Certification Report
EAL 4+ Evaluation of Intel® SOA Expressway v2.7.0.4
and Intel® SOA Expressway v2.7.0.4 for Healthcare
Issued by:
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Certification Body
Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme
© Government of Canada, Communications Security Establishment Canada, 2011
Documrnt number: 383-4-121-CR
Version: 1.0
Date: 30 September 2011
Pagination: i to iii, 1 to 9
CCS Certification Report Intel®
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DISCLAIMER
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its
associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility – established
under the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) – using
the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 3, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3. This certification report, and its associated certificate,
apply only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the CCS, and the
conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence
adduced. This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Communications Security Establishment Canada, or any other organization that
recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the
IT product by the Communications Security Establishment Canada, or any other organization
that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed
or implied.
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FOREWORD
The Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) provides a
third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology
(IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria
Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the CCS Certification Body, which is
managed by the Communications Security Establishment Canada.
A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the CCS Certification Body to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025:2005, General requirements for the
Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories. Accreditation is performed under the
Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories - Canada (PALCAN), administered by the
Standards Council of Canada.
The CCEF that carried out this evaluation is EWA-Canada located in Ottawa, Ontario.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the CCS Certification Body asserts that the
product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A
security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the
evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security
target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any
assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security
requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the
product satisfies the security requirements.
This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated 30
September 2011, and the security target identified in Section 4 of this report.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted on the
CCS Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of
the Common Criteria Project).
This certification report makes reference to the following trademarked or registered
trademarks:
 Intel is a registered trademark of Intel Corporation in the United States and other
countries;
 Linux is a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds; and
 Red Hat is a registered trademark of Red Hat, Inc.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Disclaimer....................................................................................................................................... i
Foreword........................................................................................................................................ ii
Executive Summary...................................................................................................................... 1
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ................................................................................ 2
2 TOE Description ................................................................................................................... 2
3 Evaluated Security Functionality........................................................................................ 2
4 Security Target...................................................................................................................... 2
5 Common Criteria Conformance.......................................................................................... 3
6 Security Policies .................................................................................................................... 3
7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................................. 3
7.1 SECURE USAGE ASSUMPTIONS................................................................................... 3
7.2 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................... 4
7.3 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE.......................................................................................... 4
8 Evaluated Configuration...................................................................................................... 4
9 Documentation ...................................................................................................................... 4
10 Evaluation Analysis Activities ............................................................................................. 5
11 ITS Product Testing.............................................................................................................. 6
11.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS .......................................................................... 6
11.2 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING ........................................................................ 6
11.3 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING....................................................................... 7
11.4 CONDUCT OF TESTING ............................................................................................... 8
11.5 TESTING RESULTS...................................................................................................... 8
12 Results of the Evaluation...................................................................................................... 8
13 Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations ........................................... 8
14 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations..................................................................... 8
15 References.............................................................................................................................. 9
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Executive Summary
The Intel® SOA Expressway v2.7.0.4 and Intel® SOA Expressway v2.7.0.4 for Healthcare
(hereafter referred to as the SOAE ), from Intel, is the Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 4 augmented evaluation.
The SOAE is a security gateway designed to secure the enterprise Service-Oriented
Architecture (SOA). The SOAE provides trust enablement and threat prevention by
providing a secure gateway between external service providers and internal services. The
SOAE links web services clients to web services servers and web integration servers using
administrator defined security rulesets.
EWA-Canada is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on
31 August 2011 and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common
Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS).
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions
made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the SOAE , the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their
operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification
report.
The results documented in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)1
for this product provide
sufficient evidence that it meets the EAL 4 Augmented assurance requirements for the
evaluated security functionality. The evaluation was conducted using the Common
Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3, for
conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 3. The following augmentation is claimed:
 ALC_FLR.1 - Basic Flaw Remediation
SOAE is conformant with the Application-Level Firewall Protection Profile for Basic
Robustness Environments, Version 1.1, July 25, 2007.
Communications Security Establishment Canada, as the CCS Certification Body, declares
that the SOAE v2.7.0.4 evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the
Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the CCS
Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
Common Criteria Project).
1
The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and
may not be releasable for public review.
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1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 4 augmented
evaluation is Intel® SOA Expressway v2.7.0.4 and Intel® SOA Expressway v2.7.0.4 for
Healthcare (hereafter referred to as SOAE), from Intel.
2 TOE Description
The SOAE is a security gateway designed to secure the enterprise Service-Oriented
Architecture (SOA). The SOAE provides trust enablement and threat prevention by
providing a secure gateway between external service providers and internal services. The
SOAE links web services clients to web services servers and web integration servers using
administrator defined security rulesets.
3 Evaluated Security Functionality
The complete list of evaluated security functionality for the SOAE is identified in Section 6
of the Security Target (ST).
