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D'Amo Agent v4.0
Certification Report

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This document is the certification report for D'Amo Agent v4.0 of Penta Security Systems Inc.

The Certification Body

IT Security Certification Center

The Evaluation Facility

Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)

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1. Executive Summary

This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the results of the evaluation of D'Amo Agent v4.0 of Penta Security Systems Inc. with reference to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation ("CC" hereinafter) [1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is database encryption software to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of confidential information by encrypting the database. The TOE consists of D'Amo KMS, D'Amo KMS Console, D'Amo DA, and D'Amo BA-SCP. D'Amo KMS and D'Amo KMS Console allow authorized administrators to manage security functions and TSF data such as cryptographic operation policies and keys. D'Amo BA-SCP, and D'Amo DA are agents that encrypts and decrypts the user data based on the policies. The TOE includes cryptographic modules (CIS-CC v3.3) validated under the Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Program (KCMVP).

There are two types of the TOE operational environments: plug-in and API types. In the plug-in type, D'Amo DA is installed in a database server, while D'Amo BA-SCP is installed in an application server in the API type. Regardless of the types, D'Amo KMS and D'Amo KMS Console are installed on the physically separated systems.

The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS) and completed on November 3, 2021. This report grounds on the evaluation technical report (ETR) KOSYAS had submitted [5] and the Security Target (ST) [6].

The ST claims strict conformance to the Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption [7]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only upon assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of the PP [7]. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both functional components in CC Part 2 and newly defined components in the Extended Component Definition chapter of the ST, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.

[Figure 1] and [Figure 2] show the operational environments of the TOE.



[Figure 1] Operational environment of the TOE (Plug-in type)



[Figure 2] Operational environment of the TOE (API type)

[Table 1] shows minimum hardware and software requirements necessary for installation and operation of the TOE.

Category		Contents
D'Amo KMS	CPU	Intel Xeon Quad Core E3-1275v6 3.80GHz or higher
	RAM	24 GB or higher
	HDD	100 GB or higher space for installation of D'Amo KMS
	NIC	10/100/1000 Mbps X 1 Port or higher
	OS	Ubuntu 18.04 (Linux kernel 4.15) 64-bit
	Required S/W	MariaDB 10.2.39

D'Amo KMS Console	CPU	Intel Core i7-7700 3.60 GHz or higher
	RAM	16 GB or higher
	HDD	20 GB or higher space for installation of D'Amo KMS Console
	NIC	10/100/1000 Mbps X 1 Port or higher
	OS	Windows 10 Pro K 32-bit
D'Amo DA (for Windows and Ubuntu)	CPU	Intel Pentium G4600 3.60 GHz or higher
	RAM	8 GB or higher
	HDD	50GB or higher space for installation of D'Amo DA
	NIC	10/100/1000 Mbps X 1 Port or higher
	OS	Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard 64-bit Ubuntu 18.04 (Linux kernel 4.15) 64-bit
	Required S/W	CUBRID 10.1 Tibero 6
D'Amo DA (for AIX)	CPU	PowerPC_POWER3 450 MHz or higher
	RAM	8 GB or higher
	HDD	50GB or higher space for installation of D'Amo DA
	NIC	10/100/1000 Mbps X 1 Port or higher
	OS	AIX 5.3 64bit
	Required S/W	Tibero 6
D'Amo BA-SCP	CPU	Intel i3-9100 3.60 GHz or higher
	RAM	16 GB or higher
	HDD	50GB or higher space for installation of D'Amo BA-SCP
	NIC	10/100/1000 Mbps X 1 Port or higher
	OS	Ubuntu 18.04 (Linux kernel 4.15) 64-bit

[Table 1] Hardware and software requirements for the TOE

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2. Identification

The TOE is software consisting of the following software components and related guidance documents.

TOE	D'Amo Agent v4.0	
Version	D'Amo Agent v4.0.5	
TOE Components	D'Amo KMS	D'Amo KMS v4.0.5 (Install_D'Amo_KMS_v4.0.5.kip)
	D'Amo KMS Console	D'Amo KMS Console v4.0.5 (Install_D'Amo_KMS_Console_v4.0.5.exe)
	D'Amo DA	D'Amo DA v4.0.5 (Install_D'Amo_DA_v4.0.5.zip)
	D'Amo BA-SCP	D'Amo BA-SCP v4.0.5 (Install_D'Amo_BA-SCP_v4.0.5.zip)
Guidance Document	D'Amo Agent v4.0 Preparation procedure and user operation manual v1.3(D'Amo BA-SCP) (D'Amo_Agent_v4.0_Preparation procedure and user operation manual_v1.3(D'Amo BA-SCP).pdf) D'Amo Agent v4.0 Preparation procedure and user operation manual v1.3(D'Amo DA) (D'Amo_Agent_v4.0_Preparation procedure and user operation manual_v1.3(D'Amo DA).pdf) D'Amo Agent v4.0 Preparation procedure and user operation manual v1.3(D'Amo KMS) (D'Amo_Agent_v4.0_Preparation procedure and user operation manual_v1.3(D'Amo KMS).pdf)	

[Table 2] TOE identification

Note that the TOE is delivered contained in a CD-ROM.

