Trend Micro Virtual Mobile
Infrastructure (TMVMI), Version 6
(ASPP13) Security Target
Version 0.4
06/29/2020
Prepared for:
SK Infosec, Inc.
23, Pangyo-ro 227beon-gil, Bundang-gu,
Seongnam-si, Gyeonggi-do (13486)
Prepared By:
www.gossamersec.com
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1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION....................................................................... 4
1.1 SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE .......................................................................................... 4
1.2 TOE REFERENCE................................................................................................................ 5
1.3 TOE OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................. 5
1.4 TOE DESCRIPTION ............................................................................................................. 6
1.4.1 TOE Architecture........................................................................................................ 6
1.4.2 TOE Documentation ................................................................................................... 7
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS............................................................................................. 8
2.1 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE............................................................................................... 9
3. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................. 10
3.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ....................................... 10
4. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION ............................................................... 11
5. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS...................................................................................... 12
5.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ................................................................. 12
5.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS)................................................................................... 13
5.1.2 User data protection (FDP)...................................................................................... 15
5.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA).................................................................... 16
5.1.4 Security management (FMT) .................................................................................... 17
5.1.5 Privacy (FPR)........................................................................................................... 17
5.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT) ..................................................................................... 19
5.1.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP).................................................................................... 17
5.2 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS................................................................... 18
5.2.1 Development (ADV).................................................................................................. 18
5.2.2 Guidance documents (AGD)..................................................................................... 19
5.2.3 Life-cycle support (ALC)........................................................................................... 22
5.2.4 Tests (ATE)................................................................................................................ 23
5.2.5 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)................................................................................ 23
6. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION............................................................................. 25
6.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT................................................................................................ 25
6.2 USER DATA PROTECTION .................................................................................................. 26
6.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION........................................................................... 26
6.4 SECURITY MANAGEMENT.................................................................................................. 27
6.5 PRIVACY........................................................................................................................... 27
6.6 PROTECTION OF THE TSF.................................................................................................. 27
6.7 TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS ............................................................................................... 29
7. SECURITY RELATED PLATFORM APIS INVOKED BY TOE ............................. 30
7.1 ANDROID JAVA APIS........................................................................................................ 30
7.2 IOS OBJ-C APIS ............................................................................................................... 30
LIST OF TABLES
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Table 1 TOE Security Functional Components....................................................................... 13
Table 2 Assurance Components ................................................................................................ 18
Table 3 CAVP Certificates......................................................................................................... 25
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1. Security Target Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST
conventions, ST conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is Trend Micro Virtual
Mobile Infrastructure (TMVMI). The TOE is being evaluated as a software application.
The Security Target contains the following additional sections:
• Conformance Claims (Section 2)
• Security Objectives (Section 3)
• Extended Components Definition (Section 4)
• Security Requirements (Section 5)
• TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)
Conventions
The following conventions have been applied in this document:
• Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations
that may be applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and
refinement.
o Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations.
In the ST, iteration is indicated by a parenthetical number placed at the end of the
component. For example FDP_ACC.1(1) and FDP_ACC.1(2) indicate that the ST
includes two iterations of the FDP_ACC.1 requirement.
o Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are
indicated using bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment]). Note that
an assignment within a selection would be identified in italics and with embedded
bold brackets (e.g., [[selected-assignment]]).
o Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections
are indicated using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection]).
o Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold,
for additions, and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “… all objects …” or “… some
big things …”).
• Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special
interest, such as captions.
1.1 Security Target Reference
ST Title – Trend Micro Virtual Mobile Infrastructure (TMVMI), Version 6 (ASPP13) Security
Target
ST Version – Version 0.4
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ST Date – 06/29/2020
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Identification – Trend Micro Virtual Mobile Infrastructure (TMVMI), Version 6
TOE Developer – Trend Micro, Inc.
Evaluation Sponsor – SK Infosec, Inc.
1.3 TOE Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Trend Micro Virtual Mobile Infrastructure (TMVMI),
Version 6.
The TOE is the Virtual Mobile Infrastructure Client application for Android and iOS platforms.
The TOE is a thin client providing access to a Trend Micro Virtual Mobile Infrastructure (VMI)
server from a mobile device. The TOE was tested on the following mobile devices.
Device Name Processor Operating System
Samsung Galaxy S10 Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 (SDM855) Android 9.0
Apple iPhone 7 Apple A10 Apple iOS 13.1
The TOE runs on a Samsung Galaxy S10, Note 10, S9, Note 9, S8, and Note 8 devices running
Android 9. The TOE also runs on Apple iOS 13.1 on iPhone devices including iPhone X, 8, 7,
and 6. The same application runs on all Android devices and the same application runs on all
iPhone devices. The S10 was used for Android testing and iPhone 7 was used for iOS testing. All
other devices are claimed as equivalent.
