National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Venafi Trust Protection Platform v23.1
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11434-2024
Dated: 07/29/2024
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Lisa Mitchell
Linda Morrison
Randy Heimann
Lori Sarem
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Elliot Keen
Adarsh Pandey
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary................................................................................................................. 5
2 Identification........................................................................................................................... 6
3 Architectural Information....................................................................................................... 7
3.1 TOE Overview and Description........................................................................................................................7
3.2 Physical Boundaries.........................................................................................................................................7
3.3 TOE Environment.............................................................................................................................................9
4 Security Policy....................................................................................................................... 11
4.1 Cryptographic Support...................................................................................................................................11
4.2 Security Management....................................................................................................................................11
4.3 Privacy............................................................................................................................................................11
4.4 User Data Protection .....................................................................................................................................11
4.5 Protection of the TSF .....................................................................................................................................11
4.6 Trusted Path/Channels..................................................................................................................................12
4.7 Unevaluated Functionality ................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope.................................................................................. 13
5.1 Assumptions...................................................................................................................................................13
5.2 Clarification of Scope.....................................................................................................................................13
6 Documentation ..................................................................................................................... 15
7 IT Product Testing ................................................................................................................. 16
7.1 Developer Testing..........................................................................................................................................16
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing .........................................................................................................16
8 TOE Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................... 17
8.1 Evaluated Configuration................................................................................................................................17
8.2 Excluded Functionality...................................................................................................................................18
9 Results of the Evaluation...................................................................................................... 20
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target ........................................................................................................................20
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation ................................................................................................20
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents..............................................................................................................20
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities....................................................................................................21
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................21
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity.................................................................................................................21
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results.....................................................................................................................22
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ......................................................................... 23
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 24
12 Security Target ...................................................................................................................... 25
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13 Glossary................................................................................................................................. 26
14 Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 27
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration
are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Venafi Trust Protection Platform Series Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents
the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an
endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is
either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of the
product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in July 2024. The information in this report is
largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all written
by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part
2 Extended and Part 3 Extended and meets the assurance requirements of the Protection Profile
for Application Software, version 1.4, dated 07 October 2021 [SWAPP], and Functional Package
for Secure Shell, version 1.0, dated 13 May 2021 [SSHFP].
The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as
interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in the Protection Profile (PP). This VR applies
only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence
provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the ST. Based on these findings,
the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions
justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in
the ETR are consistent with the evidence produced.
6
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories
called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against PPs
containing Assurance Activities, which are interpretations of Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation contract
with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the
evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliant List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1 Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Venafi Trust Protection Platform v23.1
Protection Profile • Protection Profile for Application Software, version 1.4, dated 22 April 2022 [SWAPP],
Functional Package for Secure Shell, version 1.0, dated 13 May 2021 [SSHFP].
Security Target Venafi Trust Protection Platform v23.1 Security Target, version 1.6
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Extended
Sponsor & Developer Venafi
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
Rockville, MD
CCEVS Validators Lisa Mitchell
Linda Morrison
Randy Heimann
Lori Sarem
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3 Architectural Information
3.1 TOE Overview and Description
Venafi Trust Protection Platform is a windows application that secures and protects keys and
certificates. This protection improves security posture with increased visibility, threat
intelligence, policy enforcement, and faster incident response for certificate-related outages and
compromises leveraging misused keys and certificates.
The platform supports all Venafi products and provides native integration with thousands of
applications and common APIs for the extensive security ecosystem. Shared and extensible
services enable enterprises to gain complete visibility into their key and certificate inventory,
identify certificate reputation, and establish a baseline. The entire issuance and renewal process
can be automated with policy enforcement and workflows, enabling new encryption dependent
applications to be scaled quickly. Trust Protection Platform keeps organizations secure, helping
them comply with standards and remediate key and certificate misuse.
The description above provides a general description of the functionality provided by the Venafi
Trust Protection Platform.
