



# Microsoft Windows

# Common Criteria Evaluation

Microsoft Windows 10 version 1909 (November 2019 Update)

Microsoft Windows Server version 1909 (November 2019 Update)

## Security Target

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## Microsoft Common Criteria Security Target

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## 1 Security Target Introduction

This section presents the following information required for a Common Criteria (CC) evaluation:

- Identifies the Security Target (ST) and the Target of Evaluation (TOE)
- Specifies the security target conventions,
- Describes the organization of the security target

### 1.1 ST Reference

ST Title: Microsoft Windows 10, Windows Server version 1909 Security Target

ST Version: version 0.04, January 16, 2020

### 1.2 TOE Reference

TOE Software Identification: The following Windows Operating Systems (OS):

- Microsoft Windows 10 Home edition (November 2019 Update) (32-bit and 64-bit versions)
- Microsoft Windows 10 Pro edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit version)
- Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit version)
- Microsoft Windows Server Standard edition (November 2019 Update)
- Microsoft Windows Server Datacenter edition (November 2019 Update)

TOE Versions:

- Windows 10: build 10.0. 18363 (also known as version 1909)
- Windows Server: build 10.0. 18363 (also known as version 1909)

The following security updates must be applied for:

- Windows 10 and Windows Server: all critical updates as of October 31, 2019

### 1.3 TOE Overview

The TOE includes the Windows 10 operating system, the Windows Server operating system, and those applications necessary to manage, support and configure the operating system. Windows 10 and Windows Server can be delivered preinstalled on a new computer or downloaded from the Microsoft website.

#### 1.3.1 TOE Types

All Windows 10 and Windows Server editions, collectively called “Windows”, are preemptive multitasking, multiprocessor, and multi-user operating systems. In general, operating systems provide users with a convenient interface to manage underlying hardware. They control the allocation and manage computing resources such as processors, memory, and Input/Output (I/O) devices. Windows expands these basic operating system capabilities to controlling the allocation and managing higher level IT resources such as security principals (user or machine accounts), files, printing objects, services,

window station, desktops, cryptographic keys, network ports traffic, directory objects, and web content. Multi-user operating systems such as Windows keep track of which user is using which resource, grant resource requests, account for resource usage, and mediate conflicting requests from different programs and users.

### 1.3.2 TOE Usage

Windows 10 is suited for business desktops, notebook, and convertible computers. It is the workstation product and while it can be used by itself, it is designed to serve as a client within Windows domains.

Built for workloads ranging from the department to the enterprise to the cloud, Windows Server delivers intelligent file and printer sharing; secure connectivity based on Internet technologies, and centralized desktop policy management. It provides the necessary scalable and reliable foundation to support mission-critical solutions for databases, enterprise resource planning software, high-volume, real-time transaction processing, server consolidation, public key infrastructure, virtualization, and additional server roles.

Windows provides an interactive User Interface (UI), as well as a network interface. The TOE includes a set of computer systems that can be connected via their network interfaces and organized into domains and forests. A domain is a logical collection of Windows systems that allows the administration and application of a common security policy and the use of a common accounts database. One or more domains combine to comprise a forest. Windows supports single-domain and multiple-domain (i.e., forest) configurations as well as federation between forests and external authentication services.

Each domain must include at least one designated server known as a Domain Controller (DC) to manage the domain. The TOE allows for multiple DCs that replicate TOE user and machine account as well as group policy management data among themselves to provide for higher availability.

Each Windows system, whether it is a DC server, non-DC server, or workstation, provides a subset of the TSFs. The TSF subset for Windows can consist of the security functions from a single system, for a stand-alone system, or the collection of security functions from an entire network of systems, for a domain configuration.

### 1.3.3 TOE Security Services

This section summarizes the security services provided by the TOE:

- **Security Audit:** Windows has the ability to collect audit data, review audit logs, protect audit logs from overflow, and restrict access to audit logs. Audit information generated by the system includes the date and time of the event, the user identity that caused the event to be generated, and other event specific data. Authorized administrators can review audit logs and have the ability to search and sort audit records. Authorized Administrators can also configure the audit system to include or exclude potentially auditable events to be audited based on a wide range of characteristics. In the context of this evaluation, the protection profile requirements cover generating audit events, selecting which events should be audited, and providing secure storage for audit event entries.
- **Cryptographic Support:** Windows provides FIPS 140-2 CAVP validated cryptographic functions that support encryption/decryption, cryptographic signatures, cryptographic hashing,

cryptographic key agreement, and random number generation. The TOE additionally provides support for public keys, credential management and certificate validation functions and provides support for the National Security Agency's Suite B cryptographic algorithms. Windows also provides extensive auditing support of cryptographic operations, the ability to replace cryptographic functions and random number generators with alternative implementations,<sup>1</sup> and a key isolation service designed to limit the potential exposure of secret and private keys. In addition to using cryptography for its own security functions, Windows offers access to the cryptographic support functions for user-mode and kernel-mode programs. Public key certificates generated and used by Windows authenticate users and machines as well as protect both user and system data in transit.

- **TLS:** Windows implements Transport Layer Security to provide protected, authenticated, confidential, and tamper-proof networking between two peer computers
- **IPsec:** Windows implements IPsec to provide protected, authenticated, confidential, and tamper-proof networking between two peer computers.
- **Wi-Fi:** Windows implements IEEE 802.11 wireless networking to provide protected, authenticated, confidential, and tamper-proof networking between Windows clients and Wi-Fi access points.
- **User Data Protection:** In the context of this evaluation Windows protects user data and provides virtual private networking capabilities.
- **Identification and Authentication** Each Windows user must be identified and authenticated based on administrator-defined policy prior to performing any TSF-mediated functions. An interactive user invokes a trusted path in order to protect his I&A information. Windows maintains databases of accounts including their identities, authentication information, group associations, and privilege and logon rights associations. Windows account policy functions include the ability to define the minimum password length, the number of failed logon attempts, the duration of lockout, and password age. Windows provides the ability to use, store, and protect X.509 certificates that are used for IPsec VPN sessions.
- **Protection of the TOE Security Functions:** Windows provides a number of features to ensure the protection of TOE security functions. Windows protects against unauthorized data disclosure and modification by using a suite of Internet standard protocols including IPsec, IKE, and ISAKMP. Windows ensures process isolation security for all processes through private virtual address spaces, execution context, and security context. The Windows data structures defining process address space, execution context, memory protection, and security context are stored in protected kernel-mode memory. Windows includes self-testing features that ensure the integrity of executable program images and its cryptographic functions. Finally, Windows provides a trusted update mechanism to update Windows binaries itself.
- **Session Locking:** Windows provides the ability for a user to lock their session either immediately or after a defined interval. Windows constantly monitors the mouse, keyboard, and touch display for activity and locks the computer after a set period of inactivity.

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<sup>1</sup> This option is not included in the Windows Common Criteria evaluation.

- **TOE Access:** Windows allows an authorized administrator to configure the system to display a logon banner before the logon dialog.
- **Trusted Path for Communications:** Windows uses TLS, HTTPS, DTLS, EAP-TLS, and IPsec to provide a trusted path for communications.
- **Security Management:** Windows includes several functions to manage security policies. Policy management is controlled through a combination of access control, membership in administrator groups, and privileges.

#### 1.3.4 Non-TOE Hardware, Software, Firmware in the Evaluation

Non-TOE Hardware Identification: The following real and virtualized hardware platforms, corresponding firmware, and components are included in the evaluated configuration:

- Microsoft Surface Go
- Microsoft Surface Go LTE
- Microsoft Surface Pro LTE
- Microsoft Surface Book 2
- Microsoft Surface Pro 6
- Microsoft Surface Laptop 2
- Microsoft Surface Studio 2
- Microsoft Windows Server 2019 Hyper-V
- Microsoft Windows Server 2016 Hyper-V
- Dell Latitude 7200 2-in-1
- Dell Latitude 5300 2-in-1
- Dell PowerEdge R740
- Dell PowerEdge R7425
- HP ZBook 15G6
- HP ProBook 650 G5
- Panasonic Toughbook CF-33
- Samsung Galaxy Book 10.6"
- Samsung Galaxy Book 12"

### 1.4 TOE Description

The TOE includes the Windows 10 operating system, the Windows Server supporting hardware, and those applications necessary to manage, support and configure the operating system.

#### 1.4.1 Evaluated Configurations

The TOE includes five product variants of Windows (build 10.0.18363):

- Microsoft Windows 10 Home edition (November 2019 Update) (32-bit and 64-bit versions)
- Microsoft Windows 10 Pro edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit version)
- Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit version)
- Microsoft Windows Server Standard edition (November 2019 Update)
- Microsoft Windows Server Datacenter edition (November 2019 Update)

Within this security target, when specifically referring to a type of TSF (for example, a domain controller), the TSF type will be explicitly stated. Otherwise, the term TSF refers to the total of all TSFs within the TOE.

## 1.4.2 Security Environment and TOE Boundary

The TOE includes both physical and logical boundaries. Its operational environment is a networked environment.

### 1.4.2.1 Logical Boundaries

Conceptually the Windows TOE can be thought of as a collection of the following security services which the security target describes with increasing detail:

- Security Audit
- Cryptographic Support
- User Data Protection
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Protection of the TOE Security Functions
- Access to the TOE
- Trusted Path and Channels

These services are primarily provided by Windows components:

- The **Boot Manager**, which is invoked by the computer's bootstrapping code.
- The **Windows Loader** which loads the operating system into the computer's memory.
- **Windows OS Resume** which reloads an image of the executing operating system from a hibernation file as part of resuming from a hibernated state.
- The **Windows Kernel** which contains device drivers for the Windows NT File System, full volume encryption, the crash dump filter, and the kernel-mode cryptographic library.
- The **IPv4 / IPv6 network stack** in the kernel.
- The **IPsec** module in user-mode.
- The **IKE and AuthIP Keying Modules** service which hosts the IKE and Authenticated Internet Protocol (AuthIP) keying modules. These keying modules are used for authentication and key exchange in Internet Protocol security (IPsec).
- The **Remote Access Service** device driver in the kernel, which is used primarily for ad hoc or user-defined VPN connections; known as the "RAS IPsec VPN" or "RAS VPN".
- The **IPsec Policy Agent** service which enforces IPsec policies.
- The **Key Isolation Service** which protects secret and private keys.
- The **Local Security Authority Subsystem** which identifies and authenticates users prior to log on and generates events for the security audit log.
- FIPS-Approved **cryptographic algorithms** to protect user and system data.
- **Local and remote administrative interfaces** for security management.

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- **Windows Explorer** which can be used to manage the OS and check the integrity of Windows files and updates.
- The **Windows Trusted Installer** which installs updates to the Windows operating system.

### *1.4.2.2 Physical Boundaries*

Each instance of the general-purpose OS TOE runs on a tablet, convertible, workstation or server computer. The TOE executes on processors from Intel (x86 and x64) or AMD (x86 and x64) along with peripherals for input/output (keyboard, mouse, display, and network).

The TOE was tested on the following physical and virtual computer platforms:

- Microsoft Surface Go
- Microsoft Surface Go LTE
- Microsoft Surface Pro LTE
- Microsoft Surface Book 2
- Microsoft Surface Pro 6
- Microsoft Surface Laptop 2
- Microsoft Surface Studio 2
- Microsoft Windows Server 2019 Hyper-V
- Microsoft Windows Server 2016 Hyper-V
- Dell Latitude 7200 2-in-1
- Dell Latitude 5300 2-in-1
- Dell PowerEdge R740
- Dell PowerEdge R7425
- HP ZBook 15G6
- HP ProBook 650 G5
- Panasonic Toughbook CF-33
- Samsung Galaxy Book 10.6"
- Samsung Galaxy Book 12"

The Assurance Activity Report describes the relationship between the different hardware platforms and the operating systems examined during the evaluation.

The TOE does not include any hardware or network infrastructure components between the computers that comprise the distributed TOE. The security target assumes that any network connections, equipment, peripherals and cables are appropriately protected in the TOE security environment.

The Windows operating system must be pre-installed on a computer by an OEM, installed by the end-user, by an organization's IT administrator, or updated from a previous Windows 10 version downloaded from Windows Update. Consumers can download Windows 10 from <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/software-download/windows10> and IT professionals can obtain a copy of Windows Server from <https://www.microsoft.com/Licensing/servicecenter/default.aspx>. The obtained file is in .iso format. Enterprises typically obtain Windows using volume licensing programs and subscriptions such as these for [Windows 10](#).

Windows is pre-installed on all Microsoft Surface computers.

TOE Guidance Identification: The following administrator, user, and configuration guides were evaluated as part of the TOE and delivered in .docx format:

- *Microsoft Windows 10 and Windows Server version 1909 GP OS Operational and Administrative Guidance* along with all the documents referenced therein.

The administrator and user must follow the instructions in the *Microsoft Windows 10 and Windows Server version 1909 GP OS Operational and Administrative Guidance* to configure and remain in the evaluated configuration.

## 1.5 Product Description

In addition to core **operating system** capabilities described in the previous section, Windows can also be categorized as the following types of Information Assurance (IA) or IA-enabled IT products, these capabilities leverage functionality included in this General Purpose OS evaluation as well as capabilities which fall outside the scope of the GP OS PP:

- Windows is a **Network Management** and **Desktop Management** product to support security infrastructure. Group Policy and mobile device management Configuration Service Providers, which is part of the Windows TOE, provide the centralized network management in Windows networks and desktops.
- Windows is a **Single Sign-On** product (using password or certificate) for Windows networks to defend the computing environment. Windows supports single sign on to the TOE.
- Windows is a **Firewall** product with the capability to filter network traffic based upon source and destination addresses, ports, applications, user or machine identity, and protocols.

## 1.6 Conventions, Terminology, Acronyms

This section specifies the formatting information used in the security target.

### 1.6.1 Conventions

The following conventions have been applied in this document:

- Security Functional Requirements (SFRs): Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
  - Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations.
  - Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter.
  - Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list.
  - Refinement: allows the addition of details.

The conventions for the assignment, selection, refinement, and iteration operations are described in Section 5.

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- Other sections of the security target use a bold font to highlight text of special interest, such as captions.

### 1.6.2 Terminology

The following terminology is used in the security target:

Term	Definition
<b>Access</b>	Interaction between an entity and an object that results in the flow or modification of data.
<b>Access control</b>	Security service that controls the use of resources <sup>2</sup> and the disclosure and modification of data <sup>3</sup> .
<b>Accountability</b>	Tracing each activity in an IT system to the entity responsible for the activity.
<b>Active Directory</b>	Active Directory manages enterprise identities, credentials, information protection, system and application settings through AD Domain Services, Federation Services, Certificate Services and Lightweight Directory Services.
<b>Administrator</b>	An authorized user who has been specifically granted the authority to manage some portion or the entire TOE and thus whose actions may affect the TOE Security Policy (TSP). Administrators may possess special privileges that provide capabilities to override portions of the TSP.
<b>Assurance</b>	A measure of confidence that the security features of an IT system are sufficient to enforce the IT system's security policy.
<b>Attack</b>	An intentional act attempting to violate the security policy of an IT system.
<b>Authentication</b>	A security measure that verifies a claimed identity.
<b>Authentication data</b>	The information used to verify a claimed identity.
<b>Authorization</b>	Permission, granted by an entity authorized to do so, to perform functions and access data.
<b>Authorized user</b>	An authenticated user who may, in accordance with the TOE Security Policy, perform an operation.
<b>Availability</b>	Timely <sup>4</sup> , reliable access to IT resources.
<b>Compromise</b>	Violation of a security policy.
<b>Confidentiality</b>	A security policy pertaining to disclosure of data.
<b>Critical cryptographic security parameters</b>	Security-related information appearing in plaintext or otherwise unprotected form and whose disclosure or modification can compromise the security of a cryptographic module or the security of the information protected by the module.
<b>Cryptographic boundary</b>	An explicitly defined contiguous perimeter that establishes the physical bounds (for hardware) or logical bounds (for software) of a cryptographic module.
<b>Cryptographic key (key)</b>	A parameter used in conjunction with a cryptographic algorithm that determines: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the transformation of plaintext data into ciphertext data</li> </ul>

<sup>2</sup> Hardware and software

<sup>3</sup> Stored or communicated

<sup>4</sup> According to a defined metric



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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the transformation of ciphertext data into plaintext data</li> <li>• a digital signature computed from data</li> <li>• the verification of a digital signature computed from data</li> <li>• a data authentication code computed from data</li> </ul>
<b>Cryptographic module</b>	The set of hardware, software, and/or firmware that implements approved security functions, including cryptographic algorithms and key generation, which is contained within the cryptographic boundary.
<b>Cryptographic module security policy</b>	A precise specification of the security rules under which a cryptographic module must operate.
<b>Defense-in-depth</b>	A security design strategy whereby layers of protection are utilized to establish an adequate security posture for an IT system.
<b>Discretionary Access Control (DAC)</b>	A means of restricting access to objects based on the identity of subjects and groups to which the objects belong. The controls are discretionary meaning that a subject with a certain access permission is capable of passing that permission (perhaps indirectly) on to any other subject.
<b>Edition</b>	A distinct variation of a Windows OS version. Examples of editions are Windows 10 Pro and Windows 10 Enterprise.
<b>Enclave</b>	A collection of entities under the control of a single authority and having a homogeneous security policy. They may be logical or based on physical location and proximity.
<b>Entity</b>	A subject, object, user or external IT device.
<b>General-Purpose Operating System</b>	A general-purpose operating system is designed to meet a variety of goals, including protection between users and applications, fast response time for interactive applications, high throughput for server applications, and high overall resource utilization.
<b>Identity</b>	A means of uniquely identifying an authorized user of the TOE.
<b>Integrated Windows authentication</b>	An authentication protocol formerly known as NTLM or Windows NT Challenge/Response.
<b>Named object</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An object that exhibits all of the following characteristics:</li> <li>• The object may be used to transfer information between subjects of differing user identities within the TOE Security Function (TSF).</li> <li>• Subjects in the TOE must be able to request a specific instance of the object.</li> <li>• The name used to refer to a specific instance of the object must exist in a context that potentially allows subjects with different user identities to request the same instance of the object.</li> </ul>
<b>Object</b>	An entity under the control of the TOE that contains or receives information and upon which subjects perform operations.
<b>Operating environment</b>	The total environment in which a TOE operates. It includes the physical facility and any physical, procedural, administrative and personnel controls.
<b>Persistent storage</b>	All types of data storage media that maintain data across system boots (e.g., hard disk, removable media).
<b>Public object</b>	An object for which the TSF unconditionally permits all entities “read” access under the Discretionary Access Control SFP. Only the TSF or authorized administrators may create, delete, or modify the public objects.

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<b>Resource</b>	A fundamental element in an IT system (e.g., processing time, disk space, and memory) that may be used to create the abstractions of subjects and objects.
<b>SChannel</b>	A security package (SSP) that provides network authentication between clients and servers.
<b>Secure State</b>	Condition in which all TOE security policies are enforced.
<b>Security attributes</b>	TSF data associated with subjects, objects and users that is used for the enforcement of the TSP.
<b>Security-enforcing</b>	A term used to indicate that the entity (e.g., module, interface, subsystem) is related to the enforcement of the TOE security policies.
<b>Security-supporting</b>	A term used to indicate that the entity (e.g., module, interface, subsystem) is not security-enforcing; however, the entity's implementation must still preserve the security of the TSF.
<b>Security context</b>	The security attributes or rules that are currently in effect. For SSPI, a security context is an opaque data structure that contains security data relevant to a connection, such as a session key or an indication of the duration of the session.
<b>Security package</b>	The software implementation of a security protocol. Security packages are contained in security support provider libraries or security support provider/authentication package libraries.
<b>Security principal</b>	An entity recognized by the security system. Principals can include human users as well as autonomous processes.
<b>Security Support Provider (SSP)</b>	A dynamic-link library that implements the SSPI by making one or more security packages available to applications. Each security package provides mappings between an application's SSPI function calls and an actual security model's function. Security packages support security protocols such as Kerberos authentication and Integrated Windows Authentication.
<b>Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI)</b>	A common interface between transport-level applications. SSPI allows a transport application to call one of several security providers to obtain an authenticated connection. These calls do not require extensive knowledge of the security protocol's details.
<b>Security Target (ST)</b>	A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
<b>Subject</b>	An active entity within the TOE Scope of Control (TSC) that causes operations to be performed. Subjects can come in two forms: trusted and untrusted. Trusted subjects are exempt from part or all of the TOE security policies. Untrusted subjects are bound by all TOE security policies.
<b>Target of Evaluation (TOE)</b>	An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
<b>Threat</b>	Capabilities, intentions and attack methods of adversaries, or any circumstance or event, with the potential to violate the TOE security policy.
<b>Unauthorized individual</b>	A type of threat agent in which individuals who have not been granted access to the TOE attempt to gain access to information or functions provided by the TOE.

<b>Unauthorized user</b>	A type of threat agent in which individuals who are registered and have been explicitly granted access to the TOE may attempt to access information or functions that they are not permitted to access.
<b>Universal Unique Identifier (UUID)</b>	UUID is an identifier that is unique across both space and time, with respect to the space of all UUIDs. A UUID can be used for multiple purposes, from tagging objects with an extremely short lifetime, to reliably identifying very persistent objects across a network.
<b>User</b>	Any person who interacts with the TOE.
<b>User Principal Name (UPN)</b>	An identifier used by Microsoft Active Directory that provides a user name and the Internet domain with which that username is associated in an e-mail address format. The format is <i>[AD username]@[associated domain]</i> ; an example would be <i>john.smith@microsoft.com</i> .
<b>Uniform Resource Locator (URL)</b>	The address that is used to locate a Web site. URLs are text strings that must conform to the guidelines in RFC 2396.
<b>Version</b>	A Version refers to a release level of the Windows operating system. Windows 7 and Windows 8 are different versions.
<b>Vulnerability</b>	A weakness that can be exploited to violate the TOE security policy.

### 1.6.3 Acronyms

The acronyms used in this security target are specified in **Appendix A: List of Abbreviations**.

## 1.7 ST Overview and Organization

This security target contains the following additional sections:

- CC Conformance Claims (Section ): Formal conformance claims which are examined during the evaluation.
- Security Problem Definition (Section 3): Describes the threats, organizational security policies and assumptions that pertain to the TOE.
- Security Objectives (Section 4): Identifies the security objectives that are satisfied by the TOE and the TOE operational environment.
- Security Requirements (Section 5): Presents the security functional and assurance requirements met by the TOE.
- TOE Summary Specification (TSS) (Section 6): Describes the security functions provided by the TOE to satisfy the security requirements and objectives.
- Protection Profile Conformance Claim (Section 7): Presents the rationale concerning compliance of the ST with the **General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile**.
- Rationale for Modifications to the Security Requirements (Section 8): Presents the rationale for the security objectives, requirements, and TOE Summary Specification as to their consistency, completeness and suitability.

## 2 CC Conformance Claims

This ST and the Windows 10 editions (TOEs) are consistent with the following specifications:

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017, extended (Part 2 extended)
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance requirements Version 3.1, Revision 5 April 2017, (Part 3 extended)
- Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.2.1, April 22, 2019 (GP OS PP)
- General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile / Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, version 1.0, February 8, 2016 (“WLAN Client EP”)
- General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile / Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile / Application Software Protection Profile: PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, version 2.1, October 5, 2017 (“IPsec Client EP”)

This ST and the Windows Server editions (TOEs) are consistent with the following specifications:

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017, extended (Part 2 extended)
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance requirements Version 3.1, Revision 5 April 2017, (Part 3 extended)
- General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile, Version 4.2.1, April 22, 2019 (GP OS PP)
- General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile / Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile / Application Software Protection Profile: PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, version 2.1, October 5, 2017 (IPsec Client EP)

The security functional requirements and assurance activities have been modified with the following NIAP Technical Decisions:

- NIAP Technical Decision [496](#) for the GP OS PP
- NIAP Technical Decision [492](#) for FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1/WLAN in the WLAN Client EP
- NIAP Technical Decision [485](#) in the IPsec Client EP is not applicable to the GP OS
- NIAP Technical Decision [470](#) for FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1/WLAN and FTA\_WSE\_EXT.1 in the WLAN Client EP
- NIAP Technical Decision [463](#) for FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1, FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2
- NIAP Technical Decision [441](#) for FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1
- NIAP Technical Decision [439](#) for FIA\_X509\_EXT.1 in the WLAN Client EP
- NIAP Technical Decision [404](#) in the IPsec Client EP is not applicable to the GP OS
- NIAP Technical Decision [365](#) for FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4
- NIAP Technical Decision [386](#) for FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1

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- NIAP Technical Decision [194](#) for FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 in the WLAN Client EP
- NIAP Technical Decision [303](#) for FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1 in the IPsec Client EP
- NIAP Technical Decision [330](#) for FCS\_CKM.1 is not applicable in a GP OS evaluation
- NIAP Technical Decision [355](#) for FCS\_CKM.1(VPN) is not applicable in a GP OS evaluation
- NIAP Technical Decision [362](#) for FAU\_GEN.1 in the IPsec Client EP
- NIAP Technical Decision [378](#) for FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1 in the IPsec Client EP
- NIAP Technical Decision [379](#) for FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1 in the IPsec Client EP
- NIAP Technical Decision [385](#) in the IPsec Client EP is not applicable in a GP OS evaluation
- NIAP Technical Decision [387](#) in the IPsec Client EP

Evaluation Assurance: As specified in section 5.2.1 and specific Assurance Activities associated with the security functional requirements from section 5.2.2.

CC Identification: CC for Information Technology (IT) Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.

### 3 Security Problem Definition

The security problem definition consists of the threats to security, organizational security policies, and usage assumptions as they relate to Windows. The assumptions, threats, and policies are copied from the General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile, Version 4.2.1, April 22, 2019 (“GP OS PP”) and the General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients (“WLAN Client EP”) and the PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients (“IPsec Client EP”).

#### 3.1 Threats to Security

**Table 1** presents known or presumed threats to protected resources that are addressed by Windows based on conformance to the General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile.

**Table 1 GP OS PP Threats Addressed by Windows**

Threat	Description
<b>T.NETWORK_ATTACK</b>	An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with applications and services running on or part of the OS with the intent of compromise. Engagement may consist of altering existing legitimate communications.
<b>T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP</b>	An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged between applications and services that are running on or part of the OS.
<b>T.LOCAL_ATTACK</b>	An attacker may compromise applications running on the OS. The compromised application may provide maliciously formatted input to the OS through a variety of channels including unprivileged system calls and messaging via the file system.
<b>T.LIMITED_PHYSICAL_ACCESS</b>	An attacker may attempt to access data on the OS while having a limited amount of time with the physical device.

**Table 2** presents known or presumed threats to protected resources that are addressed by Windows based on conformance to the WLAN Client EP.

**Table 2 WLAN Client EP Threats Addressed by Windows**

Threat	Description
<b>T.TSF_FAILURE (TSF Failure)</b>	Security mechanisms of the TOE generally build up from a primitive set of mechanisms (e.g., memory management, privileged modes of process execution) to more complex sets of mechanisms. Failure of the primitive mechanisms could lead to a

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	compromise in more complex mechanisms, resulting in a compromise of the TSF.
<b>T.UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS (Unauthorized Access)</b>	A user may gain unauthorized access to the TOE data and TOE executable code. A malicious user, process, or external IT entity may masquerade as an authorized entity in order to gain unauthorized access to data or TOE resources. A malicious user, process, or external IT entity may misrepresent itself as the TOE to obtain identification and authentication data.
<b>T.UNDETECTED_ACTIONS (Undetected Actions)</b>	Malicious remote users or external IT entities may take actions that adversely affect the security of the TOE. These actions may remain undetected and thus their effects cannot be effectively mitigated.

The following table presents known or presumed threats to protected resources that are addressed by Windows based on conformance to the IPsec Client EP.

**Table 3 IPsec Client EP Threats Addressed by Windows**

Threat	Description
<b>T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS</b>	<p>This PP-Module does not include requirements that can protect against an insider threat. Authorized users are not considered hostile or malicious and are trusted to follow appropriate guidance. Only authorized personnel should have access to the system or device that contains the IPsec VPN client. Therefore, the primary threat agents are the unauthorized entities that try to gain access to the protected network (in cases where tunnel mode is used) or to plaintext data that traverses the public network (regardless of whether transport mode or tunnel mode is used). The endpoint of the network communication can be both geographically and logically distant from the TOE, and can pass through a variety of other systems. These intermediate systems may be under the control of the adversary, and offer an opportunity for communications over the network to be compromised.</p> <p>Plaintext communication over the network may allow critical data (such as passwords, configuration settings, and user data) to be read and/or manipulated directly by intermediate systems, leading to a compromise of the TOE or to the secured environmental system(s) that the TOE is being used to facilitate communications with. IPsec can be used to provide protection for this communication; however, there are myriad options that can be implemented for the protocol to be compliant to the protocol specification listed in the RFC. Some of these options can have</p>

	<p>negative impacts on the security of the connection. For instance, using a weak encryption algorithm (even one that is allowed by the RFC, such as DES) can allow an adversary to read and even manipulate the data on the encrypted channel, thus circumventing countermeasures in place to prevent such attacks. Further, if the protocol is implemented with little-used or non-standard options, it may be compliant with the protocol specification but will not be able to interact with other, diverse equipment that is typically found in large enterprises.</p> <p>Even though the communication path is protected, there is a possibility that the IPsec peer could be duped into thinking that a malicious third-party user or system is the TOE. For instance, a middleman could intercept a connection request to the TOE, and respond to the request as if it were the TOE. In a similar manner, the TOE could also be duped into thinking that it is establishing communications with a legitimate IPsec peer when in fact it is not. An attacker could also mount a malicious man-in-the-middle-type of attack, in which an intermediate system is compromised, and the traffic is proxied, examined, and modified by this system. This attack can even be mounted via encrypted communication channels if appropriate countermeasures are not applied. These attacks are, in part, enabled by a malicious attacker capturing network traffic (for instance, an authentication session) and “playing back” that traffic in order to fool an endpoint into thinking it was communicating with a legitimate remote entity.</p>
<p><b>T.TSF_CONFIGURATION</b></p>	<p>Configuring VPN tunnels is a complex and time-consuming process, and prone to errors if the interface for doing so is not well-specified or well-behaved. The inability to configure certain aspects of the interface may also lead to the mis-specification of the desired communications policy or use of cryptography that may be desired or required for a particular site. This may result in unintended weak or plaintext communications while the user thinks that their data are being protected. Other aspects of configuring the TOE or using its security mechanisms (for example, the update process) may also result in a reduction in the trustworthiness of the VPN client.</p>
<p><b>T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE</b></p>	<p>Since the most common attack vector used involves attacking unpatched versions of software containing well-known flaws, updating the VPN client is necessary to ensure that changes to threat environment are addressed. Timely application of patches ensures that the client is a “hard target”, thus increasing the likelihood that product will be able to maintain and enforce its security policy. However, the updates to be applied to the product must be trustable in some manner; otherwise, an attacker can write their own “update” that instead contains malicious code of</p>



	<p>their choosing, such as a rootkit, bot, or other malware. Once this “update” is installed, the attacker then has control of the system and all of its data.</p> <p>Methods of countering this threat typically involve hashes of the updates, and potentially cryptographic operations (e.g., digital signatures) on those hashes as well. However, the validity of these methods introduces additional threats. For instance, a weak hash function could result in the attacker being able to modify the legitimate update in such a way that the hash remained unchanged. For cryptographic signature schemes, there are dependencies on</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) the strength of the cryptographic algorithm used to provide the signature, and</li> <li>2) the ability of the end user to verify the signature (which typically involves checking a hierarchy of digital signatures back to a root of trust (a certificate authority)).</li> </ol> <p>If a cryptographic signature scheme is weak, then it may be compromised by an attacker and the end user will install a malicious update, thinking that it is legitimate. Similarly, if the root of trust can be compromised, then a strong digital signature algorithm will not stop the malicious update from being installed (the attacker will just create their own signature on the update using the compromised root of trust, and the malicious update will then be installed without detection).</p>
<p><b>T.USER_DATA_REUSE</b></p>	<p>Data traversing the TOE could inadvertently be sent to a different user; since these data may be sensitive, this may cause a compromise that is unacceptable. The specific threat that must be addressed concerns user data that is retained by the TOE in the course of processing network traffic that could be inadvertently re-used in sending network traffic to a user other than that intended by the sender of the original network traffic.</p>
<p><b>T.TSF_FAILURE</b></p>	<p>Security mechanisms of the TOE generally build up from a primitive set of mechanisms (e.g., memory management, privileged modes of process execution) to more complex sets of mechanisms. Failure of the primitive mechanisms could lead to a compromise in more complex mechanisms, resulting in a compromise of the TSF.</p>

### 3.2 Organizational Security Policies

An organizational security policy is a set of rules or procedures imposed by an organization upon its operations to protect its sensitive data and IT assets. **Table 4** describes organizational security policies which are necessary for conformance to the protection profile.

**Table 4 Organizational Security Policies**

Security Policy	Description
[None]	There are no Organizational Security Policies for the protection profile or extended package.

### 3.3 Secure Usage Assumptions

**Table 5** describes the core security aspects of the environment in which Windows is intended to be used. It includes information about the physical, personnel, procedural, and connectivity aspects of the environment.

The following specific conditions are assumed to exist in an environment where the TOE is employed in order to conform to the protection profile:

**Table 5 GP OS PP Secure Usage Assumptions**

Assumption	Description
<b>A.PLATFORM</b>	The OS relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This underlying platform is out of scope of this PP.
<b>A.PROPER_USER</b>	The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy. At the same time, malicious software could act as the user, so requirements which confine malicious subjects are still in scope.
<b>A.PROPER_ADMIN</b>	The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.

**Table 6 WLAN Client EP Secure Usage Assumptions**

Assumption	Description
<b>A.NO_TOE_BYPASS</b>	Information cannot flow between the wireless client and the internal wired network without passing through the TOE.
<b>A.TRUSTED_ADMIN</b>	TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all administrator guidance in a trusted manner.

**Table 7 IPsec Client EP Secure Usage Assumptions**

Assumption	Description
<b>A.NO_TOE_BYPASS</b>	Information cannot flow onto the network to which the VPN client's host is connected without passing through the TOE.

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<b>A.PHYSICAL</b>	Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
<b>A.TRUSTED_CONFIG</b>	Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational environment will follow the applicable security configuration guidance.

## 4 Security Objectives

This section defines the security objectives for Windows and its supporting environment. Security objectives, categorized as either TOE security objectives or objectives by the supporting environment, reflect the stated intent to counter identified threats, comply with any organizational security policies identified, or address identified assumptions. All of the identified threats, organizational policies, and assumptions are addressed under one of the categories below.

### 4.1 TOE Security Objectives

**Table 8** describes the security objectives for Windows which are needed to comply with the GP OS PP.

**Table 8 GP OS PP Security Objectives for the TOE**

Security Objective	Source
<b>O.ACCOUNTABILITY</b>	Conformant OSES ensure that information exists that allows administrators to discover unintentional issues with the configuration and operation of the operating system and discover its cause. Gathering event information and immediately transmitting it to another system can also enable incident response in the event of system compromise.
<b>O.INTEGRITY</b>	Conformant OSES ensure the integrity of their update packages. OSES are seldom if ever shipped without errors, and the ability to deploy patches and updates with integrity is critical to enterprise network security. Conformant OSES provide execution environment-based mitigations that increase the cost to attackers by adding complexity to the task of compromising systems.
<b>O.MANAGEMENT</b>	To facilitate management by users and the enterprise, conformant OSES provide consistent and supported interfaces for their security-relevant configuration and maintenance. This includes the deployment of applications and application updates through the use of platform-supported deployment mechanisms and formats, as well as providing mechanisms for configuration and application execution control.
<b>O.PROTECTED_STORAGE</b>	To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of credentials in the event of loss of physical control of the storage medium, conformant OSES provide data-at-rest protection for credentials. Conformant OSES also provide access controls which allow users to keep their files private from other users of the same system.
<b>O.PROTECTED_COMMS</b>	To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet modification) network attack threats, conformant OSES provide mechanisms to create trusted channels for CSP and sensitive data. Both CSP and sensitive data should not be exposed outside of the platform.

**Table 9** describes the security objectives for Windows which are needed to comply with the WLAN Client EP.

**Table 9 WLAN Client EP Security Objectives for the TOE**

Security Objective	Source
<b>O.AUTH_COMM</b> <b>(Authorized Communication)</b>	The TOE will provide a means to ensure that it is communicating with an authorized Access Point and not some other entity pretending to be an authorized Access Point, and will provide assurance to the Access Point of its identity.
<b>O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_FUNCTIONS</b> <b>(Cryptographic Functions)</b>	The TOE shall provide or use cryptographic functions (i.e., encryption/decryption and digital signature operations) to maintain the confidentiality and allow for detection of modification of data that are transmitted outside the TOE and its host environment.
<b>O.SYSTEM_MONITORING</b> <b>(System Monitoring)</b>	The TOE will provide the capability to generate audit data.
<b>O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION</b> <b>(TOE Administration)</b>	The TOE will provide mechanisms to allow administrators to be able to configure the TOE.
<b>O.TSF_SELF_TEST</b> <b>(TSF Self Test)</b>	The TOE will provide the capability to test some subset of its security functionality to ensure it is operating properly.
<b>O.WIRELESS_ACCESS_POINT_CONNECTION</b> <b>Wireless Access Point Connection</b>	The TOE will provide the capability to restrict the wireless access points to which it will connect.

The IPsec Client EP does not define any security objective to supplement the ones in the GP OS protection profile.

## 4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

The TOE is assumed to be complete and self-contained and, as such, is not dependent upon any other products to perform properly. However, certain objectives with respect to the general operating environment must be met. **Table 10** describes the security objectives for the operational environment as specified in the protection profile.

**Table 10 GP OS PP Security Objectives for the Operational Environment**

Environment Objective	Description
<b>OE.PLATFORM</b>	The OS relies on being installed on trusted hardware.
<b>OE.PROPER_USER</b>	The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy. Standard user accounts are provisioned in accordance with the least privilege model. Users requiring higher levels of access should have a separate account dedicated for that use.
<b>OE.PROPER_ADMIN</b>	The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise policy.

**Table 11 WLAN Client EP Security Objectives for the Operational Environment**

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Environment Objective	Description
<b>OE.NO_TOE_BYPASS</b>	Information cannot flow between external and internal networks located in different enclaves without passing through the TOE.
<b>OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN</b>	TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all administrator guidance in a trusted manner.

**Table 12 IPsec Client EP Security Objectives for the Operational Environment**

Environment Objective	Description
<b>OE.NO_TOE_BYPASS</b>	Information cannot flow onto the network to which the VPN client's host is connected without passing through the TOE.
<b>OE.PHYSICAL</b>	Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
<b>OE.TRUSTED_CONFIG</b>	Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational environment will follow the applicable security configuration guidance.

## 5 Security Requirements

The section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) for the TOE. The requirements in this section have been drawn from the General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile, Version 4.2.1, April 22, 2019 (GP OS PP), the General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/ Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, version 1.0, February 8, 2016 (WLAN Client EP), the Common Criteria, or are defined in the following section.

### Conventions:

Where requirements are drawn from the protection profile, the requirements are copied verbatim, except for some changes to required identifiers to match the iteration convention of this document, from that protection profile and only operations performed in this security target are identified.

The extended requirements, extended component definitions and extended requirement conventions in this security target are drawn from the protection profile; the security target reuses the conventions from the protection profile which include the use of the word “Extended” and the “\_EXT” identifier to denote extended functional requirements. The security target assumes that the protection profile correctly defines the extended components and so they are not reproduced in the security target.

Where applicable the following conventions are used to identify operations:

- **Iteration:** Iterated requirements (components and elements) are identified with letter following the base component identifier. For example, iterations of FMT\_MOF.1 are identified in a manner similar to FMT\_MOF.1(Audit) (for the component) and FCS\_COP.1.1(Audit) (for the elements).
- **Assignment:** Assignments are identified in brackets and bold (e.g., **[assigned value]**).
- **Selection:** Selections are identified in brackets, bold, and italics (e.g., ***[selected value]***).
  - Assignments within selections are identified using the previous conventions, except that the assigned value would also be italicized and extra brackets would occur (e.g., ***[selected value [assigned value]]***).
- **Refinement:** Refinements are identified using bold text (e.g., **added text**) for additions and strike-through text (e.g., ~~deleted text~~) for deletions.

### 5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements

This section specifies the SFRs for the TOE.

