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HIDApp-eDoc suite
Security Target
eIDAS eSign Application
Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 5
Assurance Level EAL5+
Version 1.1
Date 2023-05-29
Reference TCLE210006
Classification PUBLIC
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Table of Contents
Abbreviations and notations ..........................................................................................12
Foreword ..........................................................................................................................13
1. Introduction ..............................................................................................................14
1.1 Security Target overview .................................................................................14
1.2 Security Target reference ................................................................................14
1.3 TOE reference ...................................................................................................15
1.4 TOE overview....................................................................................................15
1.4.1 TOE type, usage and major security features ........................................15
1.4.2 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware....................................17
2. TOE description .......................................................................................................18
2.1 TOE physical scope..........................................................................................18
2.2 TOE logical scope.............................................................................................19
2.2.1 Mutual authentication...............................................................................20
2.2.2 Generation of SCD/SVD pairs ..................................................................22
2.2.3 Signature creation with SCD....................................................................23
2.3 TOE life cycle ....................................................................................................23
2.3.1 Phase 1: Development..............................................................................26
2.3.2 Phase 2: Manufacturing............................................................................27
2.3.3 Phase 3: Personalization..........................................................................28
2.3.4 Phase 4: Operational use .........................................................................29
3. Conformance claims................................................................................................30
3.1 Common Criteria conformance claim.............................................................30
3.2 Package conformance claim ...........................................................................30
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3.3 Protection Profile conformance claim ............................................................30
3.4 Protection Profile conformance rationale ......................................................30
3.4.1 Terminology ..............................................................................................31
3.4.2 Security problem definition......................................................................31
3.4.3 Security objectives for the TOE...............................................................32
3.4.4 Security objectives for the operational environment.............................33
3.4.5 Security functional requirements ............................................................33
3.4.6 Security assurance requirements ...........................................................36
4. Security problem definition.....................................................................................37
4.1 Assets, users, and threat agents ....................................................................37
4.2 Threats...............................................................................................................38
4.2.1 T.SCD_Divulg ............................................................................................38
4.2.2 T.SCD_Derive ............................................................................................38
4.2.3 T.Hack_Phys..............................................................................................38
4.2.4 T.SVD_Forgery..........................................................................................38
4.2.5 T.SigF_Misuse...........................................................................................38
4.2.6 T.DTBS_Forgery........................................................................................39
4.2.7 T.Sig_Forgery............................................................................................39
4.3 Organizational Security Policies .....................................................................39
4.3.1 P.CSP_QCert .............................................................................................39
4.3.2 P.QSign......................................................................................................39
4.3.3 P.Sigy_QSCD.............................................................................................40
4.3.4 P.Sig_Non-Repud......................................................................................40
4.3.5 P.Manufact.................................................................................................40
4.3.6 P.Personalization ......................................................................................40
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4.4 Assumptions.....................................................................................................41
4.4.1 A.CGA ........................................................................................................41
4.4.2 A.SCA.........................................................................................................41
5. Security objectives ..................................................................................................42
5.1 Security objectives for the TOE ......................................................................42
5.1.1 OT.Lifecycle_Security...............................................................................42
5.1.2 OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen...........................................................................42
5.1.3 OT.SCD_Unique ........................................................................................42
5.1.4 OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp .............................................................................42
5.1.5 OT.SCD_Secrecy.......................................................................................43
5.1.6 OT.Sig_Secure ..........................................................................................43
5.1.7 OT.Sigy_SigF.............................................................................................43
5.1.8 OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE...........................................................................43
5.1.9 OT.EMSEC_Design ...................................................................................43
5.1.10 OT.Tamper_ID ...........................................................................................44
5.1.11 OT.Tamper_Resistance ............................................................................44
5.1.12 OT.TOE_QSCD_Auth ................................................................................44
5.1.13 OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp..............................................................................44
5.1.14 OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp..............................................................................44
5.1.15 OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp............................................................................45
5.1.16 OT.AC_Init .................................................................................................45
5.1.17 OT.AC_Pers ...............................................................................................45
5.2 Security objectives for the operational environment ....................................46
5.2.1 OE.SVD_Auth ............................................................................................46
5.2.2 OE.CGA_QCert..........................................................................................46
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5.2.3 OE.DTBS_Intend .......................................................................................46
5.2.4 OE.Signatory .............................................................................................47
5.2.5 OE.Dev_Prov_Service...............................................................................47
5.2.6 OE.CGA_QSCD_Auth ...............................................................................47
5.2.7 OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp .............................................................................47
5.2.8 OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp...............................................................................48
5.2.9 OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp ...........................................................................49
6. Security objectives rationale...................................................................................50
6.1 Coverage of security objectives......................................................................50
6.2 Sufficiency of security objectives...................................................................51
7. Extended components definition............................................................................57
7.1 Definition of family FPT_EMS..........................................................................57
7.2 Definition of family FIA_API.............................................................................58
8. Security functional requirements ...........................................................................60
8.1 Class FCS: Cryptographic support.................................................................62
8.1.1 FCS_CKM.1/RSA .......................................................................................62
8.1.2 FCS_CKM.1/ECDSA ..................................................................................63
8.1.3 FCS_CKM.4................................................................................................63
8.1.4 FCS_COP.1/RSA .......................................................................................64
8.1.5 FCS_COP.1/ECDSA...................................................................................64
8.2 Class FDP: User data protection.....................................................................65
8.2.1 FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation ..........................................................65
8.2.2 FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation...........................................................66
8.2.3 FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer .......................................................................67
8.2.4 FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer........................................................................67
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8.2.5 FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation ..............................................................68
8.2.6 FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation ..............................................................69
8.2.7 FDP_RIP.1..................................................................................................70
8.2.8 FDP_SDI.2/Persistent................................................................................70
8.2.9 FDP_SDI.2/DTBS .......................................................................................71
8.2.10 FDP_DAU.2/SVD........................................................................................72
8.2.11 FDP_UIT.1/DTBS .......................................................................................72
8.3 Class FIA: Identification and authentication ..................................................73
8.3.1 FIA_UID.1...................................................................................................73
8.3.2 FIA_UAU.1 .................................................................................................74
8.3.3 FIA_AFL.1 ..................................................................................................75
8.3.4 FIA_API.1 ...................................................................................................75
8.4 Class FMT: Security management ..................................................................76
8.4.1 FMT_SMR.1/QSCD ....................................................................................76
8.4.2 FMT_SMR.1/Init .........................................................................................77
8.4.3 FMT_SMR.1/Pers.......................................................................................77
8.4.4 FMT_SMF.1................................................................................................77
8.4.5 FMT_MOF.1................................................................................................78
8.4.6 FMT_MSA.1/Admin....................................................................................78
8.4.7 FMT_MSA.1/Signatory ..............................................................................79
8.4.8 FMT_MSA.2................................................................................................80
8.4.9 FMT_MSA.3................................................................................................80
8.4.10 FMT_MSA.4................................................................................................81
8.4.11 FMT_MTD.1/Admin....................................................................................81
8.4.12 FMT_MTD.1/Signatory ..............................................................................82
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8.4.13 FMT_MTD.1/Init .........................................................................................82
8.4.14 FMT_MTD.1/Pers .......................................................................................83
8.5 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF....................................................................83
8.5.1 FPT_EMS.1 ................................................................................................83
8.5.2 FPT_FLS.1 .................................................................................................84
8.5.3 FPT_PHP.1.................................................................................................85
8.5.4 FPT_PHP.3.................................................................................................85
8.5.5 FPT_TST.1 .................................................................................................86
8.6 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels..................................................................87
8.6.1 FTP_ITC.1/SVD ..........................................................................................87
8.6.2 FTP_ITC.1/VAD..........................................................................................88
8.6.3 FTP_ITC.1/DTBS........................................................................................89
8.6.4 FTP_ITC.1/Init ............................................................................................90
8.6.5 FTP_ITC.1/Pers..........................................................................................90
9. Security assurance requirements...........................................................................92
10. Security requirements rationale .............................................................................94
10.1 Coverage of security functional requirements ..............................................94
10.2 Sufficiency of security functional requirements............................................96
10.3 Satisfaction of dependencies of security requirements .............................100
10.4 Rationale for security assurance requirements...........................................103
11. TOE summary specification..................................................................................105
12. References..............................................................................................................108
12.1 Acronyms ........................................................................................................108
12.2 Technical references......................................................................................110
Appendix A Platform identification.....................................................................114
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List of Tables
Table 1-1 Security Target reference .............................................................................14
Table 1-2 TOE reference................................................................................................15
Table 2-1 TOE component delivery ..............................................................................19
Table 2-2 Standardized domain parameters................................................................21
Table 2-3 Mapping between QSCD roles and their credentials .................................21
Table 2-4 Legend for deliveries occurring between non-consecutive actors ..........24
Table 2-5 Identification of recipient actors for the guidance documentation of the
TOE eIDAS eSign application .........................................................................................26
Table 3-1 Source of assumptions, threats, and OSPs................................................31
Table 3-2 Changes, additions, and deletions to the threats with respect to the PPs
...........................................................................................................................................31
Table 3-3 Changes, additions, and deletions to the OSPs with respect to the PPs.32
Table 3-4 Source of security objectives for the TOE ..................................................32
Table 3-5 Changes, additions, and deletions to the security objectives for the TOE
with respect to the PPs ...................................................................................................32
Table 3-6 Source of security objectives for the operational environement..............33
Table 3-7 Source of security functional requirements ...............................................34
Table 3-8 Changes, additions, and deletions to the security functional requirements
with respect to the PPs ...................................................................................................35
Table 6-1 Mapping of the security problem definition to the security objectives for
the TOE.............................................................................................................................50
Table 6-2 Mapping of the security problem definition to the security objectives for
the operational environment...........................................................................................51
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Table 8-1 Mapping of the security functional requirements to the PPs....................60
Table 8-2 Security attributes of subjects and objects for access control ................65
Table 9-1 Security assurance requirements: EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5.......................................................................................................................92
Table 10-1 Mapping of the security functional requirements to the security
objectives for the TOE.....................................................................................................94
Table 10-2 Satisfaction of dependencies of security functional requirements ......100
Table 10-3 Satisfaction of dependencies of security assurance requirements .....103
Table 11-1 Implementation of the security functional requirements in the TOE....105
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List of Figures
Figure 2-1 Life cycle of the TOE eIDAS eSign application .........................................25
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Abbreviations and notations
Numerical values
Numbers are printed in decimal, hexadecimal or binary notation.
Hexadecimal values are indicated with a ‘h’ suffix as in XXh, where X is a hexadecimal digit
from 0 to F.
Decimal values have no suffix.
Example: the decimal value 179 may be noted as the hexadecimal value B3h.
Acronyms
The term HID is an acronym for Human Interface Device, as described in section 12.1, used
in the protection profiles for secure signature creation device [R10] [R11] [R12] and should
not be confused with the name of the company HID Global.
Keywords
The words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”,
“SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY” and “OPTIONAL” are to be interpreted as
described in RFC 2119 [R30].
Definitions
The IC Developer is defined as the Platform Developer of the composite product evaluation;
the IC Manufacturer is defined as the Platform Manufacturer of the composite product
evaluation (see section 3.4).
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Foreword
This security target refers to the European Parliament Directive 1999/93/EC [R15] in
accordance with the protection profiles EN 419211-2:2013 [R10], EN 419211-4:2013 [R11],
EN 419211-5:2013 [R12] it declares conformance with (cf. Section 3.3). However, it also
incorporates the requirements of the eIDAS Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [R13] and the
according Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/650 [R14], repealing the Directive
1999/93/EC.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Security Target overview
This document is the sanitized version of the document Security Target for HIDApp-eDoc
suite – eIDAS eSign Application [R20].
This security target defines the security requirements, as well as the scope of the Common
Criteria evaluation, for the signature creation functionality of HIDApp-eDoc suite.
The Target Of Evaluation (TOE) is the platform NXP JCOP 4 P71 [R37] with application
Java Card Applet HID HIDApp-eDoc suite, namely an International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) applet compliant with ICAO Doc 9303 8th ed. 2021 – LDS1 [R27] [R28]
[R29] and an eIDAS eSign Applet providing qualified signature features (QSCD). The
qualified signature features are compliant with the eIDAS Regulation (EU) No 910/2014
[R13] and the according Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/650 [R14],
repealing the European Parliament Directive 1999/93/EC [R15]. The eIDAS eSign
application is also compliant to the BSI TR-03110-2 [R4] and TR Signature creation and
administration for eIDAS token [R1].
This security target specifies the security requirements for the eIDAS eSign application of
the TOE.
Furthermore, the ICAO application of the TOE supports:
 Basic Access Control (BAC) compliant with ICAO Doc 9303 [R28].
which is addressed by another security target [R18] and:
 Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) compliant with ICAO
Doc 9303 [R28];
 Active Authentication (AA) compliant with ICAO Doc 9303 [R28];
 Extended Access Control (EAC) v1 compliant with BSI TR-03110 [R3] [R4] [R5];
which are addressed by still another security target [R19].
1.2 Security Target reference
Table 1-1 Security Target reference
Title
Security Target for HIDApp-eDoc suite - eIDAS eSign Application - Public
version
Version 1.1
Authors Giovanni LICCARDO, Roberta SODANO
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Date 2023-05-29
Reference TCLE210006
1.3 TOE reference
Table 1-2 TOE reference
TOE name
HIDApp-eDoc suite
eIDAS eSign Application
TOE version 3_00
TOE developer HID Global
TOE identifier HIDApp-eDoc_3_00
TOE identification data
48h 49h 44h 41h 70h 70h 2Dh 65h 44h 6Fh 63h 5Fh 33h 5Fh
30h 30h
Platform security target
JCOP 4 P71, Security Target Lite for JCOP 4 P71 / SE050 Rev.