3.2 Physical Boundaries
The TOE boundary is the application software which runs on the host platform. The TOE is a
Windows Application. For this evaluation the TOE runs on Windows Server 2016 Standard
configured in FIPS mode running on a server with an Intel Xeon processor with AES-NI and
PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3. The Universal C Runtime must be installed. In addition to this the
following Microsoft Internet Information (IIS) web server roles must be installed:
• Common HTTP Features\Static Content
• Common HTTP Features\Default Document
• Health and Diagnostics\HTTP Logging
• Health and Diagnostics\Logging Tools
• Health and Diagnostics\Request Monitor
• Health and Diagnostics\Tracing
• Security\Request Filtering
• Performance\Static Content Compression
It should be noted that this operating system is outside the TOE boundary.
The following third-party libraries come bundled with the TOE and are inside the TOE boundary.
• IronPython
• Chaos.NaCl
• Microsoft Intune CSR Validation
• Sustainsys Saml2
• Excelsior JET
8
• F5 iControl Assembly for .NET
• Bootstrap
• Backbone
• Underscore
• Jquery
• date.js
• dateRangePicker.js, dateRangePicker.css
• moment.js
• easyDate.js
• maskedInput.js
• browser.js
• jquery.timepicker.js
• Select2.js
• moment-timezone.js
• core.js
• dropzone.js
• JSON.Net
• ASP.NET Web Stack
• Sencha Ext JS
• Tigra Calendar
• Pretty-Print JSON
• D3.js
• chart.js
• mustache.js
The TOE provides three consoles for management:
• A web-based console that can be launched by connecting to the TOE using a
browser.
• Venafi Configuration Console (VCC): A powerful Microsoft Management Console
(MMC) is a snap-in console that allows an administrator to manage Venafi services,
enable product components, configure database settings.
• WinAdmin: A Windows-based console that runs locally on the Trust Protection
Platform server.
The TOE also uses an external database to store credentials, certificates, keys and log data.
Microsoft SQL Server 2022 Developer is used in the evaluated configuration and Microsoft SQL
Server 2014, 2016 SP2, 2017, and 2019 are also supported. This database is outside the
boundary of the TOE and is only used for the storage of data. All data that is sent to the
database is encrypted by the TOE and is stored in the database as cipherstrings. Decryption of
data happens on the TOE after the data is retrieved from the database. The TOE supports local
as well as a remote database.
The TOE provides following connections:
9
• The TOE leverages Microsoft’s IIS to provide web services for User or Admin
authentication to access the web-based console
• The TOE connects to a remote database securely over TLS
• The TOE acts as a client and connects securely with managed hosts over SSH
• The TOE acts as a client and connects securely over TLS to perform discovery services
• The TOE communicates with a CA server over HTTP to validate the presented server’s
certificate by retrieving CRLs
Figure 1 TOE network diagram
3.3 TOE Environment
The following components must be present in the operational environment to operate the TOE
in the evaluated configuration:
Table 2 Operational Environment Components
Component Required Purpose/Description
Workstation Optional Workstation to access the
TOE via web-based console
over TLS.
10
SQL Server (Database) Yes The TOE uses an external
database to store credentials,
certificates, keys and log
data. Microsoft SQL Server
2022 Developer is used in the
evaluated configuration. The
connection to a remote
database is secured over TLS.
TLS Server (Discovery
Service)
Optional This is a IP-based target
machine on which discovery
services can be performed to
discover the SSL certificates.
The TOE communicates
securely over TLS.
CA Server Optional This is a CRL server that
provides a list of certificates
that have been revoked. It is
used by the TOE to check a
server’s presented certificate
revocation status. The TOE
communicates to the CA/CRL
server over HTTP.
SSH Server (managed host) Yes This is a remote system
managed host. TOE connects
to the managed host over
SSH
11
4 Security Policy
The TOE provides the security functionality required by [SWAPP] and [SSHFP].
4.1 Cryptographic Support
The TOE relies on underlying cryptographic functionality provided by the platform for all of its
cryptographic operations, as allowed by the [SWAPP] and [SSHFP].
4.2 Security Management
The TOE does not come with any default credentials. Upon installation it will randomly generate
a self-signed certificate, and AES 256 symmetric key and a GUID for the base configuration of the
system. No data is stored by the application on the platform file system.
4.3 Privacy
The TOE does not store or transmit anything that could be considered Personally Identifiable
Information (PII).