Device Name Processor Operating System
Samsung Devices
Galaxy S10+ Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 (SDM855) Android 9.0
Galaxy S10 Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 (SDM855) Android 9.0
Galaxy Note10 Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 (SDM855) Android 9.0
Galaxy Note10+ Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 (SDM855) Android 9.0
Galaxy Note10+ 5G Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 (SDM855) Android 9.0
Galaxy S9+ Qualcomm Snapdragon 845 (SDM845) Android 9.0
Galaxy S9 Qualcomm Snapdragon 845 (SDM845) Android 9.0
Galaxy Note 9 Qualcomm Snapdragon 845 (SDM845) Android 9.0
Galaxy S8+ Qualcomm Snapdragon 835 (SDM845) Android 9.0
Galaxy S8 Qualcomm Snapdragon 835 (SDM845) Android 9.0
Galaxy Note 8 Qualcomm Snapdragon 835 (SDM845) Android 9.0
Apple Devices
iPhone XS Apple A12 Bionic iOS 13.1
iPhone XS Max Apple A12 Bionic iOS 13.1
iPhone XR Apple A12 Bionic iOS 13.1
iPhone X Apple A11 iOS 13.1
iPhone 8 Plus Apple A11 iOS 13.1
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iPhone 8 Apple A11 iOS 13.1
iPhone 7 Plus Apple A10 iOS 13.1
iPhone 7 Apple A10 iOS 13.1
iPhone 6 Plus Apple A9 iOS 13.1
iPhone 6 Apple A9 iOS 13.1
1.4 TOE Description
A VMI client is a service that hosts independent workspaces for every user. A user workspace is
based on the Android operating system, which is accessible via the VMI mobile client application
installed on an Android or iOS mobile device. Using the VMI client application, users can access
the same mobile environment that includes all their applications and data from any location,
without being tied to a single mobile device. The VMI client presents only the interface offered
by the VMI server and ensures that communication with the server utilizes secured protocols.
The TOE when executed, connects to the specified Trend Micro Virtual Mobile Infrastructure
(VMI) server, authenticating the server's certificate received while negotiating the HTTPS or TLS
session. The TOE is responsible only for protecting data-in-transit between the physical mobile
device and the VMI server.
1.4.1 TOE Architecture
The TOE is an application installed onto a physical mobile device from the Google Playstore or
Apple App Store.
1.4.1.1 Physical Boundaries
The physical boundary of the TOE is the physical perimeter of the device on which the TOE resides
1.4.1.2 Logical Boundaries
This section summarizes the security functions provided by the VMI Client:
- Cryptographic support
- User data protection
- Security management
- Privacy
- Protection of the TSF
- Trusted path/channels
1.4.1.2.1 Cryptographic support
The VMI client utilizes platform APIs to provide secure network communication using the
HTTPS. The client also uses its own cryptography to establish a trusted TLS channels to transmit
data to the VMI Server.
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1.4.1.2.2 User data protection
The VMI client informs a user of hardware and software resources the TOE accesses. It uses the
platform’s permission mechanism to get a user’s approval for access. The user initiates a secure
network connection to the VMI server using the TOE. In general, sensitive data resides on the
VMI server and not the VMI Client, although the client does store encrypted credentials.
1.4.1.2.3 Identification and authentication
The VMI client performs certificate validation checking for TLS connections. Both Android and
iOS applications support OCSP stapling when performing validity checks.
1.4.1.2.4 Security management
The VMI client does not include any predefined or default credentials, and utilize the platform
recommended storage process for configuration options.
1.4.1.2.5 Privacy
The VMI client does not collect any PII and does not transmit any PII over a network.
1.4.1.2.6 Protection of the TSF
The VMI client relies on the physical boundary of the evaluated platform as well as the Android
and iOS operating system for the protection of the TOE’s application components. All compiled
VMI client code is designed to utilize compiler provided anti-exploitation capabilities. The VMI
client application is available through the Google Playstore and the Apple store.
1.4.1.2.7 Trusted path/channels
The VMI client utilizes platform API to establish HTTPS connections to a VMI server. The client
also uses OpenSSL to establish TLS connections to a VMI server.
