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HEMLIG/
enligt Offentlighets- och sekretesslagen
(2009:400)
2019-12-10
Country of origin: Sweden
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 3253ci,
TASKalfa 2553ci Series with Hard Disk and FAX
System
Issue: 1.0, 2019-Dec-10
Authorisation: Ulf Noring, Lead Certifier , CSEC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 4
2 Identification 7
3 Security Policy 8
3.1 User Management 8
3.2 Data Access Control 8
3.3 Job Authorization Function 8
3.4 Hard Disk Drive Encryption 8
3.5 Overwrite-Erase Function 8
3.6 Audit Log 8
3.7 Security Management 8
3.8 Self-Test Function 9
3.9 Network Protection Function 9
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 10
4.1 Usage Assumptions 10
4.2 Clarification of Scope 10
5 Architectural Information 12
5.1 Physical configuration of the TOE 12
5.2 Logical configuration of the TOE 13
6 Documentation 14
7 IT Product Testing 15
7.1 Developer Testing 15
7.2 Evaluator Testing 15
7.3 Penetration Testing 16
8 Evaluated Configuration 17
8.1 Dependencies to Other Hardware, Firmware and Software 17
8.2 Excluded from TOE Evaluated Configuration 17
9 Results of the Evaluation 18
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 19
11 Glossary 20
12 Bibliography 21
12.1 General 21
12.2 Documentation 21
Appendix A Scheme Versions 23
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 23
A.2 Scheme Notes 23
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) consists of the hardware and firmware of the follow-
ing multifunction printer (MFP) models with Hard Disk and FAX System:
Kyocera:
TASKalfa 3253ci
TASKalfa 2553ci
TASKalfa 3253ciG
TASKalfa 2553ciG
Copystar:
CS 3253ci
CS 2553ci
TA Triumph-Adler:
3207ci
2507ci
UTAX:
3207ci
2507ci
The TSF and its execution environment are the same in all the listed models above.
The only differences between them are print speed and sales destinations. The follow-
ing firmware is used by the system:
System Firmware: 2VG_S0IS.C01.013
FAX Firmware : 3R2_5100.003.012
The MFP models with hard drive and fax system provide copying, scan to send, print-
ing, faxing and box functionality.
The evaluated security features include user management, data access control, job au-
thorization, hard drive encryption, overwrite-erase functionality, auditing, security
management, self-test, and network protection (IPSec and TLS).
The following functionality is excluded from the evaluation:
- The maintenance interface
- Network authentication
- The installation of Java applications on the MFP
The ST claims demonstrable conformance to the following PP:
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IEEE Std 2600.2-2009; "2600.2-PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Opera-
tional Environment B" (with NIAP CCEVS Policy Letter #20) ([PP2600.2]), version
1.0. The TOE claims conformance to the following SFR packages:
- 2600.2-PRT SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational Envi-
ronment B Conformant
- 2600.2SCN SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational Envi-
ronment B Conformant
- 2600.2-CPY SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational Envi-
ronment B Conformant
- 2600.2-FAX SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational Envi-
ronment B Conformant
- 2600.2-DSR SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval
(DSR) Functions, Operational Environment B Conformant
- 2600.2-SMI SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions,
Operational Environment B Conformant
The TOE is delivered to the customer by a courier trusted by KYOCERA Document
Solutions Inc. The main MFP printer unit is delivered separately from the Hard Disk
and FAX system add-ons. The TOE can be purchased from a KYOCERA Document
Solutions Inc. group corporation directly or from a dealer. A service person from the
organisation that sold the TOE will set it up for the customer.
The evaluation has been performed by Combitech AB in their premises in Sundbyberg
and Bromma, Sweden with testing done in the developer's premises in Osaka, Japan
and was completed on the 8th of November 2019.
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Common Crite-
ria, version 3.1, revision 5, and the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation,
version 3.1, revision 5. The evaluation conforms to evaluation assurance level EAL 2,
augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
Combitech AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria under the Swe-
dish Common Critera Evaluation and Certification Scheme. Combitech AB is also ac-
credited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC according to ISO/IEC
17025:2005 for Common Criteria evaluation.
