This document was evaluated in the form of Korean version, and translated into English version
Smart TV Security Solution V6.0
for Samsung Knox
Security Target Lite
V1.1
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO.,
Ltd.
2 / 49
Document History
VERSION DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE DATE
1.0 Sanitized version of the ST V1.0 2020. 11. 30
1.1 OpenSSL, SQLite Version update 2021. 11. 11
3 / 49
CONTENTS
1. Introduction of Security Target.............................................................6
1.1. Security Target Reference .........................................................................................................................6
1.2. TOE Reference...................................................................................................................................................6
1.3. TOE Overview ....................................................................................................................................................7
1.4. TOE Description ............................................................................................................................................. 11
1.4.1. Physical Scope of TOE............................................................................................................................... 11
1.4.2. Logical Scope of TOE.................................................................................................................................. 13
1.5. Conventions ....................................................................................................................................................... 17
1.6. Terms and Definitions................................................................................................................................. 18
2. Conformance Claims............................................................................20
2.1. Conformance to Common Criteria........................................................................................................ 20
2.2. Conformance to Packages......................................................................................................................... 20
2.3. Conformance to Protection Profiles ................................................................................................... 21
3. Security Objectives .............................................................................22
3.1. Security Objectives for Operational Environment..................................................................... 22
4. Security Requirements........................................................................23
4.1. Security Functional Requirements ...................................................................................................... 23
4.1.1. Cryptographic support (FCS)................................................................................................... 24
4.1.2. User data protection(FDP) ........................................................................................................ 26
4.1.3. Security management(FMT)..................................................................................................... 28
4.1.4. Protection of the TSF (FPT).................................................................................................... 30
4.2. Security Assurance Requirements...................................................................................................... 30
4.2.1. Security Target evaluation......................................................................................................... 31
4.2.2. Development........................................................................................................................................ 37
4.2.3. Guidance documents....................................................................................................................... 38
4.2.4. Life-cycle support.......................................................................................................................... 41
4.2.5. Tests........................................................................................................................................................ 42
4.2.6. Vulnerability assessment ............................................................................................................ 43
4.3. Dependency Rationale................................................................................................................................. 44
4.3.1. SFR Dependencies........................................................................................................................... 44
4.3.2. SAR Dependencies.......................................................................................................................... 45
5. TOE Summary Specification................................................................46
4 / 49
5.1. System Integrity Monitoring................................................................................................................... 46
5.2. Web App Protection...................................................................................................................................... 47
5.3. Data Encryption/Decryption.................................................................................................................... 48
5.4. Phishing Site Blocking................................................................................................................................. 49
5 / 49
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Non-TOE Hardware/Software required by the TOE...................................................9
Table 2: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment............................................... 22
Table 3: Security Functional Requirements ........................................................................................ 23
Table 4: Security Assurance Requirements........................................................................................ 31
Table 5: Dependencies on the TOE Security Functional Components................................ 44
6 / 49
1. Introduction of Security Target
1.1. Security Target Reference
This section provides information to refer to the Security Target (ST) as in
the following Table. The ST is identified by the ST Title and the ST Version.
Security Target
Lite Title
Smart TV Security Solution V6.0 for Samsung Knox
Security Target Lite
Security Target
Lite Version
V1.1
Publication
Date
2021. 11. 11
Authors SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd.
CC
Identification
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
(CC Version 3.1 Revision 5)
Evaluation
Assurance
Level
EAL1
1.2. TOE Reference
This section provides information to refer to the TOE as in the following Table.
The TOE is identified by the TOE Title and the TOE Version.
TOE
reference
Smart TV Security Solution V6.0 for Samsung Knox
TOE
Version
V6.0
TOE
Component
Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_SYSTEM_001_V6.0_
Release_1-1-1.armv7l
Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_PLATFORM_001_V6
.0_Release_1-1-1.armv7l
Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_PLATFORM_002_V6
.0_Release_1-1-1.armv7l
Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_PLATFORM_003_V6
7 / 49
.0_Release_1-1-1.armv7l
Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_SERVICE_001_V6.0_
Release_1-1-1.armv7l
Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_SERVICE_002_V6.0_
Release_1-1-1.armv7l
Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_SERVICE_003_V6.0_
Release_1-1-1.armv7l
Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_SERVICE_004_V6.0_
Release_1-1-1.armv7l
Developer SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., Ltd.
1.3. TOE Overview
Smart TV Security Solution V6.0 for Samsung Knox (hereinafter TOE) is a
Smart TV Security Solution that provides security functions in the form of
library by being embedded on Samsung Smart TV. Samsung Knox is a brand
name given to a secure platform and security solutions that are equipped with
the products released from Samsung Electronics.