1.4.2 TOE Documentation
Trend Micro Virtual Mobile Infrastructure (TMVMI) User’s Guide, Version 0.3, 06/29/2020
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2. Conformance Claims
This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
• Part 2 Extended
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
• Part 3 Extended
• Package Claims:
• Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019 (ASPP13)
• Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 1 March
2019 (PKGTLS11)
• NIAP Technical Decisions
TD
Number
Summary Applied Rationale
TD0510 Obtaining random bytes for
iOS/macOS
Yes
TD0505 Clarification of revocation testing
under RFC6066
Yes
TD0499 Testing with pinned certificates Yes
TD0498 Application Software PP Security
Objectives and Requirements
Rationale
Yes
TD0495 FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 Test
Clarification
Yes
TD0486 Removal of PP-Module for VPN
Clients from allowed with list
Yes
TD0473 Support for Client or Server TOEs
in FCS_HTTPS_EXT
No SFR not included
TD0469 Modification of test activity for
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 test 4.1
No SFR not included
TD0465 Configuration Storage for .NET
Apps
No Windows platform not included
TD0445 User Modifiable File Definition Yes
TD0444 IPsec selections No SFR not included
TD0442 Updated TLS Ciphersuites for TLS
Package
Yes
TD0437 Supported Configuration
Mechanism
Yes
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TD0435 Alternative to SELinux for
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3
No Linux platform not included
TD0434 Windows Desktop Applications Test No Windows platform not included
TD0427 Reliable Time Source Yes
TD0416 Correction to FCS_RBG_EXT.1
Test Activity
Yes
2.1 Conformance Rationale
The ST conforms to the ASPP13/PKGTLS11. As explained previously, the security problem
definition, security objectives, and security requirements have been drawn from the PP.
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3. Security Objectives
The Security Problem Definition may be found in the ASPP13/PKGTLS11and this section
reproduces only the corresponding Security Objectives for operational environment for reader
convenience. The ASPP13/PKGTLS11offers additional information about the identified security
objectives, but that has not been reproduced here and the ASPP13 should be consulted if there is
interest in that material.
In general, the ASPP13/PKGTLS11has defined Security Objectives appropriate for a software
application and as such are applicable to the VMI Client TOE.
3.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This
includes the underlying operating system and any discrete execution environment provided to the
TOE.
OE.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully
negligent or hostile, and administers the software within compliance of the applied enterprise
security policy.
OE.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile,
and uses the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
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4. Extended Components Definition
All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the ASPP13/PKGTLS11. The
ASPP13/PKGTLS11defines the following extended requirements and since they are not redefined
in this ST the ASPP13/PKGTLS11should be consulted for more information in regard to those CC
extensions.
Extended SFRs:
- ASPP13:FCS_CKM_EXT.1: Cryptographic Key Generation Services
- ASPP13:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation Services
- ASPP13:FCS_STO_EXT.1: Storage of Credentials
- PKGTLS11:FCS_TLS_EXT.1:TLS Protocol
- PKGTLS11:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1:TLS Client Protocol
- ASPP13:FDP_DAR_EXT.1: Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data
- ASPP13:FDP_DEC_EXT.1: Access to Platform Resources
- ASPP13:FDP_NET_EXT.1: Network Communications
- ASPP13:FIA_X509_EXT.1: X.509 Certificate Validation
- ASPP13:FIA_X509_EXT.2: X.509 Certificate Authentication
- ASPP13:FMT_CFG_EXT.1: Secure by Default Configuration
- ASPP13:FMT_MEC_EXT.1: Supported Configuration Mechanism
- ASPP13:FPR_ANO_EXT.1: User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable
- ASPP13:FPT_AEX_EXT.1: Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
- ASPP13:FPT_API_EXT.1: Use of Supported Services and APIs
- ASPP13:FPT_IDV_EXT.1: Software Identification and Versions
- ASPP13:FPT_LIB_EXT.1: Use of Third Party Libraries
- ASPP13:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Integrity for Installation and Update
-ASPP13:FPT_TUD_EXT.2: Integrity for Installation and Update
- ASPP13:FTP_DIT_EXT.1: Protection of Data in Transit
Extended SARs:
- ALC_TSU_EXT.1: Timely Security Updates
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5. Security Requirements
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance
Requirements (SARs) that serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of
Evaluation (TOE) and to scope the evaluation effort.
The SFRs have all been drawn from the ASPP13/PKGTLS11. The refinements and operations
already performed in the ASPP13/PKGTLS11are not identified (e.g., highlighted) here, rather the
requirements have been copied from the ASPP13/PKGTLS11and any residual operations have
been completed herein. Of particular note, the ASPP13/PKGTLS11made a number of refinements
and completed some of the SFR operations defined in the Common Criteria (CC) and that PP
should be consulted to identify those changes if necessary.
The SARs are also drawn from the ASPP13/PKGTLS11which includes all the SARs for EAL 1.
However, the SARs are effectively refined since requirement-specific 'Assurance Activities' are
defined in the ASPP13/PKGTLS11that serve to ensure corresponding evaluations will yield more
practical and consistent assurance than the EAL 1 assurance requirements alone. The
ASPP13/PKGTLS11should be consulted for the assurance activity definitions.