4.4 User Data Protection
The TOE relies on the platform to securely store the following:
• DSN key
• PKCS12 key
• PKCS8 (private key)
• Usernames
• Passwords
• Customer application credentials
The Windows Registry is used for storage of the TOE’s symmetric key. An AES 256 key is used for
the encryption and decryption of secrets. It is protected by the Windows Data Protection API
(DPAPI).
No additional sensitive data is stored by the TOE.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE employs several mechanisms to ensure that it is secure on the host platform. The TOE
never allocates memory with both write and execute permission. The TOE is designed to operate
in an environment in which the following security techniques are in effect:
• Data execution prevention,
• Mandatory address space layout randomization (no memory map to an explicit address),
• Structured exception handler overwrite protection,
• Export address table access filtering, and
• Anti-Return Oriented Programming.
12
This allows the TOE to operate in an environment in which the Enhanced Mitigation Experience
Toolkit is also running. During compilation, the TOE is built with several flags enabled that check
for engineering flaws. The TOE is built with the /GS flag enabled. This reduces the possibilities of
stack-based buffer overflows in the product.
4.6 Trusted Path/Channels
TLS and SSH are used to protect all data transmitted to and from the TOE.
13
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
The following assumptions are drawn directly from the SWAPP.
Table 3 Assumptions
ID Assumption
A.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a reliable time clock for
its execution. This includes the underlying platform and whatever runtime
environment it provides to the TOE.
A.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the
software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
A.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or
hostile, and administers the software in compliance of the applied enterprise
security policy.
5.2 Clarification of Scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in [SWAPP]
and [SSHFP] as described for this TOE in the ST. Other functionality included in the product was
not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the devices needs to
be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance
for this evaluation is defined within [SWAPP] and [SSHFP].
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific
Software Application models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and
therefore should not be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as
evaluated.
• Consistent with the expectations of the PP, this evaluation did not specifically search for,
nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities
14
to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one
that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical
sophistication and resources.
• The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
15
6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
• Venafi Trust Protection Platform v23.1 Security Target, Version 1.6 [ST]
• Venafi Trust Protection Platform 23.1 Common Criteria Guidance, Version 1.0 [AGD]
16
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in ETR for Venafi Trust Protection Platform, which is not publicly
available. The AAR provides an overview of testing and the prescribed assurance activities.
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to the vendor-provided guidance
documentation and ran the tests specified in the Protection Profile for Application Software,
version 1.4, dated 22 April 2022 [SWAPP], and the Functional Package for Secure Shell, version
1.0, dated 13 May 2021 [SSHFP]. The Independent Testing activity is documented in the AAR,
which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.
17
8 TOE Evaluated Configuration
8.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE boundary is the application software which runs on the host platform. The TOE is a
Windows Desktop/Classic Application. For this evaluation the TOE runs on Windows Server 2016
Standard configured in FIPS mode running on a server with an Intel Xeon processor with AES-NI
and PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3. The Universal C Runtime must be installed. In addition to this the
following Microsoft Internet Information (IIS) web server roles must be installed:
• Common HTTP Features\Static Content
• Common HTTP Features\Default Document
• Health and Diagnostics\HTTP Logging
• Health and Diagnostics\Logging Tools
• Health and Diagnostics\Request Monitor
• Health and Diagnostics\Tracing
• Security\Request Filtering
• Performance\Static Content Compression
It should be noted that this operating system is outside the TOE boundary.
The following third-party libraries come bundled with the TOE and are inside the TOE boundary.
• IronPython
• Chaos.NaCl
• Microsoft Intune CSR Validation
• Sustainsys Saml2
• Excelsior JET
• F5 iControl Assembly for .NET
• Bootstrap
• Backbone
• Underscore
• Jquery
• date.js
• dateRangePicker.js, dateRangePicker.css
• moment.js
• easyDate.js
• maskedInput.js
• browser.js
• jquery.timepicker.js
• Select2.js
• moment-timezone.js
• core.js
• dropzone.js
18
• JSON.Net
• ASP.NET Web Stack
• Sencha Ext JS
• Tigra Calendar
• Pretty-Print JSON
• D3.js
• chart.js
• mustache.js
The TOE provides three consoles for management:
• A web-based console that can be launched by connecting to the TOE using a
browser.