**Table 13 TOE Security Functional Requirements for GP OS PP**

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
<b>Security Audit (FAU)</b>	Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1)
<b>Cryptographic Support (FCS)</b>	Cryptographic Key Generation for (FCS_CKM.1)
	Cryptographic Key Establishment (FCS_CKM.2)
	Cryptographic Key Destruction (FCS_CKM_EXT.4)

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	Cryptographic Operation for Data Encryption/Decryption (FCS_COP.1(SYM))
	Cryptographic Operation for Hashing (FCS_COP.1(HASH))
	Cryptographic Operation for Signing (FCS_COP.1(SIGN))
	Cryptographic Operation for Keyed Hash Algorithms (FCS_COP.1(HMAC))
	Random Bit Generation (FCS_RBG_EXT.1)
	Storage of Sensitive Data (FCS_STO_EXT.1)
	TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.1)
	TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.2)
	TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.3)
	TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.4)
	DTLS Implementation (FCS_DTLS_EXT.1)
<b>User Data Protection (FDP)</b>	Access Controls for Protecting User Data (FDP_ACF_EXT.1)
	Information Flow Control (FDP_IFC_EXT.1)
<b>Identification &amp; Authentication (FIA)</b>	Authorization Failure Handling (FIA_AFL.1)
	Multiple Authentication Mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)
	X.509 Certification Validation (FIA_X509_EXT.1)
	X.509 Certificate Authentication (FIA_X509_EXT.2)
<b>Security Management (FMT)</b>	Management of Security Functions Behavior (FMT_MOF_EXT.1)
	Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF_EXT.1)
<b>Protection of the TSF (FPT)</b>	Access Controls (FPT_ACF_EXT.1)
	Address Space Layout Randomization (FPT_ASLR_EXT.1)
	Stack Buffer Overflow Protection (FPT_SBOP_EXT.1)
	Software Restriction Policies (FPT_SRP_EXT.1)
	Boot Integrity (FPT_TST_EXT.1)
	Trusted Update (FPT_TUD_EXT.1)
	Trusted Update for Application Software (FPT_TUD_EXT.2)
<b>TOE Access (FTA)</b>	Default TOE Access Banners (FTA_TAB.1)
<b>Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)</b>	Trusted Path (FTP_TRP.1)
	Trusted Channel Communication (FTP_ITC_EXT.1(TLS))
	Trusted Channel Communication (FTP_ITC_EXT.1(DTLS))

**Table 14 TOE Security Functional Requirements for WLAN Client EP**

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
<b>Security Audit (FAU)</b>	Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1 (WLAN))
<b>Cryptographic Support (FCS)</b>	Cryptographic Key Generation for WPA2 Connections (FCS_CKM.1(WLAN))
	Cryptographic Key Distribution for GTK (FCS_CKM.2(WLAN))
	Extended: Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer Security (FCS_TLSC_EXT.1(WLAN))
	Extended: TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.2(WLAN))
<b>Identification &amp; Authentication (FIA)</b>	Extended: Port Access Entity Authentication (FIA_PAE_EXT.1)
	Extended: X.509 Certificate Validation (FIA_X509_EXT.1(WLAN))
	Extended: X.509 Certificate Authentication (EAP-TLS) (FIA_X509_EXT.2(WLAN))
	Extended: Certificate Storage and Management (FIA_X509_EXT.4)



<b>Security Management (FMT)</b>	Extended: Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF_EXT.1(WLAN))
<b>Protection of the TSF (FPT)</b>	Extended: TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing (FPT_TST_EXT.1 (WLAN))
<b>TOE Access (FTA)</b>	Extended: Wireless Network Access (FTA_WSE_EXT.1)
<b>Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)</b>	Extended: Trusted Channel Communication (FTP_ITC_EXT.1 (WLAN))

**Table 15 TOE Security Functional Requirements for IPsec Client EP**

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
<b>Security Audit (FAU)</b>	Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1(IPSEC))
	Selective Audit (FAU_SEL.1)
<b>Cryptographic Support (FCS)</b>	Cryptographic Key Generation (FCS_CKM.1 (VPN))
	Cryptographic Key Storage (FCS_CKM_EXT.2)
	IPsec (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1)
<b>User Data Protection (FDP)</b>	Subset Information Flow Control (FDP_IFC_EXT.1(IPSEC))
	Full Residual Information Protection (FDP_RIP.2)
<b>Identification &amp; Authentication (FIA)</b>	Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition (FIA_PSK_EXT.1)
	Extended: X.509 Certificate Use and Management (FIA_X509_EXT.3)
<b>Security Management (FMT)</b>	Specification of Management Functions (VPN) (FMT_SMF.1(VPN))
<b>Protection of the TSF (FPT)</b>	Self-Test (FPT_TST_EXT.1 (IPSEC))
<b>Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)</b>	Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (FTP_ITC.1(IPSEC))

## 5.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)

### 5.1.1.1 Audit Data Generation (FAU\_GEN.1) and FAU\_GEN.1(WLAN)

#### FAU\_GEN.1.1

The OS shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
- b. All auditable events for the **not specified** level of audit; and
- c.
  - **Authentication events (Success/Failure);**
  - **Use of privileged/special rights events (Successful and unsuccessful security, audit, and configuration changes);**
  - **Privilege or role escalation events (Success/Failure);**

[

- *File and object events (Successful and unsuccessful attempts to create, access, delete, modify, modify permissions),*
- *User and Group management events (Successful and unsuccessful add, delete, modify, disable),*
- *Audit and log data access events (Success/Failure),*
- *Cryptographic verification of software (Success/Failure),*
- *Attempted application invocation with arguments (Success/Failure e.g. due to software restriction policy),*
- *System reboot, restart, and shutdown events (Success/Failure),*
- *Kernel module loading and unloading events (Success/Failure),*
- *Administrator or root-level access events (Success/Failure),*
- *[Lock and unlock a user account, audit events from the WLAN Client EP listed in [Table 16](#)].*

]

**FAU\_GEN.1.2**

The OS shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a. Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST [none].

**Table 16 WLAN Client EP Audit Events**

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
<b>FAU_GEN.1/WLAN</b>	None.	
<b>FCS_CKM.1/WLAN</b>	None.	
<b>FCS_CKM.2/WLAN</b>	None.	
<b>FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN</b>	Failure to establish an EAP-TLS session.  Establishment/termination of an EAP-TLS session.	Reason for failure.  Non-TOE endpoint of connection.
<b>FIA_PAE_EXT.1</b>	None.	
<b>FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN<sup>5</sup></b>	Failure to validate X.509v3 certificate	Reason for failure of validation.
<b>FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN</b>	None.	
<b>FIA_X509_EXT.4/WLAN</b>	Attempts to load certificates.  Attempts to revoke certificates.	None.
<b>FMT_SMF_EXT.1/WLAN</b>	None.	

<sup>5</sup> This extended package requirement was replaced as part of NIAP Technical Decision [439](#).

<b>FPT_TST_EXT.1/WLAN</b>	Execution of this set of TSF self-tests.  <b>[detected integrity violation]</b> .	<b>[The TSF binary file that caused the integrity violation]</b> .
<b>FTA_WSE_EXT.1</b>	All attempts to connect to access points.	Identity of access point being connected to as well as success and failures (including reason for failure).
<b>FTP_ITC_EXT.1/WLAN<sup>6</sup></b>	All attempts to establish a trusted channel.	Identification of the non-TOE endpoint of the channel.

### 5.1.1.2 Security Audit for IPsec Client EP

#### 5.1.1.2.1 Audit Data Generation (FAU\_GEN.1(IPSEC))

**Application Note:** FAU\_GEN.1(IPSEC) corresponds to FAU\_GEN.1 in the IPsec extended package.

**FAU\_GEN.1.1(IPSEC)** The TSF and **[no other component]** shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
- All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and
- All administrative actions;
- Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 17 C-1.

**FAU\_GEN.1.2(IPSEC)** The TSF and **[no other component]** shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP-Module/ST, information specified in column three of Table 17 C-1.

**Table 17 IPsec Client EP Audit Events**

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_SEL.1	All modifications to the audit configuration that occur while the audit collection functions are operating.	None.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1	Decisions to DISCARD or BYPASS network packets processed by the TOE.  Failure to establish an IPsec SA.	Presumed identity of source subject. Identity of destination subject. Transport layer protocol, if applicable. Source subject service identifier, if applicable.

<sup>6</sup> This extended package requirement was replaced as part of NIAP Technical Decision [194](#).

	Establishment/Termination of an IPsec SA.	The entry in the SPD that applied to the decision.  Reason for failure.  Non-TOE endpoint of connection (IP address) for both successes and failures.
FDP_RIP.2	None.	
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 <sup>7</sup>	Failure of the randomization process. (Optional) <sup>8</sup>	None.
FMT_SMF.1(VPN)	Success or failure of management function.	None.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Initiation of the update.  Any failure to verify the integrity of the update.	No additional information.

#### 5.1.1.2.2 Selective Audit (FAU\_SEL.1)

**FAU\_SEL.1.1** The [TSF] shall be able to select the set of events to be audited from the set of all auditable events based on the following attributes: event type, success of auditable security events, failure of auditable security events, [subject or user identity].

## 5.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

### 5.1.2.1 Cryptographic Support for GP OS PP

#### 5.1.2.1.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (FCS\_CKM.1)<sup>9</sup>

**FCS\_CKM.1.1** The OS shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm

- ECC schemes using “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [P-521] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Appendix B.4;
- FFC schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.1,

[

- ***RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3***

].

<sup>7</sup> This extended package requirement was replaced as part of NIAP Technical Decision [362](#).

<sup>8</sup> This protection profile requirement was replaced as part of NIAP Technical Decision [362](#).

<sup>9</sup> This GP OS PP requirement was replaced by the IPsec Client EP equivalent.

#### 5.1.2.1.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (FCS\_CKM.2)<sup>10</sup>

**FCS\_CKM.2.1** The OS shall implement functionality to perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method:

- **RSA-based key establishment schemes** that meets the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56B, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography” and
- Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” and implementing “NIST curves” P-256, P-384, and [P-521] as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”, and [
- **Finite field-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”,**
- **Key establishment scheme using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meets the following: RFC 3526, Section 3**

].

#### 5.1.2.1.3 Cryptographic Key Destruction (FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4)<sup>11</sup>

**FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4.1** The OS shall destroy cryptographic keys and key material in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [

- **For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [**
  - **single overwrite consisting of [zeroes],**

].

**FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4.2** The OS shall destroy all keys and key material when no longer needed.

#### 5.1.2.1.4 Cryptographic Operation for Encryption / Decryption (FCS\_COP.1(SYM))<sup>12</sup>

**Application Note:** FCS\_COP.1(SYM) corresponds to FCS\_COP.1(1) in the GP OS protection profile.

**FCS\_COP.1.1(SYM)** The OS shall perform encryption/decryption services for data in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm

- AES-XTS (as defined in NIST SP 800-38E) mode;
- AES-CBC (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A) mode,
- AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D),
- 

and [

- **AES-CCMP (as defined in FIPS PUB 197, NIST SP 800-38C and IEEE 802.11-2012),**
- **AES Key Wrap (KW) (as defined in NIST SP 800-38F),**
- **AES-CCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38C)**

<sup>10</sup> This GP OS PP requirement was replaced by the IPsec Client EP equivalent.

<sup>11</sup> This protection profile requirement was replaced as part of NIAP Technical Decision [365](#).

<sup>12</sup> This GP OS PP requirement was replaced by the IPsec Client EP equivalent.

- **AES-CCMP-256 (as defined in NIST SP800-38C and IEEE 802.11ac2013),**
- **AES-GCMP-256 (as defined in NIST SP800-38D and IEEE 802.11ac2013),**

] and cryptographic key sizes 128-bit, 256-bit.

#### 5.1.2.1.5 Cryptographic Operation for Hashing (FCS\_COP.1(HASH))

**Application Note:** FCS\_COP.1(HASH) corresponds to FCS\_COP.1(2) in the GP OS protection profile.

**FCS\_COP.1.1(HASH)** The OS shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and [**SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512**] and **message digest sizes** 160 bits and [**256 bits, 384 bits, 512 bits**] that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-4.

#### 5.1.2.1.6 Cryptographic Operation for Signing (FCS\_COP.1(SIGN))

**Application Note:** FCS\_COP.1(SIGN) corresponds to FCS\_COP.1(3) in the GP OS protection profile.

**FCS\_COP.1.1(SIGN)** The OS shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [

- **RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 4,**
- **ECDSA schemes using “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [P-521] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5**

].

#### 5.1.2.1.7 Cryptographic Operation for Keyed Hash Algorithms (FCS\_COP.1(HMAC))

**Application Note:** FCS\_COP.1(HMAC) corresponds to FCS\_COP.1(4) in the GP OS protection profile.

**FCS\_COP.1.1(HMAC)** The OS shall perform keyed-hash message authentication services in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512**] with key sizes [**128 and 256 bits**] and **message digest sizes** [**160 bits, 256 bits, 384 bits, 512 bits**] that meet the following: FIPS Pub 198-1 *The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code* and FIPS Pub 180-4 *Secure Hash Standard*.

#### 5.1.2.1.8 Random Bit Generation (FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1)

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1** The OS shall perform all deterministic random bit generation (DRBG) services in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-90A using [**CTR\_DRBG (AES)**].

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2** The deterministic RBG used by the OS shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy from a [**software-based noise source, platform-based noise source**] with a minimum of [**256 bits**] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength (according to NIST SP 800-57) of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

5.1.2.1.9 Storage of Sensitive Data (FCS\_STO\_EXT.1)

**FCS\_STO\_EXT.1.1** The OS shall implement functionality to encrypt sensitive data stored in non-volatile storage and provide interfaces to applications to invoke this functionality.

5.1.2.1.10 TLS Client Protocol (FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1)

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.1** The OS shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) supporting the following ciphersuites: [

- *TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 5246,*
- *TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 5246,*
- *TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,*
- *TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,*
- *TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288,*
- *TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288,*
- *TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288,*
- *TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288,*
- *TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,*
- *TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,*
- *TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,*
- *TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,*
- *TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,*
- *TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,*
- *TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,*
- *TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289 ].<sup>13</sup>*

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.2** The OS shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier according to RFC 6125.

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.3** The OS shall only establish a trusted channel if the peer certificate is valid.

5.1.2.1.11 TLS Client Protocol (FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2)

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2.1** The OS shall present the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension in the Client Hello with the following NIST curves: [*secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1*].

5.1.2.1.12 TLS Client Protocol (FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.3)

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.3.1** The OS shall present the signature\_algorithms extension in the Client Hello with the supported\_signature\_algorithms value containing the following hash algorithms [*SHA256, SHA384, SHA512*] and no other hash algorithms.

---

<sup>13</sup> This protection profile requirement was replaced as part of NIAP Technical Decision [441](#).

#### 5.1.2.1.13 TLS Client Protocol (FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.4)

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.4.1** The OS shall support mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates.

#### 5.1.2.1.14 DTLS Implementation (FCS\_DTLS\_EXT.1)

**FCS\_DTLS\_EXT.1.1** The OS shall implement the DTLS protocol in accordance with [*DTLS 1.0 (RFC 4347)*, *DTLS 1.2 (RFC 6347)*].

**FCS\_DTLS\_EXT.1.2** The OS shall implement the requirements in TLS (FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1) for the DTLS implementation, except where variations are allowed according to DTLS 1.2 (RFC 6347).

### 5.1.2.2 Cryptographic Support for WLAN Client EP

#### 5.1.2.2.1 Cryptographic Key Generation for WPA2 Connections (FCS\_CKM.1(WLAN))

**Application Note:** FCS\_CKM.1(WLAN) corresponds to FCS\_CKM.1/WLAN in the WLAN Client EP.

**FCS\_CKM.1.1(WLAN)** The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm PRF-384 and [*PRF-704*] and specified cryptographic key sizes 128 bits and [**256 bits**] using a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 that meet the following: IEEE 802.11-2012 and [*IEEE 802.11ac-2014*].

#### 5.1.2.2.2 Cryptographic Key Distribution for GTK (FCS\_CKM.2(WLAN))

**Application Note:** FCS\_CKM.2(WLAN) corresponds to FCS\_CKM.2/WLAN in the WLAN Client EP.

**FCS\_CKM.2.1(WLAN)** The TSF shall decrypt Group Temporal Key in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method AES Key Wrap in an EAPOL-Key frame that meets the following: RFC 3394 for AES Key Wrap, 802.11-2012 for the packet format and timing considerations and does not expose the cryptographic keys.

#### 5.1.2.2.3 Extended: Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer Security (FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1(WLAN))<sup>14</sup>

**Application Note:** FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1(WLAN) corresponds to FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1/WLAN in the WLAN Client EP.

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.1(WLAN)** The TSF shall implement [*TLS 1.0 (RFC 2246)*, *TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)*, *TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)*] in support of the EAP-TLS protocol as specified in RFC 5216 supporting the following ciphersuites: [

- *TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 5246*
- *TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 5246*
- *TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246*
- *TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246*
- *TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289*
- *TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5430*

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<sup>14</sup> This extended package requirement was replaced as part of NIAP Technical Decision [492](#).



- ***TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5430***  
].

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.2(WLAN)** The TSF shall generate random values used in the EAP-TLS exchange using the RBG specified in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.3(WLAN)** The TSF shall use X509 v3 certificates as specified in FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.4(WLAN)** The TSF shall verify that the server certificate presented includes the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.5(WLAN)** The TSF shall allow an authorized administrator to configure the list of CAs that are allowed to sign authentication server certificates that are accepted by the TOE.

#### 5.1.2.2.4 Extended: TLS Client Protocol (FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2(WLAN))

**Application Note:** FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2(WLAN) corresponds to FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2/WLAN in the WLAN CLIENT EP.

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2.1(WLAN)** The TSF shall present the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension in the Client Hello with the following NIST curves: [***secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1***].<sup>15</sup>

### 5.1.2.3 Cryptographic Support for IPsec Client EP

#### 5.1.2.3.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (FCS\_CKM.1 (VPN))

**Application Note:** FCS\_CKM.1(VPN) corresponds to FCS\_CKM.1/VPN in the IPsec extended package.

**FCS\_CKM.1.1(VPN)** The [OS] shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys used for IKE peer authentication in accordance with: [

- ***FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.3 for RSA schemes;***
- ***FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.4 for ECDSA schemes and implementing "NIST curves", P-256, P-384, and [no other curves]***

and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key strength of 112 bits.

#### 5.1.2.3.2 Cryptographic Key Storage (FCS\_CKM\_EXT.2)

**FCS\_CKM\_EXT.2.1** The [OS] shall store persistent secrets and private keys when not in use in OS-provided key storage.

#### 5.1.2.3.3 IPsec (FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1)

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.1** The [TOE] shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC 4301.

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.2** The [TOE] shall implement [***tunnel mode, transport mode***].

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.3** The [TOE] shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches anything that is otherwise unmatched, and discards it.

- FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.4** The [TOE] shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using the cryptographic algorithms AES-GCM-128, AESGCM-256 as specified in RFC 4106, **[AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 (both specified by RFC 3602) together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC]**.
- FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.5** The [TOE] shall implement the protocol: [
- **IKEv1, using Main Mode for Phase 1 exchanges, as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408, 2409, RFC 4109, [RFC 4304 for extended sequence numbers], [RFC 4868 for hash functions], and [no support for XAUTH];**
  - **IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 7296 (with mandatory support for NAT traversal as specified in section 2.23), 4307, and [RFC 4868 for hash functions]**].
- FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.6** The [TOE] shall ensure the encrypted payload in the [IKEv1, IKEv2] protocol uses the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 as specified in RFC 6379 and **[no other algorithm]**.
- FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.7** The [TOE] shall ensure that **[IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be configured by [VPN Gateway] based on [number of packets/number of bytes, length of time], IKEv1 SA lifetimes can be configured by an [an Administrator, VPN Gateway] based on [number of packets/number of bytes, length of time]]**. If length of time is used, it must include at least one option that is 24 hours or less for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours or less for Phase 2 SAs.
- FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.8** The [TOE] shall ensure that all IKE protocols implement DH groups 14 (2048-bit MODP), 19 (256-bit Random ECP), 20 (384-bit Random ECP), and **[no other DH groups]**.
- FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.9** The [TOE] shall generate the secret value x used in the IKE Diffie-Hellman key exchange (“x” in  $g^x \text{ mod } p$ ) using the random bit generator specified in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1, and having a length of at least **[224, 256, 384]** bits.
- FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.10** The [TOE] shall generate nonces used in IKE exchanges in a manner such that the probability that a specific nonce value will be repeated during the life a specific IPsec SA is less than 1 in  $2^{[256]}$ .
- FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.11** The [TOE] shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform peer authentication using a **[RSA, ECDSA]** that use X.509v3 certificates that conform to RFC 4945 and **[Pre-shared Keys]**.
- FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.12**<sup>16</sup> The [TOE] shall not establish an SA if the **[IP address, Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN), user FQDN, Distinguished Name (DN)]** and **[no other reference identifier type]** contained in a certificate does not match the expected value(s) for the entity attempting to establish a connection.
- FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.13**<sup>17</sup> The [TOE] shall not establish an SA if the presented identifier does not match the configured reference identifier of the peer.
- FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.14** The **[TOE, VPN Gateway]** shall be able to ensure by default that the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the **[IKEv1 Phase 1, IKEv2 IKE\_SA]** connection is greater than or equal to the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the **[IKEv1 Phase 2, IKE2 CHILD\_SA]** connection.

<sup>16</sup> This extended package requirement was replaced as part of NIAP Technical Decision [378](#).

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

## 5.1.3 User Data Protection (FDP)

### 5.1.3.1 User Data Protection for GP OS PP

#### 5.1.3.1.1 Access Controls for Protecting User Data (FDP\_ACF\_EXT.1)

**FDP\_ACF\_EXT.1.1** The OS shall implement access controls which can prohibit unprivileged users from accessing files and directories owned by other users.

#### 5.1.3.1.2 Information Flow Control (FDP\_IFC\_EXT.1)

**FDP\_IFC\_EXT.1.1** The OS shall [

- **Provide an interface which allows a VPN client to protect all IP traffic using IPsec**

] with the exception of IP traffic required to establish the VPN connection and [**no other traffic**].

### 5.1.3.2 User Data Protection for IPsec Client EP

#### 5.1.3.2.1 Subset Information Flow Control (FDP\_IFC\_EXT.1(IPSEC))

**Application Note:** FDP\_IFC\_EXT.1(IPSEC) corresponds to FDP\_IFC\_EXT.1 in the IPsec EP.

**FDP\_IFC\_EXT.1.1 (IPSEC)** The TSF shall ensure that all IP traffic (other than IP traffic required to establish the VPN connection) flow through the IPsec VPN client.

#### 5.1.3.2.2 Full Residual Information Protection (FDP\_RIP.2)

**FDP\_RIP.2.1** The [**TOE**] shall enforce that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [**allocation of the resource to**] all objects.

## 5.1.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

### 5.1.4.1 Identification and Authentication for GP OS PP

#### 5.1.4.1.1 Authentication Failure Handling (FIA\_AFL.1)

**FIA\_AFL.1.1** The OS shall detect when [**an administrator configurable positive integer within a [range of 1 - 999]**] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to **events with** [

- **authentication based on user name and password,**
- **authentication based on user name and a PIN that releases an asymmetric key stored in OE-protected storage**

].

**FIA\_AFL.1.2** When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts for an account has been **met**, the OS shall: [**Account Lockout**].

#### 5.1.4.1.2 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms (FIA\_UAU.5)

**FIA\_UAU.5.1** The OS shall provide the following authentication mechanisms: [

- **Authentication based on user name and password,**

]

- **authentication based on user name and a PIN that releases an asymmetric key stored in OE-protected storage<sup>18</sup>**

] to support user authentication.

#### FIA\_UAU.5.2

The OS shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the [authentication based on username and password is performed for TOE-originated requests and with credentials stored by the OS for Windows Hello, smart card and virtual smart card].

#### 5.1.4.1.3 X.509 Certification Validation (FIA\_X509\_EXT.1)

##### FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1

The OS shall implement functionality to validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
- The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
- The OS shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates.
- The OS shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [**the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 2560, a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5759, an OCSP TLS Status Request Extension (i.e., OCSP stapling) as specified in RFC 6066**].
- The OS shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
  - Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.

##### FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.2

The OS shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

#### 5.1.4.1.4 X.509 Certificate Authentication (FIA\_X509\_EXT.2)

##### FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1

The OS shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for TLS and [HTTPS] connections.

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<sup>18</sup> PIN-based authentications is for Windows 10, smart card authentication is for Windows 10 and Windows Server only.

#### 5.1.4.2 Identification and Authentication for WLAN Client EP

##### 5.1.4.2.1 Extended: Port Access Entity Authentication (FIA\_PAE\_EXT.1)

**FIA\_PAE\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall conform to IEEE Standard 802.1X for a Port Access Entity (PAE) in the “Supplicant” role.

##### 5.1.4.2.2 Extended: X.509 Certificate Validation (FIA\_X509\_EXT.1(WLAN))<sup>19</sup>

**Application Note:** FIA\_X509\_EXT.1(WLAN) corresponds to FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/WLAN in the WLAN CLIENT EP.

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1(WLAN)** The TSF shall validate certificates for EAP-TLS in accordance with the following rules:

- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation
- The certificate path must terminate with a certificate in the Trust Anchor Database
- The TSF shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates
- The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
  - Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field
  - Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.2(WLAN)** The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

##### 5.1.4.2.3 Extended: X.509 Certificate Authentication (EAP-TLS) (FIA\_X509\_EXT.2(WLAN))

**Application Note:** FIA\_X509\_EXT.2(WLAN) corresponds to FIA\_X509\_EXT.2/WLAN in the WLAN CLIENT EP.

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1(WLAN)** The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for EAP-TLS exchanges.

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.2(WLAN)** When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall ***allow the administrator to choose whether to accept the certificate in these cases, allow the user to choose whether to accept the certificate in these cases, not accept the certificate***.

##### 5.1.4.2.4 Extended: Certificate Storage and Management (FIA\_X509\_EXT.4)

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.4.1** The TSF shall store and protect certificate(s) from unauthorized deletion and modification.

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.4.2** The TSF shall provide the capability for authorized administrators to load X.509v3 certificates into the TOE for use by the security functions specified in **this the WLAN Client EP**.

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<sup>19</sup> This extended package requirement was added as part of NIAP Technical Decision [439](#).

### 5.1.4.3 Identification and Authentication for IPsec Client EP

#### 5.1.4.3.1 Pre-Shared Key Composition (FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1)

- FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.1** The [TOE] shall be able to use pre-shared keys for IPsec.
- FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.2** The [TOE] shall be able to accept text-based pre-shared keys that:
- are 22 characters and [**not more than 256 characters**];
  - composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters (that include: “!”, “@”, “#”, “\$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “\*”, “(”, “)”, and [**no other special characters**]).
- FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.3** The [TOE] shall condition the text-based pre-shared keys by using [[**No additional conditioning**]], [**perform no other conditioning**].

#### 5.1.4.3.2 X.509 Certificate Use and Management (FIA\_X509\_EXT.3)

- FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.1** The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for IPsec exchanges, and [**digital signatures for FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1, integrity checks for FPT\_TST\_EXT.1**].
- FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.2** When a connection to determine the validity of a certificate cannot be established, the [VPN client] shall [**not accept the certificate**].
- FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.3** The [OS] shall not establish an SA if a certificate or certificate path is deemed invalid.

## 5.1.5 Security Management (FMT)

### 5.1.5.1 Security Management for GP OS PP

#### 5.1.5.1.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior (FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1)

- FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1.1** The OS shall restrict the ability to perform the function indicated in the "Administrator" column in FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1.1 to the administrator.

#### 5.1.5.1.2 Management of Security Functions Behavior (FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1)

- FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1.1** The OS shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

Management Function	Administrator	User
Enable/disable [ <b>screen lock, session timeout</b> ]	X	O
Configure [ <b>screen lock, session</b> ] inactivity timeout	X	O
Configure local audit storage capacity	O	O
Configure minimum password Length	O	O
Configure minimum number of special characters in password	⊖	⊖
Configure minimum number of numeric characters in password	⊖	⊖
Configure minimum number of uppercase characters in password	⊖	⊖
Configure minimum number of lowercase characters in password	⊖	⊖

Microsoft Common Criteria Security Target

Configure lockout policy for unsuccessful authentication attempts through [ <i>timeouts between attempts, limiting number of attempts during a time period</i> ]	O	O
Configure host-based firewall	O	O
Configure name/address of directory server to bind with <sup>20</sup>	O	O
Configure name/address of remote management server from which to receive management settings	O	O
<del>Configure name/address of audit/logging server to which to send audit/logging records</del>	<del>⊖</del>	<del>⊖</del>
Configure audit rules	O	O
Configure name/address of network time server	O	O
Enable/disable automatic software update	O	O
Configure Wi-Fi interface	O	O
Enable/disable Bluetooth interface	O	O
Enable/disable [ <b>local area network interface, configure USB interfaces</b> ]	O	O
[ <b>manage Windows Diagnostics settings, Configure remote connection inactivity timeout</b> ]	O	O

**Table 18 TOE Security Management Functions**

**5.1.5.2 Security Management for WLAN Client EP**

5.1.5.2.1 Extended: Specification of Management Functions (FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1(WLAN))<sup>21</sup>

**Application Note:** FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1(WLAN) corresponds to FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1/WLAN in the WLAN CLIENT EP.

**FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1.1(WLAN)** The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- configure security policy for each wireless network:
  - [*specify the CA(s) from which the TSF will accept WLAN authentication server certificate(s), specify the FQDN(s) of acceptable WLAN authentication server certificate(s)*]
  - security type
  - authentication protocol
  - client credentials to be used for authentication;

<sup>20</sup> For Windows 10 Pro, Windows 10 Enterprise, and Windows Server.

<sup>21</sup> This extended package requirement was replaced as part of NIAP Technical Decision [470](#).

- ~~{optional}~~ specify wireless networks (SSIDs) to which the TSF may connect;
- ~~{optional}~~ enable/disable certificate revocation list checking;
- ~~{optional}~~ disable ad hoc wireless client-to-client connection capability;
- ~~{optional}~~ disable wireless network bridging capability (for example, bridging a connection between the WLAN and cellular radios on a smartphone so it can function as a hotspot);
- ~~{optional}~~ disable roaming capability;
- ~~{optional}~~ enable/disable IEEE 802.1X pre-authentication;
- ~~{optional}~~ enable/disable and configure PMK caching:
  - set the amount of time (in minutes) for which PMK entries are cached;
  - set the maximum number of PMK entries that can be cached.

### 5.1.5.3 Security Management for IPsec Client EP

#### 5.1.5.3.1 Specification of Management Functions (VPN) (FMT\_SMF.1(VPN))

**Application Note:** FMT\_SMF.1(VPN) corresponds to FMT\_SMF.1/VPN in the IPsec EP.

##### FMT\_SMF.1.1(VPN)

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [

- *Specify VPN gateways to use for connections,*
- *Specify IPsec VPN Clients to use for connections,*
- *Specify IPsec-capable network devices to use for connections],*
- *Specify client credentials to be used for connections,*
- *Configure the reference identifier of the peer*
- *[no other actions]*].

### 5.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

#### 5.1.6.1 Protection of the TSF for GP OS PP

##### 5.1.6.1.1 Access Controls (FPT\_ACF\_EXT.1)

###### FPT\_ACF\_EXT.1.1

The OS shall implement access controls which prohibit unprivileged users from modifying:

- Kernel and its drivers/modules
- Security audit logs
- Shared libraries
- System executables
- System configuration files
- [none]

###### FPT\_ACF\_EXT.1.2

The OS shall implement access controls which prohibit unprivileged users from reading:

- Security audit logs
- System-wide credential repositories



- [none]

#### 5.1.6.1.2 Address Space Layout Randomization (FPT\_ASLR\_EXT.1)

**FPT\_ASLR\_EXT.1.1** The OS shall always randomize process address space memory locations with **[8 bits of entropy for 32-bit applications and at least 17 bits of entropy for 64-bit applications]** bits of entropy except for [none].

#### 5.1.6.1.3 Stack Buffer Overflow Protection (FPT\_SBOP\_EXT.1)

**FPT\_SBOP\_EXT.1.1** The OS shall [**employ stack-based buffer overflow protections**].

#### 5.1.6.1.4 Software Restriction Policies (FPT\_SRP\_EXT.1)

**FPT\_SRP\_EXT.1.1** The OS shall restrict execution to only programs which match an administrator-specified [

- **File path,**
- **File digital signature,**
- **Version,**<sup>22</sup>
- **Hash**

].

#### 5.1.6.1.5 Boot Integrity (FPT\_TST\_EXT.1)

**FPT\_TST\_EXT.1.1** The OS shall verify the integrity of the bootchain up through the OS kernel and [**operating system executable code and application executable code**] prior to its execution through the use of [**a digital signature using a hardware-protected asymmetric key, a hardware-protected hash**].<sup>23</sup>

#### 5.1.6.1.6 Trusted Update (FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1)

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.1** The OS shall provide the ability to check for updates to the OS software itself and shall use a digital signature scheme specified in FCS\_COP.1(**3 SIGN**) to validate the authenticity of the response.

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.2** The OS shall [**cryptographically verify**] updates to itself using a digital signature prior to installation using schemes specified in FCS\_COP.1(**3 SIGN**).<sup>24, 25</sup>

#### 5.1.6.1.7 Trusted Update for Application Software (FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2)

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2.1** The OS shall provide the ability to check for updates to application software and shall use a digital signature scheme specified in FCS\_COP.1(**3 SIGN**) to validate the authenticity of the response.<sup>26</sup>

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2.2** The OS shall cryptographically verify the integrity of updates to applications using a digital signature specified by FCS\_COP.1(**3 SIGN**) prior to installation.

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<sup>22</sup> Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server can restrict program execution based on a version using AppLocker and Device Guard; Windows 10 Pro and Windows 10 Home editions cannot.

<sup>23</sup> Windows can also run on computers that do not have a TPM, which is the mechanism that provides the hardware-based protection for boot integrity.

<sup>24</sup> This protection profile requirement was replaced as part of NIAP Technical Decision [463](#).

<sup>25</sup> This protection profile requirement was replaced as part of NIAP Technical Decision [386](#).

<sup>26</sup> This protection profile requirement was replaced as part of NIAP Technical Decision [463](#).

### 5.1.6.2 Protection of the TSF for WLAN Client EP

#### 5.1.6.2.1 Extended: TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing (FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 (WLAN))

**Application Note:** FPT\_TST\_EXT.1(WLAN) corresponds to FPT\_TST\_EXT.1/WLAN in the WLAN CLIENT EP.

**FPT\_TST\_EXT.1.1(WLAN)** The [TOE] shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (on power on) to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.

**FPT\_TST\_EXT.1.2(WLAN)** The [TOE] shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code when it is loaded for execution through the use of the TSF-provided cryptographic services.

### 5.1.6.3 Protection of the TSF for IPsec Client EP

#### 5.1.6.3.1 Self-Test (FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 (IPSEC))

**Application Note:** FPT\_TST\_EXT.1(IPSEC) corresponds to FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 in the IPsec EP.

**FPT\_TST\_EXT.1.1(IPSEC)** The [TOE] shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (on power on) to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.

**FPT\_TST\_EXT.1.2(IPSEC)** The [TOE] shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code when it is loaded for execution through the use of the [FCS\_COP.1(SIGN) cryptographic services provided by the operating system].

## 5.1.7 TOE Access (FTA)

### 5.1.7.1 TOE Access for GP OS PP

#### 5.1.7.1.1 Default TOE Access Banners (FTA\_TAB.1)

**FTA\_TAB.1.1** Before establishing a user session, the OS shall display an advisory warning message regarding unauthorized use of the OS.

### 5.1.7.2 TOE Access for WLAN Client EP

#### 5.1.7.2.1 Extended: Wireless Network Access (FTA\_WSE\_EXT.1)

**FTA\_WSE\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall be able to attempt connections only to wireless networks specified as acceptable networks as configured by the administrator in FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1(WLAN).1/WLAN.

## 5.1.8 Trusted Path / Channels (FTP)

### 5.1.8.1 Trusted Path / Channels for GP OS PP

#### 5.1.8.1.1 Trusted Path (FTP\_TRP.1)

**FTP\_TRP.1.1** The OS shall provide a communications path between itself and [local, remote] users that is logically distinct from other communications paths and

provides assured identification of its endpoints and protection of the communicated data from modification and disclosure.<sup>27</sup>

**FTP\_TRP.1.2**

The OS shall permit [*the TSF, local users, remote users*] to initiate communication via the trusted path.

**FTP\_TRP.1.3**

The OS shall require use of the trusted path for all remote administrative actions.

5.1.8.1.2 Trusted Channel Communication (FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1(TLS))

**FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1.1(TLS)** The OS shall use [

- **TLS as conforming to FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1**

] to provide a trusted communications channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: [**authentication server, [CRL checking, web traffic]**] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.

5.1.8.1.3 Trusted Channel Communication (FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1(DTLS))

**FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1.1(DTLS)** The OS shall use [

- **DTLS as conforming to FCS\_DTLS\_EXT.1,**

] to provide a trusted communications channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: [**web traffic, datagram-based application protocols**] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.

**5.1.8.2 Trusted Path / Channels for WLAN Client EP**

5.1.8.2.1 Extended: Trusted Channel Communication (FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 (WLAN))

**Application Note:** FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1(WLAN) corresponds to FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1/WLAN in the WLAN CLIENT EP.

**FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1.1(WLAN)**

The TSF shall use 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and a wireless access point that is logically distinct from other communication channels, provides assured identification of its end points, protects channel data from disclosure, and detects modification of the channel data.

**FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1.2(WLAN)**

The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for wireless access point connections.

**5.1.8.3 Trusted Path / Channels for IPsec Client EP**

5.1.8.3.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (FTP\_ITC.1(IPSEC))

**Application Note:** FTP\_ITC.1(IPSEC) corresponds to FTP\_ITC.1 in the IPsec EP.

**FTP\_ITC.1.1(IPSEC)**

The [**VPN client, OS**] shall use IPsec to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and [**a remote VPN gateway, a remote VPN client,**

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<sup>27</sup> This protection profile requirement was modified as part of NIAP Technical Decision [208](#).

*a remote IPsec-capable network device*] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.

**FTP\_ITC.1.2(IPSEC)**

The [OS] shall permit the TSF to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

**FTP\_ITC.1.3(IPSEC)**

The [OS] shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for all traffic traversing that connection.

## 5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

### 5.2.1 CC Part 3 Assurance Requirements

The following table is the collection of CC Part 3 assurance requirements from the General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile.

**Table 19 TOE Security Assurance Requirements**

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
<b>Security Target (ASE)</b>	ST Introduction (ASE_INT.1)
	Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL.1)
	Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ.2)
	Extended Components Definition (ASE_ECD.1)
	Stated Security Requirements (ASE_REQ.2)
	Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
	TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS.1)
<b>Design (ADV)</b>	Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)
<b>Guidance (AGD)</b>	Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
	Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
<b>Lifecycle (ALC)</b>	Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
	TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
	Timely Security Updates (ALC_TSU_EXT.1)
<b>Testing (ATE)</b>	Independent Testing – Conformance (ATE_IND.1)
<b>Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)</b>	Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)

#### 5.2.1.1 Timely Security Updates (ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1)

**Developer action elements:**

**ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1.1D** The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how timely security updates are made to the TOE.

**ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1.2D** The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how users are notified when updates change security properties or the configuration of the product.

**Content and presentation elements:**

**ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1.1C** The description shall include the process for creating and deploying security updates for the TOE software.

**ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1.2C** The description shall include the mechanisms publicly available for reporting security issues pertaining to the TOE. The reporting mechanism could include web sites, email addresses, as well as a means to protect the sensitive nature of the report (e.g., public keys that could be used to encrypt the details of a proof-of-concept exploit).

**Evaluator action elements:**

**ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1.1E** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all the requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

**Assurance Activity:** The evaluator will verify that the TSS contains a description of the timely security update process used by the developer to create and deploy security updates. The evaluator will verify that this description addresses the entire application. The evaluator will also verify that, in addition to the OS developer's process, any third-party processes are also addressed in the description. The evaluator will also verify that each mechanism for deployment of security updates is described.

The evaluator will verify that, for each deployment mechanism described for the update process, the TSS lists a time between public disclosure of a vulnerability and public availability of the security update to the OS patching this vulnerability, to include any third-party or carrier delays in deployment. The evaluator will verify that this time is expressed in a number or range of days.

