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Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v13.1.1 FWcPP
Issue: 2.0, 2019-aug-12
Authorisation: Jerry Johansson, Lead Certifier , CSEC
Report Distribution: Arkiv
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 5
3 Security Policy 6
3.1 Security Audit 6
3.2 Cryptographic Support 6
3.3 Identification and Authentication 6
3.4 Security Function Management 6
3.5 Protection of the TSF 7
3.6 TOE Access 7
3.7 Trusted Path/Channels 7
3.8 Firewall 7
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
4.1 Usage Assumptions 8
4.2 Organizational Security Policies 9
4.3 Clarification of Scope 9
5 Architectural Information 12
6 Documentation 14
7 IT Product Testing 16
7.1 Independent Evaluator Testing 16
7.2 Evaluator Penetration Testing 16
8 Evaluated Configuration 17
9 Results of the Evaluation 18
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 19
11 Glossary 20
12 Bibliography 21
Appendix A QMS Consistency 23
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a firewall networking device, comprised of hard-
ware and software. The TOE provides network traffic management functionality, e.g.
local traffic management and access policy management. The TOE consists of the
software version 13.1.1 LTM+AFM (build 13.1.1-0.0.4) with engineering hotfix
13.1.1.0.100.4-ENG installed on any of the following hardware appliances;
 i5000 model series, including i5600, i5800 and i5820-DF
 i7000 model series including i7600, i7800 and i7820-DF
 i10000 model series, including i10600, i10800
 10000 model series, including 10350v-F
 i11000-DS model series, including i11800-DS
 i15000 model series, including i15800
 B2250 model series, including B2250
 B4450N model series including B4450N
 C2400 model series including C2400-AC
 C4480 model series including C4480-AC
or installed on F5 Virtual Clustered Multiprocessing (vCMP) environment running on
any of the appliances listed above.
The TOE hardware is delivered via trusted couriers, while the software is delivered as
a downloadable ISO image from the F5 website.
The ST claims exact conformance to Collaborative Protection Profile for Stateful Traf-
fic Filter Firewalls (FWcPP), version 2.0 + Errata 20180314.
The NIT technical decisions that have been applied to the Network Device Collabora-
tive Protection Profile can be found in the ST.
There are six assumptions being made in the ST regarding the secure usage and envi-
ronment of the TOE. The TOE relies on these to counter the thirteen threats and
comply with the one organisational security policy (OSP) in the ST. The assumptions,
the threat and the OSP are described in chapter 4 Assumptions and Clarification of
Scope.
The evaluation has been performed by atsec information security AB and was com-
pleted 2019-Jun-04. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the require-
ments of Common Criteria, version 3.1, release 5, and the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1, release 5. The evaluation meets the requirements
of evaluation assurance level EAL 1, augmented by ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem Defi-
nition and the NDcPP Evaluation Activities.
atsec information security AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria un-
der the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. atsec infor-
mation security AB is also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC ac-
cording to ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria evaluation.
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The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results
confirm the security claims in the Security Target [ST], and have been reached in
agreement with the requirements of the Common Criteria and the Common Method-
ology for evaluation assurance level:
EAL 1 + ASE_SPD.1 and in accordance with the NDcPP Evaluation Activities.
The certification results only apply to the versions of the products indicated in
the certificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target
[ST] are met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other or-
ganization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of
the IT product by CSEC or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect
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2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2017016
Name and version of the F5 BIG-IP v13 LTM + AFM with software version
certified IT product 13.1.1 LTM+AFM (build 13.1.1-0.0.4) and the
engineering hotfix 13.1.1.0.100.4-ENG, running on
any of the following appliances or on the hypervisor
vCMP, installed on any of the following appliances:
i5600, i5800, i5820-DF, i7600, i7800, i7820-DF,
i10600, i10800, 10350v-F, i11800-DS, i15800,
B2250, B4450N, C2400-AC, and C4480-AC
Security Target BIG-IP Version 13.1.1 LTM+AFM Security Target
Assurance level EAL 1 + ASE_SPD.1 and
FWcPP v2.0+Errata 20180314
Sponsor F5 Networks Inc.
Developer F5 Networks Inc.
