PREMIER MINISTRE
Secretariat General for National Defence
Central Directorate for Information Systems Security
Certification Report 2007/06
Oberthur Card ID-One ePass 64K: application
ID-One ePass 64K v1.0 masked on Philips
(NXP) components P5CD072/V0P and
P5CD072/V0Q
Paris, 23rd
March 2007
Courtesy Translation
Certification report 2007/06
Oberthur Card ID-One ePass 64K: application ID-One ePass
64K v1.0 masked on Philips (NXP) components
P5CD072/V0P and P5CD072/V0Q
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Warning
This report is designed to provide sponsors with a document enabling them to assess the
security level of a product under the conditions of use and operation defined in this report for
the evaluated version. It is also designed to provide the potential purchaser of the product with
the conditions under which he may operate or use the product so as to meet the conditions of
use for which the product has been evaluated and certified; that is why this certification report
must be read alongside the evaluated user and administration guidance, as well as with the
product security target, which presents threats, environmental assumptions and the supposed
conditions of use so that the user can judge for himself whether the product meets his needs in
terms of security objectives.
Certification does not, however, constitute a recommendation product from DCSSI (Central
Directorate for Information Systems Security), and does not guarantee that the certified
product is totally free of all exploitable vulnerabilities.
Any correspondence about this report has to be addressed to:
Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale
Direction Centrale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information
Centre de certification
51, boulevard de la Tour Maubourg
75700 PARIS cedex 07 SP
France
certification.dcssi@sgdn.pm.gouv.fr
Reproduction of this document without any change or cut is authorised.
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Certification report reference
2007/06
Product name
Oberthur Card ID-One ePass 64K: application ID-One
ePass 64K v1.0 masked on Philips (NXP) components
P5CD072/V0P and P5CD072/V0Q
Product reference
Philips references IC + ROM mask : 9352 831 41006 VOP et 9352 831 64118 VOQ
Protection profile conformity
« Machine readable Travel Document with ICAO
Application, Basic Access Control »
BSI-PP-0017 rev: 1.0 date 18/08/2005
Evaluation criteria and version
Common Criteria version 2.3
compliant with ISO 15408:2005
Evaluation level
EAL 4 augmented
ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2
Developer(s)
Oberthur Card Systems SA
71-73 rue des Hautes Pâtures
92726 Nanterre, France
Philips Semiconductors
Postfach 54 02 40,
D-22502 Hamburg, Allemagne
Sponsor
Oberthur Card Systems SA
71-73 rue des Hautes Pâtures, 92726 Nanterre, France
Evaluation facility
CEA - LETI
17 rue des martyrs, 38054 Grenoble Cedex 9, France
Tél : +33 (0)4 38 78 40 87, mél : cesti.leti@cea.fr
Recognition arrangements
CCRA
The product is recognised at EAL4 level.
SOG-IS
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Introduction
The Certification
Security certification for information technology products and systems is governed by decree
number 2002-535 dated April, 18th 2002, and published in the "Journal Officiel de la
République Française". This decree stipulates that:
• The central information system security department draws up certification reports.
These reports indicate the features of the proposed security targets. They may include
any warnings that the authors feel the need to mention for security reasons. They may
or may not be transmitted to third parties or made public, as the principals desire
(article 7).
• The certificates issued by the Prime Minister certify that the copies of the products or
systems submitted for evaluation fulfil the specified security features. They also
certify that the evaluations have been carried out in compliance with applicable rules
and standards, with the required degrees of skill and impartiality (article 8).
The procedures are available on the Internet site www.ssi.gouv.fr.
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Content
1. THE PRODUCT........................................................................................................................... 6
1.1. PRESENTATION OF THE PRODUCT........................................................................................... 6
1.2. EVALUATED PRODUCT DESCRIPTION ..................................................................................... 6
1.2.1. Product identification.................................................................................................... 6
1.2.2. Security services............................................................................................................ 7
1.2.3. Architecture................................................................................................................... 7
1.2.4. Life cycle ....................................................................................................................... 7
1.2.5. Evaluated configuration................................................................................................ 8
2. THE EVALUATION.................................................................................................................... 9
2.1. EVALUATION REFERENTIAL ................................................................................................... 9
2.2. EVALUATION WORK ............................................................................................................... 9
2.3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MECHANISMS ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS....................................................... 9
3. CERTIFICATION...................................................................................................................... 10
3.1. CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................ 10
3.2. RESTRICTIONS...................................................................................................................... 10
3.3. RECOGNITION OF THE CERTIFICATE..................................................................................... 12
3.3.1. European recognition (SOG-IS).................................................................................. 12
3.3.2. International common criteria recognition (CCRA)................................................... 12
ANNEX 1. EVALUATION LEVEL OF THE PRODUCT.......................................................... 13
ANNEX 2. EVALUATED PRODUCT REFERENCES .............................................................. 14
ANNEX 3. CERTIFICATION REFERENCES ........................................................................... 15
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1. The product
1.1. Presentation of the product
The evaluated product « Oberthur Card ID-One ePass 64K: application ID-One ePass 64K
v1.0 masked on Philips (NXP) components P5CD072/V0P and P5CD072/V0Q » is an
electronic passport developed by Oberthur Card Systems SA.