The following cryptographic modules were evaluated to the FIPS 140-2 standard:
Cryptographic Module Certificate #
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 OpenSSH-Server 1384
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 OpenSSH Client 1385
Nitrol XL 1600-NFBE HSM Family 1369
The following Government of Canada approved cryptographic algorithms were evaluated for
correct implementation in SOAE:
Cryptographic Algorithm Standard Certificate #
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) FIPS 197 1160,1161,1162,1265,1266
4 Security Target
The ST associated with this Certification Report is identified by the following nomenclature:
Title: Intel® SOA Expressway v2.7.0.4 and Intel® SOA Expressway
v2.7.0.4
for Healthcare Security Target
Version: 1.9
Date: August 30 2011
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5 Common Criteria Conformance
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3, for conformance to the Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3.
The SOAE is:
a. Common Criteria Part 2 conformant, with security functional requirements based on
functional components in Part 2;
b. Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, with security assurance requirements based on
assurance components in Part 3;
c. Common Criteria EAL 4 Augmented, containing all the security assurance requirements
in the EAL 4 package, as well as the following: ALC_FLR.1-Basic Flaw Remediation;
and
d. SOAE is conformant with the Application-Level Firewall Protection Profile for Basic
Robustness Environments, Version 1.1, July 25, 2007.
6 Security Policies
SOAE implements three security policies. The Operation Management policy controls user
access to the Operation Management process. The Unauthenticated Web Services policy
provides a mechanism to configure rulesets to classify unauthenticated incoming HTTP
messages. The Authenticated Web Services policy provides a mechanism to configure
rulesets to classify authenticated incoming HTTP messages. Details of these security policies
can be found in Section 1.5.5 of the ST.
In addition, the SOAE implements policies pertaining to Security Audit, Cryptographic
Operation, User Data Protection, Identification and Authentication, Security Management,
Protection of the TSF, Resource Utilisation and TOE Access. Further details on these
security policies may be found in Sections 5 and 6 of the ST.
7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
Consumers of the SOAE product should consider assumptions about usage and
environmental settings as requirements for the product’s installation and its operating
environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.
7.1 Secure Usage Assumptions
The following Secure Usage Assumptions are listed in the ST:
a. Only authorized administrators may access the TOE remotely from the internal and
external networks;
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b. There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., the ability to execute arbitrary
code or applications) and storage repository capabilities on the TOE;
c. Authorized administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator guidance;
however, they are capable of error;
d. The TOE does not host public data; and
e. Information cannot flow among the internal and external networks unless it passes
through the TOE.
7.2 Environmental Assumptions
The following Environmental Assumption is listed in the ST:
a. The TOE is installed and operated in a secure physical environment.
7.3 Clarification of Scope
The SOAE is not intended to be placed or operated in a hostile environment, and should be
protected by other products specifically designed to address sophisticated threats.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration of the SOAE comprises the Intel SOA Expressway v2.7.0.4
Build On 2011-07-15 18:02 running on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.4 and browsers Internet
Explorer and Firefox.
The publication entitled Intel® SOA Expressway Installation Guide for Linux OS For Intel®
SOA Expressway v2.7, February 2011 describes the procedures necessary to install and
operate SOAE in its evaluated configuration.
9 Documentation
The Intel documents provided to the consumer are as follows:
a. Intel® SOA Expressway Installation Guide for Linux OS For Intel® SOA Expressway
v2.7, February 2011;
b. Setting up the 2.7 Intel® SOA Expressway Hardware Appliance with FIPS Option,
March 2011;
c. Intel® SOA Expressway Management Console User’s Guide for Linux OS For Intel®
SOA Expressway v2.7, April 2011;
d. Intel® SOA Expressway CLI Guide for Linux OS for Intel® SOA Expressway v2.7,
March 2011; and
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e. Intel® SOA Expressway Security Reference Guide For Intel® SOA Expressway v2.7,
April 2011.
10 Evaluation Analysis Activities
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the SOAE, including
the following areas:
Development: The evaluators analyzed the SOAE functional specification, design
documentation, and a subset of the implementation representation; they determined that the
design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces,
the TSF subsystems and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements
(SFRs). The evaluators analyzed the SOAE security architectural description and determined
that the initialization process is secure and that the security functions are protected against
tamper and bypass, and that the security domains are maintained. The evaluators also
independently verified that the correspondence mappings between the design documents are
correct.
Guidance Documents: The evaluators examined the SOAE preparative user guidance and
operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously describes
how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use and
administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational
guidance, and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure
configuration.
Life-Cycle Support: An analysis of the SOAE configuration management system and
associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the SOAE configuration
items were clearly marked and could be modified and controlled by automated tools. The
developer’s configuration management system was observed during a site visit, and it was
found to be mature and well developed and operated in accordance with the CM plan. The
evaluators confirmed that the access control measures as described in the CM plan are
effective in preventing unauthorised access to the configuration items.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of
the procedures required to maintain the integrity of SOAE during distribution to the
consumer.
