BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023
for
Qualcomm Secure Processing Unit SPU230 in
SDM855 SoC with MCP version spss.a1.1.2_00100
from
Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.45
BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023 (*)
Qualcomm Secure Processing Unit SPU230 in SDM855 SoC with MCP
version spss.a1.1.2_00100
from Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification
Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version
3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 3 March 2023
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................21
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................22
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................22
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................22
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................24
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................26
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................27
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 3 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 519
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Qualcomm Secure Processing Unit SPU230 in SDM855 SoC with MCP,
version spss.a1.1.2_00100 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-
certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-2019. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-2019 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Qualcomm Secure Processing Unit SPU230 in SDM855
SoC with MCP, version spss.a1.1.2_00100 was conducted by Deutsche Telekom Security
GmbH and atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 22
February 2023. Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH and atsec information security GmbH
are evaluation facilities (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Qualcomm Technologies Inc..
The product was developed by: Qualcomm Technologies Inc..
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 3 March
2023 is valid until 2 March 2028. Validity can be renewed by re-certification.
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023 Certification Report
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Qualcomm Secure Processing Unit SPU230 in SDM855 SoC with MCP,
version spss.a1.1.2_00100 has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
5775 Morehouse drive
San Diego, CA 92121
USA
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the “Qualcomm Secure Processing Unit SPU230 in
SDM855 SoC with MCP version spss.a1.1.2_00100”. The TOEs hardware and firmware
are embedded in the SDM855 host SoC combined with a DDR in a PoP (Package-on-
Package) configuration and its corresponding Software.
The hardware is a hard macro (sub-unit of a System-on-Chip which is already synthesized,
placed and routed, delivered as GDS file) and the special packaging. The TOE is
integrated into the SDM855 SoC by the SoC integrator (Qualcomm).
The firmware and software comprise the operating system of the secure processing unit
and the software API providing symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic services to SPU
applications. The SPU applications can be developed by the SPU application developer
using the software API.
The TOE can be used for multiple applications that require a high level of security.
Examples are as follows: User authentication and password storage, Content protection,
Payment, Subscriber Identity Module (SIM), Storage and management of digital identities,
secure key storage, Root of trust, Storage of sensitive user data (e.g., health care
records).
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 8. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Cryptographic services and random
number generation
Random number generation, AES coprocessor,
Hashing, Authentication, Key derivation function,
Key protection, TDES, Asymmetric crypto
Secure boot and secure update Secure boot, Secure software update
Application manager User data and TSF data of different applications
is only accessible by the associated application.
Domain separation between
applications executed by the TOE
Dedicated control for the access to external
memory as well as for the access to internal
memories and resources that can be configured
in privileged mode.
Physical protection Protection mechanisms against non-invasive,
semi-invasive, and invasive physical attacks.
Access control and management
(hardware)
Control memory areas shared with other
components of the SoC, control access to keys
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
and the key table, control use of hardware
support for cryptographic operations and random
number generation, control access to the SP-
RAM by software on the SP-CPU
Access control and management
(operating system)
Cryptographic protection of persistent data stored
outside the TOE, Cryptographic protection of
transient data and code stored outside the TOE,
Reallocation of shared resources
Logical protection SP-ROM, SP-RAM
Production data and OTP handling Data for the identification of the TOE and the
associated initialization and pre-personalization
data is stored in the SP-QFPROM.
