TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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Version
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Certification Report
Huawei GaussDB(openGauss) Database Management
System (DBMS) V500R001C20SPC100+V500R001C20HP1015
Sponsor and developer: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Huawei Industrial Base Bantian
Longgang, Shenzhen 518129
People's Republic of China
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0392006-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0392006
Author(s): Andy Brown
Date: 31 August 2022
Number of pages: 11
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.3.1 Assumptions 6
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 6
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 7
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 7
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 8
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 8
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 8
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Huawei
GaussDB(openGauss) Database Management System (DBMS)
V500R001C20SPC100+V500R001C20HP1015. The developer of the Huawei GaussDB(openGauss)
Database Management System (DBMS) V500R001C20SPC100+V500R001C20HP1015 is Huawei
Technologies Co., Ltd. located in Shenzhen, China and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation
and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the
suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a Database Management System (DBMS). It provides a relational database engine
providing mechanisms for user access control, identification and authentication, data protection, and
security audit. It mainly focuses on online transaction processing scenarios with large data volumes
and high concurrency.
This TOE is a software-only TOE.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 31 August 2022 with the approval of the ETR. The certification
procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for
Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Huawei GaussDB(openGauss) Database
Management System (DBMS) V500R001C20SPC100+V500R001C20HP1015, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Huawei GaussDB(openGauss)
Database Management System (DBMS) V500R001C20SPC100+V500R001C20HP1015 are advised
to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration
to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4+ALC_FLR.2 assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.2 (Flaw reporting procedures).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Huawei GaussDB(openGauss) Database
Management System (DBMS) V500R001C20SPC100+V500R001C20HP1015 from Huawei
Technologies Co., Ltd. located in Shenzhen, China.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Software
Huawei GaussDB(openGauss) Database
Management System (DBMS)
V500R001C20SPC100 +
V500R001C20HP1015
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the Huawei
GaussDB(openGauss) Database Management System (DBMS)
V500R001C20SPC100+V500R001C20HP1015. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this
report.
2.2 Security Policy
To counter the security threats listed in the [ST], the TOE provides the following security features:
• Security Audit. Audit entries are generated for security related events. Moreover, the TOE
supports selecting the set of events to be audited based on a set of attributes.
• User Data Protection. The TOE provides a discretionary access control policy (RBAC) to provide
access control. It further controls that only authorized administrators are able to manage the TOE.
• Identification and Authentication. Identification and identity authentication are performed before
users are allowed to access database objects.
• Security Management. The security functions associated with audit, access control, and user
accounts are provided by the SQL command line interface and the parameter configuration tool on
the server.
• Protection of the TSF. The consistency of replicated TSF data is protected by ensuring the
consistency of the replicated TSF data upon reconnection before processing any requests.
• TOE Access. The Session Handling mechanism limits the possibilities of users to establish
sessions with the TOE and maintains a separate execution context for every operation.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5.2.1 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE is a DBMS. It provides a relational database engine providing mechanisms for user access
control, identification and authentication, data protection, and security audit. It mainly focuses on
online transaction processing scenarios with large data volumes and high concurrency.
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The TOE is software-only.
The logical architecture can be depicted as follows:
The TOE can restrict the access of authorized users to the TOE, implement discretionary access
control on objects controlled by the DBMS based on users or roles, and can clarify users'
responsibilities by their behaviour.
TOE security functions include security audit, user data protection, identity identification and
authentication, security management, data backup and restoration, ensuring database security.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
HUAWEI GaussDB Kernel V500R001C20SPC100+
V500R001C20HP1015 AGD_PRE
0.12
HUAWEI GaussDB Kernel V500R001C20SPC100+ 0.12
V500R001C20HP1015 AGD_OPE
0.11
GaussDB Kernel V500R001C20SPC100+V500R001C20HP1015 Product
Documentation
0.4
GaussDB Kernel V500R001C20SPC100+V500R001C20HP1015
Communication Matrix
03
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer undertook functional testing covering all TSFI’s and subsystems focussing on the gsql
interface and security functionalities. A list of tests was executed by an automatic test framework tool
created by the developer. A preparation procedure was provided in the evaluation evidence which also
specified the list of automated and non-automated test cases. 75% of the test case were automated
and 25% manual.
The independent evaluator repeat testing focused on doing the maximum number of developer’s test
cases which covered a significant amount of the TSF, namely:
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• Security Audit.
• User Data Protection.
• User Identification and Authentication.
• Security Management.
• Protection of the TSF.
• TOE Access.
In addition to the automated tests, a sample of manual tests was chosen to ensure that the repeated
developer test plan covered all TSFIs and modules of the TOE Design. The evaluator ensured that the
automatic tests covered all TSFIs and modules of the TOE not covered by the manual independent
tests.
The evaluator defined further tests to cover more scenarios and gain extra assurance from existing
test cases.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
To identify potential vulnerabilities the evaluator performed the following activities:
• Source Code review.
• Vulnerabilities resulting from a search through the ST, the functional specification, the TOE
design, the security architecture description and the guidance documentation.
• Public vulnerabilities stemming from previous products, dependencies and the public domain.
From this analysis, penetration tests were created. The total test effort expended by the evaluators
was 9 weeks. During that test campaign, 100% of the total time was spent on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was
the same as described in the [ST].
The TOE was tested in the following configurations:
• Single node configuration running on x86_64 server.
• Multi-node (HA) configuration running on 3 instances of x86_64 servers consisting of one
• primary and two standby nodes.
• In addition to the information about the operating system in [ST], Python 2.7 used the library
psycopg2 v2.8.6.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of a Site Technical Audit Reuse report.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Huawei GaussDB(openGauss)
Database Management System (DBMS) V500R001C20SPC100+V500R001C20HP1015.
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2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents, and Site Technical Audit Report(s) for the site(s)
[STAR-BDC] and [STAR-HDC] 2.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Huawei
GaussDB(openGauss) Database Management System (DBMS)
V500R001C20SPC100+V500R001C20HP1015, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant,
and to meet the requirements of EAL 4 augmented with ALC_FLR.2. This implies that the product
satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the TOE user guidance. There
are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user guidance.
Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning the resistance against certain
attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: None.
2 The Site Technical Audit Report contains information necessary to an evaluation lab and
certification body for the reuse of the site audit report in a TOE evaluation.
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3 Security Target
The Huawei GaussDB Kernel V500R001C20SPC100+V500R001C20HP1015 Security Target, 0.18,
07 June 2022 [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report Huawei GaussDB (openGauss) V5 – EAL4+, 21-
RPT-470, 5.0, 25 August 2022
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[PP] Protection Profile for Database Management Systems (Base Package), BSI-
CC-PP-0088-V2, Version 2.12, 23 March 2017.
[ST] Huawei GaussDB Kernel V500R001C20SPC100+V500R001C20HP1015
Security Target, 0.18, 07 June 2022
[STAR-BDC] Site Technical Audit Report Huawei Beijing Development Site, 21-RPT-1061,
v3.0, 07 June 2022.
[STAR-HDC] Site Technical Audit Report Huawei Beijing Huitian Data Center site, 21-RPT-
1062, v3.0, 07 June 2022.
(This is the end of this report.)