

## **Nessus Network Monitor 6.2.2**

### **Security Target**

**Version 1.1**

**28 June 2023**

**Prepared for:**



Tenable, Inc.  
6100 Merriweather Drive  
12th Floor  
Columbia, MD 21044

**Prepared by:**



Accredited Testing and Evaluation Labs  
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive  
Columbia, MD 21046

---

## Contents

1	Security Target Introduction.....	1
1.1	Security Target, TOE and CC Identification.....	1
1.2	Conformance Claims.....	1
1.3	Conventions.....	3
1.3.1	Terminology .....	4
1.3.2	Abbreviations and Acronyms .....	4
2	Product and TOE Description.....	6
2.1	Introduction.....	6
2.2	Product Overview .....	6
2.3	TOE Overview .....	6
2.4	TOE Architecture .....	7
2.4.1	Physical Boundary .....	7
2.4.2	Logical Boundary .....	8
2.4.2.1	Timely Security Updates .....	9
2.4.2.2	Cryptographic Support.....	9
2.4.2.3	User Data Protection.....	9
2.4.2.4	Identification and Authentication.....	9
2.4.2.5	Security Management.....	9
2.4.2.6	Privacy .....	10
2.4.2.7	Protection of the TSF .....	10
2.4.2.8	Trusted Path/Channels .....	10
2.5	TOE Documentation .....	10
3	Security Problem Definition.....	11
4	Security Objectives .....	12
5	IT Security Requirements.....	13
5.1	Extended Requirements .....	13
5.2	TOE Security Functional Requirements.....	14
5.2.1	Cryptographic Support (FCS).....	15
5.2.1.1	FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services .....	15
5.2.1.2	FCS_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation .....	15
5.2.1.3	FCS_CKM_EXT.1/PBKDF Password Conditioning .....	15
5.2.1.4	FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment.....	16
5.2.1.5	FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption.....	16
5.2.1.6	FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation – Hashing .....	16
5.2.1.7	FCS_COP.1/Sig Cryptographic Operation – Signing .....	17
5.2.1.8	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication .....	17
5.2.1.9	FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Server HTTPS Protocol.....	17
5.2.1.10	FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2 HTTPS Protocol with Mutual Authentication.....	17
5.2.1.11	FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services.....	17
5.2.1.12	FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application.....	18
5.2.1.13	FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials.....	18
5.2.1.14	FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol (TLS Package) .....	18

---

5.2.1.15	FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol (TLS Package)	18
5.2.1.16	FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 TLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication (TLS Package)	19
5.2.2	User Data Protection (FDP)	19
5.2.2.1	FDP_DAR_EXT.1(1) Encryption of Sensitive Application Data (by TOE)	19
5.2.2.2	FDP_DAR_EXT.1(2) Encryption of Sensitive Application Data (by OE)	19
5.2.2.3	FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources	19
5.2.2.4	FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications	20
5.2.3	Identification and Authentication (FIA)	20
5.2.3.1	FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation	20
5.2.3.2	FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication	21
5.2.4	Security Management (FMT)	21
5.2.4.1	FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration	21
5.2.4.2	FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism	21
5.2.4.3	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	21
5.2.5	Privacy (FPR)	21
5.2.5.1	FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information	21
5.2.6	Protection of the TSF (FPT)	21
5.2.6.1	FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities	21
5.2.6.2	FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs	22
5.2.6.3	FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions	22
5.2.6.4	FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries	22
5.2.6.5	FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update	22
5.2.6.6	FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update	22
5.2.7	Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)	23
5.2.7.1	FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit	23
5.3	TOE Security Assurance Requirements	23
6	TOE Summary Specification	24
6.1	Timely Security Updates	24
6.2	Cryptographic Support	24
6.3	User Data Protection	27
6.4	Identification and Authentication	28
6.5	Security Management	29
6.6	Privacy	30
6.7	Protection of the TSF	30
6.8	Trusted Path/Channels	31
7	Protection Profile Claims	33
8	Rationale	34
8.1	TOE Summary Specification Rationale	34
Appendix A	TOE Usage of Third-Party Components	36
A.1	Platform APIs	36
A.2	Third-Party Libraries	37

## Tables

Table 1: Terms and Definitions	4
Table 2: Abbreviations and Acronyms	4

---

Table 3: TOE Security Functional Components..... 14

Table 4: Assurance Components..... 23

Table 5: Cryptographic Functions ..... 24

Table 6: Sensitive Data..... 27

Table 7: TOE Network Usage ..... 28

Table 8: Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping..... 34

# 1 Security Target Introduction

The Security Target (ST) contains the following additional sections:

- Product and TOE Description (Section 2)
- Security Problem Definition (Section 3)
- Security Objectives (Section 4)
- IT Security Requirements (Section 5)
- 
- [TLS\_PKG] does contain evaluation activities for how to evaluate its SFR claims as part of the evaluation of ASE\_TSS.1, AGD\_OPE.1, AGD\_PRE.1, and ATE\_IND.1. All Security Functional Requirements specified by [TLS\_PKG] are evaluated in the manner specified in that package.

- TOE Summary Specification (Section 0)
-

- Protection Profile Claims (Section 0)
- This ST is conformant to *Protection Profile for Application Software*, Version 1.4, 7 October 2021 ([APP\_PP]) and *Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS)*, Version 1.1, 1 March 2019 ([TLS\_PKG]) along with all applicable errata and interpretations from the certificate issuing scheme.

The TOE consists of a software application that runs on a Linux or Windows operating system as its platform.

As explained in section 3, Security Problem Definition, the Security Problem Definition of [APP\_PP] has been included by reference into this ST.

As explained in section 4, Security Objectives, the Security Objectives of [APP\_PP] have been included by reference into this ST.

All claimed SFRs are defined in [APP\_PP] or [TLS\_PKG]. All mandatory SFRs are claimed. No optional or objective SFRs are claimed. Selection-based SFR claims are consistent with the selections made in the mandatory SFRs that prompt their inclusion.

- Rationale (Section 0)
- TOE Usage of Third-Party Components (Appendix A).

## 1.1 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification

**ST Title** – Nessus Network Monitor 6.2.2 Security Target

**ST Version** – Version 1.1

**ST Date** – 28 June 2023

**TOE Identification** – Nessus Network Monitor (also known as NNM) 6.2.2, supported on RHEL 8.7 and Windows Server 2019

**TOE Developer** – Tenable, Inc.

**Evaluation Sponsor** – Tenable, Inc.

**CC Identification** – Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017

## 1.2 Conformance Claims

This ST and the TOE it describes are conformant to the following CC specifications:

- *Protection Profile for Application Software*, Version 1.4, 7 October 2021 ([APP\_PP]) with the following optional and selection-based SFRs:
  - FCS\_CKM.1/AK
  - FCS\_CKM.1/PBKDF
  - FCS\_CKM.2
  - FCS\_COP.1/SKC
  - FCS\_COP.1/Hash
  - FCS\_COP.1/Sig
  - FCS\_COP.1/KeyedHash
  - FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1/Server
  - FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.2
  - FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2
  - FIA\_X509\_EXT.1
  - FIA\_X509\_EXT.2
- *Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS)*, Version 1.1, 1 March 2019 ([TLS\_PKG]) with the following optional and selection-based SFRs:
  - FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1
  - FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.2
- The following NIAP Technical Decisions affecting [APP\_PP] apply to the TOE and have been accounted for in the ST development and the conduct of the evaluation, or were considered to be non-applicable for the reasons stated:

**TD0624: Addition of DataStore for Storing and Setting Configuration Options**

- N/A; the TOE is not evaluated on an Android platform.



**TD0628: Addition of Container Image to Package Format**

- The ST accounts for this TD.

**TD0650: Conformance claim sections updated to allow for MOD\_VPNC\_V2.3 and 2.4**

- No change to ST; affects only PP conformance claims and the ST does not claim conformance to the relevant PP-Module.

**TD0664: Testing activity for FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2.2**

- No change to ST; affects only evaluation activities.

**TD0669: FIA\_X509\_EXT.1 Test 4 Interpretation**

- No change to ST; affects only evaluation activities.

**TD0717: Format changes for PP\_APP\_V1.4**

- The ST accounts for this TD.

**TD0719: ECD for PP APP V1.3 and 1.4**

- No change to ST; affects only PP conformance to CC.