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by VMI Client TOE.
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FCS: Cryptographic
support
ASPP13:FCS_CKM.2: Cryptographic Key Establishment
ASPP13:FCS_CKM_EXT.1: Cryptographic Key
Generation Services
ASPP13:FCS_COP.1(1): Cryptographic Operation –
Encryption/Decryption
ASPP13:FCS_COP.1(2): Cryptographic Operation –
Hashing
ASPP13:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation
Services
ASPP13:FCS_STO_EXT.1: Storage of Credentials
PKGTLS11:FCS_TLS_EXT.1:TLS Protocol
PKGTLS11:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1:TLS Client Protocol
FDP: User data protection ASPP13:FDP_DAR_EXT.1: Encryption Of Sensitive
Application Data
ASPP13:FDP_DEC_EXT.1: Access to Platform Resources
ASPP13:FDP_NET_EXT.1: Network Communications
FIA: Identification and
Authentication
ASPP13:FIA_X509_EXT.1: X.509 Certificate Validation
ASPP13:FIA_X509_EXT.2: X.509 Certificate
Authentication
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FMT: Security
management
ASPP13:FMT_CFG_EXT.1: Secure by Default
Configuration
ASPP13:FMT_MEC_EXT.1: Supported Configuration
Mechanism
ASPP13:FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management
Functions
FPR: Privacy ASPP13:FPR_ANO_EXT.1: User Consent for
Transmission of Personally Identifiable
FPT: Protection of the
TSF
ASPP13:FPT_AEX_EXT.1: Anti-Exploitation
Capabilities
ASPP13:FPT_API_EXT.1: Use of Supported Services and
APIs
ASPP13:FPT_IDV_EXT.1: Software Identification and
Versions
ASPP13:FPT_LIB_EXT.1: Use of Third Party Libraries
ASPP13:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Integrity for Installation and
Update
ASPP13:FPT_TUD_EXT.2: Integrity for Installation and
Update
FTP: Trusted
path/channels
ASPP13:FTP_DIT_EXT.1: Protection of Data in Transit
Table 1 TOE Security Functional Components
5.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS)
5.1.1.1 Cryptographic Key Establishment (ASPP13:FCS_CKM.2)
ASPP13:FCS_CKM.2.1
The application shall [implement functionality] to perform cryptographic key
establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment
method: [RSA-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST
Special Publication 800-56B, 'Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography”]].
5.1.1.2 Cryptographic Key Generation Services (ASPP13:FCS_CKM_EXT.1)
ASPP13:FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1
The application shall [generate no asymmetric cryptographic keys].
5.1.1.3 Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption (ASPP13:FCS_COP.1(1))
ASPP13:FCS_COP.1(1)
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The application shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [AES-CBC (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A)
mode] and cryptographic key sizes [128-bit].
5.1.1.4 Cryptographic Operation - Hashing (ASPP13:FCS_COP.1(2))
ASPP13:FCS_COP.1.1(2)
The application shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1] and message digest sizes [160, 256,]
bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-4.
5.1.1.5 Random Bit Generation Services (ASPP13:FCS_RBG_EXT.1)
ASPP13:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The application shall [invoke platform-provided DRBG functionality] for its
cryptographic operations.
5.1.1.6 Storage of Credentials (ASPP13:FCS_STO_EXT.1)
ASPP13:FCS_STO_EXT.1.1
The application shall [implement functionality to securely store [server account
password] according to [FCS_COP.1(1)]] to non-volatile memory.
5.1.1.7 TLS Protocol (PKGTLS11:FCS_TLS_EXT.1)
PKGTLS11:FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1
The product shall implement [TLS as a client].
5.1.1.8 TLS Client Protocol (PKGTLS11:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1)
PKGTLS11:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1
The product shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and [no earlier TLS versions]
as a client that supports the cipher suites
[TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246]
and also supports functionality for [session renegotiation] (TD0442 applied)
PKGTLS11:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2
The product shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference
identifier according to RFC 6125.
PKGTLS11:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3
The product shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid
[with no exceptions]
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5.1.2 User data protection (FDP)
5.1.2.1 Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data (ASPP13:FDP_DAR_EXT.1)
ASPP13:FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1
The application shall [protect sensitive data in accordance with
FCS_STO_EXT.1] in non-volatile memory.
5.1.2.2 Access to Platform Resources (ASPP13:FDP_DEC_EXT.1)
ASPP13:FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1
The application shall restrict its access to [
iOS:
• Background operation
• Camera
• Location
• Microphone
• Photo library
• Notifications
• Bluetooth
Android:
• Access network state
• Access WIFI state
• Bluetooth
• Change WIFI state
• Internet
• Request install packages
• Use fingerprint
• Vibrate
• Wake lock
• Foreground service
• Access coarse location
• Access fine location
• Camera
• Record audio
].
