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Reference: 2020-44-INF-3867- v1
Target: Pública
Date: 16.06.2023
Created by: CERT9
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
Dossier # 2020-44
TOE Huawei CloudEngine S Series Switches running VRP software Version
V200R020C00SPC300 Patch V200R020SPH507T
Applicant B84136464 - Huawei Technologies España, S.L.
References
[EXT-7494] 2021-12-24_2020-44_ETR_V1
Certification report of the product Huawei CloudEngine S Series Switches running VRP software
Version V200R020C00SPC300 Patch V200R020SPH507T, as requested in [EXT-6186] dated
01/06/2020, and evaluated by Applus Laboratories, as detailed in the Evaluation Technical Report
[EXT-7494] received on 24/12/2021.
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................ 3
TOE SUMMARY................................................................................................................................ 4
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................... 4
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS......................................................................................... 5
IDENTIFICATION.................................................................................................................................. 5
SECURITY POLICIES.............................................................................................................................. 5
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................... 6
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS................................................................................ 6
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY ............................................................................. 6
ARCHITECTURE.................................................................................................................................... 6
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE ................................................................................................................. 6
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE................................................................................................................ 8
DOCUMENTS..................................................................................................................................... 12
PRODUCT TESTING............................................................................................................................ 12
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION .......................................................................................................... 13
EVALUATION RESULTS ...................................................................................................................... 13
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM ............................................. 13
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS....................................................................................................... 14
GLOSSARY ......................................................................................................................................... 14
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................. 14
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)............................................................ 15
RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS............................................................................................................ 16
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).................................................... 16
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)................................................................... 16
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product Huawei
CloudEngine S Series Switches running VRP software Version V200R020C00SPC300 Patch
V200R020SPH507T.
The Huawei CloudEngine S Series Switches TOE are used to satisfy the requirements for networks of
various scales. They are deployed at the edge of IP backbone networks, IP metropolitan area
networks (MANs), and other large-scale IP networks，also can be used to access, aggregate, and
transmit carrier-class Ethernet services on Fixed-Mobile Convergence (FMC) Metropolitan Area
Networks (MANs).
The TOE is comprised of several security features as identified below:
• Security audit
• Cryptographic support
• Identification and authentication
• Secure Management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE access through user authentication
• Trusted path and channels for device authentication.
Developer/manufacturer: Huawei Technologies España, S.L.
Sponsor: Huawei Technologies España, S.L..
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN).
ITSEF: Applus Laboratories.
Protection Profile: [CPP_ND] Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 24-
Sep-20181
.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5 (assurance packages according to the
[CPP_ND]
Evaluation end date: 19/01/2023.
Expiration Date2
: 17/06/2028.
1
This cPP version is CCRA archived at the time of issuing this certificate.
2
This date refers to the expiration date of the certificate recognition within the scope of the mutual recognition
arrangements signed by this Certification Body.
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All the assurance components required by the evaluation level of the [CPP_ND] have been assigned
a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Applus Laboratories assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to
the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the [CPP_ND], as defined by the
Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5, the [CPP_ND], and Common Criteria Evaluation
Methodology version 3.1 release 5.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product Huawei CloudEngine S Series Switches running VRP software Version V200R020C00SPC300
Patch V200R020SPH507T, a positive resolution is proposed.
TOE SUMMARY
The TOE is CloudEngine S Series Switches comprised of both software and hardware. The software
is comprised of Versatile Routing Platform (VRP) software, VRP is a network OS incorporating
Huawei's proprietary intellectual properties and capable of supporting various network systems of
Huawei. The hardware is comprised of the following: CloudEngine S6730-H, CloudEngine S6730-S,
CloudEngine S5731-H, CloudEngine S5732-H, CloudEngine S5731-S, CloudEngine S5735-S,
CloudEngine S5735-L, CloudEngine S6330-H, CloudEngine S5331-H, CloudEngine S5335-L,
CloudEngine S5332-H, CloudEngine S5335-S, CloudEngine S12700E.
The Huawei CloudEngine S Series Switches use the same VRP version. TSF relevant functions
depend on software implementation.
