© 2007 EMC Corporation
EMC Corporation
EMC Celerra Network Server Version
5.5 running on EMC® Celerra® NSX
series and EMC® Celerra® NS series
Security Target
Evaluation Assurance Level: EAL2+
Document Version: 1.0
Prepared for: Prepared by:
EMC Corporation Corsec Security, Inc.
176 South Street
Hopkinton, MA 01748
10340 Democracy Lane, Suite 201
Fairfax, VA 22030
Phone: (508) 435-1000 Phone: (703) 267-6050
http://www.emc.com http://www.corsec.com
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Revision History
Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes
0.1 2006-06-29 Matthew Appler Initial draft.
0.2 2006-06-30 Nathan Lee Updated threat text based on lab feedback.
0.3 2006-07-05 Nathan Lee Updated EAL and associated text.
0.4 2006-07-06 Nathan Lee Added Life Cycle Support subsection to TSS Rationale
section.
0.5 2006-11-03 Christie Kummers Minor updates and changes in response to lab verdicts.
0.6 2006-11-22 Christie Kummers Minor updates and changes to Section 1.
0.7 2006-12-13 Christie Kummers Minor updates and changes throughout.
0.8 2007-02-21 Christie Kummers Minor updates and changes throughout.
0.9 2007-07-24 Christie Kummers Updates in response to Lab ORs v1.1 and v1.2.
1.0 2007-09-20 Nathan Lee
Elizabeth Pugrud
Additional Environmental SFR defined with additional
appropriate updates throughout to incorporate it.
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Table of Contents
REVISION HISTORY................................................................................................................................................2
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................................3
TABLE OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................................4
TABLE OF TABLES ..................................................................................................................................................4
1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................5
1.1 OVERVIEW......................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 SECURITY TARGET, TOE AND CC IDENTIFICATION AND CONFORMANCE ......................................................5
1.3 CONVENTIONS AND TERMINOLOGY................................................................................................................6
1.3.1 Conventions ...........................................................................................................................................6
1.3.2 Terminology...........................................................................................................................................6
2 TOE DESCRIPTION..........................................................................................................................................7
2.1 PRODUCT TYPE...............................................................................................................................................7
2.2 PRODUCT DESCRIPTION..................................................................................................................................9
2.2.1 Physical Description of the Product......................................................................................................9
2.2.2 Logical Description of the Product........................................................................................................9
2.3 TOE BOUNDARIES AND SCOPE.....................................................................................................................10
2.3.1 Physical Boundary...............................................................................................................................10
2.3.2 Logical Boundary ................................................................................................................................11
2.3.3 Physical/Logical Features and Functionality Not Included in the Evaluated Configuration of the TOE
12
3 SECURITY ENVIRONMENT.........................................................................................................................13
3.1 ASSUMPTIONS ..............................................................................................................................................13
3.2 THREATS TO SECURITY.................................................................................................................................13
3.3 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ........................................................................................................14
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES ..............................................................................................................................15
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE...........................................................................................................15
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT...........................................................................................15
4.2.1 IT Security Objectives..........................................................................................................................15
4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives..................................................................................................................16
5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.......................................................................................................................17
5.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .............................................................................................17
Class FDP: User Data Protection.......................................................................................................................18
5.1.1 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication ......................................................................................20
5.1.2 Class FMT: Security Management ......................................................................................................21
5.1.3 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF........................................................................................................23
5.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ON THE IT ENVIRONMENT ............................................................24
5.3 ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS........................................................................................................................25
6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION..............................................................................................................27
6.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS..........................................................................................................................27
6.1.1 Identification and Authentication ........................................................................................................28
6.1.2 Protection of the TSF...........................................................................................................................28
6.1.3 Security Management ..........................................................................................................................28
6.1.4 User Data Protection...........................................................................................................................29
6.2 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE MEASURES......................................................................................................29
7 PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS...............................................................................................................32
7.1 PROTECTION PROFILE REFERENCE ...............................................................................................................32
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8 RATIONALE.....................................................................................................................................................33
8.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE..............................................................................................................33
8.1.1 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Threats ..............................................................................33
8.1.2 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Assumptions ......................................................................35
8.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ..................................................................................36
8.2.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE Objectives.............................................36
8.2.2 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the IT Environment.............................................38
8.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE....................................................................................39
8.4 RATIONALE FOR REFINEMENTS OF SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ...............................................39
8.5 DEPENDENCY RATIONALE............................................................................................................................40
8.6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION RATIONALE................................................................................................41
8.6.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements.............................41
8.6.2 TOE Summary Specification Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements..............................41
8.7 STRENGTH OF FUNCTION..............................................................................................................................43
9 ACRONYMS......................................................................................................................................................45
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 - DEPLOYMENT CONFIGURATION OF THE TOE................................................................................................8
FIGURE 2 - PHYSICAL TOE BOUNDARY........................................................................................................................11
Table of Tables
TABLE 1 - ST, TOE, AND CC IDENTIFICATION AND CONFORMANCE..............................................................................5
TABLE 2 - TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.............................................................................................17