ASPP13:FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2
The application shall restrict its access to [no sensitive information repositories].
5.1.2.3 Network Communications (ASPP13:FDP_NET_EXT.1)
ASPP13:FDP_NET_EXT.1.1
The application shall restrict network communication to [
user-initiated communication for [connecting to a VMI server],
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respond to [push notifications from Apple’s APNs server sent from VMI server
(on iOS clients)]
].
5.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)
5.1.3.1 X.509 Certificate Validation (ASPP13:FIA_X509_EXT.1)
ASPP13:FIA_X509_EXT.1.1
The application shall [implement functionality] to validate certificates in
accordance with the following rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
• The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the
basicConstraints extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA
certificates.
• The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [OCSP
TLS Multi-Certificate Status Request Extension (i.e.,OCSP Multi-stapling) as
specified in RFC 6066]. (TD0505 applied)
• The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the
following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity
verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication
purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage
field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication
purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage
field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall
have the Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in
the extendedKeyUsage field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP
Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration
Authority (RA) purpose (id-kpcmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
ASPP13:FIA_X509_EXT.1.2
The application shall treat a certificate as a CA certificate only if the
basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
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5.1.3.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication (ASPP13:FIA_X509_EXT.2)
ASPP13:FIA_X509_EXT.2.1
The application shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support
authentication for [HTTPS,TLS] (TD0444 applied)
ASPP13:FIA_X509_EXT.2.2
When the application cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a
certificate, the application shall [not accept the certificate].
5.1.4 Security management (FMT)
5.1.4.1 Secure by Default Configuration (ASPP13:FMT_CFG_EXT.1)
ASPP13:FMT_CFG_EXT.1.1
The application shall provide only enough functionality to set new credentials
when configured with default credentials or no credentials.
ASPP13:FMT_CFG_EXT.1.2
The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect
the application's binaries and data files from modification by normal unprivileged
user.
5.1.4.2 Supported Configuration Mechanism (ASPP13:FMT_MEC_EXT.1)
ASPP13:FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1
The application shall [invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform
vendor for storing and setting configuration options] (TD0437 applied)
5.1.4.3 Specification of Management Functions (ASPP13:FMT_SMF.1)
ASPP13:FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [
Specify the network address of a VMI server,
Set the remember password option].
5.1.5 Privacy (FPR)
5.1.5.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable (ASPP13:FPR_ANO_EXT.1)
ASPP13:FPR_ANO_EXT.1.1
The application shall [not transmit PII over a network].
5.1.6 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
5.1.6.1 Protection of Data in Transit (ASPP13:FTP_DIT_EXT.1)
ASPP13:FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
• encrypt all transmitted [data] with [TLS as defined in the TLS package]
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• invoke platform-provided functionality to encrypt all transmitted data
with [HTTPS]
] between itself and another trusted IT product. (TD0444 applied)
5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The SARs for the TOE are the components as specified in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. Note
that the SARs have effectively been refined with the assurance activities explicitly defined in
association with both the SFRs and SARs.
Requirement Class Requirement Component
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1: Basic Functional Specification
AGD: Guidance
documents
AGD_OPE.1: Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative Procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.1: Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1: TOE CM Coverage
ALC_TSU_EXT.1: Timely Security Updates
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1: Independent Testing - Conformance
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1: Vulnerability Survey
Table 2 Assurance Components
5.2.1 Development (ADV)
5.2.1.1 Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)
ADV_FSP.1.1d
The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.2d
The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the
SFRs.
ADV_FSP.1.1c
The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each
SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.2c
The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each
SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.3c
The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization
of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.
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ADV_FSP.1.4c
The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional
specification.
ADV_FSP.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.1.2e
The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and
complete instantiation of the SFRs.
5.2.2 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.2.2.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities (ASPP13:FPT_AEX_EXT.1)
ASPP13:FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1
The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for
[no exceptions].
ASPP13:FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2
The application shall [not allocate any memory region with both write and
execute permissions].
ASPP13:FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3
The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the
platform vendor.
ASPP13:FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4
The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain
executable files unless explicitly directed by the user to do so.
ASPP13:FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5
The application shall be built with stack-based buffer overflow protection
enabled.
5.2.2.2 Use of Supported Services and APIs (ASPP13:FPT_API_EXT.1)
ASPP13:FPT_API_EXT.1.1
The application shall use only documented platform APIs.
