TrustCB B.V.
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nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
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TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
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under number 858360275.
Version
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Certification Report
Cyberark Privileged Access Manager – Linux Components
including PSMP v14.0.0.14
Sponsor and developer: CyberArk Software Ltd.
9 Hapsagot St. Park Ofer 2, P.O. Box 3143
Petach-Tikva 4951040
Israel
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2400011-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2400011-01
Author(s): Brian Smithson
Date: 03 July 2024
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.2.1 Cryptographic Support 6
2.2.2 User Data Protection 6
2.2.3 Identification and Authentication 6
2.2.4 Security Management 6
2.2.5 Privacy 6
2.2.6 Protection of the TSF 6
2.2.7 Trusted Path 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 10
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 12
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
Cyberark Privileged Access Manager – Linux Components including PSMP v14.0.0.14. The developer
of the Cyberark Privileged Access Manager – Linux Components including PSMP v14.0.0.14 is
CyberArk Software Ltd. located in Petach-Tikva, Israel and they also act as the sponsor of the
evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when
judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a software application that runs on the Linux Operating System (OS), and it is a part of the
CyberArk Privileged Access Manager (PAM) Solution suite. The TOE is composed of the PAM
component PSMP, which provides the functionality to establish SSH connection to remote devices. In
its evaluated configuration, the TOE is a part of CyberArk’s PAM Solution. PSMP is installed on a
single instance of Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 8. RHEL contains the required OpenSSL and
OpenSSH Server packages that are required to secure communications with clients. PSMP contains
the required OpenSSH Client package that is installed on the RHEL machine for communicating with
remote targets.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 03-07-2024 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure
has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in
the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Cyberark Privileged Access Manager – Linux
Components including PSMP v14.0.0.14, the security requirements, and the level of confidence
(evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements.
Consumers of the Cyberark Privileged Access Manager – Linux Components including PSMP
v14.0.0.14 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and
to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification
report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the assurance requirements listed in section 2.9 for the evaluated
security functionality, and conforms to the [PP_APP], [PKG_TLS], and [PKG_SSH].
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Cyberark Privileged Access Manager – Linux
Components including PSMP v14.0.0.14 from CyberArk Software Ltd. located in Petach-Tikva, Israel.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Software
Cyberark Privileged Access Manager – Linux Components
including PSMP v14.0.0.14
PSMP
v14.0.0.14
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the Cyberark
Privileged Access Manager – Linux Components including PSMP v14.0.0.14. For details, see 2.5 of
this document.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE provides the following security functions:
2.2.1 Cryptographic Support
The TOE uses a CAVP-validated cryptographic algorithm provided by its OpenSSL FIPS Object
Module with the CyberArk library. The library is used to support the establishment of trusted channels
to protect data in transit. In the evaluated configuration, the TOE’s cryptographic library is used by the
OpenSSH Client to remote targets and the TLS client connection to the Digital Vault Server.
2.2.2 User Data Protection
The TOE stores sensitive information in the form of encrypted passwords in non-volatile memory. The
TOE limits its access to only network connectivity when accessing the platform’s hardware resources.
The network connection is used for communications from the TOE to the Digital Vault Server, the TOE
to the target devices, and the user to the TOE. The TOE also accesses the Digital Vault Server’s
sensitive information repository (Safes) when it needs to authenticate users or request root
credentials.
2.2.3 Identification and Authentication
To validate the Digital Vault Server’s certificate during the TLS handshake, the TOE implements
functionality to validate X.509 certificates. The TOE uses a CRL to check certificate revocation status
and does not establish a connection to the Digital Vault Server when the CRL is unavailable.
2.2.4 Security Management
The TOE is configured with default file permissions already in place and does not provide default
credentials for user authentication. The TOE relies on the platform for storing and setting configuration
options within its config files. Administrators are able to view the status of the TOE in addition to being
able to start, stop, and restart it.
2.2.5 Privacy
The TOE does not store or transmit any Personally Identifiable Identification (PII).
2.2.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against exploitation by implementing address space layout randomization (ASLR)
except for vesical and not allocating memory with both writing and execution. The TOE is also
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compatible with SELinux and is compiled with stack-based buffer overflow protection. It also stores
user-modifiable files to directories that do not contain executable files. The TOE uses standard
platform APIs and includes only the third-party libraries that it needs to perform its functionality. The
TOE version can be checked using commands provided by the platform. Checking for updates to the
TOE is reliant on the platform’s functionally. Any update downloaded for the TOE must be installed
using the platform’s package manager. An administrator will install a public key from CyberArk that is
used by the package manager to verify the integrity of any updates to the TOE.
