TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Certification Report
FM1280 07 Dual Interface Smart Card Chip with IC Dedicated
Software 2.77
Sponsor and developer: Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics Group Company
Limited
Building 4, No.127, GuoTai Road
Shanghai
P.R. China
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2300106-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2300106-01
Author(s): Kjartan Jæger Kvassnes
Date: 01 October 2025
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 12
Page: 3/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300106-01-CR, dated 01 October 2025
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
Page: 5/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300106-01-CR, dated 01 October 2025
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the FM1280
07 Dual Interface Smart Card Chip with IC Dedicated Software 2.77. The developer of the FM1280 07
Dual Interface Smart Card Chip with IC Dedicated Software 2.77 is Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics
Group Company Limited located in Shanghai, P.R.C. and they also act as the sponsor of the
evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when
judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a FM1280 07 Dual Interface Smart Card Chip with IC Dedicated Software 2.77, in short
FM1280, developed by Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics. It can be widely and easily applied in
various security fields.
The FM1280 consists of the IC Hardware, the IC Dedicated Software and the supporting documents.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 01 October 2025 with the approval of the ETR. The certification
procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for
Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the FM1280 07 Dual Interface Smart Card Chip
with IC Dedicated Software 2.77, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation
assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of
the FM1280 07 Dual Interface Smart Card Chip with IC Dedicated Software 2.77 are advised to verify
that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the
comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the FM1280 07 Dual Interface Smart Card Chip
with IC Dedicated Software 2.77 from Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics Group Company Limited
located in Shanghai, P.R.C..
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware FM1280 07 07
Software IC Dedicated Firmware which includes the following: 2.77
FMSH_CryptoLib 3.110
FM_CryptoLib.h
FM_CryptoLib_struct.h
FM_Firmware_staticLib_Crypto.lib
2.01
Driver 1.00
FM_DriverAPI.h
FM_Firmware_staticLib_Driver.lib
1.12
AU library 06
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the FM1280 07 Dual
Interface Smart Card Chip with IC Dedicated Software 2.77. For details, see section 2.5
“Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST] or [ST-Lite], Chapter 1.4.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE has the following security features:
• Hardware coprocessor for TDES
• Hardware coprocessor for AES
• True Random Number Generator with protections
• Hardware for RSA support
• Protection against power and electronic magnetic analysis
• Protection against physical attacks
• Protection against perturbation attacks
• Memory access control
• Memory encryption
• Data and critical register protection
• Active shielding
• Security sensors
• Software library with cryptographic services
Page: 7/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300106-01-CR, dated 01 October 2025
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2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 and 4.3 of the [ST]
or [ST-Lite].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The logical architecture of the TOE can be depicted as follows:
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
FM1280 07 Security Preparatory Guidance, Dated March 2025 V0.7
FM1280 07 Security Programming Guidance, Dated March 2025 V0.7
FM1280 07 Application Programming Interface for
FMSH_CryptoLib, Dated October 2023
V0.3
FM1280 07 Application Programming Interface for
Driver, Dated August 2023
V0.2
FM1280 07 User Manual, Dated February 2024 V1.3
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2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-enforcing
module level. All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were
tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The
testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were
used extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment.
The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers
whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified
behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review is performed on the TOE.
During this attack-oriented analysis, the protection of the TOE is analysed using the
knowledge gained from all previous evaluation classes. This results in the identification of
(additional) potential vulnerabilities. For this analysis will be performed according to the attack
methods in [JIL-AM].
• All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that
these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed
by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.
• Due to the long evaluation time period, the source code was reviewed again and re-testing
was performed in 2025 to validate the previous test results.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 50 weeks. During that test campaign, 5% of the
total time was spent on physical attacks, 26% on Perturbation attacks, 47% on side-channel testing,
and 5% on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The testing was performed on the following configuration:
• Hardware: FM1280 07
• IC Dedicated Software: 2.77
o CryptoLib: 3.110
o Crypto.lib: 2.01
o Driver: 1.000
o Driver.lib: 1.12
o AU library: 05/06
Note that the updated RSA function in AU library is tested against AU library version
v06. Other parts of the TOE components were tested against AU library v05. The
evaluator confirmed the results for version 05 are also valid for 06.
Page: 9/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300106-01-CR, dated 01 October 2025
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2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of 4 site audit reports, 1 site certificate and 1 Site Technical Audit
Report.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number FM1280 07 Dual Interface Smart Card
Chip with IC Dedicated Software 2.77.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to
[COMP] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document provides details of
the TOE evaluation that must be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite
evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the FM1280 07 Dual Interface
Smart Card Chip with IC Dedicated Software 2.77, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant,
and to meet the requirements of EAL 5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. This implies
that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP_0084].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
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cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
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3 Security Target
The FM1280 07 Dual Interface Smart Card Chip with IC Dedicated Software Security Target, v0.9, 22
June 2025 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II
and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards
and similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “FM1280 07 Dual Interface Smart Card Chip
with IC Dedicated Software” – EAL5+, 23-RPT-1471, Version 8.1, Dated 13
August 2025
[ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition “FM1280 07 Dual Interface
Smart Card Chip with IC Dedicated Software 2.77” – EAL5+, 24-RPT-958,
Version 6.1, Dated 13 August 2025
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2.1, February
2024
[JIL-AMS] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.5, May 2022
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[PP_0084] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages,
registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, Version 1.0, 13
January 2014
[ST] FM1280 07 Dual Interface Smart Card Chip with IC Dedicated Software
Security Target, v0.9, 22 June 2025
[ST-lite] FM1280 07 Dual Interface Smart Card Chip with IC Dedicated Software 2.77
Security Target Lite, v1.2, dated March 2025
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)