4.11 – 3 January 2023 [R37]
Platform certification report NSCIB-CC-180212-5MA1 [R44]
The TOE is delivered as a chip ready for initialization. It is identified by the following string,
which constitutes the TOE identifier:
HIDApp-eDoc_3_00
(ASCII encoding: 48h 49h 44h 41h 70h 70h 2Dh 65h 44h 6Fh 63h 5Fh 33h 5Fh 30h 30h)
where:
 “HIDApp-eDoc” is the TOE name,
 the underscore character is a separator and
 “3” is the TOE major version number and
 “00” is the TOE minor version number
The ASCII encoding of the TOE identifier constitutes the TOE identification data, located in
the persistent memory of the chip. Instructions for reading these data are provided by the
guidance documentation [R21] [R22] [R23] [R24] [R25].
1.4 TOE overview
1.4.1 TOE type, usage and major security features
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The TOE is a combination of hardware and software configured to securely create, use and
manage Signature Creation Data (SCD). The QSCD protects the SCD during its whole life
cycle as to be used in a signature creation process solely by its Signatory.
The TOE comprises all IT security functionality necessary to ensure the secrecy of the SCD
and the security of the electronic signature.
The TOE provides the following functions:
1. to generate Signature Creation Data (SCD) and the corresponding Signature
Verification Data (SVD),
2. to export the SVD for certification to the CGA over a trusted channel,
3. to prove the identity as QSCD to external entities,
4. to, optionally, receive and store certificate info,
5. to switch the QSCD from a non-operational state to an operational state and
6. if in an operational state, to create digital signatures for data with the following steps:
a. select an SCD if multiple are present in the QSCD,
b. authenticate the Signatory and determine its intent to sign,
c. receive data to be signed or a unique representation thereof (DTBS/R) from
the SCA over a trusted channel,
d. apply an appropriate cryptographic signature creation function to the DTBS/R
using the selected SCD.
The TOE is prepared for the Signatory’s use by:
1. generating at least one SCD/SVD pair and
2. personalizing for the Signatory by storing in the TOE:
a. the Signatory’s Reference Authentication Data (RAD),
b. optionally, certificate info for at least one SCD in the TOE.
The eIDAS eSign application supports the General Authentication Protocol (GAP) [R4].
After preparation, the SCD shall be in a non-operational state. Upon receiving a TOE, the
Signatory shall verify its non-active state and change the SCD state to operational.
After preparation, the intended legitimate user should be informed of the Signatory’s
Verification Authentication Data (VAD) required for use of the TOE in signing. The means of
providing this information is expected to protect the confidentiality and the integrity of the
corresponding Reference Authentication Data (RAD).
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If the use of an SCD is no longer required, then it shall be destroyed.
1.4.2 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
In order to be powered up and to communicate with the external world, the TOE needs a
terminal that supports contactless or contact-based communication according to [R31],
[R33] and [R32].
The TOE shall be able to distinguish the following kinds of terminals:
 Signature Management Terminal (SMT), this is a terminal that allows signature
creation as well as the management of the signature application.
 Signature Terminal (ST), this is a terminal that allows for the creation of electronic
signature.
The TOE operates in the following operational environments:
 The preparation environment, where it interacts with a Certification Service Provider
(CSP) through a Certificate Generation Application (CGA) to obtain a certificate for
the Signature Verification Data (SVD) corresponding to the Signature Creation Data
(SCD) generated by the TOE. The TOE exports the SVD through a trusted channel
allowing the CGA to check its authenticity. The preparation environment interacts
further with the TOE to personalize it with the initial value of the Reference
Authentication Data (RAD);
 The signing environment, where it interacts with the signer through a Signature
Creation Application (SCA) to sign data after authenticating the signer as its
Signatory. The SCA provides the data to be signed or a unique representation thereof
(DTBS/R) as input to the TOE signature creation function and obtains the resulting
digital signature. The TOE and the SCA communicate through a trusted channel to
ensure the integrity of the DTBS/R;
 The management environment, where it interacts with the user to perform
management operations, e.g. to reset a blocked RAD, after authenticating the user
as its Signatory. A single device, e.g. a smart card terminal, may provide the required
environment for management and signing.
Therefore, the use of the TOE requires any hardware, software and firmware component of
such operational environments, particularly a Certificate Generation Application (CGA) and
Signature Creation Application (SCA) supporting trusted channels with the TOE.
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2. TOE description
2.1 TOE physical scope
The HIDApp-eDoc suite is comprised of the following parts:
 The platform NXP JCOP 4 P71 (see Appendix A), which is composed by the Micro
Controller and a software stack which is stored on the Micro Controller and which can
be executed by the Micro Controller. The software stack can be further split into the
following components:
o Firmware for booting and low level functionality of the Micro Controller (MC
FW) like writing to flash memory. This includes software for implementing
cryptographic operations, called Crypto Library.
o Software for implementing a Java Card Virtual Machine [R42], a Java Card
Runtime Environment [R41] and a Java Card Application Programming
Interface [R40] called JCVM, JCRE and JCAPI.
o Software for implementing content management according to GlobalPlatform
[R16] called GlobalPlatform Framework.
o Software for executing native libraries, called Secure Box.
 the applet, composed by:
o an ICAO application LDS1 compliant with ICAO Doc 9303 [R27] [R28] [R29]1,
o eIDAS eSign application compliant with the eIDAS Regulation (EU) No
910/2014 [R13] and the according Commission Implementing Decision (EU)
2016/650 [R14], repealing the European Parliament Directive 1999/93/EC
[R15]. The eIDAS eSign application is also compliant to the BSI TR-03110-2
[R4].
 guidance documentation about the initialization of the TOE, the preparation and use
of the ICAO application and eIDAS eSign application, composed by:
o the Initialization Guidance [R21],
o the Personalization Guidance [R22] – ICAO application,
o the Operational User Guidance [R24] – ICAO application,
o the Personalization Guidance [R23] – eIDAS eSign application,
o the Operational User Guidance [R25] – eIDAS eSign application.
1 The ICAO Application is out of the scope of this Security Target.
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Table 2-5 identifies, for each guidance document, the actors involved in TOE life cycle
who are the intended recipients of that document.
Table 2-1 described the format and delivery method of each TOE components:
Table 2-1 TOE component delivery
Type TOE component Format Delivery method
Platform NXP JCOP 4 P71
Smart
Card
Secure courier
Applet HIDApp-eDoc suite CAP file
Secure IC Manufacturer’s Web
application
Document
Preparative and operational
guidance
pdf/docx Encrypted email message
The delivery procedure for the TOE is described in detail [R26].
2.2 TOE logical scope
The eIDAS eSign application of the TOE supports the same life cycle phases, as well as the
same roles, i.e. Administrator and Signatory, as those defined in the PPs [R10] [R11] [R12]:
 “Administrator: User who is in charge to perform the TOE initialization, TOE
personalization or other TOE administrative functions. The subject S.Admin is acting
in the role R.Admin for this user after successful authentication as administrator.”
 “Signatory: User who hold the TOE and use it on their own behalf or on behalf of the
natural or legal person or entity they represent. The subject S.Sigy is acting in the
role R.Sigy for this user after successful authentication as signatory.”
The BSI TR-03110-2 [R4] defines the following terminal types:
 Signature Management Terminal (SMT) is an extension of a Authentication Terminal
to support management of the Signature Application. This terminal allows signature
creation as well as the management of the Signature Application (e.g. signature key
generation).
 Signature Terminal (ST) is a terminal that allows for the creation of electronic
signatures. The eIDAS token SHALL require a Signature Terminal to authenticate
itself before access according to the effective authorization is granted. To
authenticate a terminal as Signature Terminal, the General Authentication Procedure
MUST be used. The authorization level of a Signature Terminal SHALL be
determined by the effective authorization calculated from the certificate chain.
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In this Security Target we assume that:
 The administrator is a user who is in charge to perform the TOE administrative
functions. He uses a terminal that is entitled to manage the eSign application.
The administrator shall also use a terminal that is authorized to manage the eSign
application.
The signatory can be the administrator in the case he can perform the operations
using an authorized terminal (cf. section 2.2 of [R25]).
 The signatory is a user who holds the TOE and uses it on his own behalf or on behalf
of the natural or legal person or entity they represent. He uses a terminal that is
entitled to create electronic signature with the eSign application.
To prove his entitlement to sign, the user shall know the signature PIN, that could be
the Global PIN or Local PIN (cf. section 2.2 of [R25]).
The TOE distinguishes between S.Admin or S.Sigy based on the effective authorization
obtained from GAP [R1].
For each of the Signatory’s authentication secrets provided for by the PPs [R10] [R11] [R12],
i.e. the RAD, the VAD and the PUK2, the Signatory’s credentials are
 RAD: Global PIN with sign privileges or Local PIN
 VAD: Global PIN with sign privileges or Local PIN
 PUC: PUK
Each of the main operations of the TOE is described here below.
2.2.1 Mutual authentication
As a precondition for gaining access to further operations, both the Administrator and the
Signatory must perform a mutual authentication with respect to the eIDAS eSign application.
This is executed by means of the General Authentication Procedure (GAP) as in TR-03110
part 2 [R4] and it is comprised of the following steps:
1. Authentication by means of a PACE authentication;
2. Extended Access Control (EACv2) authentication, composed by Terminal
Authentication v2 (TA2) and Chip Authentication v2 (CA2).
2 The PPs implicitly provide for the existence of a PUK by allowing the support of RAD unblock.
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The PACE authentication supports the following algorithms:
 Key agreement: ECDH
 Mapping: Generic Mapping, Integrated Mapping
 Symmetric ciphering and MAC computation (key bit length): 3DES (112), AES
(128, 192 and 256)
 Standardized Domain Parameters: see Table 2-2 (identifiers other than the
standard ones must be used for proprietary Domain Parameters)
Table 2-2 Standardized domain parameters
Id Name
0 Not supported
1 2048-bit MODP Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup
2 2048-bit MODP Group with 256-bit Prime Order Subgroup
3-7 RFU
8 Not supported
9 Not supported
10 NIST P-224 (secp224r1)
11 BrainpoolP224r1
12 NIST P-256 (secp256r1)
13 BrainpoolP256r1
14 BrainpoolP320r1
15 NIST P-384 (secp384r1)
16 BrainpoolP384r1
17 BrainpoolP512r1
18 NIST P-521 (secp521r1)
19-31 RFU
For PACE-PIN, the key lengths that can be used are limited to 256, 384 and 512 bits. For
PACE-CAN, all key sizes can be used (cf. section 6.4 of [R39]).
The export of the SVD to the CGA upon key pair generation, as well as the import of the
DTBS/R from the SCA upon signature creation, shall be executed over the trusted channel
compliant with TR-03110 part 2 [R4] opened by means of General Authentication Procedure.
Table 2-3 identifies the credentials associated to either of the QSCD roles, through which
they can perform their respective mutual authentication procedures.
Table 2-3 Mapping between QSCD roles and their credentials
QSCD roles Credentials
Administrator
 CAN
 Administrator’s terminal key pair
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 Global PIN without sign privileges
Signatory
(for ordinary operations)
 CAN
 Signatory’s terminal key pair
 Global PIN with sign privileges
 Local PIN
Signatory
(for RAD unblock)
 CAN
 Signatory’s terminal key pair
 PUK
In accordance with Table 2-3, either of the QSCD roles shall perform mutual authentication
as follows:
 The Administrator shall perform:
1. GAP authentication using CAN and Administrator’s terminal key pair.
Or
1. GAP authentication using Global PIN without sign privileges and Administrator’s
terminal key pair.
 The Signatory shall perform:
1. GAP authentication using CAN and Signatory’s terminal key pair;
2. Verification of the Global PIN with sign privileges, for signature operations.
Or
1. GAP authentication using CAN and Signatory’s terminal key pair;
2. Verification of the Local PIN, for signature operations.
Or
1. GAP authentication using CAN and Signatory’s terminal key pair;
2. Verification of the PUK, for RAD unblock.
Or
1. GAP authentication using Global PIN with sign privileges and Signatory’s terminal
key pair, for signature operations.
2.2.2 Generation of SCD/SVD pairs
The eIDAS eSign application supports the generation of multiple SCD/SVD pairs. The import
of certificate info from the CGA is supported as well.
SCD/SVD pair generation is only allowed after the authentication and must be executed
over the trusted channel opened via GAP. This ensures the protection of SVD integrity upon
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export of the SVD to the CGA. The import of certificate info from the CGA must be executed
over the same trusted channel.
The eIDAS eSign application supports the generation of:
 RSA key pairs compliant with [R43] of 2048, 3072 or 4096 bits;
 ECDSA key pairs compliant with [R6] of 256, 320, 384, 512 and 521 bits.
2.2.3 Signature creation with SCD
The signature creation function of the eIDAS eSign application is compliant to [R1].
The eIDAS eSign application supports digital signature creation with signature creation
algorithm RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 compliant with PKCS #1 [R43]. The signature creation
algorithm RSASSA-PSS [R43] is supported as well. In both cases the hash algorithm is
SHA-256 and SHA-512 compliant with FIPS PUB 180-4 [R35] and keys of 2048, 3072 or
4096 bits are supported.
The eIDAS eSign application support digital signature creation with signature creation
algorithm ECDSA and keys of 256, 320, 384, 512 or 521 bits are supported3. The hash
algorithms are SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512 compliant with FIPS PUB 180-4 [R35].
The export of public keys and certificate info to the SCA is supported as well.
Signature creation is only allowed after the authentication of the user in the Signatory role
(cf. section 2.2.1) and must be executed over the trusted channel opened via the GAP. This
guarantees the protection of DTBS/R integrity upon import of the DTBS/R from the SCA.
The export of digital signatures to the SCA must be executed over the same trusted channel.
2.3 TOE life cycle
The TOE life cycle is comprised of four life cycle phases, i.e. development, manufacturing,
personalization and operational use. With regard to the life cycle of the eIDAS eSign
application, these phases can be split into eight steps. The last step, which takes place when
the TOE stands in the operational use phase, matches the QSCD life cycle phases defined
in the PPs [R10] [R11] [R12].