The TOE provides functions for the secure operation of Samsung Smart TV
with the system(kernel of Tizen OS) integrity verification, blocking the
execution of unauthorized Web App, and blocking access to phishing sites. In
addition, the TOE also provides encryption/decryption function for data used
in Web App.
The TOE provides the security functions as follows:
- System Integrity Monitoring function: Integrity verification function for
the kernel of Tizen OS
- Web App Protection function: Function to block the execution of
unauthorized Web App in Smart TV
- Data Encryption/Decryption function: Function to encrypt and decrypt
8 / 49
data that developer designates for protection out of the data used in
Web App
- Phishing Site Blocking function: Function to verify whether the site to
access is a phishing site or not when Smart TV user accesses the site
by using Web Browser (linked to Google Safe Browsing)
The TOE is delivered to the developers of Samsung Smart TV in the form of
a library which is a kind of software, and is not in charge of all kinds of
security functions provided in Samsung Smart TV. The TOE provides only
the security function defined in the above.
The TOE is a library to provide the security for the firmware of Samsung
Smart TV, and performs the role of being in charge of security function of
Samsung Smart TV. The TOE allows a secure web surfing of a Samsung
Smart TV user who accesses a web site using Web Browser by providing
Phishing Site Blocking function. In addition, by blocking the execution of
unauthorized Web App, the TOE prevents the execution of an unauthorized
Web App from accessing the resource of Samsung Smart TV. Important data
used in Web App are stored securely with encryption. With System Integrity
Monitoring function, the verification on the integrity of the system(kernel of
Tizen OS) is performed to guarantee secure operation of Samsung Smart TV.
The update manager communicates with the update server to download the
update file to the smart TV and performs integrity (digital signature)
verification for the update file. TOE performs the update for the functions
(integrity result report and phishing site DB list update) that are performed
by communicating with the update server using the update file downloaded
from the smart TV.
The TOE communicates with an external IT entity. Communication with
9 / 49
external IT entity can be done in the form of a wired communication using
Ethernet and a wireless communication using Wi-Fi. Google Safe Browsing
server and Update server are external IT entities which communicate with
Phishing Site Blocking function. In a certain area, since Samsung Smart TV
and update server are not interoperated, System Integrity Monitoring function
does not report the result, and Phishing Site Blocking function is not operated.
The communication with external IT entities uses a secure communication
channel that supports confidentiality and integrity via OpenSSL provided in
the operational environment. The developer can communicate with Samsung
Smart TV using the serial port when developing applications for Smart TV
using TOE. Serial port communication is not provided to Smart TV users who
are not developers.
The TOE is a security solution that is in the form of library running in
Samsung Smart TV and has the minimum hardware and the software
requirements as in the following Table 1. Table 1 is classified as the TOE
Operational Environment not included in the TOE scope.
Table 1: Non-TOE Hardware/Software required by the TOE
Category Contents
H/W
CPU ARM architecture (Cortex A53 Quad) or higher
DDR
Memory
1.0GB or higher
Flash
Memory
eMMC 4GB or higher
Ethernet 1 x 10/100Mb RJ45
Wi-Fi 802.11 a/b/g/n
Serial Port RS-232C
S/W
Web
Brower
Tizen Browser 4.1.9200
OpenSSL V1.1.1l
10 / 49
SQLite V3.33.0
REE OS Tizen 6.0
TEE OS TrustWare V3.1.0
External IT entities needed for the TOE operation are as follows. The TOE
uses TLS V1.2 Protocol (OpenSSL 1.1.1l) provided in the operational
environment when communicating with the external IT entity of below.
- Google Safe Browsing Server : A server provided by Google that
informs whether a relevant URL is a phishing site or not.
- Update Server
 receives the result detected by the system integrity monitoring
function of Samsung smart TV and transmits the phishing site DB
list to the smart TV.
 transmits an online update file to Smart TV for functions which
report the result and download the phishing site database
The architecture of Samsung Smart TV is basically composed based on the
ARM TrustZone technology provided by ARM CPU. The execution
environment of Samsung Smart TV is classified as Trusted Execution
Environment(TEE) and Rich OS Application Environment. TEE functions
based on TrustWare V3.1.0(Operating System developed by Samsung
Electronics) and Rich OS Application Environment functions in Tizen 6.0
Operating System. Among the security functions of the TOE, System Integrity
Monitoring function is executed in TEE and REE, Data Encryption/Decryption
function is executed in REE or TEE according to the developer selection,
whereas Web App Protection function and Phishing Site Blocking function are
executed in REE.
11 / 49
1.4. TOE Description
1.4.1.Physical Scope of TOE
The TOE consists of software provided in the form of a library, and developer
guidance. The TOE is delivered to the developers of Samsung Smart TV, and
is operated in the form of a library for its operation after installation. The
scope of the TOE includes only some of the library that is in charge of security
function out of all the elements that compose the whole Samsung Smart TV.