The evaluator will verify that this description includes the publicly available mechanisms (including either an email address or website) for reporting security issues related to the OS. The evaluator shall verify that the description of this mechanism includes a method for protecting the report either using a public key for encrypting email or a trusted channel for a website.

## 5.2.2 General Purpose OS PP Assurance Activities

This section copies the assurance activities from the protection profile in order to ease reading and comparisons between the protection profile and the security target.

### 5.2.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)

#### *FAU\_GEN.1.1*

The evaluator will check the administrative guide and ensure that it lists all of the auditable events. The evaluator will check to make sure that every audit event type selected in the ST is included. The evaluator will test the OS's ability to correctly generate audit records by having the TOE generate audit records for the events listed in the ST. This should include all instance types of an event specified. When verifying the test results, the evaluator will ensure the audit records generated during testing match the format specified in the administrative guide, and that the fields in each audit record have the proper entries.

#### *FAU\_GEN.1.2*

The evaluator will check the administrative guide and ensure that it provides a format for audit records. Each audit record format type must be covered, along with a brief description of each field. The evaluator will ensure that the fields contains the information required. The evaluator shall test the OS's ability to correctly generate audit records by having the TOE generate audit records for the events listed in the ST. The evaluator will ensure the audit records generated during testing match the format

specified in the administrative guide, and that the fields in each audit record provide the required information.

### 5.2.2.2 *Cryptographic Support (FCS)*

#### 5.2.2.2.1 *Cryptographic Key Generation (FCS\_CKM.1)*

The evaluator will verify the implementation of RSA Key Generation by the OS using the Key Generation test. This test verifies the ability of the TSF to correctly produce values for the key components including the public verification exponent  $e$ , the private prime factors  $p$  and  $q$ , the public modulus  $n$  and the calculation of the private signature exponent  $d$ . Key Pair generation specifies 5 ways (or methods) to generate the primes  $p$  and  $q$ .

These include:

1. Random Primes:
  - Provable primes
  - Probable primes
2. Primes with Conditions:
  - Primes  $p_1, p_2, q_1, q_2, p$  and  $q$  shall all be provable primes
  - Primes  $p_1, p_2, q_1,$  and  $q_2$  shall be provable primes and  $p$  and  $q$  shall be probable primes
  - Primes  $p_1, p_2, q_1, q_2, p$  and  $q$  shall all be probable primes

To test the key generation method for the Random Provable primes method and for all the Primes with Conditions methods, the evaluator must seed the TSF key generation routine with sufficient data to deterministically generate the RSA key pair. This includes the random seed(s), the public exponent of the RSA key, and the desired key length. For each key length supported, the evaluator shall have the TSF generate 25 key pairs. The evaluator will verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation by comparing values generated by the TSF with those generated from a known good implementation.

If possible, the Random Probable primes method should also be verified against a known good implementation as described above. Otherwise, the evaluator will have the TSF generate 10 keys pairs for each supported key length  $nlen$  and verify:

- $n = p \cdot q,$
- $p$  and  $q$  are probably prime according to Miller-Rabin tests,
- $GCD(p-1, e) = 1,$
- $GCD(q-1, e) = 1,$
- $2^{16} \leq e \leq 2^{256}$  and  $e$  is an odd integer,
- $|p-q| > 2^{nlen/2 - 100},$
- $p \geq 2^{nlen/2 - 1/2},$
- $q \geq 2^{nlen/2 - 1/2},$
- $2^{(nlen/2)} < d < LCM(p-1, q-1),$
- $e \cdot d = 1 \text{ mod } LCM(p-1, q-1).$

#### **Key Generation for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)**

*FIPS 186-4 ECC Key Generation Test*

For each supported NIST curve, i.e., P-256, P-384 and P-521, the evaluator will require the implementation under test (IUT) to generate 10 private/public key pairs. The private key shall be generated using an approved random bit generator (RBG). To determine correctness, the evaluator will submit the generated key pairs to the public key verification (PKV) function of a known good implementation.

*FIPS 186-4 Public Key Verification (PKV) Test*

For each supported NIST curve, i.e., P-256, P-384 and P-521, the evaluator will generate 10 private/public key pairs using the key generation function of a known good implementation and modify five of the public key values so that they are incorrect, leaving five values unchanged (i.e., correct). The evaluator will obtain in response a set of 10 PASS/FAIL values.

**Key Generation for Finite-Field Cryptography (FFC)**

The evaluator will verify the implementation of the Parameters Generation and the Key Generation for FFC by the TOE using the Parameter Generation and Key Generation test. This test verifies the ability of the TSF to correctly produce values for the field prime  $p$ , the cryptographic prime  $q$  (dividing  $p-1$ ), the cryptographic group generator  $g$ , and the calculation of the private key  $x$  and public key  $y$ .

The Parameter generation specifies 2 ways (or methods) to generate the cryptographic prime  $q$  and the field prime  $p$ :

- Cryptographic and Field Primes:
  - Primes  $q$  and  $p$  shall both be provable primes
  - Primes  $q$  and field prime  $p$  shall both be probable primes

and two ways to generate the cryptographic group generator  $g$ :

- Cryptographic Group Generator:
  - Generator  $g$  constructed through a verifiable process
  - Generator  $g$  constructed through an unverifiable process

The Key generation specifies 2 ways to generate the private key  $x$ :

- Private Key:
  - $\text{len}(q)$  bit output of RBG where  $1 \leq x \leq q-1$
  - $\text{len}(q) + 64$  bit output of RBG, followed by a mod  $q-1$  operation where  $1 \leq x \leq q-1$

The security strength of the RBG must be at least that of the security offered by the FFC parameter set. To test the cryptographic and field prime generation method for the provable primes method and/or the group generator  $g$  for a verifiable process, the evaluator must seed the TSF parameter generation routine with sufficient data to deterministically generate the parameter set. For each key length supported, the evaluator will have the TSF generate 25 parameter sets and key pairs. The evaluator will verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation by comparing values generated by the TSF with those generated from a known good implementation. Verification must also confirm:

- $g \neq 0, 1$
- $q$  divides  $p-1$
- $g^q \bmod p = 1$
- $g^x \bmod p = y$

for each FFC parameter set and key pair.

#### 5.2.2.2.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (FCS\_CKM.2)

The evaluator will ensure that the supported key establishment schemes correspond to the key generation schemes identified in FCS\_CKM.1.1. If the ST specifies more than one scheme, the evaluator will examine the TSS to verify that it identifies the usage for each scheme.

The evaluator will verify that the AGD guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the OS to use the selected key establishment scheme(s).

Evaluation Activity Note: The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

#### **Key Establishment Schemes**

The evaluator will verify the implementation of the key establishment schemes supported by the OS using the applicable tests below.

#### **SP800-56A Key Establishment Schemes**

The evaluator will verify the OS's implementation of SP800-56A key agreement schemes using the following Function and Validity tests. These validation tests for each key agreement scheme verify that the OS has implemented the components of the key agreement scheme according to the specifications in the Recommendation. These components include the calculation of the discrete logarithm cryptography (DLC) primitives (the shared secret value  $Z$ ) and the calculation of the derived keying material (DKM) via the Key Derivation Function (KDF). If key confirmation is supported, the evaluator will also verify that the components of key confirmation have been implemented correctly, using the test procedures described below. This includes the parsing of the DKM, the generation of MAC data and the calculation of MAC tag.

#### **Function Test**

The Function test verifies the ability of the OS to implement the key agreement schemes correctly. To conduct this test the evaluator will generate or obtain test vectors from a known good implementation of the OS's supported schemes. For each supported key agreement scheme-key agreement role combination, KDF type, and, if supported, key confirmation role-key confirmation type combination, the tester shall generate 10 sets of test vectors. The data set consists of the NIST approved curve (ECC) per 10 sets of public keys. These keys are static, ephemeral or both depending on the scheme being tested.

The evaluator will obtain the DKM, the corresponding OS's public keys (static and/or ephemeral), the MAC tag(s), and any inputs used in the KDF, such as the Other Information field OI and OS id fields.



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If the OS does not use a KDF defined in SP 800-56A, the evaluator will obtain only the public keys and the hashed value of the shared secret.

The evaluator will verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of a given scheme by using a known good implementation to calculate the shared secret value, derive the keying material DKM, and compare hashes or MAC tags generated from these values.

If key confirmation is supported, the OS shall perform the above for each implemented approved MAC algorithm.

### ***Validity Test***

The Validity test verifies the ability of the OS to recognize another party's valid and invalid key agreement results with or without key confirmation. To conduct this test, the evaluator will obtain a list of the supporting cryptographic functions included in the SP800-56A key agreement implementation to determine which errors the OS should be able to recognize. The evaluator generates a set of 30 test vectors consisting of data sets including domain parameter values or NIST approved curves, the evaluator's public keys, the OS's public/private key pairs, MAC tag, and any inputs used in the KDF, such as the other info and OS id fields.

The evaluator will inject an error in some of the test vectors to test that the OS recognizes invalid key agreement results caused by the following fields being incorrect: the shared secret value Z, the DKM, the other information field OI, the data to be MAC'd, or the generated MAC tag. If the OS contains the full or partial (only ECC) public key validation, the evaluator will also individually inject errors in both parties' static public keys, both parties' ephemeral public keys and the OS's static private key to assure the OS detects errors in the public key validation function and/or the partial key validation function (in ECC only). At least two of the test vectors shall remain unmodified and therefore should result in valid key agreement results (they should pass).

The OS shall use these modified test vectors to emulate the key agreement scheme using the corresponding parameters. The evaluator will compare the OS's results with the results using a known good implementation verifying that the OS detects these errors.

### ***SP800-56B Key Establishment Schemes***

The evaluator will verify that the TSS describes whether the OS acts as a sender, a recipient, or both for RSA-based key establishment schemes.

If the OS acts as a sender, the following assurance activity shall be performed to ensure the proper operation of every OS supported combination of RSA-based key establishment scheme:

To conduct this test the evaluator will generate or obtain test vectors from a known good implementation of the OS's supported schemes. For each combination of supported key establishment scheme and its options (with or without key confirmation if supported, for each supported key confirmation MAC function if key confirmation is supported, and for each supported mask generation function if KTSOAEF is supported), the tester shall generate 10 sets of test vectors. Each test vector shall include the RSA public key, the plaintext keying material, any additional input parameters if applicable, the MAC key and MAC tag if key confirmation is

incorporated, and the outputted ciphertext. For each test vector, the evaluator shall perform a key establishment encryption operation on the OS with the same inputs (in cases where key confirmation is incorporated, the test shall use the MAC key from the test vector instead of the randomly generated MAC key used in normal operation) and ensure that the outputted ciphertext is equivalent to the ciphertext in the test vector.

If the OS acts as a receiver, the following evaluation activities shall be performed to ensure the proper operation of every OS supported combination of RSA-based key establishment scheme:

To conduct this test the evaluator will generate or obtain test vectors from a known good implementation of the OS's supported schemes. For each combination of supported key establishment scheme and its options (with or without key confirmation if supported, for each supported key confirmation MAC function if key confirmation is supported, and for each supported mask generation function if KTSOAEP is supported), the tester shall generate 10 sets of test vectors. Each test vector shall include the RSA private key, the plaintext keying material, any additional input parameters if applicable, the MAC tag in cases where key confirmation is incorporated, and the outputted ciphertext. For each test vector, the evaluator will perform the key establishment decryption operation on the OS and ensure that the outputted plaintext keying material is equivalent to the plaintext keying material in the test vector. In cases where key confirmation is incorporated, the evaluator will perform the key confirmation steps and ensure that the outputted MAC tag is equivalent to the MAC tag in the test vector.

The evaluator will ensure that the TSS describes how the OS handles decryption errors. In accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-56B, the OS must not reveal the particular error that occurred, either through the contents of any outputted or logged error message or through timing variations. If KTS-OAEP is supported, the evaluator will create separate contrived ciphertext values that trigger each of the three decryption error checks described in NIST Special Publication 800-56B section 7.2.2.3, ensure that each decryption attempt results in an error, and ensure that any outputted or logged error message is identical for each. If KTS-KEM-KWS is supported, the evaluator will create separate contrived ciphertext values that trigger each of the three decryption error checks described in NIST Special Publication 800-56B section 7.2.3.3, ensure that each decryption attempt results in an error, and ensure that any outputted or logged error message is identical for each.

#### 5.2.2.2.3 Cryptographic Key Destruction (FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4)<sup>28</sup>

##### TSS

The evaluator examines the TSS to ensure it describes how the keys are managed in volatile memory. This description includes details of how each identified key is introduced into volatile memory (e.g. by derivation from user input, or by unwrapping a wrapped key stored in non-volatile memory) and how they are overwritten.

The evaluator will check to ensure the TSS lists each type of key that is stored in non-volatile memory, and identifies how the TOE interacts with the underlying platform to manage keys (e.g., store, retrieve, destroy). The description includes details on the method of how the TOE interacts with the platform,

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<sup>28</sup> This protection profile assurance activity was replaced as part of NIAP Technical Decision [365](#).

including an identification and description of the interfaces it uses to manage keys (e.g., file system APIs, platform key store APIs).

If the ST makes use of the open assignment and fills in the type of pattern that is used, the evaluator examines the TSS to ensure it describes how that pattern is obtained and used. The evaluator will verify that the pattern does not contain any CSPs.

The evaluator will check that the TSS identifies any configurations or circumstances that may not strictly conform to the key destruction requirement.

If the selection “destruction of all key encrypting keys protecting target key according to FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4.1, where none of the KEKs protecting the target key are derived” is included the evaluator shall examine the TOE’s keychain in the TSS and identify each instance when a key is destroyed by this method. In each instance the evaluator shall verify all keys capable of decrypting the target key are destroyed in accordance with a specified key destruction method in FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4.1. The evaluator shall verify that all of the keys capable of decrypting the target key are not able to be derived to reestablish the keychain after their destruction.

#### *Operational Guidance*

There are a variety of concerns that may prevent or delay key destruction in some cases. The evaluator will check that the guidance documentation identifies configurations or circumstances that may not strictly conform to the key destruction requirement, and that this description is consistent with the relevant parts of the TSS and any other relevant Required Supplementary Information. The evaluator will check that the guidance documentation provides guidance on situations where key destruction may be delayed at the physical layer and how such situations can be avoided or mitigated if possible.

Some examples of what is expected to be in the documentation are provided here.

When the TOE does not have full access to the physical memory, it is possible that the storage may be implementing wear-leveling and garbage collection. This may create additional copies of the key that are logically inaccessible but persist physically. In this case, to mitigate this the drive should support the TRIM command and implements garbage collection to destroy these persistent copies when not actively engaged in other tasks.

Drive vendors implement garbage collection in a variety of different ways, as such there is a variable amount of time until data is truly removed from these solutions. There is a risk that data may persist for a longer amount of time if it is contained in a block with other data not ready for erasure. To reduce this risk, the operating system and file system of the OE should support TRIM, instructing the non-volatile memory to erase copies via garbage collection upon their deletion. If a RAID array is being used, only set-ups that support TRIM are utilized. If the drive is connected via PCI-Express, the operating system supports TRIM over that channel.

The drive should be healthy and contains minimal corrupted data and should be end-of-lifed before a significant amount of damage to drive health occurs, this minimizes the risk that small amounts of potentially recoverable data may remain in damaged areas of the drive.

*Tests*

- **Test 1:** Applied to each key held as in volatile memory and subject to destruction by overwrite by the TOE (whether or not the value is subsequently encrypted for storage in volatile or non-volatile memory). In the case where the only selection made for the destruction method key was removal of power, then this test is unnecessary. The evaluator will:
  1. Record the value of the key in the TOE subject to clearing.
  2. Cause the TOE to perform a normal cryptographic processing with the key from Step #1.
  3. Cause the TOE to clear the key.
  4. Cause the TOE to stop the execution but not exit.
  5. Cause the TOE to dump the entire memory of the TOE into a binary file.
  6. Search the content of the binary file created in Step #5 for instances of the known key value from Step #1.

Steps 1-6 ensure that the complete key does not exist anywhere in volatile memory. If a copy is found, then the test fails.

- **Test 2:** Applied to each key held in non-volatile memory and subject to destruction by the TOE. The evaluator will use special tools (as needed), provided by the TOE developer if necessary, to ensure the tests function as intended.
  1. Identify the purpose of the key and what access should fail when it is deleted. (e.g. the data encryption key being deleted would cause data decryption to fail.)
  2. Cause the TOE to clear the key.
  3. Have the TOE attempt the functionality that the cleared key would be necessary for.

The test succeeds if step 3 fails.

Tests 3 and 4 do not apply for the selection instructing the underlying platform to destroy the representation of the key, as the TOE has no visibility into the inner workings and completely relies on the underlying platform.

- **Test 3:** The following tests are used to determine the TOE is able to request the platform to overwrite the key with a TOE supplied pattern.

Applied to each key held in non-volatile memory and subject to destruction by overwrite by the TOE. The evaluator will use a tool that provides a logical view of the media (e.g., MBR file system):

1. Record the value of the key in the TOE subject to clearing.
2. Cause the TOE to perform a normal cryptographic processing with the key from Step #1.
3. Cause the TOE to clear the key.
4. Search the logical view that the key was stored in for instances of the known key value from Step #1. If a copy is found, then the test fails.

- **Test 4:** Applied to each key held as non-volatile memory and subject to destruction by overwrite by the TOE. The evaluator will use a tool that provides a logical view of the media:
  1. Record the logical storage location of the key in the TOE subject to clearing.
  2. Cause the TOE to perform a normal cryptographic processing with the key from Step #1.
  3. Cause the TOE to clear the key.
  4. Read the logical storage location in Step #1 of non-volatile memory to ensure the appropriate pattern is utilized.

The test succeeds if correct pattern is used to overwrite the key in the memory location. If the pattern is not found the test fails.

#### 5.2.2.2.4 Cryptographic Operation for Encryption / Decryption (FCS\_COP.1(SYM))

The evaluator will verify that the AGD documents contains instructions required to configure the OS to use the required modes and key sizes. The evaluator will execute all instructions as specified to configure the OS to the appropriate state. The evaluator will perform all of the following tests for each algorithm implemented by the OS and used to satisfy the requirements of this PP:

##### ***AES-CBC Known Answer Tests***

There are four Known Answer Tests (KATs), described below. In all KATs, the plaintext, ciphertext, and IV values shall be 128-bit blocks. The results from each test may either be obtained by the evaluator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator will compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.

- **KAT-1.** To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will supply a set of 10 plaintext values and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES-CBC encryption of the given plaintext using a key value of all zeros and an IV of all zeros. Five plaintext values shall be encrypted with a 128-bit all-zeros key, and the other five shall be encrypted with a 256-bit all-zeros key. To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will perform the same test as for encrypt, using 10 ciphertext values as input and AES-CBC decryption.
- **KAT-2.** To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will supply a set of 10 key values and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES-CBC encryption of an all-zeros plaintext using the given key value and an IV of all zeros. Five of the keys shall be 128bit keys, and the other five shall be 256-bit keys. To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will perform the same test as for encrypt, using an all-zero ciphertext value as input and AES-CBC decryption.
- **KAT-3.** To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will supply the two sets of key values described below and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES encryption of an all-zeros plaintext using the given key value and an IV of all zeros. The first set of keys shall have 128 128-bit keys, and the second set shall have 256 256-bit keys. Key  $i$  in each set shall have the leftmost  $i$  bits be ones and the rightmost  $N-i$  bits be zeros, for  $i$  in  $[1,N]$ . To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will supply the two sets of key and ciphertext value pairs described below and obtain the plaintext value that results from AES-CBC decryption of the

given ciphertext using the given key and an IV of all zeros. The first set of key/ciphertext pairs shall have 128 128-bit key/ciphertext pairs, and the second set of key/ciphertext pairs shall have 256 256-bit key/ciphertext pairs. Key  $i$  in each set shall have the leftmost  $i$  bits be ones and the rightmost  $N-i$  bits be zeros, for  $i$  in  $[1, N]$ . The ciphertext value in each pair shall be the value that results in an all-zeros plaintext when decrypted with its corresponding key.

- **KAT-4.** To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will supply the set of 128 plaintext values described below and obtain the two ciphertext values that result from AES-CBC encryption of the given plaintext using a 128-bit key value of all zeros with an IV of all zeros and using a 256-bit key value of all zeros with an IV of all zeros, respectively. Plaintext value  $i$  in each set shall have the leftmost  $i$  bits be ones and the rightmost  $128-i$  bits be zeros, for  $i$  in  $[1, 128]$ .

To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator will perform the same test as for encrypt, using ciphertext values of the same form as the plaintext in the encrypt test as input and AES-CBC decryption.

#### ***AES-CBC Multi-Block Message Test***

The evaluator will test the encrypt functionality by encrypting an  $i$ -block message where  $1 < i \leq 10$ . The evaluator will choose a key, an IV and plaintext message of length  $i$  blocks and encrypt the message, using the mode to be tested, with the chosen key and IV. The ciphertext shall be compared to the result of encrypting the same plaintext message with the same key and IV using a known good implementation. The evaluator will also test the decrypt functionality for each mode by decrypting an  $i$ -block message where  $1 < i \leq 10$ . The evaluator will choose a key, an IV and a ciphertext message of length  $i$  blocks and decrypt the message, using the mode to be tested, with the chosen key and IV. The plaintext shall be compared to the result of decrypting the same ciphertext message with the same key and IV using a known good implementation.

#### ***AES-CBC Monte Carlo Tests***

The evaluator will test the encrypt functionality using a set of 200 plaintext, IV, and key 3-tuples. 100 of these shall use 128 bit keys, and 100 shall use 256 bit keys. The plaintext and IV values shall be 128-bit blocks. For each 3-tuple, 1000 iterations shall be run as follows:

```
# Input: PT, IV, Key
for i = 1 to 1000:
    if i == 1:
        CT[1] = AES-CBC-Encrypt(Key, IV, PT)
        PT = IV
    else:
        CT[i] = AES-CBC-Encrypt(Key, PT)
        PT = CT[i-1]
```

The ciphertext computed in the 1000th iteration (i.e., CT[1000]) is the result for that trial. This result shall be compared to the result of running 1000 iterations with the same values using a known good

implementation. The evaluator will test the decrypt functionality using the same test as for encrypt, exchanging CT and PT and replacing AES-CBC-Encrypt with AESCBC-Decrypt.

#### ***AES-GCM Monte Carlo Tests***

The evaluator will test the authenticated encrypt functionality of AES-GCM for each combination of the following input parameter lengths:

- 128 bit and 256 bit keys
- Two plaintext lengths. One of the plaintext lengths shall be a non-zero integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported. The other plaintext length shall not be an integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported.
- Three AAD lengths. One AAD length shall be 0, if supported. One AAD length shall be a non-zero integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported. One AAD length shall not be an integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported.
- Two IV lengths. If 96 bit IV is supported, 96 bits shall be one of the two IV lengths tested.

The evaluator will test the encrypt functionality using a set of 10 key, plaintext, AAD, and IV tuples for each combination of parameter lengths above and obtain the ciphertext value and tag that results from AES-GCM authenticated encrypt. Each supported tag length shall be tested at least once per set of 10. The IV value may be supplied by the evaluator or the implementation being tested, as long as it is known.

The evaluator will test the decrypt functionality using a set of 10 key, ciphertext, tag, AAD, and IV 5-tuples for each combination of parameter lengths above and obtain a Pass/Fail result on authentication and the decrypted plaintext if Pass. The set shall include five tuples that Pass and five that Fail.

The results from each test may either be obtained by the evaluator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator will compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.

#### ***AES-CCM Tests***

The evaluator will test the generation-encryption and decryption-verification functionality of AES-CCM for the following input parameter and tag lengths:

- 128 bit and 256 bit keys
- Two payload lengths. One payload length shall be the shortest supported payload length, greater than or equal to zero bytes. The other payload length shall be the longest supported payload length, less than or equal to 32 bytes (256 bits).
- Two or three associated data lengths. One associated data length shall be 0, if supported. One associated data length shall be the shortest supported payload length, greater than or equal to zero bytes. One associated data length shall be the longest supported payload length, less than or equal to 32 bytes (256 bits). If the implementation supports an associated data length of 2 16 bytes, an associated data length of 216 bytes shall be tested.
- Nonce lengths. All supported nonce lengths between 7 and 13 bytes, inclusive, shall be tested.

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- Tag lengths. All supported tag lengths of 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 and 16 bytes shall be tested.

To test the generation-encryption functionality of AES-CCM, the evaluator will perform the following four tests:

- Test 1: For EACH supported key and associated data length and ANY supported payload, nonce and tag length, the evaluator will supply one key value, one nonce value and 10 pairs of associated data and payload values and obtain the resulting ciphertext.
- Test 2: For EACH supported key and payload length and ANY supported associated data, nonce and tag length, the evaluator will supply one key value, one nonce value and 10 pairs of associated data and payload values and obtain the resulting ciphertext.
- Test 3: For EACH supported key and nonce length and ANY supported associated data, payload and tag length, the evaluator will supply one key value and 10 associated data, payload and nonce value 3-tuples and obtain the resulting ciphertext.
- Test 4: For EACH supported key and tag length and ANY supported associated data, payload and nonce length, the evaluator will supply one key value, one nonce value and 10 pairs of associated data and payload values and obtain the resulting ciphertext.

To determine correctness in each of the above tests, the evaluator will compare the ciphertext with the result of generation-encryption of the same inputs with a known good implementation.

To test the decryption-verification functionality of AES-CCM, for EACH combination of supported associated data length, payload length, nonce length and tag length, the evaluator shall supply a key value and 15 nonce, associated data and ciphertext 3-tuples and obtain either a FAIL result or a PASS result with the decrypted payload. The evaluator will supply 10 tuples that should FAIL and 5 that should PASS per set of 15.

Additionally, the evaluator will use tests from the IEEE 802.11-02/362r6 document "Proposed Test vectors for IEEE 802.11 TGi", dated September 10, 2002, Section 2.1 AESCCMP Encapsulation Example and Section 2.2 Additional AES CCMP Test Vectors to further verify the IEEE 802.11-2007 implementation of AES-CCMP.

### ***AES-GCM Test***

The evaluator will test the authenticated encrypt functionality of AES-GCM for each combination of the following input parameter lengths:

- 128 bit and 256 bit keys
- Two plaintext lengths. One of the plaintext lengths shall be a non-zero integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported. The other plaintext length shall not be an integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported.
- Three AAD lengths. One AAD length shall be 0, if supported. One AAD length shall be a non-zero integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported. One AAD length shall not be an integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported.
- Two IV lengths. If 96 bit IV is supported, 96 bits shall be one of the two IV lengths tested.



The evaluator will test the encrypt functionality using a set of 10 key, plaintext, AAD, and IV tuples for each combination of parameter lengths above and obtain the ciphertext value and tag that results from AES-GCM authenticated encrypt. Each supported tag length shall be tested at least once per set of 10. The IV value may be supplied by the evaluator or the implementation being tested, as long as it is known.

The evaluator will test the decrypt functionality using a set of 10 key, ciphertext, tag, AAD, and IV 5-tuples for each combination of parameter lengths above and obtain a Pass/Fail result on authentication and the decrypted plaintext if Pass. The set shall include five tuples that Pass and five that Fail.

The results from each test may either be obtained by the evaluator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator will compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.

### ***XTS-AES Test***

The evaluator will test the encrypt functionality of XTS-AES for each combination of the following input parameter lengths:

- 256 bit (for AES-128) and 512 bit (for AES-256) keys
- Three data unit (i.e., plaintext) lengths. One of the data unit lengths shall be a nonzero integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported. One of the data unit lengths shall be an integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported. The third data unit length shall be either the longest supported data unit length or 216 bits, whichever is smaller.

using a set of 100 (key, plaintext and 128-bit random tweak value) 3-tuples and obtain the ciphertext that results from XTS-AES encrypt.

The evaluator may supply a data unit sequence number instead of the tweak value if the implementation supports it. The data unit sequence number is a base-10 number ranging between 0 and 255 that implementations convert to a tweak value internally.

The evaluator will test the decrypt functionality of XTS-AES using the same test as for encrypt, replacing plaintext values with ciphertext values and XTS-AES encrypt with XTS-AES decrypt.

### ***AES Key Wrap (AES-KW) and Key Wrap with Padding (AES-KWP) Test***

The evaluator will test the authenticated encryption functionality of AES-KW for EACH combination of the following input parameter lengths:

- 128 and 256 bit key encryption keys (KEKs)
- Three plaintext lengths. One of the plaintext lengths shall be two semi-blocks (128 bits). One of the plaintext lengths shall be three semi-blocks (192 bits). The third data unit length shall be the longest supported plaintext length less than or equal to 64 semi-blocks (4096 bits).

using a set of 100 key and plaintext pairs and obtain the ciphertext that results from AES-KW authenticated encryption. To determine correctness, the evaluator will use the AES-KW authenticated-encryption function of a known good implementation.

The evaluator will test the authenticated-decryption functionality of AES-KW using the same test as for authenticated-encryption, replacing plaintext values with ciphertext values and AES-KW authenticated-encryption with AES-KW authenticated-decryption.

The evaluator will test the authenticated-encryption functionality of AES-KWP using the same test as for AES-KW authenticated-encryption with the following change in the three plaintext lengths: One plaintext length shall be one octet.

- One plaintext length shall be 20 octets (160 bits).
- One plaintext length shall be the longest supported plaintext length less than or equal to 512 octets (4096 bits).

The evaluator will test the authenticated-decryption functionality of AESKWP using the same test as for AES-KWP authenticated-encryption, replacing plaintext values with ciphertext values and AES-KWP authenticated-encryption with AES-KWP authenticated-decryption.

#### 5.2.2.2.5 Cryptographic Operation for Hashing (FCS\_COP.1(HASH))

The evaluator will check that the association of the hash function with other application cryptographic functions (for example, the digital signature verification function) is documented in the TSS.

The TSF hashing functions can be implemented in one of two modes. The first mode is the byte-oriented mode. In this mode the TSF only hashes messages that are an integral number of bytes in length; i.e., the length (in bits) of the message to be hashed is divisible by 8. The second mode is the bit-oriented mode. In this mode the TSF hashes messages of arbitrary length. As there are different tests for each mode, an indication is given in the following sections for the bit-oriented vs. the byte-oriented test macs. The evaluator will perform all of the following tests for each hash algorithm implemented by the TSF and used to satisfy the requirements of this PP.

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test application that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found in the production application.

- **Test 1:** Short Messages Test (Bit oriented Mode) - The evaluator will generate an input set consisting of  $m+1$  messages, where  $m$  is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the messages range sequentially from 0 to  $m$  bits. The message text shall be pseudo-randomly generated. The evaluator will compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.
- **Test 2:** Short Messages Test (Byte oriented Mode) - The evaluator will generate an input set consisting of  $m/8+1$  messages, where  $m$  is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the messages range sequentially from 0 to  $m/8$  bytes, with each message being an integral number of bytes. The message text shall be pseudo-randomly generated. The evaluator will compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.
- **Test 3:** Selected Long Messages Test (Bit oriented Mode) - The evaluator will generate an input set consisting of  $m$  messages, where  $m$  is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  message is  $512 + 99 \cdot i$ , where  $1 \leq i \leq m$ . The message text shall be pseudo-randomly

generated. The evaluator will compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

- **Test 4:** Selected Long Messages Test (Byte oriented Mode) - The evaluator will generate an input set consisting of  $m/8$  messages, where  $m$  is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  message is  $512 + 8 \cdot 99 \cdot i$ , where  $1 \leq i \leq m/8$ . The message text shall be pseudo-randomly generated. The evaluator will compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.
- **Test 5:** Pseudo-randomly Generated Messages Test - This test is for byte-oriented implementations only. The evaluator will randomly generate a seed that is  $n$  bits long, where  $n$  is the length of the message digest produced by the hash function to be tested. The evaluator will then formulate a set of 100 messages and associated digests by following the algorithm provided in Figure 1 of [SHAVS]. The evaluator will then ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

#### 5.2.2.2.6 Cryptographic Operation for Signing (FCS\_COP.1(SIGN))

The evaluator will perform the following activities based on the selections in the ST.

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test application that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found in the production application.

##### ***ECDSA Algorithm Tests***

- **Test 1:** ECDSA FIPS 186-4 Signature Generation Test. For each supported NIST curve (i.e., P-256, P-384 and P-521) and SHA function pair, the evaluator will generate 10 1024-bit long messages and obtain for each message a public key and the resulting signature values  $R$  and  $S$ . To determine correctness, the evaluator will use the signature verification function of a known good implementation.
- **Test 2:** ECDSA FIPS 186-4 Signature Verification Test. For each supported NIST curve (i.e., P-256, P-384 and P-521) and SHA function pair, the evaluator will generate a set of 10 1024-bit message, public key and signature tuples and modify one of the values (message, public key or signature) in five of the 10 tuples. The evaluator will verify that 5 responses indicate success and 5 responses indicate failure.

##### ***RSA Signature Algorithm Tests***

- **Test 1:** Signature Generation Test. The evaluator will verify the implementation of RSA Signature Generation by the OS using the Signature Generation Test. To conduct this test the evaluator must generate or obtain 10 messages from a trusted reference implementation for each modulus size/SHA combination supported by the TSF. The evaluator will have the OS use its private key and modulus value to sign these messages. The evaluator will verify the correctness of the TSF's signature using a known good implementation and the associated public keys to verify the signatures.
- **Test 2:** Signature Verification Test. The evaluator will perform the Signature Verification test to verify the ability of the OS to recognize another party's valid and invalid signatures. The

evaluator will inject errors into the test vectors produced during the Signature Verification Test by introducing errors in some of the public keys, e, messages, IR format, and/or signatures. The evaluator will verify that the OS returns failure when validating each signature.

#### 5.2.2.2.7 Cryptographic Operation for Keyed Hash Algorithms (FCS\_COP.1(HMAC))

The evaluator will perform the following activities based on the selections in the ST.

For each of the supported parameter sets, the evaluator will compose 15 sets of test data. Each set shall consist of a key and message data. The evaluator will have the OS generate HMAC tags for these sets of test data. The resulting MAC tags shall be compared against the result of generating HMAC tags with the same key and IV using a known-good implementation

#### 5.2.2.2.8 Random Bit Generation (FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1)

##### *FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1*

The evaluator will perform the following tests:

The evaluator will perform 15 trials for the RNG implementation. If the RNG is configurable, the evaluator will perform 15 trials for each configuration. The evaluator will also confirm that the operational guidance contains appropriate instructions for configuring the RNG functionality.

If the RNG has prediction resistance enabled, each trial consists of (1) instantiate DRBG, (2) generate the first block of random bits (3) generate a second block of random bits (4) un-instantiate. The evaluator verifies that the second block of random bits is the expected value. The evaluator will generate eight input values for each trial. The first is a count (0 – 14). The next three are entropy input, nonce, and personalization string for the instantiate operation. The next two are additional input and entropy input for the first call to generate. The final two are additional input and entropy input for the second call to generate. These values are randomly generated. "generate one block of random bits" means to generate random bits with number of returned bits equal to the Output Block Length (as defined in NIST SP 800-90A).

If the RNG does not have prediction resistance, each trial consists of (1) instantiate DRBG, (2) generate the first block of random bits (3) reseed, (4) generate a second block of random bits (5) un-instantiate. The evaluator verifies that the second block of random bits is the expected value. The evaluator will generate eight input values for each trial. The first is a count (0 – 14). The next three are entropy input, nonce, and personalization string for the instantiate operation. The fifth value is additional input to the first call to generate. The sixth and seventh are additional input and entropy input to the call to reseed. The final value is additional input to the second generate call.

The following list contains more information on some of the input values to be generated/selected by the evaluator.

- **Entropy input:** The length of the entropy input value must equal the seed length.
- **Nonce:** If a nonce is supported (CTR\_DRBG with no Derivation Function does not use a nonce), the nonce bit length is one-half the seed length.
- **Personalization string:** The length of the personalization string must be less than or equal to seed length. If the implementation only supports one personalization string length, then the same length can be used for both values. If more than one string length is support, the evaluator

will use personalization strings of two different lengths. If the implementation does not use a personalization string, no value needs to be supplied.

- **Additional input:** The additional input bit lengths have the same defaults and restrictions as the personalization string lengths.

#### *FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2*

Documentation shall be produced - and the evaluator will perform the activities - in accordance with Appendix E and the Clarification to the Entropy Documentation and Assessment Annex. In the future, specific statistical testing (in line with NIST SP 800-90B) will be required to verify the entropy estimates.

#### 5.2.2.2.9 Storage of Sensitive Data (FCS\_STO\_EXT.1)

The evaluator will check the TSS to ensure that it lists all persistent sensitive data for which the OS provides a storage capability. For each of these items, the evaluator will confirm that the TSS lists for what purpose it can be used, and how it is stored. The evaluator will confirm that cryptographic operations used to protect the data occur as specified in FCS\_COP.1(1).

The evaluator will also consult the developer documentation to verify that an interface exists for applications to securely store credentials.

#### 5.2.2.2.10 TLS Client Protocol (FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1)

##### *FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.1*

The evaluator will check the description of the implementation of this protocol in the TSS to ensure that the cipher suites supported are specified. The evaluator will check the TSS to ensure that the cipher suites specified include those listed for this component. The evaluator will also check the operational guidance to ensure that it contains instructions on configuring the OS so that TLS conforms to the description in the TSS. The evaluator will also perform the following tests:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator will establish a TLS connection using each of the cipher suites specified by the requirement. This connection may be established as part of the establishment of a higher-level protocol, e.g., as part of an EAP session. It is sufficient to observe the successful negotiation of a cipher suite to satisfy the intent of the test; it is not necessary to examine the characteristics of the encrypted traffic in an attempt to discern the cipher suite being used (for example, that the cryptographic algorithm is 128-bit AES and not 256bit AES).
- **Test 2:** The evaluator will attempt to establish the connection using a server with a server certificate that contains the Server Authentication purpose in the extendedKeyUsage field and verify that a connection is established. The evaluator will then verify that the client rejects an otherwise valid server certificate that lacks the Server Authentication purpose in the extendedKeyUsage field and a connection is not established. Ideally, the two certificates should be identical except for the extendedKeyUsage field.
- **Test 3:** The evaluator will send a server certificate in the TLS connection that does not match the server-selected cipher suite (for example, send a ECDSA certificate while using the TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA cipher suite or send a RSA certificate while using one of the ECDSA cipher suites.) The evaluator will verify that the OS disconnects after receiving the server's Certificate handshake message.

- **Test 4:** The evaluator will configure the server to select the TLS\_NULL\_WITH\_NULL\_NULL cipher suite and verify that the client denies the connection.
- **Test 5:** The evaluator will perform the following modifications to the traffic:
  - **Test 5.1:** Change the TLS version selected by the server in the Server Hello to a non-supported TLS version (for example 1.3 represented by the two bytes 03 04) and verify that the client rejects the connection.
  - **Test 5.2:** Modify at least one byte in the server's nonce in the Server Hello handshake message, and verify that the client rejects the Server Key Exchange handshake message (if using a DHE or ECDHE cipher suite) or that the server denies the client's Finished handshake message.
  - **Test 5.3:** Modify the server's selected cipher suite in the Server Hello handshake message to be a cipher suite not presented in the Client Hello handshake message. The evaluator will verify that the client rejects the connection after receiving the Server Hello.
  - **Test 5.4:** If an ECDHE or DHE ciphersuite is selected, modify the signature block in the Server's Key Exchange handshake message, and verify that the client rejects the connection after receiving the Server Key Exchange message.
  - **Test 5.5:** Modify a byte in the Server Finished handshake message, and verify that the client sends a fatal alert upon receipt and does not send any application data.
  - **Test 5.6:** Send a garbled message from the Server after the Server has issued the Change Cipher Spec message and verify that the client denies the connection.

#### *FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.2*

The evaluator will ensure that the TSS describes the client's method of establishing all reference identifiers from the application-configured reference identifier, including which types of reference identifiers are supported (e.g. Common Name, DNS Name, URI Name, Service Name, or other application-specific Subject Alternative Names) and whether IP addresses and wildcards are supported. The evaluator will ensure that this description identifies whether and the manner in which certificate pinning is supported or used by the OS.

The evaluator will verify that the AGD guidance includes instructions for setting the reference identifier to be used for the purposes of certificate validation in TLS.

The evaluator will configure the reference identifier according to the AGD guidance and perform the following tests during a TLS connection:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator will present a server certificate that does not contain an identifier in either the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) or Common Name (CN) that matches the reference identifier. The evaluator will verify that the connection fails.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator will present a server certificate that contains a CN that matches the reference identifier, contains the SAN extension, but does not contain an identifier in the SAN that matches the reference identifier. The evaluator shall verify that the connection fails. The evaluator will repeat this test for each supported SAN type.

