Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004
for
Philips P5CC009V0M
Secure Smart Card Controller
from
Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Line Identification
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004
Philips P5CC009V0M
Secure Smart Card Controller
from
Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Line Identification SOGIS-MRA
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for
compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality: BSI-PP-0002-2001 conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL5 / augmented by:
ALC_DVS.2 (Life cycle support - Sufficiency of security measures),
AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure
states),
AVA_VLA.4 (Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 6 September 2004
The Vice President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Hange L.S.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004 Certification Report
V
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004
VI
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004 Certification Report
A-1
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
- Part 1, Version 0.6
- Part 2, Version 1.0
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
(AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-
Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 29th October 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1838
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the
Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004
A-2
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israel
joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February 2002, Austria
in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003, Japan in
November 2003.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004 Certification Report
A-3
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Philips P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Philips P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card
Controller was conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit.
The T-Systems GEI GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, and vendor and distributor is:
Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Line Identification
P.O. Box 54 02 40
D-22502 Hamburg, Germany
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 6 September 2004.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as
given in the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in
the following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004
A-4
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-26 and D1 to D4.
The product Philips P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller has been
included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly
(see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained
from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Business Line Identification, P.O. Box 54 02 40, D-22502
Hamburg, Germany
BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004 Certification Report
B-1
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004
B-2
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 11
3 Security Policy 13
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 13
5 Architectural Information 14
6 Documentation 15
7 IT Product Testing 15
8 Evaluated Configuration 16
9 Results of the Evaluation 17
10 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations 20
11 Annexes 21
12 Security Target 21
13 Definitions 22
14 Bibliography 24
BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004 Certification Report
B-3
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Philips P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card
Controller. It provides a hardware platform for a smart card to run smart card
applications executed by a smart card operating system.
The TOE is manufactured in the IC fabrication SSMC in Singapore (see part D,
Annex A) indicated by the nameplate (on-chip identifier) T023M.
The TOE is based on the chip Philips P5CT072 composed of a processing unit,
security components, I/O ports, volatile and non-volatile memories (4608 Bytes
RAM, 96 KBytes Application-ROM, 10 KBytes EEPROM activated), a Triple-
DES and FameXE co-processor and a Random number generator. Also two 16-
bit Timers, an Interrupt Module, a Memory Management Unit and an UART for
ISO 7816 Interface. The USB interface and the ISO 14443 contactless interface
are not available.
The TOE also includes Philips proprietary IC Dedicated Software stored on the
chip and used for testing purposes during production only. It does not provide
additional services in the operational phase of the TOE. The smart card
operating system and the application stored in the Application-ROM and in the
EEPROM are not part of the TOE.
The IC Dedicated Support Software consists of two parts: the Boot ROM
Software being executed after each reset of the TOE and the Mifare Operating
System: This software is disabled in all configurations of the TOE and can not
be used in any way.
The EEPROM part of the TOE provides a platform for applications requiring
non-volatile data storage, including smart cards and portable data banks.
Several security features independently implemented in hardware or controlled
by software will be provided to ensure proper operations and integrity and
confidentiality of stored data. This includes for example measures for memory
protection and sensors to allow operations only under specified conditions.
The Security Target is written using the Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001
[9]. With reference to this Protection Profile, the smart card product life cycle is
described in seven phases and the development, production and operational
user environment are described and referenced to these phases. The
assumptions, threats and objectives defined in this Protection Profile are used.
The IT product Philips P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller was
evaluated against the claims of the Security Target [6] by T-Systems GEI
GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit. The evaluation was completed on 23. July
2004. The T-Systems GEI GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004
B-4
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Line Identification.
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Part C or [1], part 3
for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL5+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 5 augmented). The following table shows
the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL5 TOE evaluation: Semiformally designed and tested
+: ALC_DVS.2 Life cycle support - Sufficiency of security measures
+: AVA_MSU.3 Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing of insecure
states
+: AVA_VLA.4 Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
The level of assurance is chosen in order to allow the confirmation that the TOE
is suitable for use within devices compliant with the German Digital Signature
Law [14].
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC Part 2:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source from
PP or added
in ST
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1
[DES]
Cryptographic operation ST
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1
[MEM]
Subset access control ST
FDP_ACC.1
[SFR]
9
Subset access control ST
FDP_ACF.1
[MEM]
Security Attribute based access control ST
FDP_ACF.1
[SFR]
Security Attribute based access control ST
9
[SFR] here means Special Function Register
BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004 Certification Report
B-5
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control PP
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection PP
FMT Security Management
FMT_MSA.1
[MEM]
Management of security attributes ST
FMT_MSA.1
[SFR]
Management of security attributes ST
FMT_MSA.3
[MEM]
Static attribute initialisation ST
FMT_MSA.3
[SFR]
Static attribute initialisation ST
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions (see also [
4, AIS
32, Int065])
ST
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state PP
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection PP
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack PP
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation PP
FRU Resource utilisation
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance PP
Table 2: SFRs taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined.