Figure 2-1 represents the life cycle of the TOE eIDAS eSign application. Particularly, it
illustrates the correspondence between the life cycle phases of the TOE and the life cycle
3 The cryptographic requirement REQ_ECC_POINT_MULT defined in section 6.4 of [R39] do not apply to the
TOE because the ECC point multiplication is never used in protocol other than Diffie Hellman Key Exchange
and ECDSA.
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phases of the eIDAS eSign application as defined in the PPs and identifies the actors
involved in each life cycle step. Direct deliveries of items between actors are represented
with continuous lines, while deliveries in which intermediate actors may be in charge of
receiving the exchanged items and forwarding them to the subsequent actors are
represented with dotted lines.
Deliveries of items occurring between non-consecutive actors are just marked with letters in
order to preserve the clarity of the diagram. A legend for these deliveries, which identifies
the exchanged items for each of them, is provided in Table 2-4.
Table 2-4 Legend for deliveries occurring between non-consecutive actors
Delivery Delivered items
(a)
 Initialization key
 Initialization guidance
(b)  Personalization guidance
(c)  Operational user guidance
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Figure 2-1 Life cycle of the TOE eIDAS eSign application
- Platform documentation
- Platform Dedicated Software
- Applet
- Platform
- Applet
- TOE
- TOE
- Personalization key
(a)
(b)
Step 1: Development of the
Platform
Phase 1: Development
Step 2: Development of the
Applet
IC Developer
Applet Developer
Step 3: Fabrication of the
Platform
IC Manufacturer
TOE delivery
Phase 1: Development
Phase 2: Manufacturing
Phase 2: Manufacturing
Step 4: Loading of the Applet IC Manufacturer
Phase 2: Manufacturing
Step 5: Manufacture of the
smart card or document
booklet
Card Manufacturer
Phase 2: Manufacturing
Step 6: Initialization Initialization Agent
Phase 3: Personalization
Personalization Agent
Step 7: Personalization
Delivered
self-protected
TOE
TOE
under
construction
in
a
secure
environment
- TOE
- Administrator’s credentials
- Signatory’s credentials
- TOE
Phase 4: Operational use Signatory Administrator
Step 8: Operational use
(c)
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Detailed information about the operations available in each life cycle phase of the TOE is
provided in the guidance documentation of the TOE eIDAS eSign application [R21] [R23]
[R25]. Table 2-5 identifies, for each guidance document, the actors who are the intended
recipients of that document.
Table 2-5 Identification of recipient actors for the guidance documentation of the TOE
eIDAS eSign application
Guidance document Recipient actors
Initialization guidance Initialization Agent
Personalization guidance Personalization Agent
Operational user guidance Administrator, Signatory
The phases and steps of the TOE life cycle are described in what follows. The names of the
involved actors are emphasized using boldface.
2.3.1 Phase 1: Development
Step 1: Development of the Platform
The IC Developer develops the JCOP 4 P71 Platform, the platform dedicated software and
the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
Finally, the following items are securely delivered to the Applet Developer:
 the Platform documentation,
 the Platform dedicated software,
Step 2: Development of the Applet
The Applet Developer uses the guidance documentation for the Platform and for relevant
parts of the Platform Dedicated Software and develops the applets, consisting of the ICAO
application and the eIDAS eSign application, as well as the guidance documentation
associated with these TOE components.
Furthermore, the Applet Developer generates the initialization key.
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Finally:
 the Applet is securely delivered to the IC Manufacturer;
 the initialization key are securely delivered to the Initialization Agent;
As regards TOE guidance documentation, all documents are securely delivered to the
Initialization Agent, or each document is securely delivered to the recipient actors as
identified in Table 2-5.
2.3.2 Phase 2: Manufacturing
Step 3: Fabrication of the platform
The IC Manufacturer produces the JCOP 4 P71 Platform.
Step 4: Loading of the Applet
The IC Manufacturer loads the Applet received from the Applet Developer and creates in
the IC persistent memory the high-level objects relevant for the eIDAS eSign application.
Particularly, the initialization key is stored into the IC persistent memory.
Finally, the TOE is securely delivered to the Card Manufacturer.
Application Note 1 The point of delivery of the TOE coincides with the completion of
step 4, i.e. with the delivery of the TOE, in the form of an IC not yet embedded, from the IC
Manufacturer to the Card Manufacturer. That is to say, this is the event upon which the
construction of the TOE in a secure environment ends and the TOE begins to be self-
protected.
Step 5: Manufacture of the smart card or document booklet
The Card Manufacturer equips the IC with contact-based and/or contactless interfaces and
embeds the IC into a smart card or a document booklet.
Finally, the TOE is securely delivered to the Initialization Agent.
Step 6: Initialization
The Initialization Agent use the initialization key to mutual authentication with the TOE to
instantiate the eIDAS QSCD applet and writes the Personalization Key.
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Finally, the TOE is securely delivered to the Personalization Agent, along with the
personalization key if it was delivered to the Initialization Agent rather than directly to the
Personalization Agent.
As regards TOE guidance documentation, if the Initialization Agent also received the
documents intended for the subsequent actors, then either all of these documents are
securely delivered to the Personalization Agent, or each document is securely delivered
to the recipient actors as identified in Table 2-5.
2.3.3 Phase 3: Personalization
Step 7: Personalization
The Personalization Agent establishes the identity of the Signatory to whom the TOE is to
be assigned and generate the following credentials:
 CAN;
 Global PIN without sign privileges
And, optionally:
 Global PIN with sign privileges;
 Local PIN;
 PUK.
Then, the Personalization Agent creates/modifies in the IC persistent memory the high-
level objects relevant for the eIDAS eSign application.
Particularly:
 The Initialization key is overwritten with the Personalization key;
 The number of the empty private/public key objects and certificate info files being
created, each associated with an unambiguous identifier, is equal to the maximum
possible number of key pairs required for signature creation in the operational use
phase. Although the key pairs are not generated yet, their lengths are fixed when the
key objects are created and cannot be changed afterwards.
Finally, the TOE is securely delivered to the Administrator, along with the following item:
 Administrator’s credentials;
As regards TOE guidance documentation, if the Personalization Agent also received the
operational user guidance, then this document is securely delivered to the Administrator.
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2.3.4 Phase 4: Operational use
Step 8: Operational use
Then, the Administrator and Signatory are required/allowed to modify in the IC persistent
memory the high-level objects relevant for the eIDAS eSign application.
Particularly:
 The Administrator can generate one or more key pairs for signature creation.
In this case, as many private/public key objects created in the personalization phase
are filled with the key pairs being generated.
 The Administrator shall fill one or more certificate info files for each generated key
pair (if any).
 The Signatory can generate one or more key pairs for signature creation.
In this case, as many private/public key objects created in the personalization phase
are filled with the key pairs being generated.
 The Signatory shall fill one or more certificate info files for each generated key pair
(if any).
Furthermore, the Signatory performs the following operations:
 activate signature creation for the private keys generated by the Administrator (If
any);
 create digital signatures using the available signature creation private keys;
 destroy signature creation private keys;
 change or unblock Global PIN with sign privileges;
 change or unblock Local PIN.
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3. Conformance claims
3.1 Common Criteria conformance claim
This security target claims conformance to:
 Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 5 [R7] [R8] [R9], as follows:
o Part 2 (security functional requirements) extended,
o Part 3 (security assurance requirements) conformant.
The applet runs on the platform NXP JCOP 4 P71. This platform is certified against Common
Criteria at the assurance level EAL6+ (cf. Appendix A).
3.2 Package conformance claim
This security target claims conformance to Evaluation Assurance Level EAL5, augmented
with the following security assurance requirements defined in CC Part 3 [R9]:
 ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures”;
 AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis”.
3.3 Protection Profile conformance claim
This security target claims strict conformance to the following Protection Profiles (PPs):
 Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 2: Device with key
generation, v2.0.1, EN 419211-2:2013 (certificate BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02)
[R10];
 Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 4: Extension for device
with key generation and trusted communication with certificate generation
application, v1.0.1, EN 419211-4:2013 (certificate BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012-MA-01)
[R11];
 Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 5: Extension for device
with key generation and trusted communication with signature creation application,
v1.0.1, EN 419211-5:2013 (certificate BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012-MA-01) [R12].
3.4 Protection Profile conformance rationale
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3.4.1 Terminology
In this Security Target the term QSCD replaces all occurrences of the term SSCD referred
to in the PPs;
3.4.2 Security problem definition
The source of threats, organizational security policies and assumptions is specified in Table
3-1.
Table 3-1 Source of assumptions, threats, and OSPs
Changes, additions, and deletions to asset, threat agents, threats, OSPs and assumptions
with respect to the PPs (cf. section 3.3) are listed in Table 3-2 and Table 3-3
Table 3-2 Changes, additions, and deletions to the threats with respect to the PPs
Threat Difference Rationale
- - -
Source
PP Part 2 [R10] PP Part 4 [R11] PP Part 5 [R12]
Threats
 T.SCD_Divulg
 T.SCD_Derive
 T.Hack_Phys
 T.SVD_Forgery
 T.SigF_Misuse
 T.DTBS_Forgery
 T.Sig_Forgery
All threats of the
PP Part 2 [R10]
This PP does not define
any additional threats.
All threats of the
PP Part 2 [R10]
This PP does not define
any additional threats.
Organizational
Security
Policies
 P.CSP_QCert
 P.QSign
 P.Sigy_QSCD
 P.Sig_Non-Repud
All OSP of the
PP Part 2 [R10]
This PP does not define
any additional OSP.
All OSP of the
PP Part 2 [R10]
This PP does not define
any additional OSP.
Assumptions
 A.CGA
 A.SCA
All Assumptions of the PP
Part 2 [R10]
This PP does not define
any additional
assumptions.
All Assumptions of the
PP Part 2 [R10]
This PP does not define
any additional
assumptions.
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Table 3-3 Changes, additions, and deletions to the OSPs with respect to the PPs
OSP Difference Rationale
P.Manufact Addition
Added to specify the security policy to be
enforced by the TOE in the manufacturing
phase of its life cycle (cf. section 2.3.2).
P.Personalization Addition
Added to specify the security policy to be
enforced by the TOE in the personalization
phase of its life cycle (cf. section 2.3.3).
3.4.3 Security objectives for the TOE
The source of the security objectives for the TOE is specified in Table 3-4.
Table 3-4 Source of security objectives for the TOE
Changes, additions, and deletions to the security objectives for the TOE with respect to the
PPs (cf. section 3.3) are listed in Table 3-5.
Table 3-5 Changes, additions, and deletions to the security objectives for the TOE with
respect to the PPs
Security objective Difference Rationale
OT.AC_Init Addition
Added to specify the access control to be
enforced by the TOE as regards the storage of
TOE initialization data (cf. section 2.3.2).
Source
PP Part 2 [R10] PP Part 4 [R11] PP Part 5 [R12]
Security
objectives
for the TOE
 OT.Lifecycle_Security
 OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
 OT.SCD_Unique
 OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
 OT.SCD_Secrecy
 OT.Sig_Secure
 OT.Sigy_SigF
 OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
 OT.EMSEC_Design
 OT.Tamper_ID
 OT.Tamper_Resistance
 OT.TOE_QSCD_Auth
 OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp
 OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp
 OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp
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Security objective Difference Rationale
OT.AC_Pers Addition
Added to specify the access control to be
enforced by the TOE as regards the storage of
personalization data (cf. section 2.3.3).
3.4.4 Security objectives for the operational environment
The source of the security objectives for the operational environment is specified in Table
3-6.
PP Part 4 [R11] replaces (strikethrough text) OE.QSCD_Prov_Service from PP Part 2 [R10]
with OE.Dev_Prov_Service, and adds the security objectives for the operational
environment OE.CGA_QSCD_Auth, OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp in order to address the
additional method of use of SCD/SVD pair generation after delivery to the Signatory and
outside a secure preparation environment.
PP Part 5 [R12] replaces (strikethrough text) OE.HID_VAD from PP Part 2 [R10] with
OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp, and OE.DTBS_Protect from PP Part 2 with
OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp.
Table 3-6 Source of security objectives for the operational environement
3.4.5 Security functional requirements
The source of the security functional requirements is specified in Table 3-7.
Source
PP Part 2 [R10] PP Part 4 [R11] PP Part 5 [R12]
Security
objectives for
the operational
environment
 OE.SVD_Auth
 OE.CGA_QCert
 OE.QSCD_Prov_Service
 OE.HID_VAD
 OE.DTBS_Intend
 OE.DTBS_Protect
 OE.Signatory
 OE.Dev_Prov_Service
 OE.CGA_QSCD_Auth
 OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp
 OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp
 OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp
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Table 3-7 Source of security functional requirements
Source
PP Part 2 [R10] PP Part 4 [R11] PP Part 5 [R12]
Security
objectives
for the TOE
 FCS_CKM.1
 FCS_CKM.4
 FCS_COP.1
 FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD
_Generation
 FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD
_Generation
 FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Tra
nsfer
 FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Tran
sfer
 FDP_ACC.1/Signature
_Creation
 FDP_ACF.1/Signature
creation
 FDP_RIP.1
 FDP_SDI.2/Persistent
 FDP_SDI.2/DTBS
 FIA_UID.1
 FIA_UAU.1
 FIA_AFL.1
 FMT_SMR.1
 FMT_SMF.1
 FMT_MOF.1
 FMT_MSA.1/Admin
 FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
 FMT_MSA.2
 FMT_MSA.3
 FMT_MSA.4
 FMT_MTD.1/Admin
 FMT_MTD.1/Signatory
 FPT_EMS.1
 FPT_FLS.1
 FPT_PHP.1
 FIA_UAU.1 (extends [R10])
 FIA_API.1
 FDP_DAU.2/SVD
 FTP_ITC.1/SVD
 FIA_UAU.1
(extends [R10])
 FDP_UIT.1/DTBS
 FTP_ITC.1/VAD
 FTP_ITC.1/DTBS
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Changes, additions, and deletions to the security functional requirements with respect to the
PPs (cf. section 3.3) are listed in Table 3-8.