• Venafi Configuration Console (VCC): A powerful Microsoft Management Console
(MMC) is a snap-in console that allows an administrator to manage Venafi services,
enable product components, configure database settings.
• WinAdmin: A Windows-based console that runs locally on the Trust Protection
Platform server.
The TOE also uses an external database to store credentials, certificates, keys and log data.
Microsoft SQL Server 2022 Developer is used in the evaluated configuration and Microsoft SQL
Server 2014, 2016 SP2, 2017, and 2019 are also supported. This database is outside the
boundary of the TOE and is only used for the storage of data. All data that is sent to the
database is encrypted by the TOE and is stored in the database as cipherstrings. Decryption of
data happens on the TOE after the data is retrieved from the database. The TOE supports local
as well as a remote database.
The TOE provides following connections:
• The TOE leverages Microsoft’s IIS to provide web services for User or Admin
authentication to access the web-based console
• The TOE connects to a remote database securely over TLS
• The TOE acts as a client and connects securely with managed hosts over SSH
• The TOE acts as a client and connects securely over TLS to perform discovery services
• The TOE communicates with a CA server over HTTP to validate the presented server’s
certificate (as part of TLS connection to the remote database or a discovery service)
8.2 Excluded Functionality
The following functionality is outside the scope of the evaluation:
• Providing visibility, threat intelligence, policy enforcement, and incident response for
certificate-related outages and key compromises
• Integration with Venafi products and third-party applications – the evaluation is limited
to secure communication channels
• Visibility into their key and certificate inventory, certificate reputation
19
• Issuance and renewal of certificates
• Policy enforcement
• Workflows
• Remediation of key and certificate misuse
20
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the ETR.
The reader of this document can assume that all activities and work units received a passing
verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 Rev. 5 and CEM version 3.1 Rev. 5. The evaluation determined the Venafi Trust Protection
Platform to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally, the
evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the claimed PP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains
a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security
requirements claimed to be met by the Venafi Trust Protection Platform that are consistent with
the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in
[SWAPP]/[SSHFP].
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the design
documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security
functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the ST's
TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities
specified in [SWAPP]/[SSHFP] related to the examination of the information contained in the TOE
Summary Specification.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
21
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in [SWAPP]/[SSHFP] related to the examination of the information
contained in the operational guidance documents.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the TOE
was identified.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the Assurance Activities in [SWAPP]/[SSHFP] and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the ETR and AAR.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
was provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a public
search for vulnerabilities on July 24, 2024, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover
any issues with the TOE.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
22
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
23
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validation team suggests that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated
configuration of the TOE. As stated in the Clarification of Scope, the evaluated functionality is
scoped exclusively to the SFRs specified in the ST, and the only evaluated functionality was that
which was described by the SFRs claimed in the ST. All other functionality provided by the TOE
needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about its effectiveness.
Consumers employing the TOE must follow the configuration instructions provided in the
Configuration Guidance documentation listed in Section 6 to ensure the evaluated
configuration is established and maintained.
24
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
25
12 Security Target
Venafi Trust Protection Platform v23.1 Security Target, Version 1.6 [ST]
26
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility accredited
by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by
the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under
the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of
a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and
for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme.
27
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5.
5. Protection Profile for Application Software, version 1.4, dated 07 October 2021 [SWAPP].
6. Functional Package for Secure Shell, version 1.0, dated 13 May 2021 [SSHFP].
7. Evaluation Technical Report for Venafi Trust Protection Platform v23.1, Version 0.9 [ETR].
8. Venafi Trust Protection Platform v23.1 Security Target, Version 1.6 [ST].
9. Venafi Trust Protection Platform v23.1 Common Criteria Guidance, Version 1.0 [AGD].
10. Assurance Activity Report for Venafi Trust Protection Platform v23.1, Version 1.2 [AAR].
11. Venafi Trust Protection Platform v23.1 Test Report, Version 2.0, 07/04/2024.
12. Vulnerability Assessment for Venafi Trust Protection Platform, Version 1.9, July 24, 2024.