TrustCB B.V.
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Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
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nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Version
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Certification Report
J-TACHOG2V2 v1.0.2 on ST31P450 C02
Sponsor and developer: STMicroelectronics S.r.l
Zona Industriale Marcianise SUD
81025 Marcianise (CE)
Italy
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2400153-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2400153-01
Author(s): Kjartan Jæger Kvassnes
Date: 08 April 2025
Number of pages: 11
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 7
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 8
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
Page: 3/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2400153-01-CR, dated 08 April 2025
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the J-
TACHOG2V2 v1.0.2 on ST31P450 C02. The developer of the J-TACHOG2V2 v1.0.2 on ST31P450
C02 is STMicroelectronics S.r.l located in Marcianise, Italy and they also act as the sponsor of the
evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when
judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a smart card, the Tachograph Card, which is configured and implemented as a driver card,
workshop card, control card or company card in accordance with [EU_2016_165] Annex 1C, Appendix
2, Appendix 10, Appendix 11 and related amendments introduced in [EU_2021_1228] concerning new
data files and increased data file size which have no impact on security requirements and
mechanisms.
The TOE was previously evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft and was certified under
the accreditation of TÜV Rheinland Nederland on 12-12-2022 (CC-0635023). The current evaluation
of the TOE has also been conducted by SGS Brightsight B.V. and was completed on 08 April 2025
with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the J-TACHOG2V2 v1.0.2 on ST31P450 C02, the
security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the J-TACHOG2V2 v1.0.2 on ST31P450
C02 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give
due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures), ATE_DPT.2 (Testing: security enforcing module) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical
vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the J-TACHOG2V2 v1.0.2 on ST31P450 C02
from STMicroelectronics S.r.l located in Marcianise, Italy.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware ST31P450 IC Maskset name:
K410A
IC version: C
Master identification
number: 0x01F1
Firmware version:
3.1.1 and 3.1.2
Optional Neslib crypto
library version: 6.4.7
Revision: C02
Software J-TACHOG2V2 Java Card Platform (including the
native Operating System)
v1.0.2
The J-TACHOG2V2 Tachograph Application 1.3.1
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the J-TACHOG2V2
v1.0.2 on ST31P450 C02. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 5.1.9 or [ST-Lite]
Chapter 5.1.9.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE has the following security features:
• Storage of card identification and user identification data. This data is used by the Vehicle Unit
to identify the human user, provide functions and data access rights accordingly;
o To store data related to the human user, among which are user activities data, events
and faults data and control activities
• Preservation of card identification data and user identification data stored during the card
personalization process;
• Safe storage of user data stored in the card by Vehicle Units (VU)
• Allowance of certain write operations onto the cards to only an authenticated VU.
• The data that is stored in such a way as to prevent unauthorized access to and manipulation
of the data, and to detect any such attempts
• The integrity and authenticity of data exchanged between the recording equipment and the
Tachograph Card.
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2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 7.6.2 of the [ST] or
section 7.6.2 of the [ST-Lite].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE is the micro-module made of the Integrated Circuit (IC) and its embedded software.
Embedded Software includes J-TACHOG2V2 Java Card platform and the Tachograph Application
(both First and Second Generation). It includes the associated embedded data of the smart card
working on the micro-controller unit in accordance with the functional specifications.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
J-TACHOG2V2 v.1.0.2 on ST31P450 C02 Operational User Guidance, 31
January 2025
Rev.C
J-TACHOG2V2 v.1.0.2 on ST31P450 C02 Preparative Procedure, 31
January 2025
Rev.C
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
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2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-enforcing
module level. All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were
tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The
testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were
used extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.
Tests are performed as “System Test” using “Black Box” approach. If needed, “Grey Box” approach is
also used. Functional requirements from Tachograph specification have been verified using a
standardized tool UL Smart Tachograph Card Functional Test Tool. Security requirements have been
covered by additional test cases defined by the developer, and by the UL Test Tool where the test
cases are adequate to verify the security requirements (operational stage).
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations,
because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment.
The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD, no potential vulnerabilities
were identified from generating questions to the type of TOE and the specified behaviour.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review was performed on the TOE.
During this attack oriented analysis the protection against the attack scenarios was analysed
using the knowledge gained from all previous evaluation classes. This resulted in the
identification of additional potential vulnerabilities. This analysis was performed according to
the attack list in [JIL-AP]. An important source for assurance against attacks in this step is the
[HW-ETRfC] of the underlying platform; no additional potential vulnerabilities were concluded
from this.
• All potential vulnerabilities were analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that these potential
vulnerabilities are not exploitable. For most of the potential vulnerabilities a penetration test
was defined. Several potential vulnerabilities were found to be not exploitable due to an
impractical attack path.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 2 weeks. During that test campaign, 100% of the
total time was spent on Perturbation attacks.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The TOE was tested in the following configurations:
• STM J-TACHOG2V2 v.1.0.2 on ST31P450 C02
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
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2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of 4 Site Technical Audit Reports.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number J-TACHOG2V2 v1.0.2 on ST31P450
C02.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the J-TACHOG2V2 v1.0.2 on
ST31P450 C02, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of
EAL 4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5. This implies that the product
satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP _0091].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: <none>.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
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3 Security Target
The J-TACHOG2V2 v.1.0.2 on ST31P450 C02 Security Target Common Criteria for IT security
evaluation, Rev. N, dated 13 March 2025 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
API Access Control List
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II
and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “J-TACHOG2V2 v1.0.2 on ST31P450 C02” –
EAL4+, 25-RPT-140, Version 3.0, Dated 25 March 2025
[HW-CERT] ST31P450 including optional cryptographic library NESLIB C02, CERTIFICAT
ANSSI-CC-2023/74-R01
[HW-ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for composite evaluation MANDALA C02,
MANDALA_C02_2024_ETRLite, v2.0, October 14th 2024
[HW-ST] ST31P450 C02 including optional cryptographic library NESLIB Security
Target for composition, Rev. C02.1, September 2024
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2.1, February 2024
[JIL-AMS] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.5, May 2022
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[PP_0091] Digital Tachograph – Tachograph Card (TC PP), registered under the
reference BSI-CC-PP-0091-2017, Version 1.0, 19 May 2017
[EU_2016_165] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 of 18 March 2016
implementing Regulation (EU) 165/2014 of the European Parliament and of the
Council laying down the requirements for the construction, testing, installation,
operation and repair of tachographs and their components.
[EU_2021_1228] COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/1228 of 16 July
2021 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 as regards the
requirements for the construction, testing, installation, operation and repair of
smart tachographs and their components.
[ST] J-TACHOG2V2 v.1.0.2 on ST31P450 C02 Security Target Common Criteria
for IT security evaluation, Rev. N, dated 13 March 2025
[ST-lite] J-TACHOG2V2 v.1.0.2 on ST31P450 C02 Security Target Lite Common
Criteria for IT security evaluation, Rev. E, Dated 25 March 2025
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)