5.2.2.3 Software Identification and Versions (ASPP13:FPT_IDV_EXT.1)
ASPP13:FPT_IDV_EXT.1.1
The application shall be versioned with [other version information]]
5.2.2.4 Use of Third Party Libraries (ASPP13:FPT_LIB_EXT.1)
ASPP13:FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1
The application shall be packaged with only [
iOS:
openSSL (Toolkit for TLS protocol)
AFNetworking (used for HTTPS request)
ASIHTTPRequest (used for HTTP request)
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Libegal (render remote user interface)
Libjpeg (image processing)
LibOpenGLRender (render remote user interface)
FMDB (sqlite support)
G726 (decode audio stream)
EGOImageLoading (Image caching)
MBProgressHUD (Client user interface)
SFHFKeychainUtils (System keychain support)
Reachability (Network detection)
SBJson (deserialization and serialization)
SPLockScreen (Client user interface)
TheSidebarController (Client user interface)
JSBadgeView (Client user interface)
Android:
Skia（render remote user interface）
openSSL (Toolkit for TLS protocol)
x264-152 （To encode video streams）
ffmpeg（To decode video and audio streams）
LibOpenGLRender (render remote user interface)
com.google.code.gson (deserialization and serialization)
org.samba.jcifs (For cryptography support)
fr.avianey.com.viewpagerindicator (Client user interface)
com.github.anzaizai:EasySwipeMenuLayout (Client user interface)
].
5.2.2.5 Integrity for Installation and Update (ASPP13:FPT_TUD_EXT.1)
ASPP13:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
The application shall [leverage the platform] to check for updates and patches to
the application software.
ASPP13:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The application shall [leverage the platform] to query the current version of the
application software.
ASPP13:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own binary
code.
ASPP13:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4
The application installation package and its updates shall be digitally signed such
that its platform can cryptographically verify them prior to installation
ASPP13:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5
The application is distributed [as an additional software package to the platform
OS] .
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5.2.2.6 Integrity for Installation and Update (ASPP13:FPT_TUD_EXT.2)
ASPP13:FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1
The application shall be distributed using the format of the platform-supported
package manager.
ASPP13:FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2
The application shall be packaged such that its removal results in the deletion of
all traces of the application, with the exception of configuration settings, output
files, and audit/log events.
5.2.3 Guidance documents (AGD)
5.2.3.1 Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
AGD_OPE.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE, including its preparative procedures.
AGD_OPE.1.1c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-
accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure
processing environment, including appropriate warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the
available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available
functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of
the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4c
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type
of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be
performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the
control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5c
The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the
TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), their
consequences, and implications for maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6c
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security
measures to be followed in order to fulfill the security objectives for the
operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7c
The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
AGD_OPE.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
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5.2.3.2 Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
AGD_PRE.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE, including its preparative procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.1c
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery
procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2c
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational
environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational
environment as described in the ST.
AGD_PRE.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2e
The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can
be prepared securely for operation.
5.2.4 Life-cycle support (ALC)
5.2.4.1 Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
ALC_CMC.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ALC_CMC.1.1c
The application shall be labelled with a unique reference.
ALC_CMC.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.4.2 TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
ALC_CMS.1.1d
The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how timely security
updates are made to the TOE. Application developers must support updates to
their products for purposes of fixing security vulnerabilities.
ALC_CMS.1.1c
The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the
evaluation evidence required by the SARs.
ALC_CMS.1.2c
The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
ALC_CMS.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
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5.2.4.3 Timely Security Updates (ALC_TSU_EXT.1)
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1d
The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how timely security
updates are made to the TOE. Note: Application developers must support updates
to their products for purposes of fixing security vulnerabilities.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.2d
The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how users are notified
when updates change security properties or the configuration of the product.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1c
The description shall include the process for creating and deploying security
updates for the TOE software.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.2c
The description shall express the time window as the length of time, in days,
between public disclosure of a vulnerability and the public availability of security
updates to the TOE.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.3c
The description shall include the mechanisms publicly available for reporting
security issues pertaining to the TOE.
Note: The reporting mechanism could include web sites, email addresses, as well as a means to
protect the sensitive nature of the report (e.g., public keys that could be used to
encrypt the details of a proof-of-concept exploit).
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.5 Tests (ATE)
5.2.5.1 Independent Testing - Conformance (ATE_IND.1)
ATE_IND.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
ATE_IND.1.1c
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.1.2e
The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as
specified.
5.2.6 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)
5.2.6.1 Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)
AVA_VAN.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
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AVA_VAN.1.1c
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
AVA_VAN.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements
for content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.1.2e
The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.1.3e
The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential
vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an
attacker possessing Basic attack potential.
