High Sec Labs SC21H-4, SC82PH-4,
SC162PH-4, SMX42D-M, SMX42H-M,
SMX42P-M, SMX82D-M, SMX82H-M,
SMX82P-M Firmware Version
44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing
Devices
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102A2
Version: 1.1
29 April 2024
High Sec Labs Ltd.
29 HaEshel St
Caesarea,
Israel 3079510
Prepared by:
EWA-Canada, An Intertek Company
1223 Michael Street North, Suite 200
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
K1J 7T2
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CONTENTS
1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION.............................................1
1.1 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION........................................................... 1
1.2 SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE....................................................... 2
1.3 TOE REFERENCE........................................................................... 2
1.4 TOE OVERVIEW............................................................................ 2
TOE Environment ...........................................................................3
1.5 TOE DESCRIPTION ....................................................................... 4
Evaluated Configurations.................................................................4
Physical Scope ...............................................................................6
Logical Scope.................................................................................7
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS...............................................................9
2.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE CLAIM ...................................... 9
2.2 PP-CONFIGURATION CONFORMANCE CLAIM ..................................... 9
2.3 TECHNICAL DECISIONS................................................................. 9
2.4 PACKAGE CLAIM......................................................................... 10
2.5 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE ......................................................... 11
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION..............................................12
3.1 THREATS .................................................................................. 12
3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ......................................... 13
3.3 ASSUMPTIONS........................................................................... 13
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES..............................................................15
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ............................................ 15
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT......... 19
4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE............................................... 20
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION......................................25
6 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS...................................26
6.1 CONVENTIONS........................................................................... 26
6.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS........................................ 27
User Data Protection (FDP)............................................................32
TOE Access (FTA).........................................................................38
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Protection of the TSF (FPT)............................................................38
7 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ....................................40
8 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE.....................................41
8.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ....................... 41
8.2 DEPENDENCY RATIONALE............................................................ 41
8.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ........................ 42
9 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION.................................................43
9.1 USER DATA PROTECTION ............................................................ 43
System Controller ........................................................................43
Keyboard and Mouse Functionality..................................................44
Video Switching Functionality.........................................................46
Video Compatible Device Types......................................................50
9.2 PROTECTION OF THE TSF ............................................................ 50
No Access to TOE .........................................................................50
Anti-tampering Functionality..........................................................50
TSF Testing .................................................................................50
9.3 TOE ACCESS.............................................................................. 51
Wired Remote Control (SMX42H-M)................................................51
10 TERMINOLOGY AND ACRONYMS ................................................52
10.1 TERMINOLOGY........................................................................... 52
10.2 ACRONYMS................................................................................ 52
11 REFERENCES..............................................................................54
ANNEX A – LETTER OF VOLATILITY ........................................................1
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 – Non-TOE Hardware and Software................................................. 4
Table 2 – TOE Peripheral Sharing Devices and Features ................................ 6
Table 3 – TOE Auxiliary Front Panel Devices (Remotes)................................. 6
Table 4 – Logical Scope of the TOE ............................................................ 8
Table 5 – Applicable Technical Decisions ................................................... 10
Table 6 – Threats.................................................................................. 13
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Table 7 – Assumptions........................................................................... 14
Table 8 – Security Objectives for the TOE ................................................. 19
Table 9 – Security Objectives for the Operational Environment..................... 20
Table 10 – Security Objectives Rationale .................................................. 24
Table 11 – Functional Families of Extended Components ............................. 25
Table 12 – Summary of Security Functional Requirements........................... 31
Table 13 – Security Assurance Requirements............................................. 40
Table 14 – Functional Requirement Dependencies ...................................... 42
Table 15 – Terminology ......................................................................... 52
Table 16 – Acronyms............................................................................. 53
Table 17 – References ........................................................................... 54
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 – KVM Switch Evaluated Configuration ........................................... 4
Figure 2 – Combiner Evaluated Configuration .............................................. 5
Figure 3 – Display EDID Read Function..................................................... 46
Figure 4 – Display EDID Write Function .................................................... 47
Figure 5 – Display Normal Mode .............................................................. 48
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1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION
This Security Target (ST) defines the scope of the evaluation in terms of the
assumptions made, the intended environment for the Target of Evaluation
(TOE), the Information Technology (IT) security functional and assurance
requirements to be met, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level)
to which it is asserted that the TOE satisfies its IT security requirements. This
document forms the baseline for the Common Criteria (CC) evaluation.
1.1 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION
Section 1, ST Introduction, provides the Security Target reference, the Target
of Evaluation reference, the TOE overview and the TOE description.
Section 2, Conformance Claims, describes how the ST conforms to the
Common Criteria, Protection Profile (PP) and PP Modules.
Section 3, Security Problem Definition, describes the expected environment
in which the TOE is to be used. This section defines the set of threats that are
relevant to the secure operation of the TOE, organizational security policies with
which the TOE must comply, and secure usage assumptions applicable to this
analysis.
Section 4, Security Objectives, defines the set of security objectives to be
satisfied by the TOE and by the TOE operating environment in response to the
problem defined by the security problem definition.
Section 5, Extended Components Definition, defines the extended
components which are then detailed in Section 6.
Section 6, Security Functional Requirements, specifies the security
functional requirements that must be satisfied by the TOE and the IT
environment.
Section 7, Security Assurance Requirements, specifies the security
assurance requirements that must be satisfied by the TOE and the IT
environment.
Section 8, Security Requirements Rationale, provides a rationale for the
selection of functional and assurance requirements.
Section 9, TOE Summary Specification, describes the security functions that
are included in the TOE to enable it to meet the IT security functional
requirements.
Section 10, Terminology and Acronyms, defines the acronyms and
terminology used in this ST.
Section 11, References, provides a list of documents referenced in this ST.
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1.2 SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE
ST Title: High Sec Labs SC21H-4, SC82PH-4, SC162PH-4,
SMX42D-M, SMX42H-M, SMX42P-M, SMX82D-M,
SMX82H-M, SMX82P-M Firmware Version 44404-E7E7
Peripheral Sharing Devices Security Target
ST Version: 1.1
ST Date: 29 April 2024
1.3 TOE REFERENCE
TOE Identification: High Sec Labs SC21H-4, SC82PH-4, SC162PH-4,
SMX42D-M, SMX42H-M, SMX42P-M, SMX82D-M,
SMX82H-M, SMX82P-M Firmware Version 44404-E7E7
Peripheral Sharing Devices
TOE Developer: High Sec Labs Ltd.
TOE Type: Peripheral Sharing Device (Other Devices and
Systems)
1.4 TOE OVERVIEW
The High Sec Labs (HSL) Modular Matrix Switches allow users to view and
control two computers while securely sharing keyboard, video, and mouse
peripherals between a number of connected computers.
The HSL Combiner Switches allow users to interact with multiple computers
presented on the same displays at the same time using a single set of keyboard,
mouse, and video peripherals.
The following security features are provided by the HSL Peripheral Sharing
Devices:
• Video Security
• Computer video input interfaces are isolated through the use of
separate electronic components, power and ground domains
• The display is isolated by dedicated, read-only, Extended Display
Identification Data (EDID) emulation for each computer
• Access to the monitor’s EDID is blocked
• Access to the Monitor Control Command Set (MCCS commands) is
blocked
• DisplayPort, High-Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI), and
Digital Visual Interface (DVI)-D video peripherals are supported as
follows:
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▪ DisplayPort peripherals are supported by the SC82PH-4,
SC162PH-4, SMX42P-M, and SMX82P-M devices
▪ HDMI peripherals are supported by the SC21H-4, SC82PH-4,
SC162PH-4, SMX42H-M and SMX82H-M devices
▪ DVI-D peripherals are supported by the SMX42D-M, and
SMX82D-M devices
• Keyboard and Mouse Security
• The keyboard and mouse are isolated by dedicated, USB device
emulation for each computer
• One-way, peripheral-to-computer data flow is enforced through
unidirectional optical data diodes
• Communication from computer-to-keyboard/mouse is blocked
• Non HID (Human Interface Device) data transactions are blocked
• Hardware Anti-Tampering
• Special holographic tampering evident labels on the product’s
enclosure provide a clear visual indication if the product has been
opened or compromised
High Sec Labs secure peripheral sharing devices use multiple isolated
microcontrollers (one microcontroller per connected computer) to emulate
connected peripherals in order to prevent an unauthorized data flow through bit-
by-bit signaling.
A Host Emulator (HE) communicates with the user keyboard via the USB
protocol. The Host Emulator converts user keystrokes into unidirectional serial
data. That unidirectional serial data is passed through the switch that is used to
select between Computer A and Computer B. Isolated Device Emulators (DE) are
connected to the data switch on one side and to the respective computers on the
other side. Each keystroke is converted by the selected DE into a bi-directional
stream to communicate with the computer.
The TOE is a combined software and hardware TOE. A mapping showing the
applicable SFRs for each device is included in Table 12.
TOE Environment
The following components are required for operation of the TOE in the evaluated
configuration.
Component Description
Connected Computers 1-16 General purpose computers
Keyboard General purpose USB keyboard
Mouse General purpose USB mouse
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Component Description
User display Standard computer display (HDMI 2.0, DVI-D, DisplayPort
1.1, 1.2 or 1.3)
HSL KVM Cables USB Type-A to USB Type-B (keyboard and mouse)
Video cable (DisplayPort, DVI-D, HDMI)
Table 1 – Non-TOE Hardware and Software
1.5 TOE DESCRIPTION
The TOE includes the following device types:
• Modular Matrix
• Combiner
Evaluated Configurations
1.5.1.1 Modular Matrix Switch
Figure 1 – KVM Switch Evaluated Configuration
Figure 1 shows a basic evaluated configuration for Modular Matrix Switches. In
the evaluated configuration, the TOE is connected to a keyboard, a mouse, and
four or eight computers. The video input is DisplayPort, HDMI or DVI-D and two
displays are connected. Model SMX42H-M does not have switches on the device
itself and instead uses a wired remote control. It is the only device that uses a
wired remote control.
