TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Version
2023-06
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Certification Report
CryptoServer CP5 Se12 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se52
5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se500 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5
Se1500 5.1.0.0
Sponsor and developer: Utimaco IS GmbH
Germanusstr. 4
52080 Aachen
Germany
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2300142-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2300142-01
Author(s): Haico Haak
Date: 5 December 2023
Number of pages: 15
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 8
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
2.3.1 Assumptions 8
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 8
2.4 Architectural Information 9
2.5 Documentation 10
2.6 IT Product Testing 11
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 11
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 11
2.6.3 Test configuration 11
2.6.4 Test results 11
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 12
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 12
2.9 Evaluation Results 12
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 12
3 Security Target 14
4 Definitions 14
5 Bibliography 15
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
CryptoServer CP5 Se12 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se52 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se500 5.1.0.0,
CryptoServer CP5 Se1500 5.1.0.0. The developer of the CryptoServer CP5 Se12 5.1.0.0,
CryptoServer CP5 Se52 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se500 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se1500 5.1.0.0
is Utimaco IS GmbH located in Aachen, Germany and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation
and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the
suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The CryptoServer CP5 is a hardware security module whose primary purpose is to provide secure
cryptographic services such as signing and verification of data (ECDSA, RSA), encryption or
decryption (for various cryptographic algorithms like AES and RSA), hashing, on-board random
number generation and secure key generation, key storage and further key management functions in
a tamper-protected environment.
The CryptoServer CP5 supports local signing/sealing and server signing in accordance with EN 419
241-1 Security Requirements and EN 419 241-2 Protection Profile for QSCD for Server Signing.
Furthermore, it provides the functionality for creating protected backups of keys and for secure update
of defined parts of the TOE software.
The TOE was previously evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified under the accreditation of TÜV Rheinland Nederland on 19 December 2018 (CC-19-222073)
with maintenance applied on 14 March 2019 and 14 May 2020. The current evaluation of the TOE has
also been conducted by SGS Brightsight B.V. and was completed on 5 December 2023 with the
approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The major changes from previous evaluations are updates of guidance document references, a
change in the used potting material and lifecycle updates
The certification took into account that the security evaluation reused the evaluation results of
previously performed evaluations. A full, up-to-date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as
renewed testing.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the CryptoServer CP5 Se12 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer
CP5 Se52 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se500 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se1500 5.1.0.0, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the CryptoServer CP5 Se12 5.1.0.0,
CryptoServer CP5 Se52 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se500 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se1500 5.1.0.0
are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
Note: The security target [ST] refers to the “CryptoServer Se-Series Gen2 CP5” as the collection of the
4 variants “CryptoServer CP5 Se12 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se52 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5
Se500 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se1500 5.1.0.0”.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical
vulnerability analysis.
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the CryptoServer CP5 Se12 5.1.0.0,
CryptoServer CP5 Se52 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se500 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se1500 5.1.0.0
from Utimaco IS GmbH located in Aachen, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
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To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the CryptoServer CP5
Se12 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se52 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se500 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5
Se1500 5.1.0.0. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE implements key import and export, generation, backup and restore, use and destruction.
Keys attributes can be assigned and determine what operations a user can perform on and with a
given key. Audit logs are generated for specified events.
Supported cryptographic operations include: AES, RSA, ECDSA key generation, encryption and
decryption, RSA ECDSA signature generation and verification, HMAC, SHA-2 and SHA-3 calculations,
Diffie-Hellman key agreement, KDF Key Derivation, and random number generation.
See the [ST] for details
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The TOE is intended for use in a hardware appliance. The appliance and its software are not part of
the TOE scope.
Note that EN 419221-5 Protection Profile [EN419221-5] claims the environment for the TOE protects
against loss or theft of the TOE, deters and detects physical tampering, protects against attacks based
on emanations of the TOE, and protects against unauthorised software and configuration changes on
the TOE and the hardware appliance in which it is contained (“OE.Env Protected operating
environment”).
The ST follows the PP and also claims OE.Env, thus the environment in which the TOE is used must
ensure the above protection.
Any threats violating these objectives for the environment are not considered.
The TOE can optionally also be used for implementing a QSCD for eIDAS-compliant remote Server
Signing in the sense of CEN Protection Profile EN 419 241-2, “Trustworthy Systems Supporting
Server Signing Part 2: Protection Profile for QSCD for Server Signing”. In this case, the customer has
to develop a Signature Activation Module (SAM) module and certify it against this CEN
Protection.Profile EN 419 241-2. The SAM may be either implemented as external SAM (as an
application using the external interfaces of the TOE) or internal SAM (as firmware using the internal
interfaces of the TOE).
The possibility of the SAM was in scope of the evaluation. The SAM itself is out of scope of this
evaluation. For SAM developers see the guidance “Internal SAM developer documentation”. For
composite evaluators see [ETRfC].
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2.4 Architectural Information
The CryptoServer CP5 is designed as a
protected cryptographic module provided
in form of a PCIe (PCI express) plug-in
card (specific hardware and software
product).
All hardware components of the TOE,
including the Central Processing Unit, all
memory chips, Real Time Clock, and
hardware noise generator for random
number generation, are located on a
printed circuit board (PCB). These
hardware components are completely
covered with potting material (epoxy resin)
and a heat sink. In total this is called “PCIe
security module”.