The physical scope comprises the following hardware appliances and the TOE software:
CloudEngine S6730-H, CloudEngine S6730-S, CloudEngine S5731-H, CloudEngine S5732-H,
CloudEngine S5731-S, CloudEngine S5735-S, CloudEngine S5735-L, CloudEngine S6330-H,
CloudEngine S5331-H, CloudEngine S5335-L, CloudEngine S5332-H, CloudEngine S5335-S,
CloudEngine S12700E.
There are only hardware differences between different devices. All the switches share the same
platform so the SFRs are the same. Network management server, local console and syslog server
are supported by all TOE evaluated configurations. The TOE only has one configuration.
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level of the
[CPP_ND] to the table, according to Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5.
ASSURANCE CLASS ASSURANCE COMPONENT
ADV ADV_FSP.1
AGD AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ALC ALC_CMC.1
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ALC_CMS.1
ASE ASE_CCL.1
ASE_SPD.1
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_OBJ.1
ASE_REQ.1
ASE_TSS.1
ATE ATE_IND.1
AVA AVA_VAN.1
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements, according to
Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5 assurance packages according to the Collaborative
Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 24-Sep-2018.
The detail of these security functional requirements is documented in the Security Target, section 6
(“Security Functional Requirements”).
IDENTIFICATION
Product: Huawei CloudEngine S Series Switches running VRP software Version V200R020C00SPC300
Patch V200R020SPH507T
Security Target: Security Target of Huawei CloudEngine S Series Switches Running VRP Software
version 4.9, 2021-11-29
Protection Profile: [CPP_ND] Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 24-
Sep-20183
.
SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product Huawei CloudEngine S Series Switches running VRP software Version
V200R020C00SPC300 Patch V200R020SPH507T shall implement a set of security policies assuring
the fulfilment of different standards and security demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target, section 3.3 (“Organizational
Security Policies”).
3
This cPP version is CCRA archived at the time of issuing this certificate.
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ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the security properties
and functionalities compiled by the security target. These assumptions have been applied during
the evaluation in order to determine if the identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its
operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not
be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE.
The detail of these assumptions is documented in the Security Target, section 3.2 (“Assumptions”).
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The following threats do not suppose a risk for the product Huawei CloudEngine S Series Switches
running VRP software Version V200R020C00SPC300 Patch V200R020SPH507T, although the agents
implementing attacks have the attack potential according to the attack potential of the [CPP_ND]
and always fulfilling the usage assumptions and the proper security policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product security
properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are those defined in the Security Target,
section 3.1 (“Threats”).
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some of the
objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are those defined in the
Protection Profile and they are documented in the Security Target, section 4.1 (“Security Objectives
for the operational Environment”).
ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified above
consists of several security functionalities, as identified below.
(1) Security audit
The log module of the host software records operations on a device and events
that occur to a device. The recorded operations and events are log messages. Log
messages provide evidence for diagnosing and maintaining a system. Log messages
reflect the operating status of a device and are used to analyze the conditions of a
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network and to find out the causes of network failure or faults.
Key elements of log messages include timestamp, host name, Huawei identity,
version, module name, severity, brief description, etc.
IC component are the module processing, outputting log records. Information
hierarchy is designed
to help the user roughly differentiate between information about normal
operation and information about faults. Since the information center needs to
output information to the terminal, console, log buffer, and log file.
(2) Cryptographic support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of secure connections that includes
remote administrative management.
The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are described in Table below.
TABLE 1: CRYPTOGRAPHY PROVIDED BY TOE
Cryptography Function Use in the TOE
DRBG Used in session establishment of TLS and SSH
RSA Used in session establishment of TLS
SHA Used to provide cryptographic hashing services
HMAC-SHA Used to provide integrity and authentication
verification
AES Used to encrypt traffic transmitted through TLS and
SSH
ECDSA Used in the authentication of SSH
DH Used in session establishment of SSH
DHE Used in session establishment of TLS
(3) Identification and authentication
The authentication functionality provides validation by user’s account name and
password. Public key authentication is supported for SSH users. Detailed
functionalities, for example max idle-timeout period, max log-in attempts, UI lock,
user kick out, can be applies by administrator according to networking
environment, customized security considerations, differential user role on TOE,
and/or other operational concerns.
(4) Secure Management
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The TOE restricts the ability to determine the behavior of and modify the behavior
of the function’s transmission of audit data to the security administrator. Only the
security administrator can manage the cryptographic keys. Only the security
administrator has the right of opening/closing the security services and
creation/deletion/modification of the user accounts.