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1.5.1.2 Combiner
Figure 2 – Combiner Evaluated Configuration
In the evaluated configuration there are two, eight or sixteen connected
computers. The video input is DisplayPort, HDMI or DVI-D, and one or two
displays are connected.
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Physical Scope
The TOE consists of the devices shown in Table 2.
Family Family Description Part Number Model Tamper
Evident
labels
Video in Video out Number of
supported
displays
Keyboard
and
Mouse
Remote
Combiner Secure KVM
Combiners
CGA19271 SC21H-4 Yes HDMI HDMI 1 Yes Not applicable
CGA19449 SC82PH-4 Yes DP/HDMI DP/HDMI 2 Yes Not applicable
CGA19451 SC162PH-4 Yes DP/HDMI DP/HDMI 2 Yes Not applicable
Not
applicable
Secure Modular
Matrix
CGA19461 SMX42D-M Yes DVI-D DVI-D 2 Yes WR40-3
CGA19462 SMX42H-M Yes HDMI HDMI 2 Yes WR40-3
CGA19465 SMX42P-M Yes DP DP 2 Yes WR40-3
CGA19466 SMX82D-M Yes DVI-D DVI-D 2 Yes WR40-3
CGA19469 SMX82H-M Yes HDMI HDMI 2 Yes WR40-3
CGA19470 SMX82P-M Yes DP DP 2 Yes WR40-3
Table 2 – TOE Peripheral Sharing Devices and Features
Description Part Number Model
4 port Auxiliary Front Panel CGA14333 WR40-3
Table 3 – TOE Auxiliary Front Panel Devices (Remotes)
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1.5.2.1 TOE Delivery
The TOE, together with its corresponding cables are delivered to the customer
via trusted carrier, such as Fed-Ex, that provide a tracking service for all
shipments.
1.5.2.2 TOE Guidance
The TOE includes the following guidance documentation:
• HSL Quick Installation Guide 2 Ports High Security HDMI KVM Combiner
Switches, HDC19962 Rev 1.2
• HSL Quick Installation Guide 8/16 Ports High Security DP/HDMI KVM
Combiner Switches, HDC19963 Rev 2.1
• HSL Quick Installation Guide 4/8 Ports High Security Modular Matrix KVM
Switches, HDC19957 Rev. 2.0
Guidance may be downloaded from the High Sec Labs website
(https://highseclabs.com/quick-start-guides/) in .pdf format.
The following guidance is available upon request by emailing
support@highseclabs.com:
• High Sec Labs SC21H-4, SC82PH-4, SC162PH-4, SMX42D-M, SMX42H-M,
SMX42P-M, SMX82D-M, SMX82H-M, SMX82P-M Firmware Version 44404-
E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices Common Criteria Guidance Supplement,
Version 1.4
Logical Scope
The logical boundary of the TOE includes all interfaces and functions within the
physical boundary. The logical boundary of the TOE may be broken down by the
security function classes described in Section 6. Table 4 summarizes the logical
scope of the TOE.
Functional Classes Description
User Data Protection The TOE provides secure switching and unidirectional data
flow capabilities for keyboard, video, and mouse. The TOE
ensures that only authorized peripheral devices may be
used.
Protection of the TSF1
The TOE ensures a secure state in the case of failure,
provides only restricted access, and performs self-testing.
The TOE provides passive detection of physical attack.
1
TOE Security Functionality
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Functional Classes Description
TOE Access The TOE provides a continuous indication of which
computer is currently selected.
Table 4 – Logical Scope of the TOE
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2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
2.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE CLAIM
This Security Target claims to be conformant to Version 3.1 of Common Criteria
for Information Technology Security Evaluation according to:
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model; CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Components; CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Components CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017
As follows:
• CC Part 2 extended
• CC Part 3 conformant
The Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017 has been taken into account.
2.2 PP-CONFIGURATION CONFORMANCE CLAIM
This ST claims exact conformance with the National Information Assurance
Partnership (NIAP) Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device
Keyboard/Mouse Devices, and Video/Display Devices, 19 July 2019 [CFG_PSD‐
KM‐VI_V1.0].
This PP-Configuration includes the following components:
• Base-PP: Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 4.0
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0
[MOD_KM_V1.0]
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0
[MOD_VI_V1.0]
2.3 TECHNICAL DECISIONS
The Technical Decisions in Table 5 apply to the PP and the modules and have
been accounted for in the ST and in the evaluation.
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TD Name PP affected Relevant
Y/N
TD0506 Missing Steps to disconnect and
reconnect display
[MOD_VI_V1.0] Y
TD0507 Clarification on USB plug type [MOD_KM_V1.0] Y
TD0514 Correction to MOD VI FDP_APC_EXT.1
Test 3 Step 6
[MOD_VI_V1.0] Y
TD0518 Typographical errors in dependency
Table
[PP_PSD_V4.0] N
FPT_STM.1
is not
claimed in
the ST
TD0539 Incorrect selection trigger in
FTA_CIN_EXT.1 in MOD_VI_V1.0
[MOD_VI_V1.0] Y
TD0583 FPT_PHP.3 modified for remote
controllers
[PP_PSD_V4.0] N
FPT_PHP.3
is not
claimed in
the ST
TD0584 Update to FDP_APC_EXT.1 Video
Tests
[MOD_VI_V.10] Y
TD0586 DisplayPort and HDMI Interfaces in
FDP_IPC_EXT.1
[MOD_VI_V.10] Y
TD0593 Equivalency Arguments for PSD [MOD_KM_V1.0],
[MOD_VI_V1.0]
Y
TD0620 EDID Read Requirements [MOD_VI_V1.0] Y
TD0681 PSD purging of EDID data upon
disconnect
[MOD_VI_V1.0] Y
TD0686 DisplayPort CEC Testing [MOD_VI_V1.0] Y
TD0804 Clarification regarding Extenders in
PSD Evaluations
[PP_PSD_V4.0] Y
Table 5 – Applicable Technical Decisions
2.4 PACKAGE CLAIM
This Security Target does not claim conformance with any package.
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2.5 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE
The TOE Combiner and Modular Matrix devices are inherently consistent with the
Compliant Targets of Evaluation described in the [PP_PSD_V4.0] and in the PP
modules listed in Section 2.2, and with the PP‐Configuration for Peripheral
Sharing Device, Keyboard/Mouse Devices, and Video/Display Devices [CFG_PSD‐
KM-VI_V1.0].
The security problem definition, statement of security objectives and statement
of security requirements in this ST conform exactly to the security problem
definition, statement of security objectives and statement of security
requirements contained in [PP_PSD_V4.0] and the modules listed in Section 2.2.
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3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
3.1 THREATS
Table 6 lists the threats described in Section 3.1 of the [PP_PSD_V4.0].
Mitigation to the threats is through the objectives identified in Section 4.1,
Security Objectives for the TOE.
Threat Description
T.DATA_LEAK A connection via the PSD2
between one or more
computers may allow unauthorized data flow through
the PSD or its connected peripherals.
T.SIGNAL_LEAK A connection via the PSD between one or more
computers may allow unauthorized data flow through
bit‐by‐bit signaling.
T.RESIDUAL_LEAK A PSD may leak (partial, residual, or echo) user data
between the intended connected computer and another
unintended connected computer.
T.UNINTENDED_USE A PSD may connect the user to a computer other than
the one to which the user intended to connect.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DEVICES The use of an unauthorized peripheral device with a
specific PSD peripheral port may allow unauthorized
data flows between connected devices or enable an
attack on the PSD or its connected computers.
T.LOGICAL_TAMPER An attached device (computer or peripheral) with
malware, or otherwise under the control of a
malicious user, could modify or overwrite code or
data stored in the PSD’s volatile or non‐volatile
memory to allow unauthorized information flows.
T.PHYSICAL_TAMPER A malicious user or human agent could physically
modify the PSD to allow unauthorized information
flows.
T.REPLACEMENT A malicious human agent could replace the PSD
during shipping, storage, or use with an alternate
device that does not enforce the PSD security
policies.
2
Peripheral Sharing Device
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Threat Description
T.FAILED Detectable failure of a PSD may cause an
unauthorized information flow or weakening of PSD
security functions.
Table 6 – Threats
3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES
There are no Organizational Security Policies applicable to this TOE.
3.3 ASSUMPTIONS
The assumptions required to ensure the security of the TOE are listed in Table 7.
Assumptions Description
A.NO_TEMPEST Computers and peripheral devices connected to the
PSD are not TEMPEST approved.
The TSF may or may not isolate the ground of the
keyboard and mouse computer interfaces (the USB
ground). The Operational Environment is assumed not
to support TEMPEST red‐black ground isolation.
A.PHYSICAL The environment provides physical security
commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data
it processes and contains.
A.NO_WIRELESS_DEVICES The environment includes no wireless peripheral
devices.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN PSD Administrators and users are trusted to follow and
apply all guidance in a trusted manner.
A.TRUSTED_CONFIG Personnel configuring the PSD and its operational
environment follow the applicable security
configuration guidance.
A.USER_ALLOWED_ACCESS All PSD users are allowed to interact with all
connected computers. It is not the role of the PSD to
prevent or otherwise control user access to connected
computers. Computers or their connected network
shall have the required means to authenticate the user
and to control access to their various resources.
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Assumptions Description
A.NO_SPECIAL_ANALOG
_CAPABILITIES
The computers connected to the TOE are not equipped
with special analog data collection cards or peripherals
such as analog to digital interface, high performance
audio interface, digital signal processing function, or
analog video capture function.
