KECS-CR-21-62
D’Amo Agent v4.0
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-1132-2021
2021. 11. 4.
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2021.11.04. -
Certification report for D’Amo Agent v4.0
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for D’Amo Agent v4.0 of Penta
Security Systems Inc.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
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Table of Contents
Certification Report ....................................................................................................1
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................8
3. Security Policy .....................................................................................................9
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..........................................................10
5. Architectural Information ..................................................................................10
6. Documentation................................................................................................... 11
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................ 11
8. Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................12
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................12
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................12
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................13
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................13
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)..............................................................14
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................14
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................14
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................14
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................15
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................16
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................16
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................17
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the evaluation of D’Amo Agent v4.0 of Penta Security Systems Inc. with
reference to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC”
hereinafter) [1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is database encryption software to prevent the
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information by encrypting the database. The
TOE consists of D’Amo KMS, D’Amo KMS Console, D’Amo DA, and D’Amo BA-SCP.
D’Amo KMS and D’Amo KMS Console allow authorized administrators to manage
security functions and TSF data such as cryptographic operation policies and keys.
D’Amo BA-SCP, and D’Amo DA are agents that encrypts and decrypts the user data
based on the policies. The TOE includes cryptographic modules (CIS-CC v3.3)
validated under the Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Program (KCMVP).
There are two types of the TOE operational environments: plug-in and API types. In the
plug-in type, D’Amo DA is installed in a database server, while D’Amo BA-SCP is
installed in an application server in the API type. Regardless of the types, D’Amo KMS
and D’Amo KMS Console are installed on the physically separated systems.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
and completed on November 3, 2021. This report grounds on the evaluation technical
report (ETR) KOSYAS had submitted [5] and the Security Target (ST) [6].
The ST claims strict conformance to the Korean National Protection Profile for
Database Encryption [7]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are
based only upon assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs
of the PP [7]. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The
Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both functional components
in CC Part 2 and newly defined components in the Extended Component Definition
chapter of the ST, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore, the ST and the
resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
[Figure 1] and [Figure 2] show the operational environments of the TOE.
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[Figure 1] Operational environment of the TOE (Plug-in type)
[Figure 2] Operational environment of the TOE (API type)
[Table 1] shows minimum hardware and software requirements necessary for
installation and operation of the TOE.
Category Contents
D’Amo
KMS
CPU Intel Xeon Quad Core E3-1275v6 3.80GHz or higher
RAM 24 GB or higher
HDD 100 GB or higher space for installation of D’Amo KMS
NIC 10/100/1000 Mbps X 1 Port or higher
OS Ubuntu 18.04 (Linux kernel 4.15) 64-bit
Required S/W MariaDB 10.2.39
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D’Amo
KMS
Console
CPU Intel Core i7-7700 3.60 GHz or higher
RAM 16 GB or higher
HDD 20 GB or higher space for installation of D’Amo KMS
Console
NIC 10/100/1000 Mbps X 1 Port or higher
OS Windows 10 Pro K 32-bit
D’Amo DA
(for
Windows
and
Ubuntu)
CPU Intel Pentium G4600 3.60 GHz or higher
RAM 8 GB or higher
HDD 50GB or higher space for installation of D’Amo DA
NIC 10/100/1000 Mbps X 1 Port or higher
OS Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard 64-bit
Ubuntu 18.04 (Linux kernel 4.15) 64-bit
Required S/W CUBRID 10.1
Tibero 6
D’Amo DA
(for AIX)
CPU PowerPC_POWER3 450 MHz or higher
RAM 8 GB or higher
HDD 50GB or higher space for installation of D’Amo DA
NIC 10/100/1000 Mbps X 1 Port or higher
OS AIX 5.3 64bit
Required S/W Tibero 6
D’Amo BA-
SCP
CPU Intel i3-9100 3.60 GHz or higher
RAM 16 GB or higher
HDD 50GB or higher space for installation of D’Amo BA-
SCP
NIC 10/100/1000 Mbps X 1 Port or higher
OS Ubuntu 18.04 (Linux kernel 4.15) 64-bit
[Table 1] Hardware and software requirements for the TOE
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2. Identification
The TOE is software consisting of the following software components and related
guidance documents.
TOE D’Amo Agent v4.0
Version D’Amo Agent v4.0.5
TOE
Components
D’Amo KMS D’Amo KMS v4.0.5
(Install_D'Amo_KMS_v4.0.5.kip)
D’Amo KMS Console D’Amo KMS Console v4.0.5
(Install_D'Amo_KMS_Console_v4.0.5.exe)
D’Amo DA D’Amo DA v4.0.5
(Install_D'Amo_DA_v4.0.5.zip)
D’Amo BA-SCP D’Amo BA-SCP v4.0.5
(Install_D'Amo_BA-SCP_v4.0.5.zip)
Guidance
Document
D’Amo Agent v4.0 Preparation procedure and user operation manual
v1.3(D’Amo BA-SCP)
(D'Amo_Agent_v4.0_Preparation procedure and user operation
manual_v1.3(D'Amo BA-SCP).pdf)
D’Amo Agent v4.0 Preparation procedure and user operation manual
v1.3(D’Amo DA)
(D'Amo_Agent_v4.0_Preparation procedure and user operation
manual_v1.3(D'Amo DA).pdf)
D’Amo Agent v4.0 Preparation procedure and user operation manual
v1.3(D’Amo KMS)
(D'Amo_Agent_v4.0_Preparation procedure and user operation
manual_v1.3(D'Amo KMS).pdf)
[Table 2] TOE identification
Note that the TOE is delivered contained in a CD-ROM.
