Certification Report Page 1
KECS-CR-23-38
TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-1244-2023
2023. 6. 2.
IT Security Certification Center
Certification Report Page 2
History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2023. 6. 2. -
Certification report for TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4
- First documentation
Certification Report Page 3
This document is the certification report for TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 of RaonSecure Co.,
Ltd.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
Certification Report Page 4
Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary ................................................................................................... 5
2. Identification............................................................................................................... 9
3. Security Policy.......................................................................................................... 10
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ................................................................ 10
5. Architectural Information......................................................................................... 10
5.1 Physical Scope of TOE......................................................................................... 10
5.2 Logical Scope of TOE............................................................................................11
6. Documentation ......................................................................................................... 15
7. TOE Testing............................................................................................................... 15
8. Evaluated Configuration .......................................................................................... 16
9. Results of the Evaluation......................................................................................... 17
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE) ......................................................................... 17
9.2 Development Evaluation (ADV)............................................................................ 10
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD) .............................................................. 10
9.4 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) .................................................................... 10
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)........................................................................................... 10
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)............................................................................ 10
9.7 Evaluation Results Summary ............................................................................... 10
10. Recommendations ................................................................................................... 20
11. Security Target.......................................................................................................... 21
12. Acronyms and Glossary .......................................................................................... 22
13. Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 24
Certification Report Page 5
1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 developed by RaonSecure Co., Ltd. with
reference to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC”
hereinafter)[1]. It describes the evaluation results and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (“TOE” hereinafter) is used to enable the user to access
various business systems and use the service through a single user login without
additional login action. Also, the TOE shall provide a variety of security features:
security audit, the user identification and authentication including mutual authentication
between TOE components, security management, the TOE access session
management, and the TSF protection function, etc.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea System Assurance
(KOSYAS) and completed on May 31, 2023.
The ST claims conformance to the Korean National Protection Profile for Single Sign
On V1.1[3]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only
upon assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL1+. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC
Part 3 conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both
functional components in CC Part 2 and a newly defined component in the Extended
Component Definition chapter of the PP, therefor the ST, and the TOE satisfies the
SFRs in the ST. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE provides the security audit function that records and manages critical events
as audit data when activating the security functionality and management function,
function of protecting the data that stored in the TSF controlled repository, and TSF
protection function such as TSF self-testing. In addition, the TOE provides
authentication failure handling, identification and authentication functions including
mutual authentication between the TOE components, cryptographic support function
such as cryptographic key management and cryptographic operation for issuing a
token, security management function for management of security functions behavior
and configuration, and the TOE access function to manage the authorized
administrator’s interacting session.
In addition, the token requires confidentiality and integrity protection, and the TOE
executable code requires integrity protection.
[Figure 1] shows the operational environment of the TOE.
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[Figure 1] Operational Environment of the TOE
The operational environment of the TOE is composed of the SSO server that is
installed in the management server and the SSO Agent that is installed in the business
system.
The TOE is provided in software. The SSO Server is installed in the management
server as process type and performs security management. The SSO Agent is installed
in each business system. It is provided in a combination ‘API type’ composed of the
library file which performs the authentication token issuance and verification functions,
‘process type’ composed of the executable file.
The SSO Server performs the security management of the TOE via web browser which
supports HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Secure Socket Layer). A Wrapper is
used for compatibility with various business systems, out of the TOE scope.
The requirements for hardware, software and operating system to install the TOE are
shown in [Table 1].
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Component Requirement
SSO
Server
H/W
CPU Intel(R) Xeon(R) 2.8 GHz or higher
RAM 8 GB or higher
HDD Space required for TOE installation is 1 GB or higher
NIC 100/1000 Ethernet Port x 1 EA or higher
S/W
OS Oracle Linux 8.7 (64 bit, Kernel 5.15.0)
DBMS MySQL 8.0.33
Java OpenJDK 1.8.0_372 (64 bit)
WAS Apache Tomcat 8.5.88
SSO
Agent
H/W
CPU Intel(R) Xeon(R) 2.8 GHz or higher
RAM 8 GB or higher
HDD Space required for TOE installation is 1 GB or higher
NIC 100/1000 Ethernet Port x 1 EA or higher
S/W
OS Oracle Linux 8.7 (64 bit, Kernel 5.15.0)
Java OpenJDK 1.8.0_372 (64 bit)
WAS Apache Tomcat 8.5.88
[Table 1] TOE Hardware and Software Specifications
Administrator uses a PC which can operate web browser to use the security
management. Administrator PC minimum requirements are shown in [Table 2].
Component Requirement
S/W Web Browser Chrome 112.0
[Table 2] Administrator PC Requirements
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In addition, external IT entities linked for TOE operation are shown in [Table 3].