Table 7 – Assumptions
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4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
The purpose of the security objectives is to address the security concerns and to
show which security concerns are addressed by the TOE, and which are
addressed by the environment. Threats may be addressed by the TOE or the
security environment or both. Therefore, the CC identifies two categories of
security objectives:
• Security objectives for the TOE
• Security objectives for the environment
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE
This section identifies and describes the security objectives that are to be
addressed by the TOE, and traces each Security Functional Requirement (SFR)
back to a security objective of the TOE.
Security Objective Description
O.COMPUTER
_INTERFACE
_ISOLATION
The PSD shall prevent unauthorized data flow to ensure that
the PSD and its connected peripheral devices cannot be
exploited in an attempt to leak data. The TOE‐Computer
interface shall be isolated from all other PSD‐Computer
interfaces while TOE is powered.
Addressed by:
MOD_VI FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.1
MOD_KM FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM,
FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1,
FDP_SWI_EXT.3
O.COMPUTER
_INTERFACE
_ISOLATION
_TOE_UNPOWERED
The PSD shall not allow data to transit a PSD‐Computer
interface while the PSD is unpowered.
Addressed by:
MOD_VI FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.1
MOD_KM FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM,
FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1,
FDP_SWI_EXT.3
O.USER_DATA
_ISOLATION
The PSD shall route user data, such as keyboard entries, only
to the computer selected by the user. The PSD shall provide
isolation between the data flowing from the peripheral device
to the selected computer and any non‐selected computer.
Addressed by:
MOD_VI FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.1
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Security Objective Description
MOD_KM FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM,
FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1,
FDP_SWI_EXT.3
O.NO_USER
_DATA_RETENTION
The PSD shall not retain user data in non‐volatile memory
after power up or, if supported, factory reset.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FDP_RIP_EXT.1
MOD_KM FDP_RIP.1/KM
O.NO_OTHER
_EXTERNAL
_INTERFACES
The PSD shall not have any external interfaces other than
those implemented by the TSF.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FDP_PDC_EXT.1
O.LEAK
_PREVENTION
_SWITCHING
The PSD shall ensure that there are no switching mechanisms
that allow signal data leakage between connected computers.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FDP_SWI_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.2(1),
FDP_SWI_EXT.2(2)
O.AUTHORIZED
_USAGE
The TOE shall explicitly prohibit or ignore unauthorized
switching mechanisms, either because it supports only one
connected computer or because it allows only authorized
mechanisms to switch between connected computers.
Authorized switching mechanisms shall require express user
action restricted to console buttons, console switches, console
touch screen, wired remote control, and peripheral devices
using a guard. Unauthorized switching mechanisms include
keyboard shortcuts, also known as “hotkeys,” automatic port
scanning, control through a connected computer, and control
through keyboard shortcuts. Where applicable, the results of
the switching activity shall be indicated by the TSF so that it
is clear to the user that the switching mechanism was
engaged as intended.
A conformant TOE may also provide a management function
to configure some aspects of the TSF. If the TOE provides this
functionality, it shall ensure that whatever management
functions it provides can only be performed by authorized
administrators and that an audit trail of management
activities is generated.
Addressed by:
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Security Objective Description
PP_PSD FDP_SWI_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.2(1),
FDP_SWI_EXT.2(2), FTA_CIN_EXT.1
MOD_VI FDP_CDS_EXT.1(1), FDP_CDS_EXT.1(2),
FTA_CIN_EXT.1
MOD_KM FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM
O.PERIPHERAL
_PORTS_ISOLATION
The PSD shall ensure that data does not flow between
peripheral devices connected to different PSD interfaces.
Addressed by:
MOD_VI FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.1
MOD_KM FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM,
FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1,
FDP_SWI_EXT.3
O.REJECT
_UNAUTHORIZED
_PERIPHERAL
The PSD shall reject unauthorized peripheral device types and
protocols.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FDP_PDC_EXT.1
MOD_VI FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(1-4),
FDP_IPC_EXT.1(1), FDP_IPC_EXT.1(2),
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP, SPR_EXT.1/DVI-D,
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI
MOD_KM FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM,
FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1,
FDP_SWI_EXT.3, FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM,
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM
O.REJECT
_UNAUTHORIZED
_ENDPOINTS
The PSD shall reject unauthorized peripheral devices
connected via a Universal Serial Bus (USB) hub.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FDP_PDC_EXT.1
MOD_KM FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM,
FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1,
FDP_SWI_EXT.3
O.NO_TOE_ACCESS The PSD firmware, software, and memory shall not be
accessible via its external ports.
Addressed by:
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Security Objective Description
PP_PSD FPT_NTA_EXT.1
O.TAMPER
_EVIDENT
_LABEL
The PSD shall be identifiable as authentic by the user and the
user must be made aware of any procedures or other such
information to accomplish authentication. This feature must
be available upon receipt of the PSD and continue to be
available during the PSD deployment. The PSD shall be
labeled with at least one visible unique identifying tamper‐
evident marking that can be used to authenticate the device.
The PSD manufacturer must maintain a complete list of
manufactured PSD articles and their respective identification
markings’ unique identifiers.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FPT_PHP.1
O.ANTI_TAMPERING The PSD shall be physically enclosed so that any attempts to
open or otherwise access the internals or modify the
connections of the PSD would be evident, and optionally
thwarted through disablement of the TOE. Note: This applies
to a wired remote control as well as the main chassis of the
PSD.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FPT_PHP.1
O.SELF_TEST The PSD shall perform self‐tests following power up or
powered reset.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FPT_TST.1
O.SELF_TEST
_FAIL_TOE
_DISABLE
The PSD shall enter a secure state upon detection of a critical
failure.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FPT_FLS_EXT.1, FPT_TST_EXT.1
O.SELF_TEST
_FAIL_INDICATION
The PSD shall provide clear and visible user indications in the
case of a self‐test failure.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FPT_TST_EXT.1
O.PROTECTED
_EDID
The TOE shall read the connected display Extended Display
Identification Data (EDID) once during the TOE power up or
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Security Objective Description
reboot sequence and prevent any EDID channel write
transactions that connected computers initiate.
Addressed by:
MOD_VI FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP,
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-D, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI
O.UNIDIRECTIONAL
_VIDEO
The TOE shall enforce unidirectional video data flow from the
connected computer video interface to the display interface
only.
Addressed by:
MOD_VI FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI
O.EMULATED_INPUT The TOE shall emulate the keyboard and/or mouse functions
from the TOE to the connected computer.
Addressed by:
MOD_KM FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM
O.UNIDIRECTIONAL
_INPUT
The TOE shall enforce unidirectional keyboard and/or mouse
device’s data flow from the peripheral device to only the
selected computer.
Addressed by:
MOD_KM FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM
Table 8 – Security Objectives for the TOE
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
This section identifies and describes the security objectives that are to be
addressed by the IT environment or by non-technical or procedural means.
Security Objective Description
OE.NO_TEMPEST The operational environment will not use TEMPEST
approved equipment.
OE.PHYSICAL The operational environment will provide physical
security, commensurate with the value of the PSD
and the data that transits it.
OE.NO_WIRELESS_DEVICES The operational environment will not include
wireless keyboards, mice, audio, user
authentication, or video devices.
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Security Objective Description
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN The operational environment will ensure that trusted
PSD Administrators and users are appropriately
trained.
OE.TRUSTED_CONFIG The operational environment will ensure that
administrators configuring the PSD and its
operational environment follow the applicable
security configuration guidance.
OE.NO_SPECIAL_ANALOG
_CAPABILITIES
The operational environment will not have special
analog data collection cards or peripherals such as
analog to digital interface, high performance audio
interface, or a component with digital signal
processing or analog video capture functions.
Table 9 – Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE
The security objectives rationale describes how the assumptions and threats
map to the security objectives.
Threat or
Assumption
Security
Objective(s)
Rationale
T.DATA_LEAK O.COMPUTER
_INTERFACE
_ISOLATION
Isolation of computer interfaces
prevents data from leaking between
them without authorization.
O.COMPUTER
_INTERFACE
_ISOLATION
_TOE_UNPOWERED
Maintaining interface isolation while
the TOE is in an unpowered state
ensures that data cannot leak
between computer interfaces.
O.USER_DATA
_ISOLATION
The TOE’s routing of data only to the
selected computer ensures that it will
not leak to any others.
O.NO_OTHER
_EXTERNAL
_INTERFACES
The absence of additional external
interfaces ensures that there is no
unexpected method by which data
can be leaked.
O.PERIPHERAL_PORTS
_ISOLATION
Isolation of peripheral ports prevents
data from leaking between them
without authorization.
O.UNIDIRECTIONAL
_INPUT
The TOE’s enforcement of
unidirectional input for
keyboard/mouse data prevents
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Threat or
Assumption
Security
Objective(s)
Rationale
leakage of computer data through a
connected peripheral interface.
O.PROTECTED_EDID The TOE’s protection of the EDID
interface prevents its use as a vector
for unauthorized data leakage via this
channel.
O.UNIDIRECTIONAL
_VIDEO
The TOE’s enforcement of
unidirectional output for video data
protects against data leakage via
connected computers by ensuring
that no video data can be input to a
connected computer through this
interface.
T.SIGNAL_LEAK O.COMPUTER
_INTERFACE
_ISOLATION
Isolation of computer interfaces
prevents data leakage through bit‐
wise signaling because there is no
mechanism by which the signal data
can be communicated.
O.NO_OTHER
_EXTERNAL
_INTERFACES
The absence of additional external
interfaces ensures that there is no
unexpected method by which data
can be leaked through bitwise
signaling.
O.LEAK_PREVENTION
_SWITCHING
The TOE’s use of switching methods
that are not susceptible to signal
leakage helps mitigate the signal leak
threat.
O.UNIDIRECTIONAL
_INPUT
The TOE’s enforcement of
unidirectional input for
keyboard/mouse data prevents
leakage of computer data through bit‐
by‐bit signaling to a connected
peripheral interface.
O.PROTECTED_EDID The TOE’s protection of the EDID
interface prevents its use as a vector
for bit‐by‐bit signal leakage via this
channel.