TABLE 3 – ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS.......................................................................................................................25
TABLE 4 – MAPPING OF TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS...............................27
TABLE 5 - ASSURANCE MEASURES MAPPING TO TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS (SARS)......................30
TABLE 6 - FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS DEPENDENCIES .............................................................................................40
TABLE 7 - ACRONYMS..................................................................................................................................................45
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1 Security Target Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), ST conventions, ST conformance
claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is the EMC Celerra Network Server Version 5.5 running on EMC®
Celerra® NSX series and EMC® Celerra® NS series, and will hereafter be referred to as the TOE or the Celerra
Network Server throughout this document. The Celerra Network Server is a Network Attached Storage (NAS)
device that provides access to Storage Area Network (SAN) based storage through standard file sharing protocols.
1.1 Overview
This ST contains the following sections to provide a mapping of the Security Environment to the Security
Requirements that the TOE meets in order to remove, diminish, or mitigate the defined threats:
• Security Target Introduction (Section 1) – Provides a brief summary of the content of the ST and describes
the organization of other sections of this document.
• TOE Description (Section 2) – Provides an overview of the TOE security functions and describes the
physical and logical boundaries for the TOE.
• Security Environment (Section 3) – Describes the threats and assumptions that pertain to the TOE and its
environment.
• Security Objectives (Section 4) – Identifies the security objectives that are satisfied by the TOE and its
environment.
• Security Requirements (Section 5) – Presents the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security
Assurance Requirements (SARs) met by the TOE and by the TOE’s environment.
• TOE Summary Specification (Section 6) – Describes the security functions provided by the TOE to satisfy
the security requirements and objectives.
• Protection Profile Claims (Section 7) – Provides the identification of any ST Protection Profile (PP) claims
as well as a justification to support such claims.
• Rationale (Section 8) – Presents the rationale for the security objectives, requirements, and the TOE
summary specifications as to their consistency, completeness, and suitability.
• Acronyms (Section 9) – Defines the acronyms used within this ST.
1.2 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance
Table 1 - ST, TOE, and CC Identification and Conformance
ST Title
EMC Corporation EMC Celerra Network Server Version 5.5 running on EMC Celerra
NSX series and EMC Celerra NS series Security Target
Version Version 1.0
Author
Corsec Security, Inc.
Nathan Lee and Matthew Appler
TOE Identification
EMC Celerra Network Server Version 5.5.30.4 running on EMC Celerra NSX series and
EMC Celerra NS series
Common Criteria (CC)
identification and
Conformance
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3, August
2005 (aligned with ISO/IEC 15408:2005); CC Part 2 conformant; CC Part 3 conformant;
Parts 2 and 3 Interpretations from the Interpreted CEM as of 2006-06-29 were reviewed,
and no interpretations apply to the claims made in this ST.
PP Identification None
Evaluation Assurance
Level
EAL2+: EAL2 Augmented with ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
Keywords Network Attached Storage (NAS), Storage Area Network (SAN)
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1.3 Conventions and Terminology
1.3.1 Conventions
There are several font variations used within this ST. Selected presentation choices are discussed here to aid the
Security Target reader.
The Common Criteria (CC) allows for several operations to be performed on security requirements: assignment,
refinement, selection, and iteration. All of these operations are used within this ST. These operations are presented
in the same manner in which they appear in Parts 2 and 3 of the CC with the following exceptions:
• Completed assignment statements are identified using [italicized text within brackets].
• Completed selection statements are identified using [underlined italicized text within brackets].
• Refinements are identified using bold text. Any text removed is stricken (Example: TSF Data) and should
be considered as a refinement.
• Iterations are identified by appending a letter in parenthesis following the component title. For example,
FAU_GEN.1(a) Audit Data Generation would be the first iteration and FAU_GEN.1(b) Audit Data
Generation would be the second iteration.
1.3.2 Terminology
The term “User” is used in this document to refer to any operator of the TOE who is utilizing it to store data.
The term “User Data” is used in this document to refer to the data that an operator has used to store data on the
storage system.
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2 TOE Description
This section provides a general overview of the TOE as an aid to understanding the general capabilities and security
functions provided by the TOE. The TOE description provides a context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the
product type and describing the evaluated configuration.
2.1 Product Type
The EMC Celerra Network Server Version 5.5 running on EMC Celerra NSX series and EMC Celerra NS series is a
Network Attached Storage (NAS) server that provides Internet Protocol (IP) or Fibre Channel1
access to storage,
either locally or on a Storage Area Network (SAN). The purpose of a SAN is to allow many different application
servers to share storage provided by centrally managed storage devices. The Celerra Network Server supports
several protocols to provide file sharing access to centrally managed storage.
Figure 1 below shows the details of the deployment configuration of the TOE:
1
Fibre Channel is a serial data transfer interface that operates over copper wire and/or optical fiber at data rates
currently supported at 400 MB/s.
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Figure 1 - Deployment Configuration of the TOE
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2.2 Product Description
As described above, the EMC Celerra Network Server is a Network Attached Storage (NAS) gateway solution. The
Celerra Network Server provides storage access to clients and servers in a corporate network through a variety of
access protocols. These protocols include:
• Common Internet File System (CIFS)2
• Network File System (NFS)3
versions 2, 3, and 4
• FTP4
and TFTP5
• iSCSI6
2.2.1 Physical Description of the Product
To implement this functionality, the Celerra Network Server is architected using two types of hardware components:
the Control Station and Data Movers. Each of these is described below.
The Control Station is a dedicated management computer that monitors and controls all components of the Celerra
Network Server. The Control Station provides access to the administrative functionality of the Celerra Network
Server software. It contains utilities for installing and configuring the Celerra Network Server, maintaining the
system, and monitoring system performance. The Control Station runs a set of programs that are collectively
referred to as the Control Station software. The Control Station itself uses an EMC-customized version of Linux as
its operating system. The Control Station connects internally to each of the Data Movers within the Celerra
Network Server. Only Control Station Administrators are granted access to the Celerra Control Station.
The Data Movers are the Celerra Network Server components that perform the actual transfer of data between the
storage system and the network client. The Data Mover operating system is referred to as DART (Data Access in
Real Time). Administrators do not typically manage a Data Mover directly. Rather, the Control Station is used to
send commands to an individual Data Mover. The Celerra Network Server can have from 1 to 8 Data Movers.
Additionally, there are several different models of Data Movers. However, use and management of all Data Movers
is performed the same way.
2.2.2 Logical Description of the Product
The Celerra Network Server presents itself as one or more standard network-based file servers to client machines.
In fact, each Data Mover on the Celerra Network Server can host one or more “virtual servers” that present shared
file systems to client machines. The type of server and protocols that are supported by that server (CIFS, NFS, etc.)
are configurable by an Administrator. Client machines, with the appropriate access privileges, can then use the
Celerra Network Server to store and access data as they would any other network-based file server. Additionally,
shared file systems can be configured for FTP or TFTP access.
2
CIFS is a platform-independent file sharing system commonly used by Microsoft Windows network file sharing
3
NFS is a platform-independent file sharing system commonly used by UNIX and UNIX variants for file sharing
4
File Transfer Protocol
5
Trivial File Transfer Protocol
6
internet Small Computer System Interface
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The Celerra Network Server is responsible for enforcing all access permissions for User Data. Each “virtual server”
on the Celerra Network Server can be configured to interface with a Microsoft Active Directory server or utilize
local user authentication files. When a request for data access is made, the Celerra Network Server utilizes the
appropriate authentication mechanism, checks the Access Control List (ACL) of the requested file or directory, and
either grants or denies access to the Data Mover User. User Data can be stored directly on the Celerra Network
Server or storage of User Data can be provided by the SAN.
The internal storage or the SAN that the Celerra Network Server is connected to is configured to provide a storage
system for use by the Celerra Network Server. This storage system stores and retrieves block units of data for the
Celerra Network Server. Each of these block units is associated with a Logical Unit, which is in turn associated
with a Logical Unit Number (LUN). Individual elements of the storage system are presented to the Celerra Network
Server as Logical Units (LUNs). Each LUN is a useable storage system volume that can be used to store User Data
by the Celerra Network Server.
2.3 TOE Boundaries and Scope
This section will primarily address what physical and logical components of the TOE are included in evaluation.
2.3.1 Physical Boundary
Figure 2 illustrates the physical scope and the physical boundary of the Celerra Network Server and ties together all