(5) Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects the pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys from
reading them by an unauthorized entity. The TOE stores the users or administrator
passwords in non-plaintext form preventing them from reading. The TOE verifies
the packet before their installation and uses the digital signature.
(6) TOE access through user authentication
The TOE provides communication security by implementing SSH protocol.
To protect the TOE from eavesdrop and to ensure data transmission security and
confidentiality, SSH implements:
⚫ authentication by password or by public-key;
⚫ AES encryption algorithms;
⚫ secure cryptographic key exchange;
⚫ Besides default TCP port 22, manually specifying a listening port is also
implemented since it can effectively reduce attack.
(7) Trusted path and channels for device authentication
The TOE supports the trusted connections using TLS for the communication with
the audit server.
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
This section will define the physical scope (Table 3) of the Huawei CloudEngine S Series Switches
running VRP Software to be evaluated.
TABLE 2: PHYSICAL SCOPE
Type Delivery Item Version
Hardware CloudEngine S6730-H, CloudEngine S6730-S, CloudEngine S5731-H,
CloudEngine S5732-H, CloudEngine S5731-S, CloudEngine S5735-S,
CloudEngine S5735-L, CloudEngine S6330-H, CloudEngine S5331-H,
CloudEngine S5335-L, CloudEngine S5332-H, CloudEngine S5335-S,
CloudEngine S12700E
The Hardware will be delivered by air, ship, train or automobile.
NA
Software S12700E-4/S12700E-8/S12700E-12:
S12700E-V200R020C00SPC300-MPUE.CC
Info：
Users can login the HUAWEI support website to download the
V200R020C0
0SPC300
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Type Delivery Item Version
software packet in accordance to the version of the TOE.
Users can verify the software by digital signature (The digital
signature is also published on HUAWEI support website).
S6730-H48X6C/S6730-H24X6C/S6730-H28Y4C/S6730-H24X4Y4C:
S6730-H-V200R020C00SPC300.CC
Info：Users can login the HUAWEI support website to download the
software packet in accordance to the version of the TOE.
Users can verify the software by digital signature (The digital
signature is also published on HUAWEI support website).
S6730-S24X6Q:
S6730-S-V200R020C00SPC300.CC
Info：Users can login the HUAWEI support website to download the
software packet in accordance to the version of the TOE.
Users can verify the software by digital signature (The digital
signature is also published on HUAWEI support website).
S5731-H24T4XC/S5731-H48T4XC/S5731-H24P4XC/S5731-H48P4XC:
S5731-H-V200R020C00SPC300.CC
Info：Users can login the HUAWEI support website to download the
software packet in accordance to the version of the TOE.
Users can verify the software by digital signature (The digital
signature is also published on HUAWEI support website).
S5732-H24S6Q/S5732-H48S6Q/S5732-H24UM2CC/S5732-
H48UM2CC/S5732-H48XUM2CC/S5732-H24S4Y4Q:
S5732-H-V200R020C00SPC300.CC
Info：Users can login the HUAWEI support website to download the
software packet in accordance to the version of the TOE.
Users can verify the software by digital signature (The digital
signature is also published on HUAWEI support website).
S5731-S24T4X/S5731-S24P4X/S5731-S48T4X/S5731-S48P4X:
S5731-S-V200R020C00SPC300.CC
Info：Users can login the HUAWEI support website to download the
software packet in accordance to the version of the TOE.
Users can verify the software by digital signature (The digital
signature is also published on HUAWEI support website).
V200R020C00SPC300
S5735-S24T4X/S5735-S24P4X/S5735-S48T4X/S5735-S48P4X/S5735-
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Type Delivery Item Version
S32ST4X/S5735-S48S4X/S5735-S24T4X-I:
S5735-S-V200R020C00SPC300.CC
Info：Users can login the HUAWEI support website to download the
software packet in accordance to the version of the TOE.
Users can verify the software by digital signature (The digital
signature is also published on HUAWEI support website).