Lifecycle control Lifecycle control based on a combination of
access control to TOE functionality and the
coding of the lifecycle phase in the SP-QFPROM.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 9.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 5.1 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.2 to 5.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Qualcomm Secure Processing Unit SPU230 in SDM855 SoC with MCP, version
spss.a1.1.2_00100
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 Hard
macro
SPU230 hard macro (GDS)
containing hardware design and
ROM
3.1 GDS
2 Hardware SoC embedding the SPU hard
macro SDM855
V2.2 bare die
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
3 Hardware Party packaged SoC PX90-PC761-5 Packaged bare die
without DDR7
4 Firmware ROM image - Secure boot loader
(PBL) and platform API code
(MissionROM)
MissionROM:
ROM_V2_BINARIES_0
PBL:
SDM855_SPSS_PBL_V2
Included in SPU hard
macro ROM
5 Software MCP image spss.a1.1.2_00100 Software image
encrypted and signed
6 Software System application - cryptoapp
image
spss.a1.1.2_00100 Software image
encrypted and signed
7 Software System application -
asym_cryptoapp image
spss.a1.1.2_00100 Software image
encrypted and signed
8 Document Qualcomm SPU Core – Hana API 4.6 PDF [11]
9 Document 80-PD867-16_
Secure Processor Unit ARI
B PDF [12]
10 Document 80-PF777-83_
SPU_Enablement_UG
AC PDF [13]
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
2.1. Overview of delivery procedures
The TOE hardware and firmware (ROM) including the personalization data (in SP-
QFPROM) will be delivered in the form of a partly packaged SoC to the device
manufacturers. The device manufacturer integrates the SoC into his devices.
The integration include the step of adding a DDR package on top of the partly packaged
SoC. This is called Package-on-Package (PoP). The DDR is required to operate the TOE.
In addition, the device manufacturers will receive the TOE software (MCP image and
System Applications) as part of an overall Qualcomm SW package for the SoC. Qualcomm
provides customers access to the Agile system that can be used to download the SW
package.
The TOE software will be loaded by the device manufacturer in the non-volatile memory
(e.g. flash memory) implemented on the devices.
Also, the guidance documents listed in the table “TOE Deliverables”, can be downloaded
from the data based provided in Agile.
Delivery protection for all TOE components is covered by ALC_DEL and ALC_DVS.
2.2. Identification of the TOE by the user
The developer provided a health API that can be used to read out the configuration of the
device and determine the hardware identifier. An additional verification step is the test of
the device with the encrypted and signed software provided by Qualcomm. The integrator
has a procedure (refer to [13], section 11.1) to verify the integrity of the software image
7
The final TOE is the partly packaged SoC delivered to the OEM combined with a packaged DDR
(according to the requirements of the User Guidance 80-PF777-83) resulting in a Package on
Package (PoP) form factor.
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using SHA-256. Since the software is encrypted, the software can only be executed after a
successful decryption inside the secure processing unit.
The SoC related guidance documents can be downloaded by the customers using the
Agile system. Agile is only accessible to registered user and provides a transport
protection of the data exchanged with the Agile data base.
The description of the Software API is provided to customers separately in encrypted form.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
Protection against leakage of information, against physical probing, against malfunctions,
against physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE maintain
● the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memories and the key table of
the TOE,
● the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functionalities
(security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE, and
● the integrity, authenticity, confidentiality and relay-protection of data stored outside the
TOE.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
Regarding the operational environment of the TOE, the security objectives OE.Resp-Appl
(Treatment of User Data of the Composite TOE), and OE.Process-Sec-IC (Protection
during composite product manufacturing) are relevant for the user in context of secure
installation of the TOE and the secure preparation of the operational environment. All
objectives are properly covered by user guidance.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.2.
Details on OE.Process-Sec-IC are provided with the guidance for configuration before the
delivery to the end user in [13]. In addition, requirements regarding the device where the
Qualcomm Secure Processing Unit SPU230 with MCP version spss.a1.1.2_00100 is inte-
grated, is provide in [12].
Details on OE.Resp-Appl are provided in [11].
5. Architectural Information
The TOE comprises the independent secure processing unit (subsystem) integrated in a
System-on-Chip (SoC). The secure processing unit serves as an independent Root of
Trust within the SoC. It does not rely on any external entity for any security enforcement,
allowing it to be evaluated as a separate entity. It has its own ROM code for secure boot
operations.
The hard macro consists of
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● Secure Central Processing Unit, which executes the main code of the TOE
● RAM and ROM (including the Primary Boot Loader image)
● One-Time Programmable memory for life cycle management and to store initialization
and pre-personalization data
● Cryptographic Management Unit, which includes the random number generator, the
coprocessor for AES and SHA and holds a Key Table
● Local Resource Manager, which provides the interface to the clock, the reset line, and
the interface to the sensors (voltage, temperature, logic fault, etc.)