of the components of the TOE and the constituents of the TOE Environment. The Celerra Network Server will
hereafter be referred to as the TOE throughout this document.
The TOE is a NAS product which runs on the platform as specified above. The evaluated configuration of the TOE
includes the following Celerra Network Server models: NS20, NS40, NS40G, NS80, NS80G, NS350, NS500,
NS500G, NS700, NS700G, NS704, NS704G, and NSX.7
The essential physical components for the proper
operation of the TOE in the evaluated configuration are:
• Control Station – 1 to 2 Control Stations v5.5 are present in the Celerra Network Server. The Control
Station is a dedicated management computer used to manage the Celerra Network Server
• Data Movers – 1 to 8 Data Movers are present in a Celerra Network Server running DART v5.5. Each Data
Mover is used to mediate access to storage provided by a SAN to client machines that are connected via an
IP network. The evaluated configuration of the TOE includes the following Data Movers models: X-Blade
40 (installed on the NS20, NS40, and NS40G models), X-Blade 60 and X-Blade 65 (installed on the NS80,
NS80G, and NSX models8
), NS500 (installed on the NS350, NS500, and NS500G models), and NS700
(installed on the NS700, NS700G,NS704, and NS704G models).
7
The TOE models that end with a “G” as well as the NSX model are the Celerra Gateway products. These models
consist of only the Celerra Control Station(s) and Data Mover(s). The SAN storage array is configured and
purchased separately. The TOE models without the “G” (with the exception of the NSX model) are the integrated
TOE models that include a CLARiiON™ storage array.
8
The Celerra Network Server NSX model can have both the X-Blade 60 and X-Blade 65 model Data Movers
installed in the TOE at the same time.
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Celerra
Control Station
Control Station
(optional)
Data Mover
Data Mover
Data Mover
(Up to 8 Data Movers)
Legend:
TOE Boundary
Management
Console
Internal Storage (Optional)
Figure 2 - Physical TOE Boundary
2.3.1.1 Security Considerations of the TOE Environment
The TOE relies on secure access provided by the SAN to which it is attached. The purpose of the TOE is to mediate
access to User Data for client machines connected to an IP network. This functionality requires that the
communications path to the SAN and the storage that is provided by the SAN be managed properly.
2.3.2 Logical Boundary
The TOE logical boundary is defined by the security functions that it implements. The security functions
implemented by the TOE are usefully grouped under the following Security Function Classes:
• User Data Protection
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Management
• Protection of the TSF
2.3.2.1 User Data Protection
The User Data Protection function implements functionality necessary to protect User Data which is entrusted to the
TOE. This functionality is primarily enforced by each of the Data Movers in the TOE. Users of the TOE are
identified and authenticated, either by the TOE or the TOE Environment. These Data Mover Users are then granted
access to files and directories managed by the TOE. Each file and directory has an Access Control List (ACL) that
contains the access privileges for Data Mover Users of TOE to that object.
2.3.2.2 Identification and Authentication
This function of the TOE is used to identify and authenticate each operator of the TOE. In the case of Control
Station Administrators, the TOE provides username and password verification functionality. Data Mover Users of
the TOE can be authenticated directly by the TOE or can be authenticated by a separate Active Directory, Kerberos,
or NFS client machine. This functionality is configured by an Administrator.
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2.3.2.3 Security Management
The Security Management functionality of the TOE specifies several aspects of management of the TOE Security
Function (TSF). Proper management of the TSF is required to properly mediate access to User Data.
2.3.2.4 Protection of the TSF
The Protection of the TSF function provides the integrity and management of the mechanisms that provide the TSF.
The security functions in this evaluation are impractical to bypass because the TOE is designed in such a way that
no access is possible without passing through key security features, such as identification and authentication, and
access control mediation. The TOE maintains its own domain for execution and does not share any hardware with
other applications.
2.3.3 Physical/Logical Features and Functionality Not Included in the Evaluated
Configuration of the TOE
Features/Functionality that are not part of the evaluated configuration of the TOE are:
• iSCSI functionality
• Access Control Levels for Control Station Administrators
• Multi-Path File System
• Replication Technologies
• Celerra FileMover
The TOE supports several File System Access Policies. For the purposes of this evaluation, only the “MIXED”
Access Policy is to be evaluated. The “NATIVE”, “NT”, “UNIX”, “SECURE”, and “MIXED_COMPAT” Policies
are excluded from the evaluation.
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3 Security Environment
This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used and the manner in
which the TOE is expected to be employed. It provides the statement of the TOE security environment, which
identifies and explains all:
• Assumptions about the secure usage of the TOE, including physical and personnel aspects
• Known and presumed threats countered by either the TOE or by the security environment
• Organizational security policies with which the TOE must comply
3.1 Assumptions
This section describes the security aspects of the intended environment for the evaluated TOE. The operational
environment must be managed in accordance with assurance requirement documentation for delivery, operation, and
user guidance. The following specific conditions are required to ensure the security of the TOE and are assumed to
exist in an environment where this TOE is employed.
Name Description
A.MANAGE There are one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and
the security of the information it contains.
A.NOEVIL Administrators are non-hostile, appropriately trained, and follow all
administrator guidance.
A.PHYSICAL Physical security will be provided for the TOE and its environment.
A.PROTECT The IT Environment shall provide a secure place to store user data of which
access to that data will be mediated by the TOE
3.2 Threats to Security
This section identifies the threats to the IT assets against which protection is required by the TOE or by the security
environment. The threat agents are divided into two categories:
• Attackers who are not TOE users: They have public knowledge of how the TOE operates and are assumed
to possess a low skill level, limited resources to alter TOE configuration settings/parameters, and no
physical access to the TOE.
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• TOE users: They have extensive knowledge of how the TOE operates and are assumed to possess a high
skill level, moderate resources to alter TOE configuration settings/parameters and physical access to the
TOE. (TOE users are, however, assumed not to be willfully hostile to the TOE)
The following threats are applicable:
Name Description
T.BYPASS The TOE could be bypassed by a server with direct access to the SAN.
T.IMPROPER_CONFIG The TOE could be misconfigured to provide improper storage or enforce
improper access to user data.
T.MEDIATE_ACCESS Access to user data could be improperly granted to users who should not have
access to it.
T.UNAUTH An unauthorized user could access data stored by the TOE by bypassing the
protection mechanisms of the TOE.
3.3 Organizational Security Policies
There are no Organizational Security Policies.
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4 Security Objectives
This section identifies the security objectives for the TOE and its supporting environment. The security objectives
identify the responsibilities of the TOE and its environment in meeting the TOE’s security needs.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The specific security objectives are as follows:
Name Description
O.ADMIN The TOE must provide a method for administrative control of the TOE.
O.BYPASS The TOE must ensure that the TSF cannot be bypassed.
O.I&A The TOE will uniquely identify users and will authenticate the claimed identity
before granting a User access to the TSF’s when local authentication is
required.
O.PROTECT The TOE must protect data that it has been entrusted to protect.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment
4.2.1 IT Security Objectives
The following IT security objectives are to be satisfied by the environment:
Name Description
OE.BYPASS The TOE environment must ensure that the TSF cannot be bypassed
OE.I&A The TOE environment will uniquely identify users and will authenticate the
claimed identity when requested to do so by the TOE
OE.SECURE_COMMUNICATION
S
The TOE environment must provide secure communications between systems
connected to the Storage Area Network
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Name Description
OE.SECURE_SERVERS The TOE environment must provide properly configured authentication servers
to communicate with the TOE.
4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives
The following non-IT environment security objectives are to be satisfied without imposing technical requirements
on the TOE. That is, they will not require the implementation of functions in the TOE hardware and/or software.
Thus, they will be satisfied largely through application of procedural or administrative measures.
Name Description
OE.MANAGE Sites deploying the TOE will provide competent TOE administrators who will
ensure the system is used securely.
OE.NOEVIL Sites using the TOE shall ensure that TOE administrators are non-hostile,
appropriately trained and follow all administrator guidance.
OE.PHYSICAL The TOE will be used in a physically secure site that protects it from
interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
OE.PROTECT The TOE environment must protect the data it has been entrusted to protect
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5 Security Requirements
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs)
met by the TOE as well as Security Functional Requirements met by the TOE IT environment. These requirements
are presented following the conventions identified in Section 1.3.1.
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
This section specifies the SFRs for the TOE. This section organizes the SFRs by CC class. Table 2 identifies all
SFRs implemented by the TOE and indicates the ST operations performed on each requirement.
Table 2 - TOE Security Functional Requirements
Name Description S A R I
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control 

FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control 

FIA_ATD.1(a) User attribute definition 
 

FIA_UAU.2(a) User authentication before any action 

FIA_UID.2(a) User identification before any action 

FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes 
 

FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation 
 

FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data 
 

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions 

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 

FPT_RVM.1(a) Non-bypassability of the TSP 

FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
Note: S=Selection; A=Assignment; R=Refinement; I=Iteration
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Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] on
[
a) Subjects: CIFS and NFS Users
b) Objects: Files and Directories
c) Operations: Create, Read, Write, Append, Execute, Delete, Change Ownership, Read
Permissions, Change Permissions, Read Attributes, Write Attributes, Read
Extended Attributes, and Write Extended Attributes
].
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Application Note: The CIFS naming convention has been used for operations. Equivalent operations are provided
via NFSv4, but may be named slightly differently by NFS clients. FTP, NFSv2, and NFSv3 access supports a subset
of these operations.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] to objects based on the following:
[
Subject attributes:
1. UserID
2. GroupIDs
Object attributes:
1. UTF-8 Filename
2. UTF-16 Filename
3. 8.3 MS-DOS Filename
4. Access Control List
].
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FDP_ACF.1.2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and
controlled objects is allowed: [A valid subject of the TOE is allowed to perform an operation if the contents
of the Access Control List for the object authorize the UserID or a GroupID of the Subject to perform the
desired operation].
FDP_ACF.1.3
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:
[
• For CIFS access, subjects that are members of the group Domain Administrators shall be
authorized to backup, restore, and take ownership of all objects
• For NFS access, subjects that are authorized as superusers can perform all operations on all
objects
].
FDP_ACF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [A valid subject of the TOE is
explicitly denied the ability to perform an operation if the contents of the Access Control List for the object
explicitly deny the UserID or a GroupID of the Subject to perform the desired operation].
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
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5.1.1 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_ATD.1(a) User attribute definition
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_ATD.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: [UserID, one
or more GroupIDs, and a password].
Dependencies: No dependencies
Application Note: “Users” refers to Data Mover Users, defined in FMT_SMR.1. The TOE allows either local or
remote management of Data Mover Users. This SFR applies when local administration of Data Mover Users is
selected for the TOE.
FIA_UAU.2(a) User authentication before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated
actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Application Note: The TOE allows either local or remote management of users. This SFR applies when local
administration of users is selected for the TOE
FIA_UID.2(a) User identification before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to identify itself before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf
of that user.
Dependencies: No dependencies
Application Note: The TOE allows either local or remote management of users. This SFR applies when local
administration of users is selected for the TOE
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5.1.2 Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] to restrict the ability to [modify, delete,
[add]] the security attributes [UserID and GroupID assignment] to [Authorized Users].
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Application Note: Authorized Users are either superusers in the case of NFS, or members of the Local
Administrator or Domain Administrator groups for CIFS.
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.3.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] to provide [restrictive] default values for
security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2
The TSF shall allow the [Object Owner] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values
when an object or information is created.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify, delete,[add]] the [Control Station Administrator and Data
Mover User accounts] to [Control Station Administrators].
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions:
[
1. Management of security functions behavior;
2. Management of TSF data;
3. Management of security attributes
].
Dependencies: No Dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles
[
1. Control Station Administrator
2. Data Mover User
].
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
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5.1.3 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_RVM.1(a) Non-bypassability of the TSP
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_RVM.1.1
The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before each function within
the TSC is allowed to proceed.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_SEP.1.1
The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that protects it from interference and
tampering by untrusted subjects.
FPT_SEP.1.2
The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC.
Dependencies: No dependencies
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5.2 Security Functional Requirements on the IT Environment
The TOE has the following security requirements for its IT environment. The stated SFR on the IT Environment of
the TOE presented in this section has been drawn from Part 2 of CC Version 2.3 and hence conformant to CC
Version 2.3 Part 2.
Name Description S A R I
FIA_ATD.1(b) User attribute definition 
 
 

