BSI-DSZ-CC-1030-2018
for
Huawei OptiX OSN 1800 V V100R006C20 software
management component
from
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.21
BSI-DSZ-CC-1030-2018 (*)
Network Device
Huawei OptiX OSN 1800 V V100R006C20 software management
component
from Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 26 October 2018
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1030-2018
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1030-2018 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................8
6. Publication.....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................15
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................15
6. Documentation............................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................21
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................21
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................21
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................24
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................26
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................27
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1030-2018
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1030-2018 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized under CCRA-2014 for all assurance components selected.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1030-2018
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Huawei OptiX OSN 1800 V V100R006C20 software management component
has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Huawei OptiX OSN 1800 V V100R006C20 software
management component was conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The
evaluation was completed on 25 October 2018. atsec information security GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Huawei Technologies Co.,
Ltd.
The product was developed by: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 26 October
2018 is valid until 25 October 2023. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1030-2018 Certification Report
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Huawei OptiX OSN 1800 V V100R006C20 software management component,
has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see
also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from
BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Huawei Industrial Base
Bantian, Longgang
Shenzhen, 518129
People's Republic of China
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1030-2018
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1030-2018 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Huawei OptiX OSN 1800 V V100R006C20 software
management component. It is part of the overall product OptiX OSN 1800 V. The overall
product is a transmission equipment and is mainly applicable to the access layer and the
aggregation layer of the metropolitan area network. It is generally deployed in the
upstream of wired broadband and mobile carrier facilities, and consists of software and
hardware.
The non-TOE product hardware is composed of cabinet, chassis, power unit, and boards.
The cabinet is used to install chassis and power units that supply power to the chassis.
The chassis provides the board slot to insert boards.
The boards are the core unit of processing and management in transmission equipment,
consisting of the SCC (System Control and Communication) unit and the service units
including the OTN line board, the Optical layer board, the Packet board, and the TDM
board.
The SCC (System Control and Communication) unit is the center of the system. It
collaborates with the non-TOE EMS (Element Management System) in order to centralize
control, manage all service units of the system and implement inter-equipment
communication. The EMS manages OptiX equipment using a GUI interface (i.e., the user
interface of Huawei's U2000 management software). The GUI interface complies with a
special management protocol defined by Huawei exclusively for OptiX equipment.
The OptiX OSN 1800 V software deployed in the SCC unit and service units is responsible
for the system management, control, and service transmission.
The TOE is part of the OptiX OSN 1800 V software and only runs on the SCC unit. It
consists of the (UTS) component and the underlying OS for the System Control and
Communication unit (TNZ5UXCMS). These components provide the core control and
management services of the device.
The non-TOE software components of the whole OptiX OSN 1800 V software include the
system and service attribute management, the service schedule and protect, the optical
Layer protocol, service warnings and performance, and the service control and monitor.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Authentication The TOE can identify users based on unique IDs
and enforce their authentication before granting
them access to any TSF management interfaces.
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TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Authorization The TOE enforces an access control.
Auditing The TOE provides an audit trail consisting of
operation logs and security logs.
Communication Security The TOE provides communication security by
implementing TLS version 1.1 and 1.2 in the role
of the server and SFTP with SSHv2 in the role of
the client.
Management Traffic Flow Control The TOE uses ACL to deny unwanted network
traffic on management interfaces and allow
wanted network traffic on management
interfaces.
Security Management The TOE allows management of the equipment
network by different users. The TOE can be
configured to grant each user the access right to
the equipment network resources that are
required for user operations.
Time The TOE provides its own clock and timestamps
to correctly record logs in time sequence or other
place wherever the time shall be used. The time
information on the TOE can either be set by a
user with sufficient access rights on the device or
obtained from external NTP time sources.
