National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 - Spring
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11228-2022
Dated: May 25, 2022
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 – Spring Validation Report Version 1.0, May 25, 2022
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jerome Myers, Ph.D.
Patrick Mallett, Ph.D.
DeRon Graves
The Aerospace Corporation.
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
James Arnold
Tammy Compton
Matai Spivey
Rizheng Sun
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 – Spring Validation Report Version 1.0, May 25, 2022
iii
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................1
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................2
3 Architectural Information...................................................................................................3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms...........................................................................................4
3.2 TOE Architecture .......................................................................................................4
3.3 Physical Boundaries ...................................................................................................5
4 Security Policy....................................................................................................................5
4.1 Security audit..............................................................................................................5
4.2 Cryptographic support................................................................................................5
4.3 User data protection....................................................................................................6
4.4 Identification and authentication ................................................................................6
4.5 Security management .................................................................................................6
4.6 Protection of the TSF..................................................................................................6
4.7 TOE access .................................................................................................................7
4.8 Trusted path/channels.................................................................................................7
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope...............................................................................7
6 Documentation ...................................................................................................................8
7 IT Product Testing..............................................................................................................8
7.1 Developer Testing ......................................................................................................9
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................9
8 Evaluated Configuration.....................................................................................................9
9 Results of the Evaluation..................................................................................................13
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)..................................................................13
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)....................................................................13
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD).......................................................13
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)...........................................14
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE).......................14
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN) ..............................................................14
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results ...............................................................................15
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations..........................................................................15
11 Security Target .................................................................................................................15
12 Glossary............................................................................................................................15
13 Bibliography.....................................................................................................................16
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 – Spring Validation Report Version 1.0, May 25, 2022
1
1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 - Spring
solution provided by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of
the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either
expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in May 2022. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security Solutions.
The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part
3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the Protection Profile for Mobile
Device Fundamentals, Version 3.2, 15 April 2021 with the General Purpose Operating Systems
Protection Profile/Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP)
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016; the PP-Module
for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, version 2.3, 10 August 2021; the PP-Module for
Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 2021; and the Functional Package for TLS, Version 1.1, 12 February
2019.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 - Spring.
The TOE identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as
evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the
product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the
Security Target (ST). Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s
findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Samsung Electronics
Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 Spring – Security Target, version 0.4, May
20, 2022 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 – Spring Validation Report Version 1.0, May 25, 2022
2
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 - Spring
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Virtual Private
Network (VPN) Clients, and Bluetooth, 15 May 2022 (CFG_MDF-VPNC-
BT_V1.0)
The PP-Configuration includes the following components:
• Base-PP: Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version
3.2, (PP_MD_V3.2)
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients,
Version 2.3, (MOD_VPNC-MDF_V2.3)
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, (MOD_BT_V1.0)
Package Claims:
• General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device
Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area
Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016
(PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0)
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 – Spring Validation Report Version 1.0, May 25, 2022
3
Item Identifier
• Functional Package: Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS),
Version 1.1, (PKG_TLS_V1.1)
ST Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 –
Security Target, version 0.3, April 15, 2022
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 -
Spring, version 0.1, April 15, 2022
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 extended
Sponsor Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Developer Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Jerome Myers, Ph.D.
Patrick Mallett, Ph.D.
DeRon Graves
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The TOE is a mobile device based on Android 12 with a built-in IPsec VPN client and
modifications made to increase the level of security provided to end users and enterprises. The
TOE is intended for use as part of an enterprise mobility solution providing mobile staff with
enterprise connectivity.
The TOE includes a Common Criteria mode (or “CC mode”) that an administrator can invoke
using an MDM. The TOE must meet the following prerequisites in order for an administrator
to transition the TOE to and remain in the CC configuration.
• Require a boot and device lock password (swipe, PIN, pattern, accessibility (direction),
screen locks are not allowed). Acceptable biometrics vary with the device for the device
lock.
• The maximum password failure retry policy should be less than or equal to 30.
• A screen lock password required to decrypt data on boot.
• Revocation checking must be enabled.
• Security and audit logging must be enabled.
• External storage must be encrypted.
• Developer debugging must be disabled
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 – Spring Validation Report Version 1.0, May 25, 2022
4
• When CC mode has been enabled, the TOE behaves as follows:
o The TOE sets the system wide Android CC mode property to be enabled.
o The TOE prevents loading of custom firmware/kernels and requires all updates
occur through FOTA.
o The TOE utilizes ACVP/CAVP approved cryptographic ciphers for TLS.
