to the Security Target [7],
chapter 2.6
The ITIM adapters run directly on native operating systems and have been
implemented in native programming languages (mostly C and C++). They rely
on the services provided by these operating systems in terms of runtime
environment, and interact with the managed resources via the interfaces
provided for user account management by the managed resources (in case of
the Windows AD Adapter this is the Active Directory Server Interface (ADSI),
and in case of the Oracle Database Adapter for Windows this is the Oracle
Client Software).
The following figure provides a general overview of the TOE with parts in the
yellow/green shaded area indicating the parts that implement the TSF:
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6 Documentation
The following guidance documentation is delivered to the user:
• “Common Criteria Guide”, Version 4.6, August 2005
• Archive holding the API documentation for customers
• “Server Installation and Configuration Guide for WebSphere Environments”,
First Edition, June 2005
• “Oracle Adapter for Windows Installation Guide”, Sixth Edition, June 2005
• “Planning for Deployment Guide”, First Edition, June 2005
• “Active Directory Adapter Installation and Configuration Guide”, Ninth
Edition, June 2005
• ITIM Online Help and Information Center,
http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/tividd/td/ITIM/wwhelp46/en_US/HTML/en/wwh
elp/wwhelp/wwhimpl/js/html/wwhelp.htm, Version 4.6
• “Release Notes”, Second Edition, June 2005
• “Problem Determination Guide”, Second Edition, June 2005
To install and configure the TOE such that it matches the configuration
described in the Security Target the user has to follow the guidance provided in
“Common Criteria Guide”, “Server Installation and Configuration Guide for
WebSphere Environments”, “Oracle Adapter for Windows Installation Guide”,
“Active Directory Adapter Installation and Configuration Guide”, and “ITIM
Online Help and Information Center”.
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Summary of developer testing effort
Test configuration
The test configuration used for developer testing covers different permutations
of:
• Operating systems: AIX 5.2, AIX 5.3, Windows 2003, SLES8 on xSeries,
RHEL3, Solaris 9
• WebSphere application server version 5.1.1, 5.1.1.1, 5.1.1.2, 5.1.1.3
• Databases: DB2 8.1 FP7, DB2 8.2 (equals to DB2 8.1 FP8), Oracle 9.0.2.1,
MSSQL Server 2000
• LDAP servers: SunOne 5.2, IDS 5.2
• Browsers: Mozilla 1.6, Mozilla 1.7, Internet Explorer 6
• Configuration: single system or systems allocated on several servers
In addition, the adapter test documents outline the configuration needed for
testing the adapters. This includes the specification of the software components
needed for testing. These documents also state which adapter versions have
been tested: Windows AD adapter 4.6.2 and Oracle adapter version 4.6.1.
The developer has performed his tests on the above listed platforms.
It was verified that testing covers the different implementations of security
functionality offered by the software (storing of TOE data, protection of TOE
execution domain, providing of reliable time stamps). Since all different
implementations have been tested, the remaining software systems do not differ
in their security functionality.
Testing approach
The test cases for general testing are maintained in a Lotus Notes database
called TTT whereas the test cases for adapter testing are maintained in
separate documents. Since almost all test cases are manual test cases using
the WebGUI, the test procedures provide step-by-step instructions for
establishing initial test conditions, executing the test instructions, validating the
test results and performing cleanup work.
The test cases for verifying the API functionality instruct the tester to use a test
tool called "SHOCK". The test tool provides its own setup instructions to
produce initial test conditions. These instructions explain how to set up the
LDAP database to include the required entries and attributes.
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Test result
The test results maintained in the TTT tool for the general test cases and in the
adapter test documents for the adapter test cases show that the following
stages of testing were performed:
• functional tests of components
• regression tests
The test results list for each test result verdict of the respective test case. All
test results from all tested platforms show that the expected test results are
identical to the actual test results.
Test coverage
Since a mapping provided by the developer shows that the tests cover all
individual TSF identified for the TOE, it could be verified that all TSFI are
covered with testing. This therefore satisfies the requirements for the
evaluation.