Cryptographic functions The TOE supports several Cryptographic
functions that are required by security features as
dependencies.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Huawei OptiX OSN 1800 V V100R006C20 software management component
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW Software
OptiX OSN 1800
V100R006C20SPC300
Software.zip
SHA-256 checksum:
2acd6990d24786dc7b27b35
e6111b3e97e7203b53a2a64
8af7fdf302bdb6f8bc
V100R006C20S
PC300
Pre-installed on the OptiX OSN
1800 V device delivered in a
sealed parcel and on CD
2 DOC Software signature file
OptiX OSN 1800
V100R006C20SPC300
Software.zip.asc
- On CD which is included in the
sealed parcel
3 DOC Guidance
OSN 1800 V & 1800 I II
Compact V100R006C20
Deploying Your Network
[8]
03 On CD which is included in the
sealed parcel
4 DOC Guidance
CC Huawei Optix OSN
1800V Software
V100R006C20 - AGD_OPE
[9]
V0.5 On CD which is included in the
sealed parcel
5 DOC Guidance
CC Huawei Optix OSN
1800V Software
V100R006C20 -
AGD_PRE_Production
[10]
V0.4 On CD which is included in the
sealed parcel
6 DOC Guidance
CC Huawei Optix OSN
1800V Software
V100R006C20 -
AGD_PRE_User
[11]
V1.1 On CD which is included in the
sealed parcel
7 DOC Guidance
CC Huawei Optix OSN
1800V Software
V100R006C20 - Software
Configuration and
Reference
[12]
V0.7 On CD which is included in the
sealed parcel
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Note that although the SW also comes on CD, the installation of SW from CD was not part
of the evaluation. The TOE is already installed on the device when it is sent to the
customer. Especially the configuration of the cryptographic parameters is already done
and cannot be changed by the customer (except for the disabling of the TLS 1.0 and SSL
3.0 which has to be performed by the user).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1030-2018
The TOE SW was tested and is running on an SCC board with the hardware revision
identifier TNZ5UXCMS.
Huawei installs the software on the OSN 1800 V device, packs the parcel including a CD
with the TOE documentation, the software package and the signature file and positions
anti-tamper tags on the parcel. This parcel is then sent to the customer via a trusted
shipping company. The customer is accompanied by a Huawei technical support engineer
when configuring the device and deploying the services. They first
● verify the integrity of the parcel,
● check the version of the already installed software,
● check the versions of the TOE documentation provided on CD.
If all the checks in the above list of bullet points are successfully passed, the device can be
configured. After the configuration of the device and the deployment of the services the
TOE is handed over to the customer.
The customer is informed by Huawei about the logistics company which will deliver the
device to him. The customer has to check that the company which delivered the TOE
matches the information the customer received in advance from Huawei. If it does not
match, the customer shall not accept the parcel. Additionally, the customer has to check all
anti-tamper tags on the cardboard box that contains the TOE. The customer shall check
whether the anti-tamper tags are incomplete and whether they are damaged. The
customer also has to check whether the anti-tamper tags are marked with VOID. If any of
the anti-tamper tags shows any of the described signs of tampering, the customer shall
reject the parcel.
The Huawei project supervisor / Huawei on-site technical support engineer works with the
customer to unpack and inspect the delivered equipment. The deliverables are inspected
against the Packing List and in case of damage or any other deviation the project
supervisor fills in the Equipment Problem report and send it to the order management
engineer of the local office of Huawei within three days. The customer and the Huawei
technical support engineer install and configure the device and verify after power-on the
version of the software against the stated version in this report and in the ST [6].
The TOE version can be obtained by performing the following command on the command
prompt:
display version
The response will be:
"Huawei Versatile Routing Platform Software VRP (R) software, Version 5.130 (Optix OSN
1800 V100R006C20)."
The version information given in brackets reflects the TOE with its unique version number.
The TOE version can also be obtained by querying for the software version of the system
control board on the EMS, here U2000. On the U2000, one has to choose Properties from
the main menu selecting the desired network element and the software version of the OSN
1800 V system control board will be shown. The TOE reference which has to be shown is
"V100R006C20SPC300".