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6. TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the security functions:
- Cryptographic support
- User data protection
- Security management
- Privacy
- Protection of the TSF
- Trusted path/channels
6.1 Cryptographic support
ASPP13:FCS_CKM.2
The TOE supports RSA key establishment (key size 2048) as part of HTLS. The TOE acts as a
client for TLS (RSA) when communicating with the VMI Server.
ASPP13:FCS_CKM_EXT.1
The TOE does not generate asymmetric cryptographic keys. The TOE does use RSA keys as part
of RSA key establishment when making TLS connections. Key generation is not required as the
ASPP13 notes that if the TOE acts as a receiver in the RSA key establishment scheme, the TOE
does not need to implement RSA key generation.
ASPP13:FCS_COP.1(1)(2)
The TOE provides cryptographic functions using its internal OpenSSL library. The AES
operations are used in HTTPS/TLS as well as password storage. The hash function is used as part
of HTTPS/TLS cipher negotiation.
The TOE has the following Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) certificates.
Functions Requirement Cert #
Encryption/Decryption
AES CBC (128 bits) ASPP13:FCS_COP.1(1)/Encryption/Decryption 1598, 1599
Cryptographic hashing
SHA-1 (digest sizes 160) ASPP13:FCS_COP.1(2)/Hashing 1598, 1599
Table 3 CAVP Certificates
ASPP13:FCS_RBG_EXT.1
The TOE uses random data as part of its HTTPS/TLS connection and this random data is obtained
from an approved DRBG provided by the platform. The TOE uses the javax.crypto.KeyGenerator
class on Android and /dev/random directly on iOS when invoking the DRBG.
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ASPP13:FCS_STO_EXT.1
The client implements functionality securely store server and account information in a local
database. For the VMI server, the TOE stores the server address, port, username and password.
The stored password is encrypted with AES128 CBC mode according to FCS_COP.1(1).
PKGTLS11:FCS_TLS_EXT.1/ PKGTLS11:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
The TOE communicates with the VMI Server using HTTPS/TLS. The HTTPS portion of the
connection is implemented by the platform. The TOE supports protected communication channels
using TLS v1.2 (RFC 5246) secure communication protocols. The TOE supports use of the
following ciphersuite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.
The following reference identifiers are supported - Subject Alternate Name (SAN) (i.e., DNS or
IP Address). Wildcards are supported in certificates and certificate pinning is not supported. If the
server certificate is invalid, then a connection is not made.
6.2 User data protection
ASPP13:FDP_DAR_EXT.1
The only sensitive data in the TOE is the server password and that is protected as described in
FCS_STO_EXT.1.
ASPP13:FDP_DEC_EXT.1
The TOE can access the physical resources on the mobile device. For an Android device, the TOE
can access Location services, Camera, Phone, Wake lock, Microphone, Bluetooth, Network
Access, Audio Settings, and Vibration. For an iOS device, the TOE can access location services,
camera, photos, microphone, notifications, Bluetooth, and cellular data. However, the TOE cannot
access any of the logical data repositories.
ASPP13:FDP_NET_EXT.1
The TOE allows network communication to be initiated by a user in order to connect to a VMI
server. The VMI client use VMI Server-initiated network communications to check for
notifications and display to user (on iOS).
6.3 Identification and Authentication
ASPP13:FIA_X509_EXT.1/2
The TOE performs certificate validation checking for TLS connections. The TOE comes pre-
loaded with a certificate. The following fields are verified as appropriate: SAN checks, key
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usages, chain validation, and lastly expiration status. Wildcards are not allowed in certificates.
Both Android and iOS applications support OCSP stapling when performing validity checks. Both
applications do not accept certificates as valid when revocation status cannot be determined.
6.4 Security management
ASPP13:FMT_CFG_EXT.1
The VMI client does not include any predefined or default credentials.
ASPP13:FMT_MEC_EXT.1
The evaluated Android platform on which the TOE executes automatically uses
/data/data/package/shared_prefs/ to store configuration options and settings. For an iOS platform,
all settings are stored in the iOS the user defaults system.
ASPP13:FMT_SMF.1
The TOE provides the ability to specify the network address of a VMI server. The VMI Client can
enable the Remember Password setting for each account. The VMI Client Remember Password
setting can also be disabled by policies received from the server.
6.5 Privacy
ASPP13:FPR_ANO_EXT.1
The VMI client does not collect any PII and does not intentionally transmit any PII over a network.
Users may choose to transmit any data over an established connection to the VMI server, but it is
not specifically identifiable as PII.
6.6 Protection of the TSF
ASPP13:FPT_AEX_EXT.1
Memory mapping and permissions on memory regions are not functions applicable to a Java script
application. However, some 3rd party libraries are written in a language other than Java and thus
are subject to the requirement for Anti-Exploitation Capabilities. However, none of the 3rd party
libraries used by the TOE request memory mapping at explicit addresses, and none allocate
memory for both write and execute permission.