FIA_UAU.2(b) User authentication before any action 
 

FIA_UID.2(b) User identification before any action 
 

FPT_RVM.1(b) Non-bypassability of the TSP 

FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel 

Note: S=Selection; A=Assignment; R=Refinement; I=Iteration
FIA_ATD.1(b) User attribute definition
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_ATD.1.1
The TSF TOE Environment shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual
users: [UserID and one or more GroupIDs].
Dependencies: No dependencies
Application Note: The TOE allows either local or remote management of users. This SFR applies when remote
Active Directory or NFS v2 and v3 administration of Data Mover Users is selected for the TOE
FIA_UAU.2(b) User authentication before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated by the TOE Environment before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
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Application Note: The TOE allows either local or remote management of users. This SFR applies when remote
Active Directory, Kerberos, or NFS v2 and v3 administration of Data Mover Users is selected for the TOE.
FIA_UID.2(b) User identification before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to identify itself to the TOE Environment before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: No dependencies
Application Note: The TOE allows either local or remote management of users. This SFR applies when remote
Active Directory, Kerberos, or NFS v2 and v3 administration of Data Mover Users is selected for the TOE.
FPT_RVM.1(b) Non-bypassability of the TSP
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_RVM.1.1
The TSF TOE Environment shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before
each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FTP_ITC.1.1
The TSF TOE Environment shall provide a communication channel between itself and a remote trusted IT
product systems connected to the Storage Area Network that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel
data from modification or disclosure.
5.3 Assurance Requirements
This section defines the assurance requirements for the TOE. Assurance requirements are taken from Part 3 of the
CC at EAL2+. Table 3 – Assurance Requirements summarizes the requirements.
Table 3 – Assurance Requirements
Assurance Requirements
Class ACM: Configuration management ACM_CAP.2 Configuration items
ADO_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
Class ADO: Delivery and operation
ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
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Assurance Requirements
ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification
ADV_HLD.1 Descriptive high-level design
Class ADV: Development
ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
Class AGD: Guidance documents
AGD_USR.1 User guidance
Class ALC: Flaw Remediation ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
Class ATE: Tests
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment
AVA_VLA.1 Developer vulnerability analysis
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6 TOE Summary Specification
This section presents information to detail how the TOE meets the functional and assurance requirements described
in previous sections of this ST.
6.1 TOE Security Functions
Each of the security requirements and the associated descriptions correspond to the security functions. Hence, each
function is described by how it specifically satisfies each of its related requirements. This serves to both describe
the security functions and rationalize that the security functions are suitable to satisfy the necessary requirements.
Table 4 – Mapping of TOE Security Functions to Security Functional Requirements
TOE Security Function SFR ID Description
FIA_ATD.1(a) User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.2(a) User authentication before any action
Identification and Authentication
FIA_UID.2(a) User identification before any action
FPT_RVM.1(a) Non-bypassability of the TSP
Protection of TOE Security
Functions
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management
functions
Security Management
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
User Data Protection
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access
control
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6.1.1 Identification and Authentication
The TOE performs identification and authentication of both Administrators and Data Mover Users. The purpose of
the identification and authentication function is to allow the TOE to restrict access to both administrative functions
and to user data based upon the authenticated identity and associated attributes of a user.
6.1.1.1 Administrative I&A
Control Station Administrators can access the TOE through a web browser or through a command line interface.
The TOE supports internally enforced username and password-based authentication. The first action that operators
must take when attempting to interact with the TOE is to provide a username and password. Before identification
and authentication, the TOE operator is not able to perform any TOE security functionality.
6.1.1.2 User I&A
Data Mover Users of the TOE are defined as those subjects that wish to use the TOE to store and mediate access to
data. Data Mover Users of the TOE would typically not be Administrators (although they could be). The way
identification and authentication works on the TOE for Data Mover Users is configurable by an Administrator. This
security function provides the ability for the TOE to internally identify and authenticate users, and manage their
attributes. The TOE can also utilize this functionality through its environment.
For CIFS and NFSv4 access, the TOE will identify and authenticate the username and password with each request
for access. If configured for local administration of Data Mover Users, the TOE will refer to its list of authorized
users and groups. If the user can be authenticated, the function will allow the user access. Access to individual files
and directories is then governed by the User Data Protection security function. If configured to use Active Directory
or Kerberos, the TOE will communicate with the respective server to authenticate the user and provide a list of
groups that the user is a member of. Authentication will then be performed by the TOE.
For NFSv2 and NFSv3, the server from which the request is coming has already identified and authenticated each
Data Mover User. For this configuration, the TOE relies on its environment to perform proper identification and
authentication. The TOE also relies on the environment to provide a list of GroupIDs that the user has been
assigned.
6.1.2 Protection of the TSF
Protection of the TSF provides for the integrity of the mechanisms that protect the TOE. The TOE is a purpose built
hardware appliance. It does not share memory or processors with any other application or system. The TOE
maintains its own domain for its execution. Interfacing with the TOE is only done through well defined interfaces,
each utilizing security functions to maintain the security of that interface. The TOE relies on its environment to
provide protection from physical tampering.
Non-bypassability of the TOE is provided through basic configuration and enforcement of the security mechanisms.
All Administrators and Data Mover Users of the TOE must be authenticated prior to performing any security
functionality. Once authenticated, Administrators and Data Mover Users can only perform operations which they
have been explicitly granted permission to perform. The TOE uses unique sessions for each operator and maintains
separation between concurrent operators.
6.1.3 Security Management
The purpose of the TOE is to allow Data Mover Users, connected to an IP network, to securely store data on internal
storage or on storage devices connected to a SAN. The Security Management function allows authorized
Administrators to properly configure this functionality.
Management of the TOE is typically performed by Control Station Administrators through a web-based application
called the Celerra Manager. Control Station Administrators can also manage the TOE through a command line
interface (CLI) through the Control Station.
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Control Station Administrators are primarily responsible for managing and configuring system objects. This
includes managing the use of LUNs provided by the storage system, grouping those LUNs into useful storage
groups called Volumes, and creating and managing individual file systems on those Volumes. The Celerra
Administrator also manages individual Data Movers, creates and manages “virtual servers”, and maps shares on
those file servers to configured file systems. The Celerra Administrator is responsible for configuring the access
control mechanisms to be supported by each “virtual server”.
6.1.4 User Data Protection
The TOE enforces the Discretionary Access Control SFP9
on each Data Mover User of the TOE based on the
security attributes of that user.
Discretionary Access Control SFP: The TOE enforces the Discretionary Access Control SFP on Data
Mover Users by assigning access privileges to Users based on their UserID and GroupIDs. The ability to
perform operations on objects, which are governed by the Discretionary Access Control SFP, are granted to
Data Mover Users by an object’s owner. Thus, a Data Mover User is allowed to perform an operation on
an object so long as permission is granted to the User within the object’s ACL. A Data Mover User can
also be denied the ability to perform an operation on an object if the contents of the object’s ACL deny the
desired operation based on the UserID or GroupID of the User.
Under the CIFS access protocol, Data Mover Users are allowed to backup, restore, and take ownership of
all objects if they are member of the local Administrators group. For the NFS access protocol, Data Mover
Users who are superusers can perform all operations on all objects.
The primary purpose of the TOE is to provide the User Data Protection security function. The TOE is designed to
mediate access to files and directories for authorized Data Mover Users. These files and directories are either stored
within the TOE or stored remotely on a storage system. The TOE accesses the storage system through a SAN to
provide Data Mover Users access to their data through several standard IP network file sharing mechanisms.
Identification and authentication of Data Mover Users is performed by the Identification and Authentication security
