National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Venafi Trust Protection Platform v19.2
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11024-2019
Dated: February 21, 2020
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Patrick Mallett, PhD Lead Validator
John Butterworth: ECR Team
Michelle Carlson: ECR Team
Lisa Mitchell: ECR Team
Clare Olin: ECR Team
MITRE Corporation
Jerome Myers, PhD Senior Validator
Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Kathleen Moyer
Kenji Yoshino
Rutwij Kulkarni
Danielle Canoles
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 5
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 6
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 7
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ................................................................. 8
5.1 Assumptions....................................................................................................................................................8
5.2 Threats.............................................................................................................................................................8
5.3 Clarification of Scope.....................................................................................................................................9
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 10
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 11
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................11
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 12
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................12
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................12
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 13
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................13
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................13
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................13
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................14
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................14
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................14
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................15
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 16
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 17
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 18
13 Glossary ................................................................................................................................ 19
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 20
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology (IT)
product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is where specific
security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those security claims were
tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration. Prospective users should
carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5 and the Validator Comments in
Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Venafi Trust Protection Platform v19.2 Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of
the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or
implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of the product as evaluated and
documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in February 2020. The information in this report is
largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all written by
Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
and Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements defined in the Protection Profile for
Application Software (SWAPP) version 1.3 and Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSHEP) version 1.0.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP
approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in the SWAPP and SSH EP.
This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has
been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and reviewed the
individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report (AAR). The validation
team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and
assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based on these findings, the validation team
concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the
conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical
report are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards effort to
establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program, security
evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing
Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against Protection Profile containing Assurance
Activities, which are interpretation of CEM work units specific to the technology described by the
PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency
across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation
contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the
evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliance List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Venafi Trust Protection Platform v19.2.6
Protection Profile Protection Profile for Application Software (SWAPP) version 1.3
Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSHEP) version 1.0
Security Target Venafi Trust Protection Platform v19.2 Security Target v3.1, 2/19/2020
Evaluation
Technical Report
Venafi Trust Protection Platform v19.2 ETR
CC Version Version 3.1 Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Venafi
Developer Venafi
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
2400 Research Blvd Suite 395
Rockville, MD 20850
CCEVS Validators Patrick Mallett, Jerome Myers, John Butterworth, Michelle Carlson, Lisa
Mitchell, Clare Olin
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3 Architectural Information
Venafi Trust Protection Platform secures and protects keys and certificates in the datacenter, on
desktops, on mobile and IoT devices, and in the cloud. This protection improves security posture with
increased visibility, threat intelligence, policy enforcement, and faster incident response for certificate-
related outages and compromises leveraging misused keys and certificates.
The platform supports all Venafi products and provides native integration with thousands of applications
and common APIs for the extensive security ecosystem. Shared and extensible services enable
enterprises to gain complete visibility into their key and certificate inventory, identify certificate
reputation, and establish a baseline. The entire issuance and renewal process can be automated with
policy enforcement and workflows, enabling new encryption dependent applications to be scaled
quickly. Trust Protection Platform keeps organizations secure, helping them comply with standards and
remediate key and certificate misuse.
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4 Security Policy
The logical boundary of the TOE includes those security functions implemented exclusively by the TOE.
The TOE provides the security functionality required by [SWAPP].
Cryptographic Support
The TOE relies on underlying cryptographic functionality provided by the platform for all of its
cryptographic operations, as allowed by the [SWAPP].
Secure Software Update
The TOE is distributed as a .MSI installer package.
Security Management
The TOE does not come with any default credentials. Upon installation it will randomly generate a self-
signed certificate, and AES 256 symmetric key and a GUID for the base configuration of the system. No
data is stored by the application on the platform file system.
User Data Protection
The TOE does not store or transmit anything that could be considered Personally Identifiable
Information (PII).
Protection of the TSF
The TOE employs several mechanisms to ensure that it is secure on the host platform. The TOE never
allocates memory with both write and execute permission. The TOE is designed to operate in an
environment in which the following security techniques are in effect:
 Data execution prevention,
 Mandatory address space layout randomization (no memory map to an explicit address),
 Structured exception handler overwrite protection,
 Export address table access filtering, and
 Anti-Return Oriented Programming.
This allows the TOE to operate in an environment in which the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit is
also running. During compilation, the TOE is built with several flags enabled that check for engineering
flaws. The TOE is built with the /GS flag enabled. This reduces the possibilities of stack-based buffer
overflows in the product.
Trusted Path/Channels
TLS and SSH are used to protect all data transmitted to and from the TOE.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE security
requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
ID Assumption
A.PLATFORM1
The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a reliable time clock
for its execution. This includes the underlying platform and whatever runtime
environment it provides to the TOE.
A.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses
the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
A.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or
hostile, and administers the software in compliance of the applied enterprise
security policy.
5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The assumed level of
expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
ID Threat
T.NETWORK_ATTACK An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the
network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with the
application software or alter communications between the application software
and other endpoints in order to compromise it.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the
network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged
between the application and other endpoints.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK An attacker can act through unprivileged software on the same computing
platform on which the application executes. Attackers may provide maliciously
formatted input to the application in the form of files or other local
communications.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker may try to access sensitive data at rest.
1
ST Application Note: This Assumption has been updated according to TD0427.
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5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation.
Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the
security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this evaluation
is defined within the SWAPPv1.3 and SSHEPv1.0.
 Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not specifically
search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or
vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as
one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical
sophistication and resources.
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified
in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities included in the product
were not covered by this evaluation, specifically:
o Securing and protecting keys and certificates
o Providing visibility, threat intelligence, policy enforcement, and incident response for
certificate-related outages and key compromises
o Integration with Venafi products and third-party applications – the evaluation is limited
to secure communication channels
o Visibility into their key and certificate inventory, certificate reputation
o Issuance and renewal of certificates
o Policy enforcement
o Workflows
o Remediation of key and certificate misuse
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6 Documentation
The following document was provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
 Venafi Trust Protection Platform v19.2 Common Criteria and FIPS Evaluated Configuration Guide
v1.1, 2/5/2020.
Only the Configuration Guide listed above, and the specific sections of the other documents referenced
by that guide should be trusted for the installation, administration, and use of this product in its
evaluated configuration.
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of application software configured in accordance with the
documentation specified in Section 6. The TOE boundary is the application software which runs on the
host platform. For this evaluation the TOE runs on Windows Server 2012 R2. The Universal C Runtime
must be installed. In addition to this the following Microsoft Internet Information (IIS) web server roles
must be installed:
 Common HTTP Features\Static Content
 Common HTTP Features\Default Document
 Health and Diagnostics\HTTP Logging
 Health and Diagnostics\Logging Tools
 Health and Diagnostics\Request Monitor
 Health and Diagnostics\Tracing
 Security\Request Filtering
 Performance\Static Content Compression
It should be noted that this operating system is outside the TOE boundary.
A list of third-party libraries that come bundled with the TOE and are inside the TOE boundary is listed in
section 1.3.2.7 of the Security Target. However, as is noted in the Clarification of Scope Section (5.3
above) the general effectiveness of the functionality provided by those libraries was not covered by the
scope of this evaluation.
The TOE also uses an external database to store credentials, certificates, keys and log data. Microsoft
SQL Server 2012 SP2 is used in the evaluated configuration and Microsoft SQL Server 2014 and 2016 are
also supported. This database is outside the boundary of the TOE and is only used for the storage of
data. All data that is sent to the database is encrypted by the TOE and is stored in the database as
cipherstrings. Decryption of data happens on the TOE after the data is retrieved from the database.
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived from
information contained in Evaluation Test Report for Venafi Trust Protection Platform v19.2, which is not
publicly available. The Assurance Activities Report provides a public overview of testing and the
prescribed assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance documentation and
ran the tests specified in the SWAPP and SSH EP. An overview of the configurations used to test the TOE
and the specific test tools used may be found in Section 5.1 of the Assurance Activity Report. The
Independent Testing activity is documented in the Assurance Activities Report, which is publicly
available, and is not further duplicated here.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in
detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR). The reader of this document can assume that activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1 rev
5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Venafi Trust Protection Platform v19.2 to
be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDPP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains a
description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security
requirements claimed to be met by the Venafi Trust Protection Platform v19.2 that are consistent with
the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the SWAPP
and SSH EP.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the design
documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security
functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the Security
Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities
specified in the SWAPP and SSH EP related to the examination of the information contained in the TOE
Summary Specification.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of
the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation team
ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE.
The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were
complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the SWAPP and
SSH EP related to the examination of the information contained in the operational guidance documents.
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The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests specified
by the Assurance Activities in the SWAPP and SSH EP and recorded the results in a Test Report,
summarized in the Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence was provided
by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities in the SWAPP
and SSH EP, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a public search
for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any issues with the TOE. The
following search terms were used to discover potential vulnerabilities:
 Venafi
 Trust Platform v19.2
 JSON.Net
 PDFSharp
 MigraDoc
 HTMLAgility Pack
 MS Anti-Cross Site Scripting Library
 IronPython
 jQuery v3.4.1
 Moment JS v2.24.0
 Backbone JS v1.4.0
 Twitter bootstrap Apache v2
 Underscore
 Boost
 Beast
 JSON11
 Base64
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 Cxxopts
 Chaos.NaCI
The evaluation lab examined each result provided from NVD and Exploit Search to determine if the
current TOE version or component within the environment was vulnerable. The vulnerability searches
were conducted on February 20, 2020. The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and
found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation addressed the vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the SWAPPv1.3 and SSHEPv1.0,
and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the SWAPPv1.3 and
SSHEPv1.0, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being configured
per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Venafi Trust Protection Platform v19.2 Common
Criteria and FIPS Evaluated Configuration Guide v1.1, 2/5/2020 document. This evaluation only applies
to the version of the TOE listed in Section 2, Table 1. Any other versions, either earlier or later, should be
assessed independently of this evaluation. Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped
exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality
included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. Other functionality provided by
devices in the operational environment, such as the syslog server, need to be assessed separately and
no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness
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11 Annexes
Not applicable.
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12 Security Target
Venafi Trust Protection Platform v19.2 Security Target v3.1, 2/19/2020.
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility accredited by the
National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS
Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation
is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common
Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or
the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common
Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound
and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be
evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT product,
and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for
overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme.
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security functional
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security assurance
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5.
5. Protection Profile for Application Software, version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP].
6. Extended Package for Secure Shell, version 1.0, dated 19 February 2016 [SSHEP].