Table 3-8 Changes, additions, and deletions to the security functional requirements with
respect to the PPs
SFR Difference Rationale
FCS_CKM.1/RSA Change
An iteration labelled RSA has been added to
take into account ECDSA as an additional
algorithm.
FCS_CKM.1/ECDSA Addition
Added to cover key generation algorithm
ECDSA
FCS_COP.1/RSA Change
An iteration labelled RSA has been added to
take into account ECDSA as an additional
algorithm.
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA Addition
Added to cover key generation algorithm
ECDSA
FIA_UAU.1 Change
Refined to remove user identification from the
list of the actions allowed by the TOE before
the user is authenticated.
FMT_SMR.1/QSCD Change
Iteration performed on PP SFR FMT_SMR.1
due to the introduction of further iterations,
related to the roles supported by the TOE in
addition to those specified in the PPs (cf.
below).
FMT_SMR.1/Init Addition
Added to cover the Initialization Agent role,
supported by the TOE in addition to the roles
specified in the PPs (cf. section 2.3.2).
FMT_SMR.1/Pers Addition
Added to cover the Personalization Agent role,
supported by the TOE in addition to the roles
specified in the PPs (cf. section 2.3.3).
FMT_MTD.1/Admin Change
Refined to remove the capability of creation of
RAD in Operational use by R.Admin.
FMT_MTD.1/Init Addition
Added to specify the requirements to be
enforced by the TOE as regards the
management of TOE initialization data (cf.
section 2.3.2).
FMT_MTD.1/Pers Addition
Added to specify the requirements to be
enforced by the TOE as regards the
management of Personalization data,
including the RAD (cf. section 2.3.3).
 FPT_PHP.3
 FPT_TST.1
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FTP_ITC.1/Init Addition
Added to account for the additional trusted
channel supported by the TOE for the import
of TOE initialization data (cf. section 2.3.2).
FTP_ITC.1/Pers Addition
Added to account for the additional trusted
channel supported by the TOE for the import
of personalization data (cf. section 2.3.3).
3.4.6 Security assurance requirements
The minimum package of security assurance requirements allowed for conformance to the
PPs (cf. section 3.3) is Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5.
As this security target claims conformance to Evaluation Assurance Level EAL5 augmented
with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 (cf. section 3.2), the aforesaid requirement is met.
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4. Security problem definition
4.1 Assets, users, and threat agents
The Common Criteria define assets as entities that the owner of the TOE presumably places
value upon. The term “asset” is used to describe the threats in the operational environment
of the TOE.
Assets and objects:
The PPs [R10] [R11] [R12] share the same assets, reported here below.
1. SCD: private key used to perform an electronic signature operation. The
confidentiality, integrity, and Signatory’s sole control over the use of the SCD must
be maintained.
2. SVD: public key linked to the SCD and used to perform electronic signature
verification. The integrity of the SVD must be maintained when it is exported.
3. DTBS and DTBS/R: set of data, or its representation, which the Signatory intends to
sign. Their integrity and the unforgeability of the link to the Signatory provided by the
electronic signature must be maintained.
Users and subjects acting for users:
The PPs [R10] [R11] [R12] share the same users, reported here below.
1. User: end user of the TOE who can be identified as Administrator or Signatory. The
subject S.User may act as S.Admin in the role R.Admin or as S.Sigy in the role R.Sigy.
2. Administrator: user who is in charge of performing administrative functions. The
subject S.Admin is acting in the role R.Admin for this user after successful
authentication as Administrator.
3. Signatory: user who holds the TOE and uses it on their own behalf or on behalf of the
natural or legal person or entity they represent. The subject S.Sigy is acting in the
role R.Sigy for this user after successful authentication as Signatory.
4. Initialization Agent: user in charge of performing step 6, initialization, of TOE life cycle
(cf. section 2.3.2), particularly of writing TOE initialization data. The subject S.Init is
acting in the role R.Init for this user after successful authentication as Initialization
Agent.
5. Personalization Agent: user in charge of performing step 7, personalization, of TOE
life cycle (cf. section 2.3.3), particularly of writing personalization data. The subject
S.Pers is acting in the role R.Pers for this user after successful authentication as
Personalization Agent.
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Threat agents:
The PPs [R10] [R11] [R12] share the same threat agents, reported here below.
1. Attacker: Human or process acting on their behalf located outside the TOE. The main
goal of the attacker is to access the SCD, to falsify the electronic signature. The
attacker has a high attack potential and knows no secret.
4.2 Threats
The PPs [R10] [R11] [R12] share the same threats, reported here below.
4.2.1 T.SCD_Divulg
Storing, copying, and releasing of signature creation data
An attacker stores or copies the SCD outside the TOE. An attacker can obtain the SCD
during generation, storage, and use for signature creation in the TOE.
4.2.2 T.SCD_Derive
Derive the signature creation data
An attacker derives the SCD from publicly known data, such as SVD corresponding to the
SCD or signatures created by means of the SCD or any other data exported outside the
TOE, which is a threat against the secrecy of the SCD.
4.2.3 T.Hack_Phys
Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces
An attacker interacts physically with the TOE to exploit vulnerabilities, resulting in arbitrary
security compromises. This threat is directed against SCD, SVD and DTBS.
4.2.4 T.SVD_Forgery
Forgery of the signature verification data
An attacker forges the SVD presented by the CSP to the CGA. This results in loss of SVD
integrity in the certificate of the Signatory.
4.2.5 T.SigF_Misuse
Misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE
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An attacker misuses the signature creation function of the TOE to create an SDO for data
the Signatory has not decided to sign. The TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by experts
possessing a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of security principles and
concepts employed by the TOE.
4.2.6 T.DTBS_Forgery
Forgery of the DTBS/R
An attacker modifies the DTBS/R sent by the SCA. Thus the DTBS/R used by the TOE for
signing does not match the DTBS that the Signatory intended to sign.
4.2.7 T.Sig_Forgery
Forgery of the electronic signature
An attacker forges an SDO, maybe using an electronic signature which has been created
by the TOE, and the violation of the integrity of the SDO is not detectable by the Signatory
or by third parties. The signature created by the TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by
experts possessing a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of security principles
and concepts employed by the TOE.
4.3 Organizational Security Policies
The PPs [R10] [R11] [R12] share the same OSPs, reported here below.
4.3.1 P.CSP_QCert
CSP generates qualified certificates
The CSP uses a trustworthy CGA to generate a qualified certificate or non-qualified
certificate ([R15], article 2, clause 9, and Annex I) for the SVD generated by the QSCD. The
certificates contain at least the name of the Signatory and the SVD matching the SCD
implemented in the TOE under sole control of the Signatory. The CSP ensures that the use
of the TOE as QSCD is evident with signatures through the certificate or other publicly
available information.
4.3.2 P.QSign
Qualified electronic signatures
The Signatory uses a Signature Creation System to sign data with an advanced electronic
signature ([R15], article 1, clause 2), which is a qualified electronic signature if it is based on
a valid qualified certificate (according to [R15], Annex I). The DTBS are presented to the
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Signatory and sent by the SCA as DTBS/R to the QSCD. The QSCD creates the electronic
signature with an SCD implemented in the QSCD that the Signatory maintains under their
sole control and is linked to the DTBS/R in such a manner that any subsequent change of
the data is detectable.
4.3.3 P.Sigy_QSCD
TOE as secure signature creation device
The TOE meets the requirements for a QSCD laid down in [R15], Annex III. This implies the
SCD is used for digital signature creation under sole control of the Signatory and the SCD
can practically occur only once.
4.3.4 P.Sig_Non-Repud
Non-repudiation of signatures
The lifecycle of the QSCD, the SCD and the SVD shall be implemented in a way that the
Signatory is not able to deny having signed data if the signature is successfully verified with
the SVD contained in their unrevoked certificate.
Here below are further OSPs, added in this security target to those defined in the PPs.
4.3.5 P.Manufact
Manufacturing of the e-Document
The IC Manufacturer writes IC initialization data in step 3, IC manufacturing, of TOE life
cycle, including the key for the authentication of the Initialization Agent (cf. section 2.3.2).
The Initialization Agent writes TOE initialization data in step 6, initialization, of TOE life cycle,
including the key for the authentication of the Personalization Agent (cf. section 2.3.2).
The Initialization Agent acts on behalf of the QSCD provisioning service.
4.3.6 P.Personalization
Personalization of the e-Document
The Personalization Agent writes personalization data in step 7, personalization, of TOE life
cycle (cf. section 2.3.3), including the credentials for the authentication of the Administrator
and of the Signatory.
The Personalization Agent acts on behalf of the QSCD provisioning service.
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4.4 Assumptions
The PPs [R10] [R11] [R12] share the same assumptions, reported here below.
4.4.1 A.CGA
Trustworthy certificate generation application
The CGA protects the authenticity of the signatory’s name or pseudonym and the SVD in
the (qualified) certificate by an advanced electronic signature of the CSP.
4.4.2 A.SCA
Trustworthy Signature Creation Application
The signatory uses only a trustworthy SCA. The SCA generates and sends the DTBS/R of
the data that the signatory wishes to sign in a form appropriate for signing by the TOE.
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5. Security objectives
5.1 Security objectives for the TOE
Here below are the security objectives for the TOE defined in PP Part 2 [R10].
5.1.1 OT.Lifecycle_Security
Lifecycle security
The TOE shall detect flaws during the initialization, personalization, and operational usage.
The TOE shall securely destroy the SCD on demand of the Signatory.
Application Note 2 The TOE may contain more than one set of SCD. There is no need
to destroy the SCD in case of repeated SCD generation. The Signatory shall be able to
destroy the SCD stored in the QSCD, e.g. after the (qualified) certificate for the
corresponding SVD has expired.
5.1.2 OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
Authorized SCD/SVD generation
The TOE shall provide security features to ensure that authorized users only may invoke the
generation of the SCD and the SVD.
5.1.3 OT.SCD_Unique
Uniqueness of Signature Creation Data
The TOE shall ensure the cryptographic quality of an SCD/SVD pair that it creates as
suitable for the advanced or qualified electronic signature. The SCD used for signature
creation shall practically occur only once and shall not be reconstructable from the SVD. In
that context “practically occur once” means that the probability of equal SCDs is negligible.
5.1.4 OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
Correspondence between SVD and SCD
The TOE shall ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD generated by the
TOE. This includes unambiguous reference of a created SVD/SCD pair for export of the
SVD and in creating an electronic signature with the SCD.
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5.1.5 OT.SCD_Secrecy
Secrecy of Signature Creation Data
The secrecy of the SCD (used for signature creation) shall be reasonably assured against
attacks with a high attack potential.
Application Note 3 The TOE shall keep the confidentiality of the SCD at all times, in
particular during SCD/SVD generation, signature creation operation, storage and secure
destruction.
5.1.6 OT.Sig_Secure
Cryptographic security of the electronic signature
The TOE shall create digital signatures that cannot be forged without knowledge of the SCD
through robust encryption techniques. The SCD shall not be reconstructable using the digital
signatures or any other data exportable from the TOE. The digital signatures shall be
resistant against these attacks, even when executed with a high attack potential.
5.1.7 OT.Sigy_SigF
Signature creation function for the legitimate Signatory only
The TOE shall provide the digital signature creation function for the legitimate Signatory only
and protects the SCD against the use of others. The TOE shall resist attacks with high attack
potential.
5.1.8 OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE
The TOE must not alter the DTBS/R. As by definition of the DTBS/R this may consist of the
DTBS themselves, this objective does not conflict with a signature creation process where
the TOE hashes the provided DTBS (in part or entirely) for signature creation.
5.1.9 OT.EMSEC_Design
Provision of physical emanations security
The TOE shall be designed and built in such a way as to control the production of intelligible
emanations within specified limits.
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5.1.10 OT.Tamper_ID
Tamper detection
The TOE shall provide system features that detect physical tampering of its components,
and uses those features to limit security breaches.
5.1.11 OT.Tamper_Resistance
Tamper resistance
The TOE shall prevent or resist physical tampering with specified system devices and
components.
Here below are the security objectives for the TOE defined in PP Part 4 [R11].
5.1.12 OT.TOE_QSCD_Auth
Authentication proof as QSCD
The TOE shall hold unique identity and authentication data as QSCD and provide security
mechanisms to identify and to authenticate itself as QSCD.
5.1.13 OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp
TOE trusted channel for SVD export
The TOE shall provide a trusted channel to the CGA to protect the integrity of the SVD
exported to the CGA. The TOE shall enable the CGA to detect alteration of the SVD exported
by the TOE.
Here below are the security objectives for the TOE defined in PP Part 5 [R12].
5.1.14 OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp
Trusted channel of TOE for VAD import
The TOE shall provide a trusted channel for the protection of the confidentiality and integrity
of the VAD received from the HID as needed by the authentication method employed.
Application Note 4 This security objective for the TOE is partly covering OE.HID_VAD
from PP Part 2 [R10]. While OE.HID_VAD in PP Part 2 requires only the operational
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environment to protect VAD, PP Part 5 [R12] requires the HID and the TOE to implement a
trusted channel for the protection of the VAD: the HID exports the VAD and establishes one
end of the trusted channel according to OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp, the TOE imports VAD at the
other end of the trusted channel according to OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp. Therefore, PP Part 5
partly re-assigns the VAD protection from the operational environment as described by
OE.HID_VAD to the TOE as described by OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp, and leaves only the
necessary functionality by the HID.
5.1.15 OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp
Trusted channel of TOE for DTBS import
The TOE shall provide a trusted channel to the SCA to detect alteration of the DTBS/R
received from the SCA. The TOE must not generate electronic signatures with the SCD for
altered DTBS.