The TOE includes the ability to create separate profiles part of the Knox Platform. A profile
provides a way to segment applications and data into two separate areas on the device, such as
a personal area and a work area, each with its own separate apps, data and security policies. For
this effort, the TOE was evaluated both without and with profiles created. Thus, the evaluation
includes several Knox-specific claims that apply when these profiles are created.
There are different models of the TOE, the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12, and these
models differ in their internal components (as described in the table below). All devices are
A64 architecture.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE combines with a Mobile Device Management solution (note that this evaluation does
not include an MDM agent nor server) that enables the Enterprise to watch, control and
administer all deployed mobile devices, across multiple mobile service providers as well as
facilitate secure communications through a VPN. This partnership provides a secure mobile
environment that can be managed and controlled by the environment and reduces the risks
inherent in any mobile deployment.
Data on the TOE is protected through the implementation of Samsung File-Based Encryption
(FBE) that utilizes ACVP/CAVP certified cryptographic algorithms to encrypt device storage.
This functionality is combined with a number of on-device policies including local wipe, remote
wipe, password complexity, automatic lock and privileged access to security configurations to
prevent unauthorized access to the device and stored data.
The Knox Platform for Enterprise provides a set of flexible deployment options for work
environments. With Knox Platform for Enterprise, it is possible to segment the device into two
separate areas, by convention called the personal profile and the work profile. In creating a
work profile, the Enterprise establishes a completely separate workspace, with its own
authentication, applications and services, and ensure they are kept separate from anything the
user may do in the personal profile. Another option for deployment is Knox Separated Apps, a
folder where the Enterprise can isolate a group of applications from the rest of the device,
restricting access to shared information, while maintaining seamless access to the isolated
applications for the user.
The Samsung Knox Software Development Kit (SDK) builds on top of the existing Android
security model by expanding the current set of security configuration options to more than 600
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 – Spring Validation Report Version 1.0, May 25, 2022
5
configurable policies and including additional security functionality such as application allow
and block listing.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a multi-user capable mobile device based on Android 12 that incorporates the
Samsung Knox SDK. The TOE does not include the user applications that run on top of the
operating system, but does include controls that limit application behavior. The TOE includes
an IPsec VPN client integrated into the firmware (as opposed to a downloadable application).
Within an Enterprise environment, the Enterprise can manage the configuration of the mobile
device, including the VPN client, through a compliant device management solution.
The TOE communicates and interacts with 802.11-2012 Access Points and mobile data
networks to establish network connectivity, and the through that connectivity interacts with
MDM servers that allow administrative control of the TOE.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. User data protection
4. Identification and authentication
5. Security management
6. Protection of the TSF
7. TOE access
8. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE generates logs for a range of security relevant events. The TOE stores the logs locally
so they can be accessed by an administrator or they can be exported to an MDM.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes multiple cryptographic libraries with ACVP certified algorithms for a wide
range of cryptographic functions including the following: asymmetric key generation and
establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and
keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random bit
generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage,
and key and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to
implement security protocols such as TLS, EAP-TLS, IPsec, and HTTPS and to encrypt the
media (including the generation and protection of data and key encryption keys) used by the
TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to applications
running on the TOE.
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 – Spring Validation Report Version 1.0, May 25, 2022
6
4.3 User data protection
The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of the
Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE protects user and other sensitive data using
encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected. The
functionality provided by work profiles and Knox Separated Apps enhance the security of user
data by providing an additional layer of separation between different categories of apps and
data while the device is in use. The TOE ensures that residual information is protected from
potential reuse in accessible objects such as network packets.
4.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a user
perspective, except for making phone calls to an emergency number, a password or Biometric
Authentication Factor (BAF) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. In addition, even
when the TOE is unlocked the password must be re-entered to change the password or re-enroll
the biometric template. Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the
TOE's display, the frequency of entering passwords is limited and when a configured number
of failures occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can be constructed
using upper and lower case characters, numbers, and special characters and passwords between
4 and 16 characters are supported.
The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can use X.509v3 and validate certificates
for EAP-TLS, TLS and IPsec exchanges. The TOE can also act as a client or server in an
authenticated Bluetooth pairing. In addition to storing X.509 certificates used for IPsec
connections, the TOE can also securely store pre-shared keys for VPN connections.