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source from
PP or added in
ST
FAU Security audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage PP
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers PP
FMT Security management
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities PP
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability PP
Table 3: SFRs CC part 2 extended.
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details please refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 5.1.1.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004
B-6
TOE Security
Functions
Description
F.RNG Random Number Generator
F.HW_DES Triple-DES Co-Processor
F.OPC Control of Operating Conditions
F.PHY Protection against Physical Manipulation
F.LOG Logical Protection
F.COMP Protection of Mode Control
F.MEM_ACC Memory Access Control
F.SFR_ACC Special Function Register Access Control
Table 4: TOE Security Functions
F.RNG: Random Number Generator
The random number generator continuously produces random numbers
with a length of one byte. The TOE implements the F.RNG by means of a
physical hardware random number generator working stable within the
limits guaranteed by F.OPC (operational conditions). The TSF provides a
hardware test functionality that can be used by the Smart Card
Embedded Software to detect faults in the hardware implementing the
random number generator.
F.HW_DES: Triple-DES Co-Processor
The TOE provides the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) of the
Data Encryption Standard (DES). F.HW_DES is a modular basic
cryptographic function which provides the TDEA algorithm as defined by
FIPS PUB 46-3 [13] by means of a hardware co-processor and supports
the 2-key Triple DEA algorithm according to keying option 2 in FIPS PUB
46-3.
F.OPC: Control of Operating Conditions
The function F.OPC ensures the correct operation of the TOE (functions
offered by the micro controller including the standard CPU as well as the
Triple-DES co-processor, the arithmetic coprocessor, the memories,
registers, I/O interface and the other system peripherals) during the
execution of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Smart Card
Embedded Software. This includes all specific security features of the
TOE which are able to provide an active response.
F.OPC filters the power supply and the clock input. It also monitors the
power supply, the frequency of the clock, the temperature of the chip and
the high voltage for the write process to the EEPROM by means of
sensors. In addition, light sensors are provided to detect specific attacks
and the specific range of the stack pointer is controlled.
Before TOE delivery the Test Mode is disabled. In all other modes except
the Test Mode the TOE enables the sensors automatically when
BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004 Certification Report
B-7
operated. Furthermore the TOE prevents that the Smart Card Embedded
Software disables the sensors.
F.PHY: Protection against Physical Manipulation
The function F.PHY protects the TOE against manipulation of (
i) the
hardware, (ii) the IC Dedicated Software in the ROM, (iii) the Smart Card
Embedded Software in the ROM and the EEPROM, (iv) the application
data in the EEPROM and RAM including the configuration data in the
security row. It also protects User Data or TSF data against disclosure by
physical probing when stored or while being processed by the TOE.
F.LOG: Logical Protection
The function F.LOG implements measures to limit or eliminate the
information that might be contained in the shape and amplitude of signals
or in the time between events found by measuring such signals. This
comprises the power consumption and signals on the other pads that are
not intended by the terminal or the Smart Card Embedded Software.
Thereby this security function prevents the disclosure of User Data or
TSF data stored and/or processed in the smart card IC through the
measurement of the power consumption and subsequent complex signal
processing. The protection of the TOE comprises different features within
the design that support the other security functions.
The Triple-DES co-processor includes special features to prevent
SPA/DPA analysis of shape and amplitude of the power consumption
and ensures that the calculation time is independent from any key and
plain/cipher text.
The FameXE co-processor provides measures to prevent timing attacks
on basic modular function. In addition special features are included to
provide limitations of the capability for the analysis of shape and
amplitude of the power consumption. Of course the FameXE does not
realise an algorithm on its own and algorithm-specific leakage
countermeasures have to be added for the FameXE.
Additional features that can be configured by the Smartcard Embedded
Software comprise (i) the FameXE HIGHSEC mode and (ii) several clock
configurations to support resistance against leakage attacks.
The behaviour of F.LOG is supported by different features realised in the
functions F.OPC and F.PHY.
F.COMP: Protection of Mode Control
The function F.COMP provides a control of the CPU mode for (
i) Boot
Mode, (ii) Test Mode and (iii) Mifare Mode. This includes the protection of
electronic fuses stored in a protected memory area, the so-called
“Security Row”, and the possibility to store initialisation or pre-
personalisation data in the so-called “FabKey Area”.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004
B-8
The control of the CPU mode according to Boot Mode, Test Mode and
Mifare Mode prevents the abuse of test functions after TOE delivery.