- **Test 3:** [conditional] If the TOE does not mandate the presence of the SAN extension, the evaluator will present a server certificate that contains a CN that matches the reference identifier and does not contain the SAN extension. The evaluator will verify that the connection succeeds. If the TOE mandates the presence of the SAN extension, this test shall be omitted.
- **Test 4:** The evaluator will present a server certificate that contains a CN that does not match the reference identifier but does contain an identifier in the SAN that matches. The evaluator will verify that the connection succeeds.
- **Test 5:** The evaluator will perform the following wildcard tests with each supported type of reference identifier:
  - **Test 5.1:** The evaluator will present a server certificate containing a wildcard that is not in the left-most label of the presented identifier (e.g. foo.\*.example.com) and verify that the connection fails.
  - **Test 5.2:** The evaluator will present a server certificate containing a wildcard in the left-most label but not preceding the public suffix (e.g. \*.example.com). The evaluator will configure the reference identifier with a single left-most label (e.g. foo.example.com) and verify that the connection succeeds. The evaluator will configure the reference identifier without a leftmost label as in the certificate (e.g. example.com) and verify that the connection fails. The evaluator will configure the reference identifier with two left-most labels (e.g. bar.foo.example.com) and verify that the connection fails.
  - **Test 5.3:** The evaluator will present a server certificate containing a wildcard in the left-most label immediately preceding the public suffix (e.g. \*.com). The evaluator will configure the reference identifier with a single left-most label (e.g. foo.com) and verify that the connection fails. The evaluator will configure the reference identifier with two left-most labels (e.g. bar.foo.com) and verify that the connection fails.
- **Test 6:** [conditional] If URI or Service name reference identifiers are supported, the evaluator will configure the DNS name and the service identifier. The evaluator will present a server certificate containing the correct DNS name and service identifier in the URName or SRVName fields of the SAN and verify that the connection succeeds. The evaluator will repeat this test with the wrong service identifier (but correct DNS name) and verify that the connection fails.
- **Test 7:** [conditional] If pinned certificates are supported the evaluator will present a certificate that does not match the pinned certificate and verify that the connection fails.

### *FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.3*

The evaluator will use TLS as a function to verify that the validation rules in FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1 are adhered to and shall perform the following additional test:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator will demonstrate that a peer using a certificate without a valid certification path results in an authenticate failure. Using the administrative guidance, the evaluator will then load the trusted CA certificate(s) needed to validate the peer's certificate, and demonstrate that the connection succeeds. The evaluator then shall delete one of the CA certificates, and show that the connection fails.

- **Test 2:** The evaluator will demonstrate that a peer using a certificate which has been revoked results in an authentication failure.
- **Test 3:** The evaluator will demonstrate that a peer using a certificate which has passed its expiration date results in an authentication failure.
- **Test 4:** the evaluator will demonstrate that a peer using a certificate which does not have a valid identifier shall result in an authentication failure.

#### 5.2.2.2.11 TLS Client Protocol (FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2)

The evaluator will verify that TSS describes the supported Elliptic Curves Extension and whether the required behavior is performed by default or may be configured. If the TSS indicates that the supported Elliptic Curves Extension must be configured to meet the requirement, the evaluator will verify that AGD guidance includes configuration of the supported Elliptic Curves Extension.

The evaluator will also perform the following test: The evaluator will configure a server to perform ECDHE key exchange using each of the TOE's supported curves and shall verify that the TOE successfully connects to the server.

#### 5.2.2.2.12 TLS Client Protocol (FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.3)

The evaluator will verify that TSS describes the signature\_algorithm extension and whether the required behavior is performed by default or may be configured. If the TSS indicates that the signature\_algorithm extension must be configured to meet the requirement, the evaluator will verify that AGD guidance includes configuration of the signature\_algorithm extension.

The evaluator will also perform the following test: The evaluator will configure the server to send a certificate in the TLS connection that is not supported according to the Client's HashAlgorithm enumeration within the signature\_algorithms extension (for example, send a certificate with a SHA-1 signature). The evaluator will verify that the OS disconnects after receiving the server's Certificate handshake message.

#### 5.2.2.2.13 TLS Client Protocol (FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.4)

The evaluator will ensure that the TSS description required per FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1 includes the use of client-side certificates for TLS mutual authentication.

The evaluator will verify that the AGD guidance required per FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1 includes instructions for configuring the client-side certificates for TLS mutual authentication.

The evaluator will also perform the following test:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator will establish a connection to a peer server that is not configured for mutual authentication (i.e. does not send Server's Certificate Request (type 13) message). The evaluator observes negotiation of a TLS channel and confirms that the TOE did not send Client's Certificate message (type 11) during handshake.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator will establish a connection to a peer server with a shared trusted root that is configured for mutual authentication (i.e. it sends Server's Certificate Request (type 13) message). The evaluator observes negotiation of a TLS channel and confirms that the TOE



responds with a non-empty Client's Certificate message (type 11) and Certificate Verify (type 15) messages.

#### 5.2.2.2.14 DTLS Implementation (FCS\_DTLS\_EXT.1)

##### *FCS\_DTLS\_EXT.1.1*

**Test 1:** The evaluator will attempt to establish a connection with a DTLS server, observe the traffic with a packet analyzer, and verify that the connection succeeds and that the traffic is identified as DTLS.

Other tests are performed in conjunction with the evaluation activity listed for FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.

##### *FCS\_DTLS\_EXT.1.2*

The evaluator will perform the assurance activities listed for FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.

### 5.2.2.3 User Data Protection (FDP)

#### 5.2.2.3.1 Access Controls for Protecting User Data (FDP\_ACF\_EXT.1)

The evaluator will confirm that the TSS comprehensively describes the access control policy enforced by the OS. The description must include the rules by which accesses to particular files and directories are determined for particular users. The evaluator will inspect the TSS to ensure that it describes the access control rules in such detail that given any possible scenario between a user and a file governed by the OS the access control decision is unambiguous.

The evaluator will create two new standard user accounts on the system and conduct the following tests:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator will authenticate to the system as the first user and create a file within that user's home directory. The evaluator will then log off the system and log in as the second user. The evaluator will then attempt to read the file created in the first user's home directory. The evaluator will ensure that the read attempt is denied.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator will authenticate to the system as the first user and create a file within that user's home directory. The evaluator will then log off the system and log in as the second user. The evaluator will then attempt to modify the file created in the first user's home directory. The evaluator will ensure that the modification is denied.
- **Test 3:** The evaluator will authenticate to the system as the first user and create a file within that user's user directory. The evaluator will then log off the system and log in as the second user. The evaluator will then attempt to delete the file created in the first user's home directory. The evaluator will ensure that the deletion is denied.
- **Test 4:** The evaluator will authenticate to the system as the first user. The evaluator will attempt to create a file in the second user's home directory. The evaluator will ensure that the creation of the file is denied.
- **Test 5:** The evaluator will authenticate to the system as the first user and attempt to modify the file created in the first user's home directory. The evaluator will ensure that the modification of the file is accepted.

- **Test 6:** The evaluator will authenticate to the system as the first user and attempt to delete the file created in the first user's directory. The evaluator will ensure that the deletion of the file is accepted.

#### 5.2.2.3.2 Information Flow Control (FDP\_IFC\_EXT.1)

The evaluator will verify that the TSS section of the ST describes the routing of IP traffic when a VPN client is enabled. The evaluator will ensure that the description indicates which traffic does not go through the VPN and which traffic does, and that a configuration exists for each in which only the traffic identified by the ST author as necessary for establishing the VPN connection (IKE traffic and perhaps HTTPS or DNS traffic) is not encapsulated by the VPN protocol (IPsec). The evaluator will perform the following test:

- **Test 1:**
  - **Step 1:** The evaluator will enable a network connection. The evaluator will sniff packets while performing running applications that use the network such as web browsers and email clients. The evaluator will verify that the sniffer captures the traffic generated by these actions, turn off the sniffing tool, and save the session data.
  - **Step 2:** The evaluator will configure an IPsec VPN client that supports the routing specified in this requirement. The evaluator will turn on the sniffing tool, establish the VPN connection, and perform the same actions with the device as performed in the first step. The evaluator will verify that the sniffing tool captures traffic generated by these actions, turn off the sniffing tool, and save the session data.
  - **Step 3:** The evaluator will examine the traffic from both step one and step two to verify that all non-expected Data Plane traffic in Step 2 is encapsulated by IPsec. The evaluator will examine the Security Parameter Index (SPI) value present in the encapsulated packets captured in Step 2 from the TOE to the Gateway and shall verify this value is the same for all actions used to generate traffic through the VPN. Note that it is expected that the SPI value for packets from the Gateway to the TOE is different than the SPI value for packets from the TOE to the Gateway.
  - **Step 4:** The evaluator will perform a ping on the TOE host on the local network and verify that no packets sent are captured with the sniffer. The evaluator will attempt to send packets to the TOE outside the VPN tunnel (i.e. not through the VPN gateway), including from the local network, and verify that the TOE discards them.

#### 5.2.2.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

##### 5.2.2.4.1 Authentication Failure Handling (FIA\_AFL.1)

###### *FIA\_AFL.1.1*

The evaluator will set an administrator-configurable threshold for failed attempts, or note the ST-specified assignment. The evaluator will then (per selection) repeatedly attempt to authenticate with an incorrect password, PIN, or certificate until the number of attempts reaches the threshold. Note that the authentication attempts and lockouts must also be logged as specified in FAU\_GEN.1.

### *FIA\_AFL.1.2*

- **Test 1:** The evaluator will attempt to authenticate repeatedly to the system with a known bad password. Once the defined number of failed authentication attempts has been reached the evaluator will ensure that the account that was being used for testing has had the actions detailed in the assignment list above applied to it. The evaluator will ensure that an event has been logged to the security event log detailing that the account has had these actions applied.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator will attempt to authenticate repeatedly to the system with a known bad certificate. Once the defined number of failed authentication attempts has been reached the evaluator will ensure that the account that was being used for testing has had the actions detailed in the assignment list above applied to it. The evaluator will ensure that an event has been logged to the security event log detailing that the account has had these actions applied.
- **Test 3:** The evaluator will attempt to authenticate repeatedly to the system using both a bad password and a bad certificate. Once the defined number of failed authentication attempts has been reached the evaluator will ensure that the account that was being used for testing has had the actions detailed in the assignment list above applied to it. The evaluator will ensure that an event has been logged to the security event log detailing that the account has had these actions applied.

### 5.2.2.4.2 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms (FIA\_UAU.5)

#### *FIA\_UAU.5.1*

If user name and password authentication is selected, the evaluator will configure the OS with a known user name and password and conduct the following tests:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator will attempt to authenticate to the OS using the known user name and password. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt is successful.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator will attempt to authenticate to the OS using the known user name but an incorrect password. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt is unsuccessful.

If user name and PIN that releases an asymmetric key is selected, the evaluator will examine the TSS for guidance on supported protected storage and will then configure the TOE or OE to establish a PIN which enables release of the asymmetric key from the protected storage (such as a TPM, a hardware token, or isolated execution environment) with which the OS can interface. The evaluator will then conduct the following tests:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator will attempt to authenticate to the OS using the known user name and PIN. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt is successful.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator will attempt to authenticate to the OS using the known user name but an incorrect PIN. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt is unsuccessful.

If X.509 certificate authentication is selected, the evaluator will generate an X.509v3 certificate for a user with the Client Authentication Enhanced Key Usage field set. The evaluator will provision the OS for authentication with the X.509v3 certificate. The evaluator will ensure that the certificates are validated by the OS as per FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1 and then conduct the following tests:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator will attempt to authenticate to the OS using the X.509v3 certificate. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt is successful.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator will generate a second certificate identical to the first except for the public key and any values derived from the public key. The evaluator will attempt to authenticate to the OS with this certificate. The evaluator will ensure that the authentication attempt is unsuccessful.

#### *FIA\_UAU.5.2*

The evaluator will ensure that the TSS describes each mechanism provided to support user authentication and the rules describing how the authentication mechanism(s) provide authentication. The evaluator will verify that configuration guidance for each authentication mechanism is addressed in the AGD guidance.

- **Test 1:** For each authentication mechanism selected, the evaluator will enable that mechanism and verify that it can be used to authenticate the user at the specified authentication factor interfaces.
- **Test 2:** For each authentication mechanism rule, the evaluator will ensure that the authentication mechanism(s) behave as documented in the TSS.

#### 5.2.2.4.3 X.509 Certification Validation (FIA\_X509\_EXT.1)

##### *FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1*

The evaluator will ensure the TSS describes where the check of validity of the certificates takes place. The evaluator ensures the TSS also provides a description of the certificate path validation algorithm.

The tests described must be performed in conjunction with the other certificate services evaluation activities, including the functions in FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1. The tests for the extendedKeyUsage rules are performed in conjunction with the uses that require those rules. The evaluator will create a chain of at least four certificates: the node certificate to be tested, two Intermediate CAs, and the self-signed Root CA.

- **Test 1:** The evaluator will demonstrate that validating a certificate without a valid certification path results in the function failing. The evaluator will then load a certificate or certificates as trusted CAs needed to validate the certificate to be used in the function, and demonstrate that the function succeeds. The evaluator shall then delete one of the certificates, and show that the function fails.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator will demonstrate that validating an expired certificate results in the function failing.
- **Test 3:** The evaluator will test that the OS can properly handle revoked certificates—conditional on whether CRL, OCSP, or OCSP stapling is selected; if multiple methods are selected, then a test shall be performed for each method. The evaluator will test revocation of the node certificate and revocation of the intermediate CA certificate (i.e. the intermediate CA certificate should be revoked by the root CA). The evaluator will ensure that a valid certificate is used, and that the validation function succeeds. The evaluator then attempts the test with a certificate that has

been revoked (for each method chosen in the selection) to ensure when the certificate is no longer valid that the validation function fails.

- **Test 4:** If either OCSP option is selected, the evaluator will configure the OCSP server or use a man-in-the-middle tool to present a certificate that does not have the OCSP signing purpose and verify that validation of the OCSP response fails. If CRL is selected, the evaluator will configure the CA to sign a CRL with a certificate that does not have the cRLsign key usage bit set, and verify that validation of the CRL fails.
- **Test 5:** The evaluator will modify any byte in the first eight bytes of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The certificate should fail to parse correctly.)
- **Test 6:** The evaluator will modify any byte in the last byte of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The signature on the certificate should not validate.)
- **Test 7:** The evaluator will modify any byte in the public key of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The signature on the certificate should not validate.)

#### *FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.2*

The tests described must be performed in conjunction with the other certificate services assurance activities, including the functions in FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1. The evaluator will create a chain of at least four certificates: the node certificate to be tested, two Intermediate CAs, and the self-signed Root CA.

- **Test 1:** The evaluator will construct a certificate path, such that the certificate of the CA issuing the OS's certificate does not contain the basicConstraints extension. The validation of the certificate path fails.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator will construct a certificate path, such that the certificate of the CA issuing the OS's certificate has the CA flag in the basicConstraints extension not set. The validation of the certificate path fails.
- **Test 3:** The evaluator will construct a certificate path, such that the certificate of the CA issuing the OS's certificate has the CA flag in the basicConstraints extension set to TRUE. The validation of the certificate path succeeds.

#### 5.2.2.4.4 X.509 Certificate Authentication (FIA\_X509\_EXT.2)

The evaluator will acquire or develop an application that uses the OS TLS mechanism with an X.509v3 certificate. The evaluator will then run the application and ensure that the provided certificate is used to authenticate the connection.

The evaluator will repeat the activity for any other selections listed.

#### 5.2.2.5 Security Management (FMT)

##### 5.2.2.5.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior (FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1)

The evaluator will verify that the TSS describes those management functions that are restricted to Administrators, including how the user is prevented from performing those functions, or not able to use any interfaces that allow access to that function.

- **Test 1:** For each function that is indicated as restricted to the administrator, the evaluation shall perform the function as an administrator, as specified in the Operational Guidance, and

determine that it has the expected effect as outlined by the Operational Guidance and the SFR. The evaluator will then perform the function (or otherwise attempt to access the function) as a non-administrator and observe that they are unable to invoke that functionality.

#### 5.2.2.5.2 Specification of Management Functions (FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1)

The evaluator will verify that every management function captured in the ST is described in the operational guidance and that the description contains the information required to perform the management duties associated with the management function. The evaluator will test the OS's ability to provide the management functions by configuring the operating system and testing each option selected from above. The evaluator is expected to test these functions in all the ways in which the ST and guidance documentation state the configuration can be managed.

#### 5.2.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

##### 5.2.2.6.1 Access Controls (FPT\_ACF\_EXT.1)

###### *FPT\_ACF\_EXT.1.1*

The evaluator will confirm that the TSS specifies the locations of kernel drivers/modules, security audit logs, shared libraries, system executables, and system configuration files. Every file does not need to be individually identified, but the system's conventions for storing and protecting such files must be specified. The evaluator will create an unprivileged user account. Using this account, the evaluator will ensure that the following tests result in a negative outcome (i.e., the action results in the OS denying the evaluator permission to complete the action):

- **Test 1:** The evaluator will attempt to modify all kernel drivers and modules.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator will attempt to modify all security audit logs generated by the logging subsystem.
- **Test 3:** The evaluator will attempt to modify all shared libraries that are used throughout the system.
- **Test 4:** The evaluator will attempt to modify all system executables.
- **Test 5:** The evaluator will attempt to modify all system configuration files. Test 6: The evaluator will attempt to modify any additional components selected.

###### *FPT\_ACF\_EXT.1.2*

The evaluator will create an unprivileged user account. Using this account, the evaluator will ensure that the following tests result in a negative outcome (i.e., the action results in the OS denying the evaluator permission to complete the action):

- **Test 1:** The evaluator will attempt to read security audit logs generated by the auditing subsystem
- **Test 2:** The evaluator will attempt to read system-wide credential repositories
- **Test 3:** The evaluator will attempt to read any other object specified in the assignment.

##### 5.2.2.6.2 Address Space Layout Randomization (FPT\_ASLR\_EXT.1)

The evaluator will select 3 executables included with the TSF. If the TSF includes a web browser it must be selected. If the TSF includes a mail client it must be selected. For each of these apps, the evaluator

will launch the same executables on two separate instances of the OS on identical hardware and compare all memory mapping locations. The evaluator will ensure that no memory mappings are placed in the same location. If the rare chance occurs that two mappings are the same for a single executable and not the same for the other two, the evaluator will repeat the test with that executable to verify that in the second test the mappings are different. This test can also be completed on the same hardware and rebooting between application launches.

#### 5.2.2.6.3 Stack Buffer Overflow Protection (FPT\_SBOP\_EXT.1)

For stack-based OSES, the evaluator will determine that the TSS contains a description of stack-based buffer overflow protections used by the OS. These are referred to by a variety of terms, such as stack cookie, stack guard, and stack canaries. The TSS must include a rationale for any binaries that are not protected in this manner. The evaluator will also perform the following test:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator will inventory the kernel, libraries, and application binaries to determine those that do not implement stack-based buffer overflow protections. This list should match up with the list provided in the TSS.

For OSES that store parameters/variables separately from control flow values, the evaluator will verify that the TSS describes what data structures control values, parameters, and variables are stored. The evaluator will also ensure that the TSS includes a description of the safeguards that ensure parameters and variables do not intermix with control flow values.

#### 5.2.2.6.4 Software Restriction Policies (FPT\_SRP\_EXT.1)

For each selection specified in the ST, the evaluator will ensure that the corresponding tests result in a negative outcome (i.e., the action results in the OS denying the evaluator permission to complete the action):

- **Test 1:** The evaluator will configure the OS to only allow code execution from the core OS directories. The evaluator will then attempt to execute code from a directory that is in the allowed list. The evaluator will ensure that the code they attempted to execute has been executed.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator will configure the OS to only allow code execution from the core OS directories. The evaluator will then attempt to execute code from a directory that is not in the allowed list. The evaluator will ensure that the code they attempted to execute has not been executed.
- **Test 3:** The evaluator will configure the OS to only allow code that has been signed by the OS vendor to execute. The evaluator will then attempt to execute code signed by the OS vendor. The evaluator will ensure that the code they attempted to execute has been executed.
- **Test 4:** The evaluator will configure the OS to only allow code that has been signed by the OS vendor to execute. The evaluator will then attempt to execute code signed by another digital authority. The evaluator will ensure that the code they attempted to execute has not been executed.
- **Test 5:** The evaluator will configure the OS to allow execution of a specific application based on version. The evaluator will then attempt to execute the same version of the application. The evaluator will ensure that the code they attempted to execute has been executed.

- **Test 6:** The evaluator will configure the OS to allow execution of a specific application based on version. The evaluator will then attempt to execute an older version of the application. The evaluator will ensure that the code they attempted to execute has not been executed.
- **Test 7:** The evaluator will configure the OS to allow execution based on the hash of the application executable. The evaluator will then attempt to execute the application with the matching hash. The evaluator will ensure that the code they attempted to execute has been executed.
- **Test 8:** The evaluator will configure the OS to allow execution based on the hash of the application executable. The evaluator will modify the application in such a way that the application hash is changed. The evaluator will then attempt to execute the application with the matching hash. The evaluator will ensure that the code they attempted to execute has not been executed.

#### 5.2.2.6.5 Boot Integrity (FPT\_TST\_EXT.1)

The evaluator will verify that the TSS section of the ST includes a comprehensive description of the boot procedures, including a description of the entire bootchain, for the TSF. The evaluator will ensure that the OS cryptographically verifies each piece of software it loads in the bootchain to include bootloaders and the kernel. Software loaded for execution directly by the platform (e.g. first-stage bootloaders) is out of scope. For each additional category of executable code verified before execution, the evaluator will verify that the description in the TSS describes how that software is cryptographically verified.

The evaluator will verify that the TSS contains a description of the protection afforded to the mechanism performing the cryptographic verification.

The evaluator will perform the following tests:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator will perform actions to cause TSF software to load and observe that the integrity mechanism does not flag any executables as containing integrity errors and that the OS properly boots.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator will modify a TSF executable that is part of the bootchain verified by the TSF (i.e. Not the first-stage bootloader) and attempt to boot. The evaluator will ensure that an integrity violation is triggered and the OS does not boot (Care must be taken so that the integrity violation is determined to be the cause of the failure to load the module, and not the fact that in such a way to invalidate the structure of the module.).
- **Test 3:** If the ST author indicates that the integrity verification is performed using a public key, the evaluator will verify that the update mechanism includes a certificate validation according to FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.

#### 5.2.2.6.6 Trusted Update (FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1)

##### *FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.1*

The evaluator will check for an update using procedures described in the documentation and verify that the OS provides a list of available updates. Testing this capability may require installing and temporarily placing the system into a configuration in conflict with secure configuration guidance which specifies automatic update. The evaluator is also to ensure that the response to this query is authentic by using a



digital signature scheme specified in FCS\_COP.1(3-SIGN). The digital signature verification may be performed as part of a network protocol. If the signature verification is not performed as part of a trusted channel, the evaluator shall send a query response with a bad signature and verify that the signature verification fails. The evaluator shall then send a query response with a good signature and verify that the signature verification is successful.

#### *FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.2*

For the following tests, the evaluator will initiate the download of an update and capture the update prior to installation. The download could originate from the vendor's website, an enterprise-hosted update repository, or another system (e.g. network peer). All supported origins for the update must be indicated in the TSS and evaluated.

- **Test 1:** The evaluator will ensure that the update has a digital signature belonging to the vendor prior to its installation. The evaluator will modify the downloaded update in such a way that the digital signature is no longer valid. The evaluator will then attempt to install the modified update. The evaluator will ensure that the OS does not install the modified update.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator will ensure that the update has a digital signature belonging to the vendor. The evaluator will then attempt to install the update (or permit installation to continue). The evaluator will ensure that the OS successfully installs the update.

### 5.2.2.6.7 Trusted Update for Application Software (FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2)

#### *FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2.1*

The evaluator will check for updates to application software using procedures described in the documentation and verify that the OS provides a list of available updates. Testing this capability may require temporarily placing the system into a configuration in conflict with secure configuration guidance which specifies automatic update. The evaluator is also to ensure that the response to this query is authentic by using a digital signature scheme specified in FCS\_COP.1(3-SIGN). The digital signature verification may be performed as part of a network protocol. If the signature verification is not performed as part of a trusted channel, the evaluator shall send a query response with a bad signature and verify that the signature verification fails. The evaluator shall then send a query response with a good signature and verify that the signature verification is successful

#### *FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2.2*

The evaluator will initiate an update to an application. This may vary depending on the application, but it could be through the application vendor's website, a commercial app store, or another system. All origins supported by the OS must be indicated in the TSS and evaluated. However, this only includes those mechanisms for which the OS is providing a trusted installation and update functionality. It does not include user or administrator-driven download and installation of arbitrary files.

- **Test 1:** The evaluator will ensure that the update has a digital signature which chains to the OS vendor or another trusted root managed through the OS. The evaluator will modify the downloaded update in such a way that the digital signature is no longer valid. The evaluator will then attempt to install the modified update. The evaluator will ensure that the OS does not install the modified update.

- **Test 2:** The evaluator will ensure that the update has a digital signature belonging to the OS vendor or another trusted root managed through the OS. The evaluator will then attempt to install the update. The evaluator will ensure that the OS successfully installs the update.

### 5.2.2.7 TOE Access (FTA)

#### 5.2.2.7.1 Default TOE Access Banners (FTA\_TAB.1)

The evaluator will configure the OS, per instructions in the OS manual, to display the advisory warning message "TEST TEST Warning Message TEST TEST". The evaluator will then log out and confirm that the advisory message is displayed before logging in can occur.

### 5.2.2.8 Trusted Path / Channels (FTP)

#### 5.2.2.8.1 Trusted Channel Communication (FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1)

The evaluator will configure the OS to communicate with another trusted IT product as identified in the second selection. The evaluator will monitor network traffic while the OS performs communication with each of the servers identified in the second selection. The evaluator will ensure that for each session a trusted channel was established in conformance with the protocols identified in the first selection.

#### 5.2.2.8.2 Trusted Path (FTP\_TRP.1)

The evaluator will examine the TSS to determine that the methods of remote OS administration are indicated, along with how those communications are protected. The evaluator will also confirm that all protocols listed in the TSS in support of OS administration are consistent with those specified in the requirement, and are included in the requirements in the ST. The evaluator will confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for establishing the remote administrative sessions for each supported method. The evaluator will also perform the following tests:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator will ensure that communications using each remote administration method is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the operational guidance and ensuring that communication is successful.
- **Test 2:** For each method of remote administration supported, the evaluator will follow the operational guidance to ensure that there is no available interface that can be used by a remote user to establish a remote administrative sessions without invoking the trusted path.
- **Test 3:** The evaluator will ensure, for each method of remote administration, the channel data is not sent in plaintext.
- **Test 4:** The evaluator will ensure, for each method of remote administration, modification of the channel data is detected by the OS.

## 5.2.3 WLAN Client EP Assurance Activities

This section copies the assurance activities from the WLAN Client extended package in order to ease reading and comparisons between the extended package and the security target s.

### 5.2.3.1 Security Audit (FAU)

#### 5.2.3.1.1 Audit Data Generation (FAU\_GEN.1 (WLAN))

*Design / TSS*

There are no TSS assurance activities for this SFR.

#### *Operational Guidance*

The evaluator shall check the operational guidance and ensure that it lists all of the auditable events and provides a format for audit records. Each audit record format type must be covered, along with a brief description of each field. The evaluator shall check to make sure that every audit event type mandated by the EP is described and that the description of the fields contains the information required in FAU\_GEN.1.2, and the additional information specified in Table 2.

The evaluator shall in particular ensure that the operational guidance is clear in relation to the contents for failed cryptographic events. In Table 2, information detailing the cryptographic mode of operation and a name or identifier for the object being encrypted is required. The evaluator shall ensure that name or identifier is sufficient to allow an administrator reviewing the audit log to determine the context of the cryptographic operation (for example, performed during a key negotiation exchange, performed when encrypting data for transit) as well as the non-TOE endpoint of the connection for cryptographic failures relating to communications with other IT systems.

The evaluator shall also make a determination of the administrative actions that are relevant in the context of this EP. The TOE may contain functionality that is not evaluated in the context of this EP because the functionality is not specified in an SFR. This functionality may have administrative aspects that are described in the operational guidance. Since such administrative actions will not be performed in an evaluated configuration of the TOE, the evaluator shall examine the operational guidance and make a determination of which administrative commands, including subcommands, scripts, and configuration files, are related to the configuration (including enabling or disabling) of the mechanisms implemented in the TOE that are necessary to enforce the requirements specified in the EP, which thus form the set of “all administrative actions”. The evaluator may perform this activity as part of the activities associated with ensuring the AGD\_OPE guidance satisfies the requirements.

#### *Tests*

The evaluator shall test the TOE’s ability to correctly generate audit records by having the TOE generate audit records in accordance with the assurance activities associated with the functional requirements in this EP. When verifying the test results, the evaluator shall ensure the audit records generated during testing match the format specified in the administrative guide, and that the fields in each audit record have the proper entries.

Note that the testing here can be accomplished in conjunction with the testing of the security mechanisms directly. For example, testing performed to ensure that the administrative guidance provided is correct verifies that AGD\_OPE.1 is satisfied and should address the invocation of the administrative actions that are needed to verify the audit records are generated as expected.

### **5.2.3.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)**

#### **5.2.3.2.1 Cryptographic Key Generation for WPA2 Connections (FCS\_CKM.1(WLAN))**

**Application Note:** FCS\_CKM.1(WLAN) corresponds to FCS\_CKM.1/WLAN in the WLAN CLIENT EP.

#### *Design / TSS*

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes how the primitives defined and implemented by this EP are used by the TOE in establishing and maintaining secure connectivity to the wireless clients . The TSS shall also provide a description of the developer's method(s) of assuring that their implementation conforms to the cryptographic standards; this includes not only testing done by the developing organization, but also any third-party testing that is performed.

#### *Operational Guidance*

There are no AGD assurance activities for this SFR.

#### *Tests*

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test 1: The evaluator shall configure the access point so the crypto-period of the session key is 1 hour. The evaluator shall successfully connect the TOE to the access point and maintain the connection for a length of time that is greater than the configured crypto-period. The evaluator shall use a packet capture tool to determine that after the configured crypto-period, a re-negotiation is initiated to establish a new session key. Finally, the evaluator shall determine that the renegotiation has been successful and the client continues communication with the access point.
- Test 2: The evaluator shall perform the following test using a packet sniffing tool to collect frames between the TOE and a wireless LAN access point:

Step 1: The evaluator shall configure the access point to an unused channel and configure the WLAN sniffer to sniff only on that channel (i.e., lock the sniffer on the selected channel). The sniffer should also be configured to filter on the MAC address of the TOE and/or access point.

Step 2: The evaluator shall configure the TOE to communicate with a WLAN access point using IEEE 802.11-2012 and a 256-bit (64 hex values 0-f) pre-shared key. The pre-shared key is only used for testing.

Step 3: The evaluator shall start the sniffing tool, initiate a connection between the TOE and the access point, and allow the TOE to authenticate, associate, and successfully complete the 4 way handshake with the client.

Step 4: The evaluator shall set a timer for 1 minute, at the end of which the evaluator shall disconnect the TOE from the wireless network and stop the sniffer.

Step 5: The evaluator shall identify the 4-way handshake frames (denoted EAPOL-key in Wireshark captures) and derive the PTK from the 4-way handshake frames and preshared key as specified in IEEE 802.11-2012.

Step 6: The evaluator shall select the first data frame from the captured packets that was sent between the TOE and access point after the 4-way handshake successfully completed, and without the frame control value 0x4208 (the first 2 bytes are 08 42). The evaluator shall use the PTK to decrypt the data portion of the packet as specified in IEEE 802.11-2012, and shall verify that the decrypted data contains ASCII-readable text.

Step 7: The evaluator shall repeat Step 6 for the next 2 data frames between the TOE and access point and without frame control value 0x4208.

#### 5.2.3.2.2 Cryptographic Key Distribution for GTK (FCS\_CKM.2(WLAN))

**Application Note:** FCS\_CKM.2(WLAN) corresponds to FCS\_CKM.2/WLAN in the WLAN CLIENT EP.

##### *Design / TSS*

The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that it describes how the GTK is unwrapped prior to being installed for use on the TOE using the AES implementation specified in this EP.

##### *Operational Guidance*

There are no AGD assurance activities for this SFR.

##### *Tests*

The evaluator shall perform the following test using a packet sniffing tool to collect frames between the TOE and a wireless access point (which may be performed in conjunction with the assurance activity for FCS\_CKM.1.1/WLAN).

Step 1: The evaluator shall configure the access point to an unused channel and configure the WLAN sniffer to sniff only on that channel (i.e., lock the sniffer on the selected channel). The sniffer should also be configured to filter on the MAC address of the TOE and/or access point.

Step 2: The evaluator shall configure the TOE to communicate with the access point using IEEE 802.11-2012 and a 256-bit (64 hex values 0-f) pre-shared key, setting up the connections as described in the operational guidance. The pre-shared key is only used for testing.

Step 3: The evaluator shall start the sniffing tool, initiate a connection between the TOE and access point, and allow the TOE to authenticate, associate, and successfully complete the 4-way handshake with the TOE.

Step 4: The evaluator shall set a timer for 1 minute, at the end of which the evaluator shall disconnect the TOE from the access point and stop the sniffer.

Step 5: The evaluator shall identify the 4-way handshake frames (denoted EAPOL-key in Wireshark captures) and derive the PTK and GTK from the 4-way handshake frames and pre-shared key as specified in IEEE 802.11-2012.

Step 6: The evaluator shall select the first data frame from the captured packets that was sent between the TOE and access point after the 4-way handshake successfully completed, and with the frame control value 0x4208 (the first 2 bytes are 08 42). The evaluator shall use the GTK to decrypt the data portion of the selected packet as specified in IEEE 802.11-2012, and shall verify that the decrypted data contains ASCII-readable text.

Step 7: The evaluator shall repeat Step 6 for the next 2 data frames with frame control value 0x4208.

5.2.3.2.3 Extended: Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer Security  
(FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1(WLAN))

**Application Note:** FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1(WLAN) corresponds to FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1/WLAN in the WLAN CLIENT EP.

*Design / TSS*

The evaluator shall check the description of the implementation of this protocol in the TSS to ensure that the ciphersuites supported are specified. The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that the ciphersuites specified include those listed for this component. The evaluator shall also check the operational guidance to ensure that it contains instructions on configuring the TOE so that TLS conforms to the description in the TSS. *Operational Guidance*

The evaluator shall also check the operational guidance to ensure that it contains instructions on configuring the TOE so that TLS conforms to the description in the TSS (for instance, the set of ciphersuites advertised by the TOE may have to be restricted to meet the requirements).

The evaluator shall check that the OPE guidance contains instructions for the administrator to configure the list of Certificate Authorities that are allowed to sign certificates used by the authentication server that will be accepted by the TOE in the EAP-TLS exchange, and instructions on how to specify the algorithm suites that will be proposed and accepted by the TOE during the EAP-TLS exchange.

*Tests*

The evaluator shall write, or the ST author shall provide, an application for the purposes of testing TLS.

The evaluator shall also perform the following tests:

- Test 1: The evaluator shall establish a TLS connection using each of the ciphersuites specified by the requirement. This connection may be established as part of the establishment of a higher-level protocol, e.g., as part of an EAP session. It is sufficient to observe the successful negotiation of a ciphersuite to satisfy the intent of the test; it is not necessary to examine the characteristics of the encrypted traffic in an attempt to discern the ciphersuite being used (for example, that the cryptographic algorithm is 128bit AES and not 256-bit AES).
- Test 2: The evaluator shall attempt to establish the connection using a server with a server certificate that contains the Server Authentication purpose in the extendedKeyUsage field and verify that a connection is established. The evaluator will then verify that the client rejects an otherwise valid server certificate that lacks the Server Authentication purpose in the extendedKeyUsage field and a connection is not established. Ideally, the two certificates should be identical except for the extendedKeyUsage field.
- Test 3: The evaluator shall send a server certificate in the TLS connection that does not match the server-selected ciphersuite (for example, send a ECDSA certificate while using the TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA ciphersuite or send a RSA certificate while using one of the ECDSA ciphersuites.) The evaluator shall verify that the TOE disconnects after receiving the server's Certificate handshake message.

- Test 4: The evaluator shall configure the server to select the TLS\_NULL\_WITH\_NULL\_NULL ciphersuite and verify that the client denies the connection.
- Test 5: The evaluator shall perform the following modifications to the traffic:
  - Change the TLS version selected by the server in the Server Hello to a non-supported TLS version (for example 1.3 represented by the two bytes 03 04) and verify that the client rejects the connection.
  - Modify at least one byte in the server's nonce in the Server Hello handshake message, and verify that the client rejects the Server Key Exchange handshake message (if using a DHE or ECDHE ciphersuite) or that the server denies the client's Finished handshake message.
  - Modify the server's selected ciphersuite in the Server Hello handshake message to be a ciphersuite not presented in the Client Hello handshake message. The evaluator shall verify that the client rejects the connection after receiving the Server Hello.
  - [conditional] If DHE or ECDHE cipher suites are supported, modify the signature block in the Server's Key Exchange handshake message, and verify that the client does not complete the handshake and no application data flows. This test does not apply to cipher suites using RSA key exchange. If a TOE only supports RSA key exchange in conjunction with TLS, then this test shall be omitted.<sup>29</sup>
  - Modify a byte in the Server Finished handshake message, and verify that the client sends a fatal alert upon receipt and does not send any application data.
  - Send a garbled message from the Server after the Server has issued the ChangeCipherSpec message and verify that the client denies the connection.

#### 5.2.3.2.4 Extended: TLS Client Protocol (FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2(WLAN))

##### *Design / TSS*

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the supported Elliptic Curves Extension and whether the required behavior is performed by default or may be configured.

##### *Operational Guidance*

If the TSS indicates that the supported Elliptic Curves Extension must be configured to meet the requirement, the evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance includes instructions on configuration of the supported Elliptic Curves Extension.

##### *Tests*

The evaluator shall perform the following test:

- Test 1: The evaluator shall configure the server to perform an ECDHE key exchange message in the TLS connection using a non-supported ECDHE curve (for example, P192) and shall verify that the TSF disconnects after receiving the server's Key Exchange handshake message.

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<sup>29</sup> This assurance activity was replaced as part of NIAP Technical Decision [492](#).

### 5.2.3.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

#### 5.2.3.3.1 Extended: Port Access Entity Authentication (FIA\_PAE\_EXT.1)

##### *Design / TSS*

There are no TSS assurance activities for this SFR.

##### *Operational Guidance*

There are no guidance activities for this SFR.

##### *Tests*

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test 1: The evaluator shall demonstrate that the TOE has no access to the test network. After successfully authenticating with an authentication server through a wireless access system, the evaluator shall demonstrate that the TOE does have access to the test network.
- Test 2: The evaluator shall demonstrate that the TOE has no access to the test network. The evaluator shall attempt to authenticate using an invalid client certificate, such that the EAP-TLS negotiation fails. This should result in the TOE still being unable to access the test network.
- Test 3: The evaluator shall demonstrate that the TOE has no access to the test network. The evaluator shall attempt to authenticate using an invalid authentication server certificate, such that the EAP-TLS negotiation fails. This should result in the TOE still being unable to access the test network.

#### 5.2.3.3.2 X.509 Certificate Validation (FIA\_X509\_EXT.2(WLAN))<sup>30</sup>

**Application Note:** FIA\_X509\_EXT.1(WLAN) corresponds to FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/WLAN in the WLAN CLIENT EP.

##### *TSS*

The evaluator shall ensure the TSS describes where the check of validity of the EAP-TLS certificates takes place. The evaluator ensures the TSS also provides a description of the certificate path validation algorithm.

##### *Tests*

The tests described must be performed in conjunction with the other Certificate Services assurance activities. The tests for the extendedKeyUsage rules are performed in conjunction with the uses that require those rules. The evaluator shall create a chain of at least four certificates: the node certificate to be tested, two Intermediate CAs, and the self-signed Root CA.

- Test 1: The evaluator shall then load a certificate or certificates to the Trust Anchor Database needed to validate the certificate to be used in the function (e.g. application validation), and demonstrate that the function succeeds. The evaluator then shall delete one of the certificates, and show that the function fails.

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<sup>30</sup> This extended package assurance activity was added as part of NIAP Technical Decision [439](#).