4.5 Security management
The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions (including the
VPN client) identified throughout this Security Target as well as other functions commonly
found in mobile devices. Many of the available functions are available to users of the TOE
while many are restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management
solution once the TOE has been enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and then un-enrolled,
it removes all MDM policies and disables CC mode.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity
of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as cryptographic keys so that
they are not accessible or exportable. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that
reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability). It enforces read, write, and
execute memory page protections, uses address space layout randomization, and stack-based
buffer overflow protections to minimize the potential to exploit application flaws. It also
protects itself from modification by applications as well as isolates the address spaces of
applications from one another to protect those applications.
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 – Spring Validation Report Version 1.0, May 25, 2022
7
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so
that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any self-tests fail, the TOE will not
go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital
signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the
updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital signature
checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation.
4.7 TOE access
The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of
inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an advisory message (banner) when users
unlock the TOE for use.
The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
4.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of 802.11-2012, 802.1X, EAP-TLS, TLS, HTTPS and IPsec to secure
communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.2, 15 April 2021 with
the General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device
Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network
(WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016; the PP-Module for Virtual Private
Network (VPN) Clients, version 2.3, 10 August 2021; the PP-Module for Bluetooth,
Version 1.0, 2021; and the Functional Package for TLS, Version 1.1, 12 February 2019
That information has not been reproduced here and the
PP_MDF_V3.2/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0/MOD_BT_V1.0/MOD_VPNC_V2.3/PKG_TLS_
V1.1 should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
PP_MDF_V3.2/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0/MOD_BT_V1.0/MOD_VPNC_V2.3/PKG_TLS_
V1.1 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the
product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the
devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 – Spring Validation Report Version 1.0, May 25, 2022
8
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities
specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile with the Extended
Package for Wireless LAN Client, the Module for Bluetooth, the Module for Virtual
Private Network Clients, and the Functional Package for TLS and performed by the
evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific
Mobile Device models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore
should not to be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM
defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of
understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the
PP_MDF_V3.2/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0/MOD_BT_V1.0/MOD_VPNC_V2.3/PKG
_TLS_V1.1 and applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security related
functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Samsung Android 12 on Galaxy Devices Administrator Guide, Version 8.0.1, April 15,
2022
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied upon
when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified
in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to download the
configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is derived
from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Samsung Galaxy
Devices on Android 12 - Spring, Version 0.1, April 15, 2022 (DTR), as summarized in the
evaluation Assurance Activity Report (AAR) section 3.4.
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 – Spring Validation Report Version 1.0, May 25, 2022
9
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the
PP_MDF_V3.2/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0/MOD_BT_V1.0/MOD_VPNC_V2.3/PKG_TLS_
V1.1 including the tests associated with optional requirements. The AAR, in sections 1.1 lists
the tested devices, provides a list of test tools, and has diagrams of the test environment.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the hardware and software listed in the tables below
when configured in accordance with the documentation specified in section 6. The model