Additionally it also ensures that features used at boot time to configure
the TOE can not be abused.
F.COMP limits the capabilities of the test functions and provides test
personnel during phase 3 with the capability to store the identification
and/or pre-personalisation data and/or supplements of the Smart Card
Embedded Software in the EEPROM. The security function F.COMP
maintains the security domain for its own execution that protects it from
interference and tampering by untrusted subjects both in the Test Mode
and in the other modes. It also enforces the separation between the
security domains of subjects regarding the IC Dedicated Software and
the Smart Card Embedded Software.
F.MEM_ACC: Access control for code and data memory
F.MEM_ACC controls access of any subject (program code comprising
processor instructions) to the memories of the TOE through the Memory
Management Unit (MMU). Memory access is based on virtual addresses
that are mapped to physical addresses. The CPU always uses virtual
addresses. The Memory Management Unit performs the translation from
virtual to physical addresses and the physical addresses are provided
from the MMU to the memory interfaces to access the memories. The
access control is performed in two ways (i) Partition of the memories and
(ii) Segmentation of the memory in the User Mode.
In addition F.MEM_ACC permanently checks whether the selected
addresses are within the boundary of the physical implemented memory
range. Access violations (i.e. access to forbidden memory addresses in
User Mode) and accesses outside the boundary of the physical
implemented memory range are notified by raising an exception.
F.SFR_ACC: Access control for Special Function Registers (SFRs)
The function F.SFR_ACC controls access to the Special Function
Registers and the switch between the CPU modes.
The TSF implements the access control to the Special Function
Registers as specified in the Access Control Policy and the Security
Functional Requirements FDP_ACC.1[SFR] and FDP_ACF.1[SFR].
F.SFR_ACC used information provided by F.MEM_ACC in order to
determine access to the Special Function Registers related to hardware
components. Access to all other Special Function Registers is pre-
defined and cannot be changed.
Only two modes are available to the Smart Card Embedded Software,
the System Mode and the User Mode. The combination of F.SFR_ACC
and F.COMP ensures that the other CPU modes are not available for the
Smart Card Embedded Software, but reserved for specific purposes
BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004 Certification Report
B-9
fulfilled by the IC Dedicated Software. In addition F.MEM_ACC provides
separation of the memories and access control information.
As the Test Mode is disabled before TOE delivery, all TOE Security Functions
are applicable from TOE delivery at the end of phase 3 or 4 (depending on
when TOE delivery takes place in a specific case) to phase 7.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE‘s strength of functions is rated ‘high’ (SOF-high) for those functions,
identified in the Security Target, chapter 6.1, SOF Claim. The rating of the
strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2) (see
Chapter 9 of this report).
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE are
specified in the BSI-PP-0002-2001 [9] and mentioned in the Security Target.
Considering the Application Notes 10 and 11 of [9] there are no additional high-
level security concerns or additional new threats defined in the Security Target.
Phase 1 and the phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of phase 6 are
covered by assumptions (see below).
The development and production environment starting with phase 2 up to TOE
Delivery are covered by an organisational security policy outlining that the IC
developer / manufacturer must apply the policy “Protection during TOE
Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” so that no information is
unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE. The Policy
ensures confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its related design
information and data. Access to samples, tools and material must be restricted.
Because there is a specific security component which is not derived from
threats the developer must apply the Policy P.Add-Components (Additional
Specific Security Components) for Triple DES encryption and decryption, Area
based Memory Access Control, Memory separation for different software parts
(including IC Dedicated Software and Smart Card Embedded Software) and
Special Function Register Access Control.
Objectives are taken from the Protection Profile plus additional ones related to
the additional policy.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The Philips P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller distinguishes between
five different CPU modes: Boot Mode, Test Mode, Mifare Mode, System Mode
and User Mode.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004
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As the TOE comprises the Mifare Operating System belonging to the Mifare
Mode, this mode is disabled and is not accessible. Nevertheless the Mifare
Mode is existent and security functionality with regard to the Mifare Mode is
present in the TOE, but the TOE prevents that the Mifare Mode is activated and
the related software is executed. Available for the developer of the Smart Card
Embedded Software are the System Mode and the User Mode.
The application software being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode.
The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip manufacturing
process. At this point in time the operating system software is already stored in
the non-volatile memories of the chip and the test mode is disabled.