ITSEF atsec information security AB
Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5
CEM version 3.1 release 5
Certification date 2019-06-19
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3 Security Policy
The TOE provides the following security services:
 Security Audit
 Cryptography Support
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Function Management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path/Channels
 Firewall
3.1 Security Audit
The TOE implements syslog capabilities to generate audit records for
security-relevant events. In addition, the BIG-IP protects the audit trail
from unauthorized modifications and loss of audit data due to
insufficient space.
3.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptographic functionality is provided by the
OpenSSL cryptographic module. The TOE provides a secure shell (SSH)
to allow administrators to connect over a dedicated network interface.
The TOE also implements the TLS protocol to allow administrators to
remotely manage the TOE. The TOE implements a TLS client for
interactions with other TLS servers. These cryptographic
implementations utilize the cryptographic module which provides
random number generation, key generation, key establishment, key
storage, key destruction, hash operations, encryption/decryption
operations, and digital signature operations.
3.3 Identification and Authentication
An internal password-based repository is implemented for
authentication of management users. The TOE enforces a strong
password policy and disabling user accounts after a configured number
of failed authentication attempts.
3.4 Security Function Management
A command line interface (available via the traffic management shell
"tmsh"), web-based GUI ("Configuration utility"), a SOAP-based API
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("iControl API"), and a REST-based API (“iControl REST API”) are offered
to administrators for all relevant configuration of security functionality.
The TOE manages configuration objects in a partition which includes
users, server pools, etc. This includes the authentication of
administrators by user name and password, as well as access control
based on pre-defined roles and, optionally, groups of objects
("Profiles"). "Profiles" can be defined for individual servers and classes
of servers that the TOE forwards traffic from clients to, and for traffic
that matches certain characteristics, determining the kind of treatment
applicable to that traffic. Management capabilities offered by the TOE
include the definition of templates for certain configuration options.
The management functionality also implements roles for separation
of duties.
3.5 Protection of the TSF
BIG-IP implements many capabilities to protect the integrity and
management of its own security functionality. These capabilities include
the protection of sensitive data, such as passwords and keys, self-tests,
product update verification, and reliable time stamping.
3.6 TOE Access
Prior to interactive user authentication, the BIG-IP can display an
administrative-defined banner. BIG-IP terminates interactive sessions
after an administrator-defined period of inactivity and allows users to
terminate their own authenticated session.
3.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE protects remote connections to its management interfaces
with TLS and SSH. The TOE also protects communication channels
with audit servers using TLS.
3.8 Firewall
The TOE offers basic firewall functionality, including stateful packet
inspection and network address translation, and logic to mitigate
denial-of-service attacks.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes six assumptions on the usage and the operational en-
vironment of the TOE.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY
The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and
not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose compu-
ting. For example the device should not provide computing platform for general pur-
pose applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR
The Security Administrator(s) for the network device are assumed to be trusted and
to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes being appro-
priately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Adminis-
trators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and en-
tropy and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The network de-
vice is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious administrator that
actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
A.REGULAR_UPDATES
The network device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an adminis-
trator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known
vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE
The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the network device are
protected by the platform on which they reside.
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION
The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environ-
ment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or inter-
fere with the device’s physical interconnections and correct operation. This protec-
tion is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sen-
sitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords,
etc.) on firewall equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its op-
erational environment.
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4.2 Organizational Security Policies
The Security Target [ST] places one Organizational Security Policy on the TOE.
P.ACCESS_BANNER
The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal agree-
ments, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing the
TOE.
4.3 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target [ST] contains thirteen threats, which have been considered dur-
ing the evaluation.
T.UNATHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS
Threat agents may attempt to gain administrator access to the network device by ne-
farious means such as masquerading as an administrator to the device, masquerad-
ing as the device to an administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its en-
tirety, or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would
provide access to the administrative session, or sessions between network devices.
Successfully gaining administrator access allows malicious actions that compromise
the security functionality of the device and the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY
Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic
exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key
sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the
key space and give them unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate
and/or control the traffic with minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS
Threat agents may attempt to target network devices that do not use standardized
secure tunneling protocols to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take
advantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key management to successfully per-
form man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in
loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially
could lead to a compromise of the network device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS
Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to au-
thenticate the endpoints – e.g., shared password that is guessable or transported as
plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker
could masquerade as the administrator or another device, and the attacker could in-
sert themselves into the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack.