numbers of the mobile devices used during evaluation testing are as follows:
Device Name Model
Number
Chipset
Vendor
SoC Arch Kernel Build Number
Galaxy S22 Ultra 5G SM-S908B Samsung Exynos 2200 ARMv8 5.10 SP1A.210812.016
Galaxy S22 5G SM-S901U Qualcomm Snapdragon 8 Gen
1 Mobile Platform
ARMv8 5.10 SP1A.210812.016
Galaxy S21 Ultra 5G SM-G998B Samsung Exynos 2100 ARMv8 5.4.61 RP1A.200720.012
Galaxy S21 Ultra 5G SM-G998U Qualcomm Snapdragon 888 ARMv8 5.4.61 RP1A.200720.012
Galaxy XCover Pro SM-G715FN Samsung Exynos 9611 ARMv8 4.14.113 RP1A.200720.012
Galaxy S20+ 5G SM-G986B Samsung Exynos 990 ARMv8 4.19.87 RP1A.200720.012
Galaxy S20+ 5G SM-G986U Qualcomm Snapdragon 865 ARMv8 4.19.113 RP1A.200720.012
Galaxy Note10 SM-N976B Samsung Exynos 9825 ARMv8 4.14.113 RP1A.200720.012
Galaxy S10e SM-G970F Samsung Exynos 9820 ARMv8 4.14.113 RP1A.200720.012
Galaxy S10+ SM-G975U Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 ARMv8 4.14.180 RP1A.200720.012
Table 1 - Evaluated Devices
In addition to the evaluated devices:
Evaluated Device SoC Equivalent Devices Differences
Galaxy S22 Ultra
5G
Exynos 2200
Galaxy S22+ 5G S22 Ultra > S22+ > S22 in terms of display size
Galaxy S22 5G S22+ & S22 devices have S21 Ultra 5G Wi-Fi chip
Galaxy S22 5G
Snapdragon 8
Gen 1 Mobile
Platform
Galaxy S22 Ultra 5G S22 Ultra > S22+ > S22 in terms of display size
Galaxy S22+ 5G S22+ & S22 devices have S21 Ultra 5G Wi-Fi chip
Galaxy Tab S8 Ultra Tab S8 devices are tablets (no voice calling) with S Pen
Galaxy Tab S8+ Tab S8 Ultra > Tab S8+ > Tab S7 in terms of display size
Galaxy Tab S8
Tab S8 Ultra & Tab S8+ have under screen image
fingerprint sensor
Tab S8 has power button fingerprint sensor
Galaxy S21 Ultra
5G
Exynos 2100
Galaxy S21+ 5G
S21 Ultra > S21+ > S21 > S21 FE in terms of display
size
Galaxy S21 5G S21+ & S21 devices have S20+ 5G Wi-Fi chip
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 – Spring Validation Report Version 1.0, May 25, 2022
10
Evaluated Device SoC Equivalent Devices Differences
Galaxy S21 Ultra
5G
Snapdragon
888
Galaxy S21+ 5G
S21 Ultra > S21+ > S21 > S21 FE in terms of display
size
Galaxy S21 5G S21+ & S21 devices have S20+ 5G Wi-Fi chip
Galaxy S21 5G FE
Z Fold3 5G & Z Flip3 5G have 2 displays & folding
display
Galaxy Z Fold3 5G
Z Fold3 5G & Z Flip3 5G have power button fingerprint
sensor
Galaxy Z Flip3 5G Z Fold3 & Z Flip3 have S22 Ultra Wi-Fi chip
Galaxy S20+ 5G Exynos 990
Galaxy Note20 Ultra
5G S20 Ultra > S20+ > S20 > S20 FE in terms of display
size
Galaxy Note20 Ultra
LTE
Galaxy Note20 5G
5G devices have different cellular modem
Galaxy Note20 LTE
Galaxy S20 Ultra 5G
Note20 Ultra > Note20 in terms of display size
Galaxy S20+ LTE
Galaxy S20 5G
Note20 devices include S Pen & functionality to take
advantage of it for input (not security related)
Galaxy S20 LTE
Galaxy S20 FE
Galaxy S20+ 5G
Snapdragon
865
Galaxy Z Fold2 5G
S20 Ultra > S20+ > S20 > S20 FE in terms of display
size
Galaxy Note20 Ultra
5G
Note20 Ultra > Note20 in terms of display size
Galaxy Note20 5G
Note20 devices include S Pen & functionality to take
advantage of it for input (not security related)
Galaxy Tab S7+ Z Fold2 5G & Z Flip have 2 displays & folding display
Galaxy Tab S7 Tab S7 devices are tablets (no voice calling) with S Pen
Galaxy Z Flip 5G Tx70 tablets only have Wi-Fi, others have cellular
Galaxy S20 Ultra 5G Tab S7+ > Tab S7 in terms of display size
Galaxy S20 5G
Tab S7+ & S20 FE have under screen image fingerprint
sensor
Galaxy S20 FE Tab S7 & Z Flip 5G have power button fingerprint sensor
Galaxy S10e Exynos 9820
Galaxy S10+ S10 & S10+ have ultrasonic fingerprint sensor
Galaxy S10 5G S10+ > S10 > S10e in terms of display sizes
Galaxy S10 S10 5G has different cellular modem
Galaxy S10+
Snapdragon
855
Galaxy Note10+ 5G
S10e, Fold & Z Flip have power button image fingerprint
sensor
Galaxy Note10+ S10 & S10e have smaller display sizes
Galaxy Note10 5G devices have different cellular modem
Galaxy Tab S6 Fold & Z Flip have 2 displays
Galaxy S10 5G Fold & Z Flip have folding display
Galaxy S10 Note10+ > Note10 in terms of display size
Galaxy S10e
Note10 devices include S Pen & functionality to take
advantage of it for input (not security related)
Galaxy Fold 5G Tab S6 is tablet (no voice calling) with S Pen
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 – Spring Validation Report Version 1.0, May 25, 2022
11
Evaluated Device SoC Equivalent Devices Differences
Galaxy Fold
T867 & T865 tablets have LTE, T860 tablets only have
Wi-Fi
Galaxy Z Flip Tab S6 has under screen image fingerprint sensor
Galaxy Note10+
5G
Exynos 9825
Galaxy Note10+ Note10+ > Note10 in terms of display size
Galaxy Note10 5G
5G devices have different cellular modem
Galaxy Note10
Galaxy XCover
Pro
Exynos 9611 Galaxy A51
XCover Pro is ruggedized
XCover Pro has Push-to-Talk button
XCover Pro has removable battery
A51 has under screen image fingerprint sensor
Table 2 - Equivalent Devices
In general, the devices include a final letter or number at the end of the name that denotes that
the device is for a specific carrier or region (for example, U = US Carrier build and F =
International, which were used during the evaluation).