That is, the physical scope of TOE includes the library and the developer
guidance of the API provided by the library. TOE is directly delivered to
developers in a form of CD, including instruction.
TOE Components
Delivery
Form
Note
Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_SYST
EM_001_V6.0_Release_1-1-1.armv7l
(Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_SYS
TEM_001_V6.0_Release_1-1-
1.armv7l.rpm)
Software
(CD)
System Integrity Monitoring
Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_PLA
TFORM_001_V6.0_Release_1-1-1.armv7l
(Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_PLA
TFORM_001_V6.0_Release_1-1-
1.armv7l.rpm)
Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_PLA
TFORM_003_V6.0_Release_1-1-1.armv7l
(Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_PLA
TFORM_003_V6.0_Release_1-1-
1.armv7l.rpm)
Data Encryption/Decryption
12 / 49
Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_PLA
TFORM_002_V6.0_Release_1-1-1.armv7l
(Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_PLA
TFORM_002_V6.0_Release_1-1-
1.armv7l.rpm)
Web App Protection
Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_SERV
ICE_001_V6.0_Release_1-1-1.armv7l
(Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_SER
VICE_001_V6.0_Release_1-1-
1.armv7l.rpm)
Phishing Site Blocking
Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_SERV
ICE_002_V6.0_Release_1-1-1.armv7l
(Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_SER
VICE_002_V6.0_Release_1-1-
1.armv7l.rpm)
Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_SERV
ICE_003_V6.0_Release_1-1-1.armv7l
(Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_SER
VICE_003_V6.0_Release_1-1-
1.armv7l.rpm)
Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_SERV
ICE_004_V6.0_Release_1-1-1.armv7l
(Samsung_Smart_TV_Security_Solution_SER
VICE_004_V6.0_Release_1-1-
1.armv7l.rpm)
System Integrity Monitoring
Phishing Site Blocking
Smart TV Security Solution V6.0 for Samsung
Knox Developer Guide V1.1
(Smart TV Security Solution V6.0 for
Samsung Knox Developer Guide V1.1.pdf)
Document
File
(CD)
TOE is delivered in the form of rpm package as above. As for its operation
after installation, it is operated in the form of a library.
13 / 49
1.4.2.Logical Scope of TOE
Logical scope of the TOE includes all the aspects that are included in the
physical scope of TOE. That is, all the functions provided by the library are
included in the logical scope of TOE.
The logical scope of TOE will be explained by being classified according to
security function provided by the TOE.
System Integrity Monitoring
The TOE periodically performs the verification on the kernel integrity of
Tizen OS while in normal operation through System Integrity Monitoring
function so as to ensure safe operation of Samsung Smart TV.
System Integrity Monitoring function can be separated into three parts: the
part that starts System Integrity Monitoring function on the application area
of Tizen OS; the part that does system integrity monitoring on the dynamic
kernel memory area, while operating on the kernel module area of Tizen OS,
when TOE gets operated; the part that does the system integrity monitoring
on the static area while operating on the application area of TrustWare.
The System Integrity Monitoring function that operates on application of
Tizen OS starts the monitoring process after being installed in the application
area of Tizen OS, and inserts the part that performs system integrity
monitoring on the dynamic kernel memory area into kernel as a
LKM(Loadable Kernel Module) so that the monitoring function can get
operated on the kernel area of Tizen OS.
As mentioned earlier, the System Integrity Monitoring function that operates
14 / 49
on the kernel module area of Tizen OS performs a part of functions of TOE.
Thus, this operates while being inserted as a LKM(Loadable Kernel Module)
by the System Integrity Monitoring function that operates on the application
of Tizen OS. When monitoring function starts, this performs system integrity
monitoring for dynamic kernel memory area.
The System Integrity Monitoring function that operates in the application area
of TrustWare detects whether there is any distortion or not by periodically
comparing the memory value of the static kernel memory and the original
value. This also receives the detected result from the System Integrity
Monitoring function that operates on the kernel module area of Tizen OS, and
saves the result along with the result detected in static kernel memory.
Web App Protection
The TOE provides Web App Protection function in order to prevent execution
of an unauthorized Web App in Samsung Smart TV. Samsung Smart TV can
download and store only the Web App provided in App Store (hereinafter
“App Contents Server”) provided by Samsung Electronics. When registering
Web App in App Contents server, Samsung Electronics registered after
encrypting the Web App, and Samsung Smart TV user can download the Web
App from App Contents Server and store it on Samsung Smart TV. In order
to execute the stored Web App, the decryption process is required. During
the decryption process of the Web App, if the Web App is determined to be
modified, the execution of the relevant Web App will be blocked. The TOE
uses AES Algorithm (CTR mode) for decryption of Web App, and the 128-
bit sizes of the cryptographic key.