[Table 3] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation facility, certification body, etc..

Scheme	Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (24 August 2017)

	Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (17 May 2021)
Common Criteria	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
Protection Profile	Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1, KECS-PP-0820a-2017, 11 December 2019
Developer	Penta Security Systems Inc.
Sponsor	Penta Security Systems Inc.
Evaluation Facility	Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
Completion Date of Evaluation	3 November 2021
Certification Body	IT Security Certification Center

[Table 3] Additional identification information

3. Security Policy

The TOE provides security features defined in the PP [7] as follows:

- Security audit: The TOE generates audit records of security relevant events including the start-up/shutdown of the audit functions, integrity violation and self-test failures, and stores them in the DBMS.
- Cryptographic support: The TOE performs cryptographic operation such as encryption/decryption and hash, and cryptographic key management such as key generation/distribution/destruction using cryptographic modules (CIS-CC v3.3) validated under the KCMVP.
- User data protection: The TOE provides encryption and decryption for the user data in a column of a database.
- Identification and authentication: The TOE perform password-based and certificate-based identification and authentication for KMS and KMS console, respectively. The TOE also mutually authenticates TOE components when they communicate each other.
- Security management: Security management of the TOE is restricted to only

the authorized administrator who can access the management interface provided by TOE.

- Protection of the TSF: The TOE provides secure communications between TOE components to protect the transmitted data. The TOE encrypts the stored TSF data to protect them from unauthorized exposure and modification. The TOE performs self-tests on the TOE components, which includes the self-test on the validated cryptographic module.
- TOE access: The TOE manages authorized administrators' sessions based on access IP addresses. The TOE terminates the sessions after predefined time interval of inactivity.

4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

There is no explicit Security Problem Definition chapter, therefore no Assumptions section in the low assurance ST. Some security aspects of the operational environment are added to those of the PP [7] in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used (For the detailed and precise definition of the security objectives of the operational environment, refer to the ST [6], Chapter 3.).

5. Architectural Information

The TOE is software consisting of the following components:

- D'Amo KMS provides security features of identification and authentication of an administrator, cryptographic key generation for user data encryption, and CLI-based management interface to an authorized administrator.
- D'Amo KMS Console provides security features of identification and authentication of administrators. D'Amo KMS Console also provides management interface to an authorized administrator,
- D'Amo DA and D'Amo BA-SCP encrypt and decrypt the user data in a column of a database.

Note that all the three components perform the functionalities of audit data generation, cryptographic key management, cryptographic operations, protection of TSF data, and mutual authentication between the components. For the detailed description on the

architectural information, refer to the ST [6], Chapter 1.4.2.

6. Documentation

The following documentations are evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer to the customer.

Identifier	Release	Date
D'Amo Agent v4.0 Preparation procedure and user operation manual v1.3(D'Amo DA)	V1.3	1 October 2021
D'Amo Agent v4.0 Preparation procedure and user operation manual v1.3(D'Amo BA-SCP)	V1.3	1 October 2021
D'Amo Agent v4.0 Preparation procedure and user operation manual v1.3(D'Amo KMS)	V1.3	1 October 2021

[Table 4] Documentation

7. TOE Testing

The developer took a testing approach based on the security services provided by each TOE components based on the operational environment of the TOE. Each test case includes the following information:

- Test no.: Identifier of each test case
- Test Purpose: Includes the security functions to be tested
- Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
- Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
- Expected result: Result expected from testing
- Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
- Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the expected and actual result

The developer correctly performed and documented the tests according to the assurance component ATE_FUN.1.

The evaluator installed and prepared the TOE in accordance to the preparative procedures, and conducted independent testing based upon test cases devised by the

evaluator. The TOE and test configuration are identical to the developer's tests.
Also, the evaluator conducted vulnerability analysis and penetration testing based upon test cases devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential vulnerabilities.
The evaluator's testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth, and results are summarized in the ETR [5].