**TD0736: Number of elements for iterations of FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1**

- The ST accounts for this TD.

**TD0743: FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1.1 Selection exclusivity**

- The ST accounts for this TD.

- The following NIAP Technical Decisions affecting [TLS\_PKG] apply to the TOE and have been accounted for in the ST development and the conduct of the evaluation, or were considered to be non-applicable for the reasons stated:

**TD0442: Updated TLS Ciphersuites for TLS Package**

- No change to ST; affects selections in FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1 that are not applicable to the TOE.

**TD0469: Modification of test activity for FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1.1 test 4.1**

- No change to ST; the TD modifies evaluation activities only.

**TD0499: Testing with pinned certificates**

- N/A; the TOE does not claim FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1

**TD0513: CA Certificate loading**

- N/A; the TOE does not claim FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1

**TD0588: Session Resumption Support in TLS package**

- The ST accounts for this TD.

**TD0726: Corrections to (D)TLSS SFRs in TLS 1.1 FP**

- The ST accounts for this TD.

#### TD0739: PKG\_TLS\_V1.1 has 2 different publication dates

- N/A; the TOE does not implement RSA-based key establishment methods.
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
  - Part 2 Extended
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
  - Part 3 Extended

### 1.3 Conventions

The following conventions have been applied in this document:

- Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
  - Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. This ST includes iterated requirements reproduced from [APP\_PP], which uses descriptive strings to distinguish iterations of a requirement. For example, [APP\_PP] identifies iterations of FCS\_COP.1 as follows: FCS\_COP.1/SKC, FCS\_COP.1/Hash, FCS\_COP.1/Sig, and FCS\_COP.1/KeyedHash. ST-defined iterations (i.e., those not reproduced from [APP\_PP]) use digits inside parentheses (e.g., '(1)') to distinguish between iterations of an SFR (e.g., FDP\_DAR\_EXT.1(1) and FDP\_DAR\_EXT.1(2)).
  - Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [*assignment item*]). Note that an assignment within a selection would be identified in both italics and underline, with the brackets themselves underlined since they are explicitly part of the selection text, unlike the brackets around the selection itself (e.g., [selection item, [*assignment item inside selection*]]).
  - Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated using underlines and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection item]).
  - Refinement: allows technical changes to a requirement to make it more restrictive and allows non-technical changes to grammar and formatting. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions, and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., "... **all** objects ..." or "... ~~some~~ **big** things ..."). Note that minor grammatical changes that do not involve the addition or removal of entire words (e.g., for consistency of quantity such as changing "meets" to "meet") do not have formatting applied.
- Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as captions.
- The ST does not show operations that have been completed by the PP authors, though it does preserve brackets to show where such operations have been made.

#### 1.3.1 Terminology

The following terms are used in this ST:

Table 1: Terms and Definitions

Term	Definition
Log Correlation Engine	An environmental component that is responsible for collecting log data from a variety of sources and aggregating it into a single collection of results.
Nessus Agent	An environmental component that is installed on an endpoint system to collect details about that system's configuration and behavior.
Nessus Network Monitor	The TOE; an application that collects and analyzes raw network traffic.
Nessus	An environmental component that conducts remote scans of systems to collect data about their configuration and behavior and is used to deploy and collect data from the TOE.
Platform	A general-purpose computer on which the TOE is installed.
Tenable.sc (SecurityCenter)	An environmental component that functions as a centralized aggregator for data collected by the TOE and by other environmental components.

### 1.3.2 Abbreviations and Acronyms

Table 2: Abbreviations and Acronyms

Term	Definition
API	Application Programming Interface
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
ASLR	Address Space Layout Randomization
CA	Certificate Authority
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
CC	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CCECG	Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guidance
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security
CN	Common Name
CTR	Counter (cryptographic mode)
CVE	Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EAR	Entropy Analysis Report
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDHE	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (Ephemeral)
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
FQDN	Fully Qualified Domain Name
GB	Gigabyte
GCM	Galois/Counter Mode
GUI	Graphical User Interface
HMAC	Hashed Message Authentication Code

<b>Term</b>	<b>Definition</b>
LCE	Log Correlation Engine
NIAP	National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NNM	Nessus Network Monitor
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
OE	Operational Environment
OID	Original Issue Document
OS	Operating System
PBKDF	Password-Based Key Derivation Function
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PP	Protection Profile
RAM	Random Access Memory
RSA	Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (algorithm for public-key cryptography)
SAN	Subject Alternative Name
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
ST	Security Target
TCP	Transmission Control Protocol
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Function

## 2 Product and TOE Description

### 2.1 Introduction

Nessus Network Monitor 6.2.2 (NNM) is a software product that is designed to passively collect traffic data from environmental networks for analysis.

NNM also connects to an environmental instance of Tenable.sc (SecurityCenter) which serves as a single point to aggregate and analyze data collected from various Tenable applications, including NNM.

The TOE conforms to [APP\_PP] and [TLS\_PKG]. As such, the security-relevant functionality of the product is limited to the claimed requirements in those standards. The security-relevant functionality is described in sections 2.3 and 2.4. The product overview in section 2.2 below is intended to provide the reader with an overall summary of the entire product so that its intended usage is clear. The subset of the product functionality that is within the evaluation scope is subsequently described in the sections that follow it.

### 2.2 Product Overview

NNM is a vulnerability management product that is designed to provide visibility into network assets. The product is used to collect information about its environment that is used to diagnose and enhance the security posture of the environment. It does this by passively scanning network traffic using deep packet inspection to perform asset discovery and to detect user and application activities that could indicate compromise or misuse. Information collected by NNM can be fed to the environmental Tenable.sc product for centralized aggregation, analysis, and reaction.

NNM also supports plugins, which can be downloaded and added to the product to detect specific vulnerabilities.

### 2.3 TOE Overview

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for NNM consists of the mandatory functionality prescribed by [APP\_PP] and [TLS\_PKG], as well as some selection-based functionality where needed.

The logical boundary is summarized in section 2.4.2 below. In general, the following NNM capabilities are considered to be within the scope of the TOE:

- **Protection of sensitive data at rest:** the TOE uses encryption to protect credentials and other sensitive data.
- **Protection of data in transit:** the TOE secures data in transit between itself and its operational environment using TLS and HTTPS.
- **Trusted updates:** the TOE provides visibility into its current running version and the vendor distributes updates to it that are digitally signed so that administrators can securely maintain up-to-date software.
- **Remote administration:** the TOE provides a Web GUI to administer its security functions. Note however that the bulk of the product's administration functions are outside the scope of the App PP and TLS Package and are therefore not part of the TOE.
- **Cryptographic services:** the TOE includes an implementation of OpenSSL with NIST-validated algorithm services that it uses to secure data at rest and in transit.

- Secure interaction with operating system:** the TOE is designed to interact with underlying host operating system platforms in such a way that the TOE cannot be used as an attack vector to compromise an operating system.

The TOE’s data collection capabilities are outside the scope of the TOE, as is any other product behavior that is not described in [APP\_PP] or [TLS\_PKG]. The content and execution of plugins is similarly excluded from the TOE, although they are discussed in the context of network communications because the TSF must use platform network resources to acquire them.

## 2.4 TOE Architecture

The NNM TOE consists of the NNM application, which is a C application with a PHP/JavaScript web front-end running on a proprietary web server. The TOE has both Linux and Windows platform versions.


### 2.4.1 Physical Boundary

The TOE consists of the following component, as shown in Figure 1 below:

- Nessus Network Monitor (NNM) 6.2.2.

Figure 1 shows the TOE in a sample deployment with other Tenable applications in its operational environment.

Figure 1 - TOE Boundary



TSF-relevant remote interfaces are shown in Figure 1. Note that the TOE consists of exactly one instance of NNM.

The TOE has the following basic system requirements for its host platforms (sufficient to manage up to 50,000 hosts):

- 2 x 2GHz cores
- 2 GB RAM (4 GB RAM recommended)
- At least 20 GB disk storage.

These system requirements reflect the lightest usage scenarios for the TOE. Additional factors such as network size and storage retention requirements will affect the system requirements for a particular deployment. Refer to the relevant TOE documentation (as referenced in section 2.5) for the specific system requirements that apply to a given deployment.