● SP-Timer and SP-Watchdog, used to provide timer functionality for the TOE inde-
pendent from the remaining SoC
● The External Memory Manager providing read/write capabilities to TOE external
memory
● Always-on Island containing the anti-replay mechanism.
The software part of the TOE comprises Firmware, Operating Systems and Applications
● Firmware controls the secure boot process and contains drivers that are used in Op-
erational Mode by the loaded software.
● The Operating System manages the access to the services provided by the TOE, im-
plements software countermeasures and controls the applications.
The Operating System and System applications provide the following services to applica-
tions:
● Cryptographic services (AES, Hashing and message authentication codes, random
number and generation of symmetric keys and asymmetric keys for elliptic curve al-
gorithms)
● Storage for User data in the external non-volatile memory. User data is exported en-
crypted, authenticated and protected against replay. The TOE maintains a unique key
for each application that stores User data in the external memory.
● Communication services with other entities of the SoC (e.g. Modem sub-system, HLOS
or Trusted Execution Environment).
● Application loading services
The Qualcomm Secure Processing Unit SPU230 with MCP version spss.a1.1.2_00100 is
the assembled device as Package-on-Package. One package contains the SoC with the
Secure Processing Unit and the other package contains the DDR. The DDR is also used
to swap code and User data during the operation. Also data stored in RAM is protected
using encrypted, authentication mechanism and protected against replay.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
The tests performed by the developer cover the hard macro of the secure processing unit
as well as the software that is part of the TOE. The testing is performed in different steps.
The silicon of the hard macro was tested separately using common test approaches for
silicon. These tests comprise:
● Design verification using simulations based on tools provided with the development
environment and using FPGA based hardware emulation.
● Characterization tests of the secure processing unit were part of the overall
characterization tests for the SoC. The test capabilities and the test functionality
implemented in the secure processing unit support the verification of the different
sensors for frequency, voltage and temperature and other features that may depend on
the operating conditions. These tests are performed with several samples for each test.
● Verification tests include the evaluation of security mechanisms implemented in the
hard macro. These tests were performed using samples in test mode, debug mode and
operational mode. Specific test setups are used depending on the configuration of the
device.
● Production tests of the secure processing unit are a dedicated part of the overall pro-
duction test for the SoC. Testing of the hard macro is implemented as combination of
scan testing and functional tests. All functional security mechanisms are covered by
these tests. The last step of the production tests includes the initialization and pre-
personalization that was also verified.
The developer testing approach for software is mainly based on the use of automated test
cases. These test cases are deployed onto the TOE and executed. The test applications
are standalone and have no mutual dependencies. Test applications may have one or
more test cases implemented. Each test case contains the expected test result. The test
cases perform a verification step of the observed behaviour with the expected results. If
the generated test results matches with the expected test results, the test cases return a
pass verdict. Other-wise a fail verdict is returned. In addition specific manual tests were
applied to verify specific security functionality of the hardware platform.
The developer’s testing demonstrates that the TSFs behave as specified.
7.2. Evaluator Tests – Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
Two different test configurations were delivered and used for testing:
● The hardware platform in debug mode with specific test framework and specific test
software. This setup was used to test specific components of the secure processing
unit beyond the capabilities provided in the operational mode.
● The final TOE comprising the secure processing unit with firmware and the software
package. Together with a dedicated test application the evaluators were able to test the
API provided by the TOE.
Most of the independent evaluator tests were performed in the evaluation lab. This
comprises the tests as required by AIS 31, [4] for the random number generator. Some
tests were executed on the FPGA implementation of the secure processing unit using test
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software developed by the evaluator. In addition, tests of the developer were reproduced
and additional tests were implemented to supplement the developer tests.
The independent evaluator tests confirm that the TOE provides the specified functionality
and that the TSF behave as specified. The configuration of the hard macro with firmware
and software as specified in the Security Target was considered during the tests.
7.3. Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
Penetration testing was partially performed using the developer’s environment for testing
and failure analysis. Side-channel, fault injection and parts of the sample preparation were
performed in the lab of the evaluation facility.