Android's application management requires application updates to be signed with an Android key,
thus allowing the secure updates of its applications. The Android OS Linux kernel is capable of
ASLR (address space layout randomization), ensuring that no application uses the same address
layout on two different devices.
The TOE libraries are also compiled with the '-fstack-protector-all –fno-exceptions' flags in order
to enable ASLR and stack-based buffer over flow protections. On iOS the ASLR feature (-pie) is
not set by a compiler flag, because it is on by default on the C-language compiler and this setting
is required by the Apple App store.
The TOE produces such pieces of executable code in runtime and are available in-memory only
for the running instance of the application. No piece of user-initiated JIT executable code is ever
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stored on disk. Also, after the Javascript engine has finished producing this JIT code it is turned
into read-only executable memory, limiting the exposure of write-and-execute memory areas.
ASPP13:FPT_API_EXT.1
The TOE uses the platform provided APIs for random number operations and HTTPS connections.
Refer to the Section 7 for a full list of APIs used by the TOE.
ASPP13:FPT_IDV_EXT.1
The platform user interface provides a method to query the current version of many components,
including the TOE software. The TOE software version can be accessed on the Settings display in
both devices. It is showed in format of “6.0.xxxx”, the “6.0” is the major version, the xxxx is the
build number.
ASPP13:FPT_LIB_EXT.1
The TOE uses the following third-party libraries:
iOS:
• openSSL (Toolkit for TLS protocol)
• AFNetworking (used for HTTPS request)
• ASIHTTPRequest (used for HTTP request)
• Libegal (render remote user interface)
• Libjpeg (image processing)
• LibOpenGLRender (render remote user interface)
• FMDB (sqlite support)
• G726 (decode audio stream)
• EGOImageLoading (Image caching)
• MBProgressHUD (Client user interface)
• SFHFKeychainUtils (System keychain support)
• Reachability (Network detection)
• SBJson (deserialization and serialization)
• SPLockScreen (Client user interface)
• TheSidebarController (Client user interface)
• JSBadgeView (Client user interface)
Android:
• Skia（render remote user interface）
• openSSL (Toolkit for TLS protocol)
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• x264-152 （To encode video streams）
• ffmpeg（To decode video and audio streams）
• com.google.code.gson (deserialization and serialization)
• org.samba.jcifs (For cryptography support)
• fr.avianey.com.viewpagerindicator (Client user interface)
• com.github.anzaizai:EasySwipeMenuLayout (Client user interface)
ASPP13:FPT_TUD_EXT.1/ASPP13:FPT_TUD_EXT.2
The TOE (VIM client) application is available through the Google Playstore and the Apple store.
The platform will be providing all required capabilities for trusted updates for store version.
TrendMicro will notify customer of updates using each customer’s preferred communication
mechanism. Bug reporting is available to users as described in ASPP13:ALC_TSU_EXT.1.
ASPP13:ALC_TSU_EXT.1
Trend Micro accepts bug reports (including reports for security vulnerabilities) through email
(mobilelab@trendmicro.com) and web (https://www.trendmicro.com) support channels. Trend
Micro reviews all bug reports when making product changes to resolve issues associated with the
TOE. Trend Micro makes updates and code patches to resolve issues as quickly as possible, and
makes updates available to customers. TOE updates are distributed through the Apple App Store
and Google Play. For maximum compatibility, Trend Micro recommends customers use the iOS
and Android update mechanisms to keep Trend Micro VMI client up-to-date.
6.7 Trusted path/channels
ASPP13:FTP_DIT_EXT.1
The TOE utilizes platform API to establish HTTPS to a VMI server. The TOE utilizes its internal
OpenSSL to establish TLS1.2 connections to a VMI server.
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7. Security Related Platform APIs Invoked by TOE
This section identifies the Platform APIs that are invoked by the TOE which utilize security
functions provided by the platform.
7.1 Android Java APIs
android.net.http.X509TrustManagerExtensions
android.security.KeyChain
java.security.KeyStore
java.security.KeyStoreException
java.security.MessageDigest
java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException
java.security.cert.Certificate
java.security.cert.CertificateException
java.security.cert.CertificateExpiredException
java.security.cert.CertificateNotYetValidException
java.security.cert.X509Certificate
javax.net.ssl.TrustManager
javax.net.ssl.TrustManagerFactory
javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager
javax.crypto.Cipher;
javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec
javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec
7.2 iOS Obj-C APIs
NSURLProtocol
NSURLRequest
NSURLConnection
[NSURLConnection willSendRequestForAuthenticationChallenge]
[NSURLConnection willSendRequest]
[NSURLConnection didFailWithError]
CCCrypt