Thus, there are no special procedures for generation or installation that are
important for a secure use of the TOE. The further production and delivery
processes, like the integration into a smart card, personalization and the
delivery of the smart card to an end user, have to be organised in a way that
excludes all possibilities of physical manipulation of the TOE. There are no
special security measures for the start-up of the TOE besides the requirement
that the controller has to be used under the well-defined operating conditions
and that the requirements on the software have to be applied as described in
the user documentation [11] and chapter 10 of this report.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the Protection Profile BSI-PP-
0002-2001 [9], the assumptions defined in section 3.2 of the Protection Profile
are valid for the Security Target of this TOE. With respect to the life cycle
defined in the Security Target, phase 1 and the phases from TOE Delivery up to
the end of phase 6 are covered by these assumptions from the PP:
The developer of the smart card Embedded Software (phase 1) must ensure:
• the appropriate “Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Plat-Appl)” while
developing this software in phase 1. Therefore, it has to be ensured, that
the software fulfils the assumptions for a secure use of the TOE. In
particular the assumptions imply that developers are trusted to develop
software that fulfils the assumptions.
• the appropriate “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” while developing
this software in phase 1. The smart card operating system and the smart
card application software have to use security relevant user data of the
TOE (especially keys and plain text data) in a secure way. It is assumed
that the Security Policy as defined for the specific application context of
the environment does not contradict the Security Objectives of the TOE.
Only appropriate secret keys as input for the cryptographic function of the
TOE have to be used to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.
Protection during packaging, finishing and personalisation (A.Process-Card) is
assumed after TOE Delivery up to the end of phase 6, as well as during the
delivery to phase 7.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004 Certification Report
B-11
The following additional assumption is assumed in the Security Target:
• Key-dependent functions shall be implemented (if applicable) in the
smart card Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to
leakage attacks (A.Key-Function).
• The Smart Card Embedded Software must provide a function to check
initialisation data. The data is defined by the customer and injected by
the TOE Manufacturer into the non-volatile memory to provide the
possibility for TOE identification and for traceability (A.Check-Init)
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of
the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to
this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The following TOE deliverables are provided for a customer who purchases the
TOE version Philips P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller:
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of
Delivery
1 HW Philips P5CC009V0M
Secure Smart Card
Controller
(dice include reference
T023M and specific
EEPROM coding, see
below)
V0M T023M_plus.g
ds2_2004051
4 (GDS2 File)
Sawn Wafer or
embedded in a
chip card module
2 SW Test ROM Software (the
IC dedicated test
software)
46 30 Jan. 2004 Included in Test
ROM on the chip
(tmfos_46.lst)
3 SW Boot ROM Software (part
of the IC Dedicated
Support Software)
1.9 28 Jan. 2004 Included in Test
ROM on the chip
(tmfos_46.lst)
4 SW Mifare Operating System
(part of the IC Dedicated
Support Software)
1.16 30 Jan. 2004 Included in Test
ROM on the chip
(tmfos_46.lst)10
5 DOC Data Sheet, P5CC009,
SmartMX, Secure Smart
Card Controller
2.3 7 April 2004 Electronic
document [12]
10
Although the software is implemented on the chip it is deactivated and cannot be
executed
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No Type Identifier Release Date Form of
Delivery
6 DOC Instruction Set SmartMX-
Family
1.0 9 May 2003 Electronic
document [16]
7 DOC Guidance, Delivery and
Operation Manual for the
P5CC009
1.2 8 April 2004 Electronic
document [11]
8 DOC Anomaly Sheet for
P5CT072 V0M Product
Behaviour
1.2 July 2004 Electronic
document [17]
Table 5: Deliverables of the TOE Philips P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by Philips P5CC009V0M Secure
Smart Card Controller and their specific GDS-file. A so-called nameplate (on-
chip identifier) is coded in a metal mask onto the chip during production and can
be checked by the customer, too. The nameplate T023M is specific for the
SSMC (Singapore) production site as outlined in the guidance documentation
[11]. As the TOE is a configured derivate of the chip P5CT072V0M, this
nameplate identifies Version V0M of the hardware, but does not identify
specifically the TOE Philips P5CC009V0M. For identification of a specific Philips
P5CC009V0M chip, the Device Coding Bytes stored in the EEPROM can be
used (see [12, chapter 6.9.8]):
• The value 0C hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip
P5CC009
Items 2, 3 and 4 in table 5 are not delivered as single pieces, but included in the
Test ROM part of the chip. They are identified by their unique version numbers.
The delivery process from Philips to their customers (to phase 4 or phase 5 of
the life cycle) guarantees, that the customer is aware of the exact versions of
the different parts of the TOE as outlined above.