function. Once a user has been successfully authenticated, the TOE is then in possession of the UserID and one or
more GroupIDs for that User. These credentials are used to mediate access to files and directories.
Each file and directory managed by the TOE has an ACL associated with it. This ACL contains one or more Access
Control Entries (ACEs). Each ACE contains a UserID or GroupID and a set of permissions that are granted or
explicitly denied to that UserID or GroupID. Whenever a Data Mover User requests access to a file or directory, the
TOE utilizes its Discretionary Access Control SFP to decide whether or not that access is permitted. The TOE uses
the UserID and GroupIDs of the user and the contents of the ACL to determine if the operation should be allowed to
proceed.
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Measures
EAL2+ was chosen to provide a basic level of independently assured security. This section of the Security Target
maps the assurance requirements of the TOE for a CC EAL2+ level of assurance to the assurance measures used for
the development and maintenance of the TOE. The following table provides a mapping of the appropriate
documentation to the TOE assurance requirements.
9
SFP – Security Function Policy
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Table 5 - Assurance Measures Mapping to TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SARs)
Assurance
Component
Assurance Measure Description
ACM_CAP.2 EMC Corporation EMC Celerra Network Server
Version 5.5 running on EMC Celerra NSX series
and EMC Celerra NS series - Configuration
Management: Capabilities
The Configuration Management document provides a
description of the various tools used to control the
configuration items and how they are used internally
at EMC
ADO_DEL.1 EMC Corporation EMC Celerra Network Server
Version 5.5 running on EMC Celerra NSX series
and EMC Celerra NS series - Delivery and
Operation: Secure Delivery
The Delivery and Operation document provides a
description of the secure delivery procedures
implemented by EMC to protect against TOE
modification during product delivery.
ADO_IGS.1 Celerra Network Server Celerra
NS350/NS500/NS600/NS700/NS704 Integrated
Configuration Version 5.5 PHASE 1 AND 2
SETUP GUIDE P/N 300-002-070 REV A04
These are the Guidance documents for Installation
and configuration of the EMC Celerra Network
Server.
ADV_FSP.1 EMC Corporation EMC Celerra Network Server
Version 5.5 running on EMC Celerra NSX series
and EMC Celerra NS series - TOE Architecture:
High Level Design, Functional Specification, and
Representation Correspondence
This document describes the system security
functions and externally visible interfaces.
ADV_HLD.1 EMC Corporation EMC Celerra Network Server
Version 5.5 running on EMC Celerra NSX series
and EMC Celerra NS series - TOE Architecture:
High Level Design, Functional Specification, and
Representation Correspondence
This document describes the system interfaces and
subsystems.
ADV_RCR.1 EMC Corporation EMC Celerra Network Server
Version 5.5 running on EMC Celerra NSX series
and EMC Celerra NS series- TOE Architecture:
High Level Design, Functional Specification, and
Representation Correspondence
This document establishes the correspondence
between the ST, the FSP, and the HLD design data.
AGD_ADM.1 Celerra Network Server Celerra
NS350/NS500/NS600/NS700/NS704 Integrated
Configuration Version 5.5 PHASE 1 AND 2
SETUP GUIDE P/N 300-002-070 REV A04
These are Guidance documents designed to assist
the management user with the EMC Corporation
EMC Celerra Network Server Version 5.5 running on
EMC Celerra NSX series and EMC Celerra NS
series.
AGD_USR.1 Celerra Network Server Version 5.5 COMMAND
REFERENCE MANUAL P/N 300-002-697 REV
A02
Celerra CDMS Version 2.0 for NFS and CIFS
Version 5.5 USER’S GUIDE P/N 300-002-712
REV A01
The Users Guides instruct the user on how to
properly use the EMC Corporation EMC Celerra
Network Server Version 5.5 running on EMC Celerra
NSX series and EMC Celerra NS series.
ALC_FLR.1 EMC Corporation EMC Celerra Network Server
Version 5.5 running on EMC Celerra NSX series
and EMC Celerra NS series – Life Cycle Support:
Flaw Remediation
This document describes the flaw remediation
process for the EMC Corporation EMC Celerra
Network Server Version 5.5 running on EMC Celerra
NSX series and EMC Celerra NS series.
ATE_COV.1 EMC Corporation EMC Celerra Network Server
Version 5.5 running on EMC Celerra NSX series
and EMC Celerra NS series – Testing: Coverage
This document describes the completeness of test
coverage preformed against the TOE.
ATE_FUN.1 EMC Corporation EMC Celerra Network Server
Version 5.5 running on EMC Celerra NSX series
and EMC Celerra NS series – Tests: Functional
Tests
This document describes the functional testing for the
TOE to establish that the TSF exhibits the properties
necessary to satisfy the functional requirements
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Assurance
Component
Assurance Measure Description
ATE_IND.2 Provided by laboratory evaluation None
AVA_SOF.1 EMC Corporation EMC Celerra Network Server
Version 5.5 running on EMC Celerra NSX series
and EMC Celerra NS series - Vulnerability
Assessment
This document provides The Strength of TOE
Security Function Analysis.
AVA_VLA.1 EMC Corporation EMC Celerra Network Server
Version 5.5 running on EMC Celerra NSX series
and EMC Celerra NS series - Vulnerability
Assessment
This document provides evidence of how the TOE is
resistant to attacks.
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7 Protection Profile Claims
This section provides the identification and justification for any Protection Profile conformance claims.
7.1 Protection Profile Reference
There are no Protection Profile claims for this Security Target.
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8 Rationale
This section provides the rationale for the selection of the security requirements, objectives, assumptions, and
threats. In particular, it shows that the security requirements are suitable to meet the security objectives, which in
turn are shown to be suitable to cover all aspects of the TOE security environment.
8.1 Security Objectives Rationale
This section provides a rationale for the existence of each assumption, threat, and policy statement that compose the
ST. The following tables demonstrate the mapping between the assumptions, threats, and polices to the security
objectives is complete. The Rationale column provides detailed evidence of coverage for each assumption, threat,
and policy.
8.1.1 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Threats
Threats Objectives Rationale
T.BYPASS
The TOE could be bypassed by a
server with direct access to the
SAN.
OE.BYPASS
The TOE environment must ensure
that the TSF cannot be bypassed
OE.BYPASS ensures that other IT
systems will not access User Data
being protected by the TOE using
direct access to the SAN. All access
to User Data will be through the TOE
and its protection mechanisms.
O.ADMIN
The TOE must provide a method for
administrative control of the TOE.
O.ADMIN supports the mitigation of
this threat by allowing an administrator
to properly configure the mechanisms
of the TOE designed to mitigate this
threat.
O.BYPASS
The TOE must ensure that the TSF
cannot be bypassed.
The objective O.BYPASS ensures that
the protection mechanisms of the TOE
designed to mitigate this threat cannot
be bypassed.
T.IMPROPER_CONFIG
The TOE could be misconfigured
to provide improper storage or
enforce improper access to user
data.
O.I&A
The TOE will uniquely identify users
and will authenticate the claimed
identity before granting a User access
to the TSF’s when local authentication
is required.
O.I&A supports the mitigation of this
threat by ensuring that all authorized
administrators are properly identified
and authenticated.
T.MEDIATE_ACCESS
Access to user data could be
improperly granted to users who
should not have access to it.
O.ADMIN
The TOE must provide a method for
administrative control of the TOE.
O.ADMIN supports the mitigation of
this threat by allowing an administrator
to properly configure the mechanisms
of the TOE designed to mitigate this
threat.
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Threats Objectives Rationale
O.BYPASS
The TOE must ensure that the TSF
cannot be bypassed.
The objective O.BYPASS ensures that
the protection mechanisms of the TOE
designed to mitigate this threat cannot
be bypassed.
O.I&A
The TOE will uniquely identify users
and will authenticate the claimed
identity before granting a User access
to the TSF’s when local authentication
is required.
O.I&A and OE.I&A (depending on
TOE configuration) work together to
ensure that the TOE or the TOE
environment has properly identified
and authenticated a user prior to
providing access to user data.
O.PROTECT
The TOE must protect data that it has
been entrusted to protect.
O.PROTECT mitigates this threat by
providing mechanisms to protect the
data that has been entrusted to the
TOE.
OE.I&A
The TOE environment will uniquely
identify users and will authenticate the
claimed identity when requested to do
so by the TOE
O.I&A and OE.I&A (depending on
TOE configuration) work together to
ensure that the TOE or the TOE
environment has properly identified
and authenticated a user prior to
providing access to user data.
OE.SECURE_COMMUNICATIONS
The TOE environment must provide
secure communications between
systems connected to the Storage
Area Network
OE.SECURE_COMMUNICATIONS
ensures that identification and
authentication performed by the TOE
Environment is done over a secure
communications channel.
OE.SECURE_SERVERS
The TOE environment must provide
properly configured authentication
servers to communicate with the TOE.
OE.SECURE_SERVERS supports the
mitigation of this threat by ensuring
that the servers that communicate
with the TOE on behalf of a user are
managed securely. Depending upon
the access mechanism chosen, the
TOE may depend upon these servers
for identification and authentication of
users.
T.UNAUTH
An unauthorized user could
access data stored by the TOE.
O.ADMIN
The TOE must provide a method for
administrative control of the TOE.
O.ADMIN supports the mitigation of
this threat by allowing an administrator
to properly configure the mechanisms
of the TOE designed to mitigate this
threat.
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Threats Objectives Rationale
O.BYPASS
The TOE must ensure that the TSF
cannot be bypassed.
The objective O.BYPASS ensures that
the protection mechanisms of the TOE
designed to mitigate this threat cannot