The following network port must be open for the TOE to function, but the specific port is configurable if the default port cannot be used:

- TCP/8835 (for communications with remote administrators and with Tenable.sc)

NNM will collect network traffic to determine whether potential unauthorized or malicious activity is occurring in the network. This functionality is not within the scope of the TOE because it is not “sensitive data” but it is necessary for the product to function as advertised. In particular, if network configuration between NNM and a particular network node blocks traffic to that node, it may result in a false negative if malicious activities are occurring that the TOE cannot detect due to an inability to receive the traffic.

The TOE’s operational environment includes the following:

- Other Tenable components (an instance of Tenable.sc—Nessus, Nessus Agent(s), and Log Correlation Engine are expected to be present in the TOE’s operational environment because they also interface with Tenable.sc, but the TOE does not interact with these applications directly).
- Platform (hardware and software) on which the TOE is hosted.
  - The TOE is capable of running on a general-purpose Windows or Linux operating system on standard consumer-grade hardware on either a physical or virtual machine. For the evaluated configuration, the TOE was tested on virtualized instances of Windows Server 2019 and RHEL 8.7, each running on VMware ESXi 6.5 on a system using an AMD Ryzen Threadripper 1950X processor with the Zen microarchitecture.
- Full disk encryption is required for the TOE platform to ensure adequate data-at-rest protection.
- Web browser, used to access the GUI interface.

#### 2.4.2 Logical Boundary

This section summarizes the security functions provided by the TOE:

- Timely Security Updates
- Cryptographic Support
- User Data Protection
- Identification and Authentication

- Security Management
- Privacy
- Protection of the TSF
- Trusted Path/Channels.

#### 2.4.2.1 Timely Security Updates

The TOE developer has internal mechanisms for receiving reports of security flaws, tracking product vulnerabilities, and distributing software updates to customers in a timely manner.

#### 2.4.2.2 Cryptographic Support

The TOE implements cryptography to protect data at rest and in transit.

For data at rest, the TOE stores credential data to log in to the TOE as well as passphrase data used to protect PKI certificates that the TOE uses to authenticate to environmental components. This stored data is encrypted using AES or a PBKDF, depending on the data that is being stored.

For data in transit, the TOE implements TLS/HTTPS as a server. The TOE implements a TLS server for its administrative interface and to communicate with other Tenable products in its operational environment. The TOE supports mutual authentication as a TLS server for all uses.

The TOE implements all cryptography used for these functions using its own implementations of OpenSSL with NIST-approved algorithms. The TOE's DRBG is seeded using entropy from the underlying OS platform.

#### 2.4.2.3 User Data Protection

The TOE uses cryptographic mechanisms to protect sensitive data at rest. The key used by the TOE to encrypt and decrypt sensitive data is cryptographically protected by the TOE platform.

The TOE relies on the network connectivity and system log capabilities of its host OS platform. The TOE supports user-initiated, externally-initiated, and application-initiated uses of the network.

#### 2.4.2.4 Identification and Authentication

The TOE supports X.509 certificate validation as part of establishing TLS and HTTPS connections. The TOE supports various certificate validity checking methods and can also check certificate revocation status using OCSP. If the validity status of a certificate cannot be determined, the certificate will be accepted. All other cases where a certificate is found to be invalid will result in rejection without an administrative override.

#### 2.4.2.5 Security Management

The TOE itself and the configuration settings it uses are stored in locations recommended by the platform vendor for both Windows and Linux application versions.

The TOE includes a web GUI. This interface enforces username/password authentication using locally-stored credentials that are created using the TOE. The TOE does not include a default user account to access its management interface.

The security-relevant management functions supported by the TOE relate to configuration of transmission of system data (through collection of network traffic).



#### 2.4.2.6 Privacy

The TOE does not handle personally identifiable information (PII) of any individuals.

#### 2.4.2.7 Protection of the TSF

The TOE enforces various mechanisms to prevent itself from being used as an attack vector to its host OS platform. Each TOE platform version (Windows and Linux) implements address space layout randomization (ASLR), does not allocate any memory with both write and execute permissions, does not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files, is compiled using stack overflow protection, and is compatible with the security features of its host OS platform.

Each TOE platform version contains libraries and invokes system APIs that are well-known and explicitly identified.

The TOE has a mechanism to determine its current software version. Software updates to the TOE can be acquired by leveraging its OS platform. The format of the software update is dependent on the TOE platform version. All updates are digitally signed to guarantee their authenticity and integrity.

#### 2.4.2.8 Trusted Path/Channels

The TOE encrypts sensitive data in transit between itself and its operational environment using TLS and HTTPS. It facilitates the transmission of sensitive data from remote users over TLS and HTTPS.

### 2.5 TOE Documentation

Tenable provides the following product documentation in support of the installation and secure use of the TOE:

- Nessus Network Monitor 6.2.x User Guide, Last Updated: May 18, 2023.

### 3 Security Problem Definition

This ST includes by reference the Security Problem Definition, composed of threats and assumptions, from [APP\_PP]. The Common Criteria also provides for organizational security policies to be part of a security problem definition, but no such policies are defined in [APP\_PP].

As a functional package, [TLS\_PKG] does not contain a Security Problem Definition. The TOE's use of TLS is intended to mitigate the T.NETWORK\_ATTACK and T.NETWORK\_EAVESDROP threats defined by [APP\_PP].

In general, the threat model of [APP\_PP] is designed to protect against the following:

- Disclosure of sensitive data at rest or in transit that the user has a reasonable expectation of security for.
- Excessive or poorly-implemented interfaces with the underlying platform that allow an application to be used as an intrusion point to a system.

This threat model is applicable to the TOE because aggregated and analyzed vulnerability scan results could show an attacker what system weaknesses are present in the environment if they were able to obtain this data. It is also applicable because the TOE is a collection of executable binaries that an attacker could attempt to use to compromise the underlying OS platform if it was designed in such a manner that this exploitation was possible.

## 4 Security Objectives

As with the Security Problem Definition, this ST includes by reference the security objectives defined in [APP\_PP]. This includes security objectives for the TOE (used to mitigate threats) and for its operational environment (used to satisfy assumptions).

As a functional package, [TLS\_PKG] does not contain a Security Problem Definition. The TOE's use of TLS is intended to satisfy the O.PROTECTED\_COMMS objective of [APP\_PP] by implementing a specific method by which network communications are protected.

## 5 IT Security Requirements

This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to scope the evaluation effort.

The SFRs have all been drawn from the following Protection Profiles (PP) and Functional Packages:

- *Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, 7 October 2021*
- *Functional Packages for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 1 March 2019*

As a result, any selection, assignment, or refinement operations already performed on the claimed SFRs drawn from these documents are not identified here (i.e., they are not formatted in accordance with the conventions specified in section 1.3 of this ST). Formatting conventions are only applied on SFR text that was chosen at the ST author's discretion.

### 5.1 Extended Requirements

All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from [APP\_PP] and [TLS\_PKG]. These documents define the following extended SAR and extended SFRs; since these extended requirements have not been redefined in this ST, [APP\_PP] and [TLS\_PKG] should be consulted for more information regarding these extensions to CC Parts 2 and 3.

Defined in [APP\_PP]:

- ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
- FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1 (as specified in NIAP TD0717)
- FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1/PBKDF (as specified in NIAP TD0717)
- FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1/Server HTTPS Protocol
- FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.2 HTTPS Protocol with Mutual Authentication
- FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
- FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application
- FCS\_STO\_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
- FDP\_DAR\_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data
- FDP\_DEC\_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
- FDP\_NET\_EXT.1 Network Communications
- FIA\_X509\_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
- FIA\_X509\_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
- FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
- FMT\_MEC\_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
- FPR\_ANO\_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
- FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
- FPT\_API\_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
- FPT\_IDV\_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
- FPT\_LIB\_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
- FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
- FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
- FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit

Defined in [TLS\_PKG]:

- FCS\_TLS\_EXT.1 TLS Protocol
- FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol
- FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.2 TLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication

## 5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by the TOE.

*Table 3: TOE Security Functional Components*

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
<b>FCS: Cryptographic Support</b>	FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
	FCS_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
	FCS_CKM_EXT.1/PBKDF Password Conditioning
	FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
	FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption
	FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation – Hashing
	FCS_COP.1/Sig Cryptographic Operation – Signing
	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
	FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Server HTTPS Protocol
	FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2 HTTPS Protocol with Mutual Authentication
	FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
	FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application
	FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
	FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol (TLS Package)
	FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol (TLS Package)
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 TLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication (TLS Package)	
<b>FDP: User Data Protection</b>	FDP_DAR_EXT.1(1) Encryption of Sensitive Application Data (by TOE)
	FDP_DAR_EXT.1(2) Encryption of Sensitive Application Data (by OE)
	FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
	FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
<b>FIA: Identification and authentication</b>	FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
	FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
<b>FMT: Security Management</b>	FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
	FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
<b>FPR: Privacy</b>	FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
<b>FPT: Protection of the TSF</b>	FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
	FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
	FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
	FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
	FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
	FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
<b>FTP: Trusted Path/Channels</b>	FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit

## 5.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

### 5.2.1.1 FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services

**FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1.1<sup>1</sup>** The application shall [

- implement asymmetric key generation

].