To ensure that the customer receives the evaluated version of the chip, either
• the customer collects the TOE himself at the Philips site Philips
Semiconductors GmbH, Business Line Identification, Stresemannallee
101, 22529 Hamburg – Germany (see part D, annex A of this report) as a
wafer or
• the customer collects the TOE himself at the Philips site, Philips
Semiconductors (Thailand), 303 Chaengwattana Rd., Laksi Bangkok
10210, Thailand (see part D, annex A of this report) as a module or
• the TOE is sent by Philips to the customer protected by special ordering,
secured transport and tracking measures. Additionally, a FabKey
according to the defined FabKey-procedures has to be used to support
the secure delivery and the identification of the TOE
as described [11].
TOE documentation is delivered either as hardcopy or as softcopy (encrypted)
according to defined mailing procedures.
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To ensure that the customer receives this evaluated version, the delivery pro-
cedures described in [11] have to be followed.
Defined procedures at the development and production sites guarantee that the
right versions of the Test ROM Software, Boot ROM Software and Mifare
Operating System are implemented into a specific ROM mask for a TOE IC.
3 Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functions to be used
by the smart card operating system and the smart card application thus provi-
ding an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a
symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm (DES, Triple-DES) to ensure the
confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure
authentication protocols and it will provide a random number generation of
appropriate quality.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is
also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the
confidentiality of cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed
by the TOE), protection against physical probing, malfunctions, physical
manipulations, against access for code and data memory and against abuse of
functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory
of the TOE and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of
security functions (security mechanisms and associated functions)
provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The smart card operating system and the application software stored in the
User ROM and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE. The code in the Test
ROM of the TOE (IC dedicated software) is used by the manufacturer of the
smart card to check the functionality of the chips before TOE Delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip manufacturing
process (phase 3 of the life cycle defined) or at the end of the IC packaging into
modules (phase 4 of the life cycle defined). At these specific points in time the
ROM part of the operating system software is already stored in the ROM of the
chip and the test mode is completely disabled.
The smart card applications need the security functions of the smart card
operating system based on the security features of the TOE. With respect to
security the composition of this TOE, the operating system and the smart card
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application is important. Within this composition, the security functionality is only
partly provided by the TOE and causes dependencies between the TOE
security functions and the functions provided by the operating system or the
smart card application on top. These dependencies are expressed by environ-
mental and secure usage assumptions as outlined in the user documentation.
Within this evaluation of the TOE, several aspects were specifically considered
to support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with an embedded smart
card application software (i.e. smart card operating system and application).
This was necessary as Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Line Identification is the TOE developer and manufacturer and
responsible for specific aspects of handling the embedded smart card
application software in its development and production environment. For those
aspects refer to chapter 9.2 of this report.
The full evaluation results are applicable for chips from the IC fabrication SSMC
in Singapore indicated by the nameplate (on-chip identifier) T023M.
5 Architectural Information
The Philips P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller is an integrated circuit
(IC) providing a hardware platform to a smart card operating system and Smart
Card Embedded Software. A top level block diagram including an overview of
subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target. The
complete hardware description and the complete instruction set of the Philips
P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller can be found in the Data Sheet,
P5CC009, SmartMX, Secure Smart Card Controller [12] and Instruction Set
SmartMX-Family [16].
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components
8-bit CPU, Special Function Registers, Triple-DES Co-Processor, FameXE Co-
Processor, Random Number Generator (RNG), Power Module with Security
Sensors and Filters are used. The CPU is equipped with a Memory
Management Unit and provides different CPU Modes in order to separate
different applications running on the TOE. Security measures for Physical
Protection are realised within the layout of the whole circuitry.
The Special Function Registers provide the interface to the security functions of
the TOE.
The Philips P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller provides different
levels of access control to the SFR with the different CPU Modes and additional
– configurable – access control to Special Function Registers in the least-
privileged CPU Mode, the User Mode.
The FameXE does not provide a cryptographic algorithm itself. The modular
arithmetic functions are suitable to implement different asymmetric
cryptographic algorithms.
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The TOE executes the IC Dedicated Support Software (Boot Software) during
the start up to configure and initialise the hardware. This software is executed in
the Boot Mode that is not accessible after the start up is finished.
6 Documentation
The following is provided with the product by the developer to the customer for
secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target:
• The Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual [11],
• Instruction set [16]
• The Data Sheet [12] and
• The ETR-lite [10]
• Anomaly Sheet [17]
Additional guidance as outlined in chapter 10 of this report has to be followed.