Data Encryption/Decryption
15 / 49
The TOE provides encryption/decryption function for important data used in
Web App. The TOE uses AES algorithm (CBC mode) for encryption, and the
256-bit sizes of the cryptographic key. Data encryption and decryption can
be performed in REE or TEE according to the developer selection. The
cryptographic key is derived using PBKDF2 algorithm. The Cryptographic key
exists on memory after being generated, and is destroyed after
encryption/decryption operation is completed. The zeroization is used as the
cryptographic key destruction method.
Phishing Site Blocking
The TOE provides Phishing Site Blocking function in order to prevent private
information from being exposed to any risks through the access to a harmful
phishing site by Samsung Smart TV user. If Samsung Smart TV user accesses
web sites using Web Browser(Tizen Browser), Phishing Site Blocking
function checks the site based on the phishing site database stored in Smart
TV. If the site is suspected for being a phishing site, Google Safe Browsing
service is used to check whether the relevant site is a phishing site or not. If
the relevant site is confirmed to be a phishing site, the information of such for
the site being a phishing site is informed to the user. If the user selects to
block the access to the site, the access to the phishing site is blocked to
protect private information of the user. The TOE also provides Smart TV user
the ability to either disable or enable the Phishing Site Blocking function. If a
user disables to use the Phishing Site Blocking function, the Phishing Site
Blocking function is not performed.
The list of Phishing Site on the database is updated periodically through
Update Server.
16 / 49
 When communicating with the TOE and Google Safe Browsing server, the
transmitted data is protected by using TLS V1.2 (OpenSSL 1.1.1l) protocol
provided by the operational environment.
17 / 49
1.5. Conventions
This section describes the conventions used to denote Common Criteria (CC)
operations on security functional components and to distinguish text with
special meaning. The notation, formatting, and conventions used in this ST
are largely consistent with those used in the CC. Four presentation choices
are discussed here.
Refinement
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and, thus,
further restricts a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is
denoted by bold text.
Selection
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the
CC in stating a requirement. Selections are denoted by underlined italicized
text.
Assignment
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified
parameter such as the length of a password. Showing the value in square
brackets [assignment_value(s)] indicates an assignment.
Iteration
Iterated functional components are given unique identifiers by appending to
the component name, short name, and functional element name from the CC
an iteration number inside parenthesis, for example, FIA_AFL.1 (1) and
FIA_AFL.1 (2).
18 / 49
1.6. Terms and Definitions
Google Safe Browsing
Google Safe Browsing is a service provided by Google offering URL list that
contains phishing contents and open API that can use the list.
REE(Rich Execution Environment)
This is a concept that is contradictory to TEE, and refers to execution
environment provided by general operating environment such as Tizen and
Android.
Samsung Knox
Brand name given to a secure platform and security solutions that are
equipped with the products released from Samsung Electronics.
Smart TV user
Users installing and executing Web App in order to use various smart
functions embedded on TV and using management function supported in TV.
TEE(Trusted Execution Environment)
This refers to a execution environment providing the security of a quality
higher than the execution environment provided in general operating
environment. This defined the function of security hardware and software
providing execution environment based on safe reliability of security related
applications in devices such as smartphone, smart TV. Global Platform, which
is a standard group, establishes the standard in the architecture of TEE and
related API.
19 / 49
Tizen OS
Tizen is based on the Linux kernel of Linux foundation, and is made based on
HTML5 and C++. It is an open source operating system having the purpose
of being included in mobile devices including smart phone, and electronic
devices such as TV.
TrustWare
This is an operating environment installed for the application of TEE(ARM
TrustZone) technology, and TrustWare is the operating system developed by
Samsung Electronics even from the kernel stage.
Update Server
Server that performs the update on the database for the list of phishing site
used in Phishing Site Blocking function
Web App
Application for Tizen OS based on HTML5 which can be used by being
downloaded on TV.
20 / 49
2. Conformance Claims
This chapter describes how the Security Target conforms to the Common
Criteria, Protection Profile and Package.
2.1. Conformance to Common Criteria
This Security Target conforms to the following Common Criteria:
 Common Criteria
- Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5, 2017. 4,
CCMB-2017-04-001
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
2: SFR (Security Functional Requirement), Version 3.1 Revision 5,
2017. 4, CCMB-2017-04-002
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
3: SAR (Security Assurance Requirement), Version 3.1 Revision 5,
2017. 4, CCMB-2017-04-003
 Common Criteria Conformance
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
2 conformant
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
3 conformant
2.2. Conformance to Packages
This Security Target conforms to the following Protection Profile:
- Assurance Package: EAL1
21 / 49
2.3. Conformance to Protection Profiles
- There is no Protection Profile that this Security Target conforms.
22 / 49
3. Security Objectives
3.1. Security Objectives for Operational Environment
This section describes the Security Objectives that must be fulfilled by
technical and procedural measures in the operational environment of the TOE.