The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results
confirm the security claims in the Security Target [ST] and have been reached in
agreement with the requirements of the Common Criteria and the Common Methodol-
ogy for the evaluation assurance level EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.2.
The technical information in this report is based on the Security Target [ST] and the
Final Evaluation Report [FER] produced by Combitech AB.
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The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the cer-
tificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organ-
isation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2018011
Name and version of the
certified IT product
KYOCERA TASKalfa
3253ci/2553ci/3253ciG/2553ciG
Copystar CS 3253ci/2553ci
TA Triumph-Adler 3207ci/2507ci
UTAX 3207ci/2507ci
The HD-12 option for the above printer models
The FAX System 12 option for the above printer
models
System Firmware: 2VG_S0IS.C01.013
FAX Firmware : 3R2_5100.003.012
Security Target Identification TASKalfa 3253ci, TASKalfa 2553ci Series with
Hard Disk and FAX System Security Target
EAL EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.2
Sponsor Kyocera Document Solutions Inc.
Developer Kyocera Document Solutions Inc.
ITSEF Combitech AB
Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 5
CEM version 3.1 revision 5
QMS version 1.23
Scheme Notes Release 14.0
Recognition Scope CCRA, SOGIS, and EA/MLA
Certification date 2019-12-XX
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3 Security Policy
The TOE consists of nine security functions, listed below together with a short de-
scription of each function.
3.1 User Management
Identifies and authenticates whether persons are authorized users when users intend to
operate the TOE from the operation panel or client PCs.
When the TOE is used from the Operation Panel or a Web browser, the login screen is
displayed and a user is required to enter his or her login user name and login pass-
word.
When the TOE is accessed from the printer driver or TWAIN driver, the TOE identi-
fies and authenticates if the person is authorized by referring to the login user name
and login user password obtained from the job sent by the user.
3.2 Data Access Control
Allows authorized users to only access their own image and job data stored in the
TOE using each of the TOE basic function such as copy, scan to send, print, fax and
box function. Users who own boxes can give other users permission to view the con-
tents of a particular box, and also set a password to further protect the box.
3.3 Job Authorization Function
Allows only authorized users to use the TOE basic function such as copy, scan to
send, print, fax and box function.
3.4 Hard Disk Drive Encryption
A function that encrypts information assets stored in the HDD in order to prevent
leakage of data stored in the HDD inside the TOE.
3.5 Overwrite-Erase Function
After each basic function (such as scanning, printing, etc.) completes, the TOE deletes
used image data on the HDD or flash memory. When deleting stored image data on
the HDD, the overwrite-erase function overwrites the actual image data with meaning-
less character strings so that it disables re-usage of the data.
3.6 Audit Log
The audit log function generates, records and manages audit logs when auditable
events occur.
3.7 Security Management
The security management function allows only authorized users to edit user infor-
mation, set the TOE security functions, and manage TSF. The Security management
function can be performed from the Operation Panel and Client PCs. Web browser is
used for operation from Client PCs.
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3.8 Self-Test Function
The self-test function performs the following self-tests at TOE startup:
• Check if HDD encryption is correctly performed.
• Check the integrity of the generated encryption key
• Check the integrity of executable module of the security function
3.9 Network Protection Function
The network protection function encrypts all data in transit over the network between
the TOE and trusted IT products and prevents unauthorized alteration and disclosure.
This function also provides a feature to prevent forwarding of information from an ex-
ternal interface to an internal network through the TOE without permission.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes four assumptions on the usage and the operational
environment of the TOE.
A.ACCESS.MANAGED
The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides protection
from unmanaged access to the physical components and data interfaces of the TOE.
A.USER.TRAINING
TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, and
are trained and competent to follow those policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRAINING
Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization,
are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer’s guidance and documentation,
and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and
procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRUST
Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.
4.2 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target contains six threats, which have been considered during the eval-
uation.
T.DOC.DIS
User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons.
T.DOC.ALT
User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
T.FUNC.ALT
User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
T.PROT.ALT
TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
T.CONF.DIS
TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons.
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T.CONF.ALT
TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
The Security Target contains five Organisational Security Policies (OSPs), which have
been considered during the evaluation.
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION
To preserve operational accountability and security, Users will be authorized to use
the TOE only as permitted by the TOE Owner.