Note that the customer who buys the TOE is normally the developer of the
operating system and/or application software which will use the TOE as hard-
ware computing platform to implement the software (operating system /
application software) which will use the TOE.
The ETR-lite is intended to provide the results of the platform evaluation for the
TOE in a way that meets the requirements for a composite evaluation as
defined in AIS 36 [4].
7 IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer can be divided into the following
categories:
1. technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the
technology against the specification and to get the technology
parameters used in simulations of the circuitry;
2. tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools
for the analogue parts and for the digital parts of the TOE;
3. regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software
and for the IC Dedicated Support Software on emulator versions of the
TOE and within a software simulation of chip in special hardware;
4. characterisation and verification tests to release the TOE to production:
- used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different
operating conditions and varied process parameters
- special verification tests for Security Functions which were done with
samples of the TOE and which include also layout tests by automatic
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004
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means and optical control, in order to verify statements concerning the
layout;
5. functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its
correct functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3 or
phase 4 depending on the TOE delivery form).
The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms
as identified in the functional specification and in the high and low level designs.
Chips from IC fabrication SSMC in Singapore were used for tests.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the
library of programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator
or at the developers site. They performed independent tests to supplement,
augment and to verify the tests performed by the developer. Security features of
the TOE realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the
evaluators during layout inspections both in design data and on the final
product.
The evaluation provides evidence that the actual version of the TOE provides
the Security Functions as specified by the developer. The test results confirm
the correct implementation of the TOE Security Functions.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all Security Functions into
consideration. Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis
results and performed for the underlying mechanisms of Security Functions
using bespoke equipment and expert know-how. The penetration tests
considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks which do not
modify the TOE physically (i.e. side channel testing).
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by Philips P5CC009V0M with the nameplates T023M and
specific EEPROM coding as outlined above. The TOE can be configured as
outlined in the Security Target [6] chapter 2.2. All TSF are active and usable.
Information on how to use the TOE and its security functions by the software is
provided within the user documentation.
The Philips P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller distinguishes between
five different CPU modes: Boot Mode, Test Mode, Mifare Mode, System Mode
and User Mode.
As the TOE comprises the Mifare Operating System belonging to the Mifare
Mode, this mode is disabled and is not accessible. It was not part of this
evaluation.
As the TOE operates after delivery in System Mode or User Mode and the
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the Test Mode, the
evaluation was mainly performed in the System Mode and User Mode. For all
evaluation activities performed in Test Mode, there was a rationale why the
results are valid for the System Mode and User Mode, too.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 Evaluation of the TOE
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8], was provided by the ITSEF
T-Systems GEI GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit, according to the Common
Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [
3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body [
4, AIS 34]). For smart card IC specific
methodology the CC supporting documents
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and
(iii) ETR-lite – for Composition and
ETR-lite – for Composition: Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation:
Recommended best practice
(see [4, AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36]) and [4, AIS 31] (Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology for physical random number generators) were used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL5
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Development tools CM coverage ACM_SCP.3 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Semiformal functional specification ADV_FSP.3 PASS
Semiformal high-level design ADV_HLD.3 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 PASS
Modularity ADV_INT.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Semiformal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.2 PASS
Formal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.3 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Sufficiency of security measures ALC_DVS.2 PASS
Standardised life-cycle model ALC_LCD.2 PASS
Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.2 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: low-level design ATE_DPT.2 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA.1 PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_MSU.3 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Highly resistant AVA_VLA.4 PASS
Table 6: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• the TOE is conform to the Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, BSI-
PP-0002-2001 [9]
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
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• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of
Function:
- F.RNG (random number generator), according to AIS 31 Functionality
class P2 High,
- F.LOG (Logical Protection) contributing to the leakage attacks
especially for F.HW_DES (Triple-DES Co-processor) by SPA/DPA
countermeasures.
The scheme interpretations AIS 26 and AIS 31 (see [4]) were used.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for the TOE Security Function F.HW_DES (Triple-DES Co-
processor) used for DES and Triple-DES encryption and decryption.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
The code in the Test ROM of the TOE (IC Dedicated Test Software) is used by
the TOE manufacturer to check the chip function before TOE delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The full evaluation results are applicable for chips from the IC fabrication SSMC
in Singapore (see part D, Annex A) indicated by the nameplate (on-chip
identifier) T023M and the firmware and software versions as indicated in table
5.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product or to
chips from other production and manufacturing sites, provided the sponsor
applies for re-certification of the modified product, in accordance with the
procedural requirements, and the evaluation of the modified product does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
9.2 Additional Evaluation Results
• To support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with a specific
smart card embedded software additional evaluator actions were
performed during the TOE evaluation. The results are documented in the
ETR-lite [10] according to [4, AIS 36]. Therefore, the interface between
the smart card embedded software developer and the developer of the
TOE was examined in detail. These composition related actions
comprised the following tasks:
- Examination of the integration of the embedded software in the
configuration management system of the IC manufacturer for the TOE.