The assessed product is a contactless smartcard with antenna. It implements the electronic
passport functionalities as per the specifications of the international Civil Aviation
Organization (see [ICAO]). The product itself is a contactless interface controller with an
onboard software application enabling the following:
• To store signed data items for the future passport holder (issuing organization or
country, passport number, expiry date, name of holder, nationality, date of birth, sex,
any other optional information); a biometric data item regarding the holder (photo of
face); optional authentication data and other miscellaneous data used to handle
document security;
• To check the authenticity of passport and identify its holder when going through
customs, by means of an inspection system. This microcircuit and its onboard software
application are designed to be inserted in the cover of standard passports.
1.2. Evaluated product description
The security target [ST] defines the evaluated product, its evaluated security functionalities
and its operation environment.
This security target is compliant to “Machine readable Travel Document with ICAO
Application, Basic Access Control” protection profile [PP MRTD].
1.2.1. Product identification
The configuration list [CONF] identifies the product’s constituent elements.
The certified version of the product can be identified by the following elements:
- ROM: EV4/T0QE1040
- TOE name: ID One ePass 64K
- TOE version : 1.0
- Microcontroller: Philips Smart MX P5CD072 V0Q and VOP
- Customer ROM code Identification : LDS 1.7 72K V1.0 RC
- TOE reference IC + ROM mask:
12NC: 9352 831 41006 VOP et 12NC: - 9352 831 64 118 VOQ
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1.2.2. Security services
The main security services provided by the product are:
- Access control on the product lifecycle phases;
- Authentication mechanisms ("Basic Access Control" and "Active Authentication");
- Data exchange with "Secure Messaging".
1.2.3. Architecture
The product consists of the following:
- a controller with a contactless interface and a dedicated software;
- dedicated test software and support software;
- embedded software (operating system);
- MRTD application.
1.2.4. Life cycle
The product’s life cycle is organised as follow:
The product has been developed on the following site:
Oberthur Card Systems
71/73 rue des Hautes Pâtures
92726 Nanterre
France
Neither the inlay phase nor the integration of the inlay into the passport itself is included in
the evaluation. However, this will have no impact on the level of security since the product is
protected during these phases.
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1.2.5. Evaluated configuration
The certificate applies to the following configurations detailed in the guides [GUIDES]:
- Controller configured with the options "card disable feature" at 'enabled’; "ROM read
from EEPROM feature" at ‘disabled’ and “Ram execution feature” at ‘disabled’;
- Application configured with the options: “BAC” at enabled, “test mode” at disabled,
“debrayed mode” at disabled, “erase card” at disabled and “Random UID” at enabled.
No softmask is loaded, neither by the developer nor at any subsequent stage.
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2. The evaluation
2.1. Evaluation referential
The evaluation has been performed in compliance with Common Criteria version 2.3 [CC],
with the Common Evaluation Methodology [CEM].
For assurance components above EAL4 level, the evaluation facility own evaluation methods
validated by DCSSI have been used.
In order to meet the specificities of smart cards, the [CCAP] guide has been applied.
2.2. Evaluation work
The evaluation has been performed according to the composition scheme as defined in the
guide [COMP] in order to assess that no weakness is introduced from the integration of the
software in the microcontroller already certified.
Therefore, the results of the evaluation of the microcontroller “Philips Secure Smart Card
Controller P5CD072V0P” and “Philips Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD072V0Q” both
of them evaluated at EAL5 level augmented with ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 et
AVA_VLA.4 compliant with the [PP0002] protection profile. These microcontrollers have
been certified the 28th March 2006 under the reference BSI_DSZ_CC_0348_2006 and
BSI_DSZ_CC_0349_2006.
The evaluation technical report [ETR], delivered to DCSSI the 20th
February 2007, provides
details on the work performed by the evaluation facility and assesses that all evaluation tasks
are “pass”.