S5735-L12T4S-A/S5735-L12P4S-A/S5735-L24T4S-A/S5735-L24T4X-
A/S5735-L24P4S-A/S5735-L24P4X-A/S5735-L48T4S-A/S5735-
L48T4X-A/S5735-L48P4X-A/S5735-L32ST4X-A/S5735-L24T4X-
D/S5735-L12T4S-D/S5735-L32ST4X-D:
S5735-L-V200R020C00SPC300.CC
Info：Users can login the HUAWEI support website to download the
software packet in accordance to the version of the TOE.
Users can verify the software by digital signature (The digital
signature is also published on HUAWEI support website).
S6330-H48X6C/S6330-H24X6C/S6330-H28Y4C/S6330-H24X4Y4C:
S6330-H-V200R020C00SPC300.CC
Info：Users can login the HUAWEI support website to download the
software packet in accordance to the version of the TOE.
Users can verify the software by digital signature (The digital
signature is also published on HUAWEI support website).
S5331-H24T4XC/S5331-H24P4XC/S5331-H48T4XC/S5331-H48P4XC:
S5331-H-V200R020C00SPC300.CC
Info：Users can login the HUAWEI support website to download the
software packet in accordance to the version of the TOE.
Users can verify the software by digital signature (The digital
signature is also published on HUAWEI support website).
S5335-L12T4S-A/S5335-L48T4X-A/S5335-L12P4S-A:
S5335-L-V200R020C00SPC300.CC
Info：Users can login the HUAWEI support website to download the
software packet in accordance to the version of the TOE.
Users can verify the software by digital signature (The digital
signature is also published on HUAWEI support website).
S5332-H24S6Q/ S5332-H48S6Q/ S5332-H24S4Y4Q:
S5332-H-V200R020C00SPC300.CC
Info：Users can login the HUAWEI support website to download the
software packet in accordance to the version of the TOE.
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Type Delivery Item Version
Users can verify the software by digital signature (The digital
signature is also published on HUAWEI support website).
S5335-S24T4X/ S5335-S24P4X/ S5335-S48T4X/ S5335-S48P4X/
S5335-S32ST4X/ S5335-S48S4X:
S5335-S-V200R020C00SPC300.CC
Info：Users can login the HUAWEI support website to download the
software packet in accordance to the version of the TOE.
Users can verify the software by digital signature (The digital
signature is also published on HUAWEI support website).
Patch Patch for the TOE
Name: patch_all_pack.pat
Info: The patch can be download from HUAWEI support
website. The patch is verify using digital signature when it’s loaded
for the TOE.
V200R020SP
H507T
Product
guidance
Huawei CloudEngine S Series Switches V200R020C00 Operational
user Guidance.pdf
Info:
The documentation is delivered by email.
1.6
Huawei CloudEngine S Series Switches V200R020C00 Preparative
Procedures .pdf
Info:
The documentation is delivered by email.
1.9
S2720, S5700, and S6700 Series Ethernet Switches Product
Documentation 03
Related TOE: CloudEngine S6730-H, CloudEngine S6730-S,
CloudEngine S5732-H, CloudEngine S5731-S, CloudEngine S5735-S,
CloudEngine S5735-L
S5300 and S6300 Series Ethernet Switches Product Documentation
03
Related TOE: CloudEngine S6330-H, CloudEngine S5331-H,
CloudEngine S5335-L, CloudEngine S5332-H, CloudEngine S5335-S
S12700 and S12700E Series Agile Switches Product Documentation
03
Related TOE: CloudEngine S12700E
refers to the
last number
of document
name shown
in the left
column
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Type Delivery Item Version
Info:
Users can login the HUAWEI support website to read the document
directly or download the product documentation in accordance to
the version of the TOE. The download file format is *.chm or *.hdx,
user can download the *.hdx reader from the same website.
At least a registered user is required. If a customer who does not
have the permission clicks the product name, the registration page
is redirected.
There are only hardware differences between different devices. All the switches share the same
platform so the SFRs are the same. Network management server, local console and syslog server
are supported by all TOE evaluated configurations. The TOE only has one configuration.
DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made available
together to the users of the evaluated version.
- Huawei CloudEngine S Series Switches V200R020C00 Operational user Guidance version 1.6
- Huawei CloudEngine S Series Switches V200R020C00 Preparative Procedures version 1.9
- S2720, S5700, and S6700 Product Documentation, version 03.
- S2320, S5300, S6300 Product Documentation, version 03.