Component Requirement
Mail Server
Sends an e-mail about potential security violations to the authorized
administrator on the designated receiving side from the SSO server.
[Table 3] External IT entity
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by
the government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or
gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives
effect to the certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report Page 9
2. Identification
The TOE reference is identified as follows.
TOE TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4
Version v1.4.4.3
TOE
Components
- TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Server v1.4.4.3
- TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Agent v1.4.4.3
Manuals
- TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Administrator's Manual v1.4.3
- TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 API Manual v1.4.2
- TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Installation Guide v1.4.3
[Table 4] TOE Identification
[Table 5] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation,
facility, certification body, etc.
Scheme
Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (MSIT
Notice No. 2022-61, October 31, 2022.)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Regulation for IT Security (May 17,
2021)
Common Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April
2017
TOE TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4
EAL EAL1+(ATE_FUN.1)
Protection Profile
Korean National Protection Profile for Single Sign On V1.1
(December 11, 2019)
Developer RaonSecure Co., Ltd.
Sponsor RaonSecure Co., Ltd.
Evaluation Facility Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
May 31, 2023
[Table 5] Additional Identification Information
Certification Report Page 10
3. Security Policy
The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional classes:
- Security Audit
- Cryptographic Support
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE Access
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the
Security Target (ST) [4].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There are no assumptions in the Security Problem Definition in the ST. The scope of this
evaluation is limited to the functionality and assurance covered in the Security Target.
This evaluation covers only the specific software version identified in this document, and
not any earlier or later versions released or in process. (for the detailed information of
TOE version and TOE components version refer to the [Table 4]).
5. Architectural Information
5.1 Physical Scope of TOE
The physical scope of the TOE consists of the SSO Server, SSO Agent and manuals
(Administrator’s manual, API manual, Installation guidance). The validated cryptographic
module (Key# Crypto V1.5) is embedded in the TOE components.
Hardware, operating system, DBMS, WAS, JDK, Wrapper which are operating
environments of the TOE are excluded from the physical scope of the TOE.
Category Identification Type
TOE
components
SSO
Server
TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Server v1.4.4.3
(wiseaccess_server_v1.4.4.3_linux.tar.gz)
Software
(Distributed
Certification Report Page 11
SSO
Agent
TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Agent v1.4.4.3
(wiseaccess_agent_v1.4.4.3_linux.tar.gz)
as a CD)
Manuals
TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Administrator's Manual v1.4.3
(TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Administrator's Manual v1.4.3.pdf)
PDF
(Distributed
as a CD)
TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 API Manual v1.4.2
(TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 API Manual v1.4.2.pdf)
TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Installation Guide v1.4.3
(TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Installation Guide v1.4.3.pdf)
[Table 6] Physical Scope of the TOE
The validated cryptographic module included in the TOE is as follows.
Classification Description
Cryptographic Module Key# Crypto V1.5
Validation No. CM-220-2027.11
Developer RaonSecure Co., Ltd.
Validation Date 2022. 11. 2.
Expiration Date 2027. 11. 2.
[Table 7] Validated Cryptographic Module
5.2 Logical Scope of TOE
The logical scope of the TOE is shown in [Figure 2].
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[Figure 2] Logical Scope of the TOE
▣ Security Audit
<SSO Server>
SSO Server manages the TSF data from browser and generates the audit data on security
management. Generate the audit data about management and security setting, information
change of the TSF data, identification and authentication, integrity test, start/termination of
the audit function and security violation.
The TOE corresponds to security violations and mutual authentication between the SSO
Server and SSO Agent. Generate the audit data about cryptographic key management,
integrity test and start/termination of the audit function accordingly.
The audit data includes log generation time, identity of the subject, result of the event
(success or failure), type of the event and additional audit data.
The audit data is stored in the DBMS. The audit data is provided in a manner suitable for
the authorized administrator. Protect the data from unauthorized users to delete.
Only the top-level administrator can search the audit data.
SSO Server shall periodically check audit data storage according to the setting and send a
warning email to the administrator when the audit data storage exceeds the threshold.
Delete the past records in the DBMS if the past records exceed the deletion threshold.
In addition, perform corresponding actions (send a warning email to the authorized
administrator) on security violations (self-test failure of the validated cryptographic module
‘Key# Crypto V1.5’, exceed the audit storage, self-verification and integrity test failure of the
SSO Server and the SSO Agent, the audit storage failure, exceeding the number of
authentication failures (administrator/end-user)).
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<SSO Agent>
SSO Agent generates the audit data about the mutual authentication between the SSO
Agent and the SSO Server, authentication token generation/operation/destruction using the
cryptographic key, cryptographic key management, integrity test and start/termination of the
audit function.