O.UNIDIRECTIONAL
_VIDEO
The TOE’s enforcement of
unidirectional output for video data
protects against signaling leakage via
connected computers by ensuring
that no video data can be input to a
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Threat or
Assumption
Security
Objective(s)
Rationale
connected computer through this
interface.
T.RESIDUAL
_LEAK
O.NO_USER_DATA
_RETENTION
The TOE’s lack of data retention
ensures that a residual data leak is
not possible.
O.PROTECTED_EDID The TOE’s protection of the EDID
interface prevents the leakage of
residual data by ensuring that no
such data can be written to EDID
memory.
T.UNINTENDED
_USE
O.AUTHORIZED
_USAGE
The TOE’s support for only switching
mechanisms that require explicit user
action to engage ensures that a user
has sufficient information to avoid
interacting with an unintended
computer.
T.UNAUTHORIZED
_DEVICES
O.REJECT
_UNAUTHORIZED
_ENDPOINTS
The TOE’s ability to reject
unauthorized endpoints mitigates the
threat of unauthorized devices being
used to communicate with connected
computers.
O.REJECT
_UNAUTHORIZED
_PERIPHERAL
The TOE’s ability to reject
unauthorized peripherals mitigates
the threat of unauthorized devices
being used to communicate with
connected computers.
O.EMULATED_INPUT The TOE’s emulation of
keyboard/mouse data input ensures
that a connected computer will only
receive this specific type of data
through a connected peripheral.
O.UNIDIRECTIONAL
_VIDEO
The TOE’s limitation of supported
video protocol interfaces prevents the
connection of unauthorized devices.
T.LOGICAL
_TAMPER
O.NO_TOE_ACCESS The TOE’s prevention of logical
access to its firmware, software, and
memory mitigates the threat of
logical tampering.
O.EMULATED_INPUT The TOE’s emulation of
keyboard/mouse data input prevents
logical tampering of the TSF ensuring
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Threat or
Assumption
Security
Objective(s)
Rationale
that only known inputs to it are
supported.
T.PHYSICAL
_TAMPER
O.ANTI_TAMPERING The TOE mitigates the threat of
physical tampering through use of an
enclosure that provides tamper
detection functionality.
O.TAMPER_EVIDENT
_LABEL
The TOE mitigates the threat of
physical tampering through use of
tamper evident labels that reveal
physical tampering attempts.
T.REPLACEMENT O.TAMPER_EVIDENT
_LABEL
The TOE’s use of a tamper evident
label that provides authenticity of the
device mitigates the threat that it is
substituted for a replacement device
during the acquisition process.
T.FAILED O.SELF_TEST The TOE mitigates the threat of
failures leading to compromise of
security functions through self‐tests
of its own functionality.
O.SELF_TEST_FAIL
_TOE_DISABLE
The TOE mitigates the threat of
failures leading to compromise of
security functions by disabling all
data flows in the event a failure is
detected.
O.SELF_TEST_FAIL
_INDICATION
The TOE mitigates the threat of
failures leading to compromise of
security functions by providing users
with a clear indication when it is in a
failure state and should not be
trusted.
A.NO_TEMPEST OE.NO_TEMPEST If the TOE’s operational environment
does not include TEMPEST approved
equipment, then the assumption is
satisfied.
A.NO_PHYSICAL OE.PHYSICAL If the TOE’s operational environment
provides physical security, then the
assumption is satisfied.
A.NO_WIRELESS
_DEVICES
OE.NO_WIRELESS
_DEVICES
If the TOE’s operational environment
does not include wireless peripherals,
then the assumption is satisfied.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN OE.TRUSTED
_ADMIN
If the TOE’s operational environment
ensures that only trusted
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Threat or
Assumption
Security
Objective(s)
Rationale
administrators will manage the TSF,
then the assumption is satisfied.
A.TRUSTED
_CONFIG
OE.TRUSTED
_CONFIG
If TOE administrators follow the
provided security configuration
guidance, then the assumption is
satisfied.
A.USER_ALLOWED
_ACCESS
OE.PHYSICAL If the TOE’s operational environment
provides physical access to connected
computers, then the assumption is
satisfied.
A.NO_SPECIAL
_ANALOG
_CAPABILITIES
OE.NO_SPECIAL
_ANALOG
_CAPABILITIES
If administrators in the TOE’s
operational environment take care to
ensure that computers with special
analog data collection interfaces are
not connected to the TOE, then the
assumption that such components
are not present is satisfied.
Table 10 – Security Objectives Rationale
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5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
The extended components definition is presented in Appendix C of the Protection
Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device [PP_PSD_V4.0] and in the modules for
keyboard/mouse devices [MOD_KM_V1.0] and display devices [MOD_VI_1.0].
The families to which these components belong are identified in the following
table:
Functional Class Functional Families Protection Profile
Modules
User Data Protection (FDP) FDP_APC_EXT Active PSD Connections [MOD_KM_V1.0]
FDP_CDS_EXT Connected Displays
Supported
[MOD_VI_V1.0]
FDP_FIL_EXT Device Filtering [MOD_KM_V1.0]
FDP_IPC_EXT Internal Protocol Conversion [MOD_VI_V1.0]
FDP_PDC_EXT Peripheral Device
Connection
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
[MOD_VI_V1.0]
[MOD_KM_V1.0]
FDP_RDR_EXT Re-Enumeration Device
Rejection
[MOD_KM_V1.0]
FDP_RIP_EXT Residual Information
Protection
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
FDP_SPR_EXT Sub-Protocol Rules [MOD_VI_V1.0]
FDP_SWI_EXT PSD Switching [PP_PSD_V4.0]
[MOD_KM_V1.0]
FDP_UDF_EXT Unidirectional Data Flow [MOD_VI_V1.0]
[MOD_KM_V1.0]
Protection of the TSF (FPT) FPT_FLS_EXT Failure with Preservation of
Secure State
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
FPT_NTA_EXT No Access to TOE [PP_PSD_V4.0]
FPT_TST_EXT TSF Testing [PP_PSD_V4.0]
TOE Access (FTA) FTA_CIN_EXT Continuous Indications [PP_PSD_V4.0]
[MOD_VI_V1.0]
Table 11 – Functional Families of Extended Components
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6 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS
Section 6 provides security functional and assurance requirements that must be
satisfied by a compliant TOE.
6.1 CONVENTIONS
The CC permits four types of operations to be performed on functional
requirements: selection, assignment, refinement, and iteration. This is defined
as:
• Assignment: Indicated by surrounding brackets and underline, e.g.,
[assigned item].
• Selection: Indicated by surrounding brackets and italics, e.g., [selected
item].
• Refinement: Refined components are identified by using [bold
surrounded by brackets] for additional information, or [strikeout
surrounded by brackets] for deleted text.
• Iteration: Iteration operations for iterations within the Protection Profile
and associated modules are identified with a slash (‘/’) and an identifier
(e.g. “/KM”). Where multiple iterations of the SFR are required within the
ST, a number is appended to the SFR identifier (e.g.
“FDP_CDS_EXT.1(1)”).
Extended SFRs are identified by the inclusion of “EXT” in the SFR name.
The CC operations already performed in the PP and PP modules are reproduced
in plain text and not denoted in this ST. The requirements have been copied
from the PP and PP modules and any remaining operations have been completed
herein. Refer to the PP and PP modules to identify those operations.
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6.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Section 6.2 details the security functional requirements.
Class Identifier Name Source Applicable Devices
User Data
Protection
(FDP)
FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM Active PSD
Connections
[MOD_KM_V1.0] All
FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI Active PSD
Connections
[MOD_VI_V1.0] All
FDP_CDS_EXT.1(1) Connected Displays
Supported (1)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] SC21H-4
FDP_CDS_EXT.1(2) Connected Displays
Supported (2)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] SC82PH-4,
SC162PH-4,
SMX42D-M,
SMX42H-M,
SMX42P-M,
SMX82D-M,
SMX82H-M,
SMX82P-M,
FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM Device Filtering
(Keyboard/Mouse)
[MOD_KM_V1.0] All
FDP_IPC_EXT.1(1) Internal Protocol
Conversion (1)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] SC82PH-4,
SC162PH-4
FDP_IPC_EXT.1(2) Internal Protocol
Conversion (2)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] SMX42P-M,
SMX82P-M
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Class Identifier Name Source Applicable Devices
FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Peripheral Device
Connection
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
[MOD_VI_V1.0]3
[MOD_KM_V1.0]4
All
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM Authorized Devices
(Keyboard/Mouse)
[MOD_KM_V1.0] All
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI Authorized Devices
(Video Output)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] All
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM Authorized
Connection Protocols
(Keyboard/Mouse)
[MOD_KM_V1.0] All
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(1) Authorized
Connection Protocols
(Video Output) (1)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] SC21H-4,
SMX42H-M,
SMX82H-M
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(2) Authorized
Connection Protocols
(Video Output)(2)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] SC82PH-4,
SC162PH-4
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(3) Authorized
Connection Protocols
(Video Output)(3)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] SMX42P-M,
SMX82P-M
3
There is no modification to this SFR in the [MOD_VI_V1.0]. However, there are additions to the Peripheral Device Connections
associated with this SFR and additional evaluation activities.
4
There is no modification to this SFR in the [MOD_KM_V1.0]. However, there are additions to the Peripheral Device Connections
associated with this SFR and additional evaluation activities.