Table 2: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.Firmware Update Smart TV user shall install immediately when
an alert for firmware update pops up on TV so
that the security functions can be maintained
in a most up-to-date version.
OE.Secure Communication Smart TV shall provide secure communication
channel when the TOE communicates with
Update Server and Google Safe Browsing
server,
OE.Trusted Developer The developer shall not have any malicious
intention, should receive proper education for
the use of the TOE and shall perform the
obligation accurately.
23 / 49
4. Security Requirements
This chapter describes security functional requirements and security
assurance requirements which should be satisfied in the TOE.
4.1. Security Functional Requirements
The security functional requirements defined in this Security Target are
based on the functional requirements in Part 2 of the Common Criteria.
Table 3 summarizes the security functional requirements defined by this ST.
Table 3: Security Functional Requirements
Class Component
Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation (Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction (Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1(1)
Cryptographic operation (Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1(2)
Cryptographic operation (Web App
Protection)
FCS_COP.1(3)
Cryptographic operation (System
Integrity Monitoring)
FCS_COP.1(4)
Cryptographic operation (Phishing
Site Blocking)
User Data
Protection
FDP_DAU.1 Basic Data Authentication
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
Security
Management
FMT_MOF.1
Management of security functions
behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Protection of the
TSF
FPT_TEE.1 Testing of external entities
24 / 49
4.1.1.Cryptographic support (FCS)
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation (Data Encryption/Decryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm
[Password Based Key Derivation Function(PBKDF2)] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [256-bit] that meet the
following: [RFC2898].
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction (Data Encryption/Decryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with
a specified cryptographic key destruction method
[Zeroization] that meets the following: [None].
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (Data Encryption/Decryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
25 / 49
attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption on the
important data used by Web App] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [Advanced Encryption
Standard(AES-CBC)] and cryptographic key sizes [256-bit]
that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 197].
 Precautions for Application: Important data means data designated to be
important as the developer of the Web App thought of as such among the
data used by Web App.
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (Web App Protection)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [decryption of Web App] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[Advanced Encryption Standard(AES-CTR)] and
cryptographic key sizes [128-bit] that meet the following:
[FIPS PUB 197].
26 / 49
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic operation (System Integrity Monitoring)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [verification of kernel integrity] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Secure
Hash Algorithm(SHA)] and cryptographic key sizes [256-bit]
that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 180-4].
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic operation (Phishing Site Blocking)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [Phishing Site Blocking function] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Secure
Hash Algorithm(SHA)] and cryptographic key sizes [256-bit]
that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 180-4].
4.1.2.User data protection(FDP)
27 / 49
FDP_DAU.1 Basic Data Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_DAU.1.1 The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that
can be used as a guarantee of the validity of [Web App].
FDP_DAU.1.2 The TSF shall provide [library for Web App Protection
function] with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of
the indicated information.
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Phishing site blocking SFP] on
[the below list of subjects, information, and operations that
cause controlled information to flow to and from controlled
subjects covered by the SFP].
 subject : Smart TV user
 information: URL
 operation: web site blocking
 Precautions for Application: In a certain area, Samsung Smart TV and
update server are not interoperated, the phishing site blocking function is
not operated.
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Phishing site blocking SFP] based
28 / 49
on the following types of subject and information security
attributes: [the below list of subjects and information
controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the security
attributes].
 subject: Smart TV user
 information: URL
 subject security attribute: None
 information security attribute: destination URL
FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a
controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled
operation if the following rules hold: [If the destination URL
included in the information security attribute is not included
in the list of Phishing Sites].
 Precautions for Application: For determination of a phishing site, two steps
should be performed. The first step is to compare with the list of phishing
site in the database, and if suspected for being a phishing site after the
comparison, the second step of using Google Safe Browsing service should
finally determine whether the site is a phishing site or not.
FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the [None].
FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based
on the following rules: [If the destination URL included in the
information security attribute is included in the list of phishing
sites, but if the user decided to access the relevant URL].
FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on
the following rules: [None].
4.1.3.Security management(FMT)
29 / 49
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management
Functions
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable, enable the
behaviour of the functions [Phishing site blocking] to [Smart
TV user].
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management
Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Phishing site blocking SFP] to
restrict the ability to [send] the security attributes
[destination URL] to [Smart TV user].
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Phishing site blocking SFP] to
provide permissive default values for security attributes that
are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [Smart TV user] to specify
30 / 49
alternative initial values to override the default values when
an object or information is created.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following
management functions: [Phishing site blocking].
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [Smart TV user].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
4.1.4.Protection of the TSF (FPT)
FPT_TEE.1 Testing of external entities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TEE.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of tests periodically during normal
operation to check the fulfillment of [kernel integrity for
Tizen OS].