The evaluators examined the development security procedures during a site visit and
determined that they detailed sufficient security measures for the development environment
to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the SOAE design and implementation. The
evaluators determined that the developer has used a documented model of the TOE life-cycle
and well-defined development tools that yield consistent and predictable results.
The evaluators reviewed the flaw remediation procedures used by Intel for SOAE. During a
site visit, the evaluators also examined the evidence generated by adherence to the
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procedures. The evaluators concluded that the procedures are adequate to track and correct
security flaws, and distribute the flaw information and corrections to consumers of the
product.
Vulnerability Assessment: The evaluators conducted an independent vulnerability analysis
of SOAE. Additionally, the evaluators conducted a review of public domain vulnerability
databases, and a search of all evaluation deliverables. The evaluators identified potential
vulnerabilities for testing applicable to the SOAE in its operational environment.
All these evaluation activities resulted in PASS verdicts.
11 ITS Product Testing
Testing at EAL 4 consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing
independent functional tests, and performing penetration tests.
11.1 Assessment of Developer Tests
The evaluators verified that the developer has met its testing responsibilities by examining
the test evidence, and reviewing the test results, as documented in the ETR2
.
The evaluators analyzed the developer’s test coverage and depth analyses and found them to
be complete and accurate. The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer’s
test documentation and the functional specification, TOE design and security architecture
description was complete.
11.2 Independent Functional Testing
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining
design and guidance documentation, examining the developer's test documentation,
executing a sample of the developer's test cases, and creating test cases that augmented the
developer’s tests.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability
of the testing procedures and results. Resulting from this test coverage approach was the
following list of EWA-Canada test goals:
a. Initialization: The objective of this test goal is to confirm that the TOE can be installed
and configured into the evaluated configuration, as identified in the TOE Description of
the Security Target, by following all instructions in the developer’s Installation and
Administrative guidance;
2
The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and
may not be releasable for public review.
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b. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The objective of this test goal is to repeat a subset of the
developer's tests on the evaluator’s TOE installation;
c. Protection of TOE logs: The objective of this test case is to verify the TOE protects the
log files by not providing any mechanisms for modifying or deleting the records and
relies upon the OS file system access control mechanism;
d. Role-Based access control: The objective of this test case is to verify the Web GUI
presents only the commands to the user that the user has access to based on the roles
assigned to the user;
e. Authentication system information: The objective of this test case is to verify other than
providing an asterisk character when the user enters the password, the Web GUI interface
provides only success or failure feedback while the authentication is in progress;
f. Time-out session: The objective of this test case is to verify the session time out
mechanism on Web GUI; and
g. Audit sort: The objective of this test case is to verify that thesort function works in the
Audit feature.
11.3 Independent Penetration Testing
Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all
evaluation deliverables, limited independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted.
The penetration tests focused on:
 Port scan: The objective of this test case is to identify any suspiciou open ports on the
TOE system.
 Bypass: The objective of this test case is to verify that the TOE destroys a session
successfully.
 Concurrent Sessions: The objective of this test case is to verify that the TOE manages
concurrent sessions successfully;
 Information Leak: The objective of this test case is to verify if any sensitive
information leaks in the TOE system;
 Tamper: The objective of this test case is to verify that the TOE is resistent to
standard SQL injection attack agains its logon functionality; and
 Communication Failure: The objective of this test case is to verify that the TOE
continues to operate when a communications failure has occurred and been resolved.
The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the
intended operating environment.
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11.4 Conduct of Testing
SOAE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent
functional and penetration tests. The testing took place at the Information Technology
Security Evaluation and Testing (ITSET) Facility at EWA-Canada. The CCS Certification
Body witnessed a portion of the independent testing. The detailed testing activities,
including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are
documented in a separate Test Results document.
11.5 Testing Results
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results,
giving assurance that the SOAE behaves as specified in its ST, functional specification, TOE
design, and security architecture description.
12 Results of the Evaluation
This evaluation has provided the basis for an EAL 4+ level of assurance. The overall verdict
for the evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
13 Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations
The documentation for the SOAE includes a comprehensive Installation and Security Guide.
14 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations
Acronym/Abbreviation/
Initialization
Description
CCEF Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CCS Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme
CLI Command Line Interface
CPL Certified Products list
CM Configuration Management
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSET Information Technology Security Evaluation and Testing
PALCAN Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories Canada
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOA Service-Oriented Architecture
ST Security Target
SQL Structured Query Language
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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15 References
This section lists all documentation used as source material for this report:
a. CCS Publication #4, Technical Oversight, Version 1.8, October 2010.
b. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 3, July 2009.
c. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM,
Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009.
d. Intel® SOA Expressway v2.7.0.4 and Intel® SOA Expressway v2.7.0.4 for
Healthcare Security Target, v 1.9, 30 August 2011.
e. Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) SOA Expressway, EAL 4+ Evaluation, Common
Criteria Evaluation Number: 383-4-121, Document No. 1627-000-D002, Version
1.4, 31 August, 2011.