This comprises the handling of the ROM code, the related acceptance
and verification procedures with the customer and the assignment to a
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unique commercial type identifier as well as the handling of different
ROM-code masks for the same smart card IC.
- Examination of consistency of delivery and pre-personalisation
procedures.
This comprises the handling of the FabKey and pre-personalisation
data with respect to the physical, technical and organisational
measures to protect these data as well as the procedures to ensure
the correct configuration of the TOE. In addition, the production test
related to customer specific items including the integrity check of the
customer ROM-code and the personalisation process were checked.
- Examination of the separation based on the unique commercial type
identifier and the related test and delivery procedures.
- Examination that Philips Semiconductors GmbH Business Line
Identification has implemented procedures to provide a customer
product related configuration list based on the configuration list [
15]
provided for the evaluation of the TOE supplemented by the customer
specific items including ROM-mask labelling, specific development
tools for embedded software development and related customer
specific deliveries and the corresponding verification data generated
by Philips to be sent to customer. In the course of the TOE evaluation
a specific customer product related configuration list was checked.
- Examination of aspects relevant for the user guidance documentation
of the TOE to use the TOE for a product composition.
10 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
1. The operational documentation guidance [11], Data sheet [12],
Instruction set [16] and Anomaly Sheet [17] contain necessary
information about the usage of the TOE. Additionally, for secure usage of
the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the
Security Target has to be taken into account.
2. For evaluations of products or systems including the TOE as a part or
using the TOE as a platform (for example smart card operating systems
or complete smart cards), the ETR-lite for composition [10] resulting from
this evaluation is of importance and shall be given to the succeeding
evaluation according to AIS 36.
3. For the fulfilment of the Strength of Function "high" for the Random
Number Generator according to [4, AIS31] the following guidance is to be
followed in addition:
The defined online tests of the random number generator must detect all
possible defects of the random number generator that lead to a
significantly reduced quality of the random numbers. Due to physical
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defects within the random number generator the quality of the random
numbers can be reduced. The requirements are not associated with any
attack since the components of the random number generator are
sufficiently protected and controlled by the design. The attack potential
for the manipulation of the random number generator is assessed with
“High”.
In case that the physical defect exists before the start-up of the chip it is
always detected by the two test procedures described in the User
Guidance (refer to section 4.1.3 in [11]).
If the physical defect occurs during the operation of the chip a defect can
detected by the FIPS PUB 140-2 tests (refer to section 4.1.3 in [11]) if
this test method is implemented for the statistical tests by the Smart Card
Embedded Software. This is independent from the considered failure and
the internal status of the random number generator.
If the physical defect occurs during the operation, there are
circumstances where it is not detected by a "chi-squared test of
goodness" (refer to section 4.1.3 in [11]) if this test method is
implemented for the statistical tests by the Smart Card Embedded
Software. This is based on the asynchronous operation of the random
number generator and depends on the kind of failure and the internal
status of the random number generator.
The "chi-squared test of goodness" can be extended to detect all
considered defects. In addition to the result of the "chi-squared test of
goodness" it must be checked whether two or more of the possible
sixteen 4 bit tuples do not occur in the tested sequence. In other words, if
at least two of the f[i] values in the formula given in section 4.1.3 of [11]
are zero, the test fails. If this check detects at least two missing 4 bit
tuples the test must be considered as fail and a repetition is required.
The repetition of the tests is described in section 4.1.4 of [11].
11 Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment (see part D of this report).
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitised version of the
complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed.
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13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (see [1])
CPU Central Processing Unit
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MMU Memory Management Unit
OTP One Time Programmable (a certain part of the EEPROM)
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
TSS TOE Summary Specification
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver and Transmitter
BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004 Certification Report
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13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
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TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS), Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Bonn, as relevant for the TOE,
specifically
- AIS 25, Version 2, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, -
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 1.2, July
2002
- AIS 26, Version 2, 6 August 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, -
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 1.1, July
2002
- AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 for: Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology of physical random number generators
- AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international
abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungs-
schema.
- AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for
CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
- AIS 36, Version 1, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document,
ETR-lite for Composition, Version 1.1, July 2002 and
CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition: Annex A
Composite smartcard evaluation, Version 1.2 March 2002
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0231, Version 1.2, 28 April 2004,
Evaluation of Philips P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller,
Philips Semiconductors (confidential document)
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[7] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0231, Version 1.0, 18 May 2004,
Evaluation of Philips P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller,
Philips Semiconductors (sanitised public document)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Philips P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card
Controller, Version 1.1, 23 July 2004 (confidential document)
[9] Smart Card IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001,
registered at the German Certification Body under number BSI-PP-0002-
2001
[10] ETR-lite for Composition, according to AIS 36, Version 1.2, 20 July 2004
for Philips P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller (confidential
document)
[11] Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual for the P5CC009, BSI-DSZ-
CC-0231, Version 1.2, Philips Semiconductors, 8 April 2004 (confidential
document)
[12] Data Sheet, P5CC009, SmartMX, Secure Smart Card Controller,
Preliminary Specification, Philips Semiconductors, Revision 2.3, 7 April
2004 (confidential document)
[13] FIPS PUB 46-3 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS
PUBLICATION DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES) Reaffirmed 25
Oct. 1999
[14] Gesetz über Rahmenbedingungen für elektronische Signaturen und zur
Änderung weiterer Vorschriften vom 16. Mai 2001, BGBl. I, S. 876);
veröffentlicht am 21. Mai 2001
[15] Configuration List, BSI-DSZ-CC-0227, Version 1.2, 24 June 2004,
Evaluation of the Philips P5CT072V0M Secure Smart Card Controller,
Philips Semiconductors, Business Line Identification (confidential
document) (including relevant information for Philips P5CC009V0M, too)
[16] Instruction Set SmartMX-Family, Secure Smart Card Controller,
Objective Specification, Philips Semiconductors, Revision 1.0, 9 May
2003
[17] Anomaly Sheet for P5CT072 V0M Product Behaviour, Philips
Semiconductors, Revision 1.2, Date July 2004
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is
met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented
with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements
are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirements
include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements
are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements
include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets
of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
„The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in
Table 2.1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV:
Development
Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle
support
Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 2.1 -Assurance family breakdown and mapping“
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
„The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances
the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE
at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the
operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be
considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide
utility.
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance
levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically
ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The
increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a
hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e.
increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components
from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than
one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every
component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the
substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance
component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs
defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a
constituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim.
Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility
and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be
extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary“
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
„Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the
threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent
assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with
respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against
identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
„Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not
require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when
securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
„Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation
of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.“
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
„Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,
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do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the
highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
„Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering
based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be
designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that
the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous
development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
„Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a
premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional
costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
„Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely
high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.
Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security
functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
„Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may
still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its
underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security
behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The
qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
„Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by
other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.“
„Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the
TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The
developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow
the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the
evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
„Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.“
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment D-3
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Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0231-2004
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product, Philips P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller (Target of
Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0, extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance, for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC15408: 1999) and
including final interpretations for compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and
Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 6 September 2004, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.3),
• ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1),
• ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2),
fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below ((a) – (g)):
(a) Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Business Line Identification
(BU ID), Georg-Heyken-Strasse 1, 21147 Hamburg, Germany, (development
center)
(b) Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Assembly and Test Organisation Hamburg
Stresemannallee 101, 22529 Hamburg, Germany
(c) Philips Semiconductors (Thailand), 303 Chaengwattana Rd., Laksi Bangkok
10210, Thailand (assembly)
(d) Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Business Line Identification, Document Control
Office, Mikron-Weg 1, 8101 Gratkorn, Austria
(e) Systems on Silicon Manufacturing Co. Pte. Ltd. 8 (SSMC), 70 Pasir Ris Drive 1,
Singapore 519527, Singapore (semiconductor factory)
(f) Photronics Singapore Pte. Ltd., 6 Loyang Way 2, Loyang Industrial Park,
Singapore 507099, Singapore (mask shop)
(g) Photronics Semiconductors Mask Corp. (PSMC), 1F, No.2, Li-Hsin Rd., Science-
Based Industrial Park, Hsin-Chu City Taiwan R.O.C. (mask shop)
The TOE is manufactured in the IC fabrication SSMC in Singapore (see part D, Annex A)
indicated by the nameplate (on-chip identifier) T023M.
For all sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied for each site
and in accordance with the Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0231, Version 1.2, 28 April
2004, Evaluation of Philips P5CC009V0M Secure Smart Card Controller [6]. The
evaluators verified, that the threats are countered and the security objectives for the life
cycle phases 2, 3 and 4 up to delivery at the end of phase 3 or 4 as stated in the TOE
Security Target are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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