- Test 2: The evaluator shall demonstrate that validating an expired certificate results in the function failing.
- Test 3: The evaluator shall construct a certificate path, such that the certificate of the CA issuing the TOE's certificate does not contain the basicConstraints extension. The validation of the certificate path fails.
- Test 4: The evaluator shall construct a certificate path, such that the certificate of the CA issuing the TOE's certificate has the cA flag in the basicConstraints extension not set. The validation of the certificate path fails.
- Test 5: The evaluator shall modify any byte in the first eight bytes of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate (the certificate will fail to parse correctly).
- Test 6: The evaluator shall modify any bit in the last byte of the signature algorithm of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate (the signature on the certificate will not validate).
- Test 7: The evaluator shall modify any byte in the public key of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate (the signature on the certificate will not validate).

#### 5.2.3.3.3 Extended: X.509 Certificate Authentication (EAP-TLS) (FIA\_X509\_EXT.2(WLAN))

**Application Note:** FIA\_X509\_EXT.2(WLAN) corresponds to FIA\_X509\_EXT.2/WLAN in the WLAN CLIENT EP.

#### *Design / TSS*

The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that it describes how the TOE chooses which certificates to use, and any necessary instructions in the administrative guidance for configuring the operating environment so that the TOE can use the certificates.

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to confirm that it describes the behavior of the TOE when a connection cannot be established during the validity check of a certificate used in establishing a trusted channel. The evaluator shall verify that any distinctions between trusted channels are described. If the requirement that the administrator is able to specify the default action, then the evaluator shall ensure that the operational guidance contains instructions on how this configuration action is performed.

#### *Operational Guidance*

The evaluator shall check the administrative guidance to ensure that it describes how the TOE chooses which certificates to use, and any necessary instructions for configuring the operating environment so that the TOE can use the certificates.

#### *Tests*

The evaluator shall perform the following test for each trusted channel:

Test: The evaluator shall demonstrate using a valid certificate that requires certificate validation checking to be performed in at least some part by communicating with a non-TOE IT entity. The evaluator shall then manipulate the environment so that the TOE is unable to verify the validity of the certificate, and observe that the action selected in FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.2 is performed. If the selected action is administrator-configurable, then the evaluator shall follow the operational guidance to determine that all supported administrator-configurable options behave in their documented manner.

#### 5.2.3.3.4 Extended: Certificate Storage and Management (FIA\_X509\_EXT.4)

##### *Design / TSS*

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it describes all certificate stores implemented that contain certificates used to meet the requirements of this EP. This description shall contain information pertaining to how certificates are loaded into the store, and how the store is protected from unauthorized access.

##### *Operational Guidance*

There are no AGD assurance activities for this requirement.

##### *Tests*

The evaluator shall perform the following tests for each function in the system that requires the use of certificates:

Test 1: The evaluator shall demonstrate that using a certificate without a valid certification path results in the function failing. The evaluator shall then load a certificate or certificates needed to validate the certificate to be used in the function, and demonstrate that the function succeeds. The evaluator then shall delete one of the certificates, and show that the function fails.

#### 5.2.3.4 Security Management (FMT)

##### 5.2.3.4.1 Extended: Specification of Management Functions (FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1(WLAN))

**Application Note:** FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1(WLAN) corresponds to FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1/WLAN in the WLAN CLIENT EP.

##### *Design / TSS*

There are no TSS assurance activities for this SFR.

##### *Operational Guidance*

The evaluator shall check to make sure that every management function mandated by the EP is described in the operational guidance and that the description contains the information required to perform the management duties associated with the management function.

##### *Tests*

The evaluator shall test the TOE's ability to provide the management functions by configuring the TOE and testing each option listed in the requirement above.

Note that the testing here may be accomplished in conjunction with the testing of other requirements, such as FCS\_TLSC\_EXT and FTA\_WSE\_EXT.

#### 5.2.3.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

##### 5.2.3.5.1 Extended: TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing (FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 (WLAN))

**Application Note:** FPT\_TST\_EXT.1(WLAN) corresponds to FPT\_TST\_EXT.1/WLAN in the WLAN CLIENT EP.

##### *Design / TSS*

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it details the self tests that are run by the TSF on start-up; this description should include an outline of what the tests are actually doing (e.g., rather than saying "memory is tested", a description similar to "memory is tested by writing a value to each memory location and reading it back to ensure it is identical to what was written" shall be used). The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS makes an argument that the tests are sufficient to demonstrate that the TSF is operating correctly.

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it describes how to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code when it is loaded for execution. The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS makes an argument that the tests are sufficient to demonstrate that the integrity of stored TSF executable code has not been compromised. The evaluator also ensures that the TSS (or the operational guidance) describes the actions that take place for successful (e.g. hash verified) and unsuccessful (e.g., hash not verified) cases.

#### *Operational Guidance*

The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS (or the operational guidance) describes the actions that take place for successful (e.g. hash verified) and unsuccessful (e.g., hash not verified) cases.

#### *Tests*

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test 1: The evaluator performs the integrity check on a known good TSF executable and verifies that the check is successful.
- Test 2: The evaluator modifies the TSF executable, performs the integrity check on the modified TSF executable and verifies that the check fails.

### **5.2.3.6 TOE Access (FTA)**

#### **5.2.3.6.1 Extended: Wireless Network Access (FTA\_WSE\_EXT.1)<sup>31</sup>**

##### *Design / TSS*

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it defines SSIDs as the attribute to specify acceptable networks.

##### *Operational Guidance*

The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to determine that it contains guidance for configuring the list of SSID that the WLAN Client is able to connect to.

##### *Tests*

The evaluator shall also perform the following test:

- Test 1: The evaluator configures the TOE to allow a connection to a wireless network with a specific SSID. The evaluator also configures the test environment such that the allowed SSID and an SSID that is not allowed are both "visible" to the TOE. The evaluator shall demonstrate that

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<sup>31</sup> This assurance activity was replaced as part of NIAP Technical Decision [470](#).

they can successfully establish a session with the allowed SSID. The evaluator will then attempt to establish a session with the disallowed SSID, and observe that the attempt fails.

### 5.2.3.7 *Trusted Path / Channels (FTP)*

#### 5.2.3.7.1 Extended: Trusted Channel Communication (FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 (WLAN))

**Application Note:** FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1(WLAN) corresponds to FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1/WLAN in the WLAN CLIENT EP.

#### *Design / TSS*

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it describes the details of the TOE connecting to an access point in terms of the cryptographic protocols specified in the requirement, along with TOE-specific options or procedures that might not be reflected in the specification. The evaluator shall also confirm that all protocols listed in the TSS are specified and included in the requirements in the ST.

#### *Operational Guidance*

The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for establishing the connection to the access point, and that it contains recovery instructions should a connection be unintentionally broken.

#### *Tests*

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test 1: The evaluators shall ensure that the TOE is able to initiate communications with an access point using the protocols specified in the requirement, setting up the connections as described in the operational guidance and ensuring that communication is successful.
- Test 2: The evaluator shall ensure, for each communication channel with an authorized IT entity, the channel data is not sent in plaintext.
- Test 3: The evaluator shall ensure, for each communication channel with an authorized IT entity, modification of the channel data is detected by the TOE.
- Test 4: The evaluators shall physically interrupt the connection from the TOE to the access point (e.g., moving the TOE host out of range of the access point, turning the access point off). The evaluators shall ensure that subsequent communications are appropriately protected, at a minimum in the case of any attempts to automatically resume the connection or connect to a new access point.

Further assurance activities are associated with the specific protocols.

## 5.2.4 **IPsec Client EP Assurance Activities**

This section copies the assurance activities from the IPsec Client extended package in order to ease reading and comparisons between the extended package and the security target.

### 5.2.4.1 *Security Audit (FAU)*

#### 5.2.4.1.1 Audit Data Generation (FAU\_GEN.1(IPSEC))

**Application Note:** FAU\_GEN.1(IPSEC) corresponds to FAU\_GEN.1 in the IPsec extended package.

### *TSS*

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it describes the auditable events and the component that is responsible for each type of auditable event.

### *Operational Guidance*

The evaluator shall check the operational guidance and ensure that it lists all of the auditable events and provides a format for audit records. Each audit record format type must be covered, along with a brief description of each field. The evaluator shall check to make sure that every audit event type mandated by the PP-Module is described and that the description of the fields contains the information required in FAU\_GEN.1.2, and the additional information specified in Table C-1 of the PP-Module.

In particular, the evaluator shall ensure that the operational guidance is clear in relation to the contents for failed cryptographic events. In Table C-1 of the PP-Module, information detailing the cryptographic mode of operation and a name or identifier for the object being encrypted is required. The evaluator shall ensure that name or identifier is sufficient to allow an administrator reviewing the audit log to determine the context of the cryptographic operation (for example, performed during a key negotiation exchange, performed when encrypting data for transit) as well as the non-TOE endpoint of the connection for cryptographic failures relating to communications with other IT systems.

The evaluator shall also make a determination of the administrative actions that are relevant in the context of this PP-Module. The TOE may contain functionality that is not evaluated in the context of this PP-Module because the functionality is not specified in an SFR. This functionality may have administrative aspects that are described in the operational guidance. Since such administrative actions will not be performed in an evaluated configuration of the TOE, the evaluator shall examine the operational guidance and make a determination of which administrative commands, including subcommands, scripts, and configuration files, are related to the configuration (including enabling or disabling) of the mechanisms implemented in the TOE that are necessary to enforce the requirements specified in the PP-Module, which thus form the set of "all administrative actions". The evaluator may perform this activity as part of the activities associated with ensuring the AGD\_OPE guidance satisfies the requirements.

### *Test*

The evaluator shall test the TOE's ability to correctly generate audit records by having the TOE generate audit records in accordance with the Assurance Activities associated with the functional requirements in this PP-Module. Additionally, the evaluator shall test that each administrative action applicable in the context of this PP-Module is auditable. When verifying the test results, the evaluator shall ensure the audit records generated during testing match the format specified in the administrative guide, and that the fields in each audit record have the proper entries.

Note that the testing here can be accomplished in conjunction with the testing of the security mechanisms directly. For example, testing performed to ensure that the administrative guidance provided is correct verifies that AGD\_OPE.1 is satisfied and should address the invocation of the administrative actions that are needed to verify the audit records are generated as expected.

#### 5.2.4.1.2 Selective Audit (FAU\_SEL.1)

##### TSS

There are no TSS Assurance Activities for this SFR.

##### *Operational Guidance*

The evaluator shall review the administrative guidance to ensure that the guidance itemizes all event types, as well as describes all attributes that are to be selectable in accordance with the requirement, to include those attributes listed in the assignment. The administrative guidance shall also contain instructions on how to set the pre-selection, or how the VPN gateway will configure the client, as well as explain the syntax (if present) for multi-value pre-selection. The administrative guidance shall also identify those audit records that are always recorded, regardless of the selection criteria currently being enforced.

##### *Test*

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

Test 1: For each attribute listed in the requirement, the evaluator shall devise a test to show that selecting the attribute causes only audit events with that attribute (or those that are always recorded, as identified in the administrative guidance) to be recorded.

Test 2 [conditional]: If the TSF supports specification of more complex audit pre-selection criteria (e.g., multiple attributes, logical expressions using attributes) then the evaluator shall devise tests showing that this capability is correctly implemented. The evaluator shall also, in the test plan, provide a short narrative justifying the set of tests as representative and sufficient to exercise the capability.

#### 5.2.4.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

##### 5.2.4.2.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (FCS\_CKM.1 (IPSEC))

**Application Note:** FCS\_CKM.1(IPSEC) corresponds to FCS\_CKM.1(1) in the IPsec extended package.

Refer to the Assurance Activity for FCS\_CKM.1(1) in the GPOS PP for evaluating this SFR.

##### 5.2.4.2.2 Cryptographic Key Generation (FCS\_CKM.1 (VPN))

**Application Note:** FCS\_CKM.1(VPN) corresponds to FCS\_CKM.1/VPN in the IPsec extended package.

##### TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes how the key generation functionality is invoked.

##### *Operational Guidance*

There are no AGD Assurance Activities for this requirement.

##### *Test*

There are no test Assurance Activities for this requirement.

#### 5.2.4.2.3 Cryptographic Key Establishment (FCS\_CKM.2 (IPSEC))

**Application Note:** FCS\_CKM.2(IPSEC) corresponds to FCS\_CKM.2(1) in the IPsec extended package.

For all key establishment schemes that conform to NIST SP 800-56A or 800-56B, refer to the Assurance Activity for FCS\_CKM.2(1) in the GPOS PP.

If “Key establishment scheme using Diffie-Hellman group 14...” is selected, the evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes how the implementation meets RFC 3526 Section 3. The evaluator shall also verify the correctness of the TSF’s implementation of Diffie-Hellman group 14 by using a known good implementation for each protocol selected in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 and FTP\_TRP.1 in the GPOS PP that uses Diffie-Hellman group 14. Note that because a TOE that conforms to this PP-Module must implement IPsec, the tested protocols shall include IPsec at minimum.

#### 5.2.4.2.4 Cryptographic Key Storage (FCS\_CKM\_EXT.2)

*TSS*

Regardless of whether this requirement is met by the VPN client or the OS, the evaluator will check the TSS to ensure that it lists each persistent secret (credential, secret key) and private key needed to meet the requirements in the ST. For each of these items, the evaluator will confirm that the TSS lists for what purpose it is used, and how it is stored.

The evaluator shall review the TSS for to determine that it makes a case that, for each item listed as being manipulated by the VPN client, it is not written unencrypted to persistent memory, and that the item is stored by the OS.

#### *Operational Guidance*

There are no AGD Assurance Activities for this requirement.

#### *Test*

There are no test Assurance Activities for this requirement.

#### 5.2.4.2.5 IPsec (FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1)

##### *FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.1*

*TSS*

The evaluator shall examine the TSS and determine that it describes how the IPsec capabilities are implemented and how a packet is processed, e.g., what takes place at the platform and what takes place within the client. The TSS will detail the relationship between the client and the underlying platform, including which aspects are implemented by the client, and those that are provided by the underlying platform. The TSS describes how the client interacts with the platforms network stack (e.g., does the client insert itself within the stack via kernel mods, does the client simply invoke APIs to gain access to network services).

If the SPD is implemented by the client, then the TSS describes how the SPD is implemented and the rules for processing both inbound and outbound packets in terms of the IPsec policy. The TSS describes the rules that are available and the resulting actions available after matching a rule. The TSS describes how the available rules and actions form the SPD using terms defined in RFC 4301 such as BYPASS (e.g.,

no encryption), DISCARD (e.g., drop the packet), and PROTECT (e.g., encrypt the packet) actions defined in RFC 4301.

As noted in section 4.4.1 of RFC 4301, the processing of entries in the SPD is non-trivial and the evaluator shall determine that the description in the TSS is sufficient to determine which rules will be applied given the rule structure implemented by the TOE. For example, if the TOE allows specification of ranges, conditional rules, etc., the evaluator shall determine that the description of rule processing (for both inbound and outbound packets) is sufficient to determine the action that will be applied, especially in the case where two different rules may apply. This description shall cover both the initial packets (that is, no SA is established on the interface or for that particular packet) as well as packets that are part of an established SA. If the SPD is implemented by the underlying platform, then the TSS describes how the client interacts with the platform to establish and populate the SPD, including the identification of the platform's interfaces that are used by the client.

#### *Operational Guidance*

The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to verify it describes how the SPD is created and configured. If there is an administrative interface to the client, then the guidance describes how the administrator specifies rules for processing a packet. The description includes all three cases - a rule that ensures packets are encrypted/decrypted, dropped, and allowing a packet to flow in plaintext. The evaluator shall determine that the description in the operational guidance is consistent with the description in the TSS, and that the level of detail in the operational guidance is sufficient to allow the administrator to set up the SPD in an unambiguous fashion. This includes a discussion of how ordering of rules impacts the processing of an IP packet.

If the client is configured by an external application, such as the VPN gateway, then the operational guidance should indicate this and provide a description of how the client is configured by the external application. The description should contain information as to how the SPD is established and set up in an unambiguous fashion. The description should also include what is configurable via the external application, how ordering of entries may be expressed, as well as the impacts that ordering of entries may have on the packet processing.

In either case, the evaluator ensures the description provided in the TSS is consistent with the capabilities and description provided in the operational guidance.

#### *Test*

Depending on the implementation, the evaluator may be required to use a VPN gateway or some form of application to configure the client and platform. For Test 2, the evaluator is required to choose an application that allows for the configuration of the full set of capabilities of the VPN client (in conjunction with the platform). For example, if the client provides a robust interface that allows for specification of wildcards, subnets, etc., it is unacceptable for the evaluator to choose a VPN Gateway that only allows for specifying a single fully qualified IP addresses in the rule.

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

Test 1: The evaluator shall configure an SPD on the client that is capable of the following: dropping a packet, encrypting a packet, and allowing a packet to flow in plaintext. The selectors used in the



construction of the rule shall be different such that the evaluator can generate a packet and send packets to the client with the appropriate fields (fields that are used by the rule - e.g., the IP addresses, TCP/UDP ports) in the packet header. The evaluator performs both positive and negative test cases for each type of rule. The evaluator observes via the audit trail, and packet captures that the TOE exhibited the expected behavior: appropriate packets were dropped, allowed through without modification, was encrypted by the IPsec implementation.

Test 2: The evaluator shall devise several tests that cover a variety of scenarios for packet processing. These scenarios must exercise the range of possibilities for SPD entries and processing modes as outlined in the TSS and operational guidance. Potential areas to cover include rules with overlapping ranges and conflicting entries, inbound and outbound packets, and packets that establish SAs as well as packets that belong to established SAs. The evaluator shall verify, via the audit trail and packet captures, for each scenario that the expected behavior is exhibited, and is consistent with both the TSS and the operational guidance.

#### *FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.2*

##### *TSS*

The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure it states that the VPN can be established to operate in tunnel mode and/or transport mode (as selected). The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions on how to configure the connection in each mode selected.

##### *Operational Guidance*

If both transport mode and tunnel mode are implemented, the evaluator shall review the operational guidance to determine how the use of a given mode is specified.

##### *Test*

The evaluator shall perform the following test(s) based on the selections chosen:

Test 1 [conditional]: If tunnel mode is selected, the evaluator uses the operational guidance to configure the TOE/platform to operate in tunnel mode and also configures a VPN gateway to operate in tunnel mode. The evaluator configures the TOE/platform and the VPN gateway to use any of the allowable cryptographic algorithms, authentication methods, etc. to ensure an allowable SA can be negotiated. The evaluator shall then initiate a connection from the client to connect to the VPN GW peer. The evaluator observes (for example, in the audit trail and the captured packets) that a successful connection was established using the tunnel mode.

Test 2 [conditional]: If transport mode is selected, the evaluator uses the operational guidance to configure the TOE/platform to operate in transport mode and also configures an IPsec peer to accept IPsec connections using transport mode. The evaluator configures the TOE/platform and the endpoint device to use any of the allowed cryptographic algorithms, authentication methods, etc. to ensure an allowable SA can be negotiated. The evaluator then initiates a connection from the TOE/platform to connect to the remote endpoint. The evaluator observes (for example, in the audit trail and the captured packets) that a successful connection was established using the transport mode.

Test 3 [conditional]: If both tunnel mode and transport mode are selected, the evaluator shall perform both Test 1 and Test 2 above, demonstrating that the TOE can be configured to support both modes.

Test 4 [conditional]: If both tunnel mode and transport mode are selected, the evaluator shall modify the testing for FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1 to include the supported mode for SPD PROTECT entries to show that they only apply to traffic that is transmitted or received using the indicated mode.

*FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.3*

*TSS*

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that the TSS provides a description of how a packet is processed against the SPD and that if no “rules” are found to match, that a final rule exists, either implicitly or explicitly, that causes the network packet to be discarded.

*Operational Guidance*

The evaluator checks that the operational guidance provides instructions on how to construct or acquire the SPD and uses the guidance to configure the TOE/platform for the following test.

*Test*

The evaluator shall perform the following test:

Test 1: The evaluator shall configure the SPD such that it has entries that contain operations that DISCARD, PROTECT, and (if applicable) BYPASS network packets. The evaluator may use the SPD that was created for verification of FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.1. The evaluator shall construct a network packet that matches a BYPASS entry and send that packet. The evaluator should observe that the network packet is passed to the proper destination interface with no modification. The evaluator shall then modify a field in the packet header; such that it no longer matches the evaluator-created entries (there may be a “TOE/platform created” final entry that discards packets that do not match any previous entries). The evaluator sends the packet, and observes that the packet was not permitted to flow to any of the TOE’s interfaces.

*FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.4*

*TSS*

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that the algorithms AES-GCM-128 and AES-GCM-256 are implemented. If the ST author has selected either AES-CBC-128 or AES-CBC-256 in the requirement, then the evaluator verifies the TSS describes these as well. In addition, the evaluator ensures that the SHA-based HMAC algorithm conforms to the algorithms specified in FCS\_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operations (for keyed-hash message authentication).

*Operational Guidance*

The evaluator checks the operational guidance to ensure it provides instructions on how the TOE is configured to use the algorithms selected in this component and whether this is performed through direct configuration, defined during initial installation, or defined by acquiring configuration settings from an environmental component.

*Test*

Test 1: The evaluator shall configure the TOE/platform as indicated in the operational guidance configuring the TOE/platform to using each of the AES-GCM-128, and AES-GCM-256 algorithms, and

attempt to establish a connection using ESP. If the ST Author has selected either AES-CBC-128 or AES-CBC-256, the TOE/platform is configured to use those algorithms and the evaluator attempts to establish a connection using ESP for those algorithms selected.

*FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.5<sup>32</sup>*

*TSS*

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that IKEv1 and/or IKEv2 are implemented. If IKEv1 is implemented, the evaluator shall verify that the TSS indicates whether or not XAUTH is supported, and that aggressive mode is not used for IKEv1 Phase 1 exchanges (i.e. only main mode is used) . It may be that these are configurable options.

*Operational Guidance*

The evaluator shall check the operational guidance to ensure it instructs the administrator how to configure the TOE/platform to use IKEv1 and/or IKEv2 (as selected), and uses the guidance to configure the TOE/platform to perform NAT traversal for the test below. If XAUTH is implemented, the evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance provides instructions on how it is enabled or disabled.

If the TOE supports IKEv1, the evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance either asserts that only main mode is used for Phase 1 exchanges, or provides instructions for disabling aggressive mode.

*Test*

Test 1: The evaluator shall configure the TOE/platform so that it will perform NAT traversal processing as described in the TSS and RFC 7296, section 2.23. The evaluator shall initiate an IPsec connection and determine that the NAT is successfully traversed. If the TOE/platform supports IKEv1 with or without XAUTH, the evaluator shall verify that this test can be successfully repeated with XAUTH enabled and disabled in the manner specified by the operational guidance. If the TOE/platform only supports IKEv1 with XAUTH, the evaluator shall verify that connections not using XAUTH are unsuccessful. If the TOE/platform only supports IKEv1 without XAUTH, the evaluator shall verify that connections using XAUTH are unsuccessful.

~~The evaluator shall configure the TOE/platform so that it will perform NAT traversal processing as described in the TSS and RFC 7296, section 2.23. The evaluator shall initiate an IPsec connection and determine that the NAT is successfully traversed. If XAUTH is supported, the evaluator shall verify that this test can be repeated with XAUTH both enabled and disabled in the manner specified by the operational guidance.~~

Test 2 [conditional]: If the TOE supports IKEv1, the evaluator shall perform any applicable operational guidance steps to disable the use of aggressive mode and then attempt to establish a connection using an IKEv1 Phase 1 connection in aggressive mode. This attempt should fail. The evaluator shall show that the TOE/platform will reject a VPN gateway from initiating an IKEv1 Phase 1 connection in aggressive mode. The evaluator should then show that main mode exchanges are supported.

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<sup>32</sup> This extended package assurance activity was modified as part of NIAP Technical Decision [379](#).

*FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.6*

*TSS*

The evaluator shall ensure the TSS identifies the algorithms used for encrypting the IKEv1 and/or IKEv2 payload, and that the algorithms AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 are specified, and if others are chosen in the selection of the requirement, those are included in the TSS discussion.

*Operational Guidance*

The evaluator checks the operational guidance to ensure it provides instructions on how the TOE is configured to use the algorithms selected in this component and whether this is performed through direct configuration, defined during initial installation, or defined by acquiring configuration settings from an environmental component.

*Test*

The evaluator shall use the operational guidance to configure the TOE/platform (or to configure the Operational Environment to have the TOE receive configuration) to perform the following test for each ciphersuite selected:

Test 1: The evaluator shall configure the TOE/platform to use the ciphersuite under test to encrypt the IKEv1 and/or IKEv2 payload and establish a connection with a peer device, which is configured to only accept the payload encrypted using the indicated ciphersuite. The evaluator will confirm the algorithm was that used in the negotiation. The evaluator will confirm that the connection is successful by confirming that data can be passed through the connection once it is established. For example, the evaluator may connect to a webpage on the remote network and verify that it can be reached.

*FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.7*

*TSS*

There are no TSS Assurance Activities for this requirement.

*Operational Guidance*

The evaluator shall check the operational guidance to ensure it provides instructions on how the TOE configures the values for SA lifetimes. In addition, the evaluator shall check that the guidance has the option for either the Administrator or VPN Gateway to configure Phase 1 SAs if time-based limits are supported. Currently there are no values mandated for the number of packets or number of bytes, the evaluator shall simply check the operational guidance to ensure that this can be configured if selected in the requirement.

*Test*

When testing this functionality, the evaluator needs to ensure that both sides are configured appropriately. From the RFC "A difference between IKEv1 and IKEv2 is that in IKEv1 SA lifetimes were negotiated. In IKEv2, each end of the SA is responsible for enforcing its own lifetime policy on the SA and rekeying the SA when necessary. If the two ends have different lifetime policies, the end with the shorter lifetime will end up always being the one to request the rekeying. If the two ends have the same lifetime policies, it is possible that both will initiate a rekeying at the same time (which will result in

redundant SAs). To reduce the probability of this happening, the timing of rekeying requests SHOULD be jittered.”

Each of the following tests shall be performed for each version of IKE selected in the FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.5 protocol selection:

Test 1 [conditional]: The evaluator shall configure a maximum lifetime in terms of the # of packets (or bytes) allowed following the operational guidance. The evaluator shall establish an SA and determine that once the allowed # of packets (or bytes) through this SA is exceeded, the connection is closed.

Test 2 [conditional]: The evaluator shall construct a test where a Phase 1 SA is established and attempted to be maintained for more than 24 hours before it is renegotiated. The evaluator shall observe that this SA is closed or renegotiated in 24 hours or less. If such an action requires that the TOE be configured in a specific way, the evaluator shall implement tests demonstrating that the configuration capability of the TOE works as documented in the operational guidance.

Test 3 [conditional]: The evaluator shall perform a test similar to Test 2 for Phase 2 SAs, except that the lifetime will be 8 hours or less instead of 24 hours or less.

Test 4 [conditional]: If a fixed limit for IKEv1 SAs is supported, the evaluator shall establish an SA and observe that the connection is closed after the fixed traffic and/or time value is reached.

#### *FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.8*

##### *TSS*

The evaluator shall check to ensure that the DH groups specified in the requirement are listed as being supported in the TSS. If there is more than one DH group supported, the evaluator checks to ensure the TSS describes how a particular DH group is specified/negotiated with a peer.

##### *Operational Guidance*

There are no AGD Assurance Activities for this requirement.

##### *Test*

The evaluator shall perform the following test:

Test 1: For each supported DH group, the evaluator shall test to ensure that all supported IKE protocols can be successfully completed using that particular DH group.

#### *FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.9*

##### *TSS*

The evaluator shall check to ensure that, for each DH group supported, the TSS describes the process for generating "x" (as defined in FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.9) and each nonce. The evaluator shall verify that the TSS indicates that the random number generated that meets the requirements in this EP is used, and that the length of "x" and the nonces meet the stipulations in the requirement.

##### *Operational Guidance*

There are no AGD Assurance Activities for this requirement.

*Test*

There are no test Assurance Activities for this requirement.

*FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.10*

Assurance Activities for this element are tested through Assurance Activities for FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.9.

*FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.11*<sup>33</sup>

*TSS*

The evaluator ensures that the TSS identifies RSA and/or ECDSA as being used to perform peer authentication.

If pre-shared keys are chosen in the selection, the evaluator shall check to ensure that the TSS describes how pre-shared keys are established and used in authentication of IPsec connections. The description in the TSS shall also indicate how pre-shared key establishment is accomplished for TOEs/platforms that can generate a pre-shared key as well as TOEs/platforms that simply use a pre-shared key.

The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes how the TOE compares the peer's presented identifier to the reference identifier. This description shall include whether the certificate presented identifier is compared to the ID payload presented identifier, which field(s) of the certificate are used as the presented identifier (DN, Common Name, or SAN), and, if multiple fields are supported, the logical order comparison. If the ST author assigned an additional identifier type, the TSS description shall also include a description of that type and the method by which that type is compared to the peer's presented certificate.

*Operational Guidance*

The evaluator shall check that the operational guidance describes how pre-shared keys are to be generated and established.

The evaluator ensures the operational guidance describes how to set up the TOE/platform to use the cryptographic algorithms RSA and/or ECDSA.

In order to construct the environment and configure the TOE/platform for the following tests, the evaluator will ensure that the operational guidance also describes how to configure the TOE/platform to connect to a trusted CA, and ensure a valid certificate for that CA is loaded into the TOE/platform as a trusted CA.

The evaluator shall also ensure that the operational guidance includes the configuration of the reference identifier(s) for the peer.

*Test*

For efficiency's sake, the testing that is performed here has been combined with the testing for FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1 (for IPsec connections), FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.12, FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.13 and FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.3. The following tests shall be repeated for each peer authentication protocol selected in the FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.11 selection above:

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<sup>33</sup> This extended package assurance activity was modified as part of NIAP Technical Decision [379](#).

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Test 1: The evaluator shall have the TOE/platform generate a public-private key pair, and submit a CSR (Certificate Signing Request) to a CA (trusted by both the TOE/platform and the peer VPN used to establish a connection) for its signature. The values for the DN (Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, and Country) will also be passed in the request. Alternatively, the evaluator may import to the TOE/platform a previously generated private key and corresponding certificate.

Test 2: The evaluator shall configure the TOE to use a private key and associated certificate signed by a trusted CA and shall establish an IPsec connection with the peer.

~~The evaluator shall use a certificate signed using the RSA or ECDSA algorithm to authenticate the remote peer during the IKE exchange. This test ensures the remote peer has the certificate for the trusted CA that signed the TOE's certificate and it will do a bit-wise comparison on the DN. This bit-wise comparison of the DN ensures that not only does the peer have a certificate signed by the trusted CA, but the certificate is from the DN that is expected. The evaluator will configure the TOE/platform to associate a certificate (e.g., a certificate map in some implementations) with a VPN connection. This is what the DN is checked against.~~

Test 3: The evaluator shall test that the TOE/platform can properly handle revoked certificates – conditional on whether CRL or OCSP is selected; if both are selected, and then a test is performed for each method. For this draft of the PP-Module, the evaluator has to only test one up in the trust chain (future drafts may require to ensure the validation is done up the entire chain). The evaluator shall ensure that a valid certificate is used, and that the SA is established. The evaluator then attempts the test with a certificate that will be revoked (for each method chosen in the selection) to ensure when the certificate is no longer valid that the TOE/platform will not establish an SA.

~~Test 4 [conditional]: The evaluator shall test that given a signed certificate from a trusted CA, that when the DN does not match – any of the four fields can be modified such that they do not match the expected value, that an SA does not get established.~~

Test 5 [conditional]: The evaluator shall generate a pre-shared key and use it, as indicated in the operational guidance, to establish an IPsec connection with the VPN GW peer. If the generation of the pre-shared key is supported, the evaluator shall ensure that establishment of the key is carried out for an instance of the TOE/platform generating the key as well as an instance of the TOE/platform merely taking in and using the key.

For each supported identifier type (excluding DN), the evaluator shall repeat the following tests:

Test 6: For each field of the certificate supported for comparison, the evaluator shall configure the peer's reference identifier on the TOE (per the administrative guidance) to match the field in the peer's presented certificate and shall verify that the IKE authentication succeeds.

Test 7: For each field of the certificate support for comparison, the evaluator shall configure the peer's reference identifier on the TOE (per the administrative guidance) to not match the field in the peer's presented certificate and shall verify that the IKE authentication fails.

The following tests are conditional:

Test 8 [conditional]: If, according to the TSS, the TOE supports both Common Name and SAN certificate fields and uses the preferred logic outlined in the Application Note, the tests above with the Common

Name field shall be performed using peer certificates with no SAN extension. Additionally, the evaluator shall configure the peer's reference identifier on the TOE to not match the SAN in the peer's presented certificate but to match the Common Name in the peer's presented certificate, and verify that the IKE authentication fails.

Test 9 [conditional]: If the TOE supports DN identifier types, the evaluator shall configure the peer's reference identifier on the TOE (per the administrative guidance) to match the subject DN in the peer's presented certificate and shall verify that the IKE authentication succeeds. To demonstrate a bit-wise comparison of the DN, the evaluator shall change a single bit in the DN (preferably, in an Object Identifier (OID) in the DN) and verify that the IKE authentication fails. **To demonstrate a comparison of DN values, the evaluator shall change any one of the four DN values and verify that the IKE authentication fails.**

Test 10 [conditional]: If the TOE supports both IPv4 and IPv6 and supports IP address identifier types, the evaluator must repeat test 1 and 2 with both IPv4 address identifiers and IPv6 identifiers. Additionally, the evaluator shall verify that the TOE verifies that the IP header matches the identifiers by setting the presented identifiers and the reference identifier with the same IP address that differs from the actual IP address of the peer in the IP headers and verifying that the IKE authentication fails.

Test 11 [conditional]: If, according to the TSS, the TOE performs comparisons between the peer's ID payload and the peer's certificate, the evaluator shall repeat the following test for each combination of supported identifier types and supported certificate fields (as above). The evaluator shall configure the peer to present a different ID payload than the field in the peer's presented certificate and verify that the TOE fails to authenticate the IKE peer.

#### *FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.12*

Assurance Activities for this element are tested through Assurance Activities for FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.11.

#### *FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.13*

Assurance Activities for this element are tested through Assurance Activities for FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.11.

#### *FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.14*

##### *TSS*

The evaluator shall check that the TSS describes the potential strengths (in terms of the number of bits in the symmetric key) of the algorithms that are allowed for the IKE and ESP exchanges. The TSS shall also describe the checks that are done when negotiating IKEv1 Phase 2 and/or IKEv2 CHILD\_SA suites to ensure that the strength (in terms of the number of bits of key in the symmetric algorithm) of the negotiated algorithm is less than or equal to that of the IKE SA this is protecting the negotiation.

##### *Operational Guidance*

There are no AGD Assurance Activities for this requirement.

##### *Test*

The evaluator follows the guidance to configure the TOE/platform to perform the following tests.



Test 1: This test shall be performed for each version of IKE supported. The evaluator shall successfully negotiate an IPsec connection using each of the supported algorithms and hash functions identified in the requirements.

Test 2 [conditional]: This test shall be performed for each version of IKE supported. The evaluator shall attempt to establish an SA for ESP that selects an encryption algorithm with more strength than that being used for the IKE SA (i.e., symmetric algorithm with a key size larger than that being used for the IKE SA). Such attempts should fail.

Test 3: This test shall be performed for each version of IKE supported. The evaluator shall attempt to establish an IKE SA using an algorithm that is not one of the supported algorithms and hash functions identified in the requirements. Such an attempt should fail.

Test 4: This test shall be performed for each version of IKE supported. The evaluator shall attempt to establish an SA for ESP (assumes the proper parameters were used to establish the IKE SA) that selects an encryption algorithm that is not identified in FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.4. Such an attempt should fail.

### **5.2.4.3 User Data Protection (FDP)**

#### **5.2.4.3.1 Subset Information Flow Control (FDP\_IFC\_EXT.1(IPSEC))**

**Application Note:** FDP\_IFC\_EXT.1(IPSEC) corresponds to FDP\_IFC\_EXT.1 in the IPsec EP.

#### *TSS*

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS section of the ST describes the routing of IP traffic through processes on the TSF when a VPN client is enabled. The evaluator shall ensure that the description indicates which traffic does not go through the VPN and which traffic does and that a configuration exists for each baseband protocol in which only the traffic identified by the ST author as necessary for establishing the VPN connection (IKE traffic and perhaps HTTPS or DNS traffic) is not encapsulated by the VPN protocol (IPsec). The ST author shall also identify in the TSS section any differences in the routing of IP traffic when using any supported baseband protocols (e.g. Wi-Fi or, LTE).

#### *Operational Guidance*

The evaluator shall verify that the following is addressed by the documentation:

- The description above indicates that if a VPN client is enabled, all configurations route all IP traffic (other than IP traffic required to establish the VPN connection) through the VPN client.
- The AGD guidance describes how the user and/or administrator can configure the TSF to meet this requirement.

#### *Test*

The evaluator shall perform the following test:

Step 1 - The evaluator shall use the platform to enable a network connection without using IPsec. The evaluator shall use a packet sniffing tool between the platform and an Internet-connected network. The evaluator shall turn on the sniffing tool and perform actions with the device such as navigating to websites, using provided applications, accessing other Internet resources (Use Case 1), accessing another VPN client (Use Case 2), or accessing an IPsec-capable network device (Use Case 3). The

evaluator shall verify that the sniffing tool captures the traffic generated by these actions, turn off the sniffing tool, and save the session data.

Step 2 - The evaluator shall configure an IPsec VPN client that supports the routing specified in this requirement, and if necessary, configure the device to perform the routing specified as described in the AGD guidance. The evaluator shall turn on the sniffing tool, establish the VPN connection, and perform the same actions with the device as performed in the first step. The evaluator shall verify that the sniffing tool captures traffic generated by these actions, turn off the sniffing tool, and save the session data.

Step 3 - The evaluator shall examine the traffic from both step one and step two to verify that all IP traffic, aside from and after traffic necessary for establishing the VPN (such as IKE, DNS, and possibly HTTPS), is encapsulated by IPsec.

Step 4 - The evaluator shall attempt to send packets to the TOE outside the VPN connection and shall verify that the TOE discards them.

#### 5.2.4.3.2 Full Residual Information Protection (FDP\_RIP.2)

TSS

##### **Requirement met by the platform**

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) the extent to which the client processes network packets and addresses the FDP\_RIP.2 requirement.

##### **Requirement met by the TOE**

“Resources” in the context of this requirement are network packets being sent through (as opposed to “to”, as is the case when a security administrator connects to the TOE) the TOE. The concern is that once a network packet is sent, the buffer or memory area used by the packet still contains data from that packet, and that if that buffer is re-used, those data might remain and make their way into a new packet. The evaluator shall check to ensure that the TSS describes packet processing to the extent that they can determine that no data will be reused when processing network packets. The evaluator shall ensure that this description at a minimum describes how the previous data are zeroized/overwritten, and at what point in the buffer processing this occurs.

##### *Operational Guidance*

There are no AGD Assurance Activities for this requirement.

##### *Test*

There are no test Assurance Activities for this requirement.

#### 5.2.4.4 Identification & Authentication (FIA)

##### 5.2.4.4.1 Pre-Shared Key Composition (FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1)

TSS

The evaluator shall also examine the TSS to ensure it describes the process by which the bit-based pre-shared keys are generated (if the TOE supports this functionality), and confirm that this process uses the RBG specified in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.

**Requirement met by the platform**

For each platform listed in the ST, the evaluator shall examine the ST of the platform to ensure that the functions associated with pre-shared keys claimed in that platform's ST contains the same functions specified in the VPN Client's ST. If the TOE does not perform any management or input of the pre-shared keys then no further activity is required.

**Requirement met by the TOE**

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it states that text-based pre-shared keys of 22 characters are supported. The evaluator shall also confirm that the TSS states the conditioning that takes place to transform the text-based pre-shared key from the key sequence entered by the user (e.g., ASCII representation) to the bit string used by IPsec, and that this conditioning is consistent with the FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.3.

*Operational Guidance*

If the TOE supports bit-based pre-shared keys, the evaluator shall confirm the operational guidance contains instructions for either entering bit-based pre-shared keys for each protocol identified in the requirement, or generating a bit-based pre-shared key (or both). The evaluator shall also examine the TSS to ensure it describes the process by which the bit-based pre-shared keys are generated (if the TOE supports this functionality), and confirm that this process uses the RBG specified in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.

The evaluator shall check that any management functions related to pre-shared keys that are performed by the TOE are specified in the operational guidance.