Test depth
Since a mapping of test cases to subsystems of the high-level design is
provided by the developer, it could be verified that all subsystems are covered
by test cases. Using the high-level design, the coverage of internal interfaces
was shown.
7.2 Summary of evaluator testing effort
Test configuration
The following software has been installed by the evaluator (on a system
preinstalled with Windows 2003 server):
• DB2 8.1 FixPack 8 (equals to 8.2)
• ITDS 5.2 and FixPack 2
• WebSphere application server (WAS) 5.1 with FP1, CF1, CF3 (resulting in
version 5.1.1.1)
• ITIM server version 4.6 (build 5707 according to the footer of the WebGUI)
• Windows AD adapter 4.6.2
• Oracle adapter 4.6.1
The evaluator installed the software as outlined in the installation guidance for
the ITIM server as well as for the adapters. After successful installing the
evaluator applied the configuration outlined in the CC guide. Each configuration
aspect has been covered by the evaluator in order to bring the system in its
evaluated configuration.
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Evaluator tests performed
In addition to repeating a sampled subset of the developer tests, the evaluator
devised tests for a subset of the TOE. For choosing this subset, the evaluator
performed sampling based on the functionality the test cases test.
Test results
The tests were performed at the at the developer's facility. The systems
available for testing are listed above.
All test cases devised by the evaluator passed successfully, i.e. the actual test
results matched the expected results.
Also for all the developer test cases rerun by the evaluator the actual test
results matched the expected results. Therefore this testing also passed
successfully.
Evaluator penetration testing
The evaluator has devised a set of penetration tests based on the developer's
vulnerability analysis and based on the evaluator's knowledge of the TOE
gained by the other evaluation activities. All penetration tests have been based
on suspected obvious vulnerabilities. The evaluator conducted those tests and
did not find any test that resulted in a penetration of the TOE with low attack
potential. Also the vulnerability analysis did not identify any vulnerability that
could be exploited with low attack potential. Therefore the evaluator has
determined as a result of his activities that the TOE is resistant against attacks
with low attack potential.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
According to the Security Target the evaluated configuration of the TOE and its
IT environment are defined as follows (refer also to the Security Target [7]):
• Only adapters that are part of the evaluated configuration of the TOE (i.e.
the adapters identified) are to be used. No other adapters in the IT
environment may be connected to the TOE, including LDAP or vendor
specific adapters. The adapters that are part of the evaluated configuration
use the DAML protocol (as opposed to FTP) for communication with the
ITIM server.
• The ITIM server component of the TOE is installed and operated on a
dedicated Web Application Server that communicates via network
connections with clients, adapters and the resources in the IT environment
(e.g. LDAP registry, RDBMS) as supportive to the TOE.
• “Event notifications” of adapters (remote password synchronization) and
identity feeds are not supported in the evaluated configuration. The DSML
and IDI identity feeds are operated by using their reconciliation functionality.
• Only the English user interface (and guidance) is to be used.
• The TOE must not be operated in a multi-tenant setup.
• The usage of low-level APIs (as opposed to the exported API) to extend the
functionality of the TOE’s Core Services by plugging in user-specific
extensions is prohibited.
• The Web Application Server and MQSeries are installed on one dedicated
machine that is physically and logically protected. Clustering is disabled.
• The Directory Server and RDBMS are installed either together on one or
separated on two systems. They are for dedicated use by the TOE only and
configured accordingly (e.g. restricted network availability). The underlying
machine(s) are dedicated to run only these applications.
• All network communication is protected, either by cryptographic (SSL / TLS)
or organizational (restricted network access) means.
• Access to network sockets opened by adapters for configuration with the
agentCfg tool is restricted to “root” users, or administrators, on the local
operating system hosting the adapter. High quality passwords must be set
for the adapter configuration.
• Single Sign-On is not supported.
The evaluated configuration of the TOE restricts the choice of products that can
be selected by the customer to fulfill the dependencies of the ITIM server on its
IT environment to the following products:
• The underlying operating environment for the ITIM server is IBM WebSphere
Application Server 5.1 as specified in section 2.7, the JDK as distributed with
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this WebSphere version and the embedded JMS engine, as delivered with
the single-server installation process for the TOE.