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3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. You will find a summary in the ST [6] chapters 1.5.3.1 to 1.5.3.7.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. You will find the list of
relevant topics in the ST [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE only consists of the unified transmission software (UTS), and the underlying OS,
see red frame in Figure 1-5 of the ST [6] . The unified transmission software (UTS) and the
underlying OS are the control and management core that runs on the SCC unit, which is
responsible for managing and controlling the whole OptiX OSN 1800 V software,
communication, and security features in OptiX OSN 1800 V. The TOE security
functionalities are realized by three subsystems, namely Access Control Management
(ACM), Configuration Management (CM), and Log Information Management (LIM),
supported by the OS subsystem. The UTS platform running ACM, CM, and LIM is the
major component responsible for most functionalities.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Developer testing:
The developer uses exclusively manual tests to test the TOE. As test environment setup
the following material and tools were used by the developer:
● NE: Huawei OptiX OSN 1800 V in Version V100R006C20SPC300
● Switch: Ethernet Switch
● Two PCs: Host (OS of Windows 7)
● EMS: U2000 Unified Network Management System in Version V200R016C50SPC201
● MML test tool: Navigator 7.0
● Qx test tool: Impeller 1.9.2.9418
● Simulation of Syslog server: openssl-1.0.2n
● SFTP Server: Bitvise SSH Server 5.60
● RADIUS Server: FreeRadius3.0.16
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Additionally, the general requirements for the configuration outlined in Preparative
Procedures for Users [10] were used.
The developer's testing approach mostly concentrates on the verification of product
functions that are expected by the typical user, a network administrator of a networking
service provider or a large enterprise. This approach is evident by the tests with the
developer's GUI, the U2000 user interface software, the test cases are executed manually.
An automated testing framework does not exist.
The U2000 software makes use of the Qx protocol on its backend to the TOE, which is one
of the TSFI. The developer also provided test cases for TLS and SFTP. Test cases for any
of the other TSFI (MML, RADIUS, syslog, NTP) are not explicitly provided by the
developer. Instead, implicit coverage of some of the TSFI other than the Qx protocol is
given for cases where the U2000 interface controls the behaviour of the other TSFI (which
is the case for functional aspects of NTP, RADIUS, syslog or SFTP).
The developer testing shows the absence of any test cases for the Qx protocol without any
U2000 interaction and the absence of any test case for any of the other TSFI except TLS
and SFTP as a limitation for the overall testing effort of the developer. Technically, the
supplied test cases are free from situations where the configuration of the TOE would
impose challenges for the individual test case, specifically with regards to preparation or
clean-up of configurables, or where the ordering of test cases is of importance.
The developer has provided test cases for the following TSFI: Qx, SFTP/SSH, TLS,
RADIUS, syslog. The developer does NOT provide test cases against the following TSFI:
MML, NTP.
The limitation in the supplied tests was compensated by evaluator tests.
Evaluator Testing:
The evaluator has performed 19 of the developer's tests (of a total of 28 test cases), and
additional four tests consisting of multiple variations in his independent tests. The
evaluator's independent tests attempt to make precise observations about the TOE's
behaviour as exposed by the U2000 interface in order to confirm possible limitations in the
developer's testing approach, specifically the use of the U2000 software and its ability to
display conditions of the TOE reliably and consistently, as well as the incompleteness in
the coverage of the TSFI that are tested by the developer.
The configuration of the TOE to which the tests applies is compatible with the definitions
given in the Security Target [6] section 3, more specifically the definition of threats and the
assumptions (sections 3.3 and 3.4) as well as the objectives for the environment as stated
in chapter 4.2. The developer tests are documented in such way that each test case
contains descriptions about the necessary configuration parameters of the TOE that need
to be set prerequisite to being able to conduct the respective test. The evaluator has
maintained this type of self-sufficiency of the test cases in his own test plan.
The evaluator could successfully conduct the test cases and could confirm the developer's
documented results.
Evaluator Penetration Testing:
The penetration testing was performed using the test environment of the evaluation lab.
The configuration of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation was
tested. The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and
the actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential Basic was
actually successful.