Application Note 5 This security objective for the TOE is partly covering
OE.DTBS_Protect from PP Part 2 [R10]. While OE.DTBS_Protect in PP Part 2 requires only
the operational environment to protect DTBS, PP Part 5 [R12] requires the SCA and the
TOE to implement a trusted channel for the protection of the DTBS: the SCA exports the
DTBS and establishes one end of the trusted channel according to
OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp, the TOE imports DTBS at the other end of the trusted channel
according to OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp. Therefore, PP Part 5 partly re-assigns the DTBS
protection from the operational environment as described by OE.DTBS_Protect to the TOE
as described by OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp and leaves only the necessary functionality by the
SCA.
Here below are further security objectives for the TOE, added in this security target to those
defined in the PPs.
5.1.16 OT.AC_Init
Access control for the initialization of the e-Document
The TOE must ensure that TOE initialization data, including the personalization key, can be
written in step 6, initialization, of TOE life cycle (cf. section 2.3.2) by the authorized
Initialization Agent only.
5.1.17 OT.AC_Pers
Access control for the personalization of the e-Document
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The TOE must ensure that personalization data can be written in step 7, personalization, of
TOE life cycle (cf. section 2.3.3) by the authorized Personalization Agent only.
5.2 Security objectives for the operational environment
Here below are the security objectives for the operational environment defined in PP Part 2
[R10].
5.2.1 OE.SVD_Auth
Authenticity of the SVD
The operational environment shall ensure the integrity of the SVD sent to the CGA of the
CSP. The CGA verifies the correspondence between the SCD in the QSCD of the Signatory
and the SVD in the qualified certificate.
5.2.2 OE.CGA_QCert
Generation of qualified certificates
The CGA shall generate a qualified certificate that includes (among others):
 the name of the Signatory controlling the TOE,
 the SVD matching the SCD stored in the TOE and being under sole control of the
Signatory,
 the advanced signature of the CSP.
The CGA shall confirm with the generated qualified certificate that the SCD corresponding
to the SVD is stored in the QSCD.
5.2.3 OE.DTBS_Intend
SCA sends data intended to be signed
The Signatory shall use a trustworthy SCA that:
 generates the DTBS/R of the data that has been presented as DTBS and which the
Signatory intends to sign in a form which is appropriate for signing by the TOE;
 sends the DTBS/R to the TOE and enables verification of the integrity of the DTBS/R
by the TOE;
 attaches the signature produced by the TOE to the data or provides it separately.
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5.2.4 OE.Signatory
Security obligation of the Signatory
The Signatory shall check that the SCD stored in the QSCD received from the QSCD
provisioning service is in non-operational state. The Signatory shall keep their VAD
confidential.
Here below are the security objectives for the operational environment defined in PP Part 4
[R11].
5.2.5 OE.Dev_Prov_Service
Authentic QSCD provided by the QSCD provisioning service
The QSCD provisioning service handles authentic devices that implement the TOE,
prepares the TOE for proof as QSCD to external entities, personalizes the TOE for the
legitimate user as Signatory, links the identity of the TOE as QSCD with the identity of the
legitimate user, and delivers the TOE to the Signatory.
Application Note 6 This objective replaces OE.QSCD_Prov_Service from PP Part 2
[R10], which is possible as it does not imply any additional requirement for the operational
environment when compared with OE.QSCD_Prov_Service (OE.Dev_Prov_Service is a
subset of OE.QSCD_Prov_Service).
5.2.6 OE.CGA_QSCD_Auth
Preparation of the TOE for QSCD authentication
The CSP shall check by means of the CGA whether the device presented for application of
a (qualified) certificate holds unique identification as QSCD, successfully proved this identity
as QSCD to the CGA, and whether this identity is linked to the legitimate holder of the device
as applicant for the certificate.
5.2.7 OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp
CGA trusted channel for SVD import
The CGA shall detect alteration of the SVD imported from the TOE with the claimed identity
of the QSCD.
Application Note 7 The developer prepares the TOE for the delivery to the customer
(i.e. the QSCD provisioning service) in the development phase, not addressed by security
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objectives for the operational environment. The QSCD provisioning service performs
initialization and personalization as TOE for the legitimate user (i.e. the device holder). If the
TOE is delivered to the device holder with SCD, the TOE is a QSCD. This situation is
addressed by OE.QSCD_Prov_Service except for the additional initialization of the TOE for
proof as QSCD and trusted channel to the CGA. If the TOE is delivered to the device holder
without SCD, the TOE will be a QSCD only after generation of the first SCD/SVD pair.
Because this SCD/SVD pair generation is performed by the Signatory in the operational use
stage, the TOE provides additional security functionality addressed by
OT.TOE_QSCD_Auth and OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp. But this security functionality must be
initialized by the QSCD provisioning service as described in OE.Dev_Prov_Service.
Therefore, PP Part 4 [R11] substitutes OE.QSCD_Prov_Service by OE.Dev_Prov_Service,
allowing generation of the first SCD/SVD pair after delivery of the TOE to the device holder
and requiring initialization of security functionality of the TOE. Nevertheless, the additional
security functionality must be used by the operational environment as described in
OE.CGA_QSCD_Auth and OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp. This approach does not weaken the
security objectives and requirements for the TOE, but enforces more security functionalities
of the TOE for additional methods of use. Therefore, it does not conflict with the CC
conformance claim to PP Part 2 [R10].
Here below are the security objectives for the operational environment defined in PP Part 5
[R12].
5.2.8 OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp
Trusted channel of HID for VAD export
The HID provides the human interface for user authentication. The HID will ensure
confidentiality and integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication method employed,
including export to the TOE by means of a trusted channel.
Application Note 8 This security objective for the TOE is partly covering OE.HID_VAD
from PP Part 2 [R10]. While OE.HID_VAD in PP Part 2 requires only the operational
environment to protect VAD, this PP requires the HID and the TOE to implement a trusted
channel for the protection of the VAD: the HID exports the VAD and establishes one end of
the trusted channel according to OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp, the TOE imports VAD at the other
end of the trusted channel according to OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp. Therefore, PP Part 5 [R12]
partly re-assigns the VAD protection from the operational environment as described by
OE.HID_VAD to the TOE as described by OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp, and leaves only the
necessary functionality by the HID.
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5.2.9 OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp
Trusted channel of SCA for DTBS export
The SCA provides a trusted channel to the TOE for the protection of the integrity of the
DTBS to ensure that the DTBS/R cannot be altered undetected in transit between the SCA
and the TOE.
Application Note 9 This security objective for the TOE is partly covering
OE.DTBS_Protect from PP Part 2 [R10]. While OE.DTBS_Protect in PP Part 2 requires only
the operational environment to protect DTBS, this PP requires the SCA and the TOE to
implement a trusted channel for the protection of the DTBS: the SCA exports the DTBS and
establishes one end of the trusted channel according to OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp, the TOE
imports DTBS at the other end of the trusted channel according to OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp.
Therefore, PP Part 5 [R12] partly re-assigns the DTBS protection from the operational
environment as described by OE.DTBS_Protect to the TOE as described by
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp and leaves only the necessary functionality by the SCA.
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6. Security objectives rationale
6.1 Coverage of security objectives
Table 6-1 and Table 6-2 map the elements of the security problem definition to the security
objectives for the TOE and for the operational environment, respectively. The rows are split
according to the kind of element (threats, OSPs, assumptions), while the columns are split
according to the source of the security objectives (PP Part 2 [R10], PP Part 4 [R11], PP Part
5 [R12], or this security target).
Table 6-1 Mapping of the security problem definition to the security objectives for the TOE
OT.Lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.TOE_QSCD_Auth
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp
OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp
OT.AC_Init
OT.AC_Pers
T.SCD_Divulg X
T.SCD_Derive X X
T.Hack_Phys X X X X
T.SVD_Forgery X X
T.SigF_Misuse X X X X X
T.DTBS_Forgery X X
T.Sig_Forgery X X
P.CSP_QCert X X X
P.QSign X X
P.Sigy_QSCD X X X X X X X X X X X
P.Sig_Non-
Repud
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
P.Manufact X
P.Personalization X X
A.CGA
A.SCA
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Table 6-2 Mapping of the security problem definition to the security objectives for the
operational environment
OE.CGA_QCert
OE.SVD_Auth
OE.DTBS_Intend
OE.Signatory
OE.Dev_Prov_Service
OE.CGA_QSCD_Auth
OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp
OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp
OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp
T.SCD_Divulg
T.SCD_Derive
T.Hack_Phys
T.SVD_Forgery X X
T.SigF_Misuse X X X X
T.DTBS_Forgery X X
T.Sig_Forgery X
P.CSP_QCert X X
P.QSign X X
P.Sigy_QSCD X X X
P.Sig_Non-Repud X X X X X X X X X
P.Manufact X
P.Personalization X
A.CGA X X
A.SCA X
6.2 Sufficiency of security objectives
In PP Part 4 [R11], the rationale for T.SCD_Divulg, T.SCD_Derive, T.Hack_Phys,
T.SigF_Misuse, T.DTBS_Forgery, T.Sig_Forgery, P.QSign, A.CGA, and A.SCA remains
unchanged as given in PP Part 2 [R10], section 7.3.2. The rationale how security objectives
address threats T.SCD_Divulg, T.SVD_Forgery and policies P.CSP_QCert, P.Sigy_QSCD,
and P.Sig_Non-Repud changes as reported below.
In PP Part 5 [R12], the rationale for T.Hack_Phys, T.SCD_Divulg, T.SCD_Derive,
T.Sig_Forgery, T.SVD_Forgery, P.CSP_QCert, P.QSign, A.CGA, and A.SCA remains
unchanged as given in PP Part 2 [R10], section 7.3.2. The rationale how security objectives
address threats T.DTBS_Forgery, T.SigF_Misuse and policy P.Sig_Non-Repud changes as
reported below.
Here below is the rationale borrowed from PP Part 2 [R10].
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T.SCD_Divulg (Storing, copying and releasing of the signature creation data) addresses
the threat against the legal validity of electronic signature, as expressed in recital (18) of
[R15], and confidentiality of encrypted data due to storage and copying of SCD outside the
TOE. This threat is countered by OT.SCD_Secrecy, which assures the secrecy of the SCD
used for signature creation.
T.SCD_Derive (Derive the signature creation data) deals with attacks on the SCD via
publicly known data produced by the TOE, which are the SVD and the signatures created
with the SCD. OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen counters this threat by implementing
cryptographically secure generation of the SCD/SVD pair. OT.Sig_Secure ensures
cryptographically secure electronic signatures.
T.Hack_Phys (Exploitation of physical vulnerabilities) deals with physical attacks exploiting
physical vulnerabilities of the TOE. OT.SCD_Secrecy preserves the secrecy of the SCD.
OT.EMSEC_Design counters physical attacks through the TOE interfaces and observation
of TOE emanations. OT.Tamper_ID and OT.Tamper_Resistance counter the threat by
detecting and by resisting tampering attacks.
T.Sig_Forgery (Forgery of the electronic signature) deals with non-detectable forgery of the
electronic signature. OT.Sig_Secure, OT.SCD_Unique, and OE.CGA_QCert address this
threat in general. OT.Sig_Secure ensures by means of robust cryptographic techniques that
the signed data and the electronic signature are securely linked together. OT.SCD_Unique
ensures that the same SCD cannot be generated more than once and the corresponding
SVD cannot be included in another certificate by chance. OE.CGA_QCert prevents forgery
of the certificate for the corresponding SVD, which would result in false verification decision
concerning a forged signature.
P.QSign (Qualified electronic signatures) states that the TOE and the SCA may be
employed to sign data with an advanced electronic signature, which is a qualified electronic
signature if based on a valid qualified certificate. OT.Sigy_SigF ensures Signatory’s sole
control of the SCD by requiring the TOE to provide the signature creation function for the
legitimate Signatory only and to protect the SCD against the use of others. OT.Sig_Secure
ensures that the TOE creates electronic signatures which cannot be forged without
knowledge of the SCD, through robust encryption techniques. OE.CGA_QCert addresses
the requirement of qualified or non-qualified electronic certificates building a base for the
electronic signature. OE.DTBS_Intend ensures that the SCA provides only those DTBS to
the TOE, which the Signatory intends to sign.
A.SCA (Trustworthy Signature Creation Application) establishes the trustworthiness of the
SCA with respect to generation of DTBS/R. This is addressed by OE.DTBS_Intend, which
ensures that the SCA generates the DTBS/R of the data that have been presented to the
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Signatory as DTBS and which the Signatory intends to sign in a form which is appropriate
for being signed by the TOE.
A.CGA (Trustworthy Certificate Generation Application) establishes the protection of the
authenticity of the Signatory’s name and the SVD in the qualified certificate by the advanced
signature of the CSP by means of the CGA. This is addressed by OE.CGA_QCert, which
ensures the generation of qualified certificates, and by OE.SVD_Auth, which ensures the
protection of the integrity of the received SVD and the verification of the correspondence
between the SVD and the SCD that is implemented by the QSCD of the Signatory.
Here below is the rationale borrowed from PP Part 4 [R11].
T.SVD_Forgery (Forgery of Signature Verification Data) deals with the forgery of the SVD
exported by the TOE to the CGA for the generation of the certificate. The threat is addressed
by OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp, which ensures correspondence between SVD and SCD and
unambiguous reference of the SVD/SCD pair for the SVD export, signature creation with the
SCD, and by OE.SVD_Auth, which ensures the integrity of the SVD exported by the TOE
to the CGA and verification of the correspondence between the SCD in the QSCD of the
Signatory and the SVD in the input provided to the certificate generation function of the CSP.
Additionally, the threat is addressed by OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp, which ensures that the
TOE sends the SVD in a verifiable form through a trusted channel to the CGA, as well as by
OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp, which provides verification of SVD authenticity by the CGA.