The audit data includes log generation time, subject’s identity, event result (success or
failure), items about event type and additional audit data.
▣ Cryptographic support
<SSO Server>
SSO Server generates random numbers with the RBG for mutual authentication and
verifies signature with the digital signature algorithm. After completing mutual authentication,
distribute cryptographic key to the SSO Agent. Use Key# Crypto V1.5, a validated
cryptographic module. Do not save the encryption key but destory it.
<SSO Agent>
SSO Agent generates random bits with the RBG for mutual authentication with the SSO
Server. During mutual authentication, user the digital signature algorithm to perform
signature verification. After mutual authentication, use the symmetric algorithm and the
MAC algorithm to generate and manage the authentication token. Use the validated
cryptographic module, Key# Crypto V1.5, as a cryptographic algorithm. Do not save the
encryption key but destory it.
▣ Identification and authentication
<SSO Server>
Identify the administrator with ID when attempting identification and authentication, and
perform administrator authentication before all the actions. Present the password with ‘•’ to
prevent the password from being exposed by providing the information of authentication
failure reason.
SSO Server provides the function to prevent reuse of authentication information related to
the administrator.
Set administrator’s password according to the password rule. If identification and
authentication succeeds, the administrator maintains the security management authority.
If the number of authentication attempts via the SSO Server exceeds the allowed number
of authentication failures (5 times), lock the account for 10 minutes as the administrator sets.
Perform mutual authentication via implemented protocol for safe communication among
TOE components.
<SSO Agent>
SSO Agent identifies the end-user with ID when the end-user initially attempts to identify
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and authenticate. Perform the end-user authentication before all the actions. Present the
password as ‘•’ to prevent the password from being exposed by providing the information of
authentication failure.
After completing the initial identification and authentication of end user, issue an
authentication token depending on the implementation and performs identification and
authentication with the authentication token. Onetime Token prevents the authentication
from being reused. Do not save the authentication token but destroy it.
If the end-user exceeds the allowed number of authentication failures (5 times), lock the
end-user’s account for the set time interval of user lock.
▣ Security Management
<SSO Server>
Conduct security management via SSO Server.
Set security policy for single authentication with organization/service.
Forced to change the password when the authorized administrator accesses for the first
time to the security management interface.
There is only top-level administrator who can set and perform all the policy of security
management functions.
▣ Protection of the TSF
<SSO Server>
SSO Server shall protect the TSF data stored within containers controlled by the TSF and
transferred between the TOE components. Run TSF testing to check major security
function process. SSO Server shall run self-test for major processes and ensure the
integrity of the TOE configuration files and major process periodically during initial start-up
and operation. If integrity is compromised, send a warming email to the administrator.
SSO Server safely store and manage the authentication information of end user and
administrator in the DBMS.
<SSO Agent>
When transmitting data between separate parts of the TOE, protects the data from
disclosure and modification using the secure channel. Check integrity periodically.
SSO Agent shall protect the TSF data stored within containers controlled by the TSF and
transferred between the TOE components. Run TSF testing to check major security
function process. The TOE shall run self-test for major processes and ensure the integrity of
the TOE configuration files and major process periodically during initial start-up and
operation. If integrity is compromised, send a warming email to the administrator.
The authentication token is temporarily saved in the user’s PC memory and destructed
immediately right after the use.
▣ TOE access
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<SSO Server>
For the time interval of SSO Server inactivity, the administrator performs the automated
termination of sessions function. In order to reuse, reauthentication is required.
In addition, limit the maximum number of session connection for the administrator session
of security management to 1 to avoid duplication log-in. After the authorized administrator
logs in, another administrator PC performs a log-in with the same account, the previous
connection will be terminated.
Able to set the allowed IP addresses for administrator to 2. Output ‘Access Denied Error!’
when accessing from an IP not in the allowed list.
<SSO Agent>
After the end-user’s identification and authentication, terminates the session when the idle
time of authentication token exceeds. Re-authenticate the user and perform identification
and authentication.
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identification Date
TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Administrator's Manual v1.4.3
(TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Administrator's Manual v1.4.3.pdf)
May 8, 2023
TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 API Manual v1.4.2
(TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 API Manual v1.4.2.pdf)
April 24, 2023
TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Installation Guide v1.4.3
(TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Installation Guide v1.4.3.pdf)
May 8, 2023
[Table 8] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The evaluator conducted independent testing listed in Independent Testing Report [5],
based upon test cases devised by the evaluator. The evaluator took a testing approach
based on the security services provided by each TOE components based on the
operational environment of the TOE. Each test case includes the following information:
Certification Report Page 16
- Test no.: Identifier of each test case
- Test Purpose: Includes the security functions to be tested
- Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
- Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
- Expected result: Result expected from testing
- Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
- Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the expected and
actual result
The evaluator set up the test configuration and testing environment consistent with the ST
[4]. In addition, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based upon test cases devised
by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential vulnerabilities.