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION
To detect corruption of the executable code in the TSF, procedures will exist to self-
verify executable code in the TSF.
P.AUDIT.LOGGING
To preserve operational accountability and security, records that provide an audit trail
of TOE use and security-relevant events will be created, maintained, and protected
from unauthorized disclosure or alteration, and will be reviewed by authorized per-
sonnel.
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT
To prevent unauthorized use of the external interfaces of the TOE, operation of those
interfaces will be controlled by the TOE and its IT environment.
P.HDD.ENCRYPTION
To improve the confidentiality of the documents, User Data and TSF Data stored in
HDD will be encrypted by the TOE.
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5 Architectural Information
5.1 Physical configuration of the TOE
The TOE consists of an Operation Panel, a Scanner Unit, a Printer Unit, a Main
Board, a FAX Board, HDD and SSD hardware, and the system firmware and fax
firmware. The different parts are depicted in a diagram below.
The Operation Panel is the hardware that displays status and results upon receipt of
input by the TOE user. The Scanner and Printer units are the hardware that input doc-
uments into the TOE and output documents as printed material.
The Main Board is the circuit board that controls the entire TOE. A system firmware
is installed on an SSD which is positioned on the Main Board. The Main Board has a
Network Interface (NIC) and a Local Interface (USB Port). There is also an ASIC on
the Main Board. The ASIC includes a Security Chip which implements security
arithmetic processing for the HDD encryption function and HDD Overwrite-Erase
function.
The FAX control firmware that controls FAX communication is installed on the
PROM, which is positioned on the FAX Board. Additionally, the FAX Board has an
NCU interface.
The NAND stores device settings while the Volatile Memory is used as working area.
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The HDD that stores image data and job data is connected to the Main Board. Any of
the above memory mediums are not removable. Only the FAX receive/send image is
stored in the Flash Memory. Image data handled by other basic functions is stored on
the HDD. Image data is not stored on the SSD.
5.2 Logical configuration of the TOE
The below diagram illustrates the logical scope of the TOE:
Please see section 1.4.3 in the [ST] for a more detailed description of the functionality
shown in the diagram.
There is no interface for any user or administrator to directly interact with the TOE
operating system, all interactions must go via one of the standard application functions
or the hardware interfaces of the TOE.
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6 Documentation
The following guidance documents are available:
[SG]
TASKalfa 2553ci / TASKalfa 3253ci / TASKalfa 4053ci / TASKalfa 5003i / TASK-
alfa 5053ci / TASKalfa 6003i / TASKalfa 6053ci Safety Guide
[OG-ci]
TASKalfa 6053ci, TASKalfa 5053ci, TASKalfa 4053ci, TASKalfa 3253ci, TASKalfa
2553ci Operation Guide
[OG-FAX]
FAX System 12 Operation Guide
[OG-DE]
Data Encryption/Overwrite Operation Guide
[UG-PR-ci]
TASKalfa 6053ci / TASKalfa 5053ci / TASKalfa 4053ci / TASKalfa 3553ci / TASK-
alfa 3253ci / TASKalfa 2553ci Printer Driver User Guide
[UG-CCRX]
Command Center RX User Guide
[IG-FAX]
FAX System 12 Installation Guide
[IG-HD]
HD-12 Installation Guide
[QG-ci]
TASKalfa 6053ci / TASKalfa 5053ci / TASKalfa 4053ci / TASKalfa 3253ci / TASK-
alfa 2553ci First Steps Quick Guide
[UG-DP]
KYOCERA Net Direct Print User Guide
[NOTICE]
Notice
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
The developer performed extensive manual tests on the following printer models:
TASKalfa 3253ci
TASKalfa 2553ci
Since the TSF and its execution environment are the same in all the listed models
above, and the only differences between them are print speed and sales destinations,
this covers all of the TOE models listed in chapter 1.
The developer testing was done on the following firmware:
System Firmware: 2VG_S0IS.C01.013
FAXFirmware: 3R2_5100.003.012
The developer's testing covers the security functional behaviour of all TSFIs and most
SFRs. Some gaps to the SFRs were identified and covered by evaluator independent
testing. All test results were as expected. The testing was performed on the developer's
premises in Osaka, Japan.