The result is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of confi-
dentiality and integrity, and potentially the network device itself could be compro-
mised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE
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Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or
firmware which undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-validated
updates or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the up-
date firmware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY
Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security functional-
ity of the network device without administrator awareness. This could result in the
attacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compro-
mise the device and the administrator would have no knowledge that the device has
been compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling continued ac-
cess to the network device and its critical data. The compromise of credentials in-
clude replacing existing credentials with an attacker’s credentials, modifying existing
credentials, or obtaining the administrator or device credentials for use by the at-
tacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING
Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to
gain privileged access to the device. Having privileged access to the device provides
the attacker unfettered access to the network traffic, and may allow them to take ad-
vantage of any trust relationships with other network devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE
A component of the network device may fail during start-up or during operations
causing a compromise or failure in the security functionality of the network device,
leaving the device susceptible to attackers.
T.NETWORK_DISCLOSURE
An attacker may attempt to “map” a subnet to determine the machines that reside
on the network, and obtaining the IP addresses of machines, as well as the services
(ports) those machines are offering. This information could be used to mount attacks
to those machines via the services that are exported.
T.NETWORK_ACCESS
With knowledge of the services that are exported by machines on a subnet, an at-
tacker may attempt to exploit those services by mounting attacks against those ser-
vices.
T.NETWORK_MISUSE
An attacker may attempt to use services that are exported by machines in a way that
is unintended by a site’s security policies. For example, an attacker might be able to
use a service to “anonymize” the attacker’s machine as they mount attacks against
others.
T. MALICIOUS_TRAFFIC
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An attacker may attempt to send malformed packets to a machine in hopes of caus-
ing the network stack or services listening on UDP/TCP ports of the target machine to
crash.
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5 Architectural Information
The following diagram shows the basic components that comprise the TOE:
The TOE is separated into two distinct planes, the control plane and the data plane.
The control plane validates, stores, and passes configuration data to all necessary
systems. It also provides all administrative access to the TOE. The data plane passes
user traffic through the TOE.
The TOE implements and supports the following network protocols: TLS (client and
server), SSH, HTTPS, FTP. The TOE protects remote connections to its management
interfaces with TLS and SSH. The TOE also protects communication channels with au-
dit servers using TLS (TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2). The cryptographic functionality imple-
mented in the TOE is provided by OpenSSL.
The TOE is divided into five (5) subsystems: Appliance (hardware or virtual), Traffic
Management Operating System (TMOS), Traffic Management Micro-kernel (TMM),
Local Traffic Manager (LTM), and Advanced Firewall Manager (AFM). F5’s TMOS is a
Linux-based operating system customized for performance and to execute on the
TOE appliance hardware or in the TOE Virtual Clustered Multiprocessing (vCMP) envi-
ronment. The vCMP is a hypervisor that allows multiple instances of the TOE to exe-
cute on the same underlying hardware.
The TMM is the data plane of the product, and all data plane traffic passes through
the TMM. The LTM controls network traffic coming into or exiting the local area net-
work (LAN) and provides the ability to intercept and redirect incoming network traf-
fic.
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At the core of BIG-IP is a concept referred to as Traffic Management Microkernel
(TMM), representing the data plane of the product when compared to traditional
network device architectures. It is implemented by a daemon running with root privi-
leges, performing its own memory management, and having direct access to the net-
work hardware. TMM implements a number of sequential filters both for the “client-
side” and “server-side” network interfaces served by BIG-IP. The filters implemented
in TMM include a TCP, TLS, compression, and HTTP filter, amongst others. If the hard-
ware provides more than one CPU, TMM runs multi-threaded (one thread per CPU).
In this case, disaggregators implemented in hardware or, depending on the underly-
ing appliance, firmware, are responsible for de-multiplexing and multiplexing net-
work traffic for handling by an individual TMM thread. In addition to the actual
switch hardware, F5 appliance hardware also contains a High-Speed Bridge (HSB, im-
plemented by means of an FPGA) that performs basic traffic filtering functionality as
instructed by TMM.