### 5.2.1.2 FCS\_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation

**FCS\_CKM.1.1/AK<sup>2</sup>** The application shall [

- implement functionality

] to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [

- [ECC schemes] using ["NIST curves" P-384 and [P-256, P-521]] that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.4]

].

### 5.2.1.3 FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1/PBKDF<sup>3</sup> Password Conditioning

**FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1.1/PBKDF** A password/passphrase shall perform [Password-based Key Derivation Functions] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm as specified in FCS\_COP.1/KeyedHash, with [10000] iterations, and output cryptographic key sizes [128] that meet the following [NIST SP 800-132].

**FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1.2/PBKDF** The TSF shall generate salts using a RBG that meets FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 and with entropy corresponding to the security strength selected for PBKDF in FCS\_CKM.1.1/PBKDF.

---

<sup>1</sup> Modified in accordance with TD0717.

<sup>2</sup> Modified in accordance with TD0717.

<sup>3</sup> Modified in accordance with TD0717.

#### 5.2.1.4 FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment

**FCS\_CKM.2.1** The application shall [implement functionality] to perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method: [

- [Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes] that meet the following: [NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”]

].

#### 5.2.1.5 FCS\_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption

**FCS\_COP.1.1/SKC<sup>4</sup>** The application shall perform [encryption/decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [

- AES-CBC (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A) mode,
- AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D) mode,
- AES-XTS (as defined in NIST SP 800-38E) mode

] and cryptographic key sizes [128-bit, 256-bit].

**Application Note:** *The TOE uses both 128 and 256-bit AES-CBC and AES-GCM keys in support of TLS. The TOE encrypts passphrases used for certificate encryption using a 256-bit AES-XTS key. Although the TOE’s cryptographic module is capable of using 128-bit keys in AES-XTS mode, the TOE does not make use of this capability.*

#### 5.2.1.6 FCS\_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation – Hashing

**FCS\_COP.1.1/Hash<sup>5</sup>** The application shall perform [cryptographic hashing services] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [

- SHA-256,
- SHA-384,
- SHA-512

] and message digest sizes [

- 256,
- 384,
- 512

] bits that meet the following: [FIPS Pub 180-4].

---

<sup>4</sup> Modified in accordance with TD0717.

<sup>5</sup> Modified in accordance with TD0717.

### 5.2.1.7 FCS\_COP.1/Sig Cryptographic Operation – Signing

**FCS\_COP.1.1/Sig<sup>6</sup>** The application shall perform [cryptographic signature services (generation and verification)] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [

- RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of [2048-bit or greater] that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5]

].

### 5.2.1.8 FCS\_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication

**FCS\_COP.1.1/KeyedHash<sup>7</sup>** The application shall perform [keyed-hash message authentication] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [

- HMAC-SHA-256,
- HMAC-SHA-384,
- HMAC-SHA-512]

and [

- no other algorithms

] with key sizes [256 bits, 384 bits, 512 bits] and message digest sizes [256, 384, 512] and [no other size] bits that meet the following: [FIPS Pub 198-1 ‘The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code’ and FIPS Pub 180-4 ‘Secure Hash Standard’].

### 5.2.1.9 FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1/Server<sup>8</sup> HTTPS Protocol

**FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.1/Server** The application shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.

**FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.2/Server** The application shall implement HTTPS using TLS as defined in the TLS package.

**FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.3/Server** The application shall [not establish the connection] if the peer certificate is deemed invalid.

### 5.2.1.10 FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.2 HTTPS Protocol with Mutual Authentication

**FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.2.1** The application shall [not establish the connection] if the peer certificate is deemed invalid.

### 5.2.1.11 FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1** The application shall [

- implement DRBG functionality

] for its cryptographic operations.

---

<sup>6</sup> Modified in accordance with TD0717.

<sup>7</sup> Modified in accordance with TD0717.

<sup>8</sup> Modified in accordance with TD0736.



### 5.2.1.12 FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2.1** The application shall perform all deterministic random bit generation (DRBG) services in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-90A using [CTR\_DRBG (AES)].

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2.2** The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy from a platform-based DRBG and [  

- no other noise source

] with a minimum of [  

- 256 bits

] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength (according to NIST SP 800-57) of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

### 5.2.1.13 FCS\_STO\_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials

**FCS\_STO\_EXT.1.1** The application shall [  

- implement functionality to securely store [Web GUI authentication credentials, PKI certificate passphrases] according to [FCS COP.1/SKC, FCS CKM EXT.1/PBKDF]

] to non-volatile memory.

### 5.2.1.14 FCS\_TLS\_EXT.1 TLS Protocol (TLS Package)

**FCS\_TLS\_EXT.1.1** The product shall implement [  

- TLS as a server

].

### 5.2.1.15 FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol (TLS Package)

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1.1<sup>9</sup>** The product shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and [no earlier TLS versions] as a server that supports the cipher suites [  

- TLS ECDHE RSA WITH AES 128 CBC SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
- TLS ECDHE RSA WITH AES 128 GCM SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
- TLS ECDHE RSA WITH AES 256 CBC SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
- TLS ECDHE RSA WITH AES 256 GCM SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289]

and also supports functionality for [  

- mutual authentication

].

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1.2** The product shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0 and [TLS 1.1].

---

<sup>9</sup> This SFR is modified by TD0442 but this ST does not claim any of the selections that were added by the TD.

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1.3<sup>10</sup>** The product shall perform key establishment for TLS using [

- ECDHE parameters using elliptic curves [secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1] and no other curves

].

#### 5.2.1.16 FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.2 TLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication (TLS Package)

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.2.1** The product shall support authentication of TLS clients using X.509v3 certificates.

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.2.2** The product shall not establish a trusted channel if the client certificate is invalid.

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.2.3** The product shall not establish a trusted channel if the Distinguished Name (DN) or Subject Alternative Name (SAN) contained in a certificate does not match one of the expected identifiers for the client.

### 5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)

#### 5.2.2.1 FDP\_DAR\_EXT.1(1) Encryption of Sensitive Application Data (by TOE)

**FDP\_DAR\_EXT.1.1(1)** The application shall [

- protect sensitive data in accordance with FCS\_STO\_EXT.1

] in non-volatile memory.

**Application Note:** *“Sensitive data” includes both the credential data specified in FCS\_STO\_EXT.1 as well as system scan, network traffic, and log data that is collected from the Operational Environment. This data is not credential data, but it is still protected using the methods specified in FCS\_STO\_EXT.1. This is because all sensitive data, regardless of whether or not it is credential data, is stored in an encrypted database.*

#### 5.2.2.2 FDP\_DAR\_EXT.1(2) Encryption of Sensitive Application Data (by OE)

**FDP\_DAR\_EXT.1.1(2)** The application shall [

- leverage platform-provided functionality to encrypt sensitive data

] in non-volatile memory.

**Application Note:** *The database encryption referenced in FDP\_DAR\_EXT.1(1) requires a secret key to be stored on the platform. This is considered to be sensitive data and is therefore protected using platform-provided means.*

#### 5.2.2.3 FDP\_DEC\_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources

**FDP\_DEC\_EXT.1.1** The application shall restrict its access to [

- network connectivity

].

**FDP\_DEC\_EXT.1.2** The application shall restrict its access to [

- system logs

].

---

<sup>10</sup> Modified in accordance with TD0726.