• The underlying operating systems for the adapters that are part of the
evaluated configuration are
• Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition for the Windows AD Adapter
• Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition for the Oracle Database
Adapter for Windows
• The interface provided by the IT environment for the Oracle Database
Adapter for Windows is the Oracle Client Software version 9i.
• IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 5.2 with Fix Pack 2 as LDAP v3
compatible directory server.
• The Relational Database Management System (or, transaction database) is
either
• IBM DB2 Universal Database Enterprise Edition server and IBM DB2
runtime client, Version 8.2
• Oracle Version 9i
• Microsoft SQL Server 2000
• Mozilla 1.7 and Microsoft Internet Explorer 6.0 with Service Pack 1 for
access to the presentation services (i.e. the user and administration
interface), using the Java Runtime Environment provided with them.
For setting up / configuring the TOE all guidance documents (especially the
documents [10] to [13]) have to be followed (refer also to chapter 6 of this
report).
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [5] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE (this includes especially the methodology for flaw
remediation, [6]).
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL3.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL3
augmented by ALC_FLR.1 and the class ASE for the Security Target
evaluation) are summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Authorisation controls ACM_CAP.3 PASS
TOE CM coverage ACM_SCP.1 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Delivery Procedures ADO_DEL.1 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Informal functional specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Examination of guidance AVA_MSU.1 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Developer vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.1 PASS
Table 1: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• the TOE is conform to the Identity Management Protection Profile (IMPP),
Version Number 1.17 [9]
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 conformant
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL3
augmented by ALC_FLR.1
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
SF F.I&A (Identification and authentication)
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the IBM Tivoli Identity
Manager, Version 4.6 used in its evaluated configuration (refer to the Security
Target [7] and chapter 8 of this report).
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
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10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational documents [10] to [13] contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
Additionally, for secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions
about the environment in the Security Target [7] and the Security Target as a
whole has to be taken into account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow
the guidance in these documents.
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11 Annexes
None.
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12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [7] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
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13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
ACI Access Control Item
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
DSML Directory Services Markup Language
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
IMPP Identity Management Protection Profile
ITIM IBM Tivoli Identity Manager
IT Information Technology
J2EE Java 2 Platform, Enterprise Edition
PP Protection Profile
RDBMS Relational Data Base Management System
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
SSH Secure Shell
SSL Secure Socket Layer
ST Security Target
UML Unified Modeling Language
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSFI TSF Interface
TSP TOE Security Policy
WAS Web Application Server
XML Extensible Markup Language
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
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Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
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TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme AIS33, Version 2 –
“Methodologie zur Fehlerbehebung – Flaw Remediation”, 26.07.2002
[7] IBM Tivoli Identity Manager 4.6 Security Target (BSI-DSZ-CC-0237),
Version 1.41, 12 January 2006, IBM Corporation
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2.0, atsec security information
GmbH, 01 February 2006, (confidential document)
[9] Identity Management Protection Profile (IMPP), Version Number 1.17, 12
January 2006, IBM Corporation; BSI registration ID: BSI-PP-0024-2006
[10] Common Criteria Guide, Version 4.6, August 2005
[11] Active Directory Adapter Installation and Configuration Guide, Ninth
Edition, June 2005
[12] Server Installation and Configuration Guide for WebSphere
Environments, First Edition, June 2005
[13] Oracle Adapter for Windows Installation Guide, Sixth Edition, June 2005
[14] Planning for Deployment Guide, First Edition, June 2005
[15] Problem Determination Guide, Second Edition, June 2005
[16] ITIM Online Help and Information Center,
http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/tividd/td/ITIM/wwhelp46/en_US/HTML/en/w
whelp/wwhelp/wwhimpl/js/html/wwhelp.htm, Version 4.6
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance
requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL,
Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part
of the conformance result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
"The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 2.1."
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM: Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery and
operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV: Development Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle support Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 2: Assurance family breakdown and map
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
"The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility."
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component“
is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the
obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with
explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 3: Evaluation assurance level summary
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
"Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
"Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
"Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.“
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
"Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
"Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
"Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.“
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
"Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
"Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.“
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
"Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4)
attack potential.
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