For several tests the evaluators use specially prepared devices in debug mode to speed
up testing, enable the verification of specific security mechanisms, support best case
scenarios from the attacks point of view and anticipate successful complex preparation
steps required by an attacker.
Additional penetration tests were performed using the final TOE configuration with
specially prepared samples. The performed tests confirm the effective combination of
countermeasures implemented in the hardware as well as in the firmware and software.
Experience gained during the testing with samples in debug mode were used for this
verification on the final TOE.
Systematic search for potential vulnerabilities and attacks according to the guidance
provided in AIS 26, [4] have been conducted. In addition, indications for potential
vulnerabilities noted during the evaluation of the hardware and software design were
assessed. Potential attacks that could not be excluded based on the analysis form the
basis for devised penetration tests.
The evaluator did not identify vulnerabilities that are exploitable in the intended
environment for the TOE with high attack potential. Therefore the TOE is resistant to
attackers with “high” attack potential in the intended environment of the TOE. This
comprises all the usage of the software API and security functionality described in the
Security Target [6].
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
There is only one evaluated configuration of the TOE. This configuration returns the
following hardware version information.
Target ID: SM8150xx
Hardware version: 02.xx
HW_REVISION_NUMBER.VERSION_ID: x
Serial number: individual
CHIP ID: 0x404
SP_CORE_HW_REVISION
MAJOR: 0x3
MINOR: 0x1
The values were read from the hardware registers for identification.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023
The hard macro of the secure processing unit and the associated configuration are deter-
mined by the last row: SP_Core_HW-Revision 3.1 (MAJOR: 3, MINOR: 1). The “x” in the
rows in the table above belong to the remaining part of the SoC and may change.
8.1. Precise description of the evaluated configuration of the TOE
The Qualcomm Secure Processing Unit SPU230 with MCP version spss.a1.1.2_00100 is
trimmed and configured before the delivery. Only one configuration with respect to the
Qualcomm Secure Processing Unit SPU230 in SDM855 SoC with MCP version
spss.a1.1.2_00100 is delivered. The device manufacturer needs to finalise the
configuration in the following way as outlined in [13], chapter 4:
The device manufacturer must configure the “Qualcomm Secure Processing Unit SPU230
in SDM855 SoC with MCP version spss.a1.1.2_00100” with
● SPU enabled and
● SPU anti-replay configuration active.
The enabling or disabling of the self-test as required for the FIPS compliance does not
have an impact on the security of the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
● Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
● Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 37).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
A document ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 has not been provided in
the course of this certification procedure. It could be provided by the ITSEF and submitted
to the certification body for approval subsequently.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023 Certification Report
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-2019, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the extended cryptographic
services of the TOE.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
● Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context)
only.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 120 Bits
1
Image Authenticity
and Integrity
RSA-signature
verification with SHA-
256 and PKCS#1 1.5
padding
FIPS 186-4
FIPS 180-4
RFC3447
2048 Security Level
>= 100 Bits
2
Image
Confidentiality
AES-CBC FIPS 197
NIST SP800-38A
128 Yes
3
User and TOE data
while in NVM
Confidentiality
AES-CBC FIPS 197
NIST SP800-38A
256 Yes
4
User and TOE data
while in NVM
Integrity and
Authenticity
SHA-256 tree and
AES in CMAC mode
FIPS-180-4
FIPS 197
NIST SP800-38B
Hash tree specifics
provided in
developer document
256 Yes
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 120 Bits