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Class Identifier Name Source Applicable Devices
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(4) Authorized
Connection Protocols
(Video Output) (4)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] SMX42D-M,
SMX82D-M
FDP_RDR_EXT.1 Re-Enumeration
Device Rejection
[MOD_KM_V1.0] All
FDP_RIP.1/KM Residual Information
Protection (Keyboard
Data)
[MOD_KM_V1.0] SC21H-4,
SC82PH-4,
SC162PH-4,
SMX42D-M,
SMX42H-M,
SMX42P-M,
SMX82D-M,
SMX82H-M,
SMX82P-M
FDP_RIP_EXT.1 Residual Information
Protection
[PP_PSD_V4.0] All
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP Sub-Protocol Rules
(DisplayPort
Protocol)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] SC82PH-4,
SC162PH-4,
SMX42P-M,
SMX82P-M
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-D Sub-Protocol Rules
(DVI-D Protocol)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] SMX42D-M,
SMX82D-M
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI Sub-Protocol Rules
(HDMI Protocol)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] SC21H-4,
SC82PH-4,
SC162PH-4,
SMX42H-M,
SMX82H-M
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Class Identifier Name Source Applicable Devices
FDP_SWI_EXT.1 PSD Switching [PP_PSD_V4.0] SC21H-4,
SC82PH-4,
SC162PH-4,
SMX42D-M,
SMX42H-M,
SMX42P-M,
SMX82D-M,
SMX82H-M,
SMX82P-M
FDP_SWI_EXT.2(1) PSD Switching
Methods (1)
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
[MOD_KM_V1.0]5
All
FDP_SWI_EXT.2(2) PSD Switching
Methods (2)
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
[MOD_KM_V1.0]6
SMX42H-M
FDP_SWI_EXT.3 Tied Switching [MOD_KM_V1.0] All
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM Unidirectional Data
Flow
(Keyboard/Mouse)
[MOD_KM_V1.0] All
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI Unidirectional Data
Flow (Video Output)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] All
5
There is no modification to this SFR in [MOD_KM_V1.0]; however, additional evaluation activities are triggered by the selections in
FDP_SWI_EXT.2.2(1).
6
There is no modification to this SFR in [MOD_KM_V1.0]; however, additional evaluation activities are triggered by the selections in
FDP_SWI_EXT.2.2(2).
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Class Identifier Name Source Applicable Devices
TOE Access
(FTA)
FTA_CIN_EXT.1 Continuous
Indications
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
[MOD_VI_V1.0]
SC21H-4,
SC82PH-4,
SC162PH-4,
SMX42D-M,
SMX42H-M,
SMX42P-M,
SMX82D-M,
SMX82H-M,
SMX82P-M
Protection of
the TSF (FPT)
FPT_FLS_EXT.1 Failure with
Preservation of
Secure State
[PP_PSD_V4.0] All
FPT_NTA_EXT.1 No Access to TOE [PP_PSD_V4.0] All
FPT_PHP.1 Passive Detection of
Physical Attack
[PP_PSD_V4.0] All
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing [PP_PSD_V4.0] All
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing [PP_PSD_V4.0] All
Table 12 – Summary of Security Functional Requirements
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User Data Protection (FDP)
6.2.1.1 FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM Active PSD Connections
FDP_APC_EXT.1.1/KM The TSF shall route user data only to the interfaces selected by
the user.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.2/KM The TSF shall ensure that no data or electrical signals flow
between connected computers whether the TOE is powered on
or powered off.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.3/KM The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the
TOE is powered off.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.4/KM The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the
TOE is in a failure state.
6.2.1.2 FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI Active PSD Connections
FDP_APC_EXT.1.1/VI The TSF shall route user data only from the interfaces selected
by the user.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.2/VI The TSF shall ensure that no data or electrical signals flow
between connected computers whether the TOE is powered on
or powered off.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.3/VI The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the
TOE is powered off.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.4/VI The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the
TOE is in a failure state.
6.2.1.3 FDP_CDS_EXT.1(1) Connected Displays Supported (1)
FDP_CDS_EXT.1.1(1) The TSF shall support [one connected display] at a time.
Application Note: FDP_CDS_EXT.1(1) applies to the following model: SC21H-4.
6.2.1.4 FDP_CDS_EXT.1(2) Connected Displays Supported (2)
FDP_CDS_EXT.1.1(2) The TSF shall support [multiple connected displays] at a time.
Application Note: FDP_CDS_EXT.1(2) applies to the following models: SC82PH-4,
SC162PH-4, SMX42D-M, SMX42H-M, SMX42P-M, SMX82D-M,
SMX82H-M, SMX82P-M
6.2.1.5 FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM Device Filtering (Keyboard/Mouse)
FDP_FIL_EXT.1.1/KM The TSF shall have [fixed] device filtering for [keyboard, mouse]
interfaces.
FDP_FIL_EXT.1.2/KM The TSF shall consider all PSD KM blacklisted devices as
unauthorized devices for [keyboard, mouse] interfaces in
peripheral device connections.
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FDP_FIL_EXT.1.3/KM The TSF shall consider all PSD KM whitelisted devices as
authorized devices for [keyboard, mouse] interfaces in
peripheral device connections only if they are not on the PSD KM
blacklist or otherwise unauthorized.
6.2.1.6 FDP_IPC_EXT.1(1) Internal Protocol Conversion (1)
FDP_IPC_EXT.1.1(1) The TSF shall convert the DisplayPort protocol at the DisplayPort
computer video interface into the HDMI protocol within the TOE.
FDP_IPC_EXT.1.2(1) The TSF shall output the HDMI protocol from inside the TOE to
peripheral display interface(s) as [DisplayPort protocol, HDMI
protocol].
Application Note: FDP_IPC_EXT.1(1) applies to the following models: SC82PH-4,
SC162PH-4.
TD0586 applies to this SFR definition.
6.2.1.7 FDP_IPC_EXT.1(2) Internal Protocol Conversion (2)
FDP_IPC_EXT.1.1(2) The TSF shall convert the DisplayPort protocol at the DisplayPort
computer video interface into the HDMI protocol within the TOE.
FDP_IPC_EXT.1.2(2) The TSF shall output the HDMI protocol from inside the TOE to
peripheral display interface(s) as [DisplayPort protocol].
Application Note: FDP_IPC_EXT.1(2) applies to the following models: SMX42P-M,
SMX82P-M.
TD0586 applies to this SFR definition.
6.2.1.8 FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Peripheral Device Connection
FDP_PDC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall reject connections with unauthorized devices upon
TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a
powered‐on TOE.
FDP_ PDC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall reject connections with devices presenting
unauthorized interface protocols upon TOE power up and upon
connection of a peripheral device to a powered‐on TOE.
FDP_ PDC_EXT.1.3 The TOE shall have no external interfaces other than those claimed
by the TSF.
FDP_ PDC_EXT.1.4 The TOE shall not have wireless interfaces.
FDP_ PDC_EXT.1.5 The TOE shall provide a visual or auditory indication to the User
when a peripheral is rejected.
6.2.1.9 FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM Authorized Devices
(Keyboard/Mouse)
FDP_PDC_EXT.2.1/KM The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices and
functions as defined in Appendix E [of [MOD_KM_V1.0]] and
[
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• authorized devices as defined in the PP‐Module for
Video/Display Devices
] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral
device to a powered-on TOE.
FDP_ PDC_EXT.2.2/KM The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices
presenting authorized interface protocols as defined in
Appendix E [of [MOD_KM_V1.0]] and [
• authorized devices presenting authorized interface
protocols as defined in the PP‐Module for Video/Display
Devices
] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral
device to a powered-on TOE.
6.2.1.10 FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI Peripheral Device Connection (Video
Output)
FDP_PDC_EXT.2.1/VI The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices as
defined in Appendix E [of [MOD_VI_V1.0]] and [
• authorized devices and functions as defined in the PP‐
Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices,
] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral
device to a powered-on TOE.
FDP_ PDC_EXT.2.2/VI The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices
presenting authorized interface protocols as defined in
Appendix E [of [MOD_VI_V1.0]] and [
• authorized devices presenting authorized interface
protocols as defined in the PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse
Devices,
] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral
device to a powered-on TOE.
6.2.1.11 FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM Authorized Connection Protocols
(Keyboard/Mouse)
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.1/KM The TSF shall have interfaces for the [USB (keyboard), USB
(mouse)] protocols.
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.2/KM The TSF shall apply the following rules to the supported
protocols: the TSF shall emulate any keyboard or mouse
device functions from the TOE to the connected computer.
6.2.1.12 FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(1) Authorized Connection Protocols
(Video Output) (1)
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.1/VI(1) The TSF shall have interfaces for the [HDMI] protocols.
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FDP_PDC_EXT.3.2/VI(1) The TSF shall apply the following rules to the supported
protocols: the TSF shall read the connected display EDID
information once during power‐on or reboot.
Application Note: FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(1) applies to the following models: SC21H-4,
SMX42H-M, SMX82H-M.
6.2.1.13 FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(2) Authorized Connection Protocols
(Video Output) (2)
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.1/VI(2) The TSF shall have interfaces for the [HDMI, DisplayPort]
protocols.
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.2/VI(2) The TSF shall apply the following rules to the supported
protocols: the TSF shall read the connected display EDID
information once during power‐on or reboot.
Application Note: FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(2) applies to the following models: SC82PH-4,
SC162PH-4.
6.2.1.14 FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(3) Authorized Connection Protocols
(Video Output) (3)
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.1/VI(3) The TSF shall have interfaces for the [DisplayPort]
protocols.
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.2/VI(3) The TSF shall apply the following rules to the supported
protocols: the TSF shall read the connected display EDID
information once during power‐on or reboot.
Application Note: FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(3) applies to the following models: SMX42P-M,
SMX82P-M.
6.2.1.15 FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(4) Authorized Connection Protocols
(Video Output) (4)
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.1/VI(4) The TSF shall have interfaces for the [DVI-D] protocols.
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.2/VI(4) The TSF shall apply the following rules to the supported
protocols: the TSF shall read the connected display EDID
information once during power‐on or reboot.
Application Note: FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(4) applies to the following models: SMX42D-M,
SMX82D-M.
6.2.1.16 FDP_RDR_EXT.1 Re-Enumeration Device Rejection
FDP_RDR_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall reject any device that attempts to enumerate again as
a different unauthorized device.