For each device, there are specific models that are validated. This table lists the specific carrier
models that have the validated configuration (covering both evaluated and equivalent devices).
Device Name Chipset Vendor
Base Model
Number
Carrier Models
Galaxy S22 Ultra 5G Samsung SM-S908 B, B/DS
Galaxy S22 Ultra 5G Qualcomm SM-S908 U, U1, W, N, E, SC52C*, SCG14*
Galaxy S22+ 5G Samsung SM-S906 B, B/DS
Galaxy S22+ 5G Qualcomm SM-S906 U, U1, W, N, E
Galaxy S22 5G Samsung SM-S901 B, B/DS
Galaxy S22 5G Qualcomm SM-S901 U, U1, W, N, E, SC51C*, SCG13*
Galaxy S21 Ultra 5G Samsung SM-G998 B, B/DS, N
Galaxy S21 Ultra 5G Qualcomm SM-G998 U, U1, W, SC52B*
Galaxy S21+ 5G Samsung SM-G996 B, B/DS, N
Galaxy S21+ 5G Qualcomm SM-G996 U, U1, W, SCG10*
Galaxy S21 5G Samsung SM-G991 B, B/DS, N
Galaxy S21 5G Qualcomm SM-G991 Q, U, U1, W, SC51B*, SCG09*
Galaxy S21 5G FE Qualcomm SM-G990 B, N, U, U1, W
Galaxy S20 Ultra 5G Samsung SM-G988 B
Galaxy S20 Ultra 5G Qualcomm SM-G988 N, U, U1, W, SC52A*, SCG02*
Galaxy S20+ 5G Samsung SM-G986 F
Galaxy S20+ 5G Qualcomm SM-G986 B
Galaxy S20+ LTE Samsung SM-G985 N, U, U1, V, W, SC51A*, SCG01*
Galaxy S20 5G Samsung SM-G981 F
Galaxy S20 5G Qualcomm SM-G981 F
Galaxy S20 LTE Samsung SM-G980 B, N, U, U1, V, W
Galaxy S20 FE Samsung SM-G780 F
Galaxy S20 FE Qualcomm SM-G781 B, N, U, V, W
Galaxy S10 5G Samsung SM-G977 B, N
Galaxy S10 5G Qualcomm SM-G977 P, T, U, U1
Galaxy S10+ Samsung SM-G975 F, N
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 – Spring Validation Report Version 1.0, May 25, 2022
12
Device Name Chipset Vendor
Base Model
Number
Carrier Models
Galaxy S10+ Qualcomm SM-G975 U, U1, SC-04L*, SC-05L*, SCV42*
Galaxy S10 Samsung SM-G973 F, N
Galaxy S10 Qualcomm SM-G973 U, U1, SC-03L*, SCV41*
Galaxy S10e Samsung SM-G970 F, N
Galaxy S10e Qualcomm SM-G970 U, U1
Galaxy Z Fold3 5G Qualcomm SM-F926 B, N, U, U1, W, SC-55B*, SCG11*
Galaxy Z Fold2 5G Qualcomm SM-F916 B, N, U, U1, W
Galaxy Fold 5G Qualcomm SM-F907 B, N
Galaxy Fold Qualcomm SM-F900 F, U, U1, SC-06L*, SCV44*
Galaxy Z Flip3 5G Qualcomm SM-F711 B, N, U, U1, W, SC-54B*, SCG12*
Galaxy Z Flip 5G Qualcomm SM-F707 B, N, U, U1
Galaxy Z Flip Qualcomm SM-F700 F, N, U, U1, W, SCV47*
Galaxy Note20 Ultra 5G Samsung SM-N986 B
Galaxy Note20 Ultra 5G Qualcomm SM-N986 C, N, U, U1, W, SC01O*
Galaxy Note20 Ultra LTE Samsung SM-N985 F
Galaxy Note20 5G Samsung SM-N981 B
Galaxy Note20 5G Qualcomm SM-N981 N, U, U1, W
Galaxy Note20 LTE Samsung SM-N980 F
Galaxy Note10+ 5G Samsung SM-N976 B, N
Galaxy Note10+ 5G Qualcomm SM-N976 U, V
Galaxy Note10+ Samsung SM-N975 F
Galaxy Note10+ Qualcomm SM-N975 C, U, U1, SC-01M*, SCV45*
Galaxy Note10 5G Samsung SM-N971 N
Galaxy Note10 Samsung SM-N970 F
Galaxy Note10 Qualcomm SM-N970 U, U1
Galaxy Tab S8 Ultra Qualcomm
SM-X906 B, N
SM-X900 None
Galaxy Tab S8+ Qualcomm
SM-X808 U
SM-X806 B, N, E
SM-X800 None
Galaxy Tab S8 Qualcomm SM-X706 B, N
SM-X700 None
Galaxy Tab S7+ Qualcomm
SM-T978 U
SM-T976 B, N
SM-T975 N, None
SM-T970 None
Galaxy Tab S7 Qualcomm
SM-T878 U
SM-T875 N, None
SM-T870 None
Galaxy Tab S6 5G Qualcomm SM-T866 N
Galaxy Tab S6 Qualcomm
SM-T867 R4, U, V
SM-T865 N, None
SM-T860 None
Galaxy XCover Pro Samsung SM-G715 A, FN, U, W
Galaxy A51 Samsung
SM-A515 F, U, U1, W
SM-S515 DL
Table 3 - Carrier Models
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 – Spring Validation Report Version 1.0, May 25, 2022
13
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Samsung Galaxy
Devices on Android 12 - Spring TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in