5
User and TOE data
while in external
DDR Confidentiality
AES-CBC FIPS 197
NIST SP800-38A
256 Yes
6
User and TOE data
while in external
DDR Integrity and
Authenticity
SHA-256 FIPS 180-4 256 Yes
7
API TDES
(ECB, CBC)
FIPS46-3
SP800-38A
168 No
8
API AES
(ECB, CBC, CTR,
CMAC, CCM)
FIPS 197
NIST SP800-38A
NIST SP800-38B
NIST SP800-38C
NIST SP800-38E
128, 256 Yes
9
API SHA1
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
FIPS 180-4 none No
Yes
Yes
Yes
10
API RNG PTG.3 According to
AIS-31
NIST SP800-90A
none N/A
11
API HMAC-SHA1
HMAC-SHA256
HMAC-SHA-384
HMAC-SHA-512
FIPS198-1 256 (SHA-1,
SHA-256)
512 (SHA-384,
SHA-512)
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
12
API Generate random
symmetric key
NIST SP800-90A 256 Yes
13
API Key Derivation
Function in Counter
Mode based on
HMAC SHA-256
NIST SP800-108
FIPS 198-1
FIPS 180-4
256, 512 Yes
14
API RSA signature/verify
with SHA-1, SHA-
256, SHA-384, SHA-
512 and RSASSA-
PSS and PKCS#1
v1.5 padding
schemes
FIPS 186-4
FIPS 180-4
RFC3447
1024, 2048 RSA-1024: No
RSA-2048:
Security-Level
>= 100 Bits
SHA1: No
15
API RSA
encryption /
decryption with
RSAES-OAEP and
PKCS#1 v1.5
padding schemes
FIPS186-4
RFC3447
1024, 2048 RSA-1024: No
RSA-2048:
Security-Level
>= 100 Bits
16
API ECDSA
Cryptographic key
generation
Signature Generation
/ Verification
FIPS186-4
Appendix B.4.2
ECC key
lengths
corresponding
to following ECC
parameters:
NIST P-192,
NIST P-224,
NIST P-256,
No
No
Yes
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 120 Bits
NIST P-384,
NIST P-521
Yes
Yes
17
API ECDH
Cryptographic key
generation
Shared secret
generation
SP800-56A revision
2 section 5.6.1.2
SP800-56A revision
2 section 5.7.1.2
FIPS 186-4
Appendix D.1.2
ECC key
lengths
corresponding
to following ECC
parameters:
NIST P-192,
NIST P-224,
NIST P-256,
NIST P-384,
NIST P-521
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the Embedded Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes
guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the
developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which
measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the
Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or
system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively
implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite
product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in a document
"ETR for composite evaluation".
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
API Application Programming Interface
ARI Anti-Replay Island
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DDR Dobble Data Rate RAM
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
GDS Graphic Design System
HW Hardware
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MCP Main control program
PoP Package-on-Package
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SoC System-on-Chip
SFP Security Function Policy
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023 Certification Report
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIM Subscriber Identity Module
SPL Secure boot loader
SP-RAM SPU-RAM
SP-ROM SPU-ROM
SP-CPU SPU-CPU
SP-QFPROM QFPROM
SPU Secure Processing Unit
ST Security Target
SW Software
TDES Tripple DES
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen)
https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023, Revision J, Date: 14.01.2022,
Qualcomm SPU230 Core Security Target, Qualcomm Technologies, Inc.,
(confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2.1, Date: 26.01.2023, Evaluation Technical
Report - Summary for Qualcomm Secure Processing Unit SPU230 in SDM855 SoC
with MCP version spss.a1.1.2_00100, Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH
(confidential document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13
January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023, Revision H, Date: 14.01.2022,
Qualcomm Secure Processing Unit SPU230 Core Security Target Lite, Qualcomm
Technologies, Inc., (sanitised public document)
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023 Certification Report
[10] Impact Analysis Report, Re-evaluation Secure Processing Unit SPU230, MCU SW
Update: CM081 to CM100, Qualcomm Technologies, Inc., Revision 0.4, February
22, 2022