7.2 Evaluator Testing
The evaluator's independent tests were chosen to complement the developer's manual
tests in order to complement the cover of the security functional behaviour of the
SFRs. The evaluator repeated a sample of the developer's test cases and performed in-
dividual and penetration test cases. The tests included:
TOE Installation
Identification and Authentication
Job Authorization
Data Access Control
HDD Encryption/Overwrite-Erase
Audit Log
Security Management
Self Test
Network Protection
7.2.1 Test Environment
The evaluator performed the tests on the developer's premises in Osaka, Japan using
the same test environment as the developer but only tested one hardware model, the
TASKalfa 2553ci. This was accepted since all TOE models execute on the same main
board with the same CPU running the same set of firmware. The test environment was
set up according to the below diagram:
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7.3 Penetration Testing
The evaluators penetration tested the TOE using the same test environment as de-
scribed above in chapter 7.2.1. The following types of penetration tests were per-
formed:
- Port scan
- Vulnerability scan including web application vulnerability scan
- JPG fuzzing
Port scans were run after installation and configuration had been done according the
guidance documentation. The purpose was to check that no unexpected ports were
opened unfiltered and no unexpected services available. The Nmap (www.nmap.org)
port scan tool was used. Four different modes were used: TCP Connect, TCP SYN,
UDP, and IP protocol scans. All possible 65535 ports were scanned for TCP/UDP.
Nessus (www.tenable.com) basic network vulnerability scans were run. No high, me-
dium, or low severity issues concerning the evaluated configuration were found.
A JPG picture was fuzzed approximate 110 times using the Peach fuzzing tool.
All penetration testing had negative outcome, i.e. no vulnerabilities were found.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
A notice [NOTICE] included with the TOE details verification procedures of the TOE,
explains that use of applications on the TOE is not allowed in the evaluated configura-
tion, and guides users to follow the Data Encryption/Overwrite Operation Guide [OG-
DE] to configure the TOE. The Data Encryption/Overwrite Operation Guide [OG-DE]
describes how to configure the TOE to reach evaluated configuration in the chapter
named "After Installation". The instructions need to be followed in order to use the
evaluated configuration.
8.1 Dependencies to Other Hardware, Firmware and Soft-
ware
The TOE is the hardware and firmware of the various MFP models listed in chapter 1.
To be fully operational, any combination of the following items may be connected to
the MFP:
- A LAN for network connectivity.
- A telephone line for fax capability.
- IT systems that submit print jobs to the TOE via the network using standard print
protocols.
- IT systems that send/and or receive faxes via the telephone line
- An SMTP server/FTP server/client PC/other FAX system/USB memory that will re-
ceive any input sent to the MFP if the MFP is configured to send it to them.
- A USB memory that can be used as an input source for print jobs (i.e. print from
USB).
8.2 Excluded from TOE Evaluated Configuration
The following features of the TOE are outside of the evaluated configuration:
- The maintenance interface
- Network authentication
- Expanding functionality by installing Java applications is not allowed in the TOE
evaluated configuration. The user manual [OG-ci] calls the Java applications "applica-
tions". More information can be found in chapter 5, "Application", in [OG-ci].
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluator and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].
The evaluator's overall verdict is PASS.