the
PP_MDF_V3.2/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0/MOD_BT_V1.0/MOD_VPNC_V2.3/PKG_TLS_
V1.1.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 -
Spring products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained
in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator performed the
assurance activities specified in the
PP_MDF_V3.2/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0/MOD_BT_V1.0/MOD_VPNC_V2.3/PKG_TLS_
V1.1 related to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 – Spring Validation Report Version 1.0, May 25, 2022
14
securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the assurance activities in the
PP_MDF_V3.2/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0/MOD_BT_V1.0/MOD_VPNC_V2.3/PKG_TLS_
V1.1 and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a
public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) on 5/20/2022 with the following search terms: "Samsung S10",
"SM-G970", "SM-G975", "Samsung S20", "SM-G986", "Samsung S21", "SM-G998",
"Samsung S22", "SM-S901", "SM-S908", "Samsung Note 10", "SM-N976", "Samsung
XCover Pro", "SM-G715", "Knox", "BoringSSL", "strongswan", "charon", "Android".
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 – Spring Validation Report Version 1.0, May 25, 2022
15
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of
the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the guidance documents listed in
Section 6. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later were evaluated. Please
note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was
not assessed as part of this evaluation. Other functionality provided by devices in the
operational environment, such as the syslog server, need to be assessed separately and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
11 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices
on Android 12 – Security Target, Version 0.3, April 15, 2022.
12 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more
TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 – Spring Validation Report Version 1.0, May 25, 2022
16
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the
CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of
a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and
for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme.
13 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction
and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, September 2102.
[4] Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.2, 15 April 2021
[5] General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device Fundamentals
Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)
Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016
[6] PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, version 2.3, 10 August 2021
[7] PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 2021
[8] Functional Package for TLS, Version 1.1, 12 February 2019.
[9] Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 – Security
Target, Version 0.4, May 20, 2022 (ST).
[10] Assurance Activity Report for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 - Spring,
Version 0.2, May 20, 2022 (AAR).
[11] Detailed Test Report for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 - Spring, Version 0.1,
May 20, 2022 (DTR).
[12] Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 12 - Spring,
Version 021, May 20, 2022 (ETR)