P.CSP_QCert (CSP generates qualified certificates) states that the TOE and the SCA may
be employed to sign data with (qualified) electronic signatures, as defined by [R15], article
5, paragraph 1. [R15], recital (15) refers to QSCDs to ensure the functionality of advanced
signatures. OE.CGA_QCert addresses the requirement of qualified (or advanced) electronic
signatures as being based on qualified (or non-qualified) certificates. According to
OT.TOE_QSCD_Auth, the copies of the TOE will hold unique identity and authentication
data as QSCD and provide security mechanisms enabling the CGA to identify and to
authenticate the TOE as QSCD. OE.CGA_QSCD_Auth ensures that the CSP checks the
proof that the device is a QSCD presented by the applicant. OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
ensures that the SVD exported by the TOE to the CGA corresponds to the SCD stored in
the TOE and used by the Signatory. OT.Lifecycle_Security ensures that the TOE detects
flaws during initialization, personalization, and operational usage.
P.Sigy_QSCD (TOE as Secure Signature Creation Device) requires the TOE to meet [R15],
Annex III. Paragraph 1(a) of Annex III is ensured by OT.SCD_Unique, requiring that the
SCD used for signature creation can practically occur only once. OT.SCD_Secrecy,
OT.Sig_Secure, OT.EMSEC_Design, and OT.Tamper_Resistance address the secrecy
of the SCD (cf. paragraph 1(a) of Annex III). OT.SCD_Secrecy and OT.Sig_Secure meet
the requirement in paragraph 1(b) of Annex III by the requirement to ensure that the SCD
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cannot be derived from SVD, the electronic signatures, or any other data exported outside
the TOE. OT.Sigy_SigF meets the requirement in paragraph 1(c) of Annex III by the
requirement to ensure that the TOE provides the signature creation function for the
legitimate Signatory only and protects the SCD against the use of others.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE meets the requirement in paragraph 2 of Annex III as the TOE
must not alter the DTBS/R. The usage of SCD under sole control of the Signatory is ensured
by OT.Lifecycle_Security, OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen, and OT.Sigy_SigF.
OE.Dev_Prov_Service ensures that the legitimate user obtains a TOE sample as an
authentic, initialized, and personalized TOE from a QSCD provisioning service through the
TOE delivery procedure. If the TOE implements SCD generated under control of the QSCD
provisioning service, the legitimate user receives the TOE as QSCD. If the TOE is delivered
to the legitimate user without SCD, in the operational phase the user applies for the
(qualified) certificate as the device holder and legitimate user of the TOE. The CSP will use
the TOE security feature (addressed by security objectives OT.TOE_QSCD_Auth and
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp) to check whether the device presented is a QSCD linked to the
applicant, as required by OE.CGA_QSCD_Auth, and whether the received SVD is sent by
this QSCD, as required by OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp. Thus, the obligation of the QSCD
provisioning service for the first SCD/SVD pair is complemented in an appropriate way by
the CSP for the SCD/SVD pair generated outside a secure preparation environment.
Here below is the rationale borrowed from PP Part 5 [R12].
T.SigF_Misuse (Misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE) addresses the threat
of misuse of the TOE signature creation function to create an SDO by others than the
Signatory, or to create an electronic signature on data for which the Signatory has not
expressed the intent to sign, as required by paragraph 1(c) of [R15], Annex III.
OT.Lifecycle_Security requires the TOE to detect flaws during initialization,
personalization, and operational usage, including secure destruction of the SCD, which may
be initiated by the Signatory. OT.Sigy_SigF ensures that the TOE provides the signature
creation function for the legitimate Signatory only. OE.DTBS_Intend ensures that the SCA
sends the DTBS/R only for data that the Signatory intends to sign. The combination of
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp and OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp counters the undetected
manipulation of the DTBS during the transmission from the SCA to the TOE.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE prevents the DTBS/R from alteration inside the TOE. If the SCA
provides a human interface for user authentication, OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp requires the HID
to protect the confidentiality and the integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication
method employed. The HID and the TOE will protect the VAD by a trusted channel between
them according to OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp and OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp. OE.Signatory
ensures that the Signatory checks that an SCD stored in the QSCD, when received from a
QSCD provisioning service provider, is in non-operational state, i.e. the SCD cannot be used
before the Signatory obtains control over the QSCD. OE.Signatory also ensures that the
Signatory keeps their VAD confidential.
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T.DTBS_Forgery (Forgery of the DTBS/R) addresses the threat arising from modifications
of the DTBS/R sent to the TOE for signing, which then does not match the DTBS/R
corresponding to the DTBS that the Signatory intends to sign. The threat is addressed by
security objectives OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp and OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp, which ensure
that the DTBS/R is sent through a trusted channel and cannot be altered undetected in
transit between the SCA and the TOE. The TOE counters internally this threat by means of
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE, ensuring the integrity of the DTBS/R inside the TOE. The TOE
IT environment also addresses the threat by means of OE.DTBS_Intend, which ensures
that the trustworthy SCA generates the DTBS/R of the data that has been presented as
DTBS and which the Signatory intends to sign in a form appropriate for signing by the TOE.
Here below is the rationale for policy P.Sig_Non-Repud, resulting from the combination of
the rationales provided in PP Part 4 [R11] and PP Part 5 [R12].
P.Sig_Non-Repud (Non-repudiation of signatures) deals with the repudiation of signed data
by the Signatory, although the electronic signature is successfully verified with the SVD
contained in their certificate valid at the time of signature creation. This policy is implemented
by the combination of the security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment,
that ensure the aspects of Signatory’s sole control over and responsibility for the electronic
signatures generated with the TOE. OE.Dev_Prov_Service ensures that the Signatory uses
an authentic TOE, initialized and personalized for the Signatory. OE.CGA_QCert ensures
that the certificate allows to identify the Signatory and thus to link the SVD to the Signatory.
OE.SVD_Auth and OE.CGA_QCert require the environment to ensure authenticity of the
SVD as being exported by the TOE and used under sole control of the Signatory.
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp ensures that the SVD exported by the TOE corresponds to the
SCD that is implemented in the TOE. OT.SCD_Unique ensures that the Signatory’s SCD
can practically occur just once.
OE.Signatory ensures that the Signatory checks that the SCD stored in the QSCD received
from a QSCD provisioning service is in non-operational state (i.e. the SCD cannot be used
before the Signatory obtains sole control over the QSCD). The TOE security feature
addressed by security objectives OT.TOE_QSCD_Auth and OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp,
supported by OE.Dev_Prov_Service, enables the verification whether the device presented
by the applicant is a QSCD, as required by OE.CGA_QSCD_Auth, and whether the
received SVD is sent by the device holding the corresponding SCD, as required by
OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp. OT.Sigy_SigF ensures that only the Signatory may use the TOE
for signature creation. As prerequisite, OE.Signatory ensures that the Signatory keeps their
VAD confidential. The confidentiality of VAD is protected during the transmission between
the HID and the TOE according to OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp and OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp.
OE.DTBS_Intend, OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE, OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp, and
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp ensure that the TOE generates electronic signatures only for a
DTBS/R that the Signatory has decided to sign as DTBS. The robust cryptographic
techniques required by OT.Sig_Secure ensure that only this SCD may generate a valid
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electronic signature that can be successfully verified with the corresponding SVD used for
signature verification. Security objectives for the TOE OT.Lifecycle_Security,
OT.SCD_Secrecy, OT.EMSEC_Design, OT.Tamper_ID, and OT.Tamper_Resistance
protect the SCD against any compromise.
Here below is the rationale for the elements of the security problem definition added in this
security target to those defined in the PPs.
P.Manufact (Manufacturing of the e-Document) requires the storage of TOE initialization
data to be restricted to the Initialization Agent, which is ensured by OT.AC_Init.
Furthermore, since access control requires user authentication, the secure storage of the
initialization key and the personalization key prescribed by the policy is implied by
OT.AC_Init. Finally, the fact that the Initialization Agent acts on behalf of the QSCD
provisioning service, as stated by the policy, is implied by OE.Dev_Prov_Service, which
puts the whole preparation of the TOE for its use as QSCD on the part of the Signatory
under the responsibility of the QSCD provisioning service.
P.Personalization (Personalization of the e-Document) requires the storage of
personalization data to be restricted to the Personalization Agent, which is ensured by
OT.AC_Pers. Furthermore, since access control requires user authentication, the secure
storage of Administrator’s and Signatory’s credentials prescribed by the policy is implied by
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen. Finally, the fact that the Personalization Agent acts on behalf of
the QSCD provisioning service, as stated by the policy, is implied by
OE.Dev_Prov_Service, which puts the whole preparation of the TOE for its use as QSCD
on the part of the Signatory under the responsibility of the QSCD provisioning service.
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7. Extended components definition
7.1 Definition of family FPT_EMS
The additional family FPT_EMS (TOE emanation) of class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is
defined in PP Part 2 [R10] to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE.
The TOE shall prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret data, where the attack is
based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks
are evaluation of TOE electromagnetic radiation, Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Differential
Power Analysis (DPA), timing attacks, radio emanation, etc.
Family FPT_EMS describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible
emanations. This family belongs to class FPT because it is the class for TSF protection.
Other families within class FPT do not cover TOE emanations.
FPT_EMS TOE emanation
Family behaviour: This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible
emanations.
Component levelling:
FPT_EMS.1 (TOE emanation) has two constituents:
 FPT_EMS.1.1 (Limit of emissions) requires not to emit intelligible emissions
enabling access to TSF data or user data.
 FPT_EMS.1.2 (Interface emanation) requires not to emit interface emanation
enabling access to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMS TOE emanation 1
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FPT_EMS.1 TOE emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1:
The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in
excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to
[assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of
types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2:
The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to
use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to
gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and
[assignment: list of types of user data].
7.2 Definition of family FIA_API
The additional family FIA_API (Authentication proof of identity) of class FIA (Identification
and authentication) is defined in PP Part 4 [R11] to describe the IT security functional
requirements of the TOE.
This family describes the functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity of the
TOE by an external entity, whereas the other families of class FIA address the verification
of the identity of an external entity.
FIA_API Authentication proof of identity
Family behaviour: This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove its
identity and to be verified by an external entity in the TOE IT
environment.
Component levelling:
Management: FIA_API.1
FIA_API Authentication proof of identity 1
1
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The following actions could be considered for the management
functions in FMT:
 Management of authentication information used to prove
the claimed identity.
Audit: FIA_API.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FIA_API.1 Authentication proof of identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1:
The TSF shall provide [assignment: authentication mechanism]
to prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role].
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8. Security functional requirements
Common Criteria allow several operations to be performed on functional requirements:
refinement, selection, assignment, and iteration (cf. [R7], section 8.1). Each of these
operations is used in this security target.
A (non-editorial) refinement operation is used to add details to a requirement, and thus
further restricts a requirement (as regards the distinction between editorial and non-editorial
refinements, cf. [R7], section 8.1.4). Non-editorial refinements of security requirements are
written in bold text for additions or changes, in strikethrough text for deletions, and those
made by the authors of this security target on the requirements borrowed from the PPs are
signalled by an application note.
A selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a
requirement. A selection that has been made in the PPs is indicated as underlined text, and
the original text of the component is given by a footnote. Selections filled in by the authors
of this security target are written in underlined bold text, and the original text of the
component is given by a footnote.
An assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter,
such as the length of a password. An assignment that that has been made in the PPs is
indicated as underlined text, and the original text of the component is given by a footnote.
Assignments filled in by the authors of this security target are written in underlined bold
text, and the original text of the component is given by a footnote.
An iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations.
Iteration is denoted by showing a slash “/” and the iteration indicator after the component
identifier.
Table 8-1 maps each SFR stated in this security target to the PPs in which it is defined, if
any. Particularly, SFR FIA_UAU.1 is mapped to both PP Part 4 [R11] and PP Part 5 [R12]
since both PPs extend the formulation of the SFR given in PP Part 2 [R10]. Therefore, the
formulation of the SFR given in this security target results from the combination of those
given in PP Part 4 and PP Part 5.
Table 8-1 Mapping of the security functional requirements to the PPs
Security functional requirement PP Part 2 PP Part 4 PP Part 5
FCS_CKM.1/RSA X
FCS_CKM.1/ECDSA X
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Security functional requirement PP Part 2 PP Part 4 PP Part 5
FCS_CKM.4 X
FCS_COP.1/RSA X
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA X
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation X
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation X
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer X
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer X
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation X
FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation X
FDP_RIP.1 X
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent X
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS X
FDP_DAU.2/SVD X
FDP_UIT.1/DTBS X
FIA_UID.1 X
FIA_UAU.1 X X
FIA_AFL.1 X
FIA_API.1 X
FMT_SMR.1/QSCD X
FMT_SMR.1/Init
FMT_SMR.1/Pers
FMT_SMF.1 X
FMT_MOF.1 X
FMT_MSA.1/Admin X
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory X
FMT_MSA.2 X
FMT_MSA.3 X
FMT_MSA.4 X
FMT_MTD.1/Admin X
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory X
FMT_MTD.1/Init
FMT_MTD.1/Pers
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Security functional requirement PP Part 2 PP Part 4 PP Part 5
FPT_EMS.1 X
FPT_FLS.1 X
FPT_PHP.1 X
FPT_PHP.3 X
FPT_TST.1 X
FTP_ITC.1/SVD X
FTP_ITC.1/VAD X
FTP_ITC.1/DTBS X
FTP_ITC.1/Init
FTP_ITC.1/Pers
8.1 Class FCS: Cryptographic support
8.1.1 FCS_CKM.1/RSA
Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1:
The TSF shall generate SCD/SVD pairs in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm two-prime
RSA4 and specified cryptographic key sizes 2048, 3072, 4096
bits5 that meet the following: PKCS #1 [R43]6.
Application Note 10 The refinement in the element FCS_CKM.1.1 substitutes
“cryptographic keys” with “SCD/SVD pairs” because it clearly addresses the SCD/SVD key
generation.