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The evaluator analyzed the developer design and guidance documentation and the
Security Target in order to identify the attack surface of the TOE. The evaluator came to
the conclusion that the attack surface consists of external network interfaces, i.e., data that
is sent or received on these interfaces, and the two coexisting management interfaces (Qx
and MML) with a similar functionality. The evaluator also used publicly documented
vulnerabilities in the CVE database and used general search engines. The analysis of
potential attack surfaces was performed according to the ISO/OSI layer model and
knowledge of the design and architecture of the TOE.
The TOE and the TOE environment was configured according to [6] and the guidance
documentation.
The evaluator performed TCP and UDP port scans of the TOE interfaces from the internal
network to detect any potential attack surfaces. The evaluator also performed tests on TLS
and SFTP/SSH. For the two management interfaces Qx and MML the evaluator performed
concurrency tests and tested whether the interfaces behave in the same way.
The following list of SFRs were tested: FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FAU_SAR.1,
FAU_SAR.2, all FCS_* except FCS_CKM.4/*, FCS_COP.1/PBKDF2 and FCS_RNG.1,
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_IFC.1, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UID.2,
FMT_SMR.1, FTA_TSE.1, FTP_ITC.1/TLS, and FTP_ITC.1/SFTP.
The remaining SFRs were analysed, but not penetration tested due to non-exploitability of
the related attack scenarios in the TOE’s operational environment also including an
attacker with a Basic attack potential.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential Basic was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● For the management interface, authentication is always enabled. Authentication mode is
Authentication, Authorization, Accounting (‘AAA’, i.e. username and password). Length
of password is 16 characters.
● Service of FTP has to be disabled to use the TOE in the certified configuration
● SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 is disabled.
● The SSH server functionality is disabled.
● The gateway service functionality is disabled.
● The OSPF protocol is disabled.
The environment of the TOE consists of Local PCs and Remote PCs. Local PCs are used
by administrators to connect to the TOE through interfaces on the SCC unit via a TLS
channel or non-secure channel. Access will be performed using a command line terminal.
Remote PCs are used by administrators to connect to the TOE using a TLS channel. Since
the TOE is part of the OptiX OSN 1800 V device, it can only operate as part of the device.
Hence all non-TOE parts of the device are also required. The TOE also needs in its
environment an EMS (Element Management System), a Syslog server and an SFTP
Server. A RADIUS server is optional and may be used instead of local authentication.
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The non-TOE SW components include system and service attribute management, service
schedule and protect, optical Layer protocol, service warning and performance, and
service control and monitor.
For details please see chapters 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 of the ST [6].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 2 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context)
only.
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
[13]
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level
above 100
Bits
Comments
Cryptographic Functions for TLS:
1 Authentication
(Server)
X.509 certificates RFC4346 (TLS1.1),
RFC5246 (TLS1.2)
- - -
2 Authentication
(Server)
RSA signature generation
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)
using SHA-256
RFC3447 (PKCS#1 v2.1)
RFC5246 (TLSv1.2)
FIPS186-4, B.3
FIPS180-4 (SHA)
Modulus length:
2048 to 4096 bits
yes Certificates
with
encryption
and signing
capability.
3 Authentication
(Client)
Password-based on
application layer (16
characters over an
alphabet of 94 characters)
log_2(|alphabet|
^password length)
~104,8 bit
yes
4 Key
establishment:
Key transport
RSA decryption (server)
(RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5)
(TLS_RSA)
RFC3447 (PKCS #1 v2.1)
SP800-56B (IFC key
establishment)
min (asymmetric
yes key strength,
symetric key length)
yes Server
certificate is
used for key
exchange.
Encrypted
exchange of
pre-master
secret
generated at
client side.
5 Key
establishment:
Key agreement
Ephemeral
TLS_DHE RFC3526 (for the group
diffie-hellman-group 14)
RFC4346 (TLS 1.1)
RFC5246 (TLS 1.2)
SP800-56A (DH)
PKCS3
diffie-hellman-
group14
yes This is the
only group
that is hard
coded in the
TOE.