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6.2.1.17 FDP_RIP.1/KM Residual Information Protection
(Keyboard Data)
FDP_RIP.1.1/KM The TSF shall ensure that any keyboard data in volatile
memory is purged upon switching computers.
Application Note: FDP_RIP.1/KM applies to the following models: SC21H-4, SC82PH-4,
SC162PH-4, SMX42D-M, SMX42H-M, SMX42P-M, SMX82D-M,
SMX82H-M, SMX82P-M.
6.2.1.18 FDP_RIP_EXT.1 Residual Information Protection
FDP_RIP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that no user data is written to TOE non‐volatile
memory or storage.
6.2.1.19 FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP Sub-Protocol Rules (DisplayPort
Protocol)
FDP_SPR_EXT.1.1/DP The TSF shall apply the following rules for the DisplayPort
protocol:
• block the following video/display sub‐protocols:
o CEC,
o EDID from computer to display,
o HDCP,
o MCCS
• allow the following video/display sub‐protocols:
o EDID from display to computer,
o HPD from display to computer,
o Link Training.
Application Note: FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP applies to the following models: SC82PH-4,
SC162PH-4, SMX42P-M, SMX82P-M.
6.2.1.20 FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-D Sub-Protocol Rules (DVI-D
Protocol)
FDP_SPR_EXT.1.1/DVI-D The TSF shall apply the following rules for the DVI-D
protocol:
• block the following video/display sub‐protocols:
o ARC,
o CEC,
o EDID from computer to display,
o HDCP,
o HEAC,
o HEC,
o MCCS
• allow the following video/display sub‐protocols:
o EDID from display to computer,
o HPD from display to computer.
Application Note: FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-D applies to the following models: SMX42D-M,
SMX82D-M.
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6.2.1.21 FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI Sub-Protocol Rules (HDMI
Protocol)
FDP_SPR_EXT.1.1/HDMI The TSF shall apply the following rules for the HDMI
protocol:
• block the following video/display sub‐protocols:
o ARC
o CEC,
o EDID from computer to display,
o HDCP,
o HEAC,
o HEC,
o MCCS
• allow the following video/display sub‐protocols:
o EDID from display to computer,
o HPD from display to computer.
Application Note: FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI applies to the following models: SC21H-4,
SC82PH-4, SC162PH-4, SMX42H-M, SMX82H-M.
6.2.1.22 FDP_SWI_EXT.1 PSD Switching
FDP_SWI_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that [switching can be initiated only
through express user action].
Application Note: FDP_SWI_EXT.1 applies to the following models: SC21H-4, SC82PH-
4, SC162PH-4, SMX42D-M, SMX42H-M, SMX42P-M, SMX82D-M,
SMX82H-M, SMX82P-M.
6.2.1.23 FDP_SWI_EXT.2(1) PSD Switching Methods (1)
FDP_SWI_EXT.2.1(1) The TSF shall ensure that no switching can be initiated
through automatic port scanning, control through a connected
computer, or control through keyboard shortcuts.
FDP_SWI_EXT.2.2(1) The TSF shall ensure that switching can be initiated only
through express user action using [console buttons, peripheral
devices using a guard].
Application Note: FDP_SWI_EXT.2(1) applies to the following models: SC21H-4,
SC82PH-4, SC162PH-4, SMX42D-M, SMX42H-M, SMX42P-M,
SMX82D-M, SMX82H-M, SMX82P-M.
6.2.1.24 FDP_SWI_EXT.2(2) PSD Switching Methods (2)
FDP_SWI_EXT.2.1(2) The TSF shall ensure that no switching can be initiated
through automatic port scanning, control through a connected
computer, or control through keyboard shortcuts.
FDP_SWI_EXT.2.2(2) The TSF shall ensure that switching can be initiated only
through express user action using [wired remote control, peripheral
devices using a guard].
Application Note: FDP_SWI_EXT.2(2) applies to model SMX42H-M.
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6.2.1.25 FDP_SWI_EXT.3 Tied Switching
FDP_SWI_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall ensure that connected keyboard and mouse peripheral
devices are always switched together to the same connected
computer.
Application Note: FDP_SWI_EXT.3 applies to the following models: SC21H-4, SC82PH-
4, SC162PH-4, SMX42D-M, SMX42H-M, SMX42P-M, SMX82D-M,
SMX82H-M, SMX82P-M.
6.2.1.26 FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM Unidirectional Data Flow
(Keyboard/Mouse)
FDP_UDF_EXT.1.1/KM The TSF shall ensure [keyboard, mouse] data transits the TOE
unidirectionally from the TOE [keyboard, mouse] peripheral
interface(s) to the TOE [keyboard, mouse] interface.
6.2.1.27 FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI Unidirectional Data Flow (Video
Output)
FDP_UDF_EXT.1.1/VI The TSF shall ensure video data transits the TOE
unidirectionally from the TOE computer video interface to the
TOE peripheral device display interface.
TOE Access (FTA)
6.2.2.1 FTA_CIN_EXT.1 Continuous Indications
FTA_CIN_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall display a visible indication of the selected computers
at all times when the TOE is powered.
FTA_CIN_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement the visible indication using the following
mechanism: easily visible graphical and/or textual markings of each
source video on the display, [[illuminated buttons]].
FTA_CIN_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that while the TOE is powered the current
switching status is reflected by [multiple indicators which never
display conflicting information].
Application Note: FTA_CIN_EXT.1 applies to the following models: SC21H-4, SC82PH-4,
SC162PH-4, SMX42D-M, SMX42H-M, SMX42P-M, SMX82D-M,
SMX82H-M, SMX82P-M.
Protection of the TSF (FPT)
6.2.3.1 FPT_FLS_EXT.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State
FPT_FLS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur: failure of the power‐on self‐test and [no other
failures].
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6.2.3.2 FPT_NTA_EXT.1 No Access to TOE
FPT_NTA_EXT.1.1 TOE firmware, software, and memory shall not be accessible via the
TOE’s external ports, with the following exceptions: [the Extended
Display Identification Data (EDID) memory of Video TOEs may
be accessible from connected computers; the configuration data,
settings, and logging data that may be accessible by authorized
administrators].
6.2.3.3 FPT_PHP.1 Passive Detection of Physical Attack
FPT_PHP.1.1 The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering
that might compromise the TSF.
FPT_PHP.1.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical
tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.
6.2.3.4 FPT_TST.1 TSF Testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up and at the
conditions [no other conditions] to demonstrate the correct operation of
user control functions and [no other functions].
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the
integrity of [TSF data].
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the
integrity of [TSF].
6.2.3.5 FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall respond to a self‐test failure by providing users with a
[visual] indication of failure and by shutdown of normal TSF
functions.
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7 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The assurance requirements are summarized in Table 13.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
Identifier Name
Development (ADV) ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification
Guidance Documents
(AGD)
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life-Cycle Support
(ALC)
ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM Coverage
Security Target
Evaluation (ASE)
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended Components Definition
ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security Objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived Security Requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem Definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE Summary Specification
Tests (ATE)
ATE_IND.1
Independent Testing -
Conformance
Vulnerability
Assessment (AVA)
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability Survey
Table 13 – Security Assurance Requirements
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8 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE
8.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
RATIONALE
Table 8 provides a mapping between the SFRs and Security Objectives.
8.2 DEPENDENCY RATIONALE
Table 14 identifies the Security Functional Requirements and their associated
dependencies. It also indicates whether the ST explicitly addresses each
dependency.
SFR Dependencies Rationale Statement
FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM None N/A
FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI None N/A
FDP_CDS_EXT.1(1) None N/A
FDP_CDS_EXT.1(2) None N/A
FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Included
FDP_IPC_EXT.1(1) FDP_PDC_EXT.2 Included
FDP_IPC_EXT.1(2) FDP_PDC_EXT.2 Included
FDP_PDC_EXT.1 None N/A
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Included
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Included
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(1) FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Included
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(2) FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Included
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(3) FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Included
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(4) FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Included
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Included
FDP_RDR_EXT.1 FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Included
FDP_RIP_EXT.1 None N/A
FDP_RIP.1/KM None N/A
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP FDP_PDC_EXT.3 Included
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-D FDP_PDC_EXT.3 Included
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SFR Dependencies Rationale Statement
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI FDP_PDC_EXT.3 Included
FDP_SWI_EXT.1 None N/A
FDP_SWI_EXT.2(1) FDP_SWI_EXT.1 Included
FDP_SWI_EXT.2(2) FDP_SWI_EXT.1 Included
FDP_SWI_EXT.3 FDP_SWI_EXT.1 Included
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM FDP_APC_EXT.1 Included
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI FDP_APC_EXT.1 Included
FPT_FLS_EXT.1 FPT_TST.1
FPT_PHP.3
Included
Included only if anti‐tamper is selected in
FPT_FLS_EXT.1.1
FPT_NTA_EXT.1 None N/A
FPT_PHP.1 None N/A
FPT_TST.1 None N/A
FPT_TST_EXT.1 FPT_TST.1 Included
FTA_CIN_EXT.1 FDP_APC_EXT.1 Included
Table 14 – Functional Requirement Dependencies
8.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
RATIONALE
The TOE assurance requirements for this ST consist of the requirements
indicated in the [PP_PSD_V4.0].
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9 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
This section provides a description of the security functions and assurance
measures of the TOE that meet the TOE security requirements.
9.1 USER DATA PROTECTION
System Controller
Each device includes a System Controller which is responsible for device
management, user interaction, system control security functions, and device
monitoring. It receives user input from the switches on the front panel and
drives the TOE channel select lines that control switching circuits within the TOE.
The System Controller includes a microcontroller with internal non-volatile, Read
Only Memory (ROM). The controller function manages the TOE functionality
through a pre-programmed state machine loaded on the ROM as read-only
firmware during product manufacturing.