#### 5.2.2.4 FDP\_NET\_EXT.1 Network Communications

**FDP\_NET\_EXT.1.1** The application shall restrict network communication to [

- User-initiated communication for [
  - access to Web GUI]
- Respond to [
  - retrieval of scan results by Tenable.sc,
  - retrieval of plugin updates from Tenable.sc]
- [application-initiated network communication for
  - collection of network data]

].

#### 5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

##### 5.2.3.1 FIA\_X509\_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1** The application shall [implement functionality] to validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
- The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
- The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and that any path constraints are met.
- The application shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the key usage field.
- The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [OCSP as specified in RFC 6960].
- The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage (EKU) field according to the following rules:
  - Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the EKU field.
  - Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
  - S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
  - OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.
  - Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field.

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.2** The application shall treat a certificate as a CA certificate only if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

### 5.2.3.2 FIA\_X509\_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1** The application shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [HTTPS, TLS].

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.2** When the application cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the application shall [accept the certificate].

## 5.2.4 Security Management (FMT)

### 5.2.4.1 FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration

**FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1.1** The application shall provide only enough functionality to set new credentials when configured with default credentials or no credentials.

**FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1.2** The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect the application's binaries and data files from modification by normal unprivileged users.

### 5.2.4.2 FMT\_MEC\_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism

**FMT\_MEC\_EXT.1.1** The application shall [invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform vendor for storing and setting configuration options].

### 5.2.4.3 FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

**FMT\_SMF.1.1** The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [

- [configuration of collection of network traffic data]

].

## 5.2.5 Privacy (FPR)

### 5.2.5.1 FPR\_ANO\_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information

**FPR\_ANO\_EXT.1.1** The application shall [

- not transmit PII over a network

].

## 5.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

### 5.2.6.1 FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities

**FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.1** The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for [no exceptions].

**FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.2** The application shall [

- not allocate any memory region with both write and execute permissions

].

**FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.3** The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the platform vendor.

**FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.4** The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files unless explicitly directed by the user to do so.

**FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.5** The application shall be built with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled.

#### 5.2.6.2 FPT\_API\_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs

**FPT\_API\_EXT.1.1** The application shall use only documented platform APIs.

#### 5.2.6.3 FPT\_IDV\_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions

**FPT\_IDV\_EXT.1.1** The application shall be versioned with [[semantic versioning (SemVer)]].

#### 5.2.6.4 FPT\_LIB\_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries

**FPT\_LIB\_EXT.1.1** The application shall be packaged with only *[third-party libraries listed in Appendix A.2]*.

**Application Note:** *The TOE uses a large number of third-party libraries so this information has been provided in an Appendix for readability purposes.*

#### 5.2.6.5 FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.1** The application shall [leverage the platform] to check for updates and patches to the application software.

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.2** The application shall [provide the ability, leverage the platform] to query the current version of the application software.

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.3** The application shall not download, modify, replace, or update its own binary code.

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.4** Application updates shall be digitally signed such that the application platform can cryptographically verify them prior to installation.

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.5** The application is distributed [as an additional software package to the platform OS].

#### 5.2.6.6 FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2.1<sup>11</sup>** The application shall be distributed using [the format of the platform-supported package manager].

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2.2** The application shall be packaged such that its removal results in the deletion of all traces of the application, with the exception of configuration settings, output files, and audit/log events.

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2.2** The application installation package shall be digitally signed such that its platform can cryptographically verify them prior to installation.

---

<sup>11</sup> Modified in accordance with TD0628.

## 5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

### 5.2.7.1 FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit

- FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1.1<sup>12</sup>** The application shall [
- encrypt all transmitted [sensitive data] with [
    - HTTPS as a server in accordance with FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1/Server for [administrator interactions with TOE],
    - HTTPS as a server using mutual authentication in accordance with FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.2 for [administrator interactions with TOE],
    - TLS as a server as defined in the Functional Package for TLS and also supports functionality for [mutual authentication] for [collection by Tenable.sc of network traffic data from TOE]]
- ] between itself and another trusted IT product.

## 5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The security assurance requirements for the TOE are included by reference to the App PP.

*Table 4: Assurance Components*

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
<b>ADV: Development</b>	ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification
<b>AGD: Guidance Documentation</b>	AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures
<b>ALC: Life-cycle Support</b>	ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
	ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
	ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
<b>ATE: Tests</b>	ATE_IND.1 Independent Testing – Conformance
<b>AVA: Vulnerability Assessment</b>	AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability Survey

As a functional package, [TLS\_PKG] does not define its own SARs. The expectation is that all SARs required by [APP\_PP] will apply to the entire TOE, including the portions addressed by [TLS\_PKG]. Consequently, the evaluation activities specified in [APP\_PP] apply to the entire TOE evaluation, including any changes made to them by subsequent NIAP Technical Decisions as summarized in section 1.2 above.

[TLS\_PKG] does contain evaluation activities for how to evaluate its SFR claims as part of the evaluation of ASE\_TSS.1, AGD\_OPE.1, AGD\_PRE.1, and ATE\_IND.1. All Security Functional Requirements specified by [TLS\_PKG] are evaluated in the manner specified in that package.

---

<sup>12</sup> Modified in accordance with TD0743.

## 6 TOE Summary Specification

This chapter describes the security functions of the TOE:

- Timely Security Updates
- Cryptographic Support
- User Data Protection
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Privacy
- Protection of the TSF
- Trusted Path/Channels.

### 6.1 Timely Security Updates

Tenable supports a timely security update process for the TOE. In addition to their own internal research, the product vendor supports disclosure of potential issues using community forums, direct engagement, and the Tenable support channel. For issues where there is a potential security concern, the support channel uses HTTPS for secure disclosure.

When an issue is reported, Tenable will determine its applicability to the product. The length of time needed to make this determination depends on the complexity of the issue and the extent to which it can be reproduced; well-documented issues such as exposure to a published CVE can be made quickly. If found to be a security issue, a patch is released within 30 days. Tenable monitors the third-party components used by the TOE for potential security issues as well. However, an issue with a dependent component may not be addressed if found not to be applicable to the TOE. For example, security issues are frequently found within the PHP image library but Tenable does not install this library as part of the NNM distribution.

Security updates to the TOE are delivered as regular update packages in the same manner as a functional update. This process is described in section 6.7 below.

### 6.2 Cryptographic Support

The TOE uses cryptography to secure data in transit between itself and its operational environment.

All TOE cryptographic services are implemented by the OpenSSL cryptographic library. The TOE uses OpenSSL 3.0.9. The cryptographic algorithms supplied by the TOE are NIST-validated. The following table identifies the cryptographic algorithms used by the TSF, the associated standards to which they conform, and the NIST certificates that demonstrate that the claimed conformance has been met.

*Table 5: Cryptographic Functions*

Functions	Standards	Certificates
<b>FCS_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation</b>		
ECC key pair generation (NIST curves P-256, P-384, P-521)	FIPS PUB 186-4	A3617: ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)
<b>FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment</b>		
ECDSA based key establishment	NIST SP 800-56A	A3617: KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3

Functions	Standards	Certificates
<b>FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption</b>		
AES-CBC (128, 256 bits)	CBC as defined in NIST SP 800-38A	A3617: AES-CBC
AES-GCM (128, 256 bits)	GCM as defined in NIST SP 800-38D	A3617: AES-GCM
AES-XTS (256 bits)	XTS as defined in NIST SP 800-38E	A3617: AES-XTS
<b>FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation – Hashing</b>		
SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 (digest sizes 256, 384, and 512 bits)	FIPS PUB 180-4	A3617: SHA2-256 A3617: SHA2-384 A3617: SHA2-512
<b>FCS_COP.1/Sig Cryptographic Operation – Signing</b>		
RSA (2048-bit or greater)	FIPS PUB 186-4, Section 4	A3617: RSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4) A3617: RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)
<b>FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation – Keyed Hash Message Authentication</b>		
HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512	FIPS PUB 198-1 FIPS PUB 180-4	A3617: HMAC-SHA2-256 A3617: HMAC-SHA2-384 A3617: HMAC-SHA2-512
<b>FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application</b>		
CTR_DRBG DRBG (256 bits)	NIST SP 800-90A NIST SP 800-57	A3617: Counter DRBG

The TOE generates asymmetric keys in support of trusted communications. The TSF generates ECC keys using NIST curves P-256, P-384, and P-521. These keys are generated in support of the ECDHE key establishment schemes that are used for TLS/HTTPS communications. To ensure sufficient key strength, the TOE also implements DRBG functionality for key generation, using the AES-CTR\_DRBG. The proprietary Entropy Analysis Report (EAR) describes how the TSF extracts random data from software-based sources to ensure that an amount of entropy that is at least equal to the strength of the generated keys is present (i.e., at least 256 bits when the largest supported keys are generated) when seeding the DRBG for key generation purposes. The Windows platform version of the TOE relies on a third-party entropy source provided by the platform vendor. The Linux platform version of the TOE relies on the OS platform entropy source as well. Specifically, random numbers are obtained from the following platform APIs, depending on the platform used:

- Windows: SystemPRNG
- Linux: invocation of `/dev/random` pseudo-device

In both cases, it is assumed that these platforms provide at least 256 bits of entropy.