These tests cover weakness analysis of privilege check of executable code, bypassing
security functionality, invalid inputs for interfaces, vulnerability scanning using commercial
tools, disclosure of secrets, and so on. No exploitable vulnerabilities by attackers
possessing basic attack potential were found from penetration testing. The evaluator
confirmed that all the actual testing results correspond to the expected testing results. The
evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth, and results are
summarized in the Penetration Testing Report [6].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
TOE: TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4
Version: v1.4.4.3
- TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Server v1.4.4.3
- TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Agent v1.4.4.3
The Administrator can identify the complete TOE reference after installation using the
product’s Info check menu. And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6
were evaluated with the TOE
Certification Report Page 17
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility wrote the evaluation results in the ETR which references Single Evaluation
Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports. The evaluation results were
based on the CC [1] and CEM [2]. The TOE was evaluated based on Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation (EAL1+(ATE_FUN.1)).
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in a
narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the CC
and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined, and it
is necessary. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and they are internally
consistent. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis for the
TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The functional specifications specify a high-level description of the SFR-enforcing and SFR-
supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore, the verdict PASS
Certification Report Page 18
is assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been documented
and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality and
interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure use of
the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates prevention
and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE in a
secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of users (e.g.
those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect actions could
adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has clearly identified the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMC.1.
The configuration management document verifies that the configuration list includes the
TOE and the evaluation evidence. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMS.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the software is installed in device.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
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By independently testing a subset of the TSFI, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1. Thus, the TOE behaves as
described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation evidence (described in the ADV
class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetration testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable vulnerabilities
by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational environment of the TOE.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), don’t allow
attackers possessing basic attack potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Results Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE
ASE_INT.1
ASE_INT.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
Certification Report Page 20
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE_TSS.1
ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1
ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS
PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS
AGD
AGD_PRE.1
AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ALC
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.1
ATE_IND.1.1E PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1
AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS
PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 9] Evaluation Results Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
⚫ The Server must be installed and operated in a physically secure environment
accessible only by authorized administrators and should not allow remote management
from outside.
Certification Report Page 21
⚫ The administrator shall maintain a safe state such as application of the latest security
patches, eliminating unnecessary service, change of the default ID/password, etc., of
the operating system and DBMS in the TOE operation.
⚫ The administrator should periodically check a spare space of audit data storage in case
of the audit data loss, and carries out the audit data backup to prevent audit data loss.
⚫ The developer who uses the TOE to interoperate with the user identification and
authentication function in the operational environment of the business system shall
ensure that the security functions of the TOE are securely applied in accordance with
the requirements of the manual provided with the TOE.
11. Security Target
TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Security Target v1.4.4 [4] is included in this report for
reference.
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12. Acronyms and Glossary
(1) Acronyms
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
(2) Glossary
Application Programming Interface (API)
A set of system libraries existing between the application layer and the platform system,
enables the easy development of the application running on the platform
Authenticated Data
Information used to verify a user's claimed identity
Authenticated token
Authentication data that authorized end-users use to access the business system
Certification Report Page 23
Authorized Administrator
Authorized user to securely operate and manage the TOE
Authorized User
The TOE user who may, in accordance with the SFRs, perform an operation
Business System
An application server that authorized end-users access through ‘SSO’
Decryption
The act that restoring the ciphertext into the plaintext using the decryption key
Encryption
The act that converting the plaintext into the ciphertext using the cryptographic key
end-user
Users of the TOE who want to use the business system, not the administrators of the
TOE
External Entity
An entity (person or IT object) that interact (or can interact) with the TOE from outside
the TOE
Top Administrator
The authorized administrator who has the highest authority to perform all security
management functions in the security management interface
Validated Cryptographic Module
A cryptographic module that is validated and given a validation number by validation
Certification Report Page 24
authority
Wrapper
Interfaces for interconnection between the TOE and various types of business systems
or authentication systems
13. Bibliography
The evaluation facility has used the following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision
5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April, 2017
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April, 2017
[3] Korean National Protection Profile for Single Sign On V1.1, December 11, 2019
[4] TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Security Target v1.4.4, May 31, 2023
[5] TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Independent Testing Report(ATE_IND.1) V2.00, May 31,
2023
[6] TouchEn Wiseaccess v1.4 Penetration Testing Report(AVA_VAN.1) V2.00, May 31,
2023