8. Evaluated Configuration

The TOE is D'Amo Agent v4.0 (version of D'Amo Agent v4.0.5). See table 3 for detailed information on the TOE components.
The TOE is installed from the CD-ROM distributed by Penta Security Systems Inc. After installing the TOE, an administrator can identify the complete TOE reference using the product's Info check menu. And the guidance documents listed in this report Chapter 6, [Table 4] were evaluated with the TOE.

9. Results of the Evaluation

The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [5] which references Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance components.

9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)

The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the CC and how the ST conforms to packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_CCL.1.

The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined, and it is necessary. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally consistent. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.

9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)

The developer has uniquely identified the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMC.1.
The configuration list includes the TOE and the evaluation evidence required by the SARs in the ST. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMS.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.

9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)

The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.

9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)

The developer has provided a high-level description of at least the SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.1.

The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.

9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)

The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.

By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1.

Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation evidence (described in the ADV class).

The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.

9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)

By penetration testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational environment of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.

Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE, don't allow attackers possessing basic attack potential to violate the SFRs.

The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.

9.7 Evaluation Result Summary

Assurance Class	Assurance Component	Evaluator Action Elements	Verdict		
			Evaluator Action Elements	Assurance Component	Assurance Class

Assurance Class	Assurance Component	Evaluator Action Elements	Verdict		
			Evaluator Action Elements	Assurance Component	Assurance Class
ASE	ASE_INT.1	ASE_INT.1.1E	PASS	PASS	PASS
		ASE_INT.1.2E	PASS		
	ASE_CCL.1	ASE_CCL.1.1E	PASS	PASS	
	ASE_OBJ.1	ASE_OBJ.1.1E	PASS	PASS	
	ASE_ECD.1	ASE_ECD.1.1E	PASS	PASS	
		ASE_ECD.1.2E	PASS		
	ASE_REQ.1	ASE_REQ.1.1E	PASS	PASS	
	ASE_TSS.1	ASE_TSS.1.1E	PASS	PASS	
		ASE_TSS.1.2E	PASS		
ALC	ALC_CMC.1	ALC_CMC.1.1E	PASS	PASS	PASS
	ALC_CMS.1	ALC_CMS.1.1E	PASS	PASS	
AGD	AGD_PRE.1	AGD_PRE.1.1E	PASS	PASS	PASS
		AGD_PRE.1.2E	PASS	PASS	
	AGD_OPE.1	AGD_OPE.1.1E	PASS	PASS	
ADV	ADV_FSP.1	ADV_FSP.1.1E	PASS	PASS	PASS
		ADV_FSP.1.2E	PASS		
ATE	ATE_FUN.1	ATE_FUN.1.1E	PASS	PASS	PASS
	ATE_IND.1	ATE_IND.1.1E	PASS	PASS	
		ATE_IND.1.2E	PASS		
AVA	AVA_VAN.1	AVA_VAN.1.1E	PASS	PASS	PASS
		AVA_VAN.1.2E	PASS		
		AVA_VAN.1.3E	PASS		

[Table 5] Evaluation Result Summary

10. Recommendations

The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by complying with the followings:

- The TOE must be installed and operated in a physically secure environment

accessible only by authorized administrators and should not allow remote management from outside.

- The administrator shall maintain a safe state of the operating system and DBMS in the TOE operation such as application of the latest security patches, eliminating unnecessary service, and change of the default password.
- The administrator should periodically check a spare space of audit data storage in case of the audit data loss, and carry out the audit data backup to prevent audit data loss.

11. Security Target

D'Amo Agent v4.0 Security Target v1.3 [6] is included in this report for reference.

12. Acronyms and Glossary

CC	Common Criteria
CEM	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
KCMVP	the Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Program
PP	Protection Profile
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
TSFI	TSF Interface
Decryption	The act that restoring the ciphertext into the plaintext using the decryption key
Encryption	The act that converting the plaintext into the ciphertext using the cryptographic key

Self-test	Pre-operational or conditional test executed by the cryptographic module
Validated Cryptographic Module	A cryptographic module that is validated and given a validation number by validation authority

13. Bibliography

The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.

[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components

[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017

[3] Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (24 August 2017)

[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (17 May 2021)

[5] KOSYAS-2020-31 D'Amo Agent v4.0 Evaluation Technical Report V3.00, 3 November 2021

[6] D'Amo Agent v4.0 Security Target v1.3, 1 October 2021

[7] Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1 (KECS-PP-0820a-2017, 11 December 2019)