Additional plug-in filters can be added to this queue by individual product packages.
These plug-ins typically have a filter component in TMM, with additional and more
complex logic in a counter-part implemented in a Linux-based daemon (module). The
plug-in modules relevant to this evaluation shown in figure above include:
• Local Traffic Manager (LTM): authentication of HTTP (based on
Apache 2.2.15) traffic and advanced traffic forwarding directives
• Advanced Firewall Manager (AFM): TLS-based client connectivity.
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6 Documentation
For proper configuration of the TOE into the evaluated configuration, the following
guidance documents are available:
 BIG-IP® Common Criteria Evaluation Configuration Guide BIG-IP®
 LTM+AFM and BIG-IP® LTM+APM Release 13.1.1 [ECG]
 BIG-IP System: Digital Certificates: Administration
 BIG-IP System: Essentials
 BIG-IP System: SSL Administration
 BIG-IP System: User Account Administration
 BIG-IP Systems: Getting Started Guide
 BIG-IP Local Traffic Management: Monitors Reference
 BIG-IP Local Traffic Management: Profiles Reference
 BIG-IP Local Traffic Manager: Implementations
 BIG-IP Network Firewall: Policies and Implementations
 BIG-IP TMOS: Implementations
 BIG-IP TMOS: Routing Administration
 External Monitoring of BIG-IP Systems: Implementations
 iControl Guidance Documentation (available on-line)
 iControl REST API User Guide
 Traffic Management Shell (tmsh) Reference Guide
 Platform Guide: i5000/i7000/i10000 Series
 Platform Guide: 10000 Series
 Platform Guide: i15000 Series
 Platform Guide: VIPRION® 2200 Series
 Platform Guide: VIPRION® 4400 Series
 vCMP for Appliance Models: Administration
 vCMP for VIPRION Systems: Administration
 K80425458: Modifying the list of ciphers and MAC algorithms
 used by the SSH service on the BIG-IP system or BIG-IQ system
 K52343814: Common Criteria Certification for BIG-IP 13.1.1
 K12042624: Restricting access to the Configuration utility using client certificates
 K13092: Overview of securing access the BIG-IP system
 K13302: Configuring the BIG-IP system to use an SSL chain certificate
 K13454: Configuring SSH host-based authentication on BIP-IP systems
 K14620: Managing SSL Certificates for BIG-IP systems using the Configuration
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 utility
 K14783: Overview of the Client SSL profile
 K14806: Overview of the Server SSL profile
 K15497: Configuring a secure password policy for the BIG-IP system
 K15664: Overview of BIG-IP device certificates
 K42531434: Replacing the Configuration utility's self-signed SSL certificate with
 A CA-signed SSL certificate
 K5532: Configuring the level of information logged for TMM-specific events
 K6068: Configuring a pre-login or post-login message banner for the BIG-IP
 or Enterprise Manager system
 K7683: Connecting a serial terminal to a BIG-IP system
 K7752: Licensing the BIG-IP system
 K9908: Configuring an automatic logout for idle sessions
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Independent Evaluator Testing
The cryptographic algorithm testing was performed on ten TOE models running on
hardware appliances and two TOE models running on top of vCMP, covering the dif-
ferent CPUs. For each of these models, two crypto modules were tested. The algo-
rithm tests were performed using the CAVS framework - in all 24 sets of CAVS certifi-
cates were issued.
Most of the remaining independent tests were performed on the i11800 appliance,
complemented by tests on the i5800 appliance. A subset of these tests, selected to
cover different functionality, was tested using vCMP on the B2250 appliance. The
testing was performed between August and November 2018.
The results of all test cases were consistent with the expected test results, and all
tests were judged to pass.
7.2 Evaluator Penetration Testing
A port scan was performed on a TOE running on an i5800 appliance. No unexpected
open ports were discovered.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The following configuration specifics apply to the evaluated configuration of the TOE:
 Appliance mode is licensed. This results in disabling root access to the TOE
operating system and to the bash shell.
 Certificate validation is performed using CRLs.
 Disabled interfaces:
- All command shells other than tmsh are disabled. For example, bash and other
user-serviceable shells are excluded.