FPT_TEE.1.2 If the test fails, the TSF shall [report when kernel integrity
violation is detected].
4.2. Security Assurance Requirements
31 / 49
Security assurance requirements (SAR) defined in this document consists of
assurance component in Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Part 3. The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) is
EAL1. Table 4 shows the summary of assurance components.
Table 4: Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance Class Assurance Component
ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_OBJ.1
Security objectives for the operational
environment
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ADV:
Development
ADV_FSP.1
Basic functional specification
AGD: Guidance
documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle
support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance
AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1
Vulnerability survey
4.2.1.Security Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Developer action elements:
ASE_INT.1.1D The developer shall provide an ST introduction.
32 / 49
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_INT.1.1C The ST introduction shall contain an ST reference, a TOE
reference, a TOE overview and a TOE description.
ASE_INT.1.2C The ST reference shall uniquely identify the ST.
ASE_INT.1.3C The TOE reference shall identify the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.4C The TOE overview shall summarise the usage and major
security features of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.5C The TOE overview shall identify the TOE type.
ASE_INT.1.6C The TOE overview shall identify any non-TOE
hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.7C The TOE description shall describe the physical scope of the
TOE.
ASE_INT.1.8C The TOE description shall describe the logical scope of the
TOE.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_INT.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
ASE_INT.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE reference, the TOE
overview, and the TOE description are consistent with each
other.
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Dependencies: ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
33 / 49
Developer action elements:
ASE_CCL.1.1D The developer shall provide a conformance claim.
ASE_CCL.1.2D The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_CCL.1.1C The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim
that identifies the version of the CC to which the ST and the
TOE claim conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.2C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of
the ST to CC Part 2 as either CC Part 2 conformant or CC Part
2 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.3C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of
the ST to CC Part 3 as either CC Part 3 conformant or CC Part
3 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.4C The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the
extended components definition.
ASE_CCL.1.5C The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security
requirement packages to which the ST claims conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.6C The conformance claim shall describe any conformance of the
ST to a package as either package-conformant or package-
augmented.
ASE_CCL.1.7C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the
TOE type is consistent with the TOE type in the PPs for which
conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.8C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the
statement of the security problem definition is consistent with
the statement of the security problem definition in the PPs for
which conformance is being claimed.
34 / 49
ASE_CCL.1.9C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the
statement of security objectives is consistent with the
statement of security objectives in the PPs for which
conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.10C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the
statement of security requirements is consistent with the
statement of security requirements in the PPs for which
conformance is being claimed.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_CCL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Developer action elements:
ASE_OBJ.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_OBJ.1.1C The statement of security objectives shall describe the
security objectives for the operational environment.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_OBJ.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
35 / 49
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Developer action elements:
ASE_ECD.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security
requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2D The developer shall provide an extended components
definition.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_ECD.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall identify all
extended security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2C The extended components definition shall define an extended
component for each extended security requirement.
ASE_ECD.1.3C The extended components definition shall describe how each
extended component is related to the existing CC components,
families, and classes.
ASE_ECD.1.4C The extended components definition shall use the existing CC
components, families, classes, and methodology as a model
for presentation.
ASE_ECD.1.5C The extended components shall consist of measurable and
objective elements such that conformance or nonconformance
to these elements can be demonstrated.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_ECD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
36 / 49
ASE_ECD.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can
be clearly expressed using existing components.
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
Dependencies: ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
Developer action elements:
ASE_REQ.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security
requirements.
ASE_REQ.1.2D The developer shall provide a security requirements rationale.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_REQ.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall describe the
SFRs and the SARs.
ASE_REQ.1.2C All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes, external
entities and other terms that are used in the SFRs and the
SARs shall be defined.
ASE_REQ.1.3C The statement of security requirements shall identify all
operations on the security requirements.
ASE_REQ.1.4C All operations shall be performed correctly.
ASE_REQ.1.5C Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be
satisfied, or the security requirements rationale shall justify
the dependency not being satisfied.
ASE_REQ.1.6C The statement of security requirements shall be internally
consistent.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_REQ.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
37 / 49
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Dependencies: ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Developer action elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1D The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1C The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE
meets each SFR.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
ASE_TSS.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary
specification is consistent with the TOE overview and the
TOE description.
4.2.2.Development
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Dependencies: No dependencies.
38 / 49
Developer action elements:
ADV_FSP.1.1D The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.2D The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional
specification to the SFRs.
Content and presentation elements:
ADV_FSP.1.1C The functional specification shall describe the purpose and
method of use for each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting
TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.2C The functional specification shall identify all parameters
associated with each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting
TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.3C The functional specification shall provide rationale for the
implicit categorisation of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_FSP.1.4C The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in
the functional specification.
Evaluator action elements:
ADV_FSP.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
ADV_FSP.1.2E The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification
is an accurate and complete instantiation of the SFRs.