[11] Guidance documentation for the TOE: Qualcomm SPU Core, Hana Application
Programming Interface API, Qualcomm Technologies Inc., Rev. 4.6, August 26th,
2020 (confidential document)
[12] Guidance documentation for the TOE: Secure Processor Unit (SPU) Anti-Replay
Island (ARI), Overview for SM8150, Qualcomm Technologies Inc., Revision B,
November, 2018 (confidential document)
[13] Guidance documentation for the TOE: Qualcomm Secure Processing Unit,
Enablement, 80-PF777-965 AC, Qualcomm Technologies Inc., Rev. AC, May 6th,
2021 (confidential document)
[14] Configuration list for the TOE: Configuration List user guidance,
TOE_user_guidance_config_list v13.pdf, 09th December 2021 (confidential
document)
[15] Configuration list for the TOE: Configuration List hardware spec,
TOE_HW_spec_config_list-4.0.xlsx, 04th April 2019 (confidential document)
[16] Configuration list for the TOE: Configuration List for the hardware platform,
Qualcomm Technologies, Inc., version 3,1; 11th April 2019 (SPU_3_1_config_list.txt
(confidential document)
[17] Configuration list for the TOE: Configuration list including the functional and
verification tests of the hardware plat-form: TOE_HW_test_config_list.txt
(confidential document)
[18] Configuration list for the TOE: pbl_v2_config_list.txt, 22.03.2019 (confidential
document)
[19] Configuration list for the TOE: rom_v2_binaries.txt, 23.10.2018 (confidential
document)
[20] Configuration list for the TOE: Configuration list of the documentation for the
hardware development process TOE_SW_HW_process_config_list-10.1.pdf
(confidential document)
[21] Configuration list for the TOE: Configuration list software specifications:
TOE_SW_Docs_config_list.txt (confidential document)
[22] Configuration list for the TOE: Configuration list functional and verification tests of
software: TOE_SW_Test_config_list_CC2_PHASE2.txt(confidential document)
[23] Configuration list for the TOE: MCP Software configuration list:
config_list_spu_100.txt (confidential document)
[24] Configuration list for the TOE: Configuration list of the documentation for the
software development process: ALC_CMC_Doc_config_list-5.2.pdf (confidential
document)
[25] Configuration list for the TOE: Site Security Documentation Configuration List:
Secproc_config_list.txt (confidential document)
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Qualcomm Secure Processing Unit SPU230 in SDM855 SoC with MCP,
version spss.a1.1.2_00100 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5, and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 3 March 2023, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Company Life Cycle Location Service
Qualcomm Phase 1, 2, 5
(HW and SW)
Pacific Center Blvd Ste
100 92121 San Diego
USA
Hardware and software de-
velopment, integration into the
SoC, test program development
and integration as well as device
bring-up
Qualcomm Phase 1 Omega Building, 4th
Floor, Tirat Hacarmel,
Haifa, Israel
Software development
Qualcomm Support IT Workspace Bangalore,
room E-050J, India
IT administration of Sparrow and
network
Qualcomm Phase 5 Qualcomm Singapore 51
Alps Ave, #03-04/07,
Singapore 498783
Shipping
TSMC BSI-DSZ-
CC-S-0217-2022
Phase 3a, 3b,
3c
TSMC Fab15A, Fab15B,
CP03 Taichung, Taiwan,
R.O.C.
Mask production, Wafer pro-
duction, Wafer Test
TSMC DSZ-CC-S-
0218-2022
Phase 3a, 3b,
3c
Fab 2/5, Fab 3, Fab 7,
Fab 8 and Fab
12P4/P5/P6/P7 Hsinchu,
Taiwan, R.O.C.
Support of TSMC Fab15A,
Fab15B
Amkor BSI-DSZ-
CC-S-0170-2020
Phase 3c 1F, No. 1, Kao-Ping Sec,
Chung-Feng Road, Lung-
tan Township, Taoyuan
County 325, Taiwan,
R.O.C.
Bumping and probe test
SPIL BSI-DSZ- Phase 3c SPIL ZK factory, No 19 Bumping and probe test
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1045-V2-2023 Certification Report
CC-S-0197-2022 Keya Road, Daya District,
Taichung, Taiwan, R.O.C.
Amkor Phase 4 Site K4 Gwangju 100,
Amkor-ro, Buk-gu
Gwangju 61006 Korea
Assembly
Amkor Phase 4/5 Site K5 Songdo 150,
Songdo-mirae-ro
Yeonsu-gu, In-cheon
21991 Korea
Only IT support for K3 and K4
Amkor Phase 5 Site K3 Bupyeong 110,
Anaji-ro, Gyeyang-gu In-
cheon 21107 Korea
Final test and provisioning
Amkor Phase 4 921-3, Himega-wara,
Myoko-shi, Niigata, 944-
8588 Japan
Assembly
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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