The TOE uses TLS 1.2 for server communications. All other TLS versions are rejected by the TOE. The TLS server implementation supports the following TLS cipher suites in the TOE's evaluated configuration:

- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256



- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384.

All supported ciphersuites use ephemeral elliptic curves as the method of key establishment. The TSF presents secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1 as the supported values in the Supported Groups extension and uses the same NIST curves for key establishment.

As part of certificate validation in the establishment of TLS connectivity, the TOE will validate the reference identifier of a presented server certificate. For all TOE usage of mutual TLS authentication, the TSF will perform the same verification of a presented client certificate. This is done through validation of the Common Name (CN) and Subject Alternative Name (SAN) certificate fields, the latter of which is expected to contain the FQDN of the external system that is presenting the certificate to the TOE. The reference identifier is established by configuration. IP addresses are not supported. Wildcards are only supported for the left-most label immediately preceding the public suffix. Certificate pinning is not supported. All digital signatures used for the establishment of TLS communications use 2048-bit RSA.

The TOE uses TLS server functionality for communications between the TOE and the environmental Tenable.sc application and from remote administrators to the Web GUI interface. All uses of the TOE's TLS server support mutual authentication. The TOE's implementation of HTTPS conforms to RFC 2818. In all cases, the connection will be rejected if certificate validation fails.

The TOE also uses OpenSSL to secure credential data at rest. Specifically, the TOE stores the following credentials:

- Web GUI authentication credentials: username and hashed password data for locally-defined users.
- Passphrases for certificate encryption: used to encrypt the TOE's TLS server certificate.

The TOE encrypts passphrases used for certificate encryption using AES in XTS mode with a 256 bit key. The TOE encrypts administrative credentials using PBKDF2. The TOE uses the DRBG specified in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2 to generate salts that contain at least as many entropy bits as the output key length. The TOE's PBKDF2 implementation performs 10,000 iterations and outputs a 128-bit strength key. Password-based derived keys are formed using a 128-bit salt that is randomly generated by the TOE's DRBG. This is input to the PBKDF function along with the password and specified hashing algorithm, which is SHA-512.

The TOE does not maintain a key hierarchy; the TOE's usage of PBKDF is to generate a hash.

The Cryptographic Support security function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

- FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1 – The TOE implements its own cryptographic key generation functionality.
- FCS\_CKM.1/AK – The TOE uses a NIST-validated implementation to generate asymmetric keys in support of TLS communications.
- FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1/PBKDF – The TOE performs password-based key derivation in support of secure storage of credentials.
- FCS\_CKM.2 – The TOE performs NIST-validated key establishment in support of TLS communications.

- FCS\_COP.1/SKC – The TOE uses a NIST-validated implementation to perform AES encryption and decryption in support of both TLS communications and secure storage of credentials.
- FCS\_COP.1/Hash – The TOE uses a NIST-validated implementation to perform cryptographic hashing in support of TLS communications.
- FCS\_COP.1/Sig – The TOE uses a NIST-validated implementation to generate and verify RSA digital signatures in support of TLS communications.
- FCS\_COP.1/KeyedHash – The TOE uses a NIST-validated implementation to perform HMAC functions in support of TLS communications and the pseudo-random function used for password-based key derivation.
- FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1/Server – The TOE implements HTTPS as a server to secure data in transit.
- FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.2 – The TOE implements mutual authentication when acting as an HTTPS server.
- FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 – The TOE implements its own random bit generation services.
- FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2 – The TOE uses a NIST-validated implementation to generate pseudo-random bits and this implementation is seeded with sufficiently strong entropy collected from the operational environment.
- FCS\_STO\_EXT.1 – The TOE uses its own cryptographic functions to secure credential data at rest.
- FCS\_TLS\_EXT.1 – The TOE implements TLS to secure data in transit.
- FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1 – The TOE implements TLS as a server.
- FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.2 – The TOE’s TLS server implementation supports mutual authentication.

### 6.3 User Data Protection

The [APP\_PP] defines ‘sensitive data’ as follows: “Sensitive data may include all user or enterprise data or may be specific application data such as emails, messaging, documents, calendar items, and contacts. Sensitive data must minimally include PII, credentials, and keys. Sensitive data shall be identified in the application’s TSS by the ST author.”

The table below lists the data that is considered to be ‘sensitive data’ for this TOE along with where that data resides.

*Table 6: Sensitive Data*

Sensitive Data	Exchange	Protection at Rest	Protection in Transit
GUI credentials	Admin’s browser to Web Server over browser connection	FCS_STO_EXT.1 (PBKDF)	HTTPS
Passphrase for PKI certificate encryption	None	FCS_STO_EXT.1 (AES)	N/A
Collected network traffic data	NNM to Tenable.sc	FCS_STO_EXT.1 (AES)	TLS
Database encryption key (used for all AES operations listed above)	None	FDP_DAR_EXT.1(2)	N/A

The database encryption key is generated by the TOE's DRBG as part of the initial setup process. The key is stored as a read-only file owned by root or SYSTEM, depending on platform. The administrator has the ability to optionally set a passphrase to unlock the use of this key; if this option is chosen, they must enter the passphrase when the TOE first starts. The database encryption key is protected cryptographically by the platform's use of full disk encryption.

The underlying platform functionality that the TOE interacts with includes network connectivity, system configuration, and system logs. The TOE uses network connectivity for remote management, connections to environmental components, and passive collection of network traffic data. The TOE accesses system logs on the local system (`/var/log/messages` or Windows Event Log) to record data about its own behavior. The TOE also indirectly accesses system configuration data of remote systems but only if this is communicated as network traffic; there is no interface designed for the purpose of collecting this information specifically.

The TOE uses environmental network capabilities in various ways. All communications between the TOE and the environmental Tenable.sc component are encrypted, as is remote administrative access. The following table highlights the TOE's network usage.

*Table 7: TOE Network Usage*

Component	User-Initiated	Externally-Initiated	TOE-Initiated
NNM	Access to Web GUI	Retrieval of scan results by Tenable.sc	Collection of network data
		Retrieval of plugin updates from Tenable.sc	

The User Data Protection security function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

- FDP\_DAR\_EXT.1(1) – Sensitive data at rest is protected by the TOE's implementation of AES.
- FDP\_DAR\_EXT.1(2) – the AES key used by the TOE to protect sensitive data at rest is protected in turn by the platform's use of full disk encryption.
- FDP\_DEC\_EXT.1 – The TOE's use of platform services is well understood by users prior to authorizing the TOE activity.
- FDP\_NET\_EXT.1 – The TOE communicates over the network for well-defined purposes. Depending on the function, the use of network resources is user-initiated directly through the TSF, remotely initiated by a user performing an action in the operational environment, or initiated by the TOE itself.

## 6.4 Identification and Authentication

The TOE uses X.509 certificates for authentication of the following trusted communications: validation of administrator TLS client certificate; and validation of Tenable.sc TLS client certificate. It validates X.509 certificates using the path validation algorithm defined in RFC 5280, which can be summarized as follows:

- Check the public key algorithm and parameters of each certificate in the path
- Check the current date/time against the validity period of each certificate in the path
- Check the revocation status of each certificate in the path
- Check the issuer name to ensure it equals the subject name of the previous certificate in the path

- Check name constraints to make sure the subject name is within the permitted subtrees list of all previous CA certificates and not within the excluded subtrees list of any previous CA certificate
- Check the asserted certificate policy OIDs against the permissible OIDs of the previous certificate, including any policy mapping equivalencies asserted by the previous certificate
- Check policy constraints to ensure any explicit policy requirements are not violated
- For all CA certificates, confirm the presence of the basicConstraints extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE, and ensure the key usage field includes the caSigning purpose
- Check the path length does not exceed any maximum path length asserted in this or a previous certificate
- Check the key usage extension
- Process any other recognized critical extensions.