4.2.3.Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
39 / 49
Dependencies: ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Developer action elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1D The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
Content and presentation elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user
role, the user-accessible functions and privileges that should
be controlled in a secure processing environment, including
appropriate warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user
role, how to use the available interfaces provided by the TOE
in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user
role, the available functions and interfaces, in particular all
security parameters under the control of the user, indicating
secure values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role,
clearly present each type of security-relevant event relative
to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed,
including changing the security characteristics of entities
under the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C The operational user guidance shall identify all possible
modes of operation of the TOE (including operation following
failure or operational error), their consequences and
implications for maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role,
describe the security measures to be followed in order to fulfil
40 / 49
the security objectives for the operational environment as
described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
Evaluator action elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Developer action elements:
AGD_PRE.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative
procedures.
Content and presentation elements:
AGD_PRE.1.1C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps
necessary for secure acceptance of the delivered TOE in
accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps
necessary for secure installation of the TOE and for the
secure preparation of the operational environment in
accordance with the security objectives for the operational
environment as described in the ST.
Evaluator action elements:
AGD_PRE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
41 / 49
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to
confirm that the TOE can be prepared securely for operation.
4.2.4.Life-cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
Dependencies: ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Developer action elements:
ALC_CMC.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the
TOE.
Content and presentation elements:
ALC_CMC.1.1C The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
Evaluator action elements:
ALC_CMC.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Developer action elements:
ALC_CMS.1.1D The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
42 / 49
Content and presentation elements:
ALC_CMS.1.1C The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE
itself; and the evaluation evidence required by the SARs.
ALC_CMS.1.2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration
items.
Evaluator action elements:
ALC_CMS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
4.2.5.Tests
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance
Dependencies: ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Developer action elements:
ATE_IND.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and presentation elements:
ATE_IND.1.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
Evaluator action elements:
ATE_IND.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
43 / 49
evidence.
ATE_IND.1.2E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that
the TSF operates as specified.
4.2.6.Vulnerability assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
Dependencies: ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Developer action elements:
AVA_VAN.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and presentation elements:
AVA_VAN.1.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
Evaluator action elements:
AVA_VAN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
AVA_VAN.1.2E The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain
sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.1.3E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the
identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE
is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing
Basic attack potential.
44 / 49
4.3. Dependency Rationale
4.3.1.SFR Dependencies
Table 5 shows the dependencies on the TOE Security Functional Components.
Table 5: Dependencies on the TOE Security Functional Components
No
TOE Security
Functional
Component
Claimed
Dependencies
Note
1 FCS_CKM.1 FCS_COP.1, FCS_CKM.4
2 FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1
3 FCS_COP.1(1) FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
4 FCS_COP.1(2) -
5 FCS_COP.1(3) -
6 FCS_COP.1(4) -
7 FDP_DAU.1 -
8 FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1
9 FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFC.1, FMT_MSA.3
10 FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
11 FMT_MSA.1
FDP_IFC.1, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
12 FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1
13 FMT_SMF.1
14 FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1
15 FPT_TEE.1 -
The dependency of some functional components is not satisfied, and the
description for the justification of such is as follows.
FIA_UID.1
- Smart TV embedded with security function of TOE is generally the
possession of the individual of the Smart TV user, and all the rights
45 / 49
are given to individual users, and thus identification or authentication
is not provided.
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4(Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(2)) :
- The cryptographic key used to decrypt the Web App in the Web App
Protection function is provided in the Operational Environment, and
thus does not have a process for generation and destruction of the
cryptographic key.
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4(Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(3)) :
- System Integrity Monitoring function uses SHA-256 hash algorithm in
order to verify the integrity of the kernel, and thus does not have a
process for generation and destruction of the cryptographic key.
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4(Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(4)) :
- Phishing Site Blocking function uses SHA-256 hash algorithm in order
to check whether the web site is a phishing site or not, and thus does
not have a process for generation and destruction of the cryptographic
key.
4.3.2.SAR Dependencies
The dependency of each assurance package (EAL1) provided by the CC is
already satisfied.
46 / 49
5. TOE Summary Specification
5.1. System Integrity Monitoring
The TOE periodically performs the verification on the kernel integrity of
Tizen OS while in normal operation through System Integrity Monitoring
function so as to ensure safe operation of Samsung Smart TV.
System Integrity Monitoring function can be separated into three parts: the
part that starts System Integrity Monitoring function on the application area
of Tizen OS; the part that does system integrity monitoring on the dynamic
kernel memory area, while operating on the kernel module area of Tizen OS,
when TOE gets operated; the part that does the system integrity monitoring
on the static area while operating on the application area of TrustWare.