2.3. Cryptographic mechanisms robustness analysis
The robustness of cryptographic mechanisms has been analysed by DCSSI. The results are
stated in the cryptographic analysis report [ANA-CRY] and have been taken into account in
the evaluator vulnerability analysis.
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3. Certification
3.1. Conclusion
The evaluation identified in chapter 2 and described in the evaluation technical report [ETR],
was carried out according to the current rules and standards, with the required competency
and impartiality by a licensed evaluation facility. All the work performed permits the release
of a certificate in conformance with the decree 2002-535.
This certificate testifies that the product “Oberthur Card ID-One ePass 64K: application ID-
One ePass 64K v1.0 masked on Philips (NXP) components P5CD072/V0P and
P5CD072/V0Q” submitted for evaluation fulfils the security features specified in its security
target [ST] for the evaluation level EAL 4 augmented.
3.2. Restrictions
This certificate only applies on the product specified in chapter 1.2 of this certification report.
The user of the certified product shall respect the operational environmental security
objectives specified in the security target [ST] and shall respect the recommendations in the
guidance [GUIDES], in particular:
- The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting
on the behalf of the issuing State or Organization:
o Establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographic data for the
MRTD;
o Enrol the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the
encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s);
o Personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and
logical security measures (including the digital signature in the Document
Security Object). The Personalization Agents enable or disable the Basic
Access Control function of the TOE according to the decision of the issuing
State or Organization. If the Basic Access Control function is enabled the
Personalization Agents generate the Document Basic Access Keys and store
them in the MRTD’s chip;
- The Issuing State or Organization must:
o Generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing Key Pair;
o Ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing Private Key and sign Document
Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment;
o Distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing Public Key to receiving States
and organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity;
The Issuing State or organization must:
o Generate a cryptographic secure Document Signing Key Pair and ensure the
secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys;
o Sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational
environment only;
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o Distribute the Certificate of the Document Signing Public Key to receiving
States and organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security
Object includes all data in the data groups DG1 to DG16 if stored in the LDS
according to [ICAO];
- The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key
infrastructure in order to:
o Generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair,
o Sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active
Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15,
o Support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of
the Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security
Object;
- The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the MRTD administrator acting on
the behalf of the issuing State or Organization establish the correct identity of the
holder and update the MRTD with the defined physical and logical security measures.
According to the decision of the issuing State or Organization the MRTD
administrator can for example terminate the application or execute any administrative
commands provided by the TOE;
- The inspection system of the Receiving State must examine the MRTD presented by
the traveller to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and
to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. Additionally the Extended
Inspection System performs the Active Authentication mechanism to verify the
Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip;
- The border control officer of the Receiving State uses the inspection system to verify
the traveller as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified
the signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the
logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and organizations must
manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signing Public Key
maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems;
- The inspection system of the receiving State ensures the confidentiality and integrity
of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical
MRTD being under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems, which
implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging
with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic
Inspection Systems). The receiving State examining the logical MRTD with Primary
Inspection Systems will prevent eavesdropping to the communication between TOE
and inspection system;
- The holder may prevent attempts to disclose the logical MRTD by following
recommendations for the protection of the MRZ against unauthorized people. An
attacker knowing the MRZ or a part of it have better chance to perform a successful
skimming or eavesdropping attack.
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3.3. Recognition of the certificate
3.3.1. European recognition (SOG-IS)
This certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the SOG-IS agreement [SOG-
IS].
The European Recognition Agreement made by SOG-IS in 1999 allows recognition from
Signatory States of the agreement1
, of ITSEC and Common Criteria certificates. The
European recognition is applicable up to ITSEC E6 and CC EAL7 levels. The certificates that
are recognized in the agreement scope are released with the following marking:
3.3.2. International common criteria recognition (CCRA)
This certificate is released in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA [CC RA].
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement allows the recognition, by signatory
countries2
, of the Common Criteria certificates. The mutual recognition is applicable up to the
assurance components of CC EAL4 level and also to ALC_FLR family. The certificates that
are recognized in the agreement scope are released with the following marking:
1 The signatory countries of the SOG-IS agreement are: Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
2 The signatory countries of the CCRA arrangement are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New-Zealand, Norway,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.