4 [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
5 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
6 [assignment: list of standards]
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8.1.2 FCS_CKM.1/ECDSA
Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1:
The TSF shall generate SCD/SVD pairs in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm ECDSA with
SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-5127 and specified cryptographic
key sizes 256, 320, 384, 512 and 521 bits8 that meet the
following: FIPS 186-4 [R36]9.
Application Note 11 The refinement in the element FCS_CKM.1.1 substitutes
“cryptographic keys” with “SCD/SVD pairs” because it clearly addresses the SCD/SVD key
generation.
8.1.3 FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1:
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method physical
7 [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
8 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
9 [assignment: list of standards]
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deletion by overwriting the memory data with zeros10 that
meets the following: none11.
8.1.4 FCS_COP.1/RSA
Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/RSA:
The TSF shall perform digital signature creation12 in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
with SHA-256, SHA-512 and RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256,
SHA-51213 and cryptographic key sizes 2048, 3072, 4096 bits14
that meet the following: PKCS #1 [R43], FIPS PUB 180-4
[R35]15.
8.1.5 FCS_COP.1/ECDSA
Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDSA:
10 [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]
11 [assignment: list of standards]
12 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
13 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
14 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
15 [assignment: list of standards]
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The TSF shall perform digital signature creation16 in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA with SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-51217 and cryptographic key sizes 256, 320,
384, 512 and 521 bits 18 that meet the following: Elliptic Curve
Cryptography [R6], FIPS PUB 180-4 [R35]19.
Application Note 12 For EC cryptography, the TOE makes use of the NXP cryptographic
library. The cryptographic requirement REQ_ECC_POINT_MULT defined in section 6.4 of
[R39] do not apply to the TOE because the ECC point multiplication is never used in protocol
other than Diffie Hellman Key Exchange and ECDSA.
8.2 Class FDP: User data protection
The security attributes of subjects and objects relevant for access control and the related
values are reported in Table 8-2.
Table 8-2 Security attributes of subjects and objects for access control
Subject or object Security attribute Security attribute values
S.User Role R.Admin, R.Sigy
S.User SCD/SVD management authorized, not authorized
SCD SCD operational no, yes
SCD SCD identifier arbitrary value
SVD - -
Application Note 13 The roles of R.Admin and R.Sigy are directly related to the
definitions of Administrator and Signatory (cf. section 2.2).
8.2.1 FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
16 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
17 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
18 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
19 [assignment: list of standards]
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Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/SCD/SVD_Generation:
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD Generation SFP20 on
 subjects: S.User;
 objects: SCD, SVD;
 operations: generation of SCD/SVD pairs21.
8.2.2 FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1/SCD/SVD_Generation:
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD Generation SFP22 to
objects based on the following: the user S.User is associated
with the security attribute “SCD/SVD management”23.
FDP_ACF.1.2/SCD/SVD_Generation:
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD/SVD management” set
to “authorized” is allowed to generate SCD/SVD pair24.
FDP_ACF.1.3/SCD/SVD_Generation:
20 [assignment: access control SFP]
21 [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
22 [assignment: access control SFP]
23 [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-
relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
24 [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled
operations on controlled objects]
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The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none25.
FDP_ACF.1.4/SCD/SVD_Generation:
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD/SVD management” set
to “not authorized” is not allowed to generate SCD/SVD pair26.
Application Note 14 Both the Administrator and the Signatory are allowed to generate
SCD/SVD pairs (cf. section 2.2.2).
8.2.3 FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer
Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/SVD_Transfer:
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP27 on
 subjects: S.User;
 objects: SVD;
 operations: export28.
8.2.4 FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer
Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
25 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects]
26 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
27 [assignment: access control SFP]
28 [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
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FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1/SVD_Transfer:
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP29 to objects
based on the following:
 the S.User is associated with the security attribute “Role”;
 the SVD30.
FDP_ACF.1.2/SVD_Transfer:
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: R.Admin, R.Sigy31 are allowed to export SVD32.
FDP_ACF.1.3/SVD_Transfer:
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none33.
FDP_ACF.1.4/SVD_Transfer:
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none34.
Application Note 15 Both the Administrator and the Signatory are allowed to export SVD
to the CGA in order to apply for certificates (cf. section 2.2.2).
8.2.5 FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation
Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
29 [assignment: access control SFP]
30 [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-
relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
31 [selection: R.Admin, R.Sigy]
32 [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled
operations on controlled objects]
33 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects]
34 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
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FDP_ACC.1.1/Signature_Creation:
The TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP35 on
 subjects: S.User;
 objects: DTBS/R, SCD;
 operations: signature creation36.
8.2.6 FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation
Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1/Signature_Creation:
The TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP37 to objects
based on the following:
 the user S.User is associated with the security attribute
“Role”, and
 the SCD with the security attribute “SCD Operational”38.
FDP_ACF.1.2/Signature_Creation:
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed:
R.Sigy is allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS/R
with SCD whose security attribute “SCD operational” is set to
“yes”39.
35 [assignment: access control SFP]
36 [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
37 [assignment: access control SFP]
38 [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-
relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
39 [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled
operations on controlled objects]
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FDP_ACF.1.3/Signature_Creation:
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none40.
FDP_ACF.1.4/Signature_Creation:
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules:
S.User is not allowed to create electronic signatures for
DTBS/R with SCD whose security attribute “SCD operational” is
set to “no”41.
8.2.7 FDP_RIP.1
Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1:
The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a
resource is made unavailable upon the de-allocation of the
resource from42 the following objects: SCD43.
The following data persistently stored by the TOE shall have the user data attribute “integrity
checked persistent stored data”:
 SCD;
 SVD.
The DTBS/R temporarily stored by the TOE has the user data attribute "integrity checked
stored data".
8.2.8 FDP_SDI.2/Persistent
Stored data integrity monitoring and action
40 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects]
41 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
42 [selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from]
43 [assignment: list of objects]
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Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1/Persistent:
The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled
by the TSF for integrity errors44 on all objects, based on the
following attributes: integrity checked stored data45.
FDP_SDI.2.2/Persistent:
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall
 prohibit the use of the altered data;
 inform the S.Sigy about the integrity error46.
8.2.9 FDP_SDI.2/DTBS
Stored data integrity monitoring and action – DTBS
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1/DTBS:
The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled
by the TSF for integrity errors47 on all objects, based on the
following attributes: integrity checked stored DTBS48.
FDP_SDI.2.2/DTBS:
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall
 prohibit the use of the altered data;
 inform the S.Sigy about the integrity error49.
44 [assignment: integrity errors]
45 [assignment: user data attributes]
46 [assignment: action to be taken]
47 [assignment: integrity errors]
48 [assignment: user data attributes]
49 [assignment: action to be taken]
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Application Note 16 The integrity of TSF data like RAD is also protected to ensure the
effectiveness of the user authentication.
8.2.10 FDP_DAU.2/SVD
Data authentication with Identity of Guarantor
Hierarchical to: FDP_DAU.1 Basic data authentication
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FDP_DAU.2.1/SVD:
The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that
can be used as a guarantee of the validity of SVD50.
FDP_DAU.2.2/SVD:
The TSF shall provide the CGA51 with the ability to verify
evidence of the validity of the indicated information and the
identity of the user that generated the evidence.
8.2.11 FDP_UIT.1/DTBS
Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1/DTBS:
The TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP52 to
receive53 user data in a manner protected from modification and
insertion54 errors.
50 [assignment: list of objects or information types]
51 [assignment: list of subjects]
52 [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
53 [selection: transmit, receive]
54 [selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
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FDP_UIT.1.2/DTBS:
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification or insertion55 has occurred.
8.3 Class FIA: Identification and authentication
8.3.1 FIA_UID.1
Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1:
The TSF shall allow
 self-test according to FPT_TST.1,
 establishing a trusted channel between the CGA and
the TOE by means of TSF required by
FTP_ITC.1/SVD;
 establishing a trusted channel between the HID and
the TOE by means of TSF required by
FTP_ITC.1/VAD;
 establishing a trusted channel between the
Initialization Agent’s terminal and the TOE by means
of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/Init;
 establishing a trusted channel between the
Personalization Agent’s terminal and the TOE by
means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/Pers56 57;
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
identified.
FIA_UID.1.2:
55 [selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
56 [assignment: list of additional TSF-mediated actions]
57 [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
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The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of
that user.
8.3.2 FIA_UAU.1
Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1:
The TSF shall allow
 self-test according to FPT_TST.1;
 identification of the user by means of TSF required by
FIA_UID.1;
 establishing a trusted channel between the CGA and the
TOE by means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/SVD;
 establishing a trusted channel between the HID and the
TOE by means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/VAD;
 establishing a trusted channel between the
Initialization Agent’s terminal and the TOE by means
of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/Init;
 establishing a trusted channel between the
Personalization Agent’s terminal and the TOE by
means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/Pers58 59.
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2:
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions
on behalf of that user.
58 [assignment: list of additional TSF-mediated actions]
59 [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
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Application Note 17 The TOE does not maintain any user identification information prior
to user authentication; namely, the user is regarded as an unidentified terminal until user
authentication is accomplished. Hence, this security target refines the element FIA_UAU.1.1
by deleting the bullet (2).
Application Note 18 PP Part 4 [R11] performs the assignment of the bullet (3) in the
element FIA_UAU.1.1 of PP Part 2 [R10] by adding the establishment of a trusted channel
to the CGA.
Application Note 19 PP Part 5 [R12] performs the assignment of the bullet (3) in the
element FIA_UAU.1.1 of PP Part 2 [R10] by adding the establishment of a trusted channel
to the HID.
8.3.3 FIA_AFL.1
Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1:
The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable
positive integer within 1-1560 unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to consecutive failed authentication
attempts61.
FIA_AFL.1.2:
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts has been met62, the TSF shall block RAD63.
8.3.4 FIA_API.1
Authentication proof of identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
60 [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within
[assignment: range of acceptable values]]
61 [assignment: list of authentication events]
62 [selection: met, surpassed]
63 [assignment: list of actions]
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Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1:
The TSF shall provide General Authentication Protocol
compliant with TR-03110-264 to prove the identity of the
QSCD65.
Application Note 20 Via General Authentication Protocol, the TOE is able to authenticate
itself as QSCD to the CGA (cf. section 2.2.2).
Application Note 21 For PACE-PIN, the key lengths that can be used are limited to 256,
384 and 512 bits. For PACE-CAN, all key sizes can be used (cf. section 6.4 of [R39]).
8.4 Class FMT: Security management
8.4.1 FMT_SMR.1/QSCD
Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1/QSCD:
The TSF shall maintain the roles R.Admin and R.Sigy66.
FMT_SMR.1.2/QSCD:
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application Note 22 The roles of R.Admin and R.Sigy are directly related to the
definitions of Administrator and Signatory (cf. section 2.2).
64 [assignment: authentication mechanism]
65 [assignment: authorized user or role]
66 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
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8.4.2 FMT_SMR.1/Init
Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1/Init:
The TSF shall maintain the roles R.Init67.
FMT_SMR.1.2/Init:
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
8.4.3 FMT_SMR.1/Pers
Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1/Pers:
The TSF shall maintain the roles R.Pers68.
FMT_SMR.1.2/Pers:
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
8.4.4 FMT_SMF.1
Specification management functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1:
67 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
68 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
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The TSF shall be capable of performing the following
management functions:
 creation and modification of RAD;
 enabling the signature creation function;
 modification of the security attribute “SCD/SVD
management”, “SCD operational”;
 change the default value of the security attribute “SCD
identifier”;
 unblock of RAD,
 writing TOE initialization data,
 writing personalization data69 70.
8.4.5 FMT_MOF.1
Management of security functions behaviour
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_MOF.1.1:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable71 the functions
signature creation function72 to R.Sigy73.
Application Note 23 The TOE distinguishes between S.Admin or S.Sigy based on the
effective authorization obtained from GAP [R1].
8.4.6 FMT_MSA.1/Admin
Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
69 [assignment: list of other security management functions to be provided by the TSF]
70 [assignment: list of security management functions to be provided by the TSF]
71 [selection: determine the behaviour of, disable, enable, modify the behaviour of]
72 [assignment: list of functions]
73 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
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Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_MSA.1.1/Admin:
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD Generation SFP74 to
restrict the ability to modify75 76 the security attributes SCD/SVD
management77 to R.Admin78.
Application Note 24 The TOE distinguishes between S.Admin or S.Sigy based on the
effective authorization obtained from GAP [R1].
8.4.7 FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_MSA.1.1/Signatory:
The TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP79 to restrict
the ability to modify80 the security attributes SCD operational81
to R.Sigy82.
Application Note 25 The TOE distinguishes between S.Admin or S.Sigy based on the
effective authorization obtained from GAP [R1].
74 [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
75 [assignment: other operations]
76 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
77 [assignment: list of security attributes]
78 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
79 [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
80 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
81 [assignment: list of security attributes]
82 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
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8.4.8 FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.2.1:
The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for
SCD/SVD management and SCD operational83.
Application Note 26 Since the TOE supports generation of SCD/SVD pairs on the part
of the Signatory and a trusted channel for export of the SVD to the CGA, the security attribute
“SCD/SVD management” is set to “yes” for both of subjects S.Admin and S.Sigy (cf. sections
2.2.2, 2.3.4).
8.4.9 FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1:
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD Generation SFP, SVD
Transfer SFP and Signature Creation SFP84 to provide
restrictive85 default values for security attributes that are used to
enforce the SFP.
83 [assignment: list of security attributes]
84 [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
85 [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
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FMT_MSA.3.2:
The TSF shall allow the R.Admin86 to specify alternative initial
values to override the default values when an object or
information is created.
8.4.10 FMT_MSA.4
Security attribute value inheritance
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.4.1:
The TSF shall use the following rules to set the value of security
attributes:
 If S.Admin successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair
without S.Sigy being authenticated, the security attribute
“SCD operational of the SCD” shall be set to “no” as a
single operation.