The System Integrity Monitoring function that operates on application of
Tizen OS starts the monitoring process after being installed in the application
area of Tizen OS, and inserts the part that performs system integrity
monitoring on the dynamic kernel memory area into kernel as a
LKM(Loadable Kernel Module) so that the monitoring function can get
operated on the kernel area of Tizen OS.
As mentioned earlier, the System Integrity Monitoring function that operates
on the kernel module area of Tizen OS performs a part of functions of TOE.
Thus, this operates while being inserted as a LKM(Loadable Kernel Module)
by the System Integrity Monitoring function that operates on the application
of Tizen OS. When monitoring function starts, this performs system integrity
monitoring for dynamic kernel memory area. The scope of monitoring for the
dynamic kernel memory area is the PageTable that does translating from the
virtual address of memory to a physical address, LKM(Loadable Kernel
47 / 49
Module) that has kernel authority while operating as a part of kernel while
being inserted to kernel, Netfilter that provides Hook function so that network
related function can be performed as a handler, and protection on the Virtual
File System which is an abstract hierarchy that enables access to many file
systems in the same manner.
The System Integrity Monitoring function that operates in the application area
of TrustWare detects whether there is any distortion or not by periodically
comparing the memory value of the static kernel memory and the original
value. This also receives the detected result from the System Integrity
Monitoring function that operates on the kernel module area of Tizen OS, and
saves the result along with the result detected in static kernel memory. The
scope of monitoring for the static kernel memory area is the protection for
the Read-Only which is the Read-Only data of kernel, for Text which is the
kernel code, for Exception Vector Table which deals with interrupt or
exception, and for Linux Security Module which is a Framework that provides
Hook function so as to access to important internal kernel objects at all the
points.
TOE provides an online update for function which reports the result. The
update manager provided in the operational environment communicates with
the update server to download the online update file to Smart TV and performs
integrity verification for the online update file. TOE performs the update by
installing the update file downloaded from Smart TV.
Relevant SFR : FPT_TEE.1, FCS_COP.1(3)
5.2. Web App Protection
The TOE provides Web App Protection function in order to prevent execution
48 / 49
of an unauthorized Web App in Samsung Smart TV. Samsung Smart TV can
download and store only the Web App provided in App Store (hereinafter
“App Contents Server”) provided by Samsung Electronics. When registering
Web App in App Contents server, Samsung Electronics registered after
encrypting the Web App, and Samsung Smart TV user can download the Web
App from App Contents Server and store it on Samsung Smart TV. In order
to execute the stored Web App, the decryption process is required. During
the decryption process of the Web App, if the Web App is determined to be
modified, the execution of the relevant Web App will be blocked. The TOE
uses AES Algorithm (CTR mode) for decryption of Web App, and the 128-
bit sizes of the cryptographic key.
Relevant SFR : FDP_DAU.1, FCS_COP.1(2)
5.3. Data Encryption/Decryption
The TOE provides encryption/decryption function for important data used in
Web App. The TOE uses AES algorithm (CBC mode) for encryption, and the
256-bit sizes of the cryptographic key. The cryptographic key is derived
from hardware using PBKDF2 algorithm. Data encryption and decryption can
be performed in REE OS or TEE OS according to the developer selection. The
Cryptographic key exists on memory after being generated, and is destroyed
after encryption/decryption operation is completed. The zeroization is used
as the cryptographic key destruction method.
Data Encryption/Decryption function has the lifecycle of 1) Cryptographic key
generation, 2) Encryption and Decryption operation, 3) Cryptographic key
destruction.
49 / 49
Relevant SFR : FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1(1)
5.4. Phishing Site Blocking
The TOE provides Phishing Site Blocking function in order to prevent private
information from being exposed to any risks through the access to a harmful
phishing site by Samsung Smart TV user. If Samsung Smart TV user accesses
web sites using Web Browser(Tizen Browser), Phishing Site Blocking
function checks the site based on the phishing site database(SQLite) stored
in Smart TV. If the site is suspected for being a phishing site, Google Safe
Browsing service is used to check whether the relevant site is a phishing site
or not. If the relevant site is confirmed to be a phishing site, the information
of such for the site being a phishing site is informed to the user. If the user
selects to block the access to the site, the access to the phishing site is
blocked to protect private information of the user. The TOE also provides
Smart TV user the ability to either disable or enable the Phishing Site Blocking
function. If a user disables to use the Phishing Site Blocking function, the
Phishing Site Blocking function is not performed. The list of Phishing Site on
the database is updated periodically through Update Server.
TOE provides an online update for function which downloads the phishing site
database. The update manager provided in the operational environment
communicates with the update server to download the update file to Smart TV
and performs integrity verification for the update file. TOE performs the
update by installing the update file downloaded from Smart TV.
Relevant SFR : FDP_IFC.1, FDP_IFF.1, FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1,
FMT_MSA.3, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1