6 Key derivation PRF: HMAC with SHA-256,
SHA-384 (default:
prf_sha256 for TLSv1.2,
also prf_sha384 possible
RFC2104 (HMAC)
FIPS180-4 (SHA)
RFC5246 (TLSv1.2)
variable yes
7 Key derivation PRF: HMAC with MD5 and
SHA-1 in combination
(default: prf for TLS v1.1)
RFC2104, FIPS198-1
(HMAC)
RFC1321 (MD5)
FIPS180-3 (SHA)
RFC4346 (TLS v1.1)
variable no
8 Confidentiality AES in CBC mode
(AES_128_CBC,
AES_256_CBC)
FIPS197 (AES)
SP800-38A (CBC)
|k|=128, 256 yes Bulk data
encryption /
decryption
(record layer)
9 Authenticated
Encryption
AES in GCM mode
(AES_128_GCM,
AES_256_GCM)
FIPS197 (AES)
SP800-38D (GCM)
RFC5288 (AES GCM
within TLS)
|k|=128, 256 yes
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
[13]
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level
above 100
Bits
Comments
10 Integrity and
authenticity
HMAC with SHA-1 or SHA-
256 (SHA), (SHA256)
RFC2104 (HMAC)
FIPS180-3,
FIPS180-4 (SHA)
160 (SHA-1)
256 (SHA-256)
yes Message
authentication
code (record
layer)
11 Trusted
Channel
FTP_ITC.1/TLS in ST [6],
Sec. 6.2.8.1
cf. all lines above see above yes/no Depending on
the sec. level
of the used
mechanisms
above.
Cryptographic Functions for SSH/SFTP Security:
1 Authentication RSA signature generation
& verification RSASSA-
PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-
256 (ssh-rsa)
RFC3447 (PKCS#1 v2.1)
RFC4253 (SSH-TRANS)
Sec. 6.6 for host
authentication
RFC4252, Sec. 7 (SSH-
USERAUTH) for user
authentication method:
"publickey"
Modulus length:
2048 to 4096
yes Pubkeys are
exchanged
trustworthy
out of band.
Authenticity is
not part of the
TOE. (no
certificates
used)
2 Authentication UserID & password RFC4252, Sec. 8 (SSH-
USERAUTH) for user
authentication method:
“password”
Guess success
prob. <= 2^(-20)
yes/no
(depending
on server
policy)
The client
authenticates
either with
UserID &
password or
by
cryptographic
means as
shown in #1.
Password-
based
authentication
is set by
default.
3 Key
establishment:
Key agreement
DH with diffe-hellman
-group14-sha1
RFC4253 (SSH-TRANS)
supported by RFC3526
(DH groups IKE)
FIPS180-3 (SHA-1)
plength=2048 yes Hard coded in
the TOE code.
4 Confidentiality AES in CTR mode
(aes128-ctr, aes192-ctr,
aes256-ctr)
FIPS197 (AES),
SP800-38A (CTR),
RFC4253 (SSH using
AES with CTR mode)
|k|= 128, 192, 256 yes Binary packet
protocol:
encryption
5 Integrity and
authenticity
HMAC-SHA-1 (hmac-sha1,
hmac-sha1-96)
FIPS180-3 (SHA),
RFC2104, FIPS198-1
(HMAC),
RFC4251 / RFC4253
(SSH general / detailed
HMAC support)
|k|=160 yes Binary packet
protocol:
message
authentication
truncation:
output length
96 bit
6 Key generation RSA key generation using
CRT with key size: 2048 to
4096 bits 5 rounds of
Miller-Rabin
FIPS186-4, Sec. 5.1,
B.3.3 and C.3.1 Miller
Rabin probabilistic
primality test.
n/a n/a Key
generation
FCS_CKM.1/
RSA using
FCS_RNG.1
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1030-2018 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
[13]
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level
above 100
Bits
Comments
7 Trusted Path FTP_ITC.1/SFTP in ST [6],
Sec. 6.2.8.2 for SSH/SFTP
See above n/a yes/no
(depending
on server
policy)
Cryptographic Function for password encryption:
1 Authentication PBKDF2 (HMAC-SHA256,
10000 iterations)
RFC2898 n/a n/a
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
Note: The Standards of Implementation are referenced in [13].