Following boot up of the TOE, the channel select lines are set to Channel 1 by
default. The channel select lines are also used to link the System Controller
channel select commands to the Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) that
supports video processing.
The user determines the host computer to be connected to the peripherals by
pressing a button on the matrix or combiner device front panel except for
SMX42H-M. Instead of buttons on the device, the SMX42H-M switch is controlled
by a wired remote that is used to select the host computer. When the remote
control device is used the remote’s channel indicator for the selected computer
is illuminated. The selected computer is indicated either by the illuminated front
panel button or the illuminated button on the remote control. Switching can only
be initiated through express user action and not through automated port
scanning, connected computer control, or keyboard shortcuts.
TOE devices may be switched with peripheral devices using a guard7
. This is
done by moving the mouse to the edge of the screen while pressing the left
CTRL key.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_SWI_EXT.1,
FDP_SWI_EXT.2(1), FDP_SWI_EXT.2(2).
9.1.1.1 Active PSD Connections
The TOE ensures that data flows only between the peripherals and the
connected computer selected by the user. The TOE ensures that no electrical
signal flows between the connected computers selected by the user. No data or
electrical signal transits the TOE when the TOE is powered off, or when the TOE
7
See Section 10.1 or [PP_PSD_V4.0] for the definition of a guard.
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is in a failure state. A failure state occurs when the TOE fails a self-test when
powering on.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM,
FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI.
9.1.1.2 Connected Computer Interfaces
The connected computers are attached to the TOE as follows:
• The TOE connects to the keyboard and mouse port using a USB A to USB
B cable. The USB A end attaches to the computer, and the USB B end
attaches to the TOE.
• The TOE is connected to the computer video port using a video cable
supporting DisplayPort, HDMI, or DVI-D interface.
There are no wireless interfaces or additional external interfaces.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_PDC_EXT.1.
9.1.1.3 Residual Information Protection
The Letter of Volatility is included as Annex A.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_RIP_EXT.1.
Keyboard and Mouse Functionality
9.1.2.1 Keyboard and Mouse Enumeration
The TOE determines whether or not a peripheral device that has been plugged
into the keyboard and mouse peripheral ports is allowed to operate with the
TOE. The TOE uses optical data diodes to enforce a unidirectional data flow from
the user peripherals to the coupled hosts and uses isolated device emulators to
prevent data leakage through the peripheral switching circuitry.
The Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) in the host and device emulator
circuitry stores USB Host stack parameters and up to the last 4 key codes. User
data may be briefly retained; however, there are no data buffers. Data is erased
during power off of the peripheral sharing device, and when the user switches
channels. When the TOE switches from one computer to another, the system
controller ensures that the keyboard and mouse stacks are deleted, and that
any data received from the keyboard in the first 100 milliseconds following
switching is deleted. This is done to ensure that any data buffered in the
keyboard microcontroller is not passed to the newly selected computer.
The TOE supports USB Type A HIDs on keyboard and mouse ports. The USB
bidirectional communication protocol is converted into a unidirectional
proprietary protocol and is then converted back into the USB bidirectional
protocol to communicate with the coupled computer host(s).
A USB keyboard is connected to the TOE keyboard host emulator through the
console keyboard port. The keyboard host emulator is a microcontroller which
enumerates the connected keyboard and verifies that it is a permitted device
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type. Once the keyboard has been verified, the USB keyboard sends scan codes,
which are generated when the user types. These scan codes are converted by
the keyboard host emulator into a proprietary protocol data stream that is
combined with the data stream from the mouse host emulator.
Similarly, the USB mouse is connected to the TOE mouse host emulator through
the USB mouse port. The mouse host emulator is a microcontroller which
enumerates the connected mouse and verifies that it is a permitted device type.
Once the mouse device has been verified, it sends serial data generated by
mouse movement and button use. The mouse serial data is converted by the
mouse host emulator into a proprietary protocol data stream that is combined
with the data stream from the keyboard host emulator.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM,
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM, FDP_RIP.1/KM.
9.1.2.2 Keyboard and Mouse Switching Functionality
A Host Emulator (HE) communicates with the user keyboard via the USB
protocol. The Host Emulator converts user keystrokes into unidirectional serial
data.
The combined data stream is passed through the channel select lines to the
selected host channel. The channel select lines are driven by the System
Controller Module, and the selection is based on user input through use of the
mouse or keyboard. Once a channel is selected, the combined mouse and
keyboard data stream is passed through an optical data diode and routed to the
specific host channel device emulator. The optical data diode is an opto-coupler
designed to physically prevent reverse data flow. The keyboard and mouse can
only be switched together.
Device emulators are USB enabled microcontrollers that are programmed to
emulate a standard USB keyboard and mouse composite device. The combined
data stream is converted back to bidirectional data before reaching the selected
host computer.
Since the keyboard and mouse function are emulated by the TOE, the connected
computer is not able to send data to the keyboard that would allow it to indicate
that Caps Lock, Num Lock or Scroll Lock are set. These are indicated on the TOE
front panel, on the right hand side.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM,
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM, FDP_SWI_EXT.3.
9.1.2.3 Keyboard and Mouse Compatible Device Types
The TOE employs fixed device filtering and accepts only USB HID devices at the
keyboard and mouse peripheral ports. Only USB Type A connections are
permitted. The TOE does not support a wireless connection to a mouse,
keyboard or USB hub and there are no additional external interfaces.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_PDC_EXT.1,
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM.
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9.1.2.4 Re-Enumeration Device Rejection
If a connected device attempts to re-enumerate as a different USB device type,
it will be rejected by the TOE. The TOE will reject devices which are not allowed
at any time during operation and start-up. This is indicated by an LED on the
TOE next to the Keyboard and mouse ports. This LED shows a solid green light
for an accepted device, flickering green light during enumeration, and no light
for a rejected device.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_RDR_EXT.1.
Video Switching Functionality
Video data flow is comprised of unidirectional Extended Display Identification
Data (EDID) and video data flow paths. Figure 3 shows a data flow during the
display EDID read function.
Figure 3 – Display EDID Read Function
An EDID read event only occurs as the TOE is being powered up. The video
controller reads the EDID content from the display device to verify that it is valid
and usable. If data is not valid, TOE operation will cease and wait for the display
peripheral to be changed.
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Figure 4 – Display EDID Write Function
Figure 4 illustrates the video controller (shown in blue) as it writes the EDID
content into the first channel emulated EDID Electrically Erasable Programmable
Read-Only Memory (EEPROM) chip (shown in gray). The thick lines in this figure
indicate native video lines, and the thin lines indicate Inter-Integrated Circuit
(I2C) lines. The EDID multiplexer couples the I2C lines to the first EDID mode
switch (shown in orange). The first EDID mode switch switches the video
controller I2C lines to the first emulated EDID EEPROM chip (shown in gray).
The chip write protect switch opens to enable writing. The video controller uses
the I2C lines to write to the first emulated EDID EEPROM chip. Once the write
operation is complete and verified, the video controller switches the EDID
multiplexer to the next channel and the operation repeats until all chips are
programmed. Once the write operation is complete, the video controller switches
to normal operating mode, as shown in Figure 5 below.
In EDID write mode, the Emulated EDID EEPROM chips are switched to their
respective computers to enable reading of the EDID information. The write
protect switches are switched back to protected mode to prevent any attempt to
write to the EEPROM or to transmit MCCS commands.
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Figure 5 – Display Normal Mode
In normal mode, each computer interface operates independently. The power to
each emulated EDID EEPROM is received from its respective computer through
the video cable. The main video multiplexer is switched to the user selected
computer to enable the proper video display.
During TOE normal operation (Figure 5), any attempt by a connected computer
to affect the EDID channel is blocked by the architecture. Each computer is only
able to affect its own emulated EDID EEPROM.
Video input interfaces are isolated from one another. Isolation is achieved
through the use of separate power and ground planes, separate electronic
components and a separate emulated EDID chip for each channel.
The EDID function is emulated by an independent emulation EEPROM chip for
each computer channel. These chips read content from the connected display
once during TOE power up. Any subsequent change to the display peripheral will
be ignored.
The TOE will reject any display device that does not present valid EDID content.
An LED on the rear panel of the TOE will indicate a rejected display device.
The TOE supports DisplayPort versions 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, DVI-D and HDMI 2.0
(video input/output):
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• For DisplayPort connections, the TOE video function filters the AUX
channel by converting it to I2C EDID only. DisplayPort video is converted
into an HDMI video stream, and the I2C EDID lines connected to the
emulated EDID EEPROM functions as shown in the figures above. This
allows EDID to be passed from the display to the computer (as described
above) and allows Hot-Plug Detection (HPD) and Link Training information
to pass through the TOE. AUX channel threats are mitigated through the
conversion from DisplayPort to HDMI protocols. Traffic types including
USB, Ethernet, MCCS, and EDID write from the computer to the display
are blocked by the TOE. High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection
(HDCP) and Consumer Electronics Control (CEC) functions are not
connected.
o DisplayPort is supported for video input and output on the SC82PH-
4, SC162PH-4, SMX42P-M and SMX82P-M devices.
• For DVI-D connections, EDID information is allowed to pass from the
display to the computer, as described above. HPD information is also
allowed to pass. Other protocols, including Audio Return Channel (ARC),
EDID from the computer to the display, HDMI Ethernet and Audio Return
Channel (HEAC), HDMI Ethernet Channel (HEC) and MCCS are blocked.
HDCP and Consumer Electronics Control (CEC) functions are not
connected.
o DVI-D video input and output is supported on the SMX42D-M and
SMX82D-M devices.
• For HDMI connections, EDID information is allowed to pass from the
display to the computer, as described above. HPD information is also
allowed to pass. Other protocols, including Audio Return Channel (ARC),
EDID from the computer to the display, HDMI Ethernet and Audio Return
Channel (HEAC), and HDMI Ethernet Channel (HEC) are blocked. HDCP
and Consumer Electronics Control (CEC) functions are not connected.
o HDMI video input and output is supported on the SC21H-4,
SC82PH-4, SC162PH-4, SMX42H-M and SMX82H-M devices.