2.2.7 Trusted Path
The TOE provides a trusted channel between itself and target devices over SSH using OpenSSH
Client. The SSH software used by the TOE follows the Extended Package for Secure Shell. A trusted
TLS channel is used between itself and the Digital Vault Server.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 3.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product
2.4 Architectural Information
Below is a logical diagram of the TOE in its operational environment:
A user connects to PSMP by providing a target device, target user, Vault user, and Vault password,
which are then relayed to the Digital Vault Server for verification. Once the user is verified, PSMP
retrieves the target user’s credentials to connect the user to the target device. While a user is
connected to a target device and is performing activities in the privileged session, PSMP actively
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records all the activities and uploads them to the Digital Vault Server. PSMP is used to establish SSH
connection to a remote target. PSMP separates the users from remote targets and stores the remote
target’s password in the Digital Vault. When a user connects to a remote target, PSMP retrieves the
remote target’s password from the Digital Vault using TLS through port 443, so PSMP enables
connections to privileged devices without having to divulge the passwords to the user. PSMP logs
user’s activities that are performed in the privileged session and uploads the logs to the Digital Vault
Server, where they are accessed by authorized users.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
Privileged Access Manager – Linux
Components Common Criteria Guide
V1.6, May 2024
PAM Self-Hosted v14.0 A8474D5E4B6532ED3402D38B46F7DB15F
650CA75EBD0372BB891F3ECDC7089CE,
25-Jan-2024
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
Since the TOE conforms to [PP_APP] which requires exact conformance, all of the evaluator-defined
tests are taken directly from [PP_APP], [PKG_TLS], and [PKG_SSH]. The evaluator performed all the
tests on the TOE’s version.
Some special crypto tests are performed on a special crypto library build. It is verified the special
crypto build and the crypto library used in the TOE software is equivalent.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The vulnerability assessment is performed following the guideline provided in [PP_APP], based on the
following hypotheses:
• Type 1: Public – Vulnerability based
• Type 2: Tool Generated
• Type 3: Virus scanner
The evaluator performed all the tests (independent and penetration tests) in the period 17th March
2024 until 26th March 2024, with about 1 man-week (40 man-hour) in total for testing and reporting.
During test campaign, 100% of the total time was spent on software (logical) attacks.
Penetration tests were created based on the vulnerabilities that are applicable to an attacker
possessing a Basic attack potential and according to [PP_APP] work units of AVA_VAN.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found.
2.6.3 Test configuration
Tests were executed as shown in the figure, below:
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2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There is no reuse of evaluation results in this certification.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Cyberark Privileged Access Manager –
Linux Components including PSMP v14.0.0.14. Users must follow the guidance documents listed in
section 2.5 of this document.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Cyberark Privileged Access
Manager – Linux Components including PSMP v14.0.0.14, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3
extended, and to meet the requirements of ASE_INT.1, ASE_CCL.1, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_OBJ.1,
ASE_ECD.1, ASE.REQ.1, ASE.TSS.1, ADV_FSP.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ALC_CMC.1,
ALC_CMS.1, ALC_TSU_EXT.1, ATE_IND.1, and AVA_VAN.1. This implies that the product satisfies
the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims exact conformance to the Protection Profile [PP_APP], and to the
functional packages [PKG_TLS], and [PKG_SSH]. All applicable NIAP Technical Decisions issued
before 2024-06-01 have been addressed.
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2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in 2.5 of this document contains necessary information about the usage
of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures
against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the
hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart
from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning
the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none, which are out of scope as there are no security claims relating to these.
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3 Security Target
The CyberArk Privileged Access Manager – Linux Components including Privileged Session Manager
SSH (PSMP) v14.0 Security Target, (no doc ID), v1.9, 2024-06-13, [ST], is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
DVS Digital Vault Server
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PAM Privileged Access Manager
PP Protection Profile
PSM Privileged Session Manager
PSMP Privileged Session Manager Proxy
SSH Secure Shell
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] CyberArk Privileged Access Manager Components v14.0 – Linux Component
ETR, 24-RPT-356, v4.0, 2024-06-21
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[PKG_SSH] NIAP Functional Package for Secure Shell, v1.0, 2021-05-13
[PKG_TLS] NIAP Functional Package for Transport Layer Security, v1.1, 2019-03-01
[PP_APP] NIAP Protection Profile for Application Software, v1.4 (PP_APP), 2021-10-07
[ST] CyberArk Privileged Access Manager – Linux Components including Privileged
Session Manager SSH (PSMP) v14.0 Security Target, (no doc ID), v1.9, 2024-
06-13
(This is the end of this report.)