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a finalized version of
the working version of the Security Target [6] that was used for the performed evaluation.
Their contents are identical, only some formattings, version histories, and document
classifications differ.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
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BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CM Configuration Management
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CTR Counter Mode
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
DHE Diffie Hellman Ephemeral
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EMS Element Management System
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GUI Graphical User Interface
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LIM Log Information Management
MML Man MachineLanguage
NTP Network Time Protocol
OSI Open Systems Interconnection
OSN Optical Switch Node
OTN Optical Transport Network
PBKDF2 Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2
PP Protection Profile
PRF PseudoRandom Function
Qx A proprietary interface
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
RFC Request for Comments
RSA Rivest, Shamir und Adleman
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SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCC System Control and Communication)
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SFTP Secure File Transfer Protocol
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SP Special Publication
SSL Secure Socket Layer
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TDM Time Division Multiplex
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UDP User Datagram Protocol
UTS Unified Transmission Software
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
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TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1030-2018, Security Target for Huawei OptiX OSN
1800 V V100R006C20 software management component, Version 1.53, Date 2018-
10-10, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (confidential working document) and Security
Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-1030-2018, Security Target Lite for Huawei OptiX OSN
1800 V V100R006C20 software management component, Version 1.53, Date 2018-
10-10, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (finalized public document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report for BSI-DSZ-CC-1030, OptiX OSN 1800 V Version
V100R006C20, Version 3, Date 2018-10-24, atsec information security GmbH,
(confidential document)
[8] Huawei OptiX OSN 1800 V Packet Enhanced &1800 I/II Compact Deploying your
Network V100R006C20, Version 03, Date 2017-04-28, Huawei Technologies Co.,
Ltd.
[9] Huawei OptiX OSN 1800V software V100R006C20, Operational User Guidance,
Version 0.5, Date 2018-09-10, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
[10] Huawei OptiX OSN 1800V software V100R006C20, Preparative Procedures for
Production, Version 0.4, Date 2018-03-28, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
[11] Huawei OptiX OSN 1800V software V100R006C20 Preparative Procedures for
Users, Version 1.1, Date 2018-09-10, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
[12] Huawei OptiX OSN 1800 V Software Configuration and Reference, Version 0.7,
Date 2018-09-10, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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[13] - FIPS180-3: FIPS PUB 180-3 Secure Hash Standard (SHS), Date 2008-10
- FIPS180-4: FIPS PUB 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS), Date 2012-03
- FIPS186-4: FIPS PUB 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Date 2013-07
- FIPS197: FIPS PUB 197 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Date November
2001
- FIPS198-1: FIPS PUB 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
(HMAC), Date 2008-07
- PKCS #3: PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, Author(s) RSA
Laboratories, Version 1.4, Date 1993-11
- RFC1321: The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, Date 1992-04
- RFC2104: HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication, Author(s) H.
Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, Date 1997-02-01
- RFC2898: PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.0,
Author(s) B. Kaliski, Date 2000-09-01
- RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.1, Date 2003-02
- RFC3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet
Key Exchange (IKE), Author(s) T. Kivinen, M. Kojo, Date 2003-05-01
- RFC4251: The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture, Author(s) T. Ylonen, C.
Lonvick, Date 2006-01-01
- RFC4252: The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol, Author(s) T. Ylonen, C.
Lonvick, Date 2006-01
- RFC4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, Author(s) T. Ylonen,
C. Lonvick, Date 2006-01-01
- RFC4346: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1, Author(s) T.
Dierks, E. Rescorla, Date 2006-04-01
- RFC5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, Author(s) T.
Dierks, E. Rescorla, Date 2008-08-01
- RFC5288: AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS, Author(s) J.
Salowey, A. Choudhury, D. McGrew, Date 2008-08-01
- SP800-38A: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and
Techniques, Date December 2001
- SP800-38D: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Date November 2007
- SP800-56A: Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, Version R2, Date May 2013
- SP800-56B: NIST Special Publication 800-56B Rev. 1 - Recommendation for Pair-
Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography,
Version R1, Date September 2014
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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Note: End of report
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