The TOE validates the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:

- Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
- OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.

The TOE does not use any of the other values for the extended KeyUsage field listed in the requirement (i.e., Code Signing, Server Authentication, Email Protection, or CMC Registration Authority), so this part of the requirement is trivially satisfied.

The TOE validates the certificate chain to its root to ensure it terminates with a trusted CA certificate. It performs a revocation check on each certificate in the chain (except the root certificate) using Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) in accordance with RFC 6960. In the event the revocation status of a certificate cannot be verified (i.e., the OCSP responder cannot be reached), the TOE accepts the certificate.

Because the TOE's use of the certificate validation function is to validate the authenticity of remote endpoints, the TSF chooses what certificates to use based on what is presented to it as part of establishing the TLS session. The TOE is only assigned one certificate for its own use, so there is only one certificate that it will present in cases where a remote entity may need to validate it.

The Identification and Authentication security function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

- FIA\_X509\_EXT.1 – X.509 certificates are validated by the TSF when establishing trusted communications.
- FIA\_X509\_EXT.2 – X.509 certificates are used for TLS. When revocation status of a certificate cannot be determined, the TSF accepts the certificate by default.

## 6.5 Security Management

The TOE provides a web-based graphical user interface (GUI) that requires user authentication to access. The TOE has a default administrator credential of admin/admin that must be changed on first use. Administrator credentials are stored locally and protected by the TSF as per FCS\_STO\_EXT.1. Following the initial installation, additional accounts can be created.

During general operations, an administrator will typically interact with the TOE only through the environmental instance of Tenable.sc. However, Tenable.sc does not include the ability to directly modify the initial configuration settings of the TOE.

The TOE is installed into the following locations, depending on the platform version:

- Windows: `C:\Program Files\Tenable\nnm`
- Linux: `/opt/nnm`

All directories containing TOE software and data are configured by default in such a manner that nothing is world-writable on Linux and Administrator privileges are required to access them on Windows. Configuration settings that affect the TOE's interaction with the host OS platform are stored in `/etc` for Linux and the Windows Registry for Windows.

The TOE supports the following security-relevant management functions:

- Configuration of collection of network traffic data.

The Security Management security function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

- FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1 – The TOE requires credentials to be defined before administrative use. The TOE is protected from direct modification by untrusted users via its host OS platform.
- FMT\_MEC\_EXT.1 – Configuration settings for the TOE are stored in appropriate locations for each supported host OS platform.
- FMT\_SMF.1 – Administrators can use the TSF to configure the collection of network data from the TOE's operational environment.

## 6.6 Privacy

The TOE's primary function is to examine organizational assets for configuration or operational states that may indicate the presence of a vulnerability or misuse of organizational resources. To this end, the TOE collects data about network activity and transmits it to the environmental Tenable.sc application for aggregation, analysis, and reporting. The TOE is not responsible for the collection or transmission of PII. The TOE accepts administrative credentials as part of the GUI login process but user account information is not considered to be PII.

The Privacy security function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

- FPR\_ANO\_EXT.1 – The TOE prevents the unnoticed/unauthorized transmission of PII across a network by not having functionality that is intended for such transmissions.

## 6.7 Protection of the TSF

The TOE implements several mechanisms to protect against exploitation. The TOE implements address space layout randomization (ASLR) through the use of the `/DYNAMICBASE` (Windows) and `-f PIC` (Linux) compiler flags and relies fully on its underlying host platforms to perform memory mapping. The TOE also does not use both `PROT_WRITE` and `PROT_EXEC` on the same memory regions. There is no situation where the TSF maps memory to an explicit address. The TOE is written in C and C++. The TOE is compiled with stack overflow protection whether it is intended for use on Linux or Windows. The Linux platform version is compiled with `-fstack-protector-strong` and the Windows platform version is compiled with `/GS`. The TOE has a web-based front-end, based on PHP and JavaScript. This is interpreted code to which compilation instructions do not apply.

Both platform versions of the TOE are designed to run on host OS platforms where platform security features have been enabled (e.g., Windows Defender Export Guard, SELinux enabled and enforcing). The TOE uses only documented platform APIs. Appendix A.1 lists the APIs used by the TOE. The TOE also makes use of third-party libraries. Appendix A.2 lists the libraries used by the TOE. The TOE is versioned using semver (Semantic Versioning) in the format x.y(.z) where x is the major version, y is the minor version, and the optional z is the patch version; SWID is not used. The TOE is a standalone application that is not natively bundled as part of a host OS.

The TOE can identify its current running versions through both platform and TSF-mediated methods. The Linux platform version of the TOE is installed as an RPM and will identify its version in RPM itself. The TOE will also return its version information if its binary is invoked with the `-v` flag on the OS platform regardless of which platform version it is. An administrator can also check the version of the TOE by logging into its Web GUI, or they can use the environmental instance of Tenable.sc that is connected to the TOE to check the TOE's version.

The TOE can leverage its OS platform to check for software updates and acquire them if they are available. In this case, candidate updates are obtained by the administrator downloading them directly from Tenable's website or through a package manager such as yum. The TOE will not download, modify, replace, or update its own binary code. The TOE is packaged as an .rpm file for Linux and an .exe file for Windows. Each are digitally signed by Tenable using 2048-bit RSA. Removing (uninstalling) the product will remove all executable code from the host system.

The Protection of the TSF security function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

- FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1 – The TOE interacts with its host OS platform in a manner that does not expose the system to memory-related exploitation.
- FPT\_API\_EXT.1 – The TOE uses documented platform APIs.
- FPT\_IDV\_EXT. 1 – The TOE is versioned using semver.
- FPT\_LIB\_EXT.1 – The set of third-party libraries used by the TOE is well-defined.
- FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 – There is a well-defined method for checking what version of the TOE is currently installed and whether updates to it are available. Updates are signed by the vendor and validated by the host OS platform prior to installation.
- FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2 – The TOE is distributed using a digitally signed installation package in the format of the platform-supported package manager.

## 6.8 Trusted Path/Channels

In the evaluated configuration, the TOE uses its own cryptographic implementation to encrypt sensitive data in transit. Listed below are the various external interfaces to the TOE that rely on trusted communications.

### **Between TOE and operational environment:**

- Between administrator and TOE Web GUI
  - Communications use mutually authenticated TLS/HTTPS (TOE is server)

- Configurable TCP port, 8835 is default
- Used to secure administrator interactions with the TOE

**Between TOE and environmental Tenable components:**

- Between Tenable.sc and TOE
  - Communications use mutually-authenticated TLS (Tenable.sc is client and TOE is server)
  - Configurable TCP port, 8835 is default
  - Used by Tenable.sc to collect network traffic data from TOE

Note that remote acquisition of network data from the operational environment is not necessarily captured in an encrypted format because the TOE captures this data in the native formats used by the target systems and networks. As such this is not considered to be 'sensitive data' requiring data-in-transit protection.

The Trusted Path/Channels security function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

- FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1 – The TOE relies on its own mechanisms to secure data in transit between itself and its operational environment.

## 7 Protection Profile Claims

This ST is conformant to *Protection Profile for Application Software*, Version 1.4, 7 October 2021 ([APP\_PP]) and *Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS)*, Version 1.1, 1 March 2019 ([TLS\_PKG]) along with all applicable errata and interpretations from the certificate issuing scheme.

The TOE consists of a software application that runs on a Linux or Windows operating system as its platform.

As explained in section 3, Security Problem Definition, the Security Problem Definition of [APP\_PP] has been included by reference into this ST.

As explained in section 4, Security Objectives, the Security Objectives of [APP\_PP] have been included by reference into this ST.

All claimed SFRs are defined in [APP\_PP] or [TLS\_PKG]. All mandatory SFRs are claimed. No optional or objective SFRs are claimed. Selection-based SFR claims are consistent with the selections made in the mandatory SFRs that prompt their inclusion.