To enable communication of the cryptographic module with a host, the PCIe security module offers a
PCIe interface and two USB interfaces. The PCIe security module is plugged into the PCIe bus
interface of the backplane.
Before delivery the PCIe security module can be optionally integrated into an Utimaco CryptoServer
LAN appliance.
Regardless of the TOE variant, at a high level of abstraction, the TOE is structured into the following
three subsystems:
1. Hardware: all hardware components for example CPU and memory.
2. Boot Loader: first software started inside the security module after a reboot.
3. Firmware Modules: all firmware modules containing all the software functionality needed after end
of boot phase, like for example SMOS, CXI, CMDS and HASH
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2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
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2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer has performed testing on functional specification and subsystem level. All parameter
choices have been addressed at least once. The testing was largely automated using industry
standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were extensively used to verify that the functions
return the expected values. Additional fuzzing testing and code inspection are used for properties that
are hard to verify externally.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided samples and a test
environment. The evaluators have reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a number
of test cases designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
Given the restrictions imposed by the PP (which prevents any physical attack and any side channel
attack that requires physical proximity to the TOE), the evaluator focused on vulnerabilities related to
design/architectural flaws that would lead intended users to abuse the TOE. For this reason, the
evaluator needed to find a methodical approach to scout the TOE implementation searching for such
design/architectural flaws.
Step 1: The first step of this type of vulnerability analysis was the identification of areas of concern (as
defined in [CEM]). This process is detailed in evaluation document [AVA POS].
Step 2: iteratively, for each security function (and hence indirectly for each SFR), the evaluator
formulated security relevant questions for each identified area of concern.
Step 3: These security relevant questions were then translated into TOE-specific possible
vulnerabilities (uniquely identified with POS_VUL.xxx.yyy). Note that the evaluator also used the list of
publicly known crypto attacks to formulate possible vulnerabilities as well as web searches and
cvedetails.com.
Step 4: the evaluator argued whether each possible vulnerability was removed or sufficiently mitigated
by the TOE implementation/environment/functional testing evidence. If yes, the possible vulnerability
was considered as solved, otherwise it was uniquely labeled as potential vulnerability
POT_VUL.xxx.yyy.
With this process, the evaluator identified a total of 18 potential vulnerabilities. All other possible
vulnerabilities were solved.
The remaining potential vulnerabilities were addressed by penetration tests.
No vulnerabilities remained after these tests.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators in the original evaluation in 2018 was 2 weeks. During
that test campaign, 50% of the total time was spent on side-channel attacks, and 50% on software
attacks.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators in the current re-evaluation in 2023 was 1 week.
During that test campaign, 100% of the total time was spent on software attacks.
2.6.3 Test configuration
Testing was performed on the TOE in the Se1500 (with crypto accelerator) and Se52 (without crypto
accelerator) figurations. This is representative for all TOE variants.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
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The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
The algorithmic security level exceeds 100 bits for all evaluated cryptographic functionality as required
for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the
independent penetration tests.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
reused, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
One site (Utimaco IS GmbH in Aachen) has been audited as part of the original evaluation, however
no STAR report has been made and hence this audit is not re-usable outside the NSCIB scheme.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number CryptoServer CP5 Se12 5.1.0.0,
CryptoServer CP5 Se52 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se500 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se1500 5.1.0.0
See the preparative guidance for acceptance steps and verification procedures
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
To support composite evaluations according to [COMP] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided
and approved. This document provides details of the TOE evaluation that must be considered when
this TOE is used as platform in a composite evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the CryptoServer CP5 Se12
5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se52 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se500 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se1500
5.1.0.0, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant and to meet the requirements of EAL 4
augmented with AVA_VAN.5. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements
specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [EN419221-5].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security, in particular the countermeasures against physical
attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance for the environment. There are no
particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please
note that the documents contain relevant details with respect to the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
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The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: <none>.
To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate cryptographic algorithms
with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can be found in national and
international documents and standards).
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3 Security Target
The CryptoServer Security Target for CryptoServer Se-Series Gen2 CP5, version 2.1.2, 21st
November 2023 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
DCAP Dutch Conformity Assessment Process
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SCD Signature Creation Device
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[EN419221-5] EN 419 221-5:2018, Protection Profiles for TSP Cryptographic Modules – Part
5 Cryptographic Module for Trust Services, v1.0, registered under the reference
ANSSI-CC-PP-2016/05-M01, 18 May 2020
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report CryptoServer Se-Series Gen2 CP5 EAL4+, 23-
RPT-1085, Version 3.0, 5 December 2023
[ETRfC] ETR for Composition for CryptoServer Se-Series Gen2 CP5 EAL4+, 23-RPT-
1086, Version 3.0, 5 December 2023
[EU-REG] REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust
services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing
Directive 1999/93/EC
[JIL-AP] Application of Attack Potential to Hardware Devices with Security Boxes,
Version 3.0, July 2020
[JIL-AMS] Attack Methods for Hardware Devices with Security Boxes, Version 3.0,
February 2020 (sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[ST] CryptoServer Security Target for CryptoServer Se-Series Gen2 CP5, version
2.1.2, 21st November 2023
[ST-lite] CryptoServer Security Target Lite for CryptoServer Se-Series Gen2 CP5,
version 2.1.2, 21st November 2023
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)