be bypassed.
O.I&A
The TOE will uniquely identify users
and will authenticate the claimed
identity before granting a User access
to the TSF’s when local authentication
is required.
O.I&A and OE.I&A (depending on
TOE configuration) work together to
ensure that the TOE or the TOE
environment has properly identified
and authenticated a user prior to
providing access to user data.
O.PROTECT
The TOE must protect data that it has
been entrusted to protect.
O.PROTECT mitigates this threat by
providing mechanisms to protect the
data that has been entrusted to the
TOE.
OE.I&A
The TOE environment will uniquely
identify users and will authenticate the
claimed identity when requested to do
so by the TOE
O.I&A and OE.I&A (depending on
TOE configuration) work together to
ensure that the TOE or the TOE
environment has properly identified
and authenticated a user prior to
providing access to user data.
OE.SECURE_COMMUNICATIONS
The TOE environment must provide
secure communications between
systems connected to the Storage
Area Network
OE.SECURE_COMMUNICATIONS
ensures that identification and
authentication performed by the TOE
Environment is done over a secure
communications channel.
OE.SECURE_SERVERS
The TOE environment must provide
properly configured authentication
servers to communicate with the TOE.
OE.SECURE_SERVERS supports the
mitigation of this threat by ensuring
that the servers that communicate
with the TOE on behalf of a user are
managed securely. Depending upon
the access mechanism chosen, the
TOE may depend upon these servers
for identification and authentication of
users.
8.1.2 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Assumptions
Assumptions Objectives Rationale
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Assumptions Objectives Rationale
A.PROTECT
The IT Environment shall provide
a secure place to store user data
of which access to that data will be
mediated by the TOE
OE.PROTECT
The TOE environment must protect
the data it has been entrusted to
protect
Sites using the TOE will connect the
TOE to a SAN that provides data
storage. This data storage should be
configured and managed securely to
allow the TOE to properly mediate
access to User Data.
A.PHYSICAL
Physical security will be provided
for the TOE and its environment.
OE.PHYSICAL
The TOE will be used in a physically
secure site that protects it from
interference and tampering by
untrusted subjects.
Physical security is provided within the
domain for the value of the IT
resources protected by the operating
system and the value of the stored,
processed, and transmitted
information. OE.PHYSICAL satisfies
this assumption.
A.MANAGE
There are one or more competent
individuals assigned to manage
the TOE and the security of the
information it contains.
OE.MANAGE
Sites deploying the TOE will provide
competent TOE administrators who
will ensure the system is used
securely.
Those responsible for the TOE will
provide competent individuals to
perform management of the security
of the environment, and restrict these
functions and facilities from
unauthorized use. OE.MANAGE
satisfies this assumption.
A.NOEVIL
Administrators are non-hostile,
appropriately trained, and follow all
administrator guidance.
OE.NOEVIL
Sites using the TOE shall ensure that
TOE administrators are non-hostile,
appropriately trained and follow all
administrator guidance.
Sites using the TOE ensure that
administrators are non-hostile,
appropriately trained, and follow all
administrator guidance. OE.NOEVIL
satisfies this assumption.
8.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The following discussion provides detailed evidence of coverage for each security objective.
8.2.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE Objectives
Objective Requirements Addressing the Objective Rationale
FIA_UID.2(a)
User identification before any action
The TOE will properly identify and
authenticate all administrators.
O.ADMIN
The TOE must provide a method
for administrative control of the
TOE.
FIA_UAU.2(a)
User authentication before any action
The TOE shall successfully
authenticate each administrator before
allowing them to manage the TOE
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Objective Requirements Addressing the Objective Rationale
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
Specific roles are defined to govern
management of the TOE
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management
functions
FMT_SMF specifies each of the
management functions that are
utilized to securely manage the TOE
FMT_MTD.1
Management of TSF data
The ability to modify TSF data is
granted only to certain roles managed
by the TOE
FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialisation
Restrictive values for data access are
provided, and the Object Owner can
change them when a data object is
created.
FMT_MSA.1
Management of security attributes
Security attributes of the TOE can
only be changed by authorized
administrators.
FPT_SEP.1
TSF domain separation
The TOE maintains a security domain
for its execution that protects it from
interference and tampering.
O.BYPASS
The TOE must ensure that the
TSF cannot be bypassed.
FPT_RVM.1(a)
Non-bypassability of the TSP
The TOE ensures that policy
enforcement functions are invoked
and succeed before each function is
allowed to proceed
FIA_UID.2(a)
User identification before any action
The TOE identifies each Administrator
and, when configured for local user
administration, each User prior to
granting access to the TSF.
FIA_ATD.1(a)
User attribute definition
The TOE, when configured for local
user administration, maintains security
attributes for each user.
O.I&A
The TOE will uniquely identify
users and will authenticate the
claimed identity before granting a
User access to the TSF’s when
local authentication is required.
FIA_UAU.2(a)
User authentication before any action
The TOE authenticates each
Administrator and, when configured
for local user administration, each
User prior to granting access to the
TSF.
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Objective Requirements Addressing the Objective Rationale
FDP_ACF.1
Security attribute based access
control
The TOE provides access control
functionality to manage access to data
protected by the TOE.
O.PROTECT
The TOE must protect data that it
has been entrusted to protect.
FDP_ACC.1
Subset access control
The TOE has an access control policy
which ensures that only authorized
users gain access to data protected
by the TOE.
8.2.2 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the IT Environment
Objective Requirements Addressing the Objective Rationale
FIA_ATD.1(b)
User attribute definition
The TOE Environment, when
configured for remote user
administration, maintains security
attributes for each user.
FIA_UAU.2(b)
User authentication before any action
The TOE Environment, when
configured for remote user
administration, authenticates each
user.
OE.I&A
The TOE environment will
uniquely identify users and will
authenticate the claimed identity
when requested to do so by the
TOE
FIA_UID.2(b)
User identification before any action
The TOE Environment, when
configured for remote user
administration, uniquely identifies
each user.
FIA_ATD.1(b)
User attribute definition
The TOE Environment, when
configured for remote user
administration, maintains security
attributes for each user.
FIA_UAU.2(b)
User authentication before any action
The TOE Environment, when
configured for remote user
administration, authenticates each
user.
OE.SECURE_COMMUNICATION
S
The TOE environment must
provide secure communications
between systems connected to the
Storage Area Network
FIA_UID.2(b)
User identification before any action
The TOE Environment, when
configured for remote user
administration, uniquely identifies
each user.
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Objective Requirements Addressing the Objective Rationale
FTP_ITC.1
Inter-TSF trusted channel
The TOE Environment provides a
communication channel between
systems connected to the Storage
Area Network that is logically
distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and
protection of the channel data from
modification or disclosure.
FIA_ATD.1(b)
User attribute definition
The TOE Environment, when
configured for remote user
administration, maintains security
attributes for each user.
FIA_UAU.2(b)
User authentication before any action
The TOE Environment, when
configured for remote user
administration, authenticates each
user.
OE.SECURE_SERVERS
The TOE environment must
provide properly configured
authentication servers to
communicate with the TOE.
FIA_UID.2(b)
User identification before any action
The TOE Environment, when
configured for remote user
administration, uniquely identifies
each user.
OE.BYPASS
The TOE environment must
ensure that the TSF cannot be
bypassed
FPT_RVM.1(b)
Non-bypassability of the TSP
The TOE Environment ensures that
policy enforcement functions are
invoked and succeed before access
to data is granted to a user.
8.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
EAL2+ was chosen to provide a low to moderate level of assurance that is consistent with good commercial
practices. As such, minimal additional tasks are placed upon the vendor assuming the vendor follows reasonable
software engineering practices and can provide support to the evaluation for design and testing efforts. The chosen
assurance level is appropriate with the threats defined for the environment. At EAL2+, the TOE will have incurred a
search for obvious flaws to support its introduction into the non-hostile environment.
8.4 Rationale for Refinements of Security Functional Requirements
The following refinements of SFR from CC version 2.3 have been made to clarify the content of the SFRs, and
make them easier to read:
The term “TSF” has been refined to “TOE Environment” for FIA_ATD.1(b), FPT_RVM.1(b), and FTP_TRP.1.
The words “to the TOE Environment” were added to FIA_UAU.2(b) and FIA_UID.2(b).
The words “between itself and a remote trusted IT product” has been refined to “systems connected to the Storage
Area Network” for FTP_TRP.1.
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8.5 Dependency Rationale
This ST does satisfy all the requirement dependencies of the CC. Table 6 lists each requirement to which the TOE
claims conformance with a dependency and indicates whether the dependent requirement was included. As the table
indicates, all dependencies have been met.
Table 6 - Functional Requirements Dependencies
SFR ID Dependencies
Dependency
Met Rationale
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 