- Management of the TOE via SNMP is disabled.
- Management of the TOE via the appliance's LCD display is disabled.
- Remote (i.e. SSH) access to the Lights Out/Always On Management
capabilities of the system is disabled.
- SSH client
Cryptographic acceleration is always used in the evaluated configuration, and specifi-
cally during testing of the cryptographic mechanisms.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objec-
tives stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].
The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.
The verdicts for the respective assurance classes and components are summarised in
the following table:
Assurance Class/Family Short name Verdict
Development ADV PASS
Functional Specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Guidance Documents AGD PASS
Operational User Guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
Preparative Procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
Life-cycle Support ALC PASS
CM Capabilities ALC_CMC.1 PASS
CM Scope ALC_CMS.1 PASS
Security Target Evaluation ASE PASS
ST Introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Conformance Claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
Security Problem Definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
Security Objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
Extended Components Definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
Security RequirementsASE_REQ.1 PASS
TOE Summary Specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Tests ATE PASS
Independent Testing ATE_IND.1 PASS
Vulnerability Assessment AVA PASS
Vulnerability Analysis AVA_VAN.1 PASS
Evaluation Activities for FWcPP PASS
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10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
The evaluators do not have any comments or recommendations concerning the
product nor regarding its usage.
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11 Glossary
ADC Application Delivery Controller
AFM Advanced Firewall Manager
CA Certificate Authority
CC Common Criteria
CLI Command Line Interface
CRL Certificate Revocation List
GUI Graphical User Interface
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS HTTP Secure
IP Internet Protocol
IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4
LTM Local Traffic Manager
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
SHA Secure HashAlgorithm
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TMM Traffic Management Microkernel
TMOS Traffic Management Operating System
tmsh Traffic management shell
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSFI TSF Interface
UDP User Datagram Protocol
vCMP Virtual Clustered Multi-Processing
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12 Bibliography
ST BIG-IP Version 13.1.1 LTM+AFM Security Target, F5 Networks Inc.
2019-07-16, document version 0.14
ECG BIG-IP® Common Criteria Evaluation Configuration Guide BIG-IP®
LTM+AFM and BIG-IP® LTM+APM Release 13.1.1, F5 Networks
Inc., 2019-02-07, document version 3.26
FWcPP Collaborative Protection Profile for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls,
2018-03-14, document version 2.0E (v2.0 + Errata 20180314)
NDcPP Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, 2018-03-14,
document version 2.0E (v2.0 + Errata 20180314)
EA-FW Evaluation Activities for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls cPP,
2017-05-05, document version 2.0
EA-ND Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, 2018-03-14,
document version 2.0E (v2.0 + Errata 20180314)
CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001
CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003
CC CCpart1 + CCpart2 + CCpart3
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004
SP-002 SP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2019-01-21, document
version 30.0
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v13.1.1 FWcPP
17FMV7906-64:1 2.0 2019-08-12
22 (23)
SP-188 SP-188 Scheme Crypto Policy, CSEC, 2018-01-16, document
version 8.0
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v13.1.1 FWcPP
17FMV7906-64:1 2.0 2019-08-12
23 (23)
Appendix A QMS Consistency
During the certification project, the following versions of the quality management
system (QMS) have been applicable since the certification application was registered
2017-09-20:
QMS 1.20.5 valid from 2017-06-28
QMS 1.21 valid from 2017-11-15
QMS 1.21.1 valid from 2018-03-09
QMS 1.21.2 valid from 2018-03-09 SIC!
QMS 1.21.3 valid from 2018-05-24
QMS 1.21.4 valid from 2018-09-13
QMS 1.21.5 valid from 2018-11-19
QMS 1.22 valid from 2019-02-01
QMS 1.22.1 valid from 2019-03-08
QMS 1.22.2 valid from 2019-05-02
QMS 1.22.3 valid from 2019-05-20
In order to ensure consistency in the outcome of the certification, the certifier has
examined the changes introduced in each update of the quality management system.
The changes between consecutive versions are outlined in “Ändringslista CSEC QMS
1.22.3”.
The certifier concluded that, from QMS 1.20.5 to the current QMS 1.22.3, there are
no changes with impact on the result of the certification.