## 8 Rationale

This Security Target includes by reference the [APP\_PP] Security Problem Definition, Security Objectives, and Security Assurance Requirements. The Security Target does not add, remove, or modify any of these items. Security Functional Requirements have been reproduced with the Protection Profile operations completed. All selections, assignments, and refinements made on the claimed Security Functional Requirements have been performed in a manner that is consistent with what is permitted by [APP\_PP] and [TLS\_PKG]. The proper set of selection-based requirements has been claimed based on the selections made in the mandatory requirements. Consequently, the claims made by this Security Target are sufficient to address the TOE's security problem. Rationale for the sufficiency of the TOE Summary Specification is provided below.

### 8.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale

This section in conjunction with Section 0, the

[TLS\_PKG] does contain evaluation activities for how to evaluate its SFR claims as part of the evaluation of ASE\_TSS.1, AGD\_OPE.1, AGD\_PRE.1, and ATE\_IND.1. All Security Functional Requirements specified by [TLS\_PKG] are evaluated in the manner specified in that package.

TOE Summary Specification, provides evidence that the security functions meet the TOE security requirements. Each description includes rationale indicating which requirements the corresponding security functions satisfy. The combined security functions work together to satisfy all of the security requirements. The security functions described in Section 6 are necessary for the TSF to enforce the required security functionality. Table 8 demonstrates the relationship between security requirements and functions.

Table 8: Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping

	Cryptographic Support	User Data Protection	Identification and Authentication	Security Management	Privacy	Protection of the TSF	Trusted Path/Channels
FCS_CKM_EXT.1	X						
FCS_CKM.1/AK	X						
FCS_CKM_EXT.1/PBKDF	X						
FCS_CKM.2	X						
FCS_COP.1/SKC	X						
FCS_COP.1/Hash	X						
FCS_COP.1/Sig	X						
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	X						
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Server	X						
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2	X						
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	X						
FCS_RBG_EXT.2	X						
FCS_STO_EXT.1	X						
FCS_TLS_EXT.1	X						
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1	X						
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2	X						
FDP_DAR_EXT.1(1)		X					
FDP_DAR_EXT.1(2)		X					
FDP_DEC_EXT.1		X					
FDP_NET_EXT.1		X					
FIA_X509_EXT.1			X				
FIA_X509_EXT.2			X				
FMT_CFG_EXT.1				X			
FMT_MEC_EXT.1				X			
FMT_SMF.1				X			

	Cryptographic Support	User Data Protection	Identification and Authentication	Security Management	Privacy	Protection of the TSF	Trusted Path/Channels
FPR_ANO_EXT.1					X		
FPT_AEX_EXT.1						X	
FPT_API_EXT.1						X	
FPT_IDV_EXT.1						X	
FPT_LIB_EXT.1						X	
FPT_TUD_EXT.1						X	
FPT_TUD_EXT.2						X	
FTP_DIT_EXT.1							X

## Appendix A TOE Usage of Third-Party Components

This Appendix lists the platform APIs and third-party libraries that are used by the TOE.

### A.1 Platform APIs

Listed below are the platform APIs used by the TOE. Note that these APIs do not necessarily relate to the TOE functionality claimed in the Security Target; however, since they are bundled with the product itself they are disclosed since a vulnerability outside the logical boundary of the product could still present an exploitable vulnerability.

#### Windows:

EncodePointer, UnhandledExceptionFilter, SetUnhandledExceptionFilter, IsDebuggerPresent, RtlVirtualUnwind, RtlLookupFunctionEntry, RtlCaptureContext, DecodePointer, Sleep, DuplicateHandle, FindNextFileA, SetFilePointer, GetModuleHandleA, GetProcAddress, RaiseException, HeapReAlloc, MultiByteToWideChar, CreateProcessA, WideCharToMultiByte, GetVersionExA, GetStdHandle, SetConsoleMode, GetConsoleMode, GetTickCount, ReadConsoleA, GetCurrentProcess, TlsAlloc, DeleteCriticalSection, EnterCriticalSection, LeaveCriticalSection, TlsSetValue, InitializeCriticalSection, TlsGetValue, SetCriticalSectionSpinCount, GetSystemTimeAsFileTime, GetFullPathNameA, GetCurrentDirectoryA, SetCurrentDirectoryA, GetModuleFileNameA, OpenEventA, ResetEvent, CreateEventA, GetProcessHeap, SetEvent, WaitForSingleObject, HeapFree, HeapAlloc, FormatMessageA, OpenProcess, GetExitCodeProcess, CloseHandle, GetLastError, GetCurrentProcessId, SetLastError, GetFullPathNameW, CreateFileA, GetFileSize, CreateMutexW, HeapCompact, TryEnterCriticalSection, MapViewOfFile, UnmapViewOfFile, SystemTimeToFileTime, QueryPerformanceCounter, UnlockFile, FlushViewOfFile, LockFile, WaitForSingleObjectEx, OutputDebugStringW, UnlockFileEx, WriteFile, FormatMessageW, GetVersionExW, HeapDestroy, GetFileAttributesA, HeapCreate, HeapValidate, GetFileAttributesW, ReadFile, CreateFileW, FlushFileBuffers, GetTempPathW, HeapSize, LockFileEx, GetDiskFreeSpaceW, CreateFileMappingA, CreateFileMappingW, GetDiskFreeSpaceA, GetSystemInfo, GetFileAttributesExW, GetCurrentThreadId, OutputDebugStringA, DeleteFileW, GetTempPathA, LocalFree, GetSystemTime, AreFileApisANSI, DeleteFileA, HeapSetInformation, TerminateProcess, SetHandleInformation, GetProcessId, CreatePipe, CreateThread, TzSpecificLocalTimeToSystemTime, GetTimeZoneInformation, QueryPerformanceFrequency, GetCurrentThread, TerminateThread, CreateSemaphoreA, SetThreadPriority, ReleaseSemaphore, CreateMutexA, ReleaseMutex, FindFirstFileA, FindClose, SetEndOfFile

#### Linux:

accept, access, bind, brk, chdir, chmod, clock\_gettime, close, connect, dup2, dup, epoll\_create, epoll\_ctl, epoll\_wait, eventfd, execve, \_exit, fchmod, fchown, fcntl, flock, fork, fsync, ftime, ftruncate, getdtablesize, getegid, geteuid, getgid, gethostname, getpagesize, getpeername, getpid, getrlimit, getsockname, getsockopt, gettimeofday, getuid, ioctl, iopl, kill, listen, lseek, mkdir, mlock, mmap, mmap64, mremap, munmap, nanosleep, nice, open, openat, pipe, poll, pread, pwrite, read, readdir, readlink, recv, recvfrom, recvmsg, rename, rmdir, select, send, sendmsg, sendto, setegid, seteuid, setgid, setrlimit, setsockopt, setuid, shutdown, sigaction, signal, socket, socketpair, syscall, syslog, time, timerfd\_create, timerfd\_settime, umask, uname, unlink, unlinkat, utime, utimes, waitpid, write

## A.2 Third-Party Libraries

Listed below are the third-party libraries used by the TOE. Note that these libraries do not necessarily relate to the TOE functionality claimed in the Security Target; however, since they are bundled with the product itself they are disclosed since a vulnerability outside the logical boundary of the product could still present an exploitable vulnerability.

Library	Version
c-ares	1.19.1
curl	8.1.2
dpdk	20.08.0
expat	2.5.0
Hyperscan	5.4.0
libbacktrace	1.0
libbzip2	1.0.8
libpcap	1.9.1
libpcre	8.44
libxml2	2.11.1
libxslt	1.1.37
libxmlsec	1.2.37
zlib	1.2.13
openssl	3.0.9
sqlite	3.40.1
winpcap	4.1.3
chosen	1.0.0
d3	3.4.8
DataTables	1.10.18
Handlebars	4.7.7
jQuery	3.6.4
jQuery Cookie	1.4.1
jQuery FileUpload	5.19.8
jQuery HotKeys	0.8
jQuery iFrame Transport Plugin	1.7
jQuery scroll.To	1.4.3
jQuery-Storage-API	1.7.3

<b>Library</b>	<b>Version</b>
jQuery TableSorter	0.11
jQuery tipsy	1.0.0a
jQuery UI	1.13.2
jQuery UI Touch Punch	0.2.3
mobile-detect.js	1.3.0
moment	2.29.4
spin.js	1.2.5
sugar	1.3
xml2json	0.9