FDP_ACC.1 

FDP_ACF.1
FMT_MSA.3 

FIA_ATD.1(a) No Dependencies 

FIA_UAU.2(a) FIA_UID.1 
 FIA_UID.2 is hierarchical to FIA_UID.1 and
therefore satisfies this dependency.
FIA_UAU.2(b) FIA_UID.1 
 FIA_UID.2 is hierarchical to FIA_UID.1 and
therefore satisfies this dependency.
FIA_UID.2(a) No Dependencies 

FIA_UID.2(b) No Dependencies 

FDP_ACC.1 

FMT_SMF.1 

FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1 

FMT_MSA.1 

FMT_MSA.3
FMT_SMR.1 

FMT_SMF.1 

FMT_MTD.1
FMT_SMR.1 

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SFR ID Dependencies
Dependency
Met Rationale
FMT_SMF.1 No Dependencies 

FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 
 FIA_UID.2 is hierarchical to FIA_UID.1 and
therefore satisfies this dependency.
FPT_RVM.1(a) No Dependencies 

FPT_RVM.1(b) No Dependencies 

FPT_SEP.1 No Dependencies 

FTP_TRP.1 No Dependencies 

8.6 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
8.6.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale for the Security Functional
Requirements
Each subsection in the TOE Summary Specification (Section 6.1) describes a security function of the TOE. These
sets of security functions work together to satisfy all of the security functional requirements. Furthermore, all of the
security functions are necessary in order for the TSF to meet the security functional requirements. This section, in
conjunction with the TOE Summary Specification section, provides evidence that the security functions are suitable
to fulfill the TOE security requirements.
Table 4 identifies the relationship between SFR and security functions, showing that all SFR are addressed and all
security functions are necessary (i.e., they correspond to at least one SFR).
8.6.2 TOE Summary Specification Rationale for the Security Assurance
Requirements
EAL2 was chosen to provide a basic level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of
the complete development record from the vendor. The chosen assurance level is consistent with the postulated
threat environment.
8.6.2.1 Configuration Management
The EMC Corporation EMC Celerra Network Server Version 5.5 running on EMC Celerra NSX series and EMC
Celerra NS series - Configuration Management: Capabilities documentation provides a description of tools used to
control the configuration items and how they are used at the EMC. The documentation provides a complete
configuration item list and a unique reference for each item. Additionally, the configuration management system is
described including procedures that are used by developers to control and track changes that are made to the TOE.
The documentation further details the TOE configuration items that are controlled by the configuration management
system.
Corresponding CC Assurance Components:
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• Configuration Items
8.6.2.2 Delivery and Operation
The EMC Corporation EMC Celerra Network Server Version 5.5 running on EMC Celerra NSX series and EMC
Celerra NS series - Delivery and Operation: Secure Delivery documentation provides a description of the secure
delivery procedures implemented by EMC to protect against TOE modification during product delivery. The
Installation Documentation provided by EMC details the procedures for installing the TOE and placing the TOE in a
secure state offering the same protection properties as the master copy of the TOE. The Installation Documentation
provides guidance to the administrator on the TOE configuration parameters and how they affect the TSF.
Corresponding CC Assurance Components:
• Delivery Procedures
• Installation, Generation, and Start-Up Procedures
8.6.2.3 Development
The EMC Corporation EMC Celerra Network Server Version 5.5 running on EMC Celerra NSX series and EMC
Celerra NS series - TOE Architecture: High Level Design, Functional Specification, and Representation
Correspondence design documentation consists of several related design documents that address the components of
the TOE at different levels of abstraction. The following design documents address the Development Assurance
Requirements:
• The Functional Specification provides a description of the security functions provided by the TOE and a
description of the external interfaces to the TSF. The Functional Specification covers the purpose and
method of use and a list of effects, exceptions, and errors message for each external TSF interface.
• The High-Level Design provides a top level design specification that refines the TSF functional
specification into the major constituent parts (subsystems) of the TSF. The high-level design identifies the
basic structure of the TSF, the major elements, a listing of all interfaces, and the purpose and method of use
for each interface.
• The Correspondence Analysis demonstrates the correspondence between each of the TSF representations
provided. This mapping is performed to show the functions traced from the ST description to the High-
Level Design.
Corresponding CC Assurance Components:
• Informal Functional Specification
• Descriptive High-Level Design
• Informal Representation Correspondence
8.6.2.4 Guidance Documentation
The EMC Guidance documentation provides administrator and user guidance on how to securely operate the TOE.
The Administrator Guidance provides descriptions of the security functions provided by the TOE. Additionally, it
provides detailed accurate information on how to administer the TOE in a secure manner and how to effectively use
the TSF privileges and protective functions. The User Guidance provided directs users on how to operate the TOE
in a secure manner. Additionally, User Guidance explains the user-visible security functions and how they are to be
used and explains the user’s role in maintaining the TOE’s Security. EMC provides single versions of documents
which address the Administrator Guidance and User Guidance; there are no separate guidance documents for a non-
administrative user of the TOE.
Corresponding CC Assurance Components:
• Administrator Guidance
• User Guidance
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8.6.2.5 Life Cycle Support
The EMC Corporation EMC Celerra Network Server Version 5.5 running on EMC Celerra NSX series and EMC
Celerra NS series – Life Cycle Support: Flaw Remediation documentation describes the processes that EMC follows
to capture, track, and correct flaws (or “bugs”) that are found within the TOE. The documentation demonstrates that
all discovered flaws are recorded and that the process ensures that flaws are tracked through their entire life cycle.
Corresponding CC Assurance Components:
• Basic Flaw Remediation
8.6.2.6 Tests
There are a number of components that make up the EMC Corporation EMC Celerra Network Server Version 5.5
running on EMC Celerra NSX series and EMC Celerra NS series Functional Tests and Coverage documentation,
EMC Corporation EMC Celerra Network Server Version 5.5 running on EMC Celerra NSX series and EMC
Celerra NS series Testing: Coverage and EMC Corporation EMC Celerra Network Server Version 5.5 running on
EMC Celerra NSX series and EMC Celerra NS series Testing: Functional Tests. The Coverage Analysis document
demonstrates the testing performed against the functional specification. The Coverage Analysis demonstrates the
extent to which the TOE security functions were tested, as well as the level of detail to which the TOE was tested.
Also provided are EMC Test Plans and Functional Test Procedures, which detail the overall efforts of the testing
effort and break down the specific steps taken by a tester.
Corresponding CC Assurance Components:
• Evidence of Coverage
• Functional Testing
8.6.2.7 Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses
The EMC Corporation EMC Celerra Network Server Version 5.5 running on EMC Celerra NSX series and EMC
Celerra NS series - Vulnerability Assessment documentation is provided to demonstrate ways in which an entity
could violate the TSP and provide a list of identified vulnerabilities. Additionally, the document provides evidence
of how the TOE is resistant to obvious attacks. The Strength of TOE Security Function Analysis demonstrates the
strength of the probabilistic or permutational mechanisms employed to provide security functions within the TOE
and how they exceed the minimum SOF requirements.
Corresponding CC Assurance Components:
• Strength of TOE Security Function analysis
• Vulnerability Analysis
8.7 Strength of Function
A SOF rating of SOF-basic was claimed for this TOE to meet the EAL2 assurance requirements. This SOF is
sufficient to resist the threats identified in Section 3 of the ST. Section 8.1 of the Security Target provides evidence
that demonstrates that TOE threats are countered by the TOE security objectives. Section 8.2 of the ST
demonstrates that the security objectives for the TOE and the TOE environment are satisfied by the security
requirements. The evaluated TOE is intended to operate in commercial and Department of Defense (DoD) low
robustness environments processing unclassified information.
The relevant security functions and security functional requirements which have probabilistic or permutational
functions are:
• Identification and Authentication: FIA_UAU.2(a) - User Authentication before any action
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The only mechanisms within the TOE that are probabilistic and permutational in nature are the passwords used to
authenticate users to the TOE.
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9 Acronyms
Table 7 - Acronyms
Acronym Definition
ACE Access Control Entry
AGD Assurance Guidance Document
ACL Access Control List
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Methodology for Information
Technology Security Evaluation
CIFS Common Internet File System
CLI Command Line Interface
DART Data Access in Real Time
DoD Department of Defense
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IP Internet Protocol
iSCSI internet Small Computer System Interface
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IT Information Technology
LUN Logical Unit Number
NAS Network Attached Storage
NFS Network File System
PP Protection Profile
SAN Storage Area Network
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
TSP TOE Security Policy