**Requirement met by the TOE**

The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to determine that it provides guidance on the composition of strong text-based pre-shared keys, and (if the selection indicates keys of various lengths can be entered) that it provides information on the merits of shorter or longer pre-shared keys. The guidance must specify the allowable characters for pre-shared keys, and that list must include, at minimum, the same items contained in FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.2.

*Test*

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

Test 1: The evaluator shall compose a pre-shared key of 22 characters that contains a combination of the allowed characters in accordance with the operational guidance, and demonstrates that a successful protocol negotiation can be performed with the key.

Test 2 [conditional]: If the TOE supports pre-shared keys of multiple lengths, the evaluator shall repeat Test 1 using the minimum length; the maximum length; and invalid lengths that are below the minimum length, above the maximum length, null length, empty length, or zero length. The minimum and maximum length tests should be successful, and the invalid lengths must be rejected by the TOE.

Test 3 [conditional]: If the TOE supports but does not generate bit-based pre-shared keys, the evaluator shall obtain a bit-based pre-shared key of the appropriate length and enter it per the instructions in the operational guidance. The evaluator shall then demonstrate that a successful protocol negotiation can be performed with the key.

Test 4 [conditional]: If the TOE does generate bit-based pre-shared keys, the evaluator shall generate a bit-based pre-shared key of the appropriate length and use it according to the instructions in the operational guidance. The evaluator shall then demonstrate that a successful protocol negotiation can be performed with the key.

#### 5.2.4.4.2 X.509 Certificate Use and Management (FIA\_X509\_EXT.3)

The Assurance Activities below apply to FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.2. FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.1 is evaluated as part of FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1 (and conditionally as part of FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 and/or FPT\_TST\_EXT.1) and FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.3 is evaluated as part of FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.11.

##### *TSS*

The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that it describes whether the VPN client or the OS implements the certificate validation functionality, how the VPN client/OS chooses which certificates to use, and any necessary instructions in the administrative guidance for configuring the OS so that desired certificates can be used.

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to confirm that it describes the behavior of the client/OS when a connection cannot be established during the validity check of a certificate used in establishing a trusted channel.

##### *Operational Guidance*

If the requirement that the administrator is able to specify the default action, then the evaluator shall ensure that the operational guidance contains instructions on how this configuration action is performed.

##### *Test*

The evaluator shall perform the following test regardless of whether the certificate validation functionality is implemented by the VPN client or by the OS:

Test 1: The evaluator shall demonstrate that using a valid certificate that requires certificate validation checking to be performed in at least some part by communicating with a non-TOE IT entity. The evaluator shall then manipulate the environment so that the TOE is unable to verify the validity of the certificate, and observe that the action selected in FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.2 is performed. If the selected action is administrator-configurable, then the evaluator shall follow the operational guidance to determine that all supported administrator-configurable options behave in their documented manner.

#### 5.2.4.5 Security Management (FMT)

##### 5.2.4.5.1 Specification of Management Functions (VPN) (FMT\_SMF.1(VPN))

**Application Note:** FMT\_SMF.1(VPN) corresponds to FMT\_SMF.1/VPN in the IPsec EP.

##### *TSS*

The evaluator shall check to ensure the TSS describes the client credentials and how they are used by the TOE.

*Operational Guidance*

The evaluator shall check to make sure that every management function mandated in the ST for this requirement are described in the operational guidance and that the description contains the information required to perform the management duties associated with each management function.

*Test*

The evaluator shall test the TOE's ability to provide the management functions by configuring the TOE according to the operational guidance and testing each management activity listed in the ST.

The evaluator shall ensure that all management functions claimed in the ST can be performed by completing activities described in the AGD. Note that this may be performed in the course of completing other testing.

**5.2.4.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)**

**5.2.4.6.1 Self-Test (FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 (IPSEC))**

**Application Note:** FPT\_TST\_EXT.1(IPSEC) corresponds to FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 in the IPsec EP.

Except for where it is explicitly noted, the evaluator is expected to check the following information regardless of whether the functionality is implemented by the TOE or by the TOE platform.

*TSS*

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it details the self-tests that are run by the TSF on start-up; this description should include an outline of what the tests are actually doing (e.g., rather than saying "memory is tested", a description similar to "memory is tested by writing a value to each memory location and reading it back to ensure it is identical to what was written" shall be used). The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS makes an argument that the tests are sufficient to demonstrate that the TSF is operating correctly. If some of the tests are performed by the TOE platform, the evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that those tests are identified, and that the ST for each platform contains a description of those tests. Note that the tests that are required by this component are those that support security functionality in this PP-Module, which may not correspond to the set of all self-tests contained in the platform STs.

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it describes how the integrity of stored TSF executable code is cryptographically verified when it is loaded for execution. The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS makes an argument that the tests are sufficient to demonstrate that the integrity of stored TSF executable code has not been compromised. The evaluator shall check to ensure that the cryptographic requirements listed are consistent with the description of the integrity verification process.

The evaluator also ensures that the TSS (or the operational guidance) describes the actions that take place for successful (e.g. hash verified) and unsuccessful (e.g., hash not verified) cases. For checks

implemented entirely by the platform, the evaluator ensures that the operational guidance for the TOE references or includes the platform-specific guidance for each platform listed in the ST.

*Operational Guidance*

If not present in the TSS, the evaluator ensures that the operational guidance describes the actions that take place for successful (e.g. hash verified) and unsuccessful (e.g., hash not verified) cases. For checks implemented entirely by the platform, the evaluator ensures that the operational guidance for the TOE references or includes the platform-specific guidance for each platform listed in the ST.

*Test*

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

Test 1: The evaluator performs the integrity check on a known good TSF executable and verifies that the check is successful.

Test 2: The evaluator modifies the TSF executable, performs the integrity check on the modified TSF executable and verifies that the check fails.

**5.2.4.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)**

**5.2.4.7.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (FTP\_ITC.1(IPSEC))**

**Application Note:** FTP\_ITC.1(IPSEC) corresponds to FTP\_ITC.1 in the IPsec EP.

*TSS*

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it describes the details of the TOE connecting to a VPN gateway and/or VPN client and/or IPsec-capable network device in terms of the cryptographic protocols specified in the requirement, along with TOE-specific options or procedures that might not be reflected in the specification. The evaluator shall also confirm that all protocols listed in the TSS are specified and included in the requirements in the ST.

*Operational Guidance*

The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for establishing the connection to a VPN gateway and/or VPN client and/or IPsec-capable network device, and that it contains recovery instructions should a connection be unintentionally broken.

*Test*

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

Test 1: The evaluators shall ensure that the TOE is able to initiate communications with a VPN gateway and/or VPN client and/or IPsec-capable network device using the protocols specified in the requirement, setting up the connections as described in the operational guidance and ensuring that communication is successful.

Test 2: The evaluator shall ensure, for each communication channel with an IPsec peer, the channel data is not sent in plaintext.

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Test 3: The evaluator shall ensure, for each communication channel with an IPsec peer, modification of the channel data is detected by the TOE.

Test 4: The evaluators shall physically interrupt the connection from the TOE to the IPsec peer. The evaluators shall ensure that subsequent communications are appropriately protected, at a minimum in the case of any attempts to automatically resume the connection or connect to a new access point.

Further Assurance Activities are associated with requirements for FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.

## 6 TOE Summary Specification (TSS)

This chapter describes the Windows security functions that satisfy the security functional requirements of the protection profile. The TOE also includes additional relevant security functions which are also described in the following sections, as well as a mapping to the security functional requirements satisfied by the TOE.

This section presents the TOE Security Functions (TSFs) and a mapping of security functions to Security Functional Requirements (SFRs). The TOE performs the following security functions:

- Audit
- Cryptographic Support
- User Data Protection
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE Access
- Trusted Channels

### 6.1 Audit

The TOE Audit security function performs:

- Audit Collection
- Selective Audit
- Audit Log Overflow Protection
- Audit Log Restricted Access Protection

#### 6.1.1 Audit Collection

The Windows Event Log service creates the security event log, which contains security relevant audit records collected on a system, along with other event logs which are also registered by other audit entry providers. The Local Security Authority (LSA) server collects audit events from all other parts of the TSF and forwards them to the Windows Event Log service which will place the event into the log for the appropriate provider. While there is no size limit for a single audit record, the authorized administrator can specify a limit for the size of each event log. For each audit event, the Windows Event Log service stores the following data in each audit entry:

**Table 20 Standard Fields in a Windows Audit Entry**

Field in Audit Entry	Description
<b>Date</b>	The date the event occurred.
<b>Time</b>	The time the event occurred.
<b>User</b>	The security identifier (SID) of that represents the user on whose behalf the event occurred that represents the user.
<b>Event ID</b>	A unique number within the audit category that identifies the specific audit event.



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<b>Source</b>	The Windows component that generated the audit event.
<b>Outcome</b>	Indicates whether the security audit event recorded is the result of a successful or failed attempt to perform the action.
<b>Category</b>	The type of the event defined by the event source.

The LSA service defines the following categories for audit events in the security log:

- System,
- Logon / Logoff
- Object Access
- Directory Service Access
- Privilege Use
- Detailed Process Tracking
- Policy Change
- Account Management
- Account Logon

Each audit entry may also contain category-specific data that is contained in the body of the entry as described below:

- For the System Category, the audit entry includes information relating to the system such as the time the audit trail was cleared, start or shutdown of the audit function, and startup and shutdown of Windows. Furthermore, the specific cryptographic operation is identified when such operations are audited.
- For the Logon and Account Logon Category, the audit entry includes the reason the attempted logon failed.
- For the Object Access and the Directory Service Access Category, the audit entry includes the object name and the desired access requested.
- For the Privilege Use Category, the audit entry identifies the privilege.
- For the Detailed Process Tracking Category, the audit event includes the process identifier.
- For the Policy Change and Account Management Category, the audit event includes the new values of the policy or account attributes.
- For the Account Logon Category, the audit event includes the logon type that indicates the source of the logon attempt as one of the following types in the audit record:
  - Interactive (local logon)
  - Network (logon from the network)
  - Service (logon as a service)
  - Batch (logon as a batch job)
  - Unlock (for Unlock screen saver)
  - Network\_ClearText (for anonymous authentication to IIS)

There are two places within the TSF where security audit events are collected. Inside the kernel, the Security Reference Monitor (SRM), a part of the NT Executive, is responsible for generation of all audit

entries for the object access, privilege use, and detailed process tracking event categories. Windows components can request the SRM to generate an audit record and supply all of the elements in the audit record except for the system time, which the Executive provides. With one exception, audit events for the other event categories are generated by various services that either co-exist in the LSA server or call, with the SeAuditPrivilege privilege, the Authz Report Audit interfaces implemented in the LSA Policy subcomponent. The exception is that the Event Log Service itself records an event record when the security log is cleared and when the security log exceeds the warning level configured by the authorized administrator.

The LSA server maintains an audit policy in its database that determines which categories of events are actually collected. Defining and modifying the audit policy is restricted to the authorized administrator. The authorized administrator can select events to be audited by selecting the category or categories to be audited. An authorized administrator can individually select each category. Those services in the security process determine the current audit policy via direct local function calls. The only other TSF component that uses the audit policy is the SRM in order to record object access, privilege use, and detailed tracking audit. LSA and the SRM share a private local connection port, which is used to pass the audit policy to the SRM. When an authorized administrator changes the audit policy, the LSA updates its database and notifies the SRM. The SRM receives a control flag indicating if auditing is enabled and a data structure indicating that the events in particular categories to audit.

In addition to the system-wide audit policy configuration, it is possible to define a per-user audit policy using auditpol.exe. This allows individual audit categories (of success or failure) to be enabled or disabled on a per user basis.<sup>34</sup> The per-user audit policy refines the system-wide audit policy with a more precise definition of the audit policy for which events will be audited for a specific user.

Within each category, auditing can be performed based on success, failure, or both. For object access events, auditing can be further controlled based on user/group identify and access rights using System Access Control Lists (SACLs). SACLs are associated with objects and indicate whether or not auditing for a specific object, or object attribute, is enabled.

### 6.1.2 SFR Summary

- **FAU\_GEN.1, FAU\_GEN.1(IPSEC):** The TOE audit collection is capable of generating audit events for items identified in section 5.1.1.1 and 5.1.1.2. For each audit event the TSF records the date, time, user Security Identifier (SID) or name, logon type (for logon audit records), event ID, source, type, and category.
- **FAU\_SEL.1:** The TSF provides the ability for the authorized administrator to select the events to be audited based upon object identity, user identity, workstation (host identity), event type, and success or failure of the event.

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<sup>34</sup> Windows will prevent a local administrator from disabling auditing for local administrator accounts. If an administrator can bypass auditing, they can avoid accountability for such actions as exfiltrating files without authorization.

## 6.2 Cryptographic Support

### 6.2.1 Cryptographic Algorithms and Operations

The Cryptography API: Next Generation (CNG) API is designed to be extensible at many levels and agnostic to cryptographic algorithm suites. Windows uses CNG exclusively for its own encryption needs and provides public APIs for external developers. An important feature of CNG is its native implementation of the Suite B algorithms, including algorithms for AES (128, 192, 256 key sizes)<sup>35</sup>, the SHA-1 and SHA-2 family (SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512) of hashing algorithms, elliptic curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH), and elliptical curve DSA (ECDSA) over the NIST-standard prime curves P-256, P-384, and P-521.

Protocols such as the Internet Key Exchange (IKE), and Transport Layer Security (TLS), make use of elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) included in Suite B as well as hashing functions.

Deterministic random bit generation (DRBG) is implemented in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-90. Windows generates random bits by taking the output of a cascade of two SP800-90 AES-256 counter mode based DRBGs in kernel-mode and four cascaded SP800-90 AES-256 DRBGs in user-mode; programmatic callers can choose to obtain either 128 or 256 bits from the RBG which is seeded from the Windows entropy pool. Windows has different entropy sources (deterministic and nondeterministic) which produce entropy data that is used for random numbers generation. In particular, this entropy data together with other data (such as the nonce) seed the DRBG algorithm. The entropy pool is populated using the following values:

- An initial entropy value from a seed file provided to the Windows OS Loader at boot time (512 bits of entropy).<sup>36</sup>
- A calculated value based on the high-resolution CPU cycle counter which fires after every 1024 interrupts (a continuous source providing 16384 bits of entropy).
- Random values gathered periodically from the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), (320 bits of entropy on boot, 384 bits thereafter on demand based on an OS timer).
- Random values gathered periodically by calling the RDRAND CPU instruction, (256 bits of entropy).

The entropy data is obtained from the entropy sources in a raw format and is health-tested before using it as input for the DRBG. The main source of entropy in the system is the CPU cycle counter which continuously tracks hardware interrupts. This serves as a sufficient health test; if the computer were not accumulating hardware and software interrupts it would not be running and therefore there would be no need for any entropy to seed, or reseed, the random bit generator. In the same manner, a failure of the TPM chip or the RDRAND instruction for the processor would be a critical error that halts the computer, effectively serving as an on-demand self-test.<sup>37</sup> In addition, when the user chooses to follow

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<sup>35</sup> Note that the 192-bit key size is not used by Windows but is available to developers.

<sup>36</sup> The Windows OS Loader implements a SP 800-90 AES-CTR-DRBG and passes along 384 bits of entropy to the kernel for CNG to be use during initialization. This DBRG uses the same algorithms to obtain entropy from the CPU cycle counter, TPM, and RDRAND as described above.

<sup>37</sup> In other words, the expected result from the CPU cycle counter, the RDRAND instruction, and the TPM RBG is an apparently random value which will be used as an input to seed the RBG.

the CC administrative guidance, which includes operating Windows in the FIPS validated mode, it will run FIPS 140 AES-256 Counter Mode DRBG Known Answer Tests (instantiate, generate) on start-up. Windows always runs the SP 800-90-mandated self-tests for AES-CTR-DRBG during a reseed when the user chooses to operate Windows in the FIPS validated mode.<sup>38</sup>

Each entropy source is independent of the other sources and does not depend on time. The CPU cycle counter inputs vary by environmental conditions such as data received on a network interface card, key presses on a keyboard, mouse movement and clicks, and touch input.

The TSF defends against tampering of the random number generation (RNG) / pseudorandom number generation (PRNG) sources by encapsulating its use in Kernel Security Device Driver. The interface for the Windows random number generator is [BCryptGenRandom](#).

The CNG provider for random number generation is the AES\_CTR\_DRBG, when Windows requires the use of a salt it uses the Windows RBG.

The encryption and decryption operations are performed by independent modules, known as Cryptographic Service Providers (CSPs). Windows generates symmetric keys (AES keys) using the FIPS Approved random number generator.

In addition to encryption and decryption services, the TSF provides other cryptographic operations such as hashing and digital signatures. Hashing is used by other FIPS Approved algorithms implemented in Windows (the hashed message authentication code, RSA, DSA, and EC DSA signature services, Diffie-Hellman and elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement, and random bit generation). When Windows needs to establish an RSA-based shared secret key it can act both as a sender or recipient, any decryption errors which occur during key establishment are presented to the user at a highly abstracted level, such as a failure to connect.

## 6.2.2 Cryptographic Algorithm Validation

**Table 21 Windows Cryptographic Algorithm Standards and Evaluation Methods**

Cryptographic Operation	Standard	Requirement	Evaluation Method
<b>Encryption/Decryption</b>	FIPS 197 AES	FCS_COP.1(SYM)	NIST CAVP # C1363, # C1364, # C1365, # C1368
	NIST SP 800-38A CBC mode		# C1363, # C1368
	NIST SP 800-38C CCM mode		# C1363, # C1364
	NIST SP 800-38E XTS mode		# C1363
	NIST SP 800-38F KW mode		# C1365

<sup>38</sup> Running Windows in FIPS validated mode is required according to the administrative guidance.

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	NIST SP 800-38D GCM mode		# C1363
<b>Digital signature (key generation)</b>	FIPS 186-4 RSA	FCS_CKM.1	NIST CAVP # C1363, # C1366
<b>Digital signature (generation)</b>	FIPS 186-4 RSA	FCS_COP.1(SIGN)	NIST CAVP # C1363, # C1366, # C1368
<b>Digital signature (verification)</b>	FIPS 186-4 RSA	FCS_COP.1(SIGN)	NIST CAVP # C1363, # C1366, C1367, # C1368
<b>Digital signature (generation and verification)</b>	FIPS 186-4 DSA	Added as a prerequisite of NIST CAVP KAS # C1363	NIST CAVP # C1363
<b>Digital signature (key generation)</b>	FIPS 186-4 ECDSA	FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.1(WLAN)	NIST CAVP # C1363, # C1366, # C1368
<b>Digital signature (key generation, signature generation and verification)</b>	FIPS 186-4 ECDSA	FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.1(WLAN)	NIST CAVP # C1363, # C1366
<b>Hashing</b>	FIPS 180-4 SHA-1 and SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	FCS_COP.1 (HASH)	NIST CAVP # C1363
<b>Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code</b>	FIPS 198-2 HMAC	FCS_COP.1(HMAC)	NIST CAVP # C1363, # C1368
<b>Random number generation</b>	NIST SP 800-90 CTR_DRBG	FCS_RBG_EXT.1	NIST CAVP # C1363, # C1368
<b>Key agreement</b>	NIST SP 800-56A ECDH	FCS_CKM.2	NIST CAVP # C1363, # C1368
<b>Key establishment</b>	NIST SP 800-56B RSA	FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM.2(WLAN)	NIST CVL # C1363, # C1366, Tested by the CC evaluation lab <sup>39</sup>
<b>Key-based key derivation</b>	SP800-108		NIST CAVP # C1363, # C1365, # C1368
<b>IKEv1</b>	SP800-135	FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1	NIST CAVP # C1363
<b>IKEv2</b>	SP800-135	FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1	NIST CAVP # C1363
<b>TLS</b>	SP800-135	FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2(WLAN) FCS_TLSC_EXT.3, FCS_TLSC_EXT.4, FCS_DTLS_EXT.1	NIST CAVP # C1363

<sup>39</sup> The test results are described in the evaluation and Assurance Activity Report.

CNG includes a user-mode key isolation service designed specifically to host secret and private keys in a protected process to mitigate tampering or access to sensitive key materials for user-mode processes. CNG performs a key error detection check on each transfer of key (internal and intermediate transfers). CNG prevents archiving of expired (private) signature keys and destroys non-persistent cryptographic keys. Windows overwrites each intermediate storage area for plaintext key/critical cryptographic security parameter (i.e., any storage, such as memory buffers for the key or plaintext password which was typed by the user that is included in the path of such data). This overwriting is performed as follows:

- For volatile memory, the overwrite is a single direct overwrite consisting of zeros using the [RtlSecureZeroMemory](#) function.

The following table describes the keys and secrets used for networking and data protection; when these ephemeral keys or secrets are no longer needed for a network session, due to either normal end of the session or abnormal termination, or after protecting sensitive data using DPAPI, they are deleted as described above and in section 5.1.2.2.2. Note that the administrative guidance precludes hibernating the computer and so these keys are not persisted into volatile storage

**Table 22 Types of Keys Used by Windows**

Key	Description
<b>Symmetric encryption/decryption keys</b>	Keys used for AES (FIPS 197) encryption/decryption for IPsec ESP, TLS, Wi-Fi.
<b>HMAC keys</b>	Keys used for HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA384, and HMAC-SHA512 (FIPS 198-1) as part of IPsec
<b>Asymmetric ECDSA Public Keys</b>	Keys used for the verification of ECDSA digital signatures (FIPS 186-4) for IPsec traffic and peer authentication.
<b>Asymmetric ECDSA Private Keys</b>	Keys used for the calculation of ECDSA digital signatures (FIPS 186-4) for IPsec traffic and peer authentication.
<b>Asymmetric RSA Public Keys</b>	Keys used for the verification of RSA digital signatures (FIPS 186-4) for IPsec, TLS, Wi-Fi and signed product updates.
<b>Asymmetric RSA Private Keys</b>	Keys used for the calculation of RSA digital signatures (FIPS 186-4) for IPsec, TLS, and Wi-Fi as well as TPM-based health attestations. The key size can be 2048 or 3072 bits.
<b>Asymmetric DSA Private Keys</b>	Keys used for the calculation of DSA digital signatures (FIPS 186-4) for IPsec and TLS. The key size can be 2048 or 3072 bits.
<b>Asymmetric DSA Public Keys</b>	Keys used for the verification of DSA digital signatures (FIPS 186-4) for IPsec and TLS. The key size can be 2048 or 3072 bits.
<b>DH Private and Public values</b>	Private and public values used for Diffie-Hellman key establishment for TLS.
<b>ECDH Private and Public values</b>	Private and public values used for EC Diffie-Hellman key establishment for TLS.
<b>DPAPI master secret</b>	512-bit random value used by DPAPI
<b>DPAPI master AES key</b>	256-bit encryption key that protects the DPAPI master secret

<b>DPAPI AES key</b>	256-bit encryption key used by DPAPI
<b>DRBG seed</b>	Seed for the main DRBG, zeroized during reseeding

### 6.2.3 Networking

#### 6.2.3.1 TLS, HTTPS, DTLS, EAP-TLS

The TOE implements TLS to enable a trusted network path that is used for client and server authentication, as well as HTTPS.

The following table summarizes the TLS RFCs implemented in Windows:

**Table 23 TLS RFCs Implemented by Windows**

RFC #	Name	How Used
<b>2246</b>	<a href="#">The TLS Protocol Version 1.0</a>	Specifies requirements for TLS 1.0.
<b>3268</b>	<a href="#">Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)</a>	Specifies additional ciphersuites implemented by Windows.
<b>3546</b>	<a href="#">Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions</a>	Updates RFC 2246 with TLS 1.0 extensions implemented by Windows.
<b>4346</b>	<a href="#">The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1</a>	Specifies requirements for TLS 1.1.
<b>4366</b>	<a href="#">Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions</a>	Obsoletes RFC 3546 Requirements for TLS 1.1 extensions implemented by Windows.
<b>4492</b>	<a href="#">Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)</a>	Specifies additional ciphersuites implemented by Windows.
<b>4681</b>	<a href="#">TLS User Mapping Extension</a>	Extends TLS to include a User Principal Name during the TLS handshake.
<b>5246</b>	<a href="#">The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2</a>	Obsoletes RFCs 3268, 4346, and 4366. Specifies requirements for TLS 1.2.
<b>5289</b>	<a href="#">TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)</a>	Specifies additional ciphersuites implemented by Windows.
<b>SSL3</b>	<a href="#">The SSL Protocol Version 3</a>	Specifies requirements for SSL3.

These protocols are described at:

- [MS-TLSP](#) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Profile
- [RFC 2246](#) The TLS Protocol Version 1.0
- [RFC 3268](#) -AES Ciphersuites for TLS
- [RFC 3546](#) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions
- [RFC 4366](#) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions
- [RFC 4492](#) ECC Cipher Suites for TLS
- [RFC 4681](#) TLS User Mapping Extension
- [RFC 5246](#) - The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol, Version 1.2

- [RFC 5289](#) - TLS ECC Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES GCM

The [Cipher Suites in Schannel](#) article describes the complete set of TLS cipher suites implemented in Windows (reference: [http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa374757\(v=vs.85\).aspx](http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa374757(v=vs.85).aspx)), of which the following are used in the evaluated configuration:

- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 5246,
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 5246,
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288,
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288,
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288,
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288,
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289

When negotiating a TLS 1.2 elliptic curve cipher suite, Windows will include automatically as part of the Client Hello message both its supported elliptic curves extension, i.e., secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1 as well as signature algorithm, i.e., SHA256, SHA384, and SHA512 based on the ciphersuites selected by the administrator. By default, the curve secp521r1 is disabled. This curve can be enabled adding its name in the ECC Curve Order file. In addition, the curve priority can be edited in this file.

On the other hand, by default the signature algorithms in the Client Hello message are: SHA1, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512. The signature algorithm extension is configurable by editing a registry key to meet with the FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.3 requirement. Each Windows component that uses TLS checks that the identifying information in the certificate matches what is expected, the component should reject the connection, these checks include checking the expected Distinguished Name (DN), Subject Name (SN), or Subject Alternative Name (SAN) attributes along with any applicable extended key usage identifiers. The DN, and any Subject Alternative Name, in the certificate is checked against the identity of the remote computer's DNS entry or IP address to ensure that it matches as described at [http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc783349\(v=WS.10\).aspx](http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc783349(v=WS.10).aspx), and in particular the "Server Certificate Message" section. The reference identifier in Windows for TLS is the DNS name or IP address of the remote server, which is compared against the DNS name as presented identifier in the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) or the Subject Name of the certificate. There is no configuration of the reference identifier.

A certificate that uses a wildcard in the leftmost portion of the resource identifier (i.e., \*.contoso.com) can be accepted for authentication, otherwise the certificate will be deemed invalid. Windows does not provide a general-purpose capability to "pin" TLS certificates.



Windows implements HTTPS as described in RFC 2818 so that Windows Store and system applications executing on the TOE can securely connect to external servers using HTTPS.<sup>40</sup>

### 6.2.3.2 Wireless Networking

Windows has native implementations of IEEE 802.11-2012 and IEEE 802.11ac-2013 to provide secure wireless local area networking (Wi-Fi). Windows can use PRF-384 in WPA2 Wi-Fi sessions and generate AES 128-bit keys or use PRF-704 to generate AES 256-bit keys, both utilize the Windows RBG. Windows complies with the IEEE 802.11-2012 and IEEE 802.11ac-2013 standards and interoperates with other devices that implement the standard. Computers running a Windows OS typically have Wi-Fi CERTIFIED Interoperability Certificates from the Wi-Fi Alliance.

Windows implements key wrapping and unwrapping according to the NIST SP 800-38F specification (the “KW” mode) and so unwraps the Wi-Fi Group Temporal Key (GTK) which was sent by the access point. Because the GTK was protected by AES Key Wrap when it was delivered in an EAPOL-Key frame, the GTK is not exposed to the network.

### 6.2.3.3 IPsec

The Windows IPsec implementation is an integral part of the Windows operating system ; it conforms to RFC 4301, [Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol](#). This is documented publicly in the Windows protocol documentation at [section 7.5.1 IPsec Overview and covers Windows 8, Windows RT, and Server 2012](#).<sup>41</sup>

Windows implements both RFC 2409, [Internet Key Exchange](#) (IKEv1), and RFC 4306, [Internet Key Exchange version 2](#), (IKEv2).<sup>42</sup> Windows IPsec supports both tunnel mode and transport mode and provides an option for NAT transversal (reference: [section 7.5.5, IPsec Encapsulations](#)).<sup>43</sup> The RAS VPN interface uses tunnel mode only.

The Windows IPsec implementation includes a security policy database (SPD), which states how Windows should process network packets. The SPD uses the traffic source, destination and transport protocol to determine if a packet should be transmitted or received, blocked, or protected with IPsec, (reference: [7.5.3, Security Policy Database Structure](#)), based on firewall processing rules.<sup>44</sup> These rules are described in [Understanding Firewall Rules](#) and the “Managing IPsec and VPN Connections” section of the Common Criteria *Operational and Administrative Guidance* for this evaluation. In order to prevent unsolicited inbound traffic, an authorized administrator does not need to define a final catch-all rule which will discard a network packet when no other rules in the SPD apply because Windows will discard the packet. The security policy database also includes configuration settings to limit the time and number of sessions before a new key needs to be generated.

Windows 10 implements AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256, AES-CBC-128, and AES-CBC-256 as encryption algorithms for the encapsulating security payload (ESP) (reference: [section 6, Appendix A, Product](#)

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<sup>40</sup> The Windows Update client will not include the TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 and TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 ciphersuites in the available ciphersuites when establishing a TLS session.

<sup>41</sup> Also available as [MS-WSO], *Windows System Overview*, page 43 for offline reading.

<sup>42</sup> [MS-IKEX], *Internet Key Exchange Protocol Extensions*, page 8.

<sup>43</sup> [MS-WSO], page 45.

<sup>44</sup> [MS-WPO], page 44.

[Behavior](#)).<sup>45</sup> . However only AES-CBC-128 and AES-CBC-256 can be used for IKEv1 and IKEv2 to protect the encrypted payload. The resulting potential strength of the symmetric key will be 128 or 256 bits of security depending on whether the IPsec VPN client and IPsec VPN server agreed to use a 128 or 256 AES symmetric key to protect the network traffic. Windows implements HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-384<sup>46</sup> as authentication algorithms for key exchange as well as Diffie-Hellman Groups 14, 19, and 20 (reference: [section 6, Appendix A, Product Behavior](#)).<sup>47</sup> The IPsec VPN client will propose a cryptosuite to the IPsec VPN server; if the server responds with a cryptosuite that the client supports, the client will use the server's proposed cryptosuite instead. If the IPsec VPN client and server cannot agree on a cryptosuite, either side may terminate the connection attempt.

In order to prevent security being reduced while transitioning from IKE Phase 1 / IKEv2 SA, an authorized administrator must configure the IPsec VPN client such that algorithms with same strength are used for both IKE Phase 1 and Phase 2 as well as for IKEv2 SA and IKEv2 Child SA.

Windows constructs nonces, which are 32-bit random values, as specified in RFC 2408, [Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol](#) (ISAKMP) section 3.13.<sup>48</sup> When a random number is needed for either a nonce or for key agreement, Windows uses a FIPS-validated random bit generator. When requested, the Windows random bit generator can generate 256 or 512 bits for the caller, the probability of guessing a 256 bit value is 1 in  $2^{256}$  and a 512 bit value is 1 in  $2^{512}$ . When generating the security value  $x$  used in the IKE Diffie-Hellman key exchange,  $g^x \bmod p$ , Windows uses a FIPS validated random number generator to generate 'x' with length 224, 256, or 384 bits for DH groups 14, 19, and 20 respectively.<sup>49</sup> See the TSS section for for the NIST CAVP validation numbers.

Windows implements peer authentication using 2048 bit RSA certificates,<sup>50</sup> or ECDSA certificates using the P-256 and P-384 curves for both IKEv1 and IKEv2.<sup>51</sup>

While Windows supports pre-shared IPsec keys, it is not recommended due to the potential use of weak pre-shared keys.<sup>52</sup> Windows simply uses the pre-shared key that was entered by the authorized administrator, there is no additional processing on the input data.

Windows operating systems do not implement the IKEv1 aggressive mode option during a Phase 1 key exchange.

Windows will validate certificates as described in section 6.4.1 by comparing the Common Name of the certificate presented by the VPN gateway to the expected values for the IP address or Fully Qualified Domain Name of the VPN gateway or the user FQDN.

#### Table 24 Windows 10 Implementation of IPsec RFCs

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<sup>45</sup> [MS-IKEE], pages 74 – 75.

<sup>46</sup> Windows truncates the HMAC output as described in [RFC 4868](#) for HMAC-SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-384 and for HMAC-SHA1-96 as described in [RFC 2404](#).

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>48</sup> [MS-IKEE], page 51.

<sup>49</sup> <http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc962035.aspx>.

<sup>50</sup> [MS-IKEE], page 73.

<sup>51</sup> <http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/905aa96a-4af7-44b0-8e8f-d2b6854a91e6>.

<sup>52</sup> [http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc782582\(v=WS.10\).aspx](http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc782582(v=WS.10).aspx).

RFC #	Name	How Used
<b>2407</b>	The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP	Integral part of the Windows Internet Key Exchange (IKE) implementation.
<b>2408</b>	Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)	Integral part of the Windows Internet Key Exchange (IKE) implementation.
<b>2409</b>	The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)	Integral part of the Windows Internet Key Exchange (IKE) implementation.
<b>2986</b>	PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification; Version 1.7	Public key certification requests issued by Windows.
<b>4106</b>	The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)	Certain IPsec cryptosuites implemented by Windows.
<b>4109</b>	Algorithms for Internet Key Exchange version 1 (IKEv1)	Certain IPsec cryptosuites implemented by Windows.
<b>4301</b>	Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol	Description of the general security architecture for IPsec.
<b>4303</b>	IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)	Specifies the IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) implemented by Windows.
<b>4304</b>	Extended Sequence Number (ESN) Addendum to IPsec Domain of Interpretation (DOI) for Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)	Specifies a sequence number high-order extension that is implemented by Windows.
<b>4306</b>	Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol	Integral part of the Windows Internet Key Exchange (IKE) implementation.
<b>4307</b>	Cryptographic Algorithms for Use in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)	Certain IPsec cryptosuites implemented by Windows.
<b>4868</b>	Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec	Certain IPsec cryptosuites implemented by Windows.
<b>4945</b>	The Internet IP Security PKI Profile of IKEv1/ISAKMP, IKEv2, and PKIX	Integral part of the Windows Internet Key Exchange (IKE) implementation.
<b>5280</b>	Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile	Specifies PKI support implemented by Windows.
<b>5282</b>	Using Authenticated Encryption Algorithms with the Encrypted Payload of the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) Protocol	Certain IPsec cryptosuites implemented by Windows.
<b>5996</b>	Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)	Integral part of the Windows Internet Key Exchange (IKE) implementation.
<b>6379</b>	Suite B Cryptographic Suites for IPsec	Certain IPsec cryptosuites implemented by Windows.

#### 6.2.4 Protecting Data with DPAPI

Windows provides the Data Protection API, [DPAPI](#), which Windows components, first-party and third-party applications can use to protect any persisted data which the developer deems to be sensitive.

DPAPI will use AES CBC encryption with a key that is based in part on the user's password to protect the user data. When storing private keys and secrets associated with the user account, the encrypted data is stored on the file system in a directory which is part of the user's profile.

## 6.2.5 SFR Summary

- **FCS\_CKM.1,**<sup>53</sup> **FCS\_CKM.1(WLAN), FCS\_CKM.1(IPSEC), FCS\_CKM.1(VPN), FCS\_CKM.2,**<sup>54</sup> **FCS\_CKM.2(WLAN), FCS\_CKM.2(IPSEC), FCS\_COP.1(SYM), FCS\_COP.1(HASH), FCS\_COP.1(SIGN), FCS\_COP.1(HMAC), FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1:** See [Table 21 Windows Cryptographic Algorithm Standards and Evaluation Methods](#).
- **FCS\_CKM\_EXT.2:** Windows provides secure key storage for private (asymmetric) keys and other data deemed by an authorized subject, such as the pre-shared key, to require secure storage using DPAPI and the NTFS discretionary access control policy.<sup>55</sup>
- **FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4:** Windows overwrites critical cryptographic parameters immediately after that data is no longer needed.
- **FCS\_STO\_EXT.1:** Windows provides the Data Protection API ([DPAPI](#)) for developers to encrypt and decrypt sensitive data using the [CryptProtectData](#) and [CryptUnprotectData](#) interfaces.
- **FCS\_TLS\_EXT.1, FCS\_TLS\_EXT.1(WLAN), FCS\_TLS\_EXT.2, FCS\_TLS\_EXT.2(WLAN), FCS\_TLS\_EXT.3, FCS\_TLS\_EXT.4:** Windows implements TLS 1.2 to provide server and mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates, confidentiality and integrity to upper-layer protocols such as Extensible Authentication Protocol and HTTP.
- **FCS\_DTLS\_EXT.1:** The Windows implementation of DTLS 1.0 and DTLS 1.2 is based on underlying SChannel component which implements TLS.
- **FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1:** Windows provides an IPsec implementation as described about in section 6.2.3.3.

## 6.3 User Data Protection

### 6.3.1 Discretionary Access Control

The executive component within the Windows kernel mediates access between subjects and user data objects, also known as named objects. Subjects consist of processes with one or more threads running on behalf of users. While the Windows Discretionary Access Control policy manages several different kinds of named objects, the protection profile that is the basis for this evaluation focuses on the NTFS File and NTFS Directory objects.

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<sup>53</sup> In the context of this evaluation, Windows will generate RSA and ECC key pairs as part of establishing a TLS session.

<sup>54</sup> In the context of this evaluation, Windows will generate RSA and ECC key pairs as part of establishing a TLS session.

<sup>55</sup> See [https://www.niap-ccevs.org/st/st\\_vid10677-st.pdf](https://www.niap-ccevs.org/st/st_vid10677-st.pdf) and [http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/st\\_windows10.pdf](http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/st_windows10.pdf).

### 6.3.1.1 *Subject DAC Attributes*

Windows security access tokens contain the security attributes for a subject. Tokens are associated with processes and threads running on behalf of the user. Information in a security access token that is used by DAC includes:

- The Security Identifier (SID) for the user account
- SIDs representing groups for which the user is a member
- Privileges assigned to the user
- An owner SID that identifies the SID to assign as owner for newly created objects
- A default Discretionary Access Control List (DACL) for newly created objects
- Token type which is either a primary or an impersonation token
- The impersonation level (for impersonation tokens)
- The integrity label SID
- An optional list of restricting SIDs
- The logon SID that identifies the logon session.

An administrator can change all of these except for the user account SID and logon SID.

A thread can be assigned an impersonation token that would be used instead of the process' primary token when making an access check and generating audit data. Hence, that thread is impersonating the client that provided the impersonation token. Impersonation stops when the impersonation token is removed from the thread or when the thread terminates.

An access token may also include a list of restricting SIDs which are used to limit access to objects. Restricting SIDs are contained in restricted tokens, (which is a special form of a thread impersonation token), and when configured serve to limit the corresponding process access to no more than that available to the restricted SID.

Access decisions are made using the impersonation token of a thread if it exists, and otherwise the thread's process primary token (which always exists).

### 6.3.1.2 *Object DAC Attributes*

Security Descriptors (SDs) contain all of the security attributes associated with an object. All named objects have an associated SD. The security attributes from a SD used for discretionary access control are the object owner SID which specifies the owner of the security descriptor, the DACL present flag, and the DACL itself, when present.

DACLs contain a list of Access Control Entries (ACEs). Each ACE specifies an ACE type, a SID representing a user or group, and an access mask containing a set of access rights. Each ACE has inheritance attributes associated with it that specify if the ACE applies to the associated object only, to its children objects only, or to both its children objects and the associated object.

There are two types of ACEs that apply to discretionary access control:

- ALLOW ACES
  - ACCESS\_ALLOWED\_ACE: used to grant access to a user or group of users.

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- ACCESS\_ALLOWED\_OBJECT\_ACE: (for DS objects) used to grant access for a user or group to a property or property set on the directory service object, or to limit the ACE\_inheritance to a specified type of child object. This ACE type is only supported for directory service objects.
- DENY ACES
  - ACCESS\_DENIED\_ACE: used to deny access to a user or group of users.
  - ACCESS\_DENIED\_OBJECT\_ACE: (for DS objects) used to deny access for a user or group to a property or property set on the directory service object or to limit the ACE\_inheritance to a specified type of child object. This ACE type is only supported for directory service objects.