[Table 3] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(24 August 2017)
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Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security
(17 May 2021)
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-
003, April 2017
Protection Profile Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1,
KECS-PP-0820a-2017, 11 December 2019
Developer Penta Security Systems Inc.
Sponsor Penta Security Systems Inc.
Evaluation
Facility
Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
Completion Date
of Evaluation
3 November 2021
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 3] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The TOE provides security features defined in the PP [7] as follows:
 Security audit: The TOE generates audit records of security relevant events
including the start-up/shutdown of the audit functions, integrity violation and
self-test failures, and stores them in the DBMS.
 Cryptographic support: The TOE performs cryptographic operation such as
encryption/decryption and hash, and cryptographic key management such as
key generation/distribution/destruction using cryptographic modules (CIS-CC
v3.3) validated under the KCMVP.
 User data protection: The TOE provides encryption and decryption for the user
data in a column of a database.
 Identification and authentication: The TOE perform password-based and
certificate-based identification and authentication for KMS and KMS console,
respectively. The TOE also mutually authenticates TOE components when they
communicate each other.
 Security management: Security management of the TOE is restricted to only
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the authorized administrator who can access the management interface
provided by TOE.
 Protection of the TSF: The TOE provides secure communications between
TOE components to protect the transmitted data. The TOE encrypts the stored
TSF data to protect them from unauthorized exposure and modification. The
TOE performs self-tests on the TOE components, which includes the self-test
on the validated cryptographic module.
 TOE access: The TOE manages authorized administrators’ sessions based on
access IP addresses. The TOE terminates the sessions after predefined time
interval of inactivity.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There is no explicit Security Problem Definition chapter, therefore no Assumptions
section in the low assurance ST. Some security aspects of the operational environment
are added to those of the PP [7] in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be
used (For the detailed and precise definition of the security objectives of the
operational environment, refer to the ST [6], Chapter 3.).
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
 D’Amo KMS provides security features of identification and authentication of
an administrator, cryptographic key generation for user data encryption, and
CLI-based management interface to an authorized administrator.
 D’Amo KMS Console provides security features of identification and
authentication of administrators. D’Amo KMS Console also provides
management interface to an authorized administrator,
 D’Amo DA and D’Amo BA-SCP encrypt and decrypt the user data in a column
of a database.
Note that all the three components perform the functionalities of audit data generation,
cryptographic key management, cryptographic operations, protection of TSF data, and
mutual authentication between the components. For the detailed description on the
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architectural information, refer to the ST [6], Chapter 1.4.2.
6. Documentation
The following documentations are evaluated and provided with the TOE by the
developer to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
D’Amo Agent v4.0 Preparation procedure and user
operation manual v1.3(D’Amo DA)
V1.3 1 October 2021
D’Amo Agent v4.0 Preparation procedure and user
operation manual v1.3(D’Amo BA-SCP)
V1.3 1 October 2021
D’Amo Agent v4.0 Preparation procedure and user
operation manual v1.3(D’Amo KMS)
V1.3 1 October 2021
[Table 4] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the security services provided by
each TOE components based on the operational environment of the TOE. Each test
case includes the following information:
 Test no.: Identifier of each test case
 Test Purpose: Includes the security functions to be tested
 Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
 Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
 Expected result: Result expected from testing
 Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
 Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the
expected and actual result
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests according to the
assurance component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator installed and prepared the TOE in accordance to the preparative
procedures, and conducted independent testing based upon test cases devised by the
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evaluator. The TOE and test configuration are identical to the developer’s tests.
Also, the evaluator conducted vulnerability analysis and penetration testing based upon
test cases devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential
vulnerabilities.
The evaluator’s testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth, and results
are summarized in the ETR [5].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is D’Amo Agent v4.0 (version of D’Amo Agent v4.0.5). See table 3 for detailed
information on the TOE components.
The TOE is installed from the CD-ROM distributed by Penta Security Systems Inc. After
installing the TOE, an administrator can identify the complete TOE reference using the
product’s Info check menu. And the guidance documents listed in this report Chapter 6,
[Table 4] were evaluated with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [5] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_CCL.1.
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The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore,
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined,
and it is necessary. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has uniquely identified the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ALC_CMC.1.
The configuration list includes the TOE and the evaluation evidence required by the
SARs in the ST. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMS.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
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9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The developer has provided a high-level description of at least the SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetration testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE, don’t allow attackers possessing basic attack
potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS
ATE ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1 ATE_IND.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1 AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 5] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 The TOE must be installed and operated in a physically secure environment
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accessible only by authorized administrators and should not allow remote
management from outside.
 The administrator shall maintain a safe state of the operating system and
DBMS in the TOE operation such as application of the latest security patches,
eliminating unnecessary service, and change of the default password.
 The administrator should periodically check a spare space of audit data
storage in case of the audit data loss, and carry out the audit data backup to
prevent audit data loss.
11. Security Target
D’Amo Agent v4.0 Security Target v1.3 [6] is included in this report for reference.
12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
KCMVP the Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Program
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
Decryption The act that restoring the ciphertext into the plaintext
using the decryption key
Encryption The act that converting the plaintext into the ciphertext
using the cryptographic key
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Self-test Pre-operational or conditional test executed by the
cryptographic module
Validated Cryptographic
Module
A cryptographic module that is validated and given a
validation number by validation authority
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017
[3] Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (24 August 2017)
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (17 May 2021)
[5] KOSYAS-2020-31 D’Amo Agent v4.0 Evaluation Technical Report V3.00, 3
November 2021
[6] D’Amo Agent v4.0 Security Target v1.3, 1 October 2021
[7] Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1 (KECS-PP-
0820a-2017, 11 December 2019)