The TOE video function blocks MCCS write transactions through the emulated
EDID EEPROMs. The emulated EEPROMs support only EDID read transactions
and are isolated by the write protect switch.
Following a failed self-test, or when the TOE is powered off, all video input
signals are isolated from other video inputs and from the video output interfaces
by the active video re-drivers. Emulated EDID EEPROMs may still operate since
they are powered by their respective computers; however, the video function
remains isolated.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_IPC_EXT.1,
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-D, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI,
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI.
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Video Compatible Device Types
The TOE accepts any DVI-D, DisplayPort or HDMI display device at the video
peripheral ports. The TOE does not support a wireless connection to a video
display.
The number of video displays supported by each device model is indicated in
Table 2.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_PDC_EXT.1,
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI, FDP_CDS_EXT.1.
9.2 PROTECTION OF THE TSF
No Access to TOE
Connected computers do not have access to TOE firmware or memory, with the
following exceptions:
• EDID data is accessible to connected computers from the TOE
All of the TOE microcontrollers run from internal protected flash memory.
Firmware cannot be updated from an external source. Firmware cannot be read
or rewritten through the use of Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) tools. Firmware is
executed on Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) with the appropriate
protections to prevent external access and tampering of code or stacks.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FPT_NTA_EXT.1.
Anti-tampering Functionality
The TOE enclosure was designed specifically to prevent physical tampering. It
features a stainless-steel welded chassis and panels that prevent external access
through bending or brute force.
Additionally, each device is fitted with one or more holographic Tampering
Evident Labels placed at critical locations on the TOE enclosure. If the label is
removed, the word ‘VOID’ appears on both the label and the product surface.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FPT_PHP.1.
TSF Testing
The TOE performs a self-test at initial start-up. The self-test runs independently
at each microcontroller and performs the following checks:
• Verification of the front panel pushbuttons
• Verification of the integrity of the microcontroller firmware
• Verification of computer port isolation. This is tested by sending test
packets to various interfaces and attempting to detect this traffic at all
other interfaces
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If the self-test fails, the LEDs on the front panel blink to indicate the failure. The
TOE disables the PSD switching functionality and remains in a disabled state
until the self-test is rerun and passes.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FPT_FLS_EXT.1, FPT_TST.1,
FPT_TST_EXT.1.
9.3 TOE ACCESS
The TOE user switches between computers by pressing the corresponding front
panel button on the device. The front panel button of the KVM/Matrix or the
remote control button corresponding to the selected computer will illuminate.
On power up or power up following reset, all peripherals are connected to
channel #1, and the corresponding pushbutton LED will be illuminated.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FTA_CIN_EXT.1.
Wired Remote Control (SMX42H-M)
The SMX42H-M can only be switched using a wired remote control as described
in the [PP_PSD_V4.0]. The Auxiliary Front Panel (AFP) sits on the display and is
physically connected to the TOE device using an RS232 cable. The buttons on
the AFP illuminate to indicate the selected channel.
When the user selects a channel using the remote control, the selected channel
indicator on the remote control device illuminates, and a signal is sent from the
wired remote control device to the KVM switch and the TOE peripheral sharing
device switches to the indicated channel.
Additionally, a holographic Tampering Evident Label is placed at a critical
location on the remote control device. If the label is removed, the word ‘VOID’
appears on both the label and the product surface.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FTA_CIN_EXT.1, FPT_PHP.1.
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10TERMINOLOGY AND ACRONYMS
10.1 TERMINOLOGY
The following terminology is used in this ST:
Term Description
AUX AUX refers to the auxiliary channel, particularly as it applies to
the DisplayPort protocol.
Guard 'Guard' refers to a peripheral sharing device function that
requires multiple express user actions in order to switch
between connected computers using connected peripherals.
KM KM refers to the requirements for Keyboard/Mouse Devices.
VI VI refers to the requirements for Video Display Devices.
Table 15 – Terminology
10.2 ACRONYMS
The following acronyms are used in this ST:
Acronym Definition
ARC Audio Return Channel
CC Common Criteria
CEC Consumer Electronics Control
DE Device Emulator
DVI Digital Visual Interface
EDID Extended Display Identification Data
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
HDCP High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection
HDMI High-Definition Multimedia Interface
HE Host Emulator
HEAC HDMI Ethernet and Audio Return Channel
HEC HDMI Ethernet Channel
HID Human Interface Device
HPD Hot-Plug Detection
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Acronym Definition
HSL High Sec Labs
I2C Inter-Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
JTAG Joint Test Action Group
KVM Keyboard, Video, Mouse
LED Light Emitting Diode
MCCS Monitor Control Command Set
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
OTP One Time Programming
PP Protection Profile
PSD Peripheral Sharing Device
RAM Random Access Memory
ROM Read Only Memory
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SRAM Static Random Access Memory
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
USB Universal Serial Bus
Table 16 – Acronyms
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11REFERENCES
Identifier Title
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation –
• Part 1: Introduction and General Model, CCMB‐2017‐
04‐001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
• Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB‐2017‐
04‐002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
• Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB‐2017‐
04‐003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, CCMB‐2017‐04‐004,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[PP_PSD_V4.0] Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version: 4.0,
2019‐07‐19
[MOD_KM_V1.0] PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0, 2019‐07‐
19
[MOD_VI_V1.0] PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, 2019‐07‐19
[CFG_PSD‐KM‐
VI_V1.0]
PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device,
Keyboard/Mouse Devices, and Video/Display Devices, 19 July
2019
Table 17 – References
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ANNEX A – LETTER OF VOLATILITY
The table below provides volatility information and memory types for the High Sec Labs Peripheral Sharing Devices. User
data is not retained in any TOE device when the power is turned off.
Product
Model
No. in
each
product
Function,
Manufacturer
and Part
Number
Storage Type Size Power Source (if
not the TOE)
Volatility Contains User
Data
SMX42D-M
SMX42H-M
SMX42P-M
SMX82D-M
SMX82H-M
SMX82P-M
1 System Controller,
Host emulators:
ST Microelectronics
STM32F446ZCT
Embedded SRAM1
128KB Connected computer Volatile May contain user
data
Embedded Flash2
256KB Non-Volatile No user data
Embedded EEPROM 4KB Non-Volatile No user data
OTP Memory 512bytes Non-Volatile No user data
1 Video Controller:
ST Microelectronics
STM32F070C6T6
Embedded SRAM1
16KB Connected computer Volatile No user data
Embedded Flash2
128KB Non-Volatile No user data
Embedded EEPROM 4KB Non-Volatile No user data
4 in 4 port
or 8 in 8
port
Device emulators:
ST Microelectronics
STM32F070C6T6
Embedded SRAM1
6KB Connected computer Volatile May contain user
data
Embedded Flash2
32KB Non-Volatile No user data
Embedded EEPROM 4KB Non-Volatile No user data
4 in 4 port
or 8 in 8
port
EDID Emulators:
ST Microelectronics
M24C02-WMN6TP
EEPROM3
2KB Non-Volatile No user data
SC21H-4
SC82PH-4
1 System Controller,
Host emulators:
ST Microelectronics
Embedded SRAM1
128KB Volatile May contain user
data
Embedded Flash2
256KB Non-Volatile No user data
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Product
Model
No. in
each
product
Function,
Manufacturer
and Part
Number
Storage Type Size Power Source (if
not the TOE)
Volatility Contains User
Data
SC162PH-4 STM32F446ZCT Embedded
EEPROM3
4KB Non-Volatile No user data
OTP Memory 512bytes Non-Volatile Event logs are
saved
1 Video Controller:
ST Microelectronics
STM32F070C6T6
Embedded SRAM1
16KB Volatile No user data
Embedded Flash2
128KB Non-Volatile No user data
Embedded
EEPROM3
4KB Non-Volatile No user data
1 in 2 port
devices, 2 in
8 port
devices, 4 in
16 port
devices
Video Combiner
FPGA
Embedded RAM 2,188Kb Volatile User data – video
frame
1 in 2 port
devices, 2 in
8 port
devices, 4 in
16 port
devices
Video Combiner
EEPROM
SPI Flash 512Mb Non-Volatile No user data
1 in 2 port
devices, 2 in
8 port
devices, 4 in
16 port
devices
Video Combiner
RAM
DDR memory 4Gb Volatile User data – video
frame
2 in 2 port
devices, 8 in
8 port
devices, 16
Device emulators:
ST Microelectronics
STM32F070C6T6
Embedded SRAM1
6KB Connected computer Volatile May contain user
data
Embedded Flash2
32KB Non-Volatile No user data
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Product
Model
No. in
each
product
Function,
Manufacturer
and Part
Number
Storage Type Size Power Source (if
not the TOE)
Volatility Contains User
Data
in 16 port
devices
Embedded
EEPROM3
4KB Non-Volatile No user data
2 in 2 port
devices, 8 in
8 port
devices, 16
in 16 port
devices
EDID Emulator:
ST Microelectronics
M24C02-WMN6TP
EEPROM4
2 KB Non-Volatile No user data
Notes:
1
SRAM stores USB Host stack parameters and up to the last 4 key-codes. Data is erased during power off of the KVM, and when the
user switches channels. Device emulators receive power from the individual connected computers and therefore devices are powered on
as long as the associated computer is powered on and connected.
2
Flash storage is used to store firmware code. It contains no user data. Flash storage is permanently locked by fuses after initial
programming to prevent rewriting. It is an integral part of the ST Microcontroller together with SRAM and EEPROM.
3
EEPROM is used to store operational parameters, such as display Plug & Play. They contain no user data. These devices receive power
from the individual computers connected to the TOE, and therefore are powered on as long as the associated computer is powered on
and connected.
4
EEPROM is used to store operational parameters, such as display Plug & Play, and contains no user data.