In the ACE, an access mask contains object access rights granted (or denied) to the SID, representing a user or group. An access mask is also used to specify the desired access to an object when accessing the object and to identify granted access associated with an opened object. Each bit in an access mask represents a particular access right. There are four categories of access rights: standard, specific, special, and generic. Standard access rights apply to all object types. Specific access rights have different semantic meanings depending on the type of object. Special access rights are used in desired access masks to request special access or to ask for all allowable rights. Generic access rights are convenient groupings of specific and standard access rights. Each object type provides its own mapping between generic access rights and the standard and specific access rights.

For most objects, a subject requests access to the object (e.g., opens it) and receives a pointer to a handle in return. The TSF associates a granted access mask with each opened handle. For kernel-mode objects, handles are maintained in a kernel-mode handle table. There is one handle table per process; each entry in the handle table identifies an opened object and the access rights granted to that object. For user-mode TSF servers, the handle is a server-controlled context pointer associated with the connection between the subject and the server. The server uses this context handle in the same manner as with the kernel mode (i.e., to locate an opened object and its associated granted access mask). In both cases (user and kernel-mode objects), the SRM makes all access control decisions.

The following table summarizes every DAC access right for each named object which were tested by the evaluation lab:

**Table 25 DAC Access Rights and Named Objects**

Named Object	Access Rights
<b>NTFS Directory</b>	ACCESS_SYSTEM_SECURITY READ_CONTROL WRITE_DAC WRITE_OWNER SYNCHRONIZE FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY FILE_ADD_FILE FILE_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY FILE_DELETE_CHILD FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES

Named Object	Access Rights
	FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES FILE_DELETE_CHILD FILE_ADD_FILE DELETE
<b>NTFS File</b>	ACCESS_SYSTEM_SECURITY READ_CONTROL WRITE_DAC WRITE_OWNER SYNCHRONIZE FILE_WRITE_DATA FILE_READ_DATA FILE_APPEND_DATA FILE_WRITE_EA FILE_EXECUTE FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES. FILE_WRITE_DATA and FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES. DELETE FILE_WRITE_DATA   FILE_READ_DATA FILE_READ_DATA   FILE_EXECUTE FILE_READ_DATA   FILE_EXECUTE   FILE_WRITE_DATA FILE_WRITE_DATA   FILE_WRITE_EA   FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES

### 6.3.1.3 DAC Enforcement Algorithm

The TSF enforces the DAC policy to objects based on SIDs and privileges in the requestor’s token, the desired access mask requested, and the object’s security descriptor.

Below is a summary of the algorithm used to determine whether a request to access a user data object is allowed. In order for access to be granted, all access rights specified in the desired access mask must be granted by one of the following steps. At the end of any step, if all of the requested access rights have been granted then access is allowed. At the end of the algorithm, if any requested access right has not been granted, then access is denied.

1. Privilege Check:
  - a. Check for SeSecurity privilege: This is required if ACCESS\_SYSTEM\_SECURITY is in the desired access mask. If ACCESS\_SYSTEM\_SECURITY is requested and the requestor does not have this privilege, access is denied. Otherwise ACCESS\_SYSTEM\_SECURITY is granted.
  - b. Check for SeTakeOwner privilege: If the desired mask has WRITE\_OWNER access right, and the privilege is found in the requestor’s token, then WRITE\_OWNER access is granted.
  - c. Check for SeBackupPrivilege: The Backup Files and Directories privilege allows a subject process to read files and registry objects for backup operations regardless of their ACE in the DACL. If the subject process has the SeBackupPrivilege privilege and the operation

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requires the privilege, no further checking is performed and access is allowed. Otherwise this check is irrelevant and the access check proceeds.

- d. Check for SeRestorePrivilege: The Restore Files and Directories privilege allows a subject process to write files and registry objects for restore operations regardless of their ACE in the DACL. If the subject process has the SeRestorePrivilege privilege and the operation requires the privilege no further checking is performed, and access is allowed. Otherwise this check is irrelevant and the access check proceeds.
2. Owner Check:
    - a. If the DACL contains one or more ACEs with the OwnerRights SID, those entries, along with all other applicable ACEs for the user, are used to determine the owner's rights.
    - b. Otherwise, check all the SIDs in the token to determine if there is a match with the object owner. If so, the READ\_CONTROL and WRITE\_DAC rights are granted if requested.
  3. DACL not present:
    - a. All further access rights requested are granted.
  4. DACL present but empty:
    - a. If any additional access rights are requested, access is denied.
  5. Iteratively process each ACE in the order that they appear in the DACL as described below:
    - a. If the inheritance attributes of the ACE indicate the ACE is applicable only to children objects of the associated object, the ACE is skipped.
    - b. If the SID in the ACE does not match any SID in the requestor's access token, the ACE is skipped.
    - c. If a SID match is found, and the access mask in the ACE matches an access in the desired access mask:
      - i. Access Allowed ACE Types: If the ACE is of type ACCESS\_ALLOWED\_OBJECT\_ACE and the ACE includes a GUID representing a property set or property associated with the object, then the access is granted to the property set or specific property represented by the GUID (rather than to the entire object). Otherwise the ACE grants access to the entire object.
      - ii. Access Denied ACE Type: If the ACE is of type ACCESS\_DENIED\_OBJECT\_ACE and the ACE includes a GUID representing a property set or property associated with the object, then the access is denied to the property set or specific property represented by the GUID. Otherwise the ACE denies access to the entire object. If a requested access is specifically denied by an ACE, then the entire access request fails.
  6. If all accesses are granted but the requestor's token has at least one restricting SID, the complete access check is performed against the restricting SIDs. If this second access check does not grant the desired access, then the entire access request fails.



#### 6.3.1.4 *Default DAC Protection*

The TSF provides a process ensuring a DACL is applied by default to all new objects. When new objects are created, the appropriate DACL is constructed. The default DAC protections for DS objects and non-DS objects are slightly different.

The TOE uses the following rules to set the DACL in the SDs for new named kernel objects:

- The object's DACL is the DACL from the SD specified by the creating process. The TOE merges any inheritable ACEs into the DACL unless SE\_DACL\_PROTECTED is set in the SD control flags. The TOE then sets the SE\_DACL\_PRESENT SD control flag. Note that a creating process can explicitly provide a SD that includes no DACL. The result will be an object with no protections. This is distinct from providing no SD which is described below.
- If the creating process does not specify a SD, the TOE builds the object's DACL from inheritable ACEs in the parent object's DACL. The TOE then sets the SE\_DACL\_PRESENT SD control flag.
- If the parent object has no inheritable ACEs, the TOE uses its object manager subcomponent to provide a default DACL. The TOE then sets the SE\_DACL\_PRESENT and SE\_DACL\_DEFAULTED SD control flags.
- If the object manager does not provide a default DACL, the TOE uses the default DACL in the subject's access token. The TOE then sets the SE\_DACL\_PRESENT and SE\_DACL\_DEFAULTED SD control flags.
- The subject's access token always has a default DACL, which is set by the LSA subcomponent when the token is created.

The method used to build a DACL for a new DS object is slightly different. There are two key differences, which are as follows:

- The rules for creating a DACL distinguish between generic inheritable ACEs and object-specific inheritable ACEs in the parent object's SD. Generic inheritable ACEs can be inherited by all types of child objects. Object-specific inheritable ACEs can be inherited only by the type of child object to which they apply.
- The AD schema definition for the object can include a SD. Each object class defined in the schema has a defaultSecurityDescriptor attribute. If neither the creating process nor inheritance from the parent object provides a DACL for a new AD object, the TOE uses the DACL in the default SD specified by the schema.

The TOE uses the following rules to set the DACL in the security descriptor for new DS objects:

- The object's DACL is the DACL from the SD specified by the creating process. The TOE merges any inheritable ACEs into the DACL unless SE\_DACL\_PROTECTED is set in the SD control flags. The TOE then sets the SE\_DACL\_PRESENT SD control flag.
- If the creating process does not specify a SD, the TOE checks the parent object's DACL for inheritable object-specific ACEs that apply to the type of object being created. If the parent object has inheritable object-specific ACEs for the object type, the TOE builds the object's DACL

from inheritable ACEs, including both generic and object-specific ACEs. It then sets the SE\_DACL\_PRESENT SD control flag.

- If the parent object has no inheritable object-specific ACEs for the type of object being created, the TOE uses the default DACL from the AD schema for that object type. It then sets the SE\_DACL\_PRESENT and SE\_DACL\_DEFAULTED SD control flags.
- If the AD schema does not specify a default DACL for the object type, the TOE uses the default DACL in the subject's access token. It then sets the SE\_DACL\_PRESENT and SE\_DACL\_DEFAULTED SD control flags.
- The subject's access token always has a default DACL, which is set by the LSA subcomponent when the token is created.

All tokens are created with an appropriate default DACL, which can be applied to the new objects as appropriate. The default DACL is restrictive in that it only allows the SYSTEM SID and the user SID that created the object to have access. The SYSTEM SID is a special SID representing TSF trusted processes.

#### **6.3.1.5 DAC Management**

- The following are the four methods that DACL changes are controlled:
  - Object owner: Has implicit WRITE\_DAC access.
  - Explicit DACL change access: A user granted explicit WRITE\_DAC access on the DACL can change the DACL.
  - Take owner access: A user granted explicit WRITE\_OWNER access on the DACL can take ownership of the object and then use the owner's implicit WRITE\_DAC access.
  - Take owner privilege: A user with SeTakeOwner privilege can take ownership of the object and then use the owner's implicit WRITE\_DAC access.

#### **6.3.1.6 Reference Mediation**

Access to objects on the system is generally predicated on obtaining a handle to the object. Handles are usually obtained as the result of opening or creating an object. In these cases, the TSF ensures that access validation occurs before creating a new handle for a subject. Handles may also be inherited from a parent process or directly copied (with appropriate access) from another subject. In all cases, before creating a handle, the TSF ensures that the security policy allows the subject to have the handle (and thereby access) to the object. A handle always has a granted access mask associated with it. This mask indicates, based on the security policy, which access rights to the object that the subject was granted. On every attempt to use a handle, the TSF ensures that the action requested is allowed according to the handle's granted access mask. In a few cases, such as with DS, objects are directly accessed by name without the intermediate step of obtaining a handle first. In these cases, the TSF checks the request against the access policy directly (rather than checking for a granted access mask).

#### **6.3.2 VPN Client**

The Windows IPsec VPN client can be configured by the device local administrator. The administrator can configure the IPsec VPN client that all IP traffic is routed through the IPsec tunnel except for:

- IKE traffic used to establish the VPN tunnel
- IPv4 ARP traffic for resolution of local network layer addresses and to establish a local address

- IPv6 NDP traffic for resolution of local network layer addresses and to establish a local address

The IPsec VPN is an end-to-end internetworking technology and so VPN sessions can be established over physical network protocols such as wireless LAN (Wi-Fi) or local area network.

The components responsible for routing IP traffic through the VPN client:

- The **IPv4 / IPv6 network stack** in the kernel processes ingoing and outgoing network traffic.
- The **IPsec and IKE and AuthIP Keying Modules** service which hosts the IKE and Authenticated Internet Protocol (AuthIP) keying modules. These keying modules are used for authentication and key exchange in Internet Protocol security (IPsec).
- The **Remote Access Service** device driver in the kernel, which is used primarily for VPN connections; known as the “RAS IPsec VPN” or “RAS VPN”.
- The **IPsec Policy Agent** service which enforces IPsec policies.

Universal Windows App developers can implement their own VPN client if authorized by Microsoft to use the **networkingVpnProvider** capability, which includes setting the policy to lockdown networking traffic as described above.<sup>56</sup>

### 6.3.3 Memory Management and Object Reuse

Windows ensures that any previous information content is unavailable upon allocation to subjects and objects. The TSF ensures that resources processed by the kernel or are exported to user-mode processes do not have residual information in the following ways:

- All objects are based on memory and disk storage. Memory allocated for objects, which includes memory allocated for network packets, is either overwritten with all zeros or overwritten with the provided data before being assigned to an object. Read/write pointers prevent reading beyond the space used by the object. Only the exact value of what is most recently written can be read and no more. For varying length objects, subsequent reads only return the exact value that was set, even though the actual allocated size of the object may be greater than this. Objects stored on disk are restricted to only disk space used for that object.
- Subject processes using the IPsec client have associated memory and an execution context. The TSF ensures that the memory associated with subjects is either overwritten with all zeros or overwritten with user data before allocation as described in the previous point for memory allocated to objects. In addition, the execution context (processor registers) is initialized when new threads within a process are created and restored when a thread context switch occurs.
- Network packets processed by IPsec are encrypted in place. In other words, the data to be encrypted is not copied to a separate buffer and then encrypted. The encrypted network packet is encrypted into the same buffer and overwrites the plaintext network packet. The buffers allocated to hold network packets are allocated with enough space to accommodate padding required for encryption. Each network packet is held in its own buffer. There is a list of buffers, one for each packet. A buffer that holds a network packet is not reused for another network

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<sup>56</sup> See <https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/apps/windows.networking.vpn.aspx>.

packet. After a buffer holding a network packet is no longer in use the memory allocated for the buffer is freed and released back to the TSF.

The above, in combination, will ensure that the memory used for inbound and outbound network packets does not contain data from previous use.

#### 6.3.4 SFR Summary

- **FDP\_ACF\_EXT.1:** Windows provides a Discretionary Access Control policy to limit modification and reading of objects by non-authorized users.
- **FDP\_IFC\_EXT.1, FDP\_IFC\_EXT.1(IPSEC):** Windows provides a VPN client and interfaces for developers to implement their own VPN client.
- **FDP\_RIP.2:** The TSF ensures that previous information contents of resources used for new objects are not discernible in the new object via zeroing or overwriting of memory and tracking read/write pointers for disk storage. Every process is allocated new memory and an execution context. Memory is zeroed or overwritten before allocation.

### 6.4 Identification and Authentication

All logons are treated essentially in the same manner regardless of their source (e.g., interactive logon, network interface, internally initiated service logon) and start with an account name, domain name (which may be NULL; indicating the local system), and credentials that must be provided to the TSF.

Windows 10 and Windows Server can authenticate users based on username and password as well as using a Windows Hello PIN which is backed by a TPM. Windows 10 and Windows Server can also use physical or virtual smart card thus supporting multiple user authentication.

Password-based authentication to Windows succeeds when the credential provided by the user matches the stored protected representation of the password; Windows Hello and smart cards both use PIN-based authentication to unlock a protected resource, a private key, the stored representation of the PIN is protected by the Secure Kernel.

Password authentication can be used for interactive, service, and network logons and to initiate the “change password” screen; the Windows Hello PIN, physical and virtual smart cards can be used for interactive logons; and the Windows Hello PIN is used to re-authenticate the user when the user chooses to change their PIN.

When the authentication succeeds, the user will be logged onto their desktop, their screen unlocked, or their authentication factors changed depending whether the user logged onto the computer, the display was locked, or the PIN or password was to be changed.

The Local Security Authority component within Windows maintains a count of the consecutive failed logon attempts by security principals from their last successful authentication. When the number of consecutive failed logon attempts is larger than the policy for failed logon attempts, which ranges from 0 (never lockout the account) to 999, Windows will lockout the user account. Windows persists the number of consecutive failed logons on for the user and so rebooting the computer does not reset the failed logon counter. Interactive logons are done on the secure desktop, which does not allow other programs to run, and therefore prevents automated password guessing. In addition, the Windows logon

component enforces a one second delay between every failed logon with an increased delay after several consecutive logon failures.

#### 6.4.1 X.509 Certificate Validation and Generation

Every Windows component that uses X.509 certificates is responsible for performing certificate validation, however all components use a common system subcomponent,<sup>57</sup> which validates certificates as described in [RFC 5280](#), and particular, the specific validation listed in section 5.1.4.1.3, including all applicable usage constraints such as Server Authentication for networking sessions and Code Signing when installing product updates. Every component that uses X.509 certificates will have a repository for public certificates and will select a certificate based on criteria such as entity name for the communication partner, any extended key usage constraints, and cryptographic algorithms associated with the certificate. The Windows component will use the same kinds of information along with a certification path and certificate trust lists as part of deciding to accept the certificate.

If certificate validation fails, or if Windows is not able to check the validation status for a certificate, Windows will not establish a trusted network channel, e.g. IPsec, however it will inform the user and seek their consent before establishing a HTTPS web browsing session. Certification validation for updates to Windows, mobile applications, and integrity verification is mandatory, neither the administrator nor the user have the option to bypass the results of a failed certificate validation; software installation and updates is further described in Windows and Application Updates.

When Windows needs to generate a certificate enrollment request it will include a distinguished name, information about the cryptographic algorithms used for the request, any certification extensions, and information about the client requesting the certificate.

#### 6.4.2 Certificate Storage

In a Windows OS, stored certificates known as *trusted root certificates* are contained in certificate stores. Each user has their own certificate store and there is a certificate store for the computer account; access to a certificate store is managed by the discretionary access control policy in Windows such that only the authorized administrator, i.e., the user or the local administrator, can add or remove entries. Certificates which are used by applications, for example, TLS, are also placed in certificate stores for the user.

In addition to the standard certificate revocation processes, application certificates can be loaded by either using administrative tools such as **certutil.exe**, changes to the trusted root certificates can be made using [Certificate Trust Lists](#).

#### 6.4.3 IPsec and Pre-shared Keys

IPsec is the only protocol in this evaluation which supports the use of pre-shared keys. These keys can range from a-z, A-Z, the numbers 0 – 9, and any special character entered from the keyboard. The length of the pre-shared key can range from 1 to 256 characters, and so the specific length of 22 characters which the protection profile requires is supported.

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<sup>57</sup> See [https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa380252\(v=vs.85\).aspx](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa380252(v=vs.85).aspx) for the win32 interface description for this component.

The IPsec pre-shared key is used as-is without modification by Windows and so the pre-shared key does not use the Windows random number generator. The reasoning for this is that if the user needs to supply a particular key, that specific key should be used. If the user desires a randomized bit string, then the solution is to use a X.509 certificate which will contain a bit string of suitable length and randomness.

#### 6.4.4 SFR Summary

- **FIA\_AFL.1:** After the number of consecutive failed authentication attempts for a user account has been surpassed, Windows can be configured to lockout the user account.
- **FIA\_PAE\_EXT.1:** Windows conforms to IEEE 802.1X as a Port Access Entity acting in the Supplicant role.
- **FIA\_UAU.5:** Windows provides authentication using a username and password.
- **FIA\_X509\_EXT.1, FIA\_X509\_EXT.1(WLAN):** Windows validates X.509 certificates according to RFC 5280 and provides OCSP and CRL services for applications to check certificate revocation status.
- **FIA\_X509\_EXT.2, FIA\_X509\_EXT.2(WLAN), FIA\_X509\_IPSEC.3:(IPSEC):** Windows uses X.509 certificates for EAP-TLS exchanges, TLS, DTLS, HTTPS, IPsec, code signing for system software updates, code signing for mobile applications, and code signing for integrity verification.
- **FIA\_X509\_EXT.4:** Windows stores trusted certificates in the certificate stores which controls access based on the Windows Discretionary Access Control policy.
- **FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1:** Windows allows for the use of pre-shared IPsec keys which are directly used to create an IPsec connection. The set of characters for the pre-shared key is a-z, A-Z, the numbers 0 – 9, and any special character entered from the keyboard.

### 6.5 Security Management

The complete set of management functions are described in Security Management (FMT), the following table maps which activities can be done by a standard Windows user or a local administrator. A checkmark indicates which entity can invoke the management function. Standard users, or programs running on their behalf, are not able to modify policy or configuration that is set by the administrator, the result is that the user cannot override the configuration specified by the administrator.

**Table 26 General Purpose OS Windows Security Management Functions**

#	Management Function	Administrator	User
1.	Enable/disable screen lock	√	√
2.	Configure screen lock inactivity timeout	√	√
3.	Configure local audit storage capacity	√	
4.	Configure minimum password Length	√	
5.	Configure minimum number of special characters in password		
6.	Configure minimum number of numeric characters in password		
7.	Configure minimum number of uppercase characters in password		

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8.	Configure minimum number of lowercase characters in password		
9.	Configure lockout policy for unsuccessful authentication attempts through [ <b>timeouts between attempts, limiting number of attempts during a time period</b> ]	√	
10.	Configure host-based firewall	√	
11.	Configure name/address of directory server to bind with <sup>58</sup>	√	
12.	Configure name/address of remote management server from which to receive management settings	√	
13.	Configure name/address of audit/logging server to which to send audit/logging records		
14.	Configure audit rules	√	
15.	Configure name/address of network time server	√	
16.	Enable/disable automatic software update	√	
17.	Configure Wi-Fi interface	√	
18.	Enable/disable Bluetooth interface	√	
19.	Enable/disable [ <b>local area network interface, configure USB interfaces</b> ]	√	
20.	[ <b>manage Windows Diagnostics settings,</b>	√	√
	<b>Configure remote connection inactivity timeout]</b>	√	

Table 27 IPsec VPN Client Windows Security Management Functions

Management Task	Local Administrative Interface	Remote Administrative Interface
Specify VPN gateways to use	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PowerShell</li> <li>User Interface</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Group Policy</li> <li>MDM</li> </ul>
Specify client credentials to use	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PowerShell</li> <li>User Interface</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Group Policy</li> <li>MDM</li> </ul>
Configuration of IKE protocol versions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PowerShell</li> <li>User Interface</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Group Policy</li> <li>MDM</li> </ul>
Configure IKE authentication techniques	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PowerShell</li> <li>User Interface</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Group Policy</li> <li>MDM</li> </ul>
Configure the cryptoperiod for the established session keys	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PowerShell</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Group Policy</li> <li>VPN Gateway</li> </ul>
Configure certificate revocation check	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PowerShell</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Group Policy</li> </ul>
Specify the algorithm suites that may be proposed and accepted during the IPsec exchanges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PowerShell</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Group Policy</li> </ul>
Load X.509v3 certificates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PowerShell</li> <li>User Interface</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Group Policy</li> <li>MDM</li> </ul>

<sup>58</sup> For Windows 10 Pro, Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server.

### 6.5.1 SFR Summary

- **FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1, FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1, FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1(WLAN), FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1(IPSEC):**  
Windows provides the user with the capability to administer the security functions described in the security target. The mappings to specific functions are described in each applicable section of the TOE Summary Specification.

## 6.6 Protection of the TSF

### 6.6.1 Separation and Domain Isolation

The TSF provides a security domain for its own protection and provides process isolation. The security domains used within and by the TSF consists of the following:

- Hardware
- Virtualization Partitions
- Kernel-mode software
- Trusted user-mode processes
- User-mode Administrative tools process
- Application Containers

The TSF hardware is managed by the TSF kernel-mode software and is not modifiable by untrusted subjects. The TSF kernel-mode software is protected from modification by hardware execution state and protection for both physical memory and memory allocated to a partition; an operating system image runs within a partition. The TSF hardware provides a software interrupt instruction that causes a state change from user mode to kernel mode within a partition. The TSF kernel-mode software is responsible for processing all interrupts and determines whether or not a valid kernel-mode call is being made. In addition, the TSF memory protection features ensure that attempts to access kernel-mode memory from user mode results in a hardware exception, ensuring that kernel-mode memory cannot be directly accessed by software not executing in the kernel mode.

The TSF provides process isolation for all user-mode processes through private virtual address spaces (private per process page tables), execution context (registers, program counters), and security context (handle table and token). The data structures defining process address space, execution context and security context are all stored in protected kernel-mode memory. All security relevant privileges are considered to enforce TSF Protection.

User-mode administrator tools execute with the security context of the process running on behalf of the authorized administrator. Administrator processes are protected like other user-mode processes, by process isolation.

Application Containers (“App Containers”) provide an execution environment for Universal Windows Applications which prevents Universal Windows Applications from accessing data created by other Universal Windows Applications except through brokered operating system services such as the File Picker dialog.



Like TSF processes, user processes also are provided a private address space and process context, and therefore are protected from each other. Additionally, the TSF has the added ability to protect memory pages using Data Execution Prevention (DEP) which marks memory pages in a process as non-executable unless the location explicitly contains executable code. When the processor is asked to execute instructions from a page marked as data, the processor will raise an exception for the OS to handle.

The TSF implements cryptographic mechanisms within a distinct user-mode process, where its services can be accessed by both kernel- and user-mode components, in order to isolate those functions from the rest of the TSF to limit exposure to possible errors while protecting those functions from potential tampering attempts.

Furthermore, the TSF includes a Code Integrity Verification feature, also known as Kernel-mode code signing (KMCS), whereby device drivers will be loaded only if they are digitally signed by either Microsoft or from a trusted root certificate authority recognized by Microsoft. KMCS uses public-key cryptography technology to verify the digital signature of each driver as it is loaded. When a driver tries to load, the TSF decrypts the hash included with the driver using the public key stored in the certificate. It then verifies that the hash matches the one that it computes based on the driver code using the FIPS - certified cryptographic libraries in the TSF. The authenticity of the certificate is also checked in the same way, but using the certificate authority's public key, which must be configured in and trusted by the TOE.

### 6.6.2 Protection of OS Binaries, Audit and Configuration Data

By default, a Windows operating system is installed into the `\Windows\` directory of the first bootable storage partition for the computer. The logical name for this directory is `%systemRoot%`. The kernel, device drivers (.sys files), system executables (.exe files) and dynamically loadable libraries (.dll files) are stored in the `\%systemRoot%\system32` directory and subdirectories below `system32`. Standard users have permissions to read and execute these files, however modify and write permissions are limited to the local administrator and system service accounts.

The root directory for audit logs is `%systemRoot%\system32\winevt`. The local administrator, Event Log service, and the system account have full control over the audit files; standard users are not authorized to access the logs.

The primary configuration data store for Windows is the registry, and there are separate registry hives for the computer itself and each user authorized to use the computer. The registry hives for operating system configuration data is located at `%systemRoot%\system32\config`; the registry hive for the user is located in the user's profile home directory. Registry files use the same protection scheme as event log files.

### 6.6.3 Protection From Implementation Weaknesses

The Windows kernel, user-mode applications, and all Windows Store Applications implement Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) in order to load executable code at unpredictable base addresses.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> The 64-bit version of the Windows microkernel, `ntoskrnl.exe`, implements Kernel Patch Protection to prevent the modification of kernel data structures which could be exploited by stack-based vulnerabilities.

The base address is generated using a pseudo-random number generator that is seeded by high quality entropy sources when available which provides at least 8 random bits for memory mapping.<sup>60</sup>

The Windows runtime also provides stack buffer overrun protection capability that will terminate a process after Windows detects a potential buffer overrun on the thread's stack by checking canary values in the function prolog and epilog as well as reordering the stack. All Windows binaries and Windows Store Applications implement stack buffer overrun protection by being compiled with the /GS option,<sup>61</sup> and checking that all Windows Store Applications are compiled with buffer overrun protection before ingesting the Windows Store Application into the Windows Store.

To enable these protections using the Microsoft Visual Studio development environment, programs are compiled with /DYNAMICBASE option for ASLR, and optionally with /HIGHENTROPYVA for 64-bit ASLR, or /NXCOMPAT:NO to opt out of software-based DEP, and /GS (switched on by default) for stack buffer overrun protection.

Windows Store Applications are compiled with the /APPCONTAINER option which builds the executable to run in a Windows appcontainer, to run with the user-mode protections described in this section.

#### 6.6.4 Windows Platform Integrity and Code Integrity

A Windows operating system verifies the integrity of Windows program code using the combination of Secure Boot and Code Integrity capabilities in Windows. On computers with a TPM, such as those used in this evaluation, before Windows will boot, the computer will verify the integrity of the early boot components, which includes the Boot Loader, the OS Loader, and the OS Resume binaries.

This capability, known as Secure Boot, checks that the file integrity of early boot components has not been compromised, mitigating the risk of rootkits and viruses, and additionally checks that critical boot-time data have not been modified. Secure Boot collects these file and configuration measurements and seals them to the TPM. When Secure Boot starts in the preboot environment, it will compare the sealed values from the TPM to the measured values from the current boot cycle and if those values do not match the sealed values, Secure Boot will lock the system (which prevents booting) and display a warning on the computer display. While the TPM is part of the external IT environment in this evaluation, the hardware-protected hashes serve as the first step of the chain that provides integrity from the hardware, through the bootchain into the kernel and required device drivers.

When the measurements match, the UEFI firmware will load the OS Boot Manager, which is an Authenticode-signed image file, based on the Portable Executable (PE) image file format. A SHA-256 hash-based signature and a public key certificate chain are embedded in the boot manager Authenticode signed image file under the "Certificate" IMAGE\_DATA\_DIRECTORY of the IMAGE\_OPTIONAL\_HEADER of the file. This public key certificate chain ends in a root public key. The boot manager uses the embedded SHA-256 hash-based signature and public key certificate chain to validate its own integrity. A SHA-256 hash of the boot manager image file is calculated for the whole file, with the exception of the following three elements which are excluded from the hash calculation: the CheckSum field in the IMAGE\_OPTIONAL\_HEADER, the IMAGE\_DIRECTORY\_ENTRY\_SECURITY

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<sup>60</sup> The PRNG is seeded by the TPM RBG, the RDRAND instruction and other sources.

<sup>61</sup> Winload.exe, winresume.exe, tcblaunch.exe, tcbloader.dll, and hvloader.exe are loaded before the stack buffer overrun protection mechanism is operational and therefore are not compiled with this option..

IMAGE\_DATA\_DIRECTORY, and the public key certificate table, which always resides at the end of the image file.

If the boot manager is validated, then the root public key of the embedded public key certificate chain must match one of the Microsoft root public keys which indicate that Microsoft is the publisher of the boot manager. These root public keys are necessarily hardcoded in the boot manager. If the boot manager cannot validate its own integrity, then the boot manager does not continue to load other modules and displays an error message.

After the boot manager determines its integrity, it attempts to load one application from the following list of boot applications:

- OS Loader: (Winload.exe or Winload.efi): the boot application started by the boot manager load the Windows kernel to start the boot process
- OS Resume (winresume.exe or winresume.efi): the boot application started by the boot manager to resume the instance of the executing OS which is persisted in the hibernation file "hiberfil.sys"<sup>62</sup>
- A physical memory testing application (memtest.exe) to check the physical memory ICs for the machine are working correctly.<sup>63</sup>

These boot applications are also Authenticode signed image files and so, the Boot Manager uses the embedded trusted SHA-256 hash based signature and public key certificate chain within the boot application's IMAGE\_OPTIONAL\_HEADER to validate the integrity of the boot application before attempting to load it. Except for three elements which are excluded from the hash calculation (these are the same three elements mentioned above in the Boot Manager description), a hash of a boot application image file is calculated in the same manner as for the Boot Manager.<sup>64</sup>

If the boot application is validated, then the root public key of the embedded public key certificate chain must match one of the hardcoded Microsoft's root public keys. If the boot manager cannot validate the integrity of the boot application, then the boot manager will not load the boot application and instead displays an error message below along with the full name of the boot application that failed the integrity check.

After the boot application's integrity has been determined, the boot manager attempts to load the boot application. If the boot application is successfully loaded, the boot manager then transfers execution to the loaded application.

After the Winload boot application is loaded, it receives the transfer of execution from the boot manager. During its execution, Winload attempts to load the Windows kernel (ntoskrnl.exe) together with a number of early-launch drivers. Among the modules that Winload must validate in the Portable Executable (PE) image file format, are the cryptography-related modules listed below

- The Windows kernel (ntoskrnl.exe)

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<sup>62</sup> The evaluated configuration precludes suspending/resuming Windows and so this boot application will not be used when operating Windows per the administrative guidance.

<sup>63</sup> This is considered to be a non-operational mode for the evaluation.

<sup>64</sup> Note that this is an additional integrity check in addition to the TPM measurements check.

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- The BitLocker drive encryption filter driver (fvevol.sys)
- The Windows kernel cryptography device driver (cng.sys)
- The Windows code integrity library module (ci.dll)

The four image files above have their trusted SHA hashes stored in catalog files that reside in the local machine catalog directory.

Because they are PKCS #7 SignedData messages, catalog files are signed. The root public key of the certificate chain used to verify the signature of a Microsoft's catalog file must match one of the Microsoft's root public keys indicating that Microsoft is the publisher of the Windows image files. These Microsoft's root public keys are hardcoded in the Winload boot application.

If the image files are validated, their SHA-256 hashes, as calculated by the Winload boot application, must match their trusted SHA-256 hashes in a Microsoft's catalog file, which has been verified by the Winload boot application. A hash of an image file is calculated for the whole file, with the exception of the following three elements which are excluded from the hash calculation: the CheckSum field in the IMAGE\_OPTIONAL\_HEADER, the IMAGE\_DIRECTORY\_ENTRY\_SECURITY IMAGE\_DATA\_DIRECTORY, and the public key certificate table, which always resides at the end of the image file.

Should the Winload boot application be unable to validate the integrity of one of the Windows image files, the Winload boot application does not continue to load other Windows image files. Rather it displays an error message and fails into a non-operational mode. In limited circumstances the pre-boot environment will attempt to repair the boot environment, such as copying files from a repair partition to repair files with integrity errors. When repair is not possible, the boot manager will ask the user to reinstall Windows.

After the initial device drivers have been loaded, the Windows kernel will continue to boot the rest of the operating system using the Code Integrity capability (ci.dll) to measure code integrity for (1) the remaining kernel-mode and user-mode programs which need to be loaded for the OS to complete its boot and (2) after booting, CI also verifies the integrity of applications launched by the user (applications from Microsoft are always signed by Microsoft, and third-party applications which may be signed by the developer) by checking the RSA signature for the binary and SHA-256 hashes of the binary which are compared to the catalog files described above.

Kernel-mode code signing (KMCS), also managed by CI, prevents kernel-mode device drivers, such as the TCP/IP network driver (tcpip.sys), from loading unless they are published and digitally signed by developers who have been vetted by one of a handful of trusted certificate authorities (CAs). KMCS, using public-key cryptography technologies, requires that kernel-mode code include a digital signature generated by one of the trusted certificate authorities. When a kernel device driver tries to load, Windows decrypts the hash included with the driver using the public key stored in the certificate, then verifies that the hash matches the one computed with the code. The authenticity of the certificate is checked in the same way, but using the certificate authority's public key, which is trusted by Windows. The root public key of the certificate chain that verifies the signature must match one of the Microsoft's

root public keys indicating that Microsoft is the publisher of the Windows image files. These Microsoft's root public keys are hardcoded in the Windows boot loader.<sup>65</sup>

In addition, Windows File Protection maintains a set of protected files that are stored in a cache along with cryptographic hashes of each of those files. Once the system is initialized, Windows File Protection is loaded and will scan the protected files to ensure they have valid cryptographic hashes. Windows File Protection also registers itself to be notified should any of the protected files be modified so that it can recheck the cryptographic checksum at any point while the system is operational. Should the any of the cryptographic hash checks fail, the applicable file will be restored from the cache.

### 6.6.5 Windows and Application Updates

Updates to Windows are delivered as Microsoft Update Standalone Package files (.msu files which are signed by Microsoft with two digital signatures, a RSA SHA1 signature for legacy applications and a RSA SHA-256 signature for modern applications. The digital signature is signed by *Microsoft Corporation*, with a certification path through a Microsoft Code Signing certificate and ultimately the Microsoft Root Certification Authority. These certificates are checked by the Windows Trusted Installer prior to installing the update.

The Windows operating system will check that the certificate is valid and has not been revoked using a standard PKI CRL. Once the Trusted Installer determines that the package is valid, it will update Windows; otherwise the installation will abort and there will be an error message in the event log. Note that the Windows installer will not install an update if the files in the package have lower version numbers than the installed files.

The integrity of the Microsoft Code Signing certificate on the computer is protected by the storage root key within the TPM, and the validated integrity of the Windows binaries as a result of Secure Boot and Code Integrity.

Updates to the Windows operating system, Windows applications, and Microsoft desktop applications are delivered through the Windows Update capability (for Windows) and Microsoft Update (for Microsoft desktop applications), which is enabled by default, or the user can go to <http://catalog.update.microsoft.com> to search and obtain security updates on their own volition.

A user can then check that the signature is valid either by viewing the digital signature details of the file from Windows Explorer or by using the `Get-AuthenticodeSignature` PowerShell Cmdlet. The following is an example of using PowerShell:

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<sup>65</sup> Enforcing the Kernel Mode Code Signing policy is mandatory for the x64 version of Windows. For the x86 version of Windows, Windows will check the signatures for all kernel executable code and will halt OS if it detects an integrity error in `ntoskrnl.exe`, `bootvid.dll`, `hall.dll`, `kdcom.dll`, `ci.dll`, `clfs.dll`, `ksecdd.sys`, `pshed.dll`, or `tpm.sys`.

```

Windows PowerShell
PS C:\Users\MGrimm> Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath c:\Users\MGrimm\Desktop\Windows8-RT-KB2785220-x64.msu

Directory: C:\Users\MGrimm\Desktop

SignerCertificate          Status          Path
-----
AC1FD0922A4A2A6E5779ACDD628747C28394B0B9 Valid           Windows8-RT-KB2785220-x64.msu

PS C:\Users\MGrimm>
    
```

If the `Get-AuthenticodeSignature` PowerShell Cmdlet or Windows Explorer could not verify the signature, the status will be marked as invalid. This verification check uses the same functionality described above.

### 6.6.5.1 Windows Store Applications

Universal Windows Platform (UWP) apps can be downloaded from the Microsoft Store and their installation packages are verified using a digital signature from *Microsoft Corporation* with the Code Signing usage. These applications are contained in either *AppX packages*, or a collection of AppX packages known as an *AppX bundle*.<sup>66</sup> The AppX package uses the Open Packaging Conventions (OPC) standard.<sup>67</sup> Each package contains a directory file which lists the other files in the package, a digital signature for the package, a block map representing the application files which may be installed on the target computer, and the application files themselves. The AppX Deployment Service will verify the RSA SHA-256 digital signature for the block map and the other AppX metadata at the beginning of the AppX package (or bundle) download. This is described in more detail as part at <http://blogs.msdn.com/b/windowsappdev/archive/2012/12/04/designing-a-simple-and-secure-app-package-appx.aspx>.

### 6.6.5.2 Distributing updates

There are several distribution channels for updates to Windows and Windows applications:

- Windows Update: Windows Update is the web service for delivering Windows updates to directly to consumers.
- Windows Server Update Services (WSUS): WSUS is a server role in Windows Server which IT administrators can use to distribute application updates to users within their enterprise.
- Windows Store: The Windows Store is a web service for delivering updates to Universal Windows Platform apps which were originally installed from the Windows Store.

<sup>66</sup> Windows Store Applications are typically downloaded from the [Windows Store for the Windows 10 operating system](#).

<sup>67</sup> OPC is also part of ISO/IEC 2900-2 and ECMA 376-2.

### 6.6.6 SFR Summary

- **FPT\_ACF\_EXT.1:** Windows provides a Discretionary Access Control policy to limit modification and reading of objects by non-authorized users.
- **FPT\_ASLR\_EXT.1:** Windows randomizes user-mode process address spaces and kernel-mode address space.
- **FPT\_SBOP\_EXT.1:** Windows binaries are compiled with stack overflow protection (compiled using the `/Gs` option for native applications).
- **FPT\_SRP\_EXT.1:** Windows can restrict program execution based on the file path for the executable, a digital signature for the executable, a version number for the executable, or a hash of the executable file.
- **FPT\_TST\_EXT.1, FPT\_TST\_EXT.1(WLAN), FPT\_TST\_EXT.1(IPSEC):** Windows checks the integrity of the Windows boot loader, OS loader, kernel, and system binaries and all application executable code, i.e., Windows Store Applications and updates to Windows and Windows Store Applications.
- **FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1, FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2:** Windows provides a means to identify the current version of the Windows software, the hardware model, and installed applications. Windows has update mechanisms to deliver updated operating system and application binaries and a means for a user to confirm that the digital signatures, which ensure the integrity of the update, are valid for both the operating system, applications, and Windows Store Applications.

## 6.7 TOE Access

Windows provides the ability for a user to lock their interactive logon session at their own volition or after a user-defined inactivity timeout. Windows also provides the ability for the administrator to specify the interval of inactivity after which the session will be locked. This policy will be applied to either the local machine or the computers within a domain using either local policy or group policy respectively. If both the administrator and a standard user specify an inactivity timeout period, Windows will lock the session when the shortest time period expires.