The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarized in the follow-
ing table:
Assurance Class Name / Assurance Family Name Short name (includ-
ing component iden-
tifier for assurance
families)
Verdict
Security Target Evaluation
ST Introduction
Conformance claims
Security Problem Definition
Security objectives
Extended components definition
Derived security requirements
TOE summary specification
ASE
ASE_INT.1
ASE_CCL.1
ASE_SPD.1
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_TSS.1
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
Life-cycle support
Use of a CM system
Parts of the TOE CM Coverage
Delivery procedures
Flaw reporting procedures
ALC
ALC_CMC.2
ALC_CMS.2
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_FLR.2
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
Development
Security architecture description
Security-enforcing functional specification
Basic design
ADV
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.2
ADV_TDS.1
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
Guidance documents
Operational user guidance
Preparative procedures
AGD
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
PASS
PASS
PASS
Tests
Evidence of coverage
Functional testing
Independent testing - sample
ATE
ATE_COV.1
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
Vulnerability Assessment
Vulnerability analysis
AVA
AVA_VAN.2
PASS
PASS
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10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
None
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11 Glossary
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, document de-
scribing the methodology used in Common Criteria evaluations
CM Configuration Management
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
HDD Hard Disk Drive
IPSec Internet Protocol Security
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility, test laboratory licensed to
operate within an evaluation and certification scheme
LAN Local Area Network
MFP Multi-Function Printer
NCU Network Control Unit
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
SMTP Simple Mail Transport Protocol
SSD Solid State Drive
ST Security Target, document containing security requirements
and specifications , used as the basis of a TOE evaluation
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
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12 Bibliography
12.1 General
CCp1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1,
version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-001
CCp2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2,
version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-002
CCp3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:,
version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-003
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-004
ST TASKalfa 6053ci, TASKalfa 5053ci, TASKalfa 4053ci, TASK-alfa 3553ci
Series with FAX System, Security Target, KYOCERA Document Solu-
tions Inc., 2019-11-08, document version 1.07
PP IEEE Standard Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices in IEEE Std 2600-
2008 Operational Environment B, Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE), 26 February 2010, IEEE Std 2600.2-2009
CCEVS-
PL20
NIAP policy for the use of IEEE Multifunction Function Device Protection
Profiles (IEEE 2600.1 and IEEE 2600.2), National Information Assurance
Partnership (NIAP), 2010-11-15
SP-002 SP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2019-09-24, document ver-
sion 31.0
SP-188 SP-188 Scheme Crypto Policy, CSEC, 2019-09-25, document version 9.0
12.2 Documentation
SG TASKalfa 2553ci / TASKalfa 3253ci / TASKalfa 4053ci / TASKalfa
5003i / TASKalfa 5053ci / TASKalfa 6003i / TASKalfa 6053ci Safety
Guide, KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc., 2018-09, document version
302V85622001
OG-ci TASKalfa 6053ci, TASKalfa 5053ci, TASKalfa 4053ci, TASKalfa
3253ci, TASKalfa 2553ci Operation Guide, KYOCERA Document Solut-
ions Inc., 2018-09, document version 2V8KDEN000
OG-FAX FAX System 12 Operation Guide, KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.,
2018-09, document version 303RK5671006
OG-DE Data Encryption/Overwrite Operation Guide, KYOCERA Document
Solutions Inc., 2019-11, document version 3MS2V8GEEN3
UG-PR-
ci
TASKalfa 6053ci / TASKalfa 5053ci / TASKalfa 4053ci / TASKalfa
3553ci / TASKalfa 3253ci / TASKalfa 2553ci Printer Driver User Guide,
KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc., 2018-09, document version
2V8CLKTEN730
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UG-
CCRX
Command Center RX User Guide, KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.,
2018-09, document version CCRXKDEN17
IG-FAX FAX System 12 Installation Guide, KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.,
2018-10, document version 303RK5671006
IG-HD HD-12 Installation Guide, KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc., 2016-
04, document version 303S15631001
QG-ci TASKalfa 6053ci / TASKalfa 5053ci / TASKalfa 4053ci / TASKalfa
3253ci / TASKalfa 2553ci First Steps Quick Guide, KYOCERA Docu-
ment Solutions Inc., 2018-09, document version 302V85602001
UG-DP KYOCERA Net Direct Print User Guide, KYOCERA Document Solu-
tions Inc., 2016-02, document version DirectPrintKDEN1
NOTICE Notice, KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc., 2019-11, document version
302VK5641004
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Appendix A Scheme Versions
During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
uation and Certification scheme has been used.
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System
Version Introduced Impact of changes
1.23 2019-10-14 None
1.22.3 2019-05-20 None
1.22.2 2019-05-02 None
1.22.1 2019-03-08 None
1.22 2019-02-01 None
1.21.5 Application Original version
A.2 Scheme Notes
Scheme
Note
Version Title Applicability
SN-15 3.0 Demonstration of
test coverage
Clarify demonstration of test cover-
age at EAL2: evaluator + developer
tests together provide full coverage
of the TSFI.
SN-18 1.0 Highlighted Re-
quirements on
the Security Tar-
get
Clarifications on the content of the
ST.
SN-22 1.0 Vulnerability
Assessment
Vulnerability assessment needs to be
redone if 30 days or more has passed
between AVA and the final version
of the final evaluation report.