- S12700 and S12700E Product Documentation, version 03.
PRODUCT TESTING
The tests performed by both the evaluator and the developer are based on the TSFIs description
included in the functional specification and the SFRs description included in the Security Target [ST].
The evaluator has performed an installation and configuration of the TOE and its operational
environment following the steps included in the installation and operation manuals. The TOE
configuration used to execute the independent tests is consistent with the evaluated configuration
according to the Security Target [ST].
The product series testing has followed the SOGIS supporting document Evaluation methodology
for product series, version 1.0. The ITSEF analysed the Differential Analysis Report (DAR) and
Testing Reuse Rationale (TRR) provided by the applicant to prepare the independent testing
strategy.
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The evaluator has repeated cases specified by the developer in the test documentation and has
compared the obtained results with those obtained by the developer and documented in each
associated report. The test repetition performed by the evaluator has demonstrated that the test
plan and report provided by the vendor contains information enough to make a reader able to
repeat all tests included. Additionally, after the repetition, the evaluator has obtained the same
results as the expected ones. The independent testing has covered SFRs of the [ST] and TSFIs
defined in the functional specification for the TOE, sampling has not been performed. The test
cases have taken into account critical parameters values, searching that the TOE behaves in a
nonexpected manner. There has not been any deviation from the expected results under the
environment defined in the Security Target [ST].
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The acceptance and installation procedures are given in section 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Secure Acceptance by
Production, Secure Installation of TOE Software by Production, Secure Preparation for Delivery by
Production and Secure Acceptance by User) of the preparative user guidance Huawei CloudEngine S
Series Switches V200R020C00 Preparative Procedures version 1.9.
EVALUATION RESULTS
The product Huawei CloudEngine S Series Switches running VRP software Version
V200R020C00SPC300 Patch V200R020SPH507T has been evaluated against the Security Target
“Security Target of Huawei CloudEngine S Series Switches Running VRP Software version 4.9, 2021-
11-29”.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level of the [CPP_ND] have been assigned
a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Applus Laboratories assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to
the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the evaluation level of the
[CPP_ND], as defined by the [CC_P1], [CC_P2], [CC_P3] y [CEM].
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM
Each assurance class and evaluation activity from the [CPP_ND] has a Pass verdict.
During the evaluation process, the developer has provided evidences and resolutions to close the
Observation Reports issued by the lab. The observation reports were related to the documentation
evidences, no exploitable vulnerabilities have been found in any part of the TOE. Therefore, no
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issue was detected according to the standard and evidences used for the evaluation. The product
fulfilled the whole set of Security Functional Requirements established in the Security Target.
The evaluation team makes the following security recommendations:
- To follow the security guidance’s of the TOE strictly
- To keep the TOE under personal control and set all other security measures available from
the environment.
Finally, since all the classes of the evaluation have a PASS verdict and all the dependencies have
been fulfilled, considering the evaluations results and verdict, the laboratory recommends the CB to
take into account the certification of the product POSITIVELY for an assurance level of CPP_ND
compliance.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product Huawei CloudEngine S Series Switches running VRP software Version V200R020C00SPC300
Patch V200R020SPH507T, a positive resolution is proposed.
Considering that the CCRA status of the Protection Profile [CPP_ND] Collaborative Protection Profile
for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 24-Sep-2018 is archived, consumers are advised to check if the
TOE satisfies their security requirements.
GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
OC Organismo de Certificación
TOE Target Of Evaluation
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
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[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, R5 Final,
April 2017.
[CPP_ND] Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 24-Sep-2018
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is available in the
Certification Body:
• [ST]: Security Target of Huawei CloudEngine S Series Switches Running VRP Software version
4.9, 2021-11-29.
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RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
In order to avoid multiple certifications of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under
certain conditions was agreed.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It
defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at
higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL
4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices" a
SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical
Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common
Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of
signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the
agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common
Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers
CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on
assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation
(ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-
2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-
2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity
(maintenance and re-certification) of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of
certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e., assurance components up to and including
EAL 4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
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https://oc.ccn.cni.es
organismo.certificacion@cni.es
As of September 2014, the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government representatives from
the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the
website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognized under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under CCRA up to EAL2 + ALC_FLR only due to the fact that
the cPP is archived by CCRA at the time of issuing this certificate.