Once a user has a desktop session, they can invoke the session locking function by using the same key sequence used to invoke the trusted path (**Ctrl+Alt+Del**). This key sequence is captured by the TSF and cannot be intercepted or altered by any user process. The result of that key sequence is a menu of functions, one of which is to lock the workstation. The user can also lock their desktop session by going to the Start screen, selecting their logon name, and then choosing the “Lock” option.

Windows constantly monitors the mouse, keyboard, touch display, and the orientation sensor for inactivity in order to determine if they are inactive for the specified time period. After which, Windows will lock the workstation and execute the screen saver unless the user is streaming video such as a movie. Note that if the workstation was not locked manually, the TSF will lock the display and start the screen saver program if and when the inactivity period is exceeded, as well any notifications from applications which have registered to publish the application’s badge or the badge with associated notification text to the locked screen. The user has the option to not display any notifications, or choose one Windows Store Application to display notification text, and select other applications display their badge.

After the computer was locked, in order to unlock their session, the user either presses a key or swipes the display. The user must provide the **Ctrl+Alt+Del** key combination if the **Interactive Logon: Do not required CTRL+ALT+DEL** policy is set to disabled. Either action will result in an authentication dialog. The user must then re-enter their authentication data, which has been cached by the local system from the initial logon, after which the user's display will be restored and the session will resume. Alternately, an authorized administrator can enter their administrator identity and password in the authentication dialog. If the TSF can successfully authenticate the administrator, the user will be logged off, rather than returning to the user's session, leaving the workstation ready to authenticate a new user.

As part of establishing the interactive logon session, Windows can be configured to display a logon banner, which is specified by the administrator, that the user must accept prior to establishing the session.

As described in the administrator guidance, an authorized administrator can specify which Wi-Fi networks (SSIDs) a computer may be connected to.

### 6.7.1 SFR Summary

- **FTA\_TAB.1:** An authorized administrator can define and modify a banner that will be displayed prior to allowing a user to logon.
- **FTA\_WSE\_EXT.1:** An authorized administrator can specify which Wi-Fi networks connect to, as specified in FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1(WLAN).

## 6.8 Trusted Channels

Windows provides trusted network channels to communicate with supporting IT infrastructure or applications:

- Using TLS (HTTPS) for certificate enrollment; CRL checking; authentication to network resources such as web (HTTPS) and directory (LDAP-S) servers; and management via configuration service providers in Windows that are local interface for processing Mobile Device Management (MDM) requests.
- Using DTLS for datagram-based services and web browsing using a DTLS version which is specified by the client application.
- Using IPsec for remote management of Windows and to connect over a virtual private network (VPN).

In order to establish a trusted channel, these communications are protected as described above in section 6.2.3.

The remote access can be performed through the following methods:

- Remote Desktop Services Overview: <https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hh831447.aspx>
- Connect to another computer using Remote Desktop Connection: <http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/connect-using-remote-desktop-connection#connect-using-remote-desktop-connection=windows-7>



- PowerShell Remoting: <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-US/powershell/scripting/setup/winrmsecurity?view=powershell-6>

Both methods use TLS (1.2) protocol for establishing the remote connection.

Windows implements IEEE 802.11-2012, IEEE 802.1X and EAP-TLS to provide authenticated wireless networking sessions when requested by the user as described above in .

The specific details for each protocol are described in section Network Protocols.

### 6.8.1 SFR Summary

- **FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1(TLS), FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1(DTLS), FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1(WLAN), FTP\_ITC.1(IPSEC):** Windows provides several trusted network channels that protect data in transit from disclosure, provide data integrity, and endpoint identification that is used by 802.11-2012, 802.1X, EAP-TLS, TLS, HTTPS, DTLS, and IPsec. TLS and HTTPS is used as part of network-based authentication and certification validation, HTTPS and DTLS are used for web-browsing and by other connection-based and datagram-based application protocols.
- **FTP\_TRP.1:** Windows provide a local trusted path service as described in TOE Access and a network-based trusted channel built on the network protocols described in this section.

## 6.9 Security Response Process

Microsoft utilizes industry standard practices to address reported product vulnerabilities. This includes a central email address ([secure@microsoft.com](mailto:secure@microsoft.com)) to report issues (as described at <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/faqs-report-an-issue?rtc=1>), timely triage and root cause analysis, and responsible resolution of the report which may result in the release of a binary update. If a binary update is required, it is made available through automated channels to all customers following the process described at <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/>. If the sender wishes to send secure email, there is a public PGP key for S/MIME at <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/pgp-key-msrc?rtc=1>. Security updates for Microsoft products – operating system, firmware, and applications – are delivered as described in section 6.6.4 and 6.6.5.

## 7 Protection Profile Conformance Claim

This section provides the protection profile conformance claim and supporting justifications and rationale.

This Security Target is in compliance with the General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile, Version 4.2.1, April 22, 2019 (GP OS PP), the Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, version 1.0, February 8, 2016 (“WLAN Client EP”), and the PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, version 2.1, October 5, 2017 (“IPsec Client EP”).

For all of the content incorporated from the protection profile, the corresponding rationale in that protection profile remains applicable to demonstrate the correspondence between the TOE security functional requirements and TOE security objectives. Moreover, as demonstrated in this security target Windows runs on a wide variety of hardware ranging from tablets, convertibles, notebooks, desktop, and server computers and so it is a general-purpose operating system.

The requirements in the protection profile are assumed to represent a complete set of requirements that serve to address any interdependencies. All the functional requirements in this security target have been copied from the protection profile so that all dependencies between SFRs are satisfied by the inclusion of the relevant component.

**Table 28 GP OS PP Security Objectives Rationale**

Threat or Assumption	Security Objective	Rationale
T.NETWORK_ATTACK	O.PROTECTED_COMMS, O.INTEGRITY, O.MANAGEMENT, O.ACCOUNTABILITY	The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides for integrity of transmitted data. The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.INTEGRITY as this provides for integrity of software that is installed onto the system from the network. The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.MANAGEMENT as this provides for the ability to configure the OS to defend against network attack. The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.ACCOUNTABILITY as this provides a mechanism for the OS to report behavior that may indicate a network attack has occurred.

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<b>T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP</b>	O.PROTECTED_COMMS, O.MANAGEMENT	The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides for confidentiality of transmitted data. The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.MANAGEMENT as this provides for the ability to configure the OS to protect the confidentiality of its transmitted data.
<b>T.LOCAL_ATTACK</b>	O.INTEGRITY, O.ACCOUNTABILITY	The objective O.INTEGRITY protects against the use of mechanisms that weaken the TOE with regard to attack by other software on the platform. The objective O.ACCOUNTABILITY protects against local attacks by providing a mechanism to report behavior that may indicate a local attack is occurring or has occurred.
<b>T.LIMITED_PHYSICAL_ACCESS</b>	O.PROTECTED_STORAGE	The objective O.PROTECTED_STORAGE protects against unauthorized attempts to access physical storage used by the TOE.
<b>A.PLATFORM</b>	OE.PLATFORM	The operational environment objective OE.PLATFORM is realized through A.PLATFORM.
<b>A.PROPER_USER</b>	OE.PROPER_USER	The operational environment objective OE.PROPER_USER is realized through A.PROPER_USER.
<b>A.PROPER_ADMIN</b>	OE.PROPER_ADMIN	The operational environment objective OE.PROPER_ADMIN is realized through A.PROPER_ADMIN.

**Table 29 WLAN Client EP Security Objectives Rationale**

Threat or Assumption	Security Objective	Rationale
<b>T.TSF_FAILURE</b>	O.TSF_SELF_TEST	The objective O.TSF_SELF_TEST protects against unexpected failures since some subset of the

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		TOE security functionality are periodically checked.
<b>T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS</b>	O.AUTH_COMM, O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_FUNCTIONS, O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION, and O.WIRELESS_ACCESS_POINT_CONNECTION	The objective O.AUTH_COMM provides a means to identify the Wi-Fi access point before the connection is established. Moreover, the objective O.WIRELESS_ACCESS_POINT_CONNECTION provides a means to restrict the access point, ensuring that the connection is only performed with trusted access points. The objective O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION provides the capability to configure the TOE to allow connection to specific access points. The objective O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_FUNCTIONS ensures that the communications between the TOE and the access point are protected to ensure its integrity and confidentiality.
<b>T.UNDETECTED_ACTIONS</b>	O.SYSTEM_MONITORING	The objective O.SYSTEM_MONITORING protects against undetected actions since all the actions and events occurred in the TOE are audited.
<b>A.NO_TOE_BYPASS</b>	OE.NO_TOE_BYPASS	The operational environment objective OE.NO_TOE_BYPASS is realized through A.NO_TOE_BYPASS
<b>A.TRUSTED_ADMIN</b>	OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN	The operational environment objective OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN is realized through A.TRUSTED_ADMIN

**Table 30 IPsec Client EP Security Objectives Rationale**

Threat or Assumption	Security Objective	Rationale
<b>T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS</b>	O.PROTECTED_COMMS, O.INTEGRITY, O.MANAGEMENT, O.ACCOUNTABILITY,	The threat of an attacker gaining access to a network interface or data that is transmitted over it is

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	O.PROTECTED_COMMS, O.MANAGEMENT	consistent with the T.NETWORK_ATTACK and T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP threats in the GPOS PP.
<b>T.TSF_CONFIGURATION</b>	O.INTEGRITY, O.ACCOUNTABILITY	The threat of a mis-configured VPN client is consistent with the T.LOCAL_ATTACK threat in the GPOS PP.
<b>T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE</b>	O.INTEGRITY, O.ACCOUNTABILITY	The threat of an unauthorized update to the VPN client software in particular is consistent with the T.LOCAL_ATTACK threat in the GPOS PP.
<b>T.USER_DATA_REUSE</b>	O.PROTECTED_COMMS, O.MANAGEMENT	Inadvertent disclosure of user data to an unauthorized recipient is consistent with the T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP threat in the GPOS PP.
<b>T.TSF_FAILURE</b>	O.INTEGRITY, O.ACCOUNTABILITY	A failure of TSF functionality could compromise the local system, which is consistent with the T.LOCAL_ATTACK threat in the GPOS PP.
<b>A.NO_TOE_BYPASS</b>	OE.NO_TOE_BYPASS	The operational environment objective OE.NO_TOE_BYPASS is realized through A.NO_TOE_BYPASS.
<b>A.PHYSICAL</b>	OE.PHYSICAL	The operational environment objective OE.PHYSICAL is realized through A.PHYSICAL.
<b>A.TRUSTED_CONFIG</b>	OE.TRUSTED_CONFIG	The operational environment objective OE.TRUSTED_CONFIG is realized through A.TRUSTED_CONFIG.

**Table 31 GP OS PP Tracing Between SFR and TOE Security Objective**

Security Objective	Rationale
<b>O.ACCOUNTABILITY</b>	Addressed by: FAU_GEN.1, FTP_ITC_EXT.1  Rationale: FAU_GEN.1 defines the auditable events that must be generated to diagnose the cause of unexpected system behavior. FTP_ITC_EXT.1 provides a mechanism for the TSF to transmit the audit data to a remote system.
<b>O.INTEGRITY</b>	Addressed by: FPT_SBOP_EXT.1, FPT_AS LR_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.2, FCS_COP.1(2), FCS_COP.1(3), FCS_COP.1(4),

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	<p>FPT_ACF_EXT.1, FPT_SRP_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.1, FPT_TST_EXT.1, FTP_ITC_EXT.1, FPT_W^X_EXT.1, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UAU.5</p> <p>Rationale: FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 enforces stack buffer overflow protection that makes it more difficult to exploit running code. FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 prevents attackers from exploiting code that executes in static known memory locations. FPT_TUD_EXT.1 and FPT_TUD_EXT.2 enforce integrity of software updates. FCS_COP.1(2), FCS_COP.1(3), and FCS_COP.1(4) provide the cryptographic mechanisms that are used to verify integrity values. FPT_ACF_EXT.1 guarantees the integrity of critical components by preventing unauthorized modifications of them. FPT_SRP_EXT.1 restricts the execution of unauthorized software . FPT_X509_EXT.1 provides X.509 certificates as a way of validating software integrity. FPT_TST_EXT.1 verifies the integrity of stored code. FPT_W^X_EXT.1 prevents execution of data in writable memory. FIA_UAU.5 provides mechanisms that prevent untrusted users from accessing the TSF and FIA_AFL.1 prevents brute-force authentication attempts. FTP_ITC_EXT.1 provides trusted remote communications which makes a remote authenticated session less susceptible to compromise.</p>
<b>O.MANAGEMENT</b>	<p>Addressed by: FMT_MOF_EXT.1, FMT_SMF_EXT.1, FTA_TAB.1, FTP_TRP.1</p> <p>Rationale: FMT_SMF_EXT.1 defines the TOE's management functions and FMT_MOF_EXT.1 defines the privileges required to invoke them. FTP_TRP.1 provides one or more secure remote interfaces for management of the TSF and FTA_TAB.1 provides actionable warnings against misuse of these interfaces.</p>
<b>O.PROTECTED_STORAGE</b>	<p>Addressed by: FCS_STO_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_COP.1(1), FDP_ACF_EXT.1</p> <p>Rationale: FCS_STO_EXT.1 provides a mechanism by which the TOE can designate data as 'sensitive' and subsequently require it to be encrypted. FCS_COP.1(1) defines the symmetric algorithm used to encrypt and decrypt sensitive data. FCS_RBG_EXT.1 defines the random bit generator used to create the symmetric keys used to perform this encryption and decryption. FDP_ACF_EXT.1 enforces logical access control on stored data.</p>
<b>O.PROTECTED_COMMS</b>	<p>Addressed by: FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2, FCS_TLSC_EXT.3, FCS_TLSC_EXT.4, FCS_DTLS_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM_EXT.4, FCS_COP.1(1), FCS_COP.1(2), FCS_COP.1(3), FCS_COP.1(4), FDP_IFC_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2, FTP_ITC_EXT.1</p> <p>Rationale: FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2, FCS_TLSC_EXT.3, and FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 define the ability of the TOE to act as a TLS client as a method of enforcing protected communications. FCS_DTLS_EXT.1</p>

	<p>defines the ability of the TOE to act as a DTLS client for the same purpose. FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_COP.1(1), FCS_COP.1(2), FCS_COP.1(3), FCS_COP.1(4), and FCS_RBG_EXT.1 define the cryptographic operations and key lifecycle activity used to support the establishment of protected communications. FIA_X509_EXT.1 defines how the TSF validates x.509 certificates as part of establishing protected communications. FIA_X509_EXT.2 defines the trusted communication protocols for which the TOE must perform certificate validation operations. FDP_IFC_EXT.1 defines the extent to which the TSF provides an IPsec VPN as a protected communications method. FTP_ITC_EXT.1 defines the trusted communications channels supported by the TOE.</p>
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**Table 32 WLAN Client EP Tracing Between SFR and TOE Security Objective**

Security Objective	Rationale
<b>O.AUTH_COMM</b>	<p>Addressed by: FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2/WLAN, FIA_PAE_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN, FIA_X509_EXT.4 and FTP_ITC_EXT.1.</p> <p>Rationale: FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN and FCS_TLSC_EXT.2/WLAN define the cipher suite used for establishing a secure connection between the TOE and the access point. FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN defines how the TSF validates x.509 certificates as part of establishing protected communications. FIA_X509_EXT.4 defines how the certificates used for the communications are protected from unauthorized deletion. FIA_PAE_EXT.1 defines the protocol that should be followed in the communication between the TOE and the authentication server during its connection with the access point. FTP_ITC_EXT.1/WLAN defines the trusted communications channels supported by the TOE and the access point.</p>
<b>O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_FUNCTIONS</b>	<p>Addressed by: FCS_CKM.1/WLAN and FCS_CKM.2/WLAN</p> <p>Rationale: FCS_CKM.1/WLAN and FCS_CKM.2/WLAN define the cryptographic operations and key lifecycle activity used to support the establishment of protected communications.</p>
<b>O.SYSTEM_MONITORING</b>	<p>Addressed by: FAU_GEN.1/WLAN</p> <p>Rationale: FAU_GEN.1 defines the auditable events that must be generated to monitor the actions occurred in the TOE.</p>
<b>O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION</b>	<p>Addressed by: FMT_SMF_EXT.1/WLAN</p> <p>Rationale: FMT_SMF_EXT.1/WLAN provides the capability to configure rules to determine whether the TOE can connect to some specific access points, based on different rules.</p>
<b>O.TSF_SELF_TEST</b>	<p>Addressed by: FPT_TST_EXT.1/WLAN</p>

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	Rationale: FPT_TST_EXT.1/WLAN verifies the integrity of stored code related to the WLAN component.
<b>O.WIRELESS_ACCESS_POINT_CONNECTION</b>	Addressed by: FTA_WSE_EXT.1  Rationale: FTA_WSE_EXT.1 enforces that the connection is only performed with trusted access points

**Table 33 Tracing Between GP OS PP Security Objective and IPsec Client EP SFRs**

Security Objective	Rationale
<b>O.ACCOUNTABILITY</b>	Addressed by: FAU_GEN.1 (IPSEC), FAU_SEL.1  Rationale: FAU_GEN.1(IPSEC) defines the auditable events that must be generated to diagnose the cause of unexpected system behavior. FAU_SEL.1 enables the administrator to choose which events will be audited
<b>O.INTEGRITY</b>	Addressed by: FPT_TST_EXT.1, FTP_ITC.1(IPSEC), FDP_RIP.2  Rationale: FPT_TST_EXT.1(IPSEC) verifies the integrity of stored code. FTP_ITC_EXT.1(IPSEC) provides trusted remote communications which makes a remote authenticated session less susceptible to compromise.
<b>O.MANAGEMENT</b>	Addressed by: FMT_SMF.1(VPN), FIA_PSK_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.3  Rationale: FMT_SMF.1(VPN) defines the TOE's management functions. FIA_PSK_EXT.1 specifies how the administrator can valid pre-shared keys. FIA_X509_EXT.3 specifies whether the TOE will establish a IPsec security association in there is a X.509 certificate validation problem.
<b>O.PROTECTED_STORAGE</b>	Addressed by: FCS_CKM_EXT.2, FCS_COP.1(1)  Rationale: FCS_CKM_EXT.1 ensures that sensitive data is stored when not in use. FCS_COP.1(1) defines the symmetric algorithm used to encrypt and decrypt sensitive data.
<b>O.PROTECTED_COMMS</b>	Addressed by: FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.1(VPN), FCS_CKM.2, FCS_COP.1(1), FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1, FDP_IFC_EXT.1(IPSEC), FDP_RIP.2  Rationale: FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.1(VPN), FCS_CKM.2, FCS_COP.1(1), define the cryptographic operations and key lifecycle activity used to support the establishment of protected communications. FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 defines the IPsec protocol. FDP_IFC_EXT.1(IPSEC) specifies the IPsec VPN Client. FDP_RIP.2 specifies that data storage should not be reused without clearing the memory location.





## 8 Rationale for Modifications to the Security Requirements

This section provides a rationale that describes how the Security Target reproduced the security functional requirements and security assurance requirements from the protection profile.

### 8.1 Functional Requirements

This Security Target includes security functional requirements (SFRs) that can be mapped to SFRs found in the protection profile along with SFRs that describe additional features and capabilities. The mapping from protection profile SFRs to security target SFRs along with rationale for operations is presented in **Table 34 Rationale for Operations**. SFR operations left incomplete in the protection profile have been completed in this security and are identified within each SFR in section 5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements.

**Table 34 Rationale for Operations**

PP or EP	Requirement	ST Requirement	Operation & Rationale
GP OS	FAU_GEN.1	FAU_GEN.1	A selection and multiple assignments which are allowed by the PP.
GP OS, IPsec	FCS_CKM.1(1)	FCS_CKM.1	Multiple selections which are allowed by the PP and EP.
GP OS, IPsec	FCS_CKM.2(1)	FCS_CKM.2	A selection which is allowed by the PP and EP.
GP OS	FCS_CKM_EXT.4	FCS_CKM_EXT.4	Multiple selections which are allowed by the Technical Decision #239.
GP OS, IPsec	FCS_COP.1(1)	FCS_COP.1(SYM)	Multiple selections which are allowed by the PP and EP.
GP OS	FCS_COP.1(2)	FCS_COP.1(HASH)	Multiple selections which are allowed by the PP.
GP OS	FCS_COP.1(3)	FCS_COP.1(SIGN)	A selection which is allowed by the PP.
GP OS	FCS_COP.1(4)	FCS_COP.1(HMAC)	An assignment and multiple selections which are allowed by the PP.
GP OS	FCS_RBG_EXT.1	FCS_RBG_EXT.1	Multiple selections which are allowed by the PP.
GP OS	FCS_STO_EXT.1	FCS_STO_EXT.1	Copied from the PP without changes.
GP OS	FCS_TLSC_EXT.1	FCS_TLSC_EXT.1	A selection which is allowed by the PP.
GP OS	FCS_TLSC_EXT.2	FCS_TLSC_EXT.2	Copied from the PP without changes.
GP OS	FCS_TLSC_EXT.3	FCS_TLSC_EXT.3	A selection which is allowed by the PP.
GP OS	FCS_TLSC_EXT.4	FCS_TLSC_EXT.4	Copied from the PP without changes.

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PP or EP	Requirement	ST Requirement	Operation & Rationale
GP OS	FCS_DTLS_EXT.1	FCS_DTLS_EXT.1	A selection which is allowed by the PP.
GP OS	FDP_ACF_EXT.1	FDP_ACF_EXT.1	Copied from the PP without changes.
GP OS	FDP_IFC_EXT.1	FDP_IFC_EXT.1	A selection which is allowed by the PP.
GP OS	FIA_AFL.1	FIA_AFLT.1	Multiple assignment and multiple selections which are allowed by the PP.
GP OS	FIA_UAU.5	FIA_UAU.5	An assignment and a selection which are allowed by the PP.
GP OS	FIA_X509_EXT.1	FIA_X509_EXT.1	A selection which is allowed by the PP.
GP OS	FIA_X509_EXT.2	FIA_X509_EXT.2	A selection which is allowed by the PP.
GP OS	FMT_MOF_EXT.1	FMT_MOF_EXT.1	Copied from the Technical Decision #0104 without changes.
GP OS	FMT_SMF_EXT.1	FMT_SMF_EXT.1	Refinements, selections and assignments which are allowed by the Technical Decision #104.
GP OS	FPT_ACF_EXT.1	FPT_ACF_EXT.1	Two assignment which is allowed by the PP.
GP OS	FPT_ASLR_EXT.1	FPT_ASLR_EXT.1	An assignment which is allowed by the PP.
GP OS	FPT_SBOP_EXT.1	FPT_SBOP_EXT.1	Copied from the PP without changes.
GP OS	FPT_SRP_EXT.1	FPT_SRP_EXT.1	A selection which is allowed by the PP.
GP OS	FPT_TST_EXT.1	FPT_TST_EXT.1	An assignment and multiple selections which are allowed by the PP.
GP OS	FPT_TUD_EXT.1	FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Added a refinement to align on SFR labels.
GP OS	FPT_TUD_EXT.2	FPT_TUD_EXT.2	Added a refinement to align on SFR labels.
GP OS	FTA_TAB.1	FTA_TAB.1	Copied from the PP without changes.
GP OS	FTP_TRP.1	FTP_TRP.1	Multiple selections which are allowed by the PP and Technical Decision #0208.
GP OS	FTP_ITC_EXT.1	FTP_ITC_EXT.1(TLS)	An assignment and a selection which are allowed by the PP.
GP OS	FTP_ITC_EXT.1	FTP_ITC_EXT.1(DTLS)	An assignment and a selection which are allowed by the PP.
WLAN	FAU_GEN.1/WLAN	FAU_GEN.1(WLAN)	Two selections which are allowed by the WLAN Client EP.

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PP or EP	Requirement	ST Requirement	Operation & Rationale
<b>WLAN</b>	FCS_CKM.1/WLAN	FCS_CKM.1(WLAN)	Three selections which are allowed by the WLAN Client EP.
<b>WLAN</b>	FCS_CKM.2/WLAN	FCS_CKM.2(WLAN)	Copied from the WLAN Client EP without changes.
<b>WLAN</b>	FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN	FCS_TLSC_EXT.1(WLAN)	Two selections which are allowed by the WLAN Client EP.
<b>WLAN</b>	FCS_TLSC_EXT.2/WLAN	FCS_TLSC_EXT.2(WLAN)	A selection which is allowed by the WLAN Client EP.
<b>WLAN</b>	FIA_PAE_EXT.1	FIA_PAE_EXT.1	Copied from the WLAN Client EP without changes.
<b>WLAN</b>	FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN	FIA_X509_EXT.1(WLAN)	Copied from the WLAN Client EP without changes.
<b>WLAN</b>	FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN	FIA_X509_EXT.2(WLAN)	A selection which is allowed by the WLAN Client EP.
<b>WLAN</b>	FIA_X509_EXT.4	FIA_X509_EXT.4	Copied from the WLAN Client EP without changes.
<b>WLAN</b>	FMT_SMF_EXT.1/WLAN	FMT_SMF_EXT.1(WLAN)	A selection which is allowed by the WLAN Client EP.
<b>WLAN</b>	FPT_TST_EXT.1/WLAN	FPT_TST_EXT.1(WLAN)	Two selections which are allowed by the WLAN Client EP.
<b>WLAN</b>	FTA_WSE_EXT.1	FTA_WSE_EXT.1	Copied from the WLAN Client EP without changes.
<b>WLAN</b>	FTP_ITC_EXT.1/WLAN	FTP_ITC_EXT.1(WLAN)	Copied from the WLAN Client EP without changes.
<b>IPsec</b>	FAU_GEN.1	FAU_GEN.1 (IPSEC)	Two selections and a refinement which are allowed by the IPsec Client EP.
<b>IPsec</b>	FAU_SEL.1	FAU_SEL.1	A selection and an assignment which are allowed by the IPsec Client EP.
<b>IPsec</b>	FCS_CKM.1/VPN	FCS_CKM.1(VPN)	Three selections which are allowed by the IPsec Client EP.
<b>IPsec</b>	FCS_CKM_EXT.2	FCS_CKM_EXT.2	A selection which is allowed by the IPsec Client EP.
<b>IPsec</b>	FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1	FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1	Multiple selections and assignments which are allowed by the IPsec Client EP.
<b>IPsec</b>	FDP_IFC_EXT.1	FDP_IFC_EXT.1(IPSEC)	Copied from the IPsec Client EP without changes.
<b>IPsec</b>	FDP_RDP.2	FDP_RDP.2	Two selections which are allowed by the IPsec Client EP.
<b>IPsec</b>	FIA_X509_EXT.3	FIA_X509_EXT.3	Multiple selections which are allowed by the IPsec Client EP.
<b>IPsec</b>	FIA_PSK_EXT.1	FIA_PSK_EXT.1	Multiple selections which are allowed by the IPsec Client EP.

PP or EP	Requirement	ST Requirement	Operation & Rationale
IPsec	FMT_SMF_EXT.1/VPN	FMT_SMF_EXT.1(VPN)	Two selections which are allowed by the IPsec Client EP.
IPsec	FPT_TST_EXT.1	FPT_TST_EXT.1(IPSEC)	Two selections and an assignment which are allowed by the IPsec Client EP.
IPsec	FTP_ITC.1	FTP_ITC.1(IPSEC)	Multiple selections which are allowed by the IPsec Client EP.

## 8.2 Security Assurance Requirements

The statement of security assurance requirements (SARs) found in section 5.2.1 is in strict conformance with the General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile.

## 8.3 Rationale for the TOE Summary Specification

This section, in conjunction with section 6, the TOE Summary Specification (TSS), provides evidence that the security functions are suitable to meet the TOE security requirements.

Each subsection in section 6, TOE Security Functions (TSFs), describes a Security Function (SF) of the TOE. Each description is followed with rationale that indicates which requirements are satisfied by aspects of the corresponding SF. The set of security functions work together to satisfy all of the functional requirements. Furthermore, all the security functions are necessary in order for the TSF to provide the required security functionality.

The set of security functions work together to provide all of the security requirements as indicated in **Table 35**. The security functions described in the TOE Summary Specification and listed in the tables below are all necessary for the required security functionality in the TSF.

**Table 35 Requirement to Security Function Correspondence**

PP or EP	Requirement	Audit	Cryptographic Protection	User Data Protection	I & A	Security Management	TSF Protection	Resource Utilization	TOE Access	Trusted Path / Channel
GP OS	FAU_GEN.1	X								
GP OS	FCS_CKM.1		X							
GP OS	FCS_CKM.2		X							
GP OS	FCS_CKM_EXT.4		X							
GP OS	FCS_COP.1(SYM)		X							
GP OS	FCS_COP.1(HASH)		X							

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PP or EP	Requirement	Audit	Cryptographic Protection	User Data Protection	I & A	Security Management	TSF Protection	Resource Utilization	TOE Access	Trusted Path / Channel
GP OS	FCS_COP.1(SIGN)		X							
GP OS	FCS_COP.1(HMAC)		X							
GP OS	FCS_RBG_EXT.1		X							
GP OS	FCS_STO_EXT.1		X							
GP OS	FCS_TLSC_EXT.1		X							
GP OS	FCS_TLSC_EXT.2		X							
GP OS	FCS_TLSC_EXT.3		X							
GP OS	FCS_TLSC_EXT.4		X							
GP OS	FCS_DTLS_EXT.1		X							
GP OS	FDP_ACF_EXT.1			X						
GP OS	FDP_IFC_EXT.1			X						
GP OS	FIA_AFL.1				X					
GP OS	FIA_UAU.5				X					
GP OS	FIA_X509_EXT.1				X					
GP OS	FIA_X509_EXT.2				X					
GP OS	FIA_X509_EXT.4				X					
GP OS	FMT_MOF_EXT.1					X				
GP OS	FMT_SMF_EXT.1					X				
GP OS	FPT_ACF_EXT.1						X			
GP OS	FPT_ASLR_EXT.1						X			
GP OS	FPT_SBOP_EXT.1						X			
GP OS	FPT_SRP_EXT.1						X			
GP OS	FPT_TST_EXT.1						X			
GP OS	FPT_TUD_EXT.1						X			
GP OS	FPT_TUD_EXT.2						X			
GP OS	FTA_TAB.1								X	
GP OS	FTP_TRP.1									X
GP OS	FTP_ITC_EXT.1(TLS)									X
GP OS	FTP_ITC_EXT.1(DTLS)									X
WLAN	FAU_GEN.1(WLAN)	X								
WLAN	FCS_CKM.1(WLAN)		X							
WLAN	FCS_CKM.2(WLAN)		X							
WLAN	FCS_TLSC_EXT.1(WLAN)		X							
WLAN	FCS_TLSC_EXT.2(WLAN)		X							
WLAN	FIA_PAE_EXT.1				X					
WLAN	FIA_X509_EXT.1(WLAN)				X					

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PP or EP	Requirement	Audit	Cryptographic Protection	User Data Protection	I & A	Security Management	TSF Protection	Resource Utilization	TOE Access	Trusted Path / Channel
<b>WLAN</b>	FIA_X509_EXT.2(WLAN)				X					
<b>WLAN</b>	FMT_SMF_EXT.1(WLAN)					X				
<b>WLAN</b>	FPT_TST_EXT.1(WLAN)						X			
<b>WLAN</b>	FTA_WSE_EXT.1								X	
<b>WLAN</b>	FTP_ITC_EXT.1(WLAN)									X
<b>IPsec</b>	FAU_SEL.1	X								
<b>IPsec</b>	FCS_CKM.1(VPN)		X							
<b>IPsec</b>	FCS_CKM.2(IPSEC)		X							
<b>IPsec</b>	FCS_CKM_EXT.2		X							
<b>IPsec</b>	FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1		X							
<b>IPsec</b>	FDP_IFC_EXT.1(IPSEC)			X						
<b>IPsec</b>	FDP_RIP.2			X						
<b>IPsec</b>	FIA_X509_EXT.3				X					
<b>IPsec</b>	FIA_PSK_EXT.1				X					
<b>IPsec</b>	FMT_SMF.1(VPN)					X				
<b>IPsec</b>	FPT_TST_EXT.1(IPSEC)						X			
<b>IPsec</b>	FTP_ITC.1(IPSEC)									X

## 9 Appendix A: List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Meaning
<b>3DES</b>	Triple DES
<b>ACE</b>	Access Control Entry
<b>ACL</b>	Access Control List
<b>ACP</b>	Access Control Policy
<b>AD</b>	Active Directory
<b>ADAM</b>	Active Directory Application Mode
<b>AES</b>	Advanced Encryption Standard
<b>AGD</b>	Administrator Guidance Document
<b>AH</b>	Authentication Header
<b>ALPC</b>	Advanced Local Process Communication
<b>ANSI</b>	American National Standards Institute
<b>API</b>	Application Programming Interface
<b>APIC</b>	Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller
<b>BTG</b>	BitLocker To Go
<b>CA</b>	Certificate Authority
<b>CBAC</b>	Claims Basic Access Control, see DYN
<b>CBC</b>	Cipher Block Chaining
<b>CC</b>	Common Criteria
<b>CD-ROM</b>	Compact Disk Read Only Memory
<b>CIFS</b>	Common Internet File System
<b>CIMCPP</b>	Certificate Issuing and Management Components For Basic Robustness Environments Protection Profile, Version 1.0, April 27, 2009
<b>CM</b>	Configuration Management; Control Management
<b>COM</b>	Component Object Model
<b>CP</b>	Content Provider
<b>CPU</b>	Central Processing Unit
<b>CRL</b>	Certificate Revocation List
<b>CryptoAPI</b>	Cryptographic API
<b>CSP</b>	Cryptographic Service Provider
<b>DAC</b>	Discretionary Access Control
<b>DAACL</b>	Discretionary Access Control List
<b>DC</b>	Domain Controller
<b>DEP</b>	Data Execution Prevention
<b>DES</b>	Data Encryption Standard
<b>DH</b>	Diffie-Hellman
<b>DHCP</b>	Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
<b>DFS</b>	Distributed File System
<b>DMA</b>	Direct Memory Access
<b>DNS</b>	Domain Name System
<b>DS</b>	Directory Service
<b>DSA</b>	Digital Signature Algorithm



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<b>DYN</b>	Dynamic Access Control
<b>EAL</b>	Evaluation Assurance Level
<b>ECB</b>	Electronic Code Book
<b>EFS</b>	Encrypting File System
<b>ESP</b>	Encapsulating Security Protocol
<b>FEK</b>	File Encryption Key
<b>FIPS</b>	Federal Information Processing Standard
<b>FRS</b>	File Replication Service
<b>FSMO</b>	Flexible Single Master Operation
<b>FTP</b>	File Transfer Protocol
<b>FVE</b>	Full Volume Encryption
<b>GB</b>	Gigabyte
<b>GC</b>	Global Catalog
<b>GHz</b>	Gigahertz
<b>GPC</b>	Group Policy Container
<b>GPO</b>	Group Policy Object
<b>GPOSPP</b>	US Government Protection Profile for General-Purpose Operating System in a Networked Environment
<b>GPT</b>	Group Policy Template
<b>GPT</b>	GUID Partition Table
<b>GUI</b>	Graphical User Interface
<b>GUID</b>	Globally Unique Identifiers
<b>HTTP</b>	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
<b>HTTPS</b>	Secure HTTP
<b>I/O</b>	Input / Output
<b>I&amp;A</b>	Identification and Authentication
<b>IA</b>	Information Assurance
<b>ICF</b>	Internet Connection Firewall
<b>ICMP</b>	Internet Control Message Protocol
<b>ICS</b>	Internet Connection Sharing
<b>ID</b>	Identification
<b>IDE</b>	Integrated Drive Electronics
<b>IETF</b>	Internet Engineering Task Force
<b>IFS</b>	Installable File System
<b>IIS</b>	Internet Information Services
<b>IKE</b>	Internet Key Exchange
<b>IP</b>	Internet Protocol
<b>IPv4</b>	IP Version 4
<b>IPv6</b>	IP Version 6
<b>IPC</b>	Inter-process Communication
<b>IPI</b>	Inter-process Interrupt
<b>IPSec</b>	IP Security
<b>ISAPI</b>	Internet Server API
<b>IT</b>	Information Technology
<b>KDC</b>	Key Distribution Center
<b>LAN</b>	Local Area Network

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<b>LDAP</b>	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
<b>LPC</b>	Local Procedure Call
<b>LSA</b>	Local Security Authority
<b>LSASS</b>	LSA Subsystem Service
<b>LUA</b>	Least-privilege User Account
<b>MAC</b>	Message Authentication Code
<b>MB</b>	Megabyte
<b>MMC</b>	Microsoft Management Console
<b>MSR</b>	Model Specific Register
<b>NAC</b>	(Cisco) Network Admission Control
<b>NAP</b>	Network Access Protection
<b>NAT</b>	Network Address Translation
<b>NIC</b>	Network Interface Card
<b>NIST</b>	National Institute of Standards and Technology
<b>NLB</b>	Network Load Balancing
<b>NMI</b>	Non-maskable Interrupt
<b>NTFS</b>	New Technology File System
<b>NTLM</b>	New Technology LAN Manager
<b>OS</b>	Operating System
<b>PAE</b>	Physical Address Extension
<b>PC/SC</b>	Personal Computer/Smart Card
<b>PIN</b>	Personal Identification Number
<b>PKCS</b>	Public Key Certificate Standard
<b>PKI</b>	Public Key Infrastructure
<b>PP</b>	Protection Profile
<b>RADIUS</b>	Remote Authentication Dial In Service
<b>RAID</b>	Redundant Array of Independent Disks
<b>RAM</b>	Random Access Memory
<b>RAS</b>	Remote Access Service
<b>RC4</b>	Rivest's Cipher 4
<b>RID</b>	Relative Identifier
<b>RNG</b>	Random Number Generator
<b>RPC</b>	Remote Procedure Call
<b>RSA</b>	Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
<b>RSASSA</b>	RSA Signature Scheme with Appendix
<b>SA</b>	Security Association
<b>SACL</b>	System Access Control List
<b>SAM</b>	Security Assurance Measure
<b>SAML</b>	Security Assertion Markup Language
<b>SAR</b>	Security Assurance Requirement
<b>SAS</b>	Secure Attention Sequence
<b>SD</b>	Security Descriptor
<b>SHA</b>	Secure Hash Algorithm
<b>SID</b>	Security Identifier
<b>SIP</b>	Session Initiation Protocol
<b>SIPI</b>	Startup IPI

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<b>SF</b>	Security Functions
<b>SFP</b>	Security Functional Policy
<b>SFR</b>	Security Functional Requirement
<b>SMB</b>	Server Message Block
<b>SMI</b>	System Management Interrupt
<b>SMTP</b>	Simple Mail Transport Protocol
<b>SP</b>	Service Pack
<b>SPI</b>	Security Parameters Index
<b>SPI</b>	Stateful Packet Inspection
<b>SRM</b>	Security Reference Monitor
<b>SSL</b>	Secure Sockets Layer
<b>SSP</b>	Security Support Providers
<b>SSPI</b>	Security Support Provider Interface
<b>ST</b>	Security Target
<b>SYSVOL</b>	System Volume
<b>TCP</b>	Transmission Control Protocol
<b>TDI</b>	Transport Driver Interface
<b>TLS</b>	Transport Layer Security
<b>TOE</b>	Target of Evaluation
<b>TPM</b>	Trusted Platform Module
<b>TSC</b>	TOE Scope of Control
<b>TSF</b>	TOE Security Functions
<b>TSS</b>	TOE Summary Specification
<b>UART</b>	Universal Asynchronous Receiver / Transmitter
<b>UI</b>	User Interface
<b>UID</b>	User Identifier
<b>UNC</b>	Universal Naming Convention
<b>US</b>	United States
<b>UPN</b>	User Principal Name
<b>URL</b>	Uniform Resource Locator
<b>USB</b>	Universal Serial Bus
<b>USN</b>	Update Sequence Number
<b>v5</b>	Version 5
<b>VDS</b>	Virtual Disk Service
<b>VPN</b>	Virtual Private Network
<b>VSS</b>	Volume Shadow Copy Service
<b>WAN</b>	Wide Area Network
<b>WCF</b>	Windows Communications Framework
<b>WebDAV</b>	Web Document Authoring and Versioning
<b>WebSSO</b>	Web Single Sign On
<b>WDM</b>	Windows Driver Model
<b>WIF</b>	Windows Identity Framework
<b>WMI</b>	Windows Management Instrumentation
<b>WSC</b>	Windows Security Center
<b>WU</b>	Windows Update
<b>WSDL</b>	Web Service Description Language

Microsoft Common Criteria Security Target

<b>WWW</b>	World-Wide Web
<b>X64</b>	A 64-bit instruction set architecture
<b>X86</b>	A 32-bit instruction set architecture