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Annex 1. Evaluation level of the product
Composants par niveau
d’assurance
Niveau d’assurance retenu
pour le produit
Classe Famille
EAL
1
EAL
2
EAL
3
EAL
4
EAL
5
EAL
6
EAL
7
EAL
4+
Intitulé du composant
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2 1 Partial CM automation
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5 4
Configuration support and
acceptance procedures
ACM
Gestion de
configuration
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3 2
Problem tracking CM
coverage
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 Detection of modification
ADO
Livraison et
opération ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Installation, generation and
start-up procedures
ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4 2
Fully defined external
interfaces
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5 2
Security enforcing high-level
design
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3 2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2 1 Descriptive low-level design
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 1
Informal correspondence
demonstration
ADV
Développement
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3 1
Informal TOE security policy
model
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Administrator guidance
AGD
Guides
d’utilisation AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 User guidance
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2 2
Sufficiency of security
measures
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3 1
Developer defined life-cycle
model
ALC
Support au
cycle de vie
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3 1
Well-defined development
tools
ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3 1 Testing: high-level design
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 Functional testing
ATE
Tests
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 Independent testing – sample
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3 2 Validation of analysis
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Strength of TOE security
function evaluation
AVA
Estimation des
vulnérabilités
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4 2
Independent vulnerability
analysis
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Annex 2. Evaluated product references
[ST] Reference security target for the evaluation:
- "E-PASSPORT Security Target" ref : FQR 110 3435 rev : 1-AF
date : February 19th 2007
For the needs of publication, the following security target has been
provided and validated in the evaluation:
- E-passport 72K - Public Security Target ref: 110 3674 V1.0
[ETR] Evaluation technical report :
- Evaluation Technical Report,
ref. LETI.CESTI.BIS.RTE.001 – v2.0, date : February 19th 2007
- Evaluation Technical Report Addendum
ref. LETI.CESTI.BIS.RTE.002 - v1.0 – date : March 9th
2007
[ANA-CRY] Cotation de mécanismes cryptographiques - Projet BISON
n° 45/SGDN/DCSSI/SDS/Crypto
[CONF] BISON Configuration List FQR 110 3510 v1.0 – date : March 7th 2007
[GUIDES] Administration and user guidance:
- Application LDS V1.7 72K on P5CD072 SOFTWARE
REQUIREMENT SPECIFICATION (SRS)
ref. FQR : 110 3484 rev.2-AB
- BISON Administration Guidance
ref. FQR : 110 3484 rev.1-AB, date : February 1st
2007
[OACI] - PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents offering ICC
Read-Only Access, Version 1.1, October 1st 2004
International Civil Aviation Organization,
- Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report,
Development of a Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional
Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –1.7, May 18th
2004, International Civil Aviation Organization,
Machine Readable Travel Documents supplement 9303
[PP MRTD] Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO
Application, Basic Access Control, version 1.0, August 18th 2005.
Certifié sous la référence BSI-PP-0017
[PP0002] Protection Profile, Smart card IC Platform Protection Profile Version
1.0 July 2001. Certifié sous la référence BSI-PP-0002-2001.
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Annex 3. Certification references
Decree number 2002-535 dated 18th
April 2002 related to the security evaluations and
certifications for information technology products and systems.
[CER/P/01] Procedure CER/P/01 - Certification of the security provided by IT
products and systems, DCSSI.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Part 1: Introduction and general model,
August 2005, version 2.3, ref CCMB-2005-08-001;
Part 2: Security functional requirements,
August 2005, version 2.3, ref CCMB-2005-08-002;
Part 3: Security assurance requirements,
August 2005, version 2.3, ref CCMB-2005-08-003.
The content of Common Criteria version 2.3 is identical to the
international ISO/IEC 15408:2005.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation: Evaluation Methodology,
August 2005, version 2.3, ref CCMB-2005-08-004.
The content of CEM version 2.3 is identical to the international ISO/IEC
18045:2005.
[CC AP] Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical
Document - Application of attack potential to smart-cards, version 2.1,
April 2006.
[COMP] Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical
Document - ETR-lite for composition, Version 1.3, April 2006.
[CC RA] Arrangement on the Recognition of Common criteria certificates in the
field of information Technology Security, May 2000.
[SOG-IS] «Mutual Recognition Agreement of Information Technology Security
Evaluation Certificates», version 2.0, April 1999, Management
Committee of Agreement Group.
[REF-CRY] Mécanismes cryptographiques - Règles et recommandations concernant
le choix et le dimensionnement des mécanismes cryptographiques de
niveau de robustesse standard, Version 1.10, 19th December 2006, ref:
2791/SGDN/DCSSI/SDS/Crypto.