 If S.Sigy successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair, the
security attribute “SCD operational of the SCD” shall be
set to “yes” as a single operation87.
Application Note 27 The TOE distinguishes between S.Admin or S.Sigy based on the
effective authorization obtained from GAP [R1].
8.4.11 FMT_MTD.1/Admin
Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
86 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
87 [assignment: rules for setting the values of security attributes]
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FMT_MTD.1.1/Admin:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to create88 the RAD89 to
R.Admin none90.
Application Note 28 According to the Administrator definition given in section 2.2, the
R.Admin can not create the RAD in Operational use phase. The RAD is created by the
Personalization Agent in Personalization phase (cf. FMT_MTD.1/Pers).
8.4.12 FMT_MTD.1/Signatory
Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_MTD.1.1/Signatory:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify, unblock, resume91
92 the RAD93 to R.Sigy94.
8.4.13 FMT_MTD.1/Init
Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_MTD.1.1/Init:
88 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
89 [assignment: list of TSF data]
90 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
91 [assignment: other operations]
92 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
93 [assignment: list of TSF data]
94 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
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The TSF shall restrict the ability to write95 the TOE
initialization data96 to R.Init97.
8.4.14 FMT_MTD.1/Pers
Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_MTD.1.1/Pers:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write98 the personalization
data99 to R.Pers100.
Application Note 29 The personalization data are written in Personalization and include
the RAD.
8.5 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
8.5.1 FPT_EMS.1
TOE emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1:
95 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
96 [assignment: list of TSF data]
97 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
98 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
99 [assignment: list of TSF data]
100 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
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The TOE shall not emit any measurable emissions101 in
excess of intelligible thresholds102 enabling access to RAD103
and SCD104.
FPT_EMS.1.2:
The TSF shall ensure any users105 are unable to use the
following interface contact-based/contactless interface and
circuit contacts106 to gain access to RAD107 and SCD108.
Application Note 30 The TOE shall prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret
data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE.
Such attacks may be observable at the interfaces of the TOE or may origin from internal
operation of the TOE or may origin by an attacker that varies the physical environment under
which the TOE operates. The set of measurable physical phenomena is influenced by the
technology employed to implement the TOE. Examples of measurable phenomena are
variations in the power consumption, the timing of transitions of internal states,
electromagnetic radiation due to internal operation, radio emission. Due to the
heterogeneous nature of the technologies that may cause such emanations, evaluation
against state-of-the-art attacks applicable to the technologies employed by the TOE is
assumed. Examples of such attacks are, but are not limited to, evaluation of TOE’s
electromagnetic radiation, Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Differential Power Analysis (DPA),
timing attacks, etc.
8.5.2 FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1:
101 [assignment: types of emissions]
102 [assignment: specified limits]
103 [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
104 [assignment: list of types of user data]
105 [assignment: type of users]
106 [assignment: type of connection]
107 [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
108 [assignment: list of types of user data]
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The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types
of failures occur:
 self-test according to FPT_TST fails;
 a physical attack is detected109 110.
Application Note 31 The assignments address failures detected by a failed self-test or
revealing the occurrence of a physical attack and requiring appropriate action to prevent
security violations. When the TOE is in a secure state, the TSF shall not perform any
cryptographic operations, and all data output interfaces shall be inhibited by the TSF.
8.5.3 FPT_PHP.1
Passive detection of physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.1.1:
The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical
tampering that might compromise the TSF.
FPT_PHP.1.2:
The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether
physical tampering with the TSF’s devices or TSF’s elements
has occurred.
8.5.4 FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1:
109 [assignment: list of other types of failures in the TSF]
110 [assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF]
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The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical
probing111 to the TSF112 by responding automatically such that
the SFRs are always enforced.
Application Note 32 The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously
counter physical tampering which may compromise the SCD. The “automatic response” in
the element FPT_PHP.3.1 means (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time,
and (ii) countermeasures are provided at any time. Due to the nature of these attacks, the
TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements (e.g. the TOE is destroyed). But
physical tampering must not reveal information of the SCD. E.g. the TOE may be physically
tampered in the power-off state of the TOE, which does not allow the TSF for overwriting
the SCD, but leads to physical destruction of the memory and all information therein about
the SCD. In case of physical tampering, the TSF may not provide the intended functions for
SCD/SVD pair generation, signature creation, but ensures the confidentiality of the SCD by
blocking these functions. The SFR FPT_PHP.1 requires the TSF to react to physical
tampering in such a way that the Signatory is able to determine whether the TOE was
physically tampered or not. The guidance documentation identifies the failure of TOE start-
up as an indication of physical tampering [R21] [R23] [R25].
8.5.5 FPT_TST.1
TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1:
The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up,
and at the conditions: when the applet is selected113 to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF114.
FPT_TST.1.2:
111 [assignment: physical tampering scenarios]
112 [assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]
113 [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized
user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self-test should occur]]
114 [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF]
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The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to
verify the integrity of TSF data115.
FPT_TST.1.3:
The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to
verify the integrity of TSF116.
Application Note 33 The Applet is automatically selected at the initial start-up. At the
selection, the Applet checks that is running on the expected platform JCOP 4 P71, using a
specific function provided by the platform. In case of failure, the Applet will raise a security
exception to the platform.
Application Note 34 The Applet will check the attack logger on selection. In case the
counter is zero, the Applet will raise a security exception to the platform.
8.6 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels
8.6.1 FTP_ITC.1/SVD
Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1/SVD:
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and another trusted IT product CGA that is logically distinct
from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/SVD:
The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product117 to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
115 [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF data], TSF data]
116 [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF]
117 [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
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FTP_ITC.1.3/SVD:
The TSF or the CGA shall initiate communication via the
trusted channel for
 data authentication with identity of guarantor according to
FIA_API.1 and FDP_DAU.2/SVD;
 import of certificate info from the CGA118 119.
Application Note 35 The component FTP_ITC.1/SVD requires the TSF to enforce a
trusted channel established by the CGA to export the SVD to the CGA. Moreover, the TSF
requires the use of the same trusted channel for the import of certificate info from the CGA
(cf. section 2.2.2).
8.6.2 FTP_ITC.1/VAD
Inter-TSF trusted channel – TC Human Interface Device
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1/VAD:
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and another trusted IT product HID that is logically distinct from
other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/VAD:
The TSF shall permit the remote trusted IT product120 to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/VAD:
The TSF or the HID shall initiate communication via the trusted
channel for
 user authentication according to FIA_UAU.1;
118 [assignment: list of other functions for which a trusted channel is required]
119 [assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]
120 [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
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 import of a new value of the RAD from the HID121 122.
Application Note 36 The component FTP_ITC.1/VAD requires the TSF to enforce a
trusted channel established by the HID to import the VAD from the HID. In more detail, the
trusted channel is opened by means of GAP authentication.
8.6.3 FTP_ITC.1/DTBS
Inter-TSF trusted channel – Signature creation Application
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1/DTBS:
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and another trusted IT product SCA that is logically distinct from
other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/DTBS:
The TSF shall permit the remote trusted IT product123 to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/DTBS:
The TSF or the SCA shall initiate communication via the
trusted channel for
 signature creation;
 export of digital signatures to the SCA124 125.
Application Note 37 The component FTP_ITC.1/DTBS requires the TSF to enforce a
trusted channel established by the SCA to import the DTBS from the SCA. Moreover, the
121 [assignment: list of other functions for which a trusted channel is required]
122 [assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]
123 [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
124 [assignment: list of other functions for which a trusted channel is required]
125 [assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]
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TSF requires the use of the same trusted channel for the export of digital signatures to the
SCA (cf. section 2.2.3).
8.6.4 FTP_ITC.1/Init
Inter-TSF trusted channel – TOE initialization data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1/Init:
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and another trusted IT product, the Initialization Agent’s
terminal, that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured identification of its end points
and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/Init:
The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product126 to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/Init:
The TSF or the Initialization Agent’s terminal shall initiate
communication via the trusted channel for import of TOE
initialization data from the terminal127.
Application Note 38 The component FTP_ITC.1/Init requires the TSF to enforce a
trusted channel established by the Initialization Agent’s terminal to import TOE initialization
data from the terminal. This trusted channel is established through a SCP03 authentication
[R17]. For further information, cf. the initialization guidance [R21].
8.6.5 FTP_ITC.1/Pers
Inter-TSF trusted channel – Personalization data
126 [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
127 [assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1/Pers:
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and another trusted IT product, the Personalization Agent’s
terminal, that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured identification of its end points
and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/Pers:
The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product128 to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/Pers:
The TSF or the Personalization Agent’s terminal shall initiate
communication via the trusted channel for import of
personalization data from the terminal129.
Application Note 39 The component FTP_ITC.1/Pers requires the TSF to enforce a
trusted channel established by the Personalization Agent’s terminal to import
personalization data from the terminal. This trusted channel is established through a SCP03
authentication. [R17]. For further information, cf. the personalization guidance [R23].
128 [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
129 [assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]
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9. Security assurance requirements
The Evaluation Assurance Level claimed by this security target is EAL5 augmented with
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 [R9] (cf. section 3.2). Moreover, the refinements to security
assurance requirements for composite product evaluations are also applied [R34].
Table 9-1 summarizes the security assurance requirements enforced by this Security
Target.
Table 9-1 Security assurance requirements: EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5
Assurance class Assurance components
ADV
Development
ADV_ARC.1
Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.5
Complete semiformal functional specification with additional error
information
ADV_IMP.1
Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_INT.2
Well-structured internals
ADV_TDS.4
Semiformal modular design
AGD
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1
Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1
Preparative procedures
ALC
Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.4
Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
ALC_CMS.5
Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1
Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2
Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1
Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.2
Compliance with implementation standards
ASE
Security target evaluation
ASE_CCL.1
Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1
Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1
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Assurance class Assurance components
ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2
Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2
Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1
Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1
TOE summary specification
ATE
Tests
ATE_COV.2
Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.3
Testing: modular design
ATE_FUN.1
Functional testing
ATE_IND.2
Independent testing - sample
AVA
Vulnerability assessment
AVA_VAN.5
Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
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10. Security requirements rationale
10.1 Coverage of security functional requirements
Table 10-1 maps the security functional requirements to the security objectives for the TOE.
The rows are split according to SFR classes, while the columns are split according to the
source of the security objectives (PP Part 2 [R10], PP Part 4 [R11], PP Part 5 [R12], or this
security target).
Table 10-1 Mapping of the security functional requirements to the security objectives for
the TOE
OT.Lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.TOE_QSCD_Auth
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp
OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp
OT.AC_Init
OT.AC_Pers
FCS_CKM.1/
RSA
X X X X
FCS_CKM.1/
ECDSA
X X X X
FCS_CKM.4 X X
FCS_COP.1/
RSA
X X
FCS_COP.1/
ECDSA
X X
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/
SVD_Generation
X X
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/
SVD_Generation
X X
FDP_ACC.1/SVD
_Transfer
X X
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_
Transfer
X X
FDP_ACC.1/Signa
ture_Creation
X X
FDP_ACF.1/Signa
ture_Creation
X X
FDP_RIP.1 X X
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OT.Lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.TOE_QSCD_Auth
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp
OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp
OT.AC_Init
OT.AC_Pers
FDP_SDI.2/Persis
tent
X X X
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS X X
FDP_DAU.2/SVD X
FDP_UIT.1/DTBS X
FIA_UID.1 X X X X
FIA_UAU.1 X X X X X
FIA_AFL.1 X
FIA_API.1 X
FMT_SMR.1/QSC
D
X X
FMT_SMR.1/Init X X
FMT_SMR.1/Pers X X
FMT_SMF.1 X X X X X
FMT_MOF.1 X X
FMT_MSA.1/Admi
n
X X
FMT_MSA.1/Sign
atory
X X
FMT_MSA.2 X X X
FMT_MSA.3 X X X
FMT_MSA.4 X X X X
FMT_MTD.1/Admi
n
X X
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OT.Lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.TOE_QSCD_Auth
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp
OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp
OT.AC_Init
OT.AC_Pers
FMT_MTD.1/Sign
atory
X X
FMT_MTD.1/Init X
FMT_MTD.1/Pers X
FPT_EMS.1 X X
FPT_FLS.1 X
FPT_PHP.1 X
FPT_PHP.3 X X
FPT_TST.1 X X X
FTP_ITC.1/SVD X
FTP_ITC.1/VAD X
FTP_ITC.1/DTBS X
FTP_ITC.1/Init X
FTP_ITC.1/Pers X
10.2 Sufficiency of security functional requirements
Here below is the rationale for the security objectives borrowed from PP Part 2 [R10].
OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security) is provided by the SFRs for SCD/SVD
generation FCS_CKM.1, SCD usage FCS_COP.1, and SCD destruction FCS_CKM.4,
which ensure a cryptographically secure life cycle of the SCD. The SCD/SVD generation is
controlled by TSF according to FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation and
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation. The SVD transfer for certificate generation is
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controlled by TSF according to FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer and
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer. The SCD usage is ensured by access control
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation, FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation, which is based on
secure TSF management according to FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1/Admin,
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory, FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MSA.4, FMT_MTD.1/Admin,
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/QSCD, FMT_SMR.1/Init, and
FMT_SMR.1/Pers. The test functions FPT_TST.1 provide failure detection throughout the
life cycle.
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen (Authorized SCD/SVD generation) addresses that generation of
an SCD/SVD pair requires proper user authentication. The TSF specified by FIA_UID.1 and
FIA_UAU.1 provide user identification and user authentication prior to enabling access to
authorized functions. The SFRs FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation and
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation provide access control for the SCD/SVD generation.
The security attributes of the authenticated user are provided by FMT_MSA.1/Admin,
FMT_MSA.2, and FMT_MSA.3 for static attribute initialization. The SFR FMT_MSA.4
defines rules for inheritance of the security attribute “SCD operational” of the SCD.
OT.SCD_Unique (Uniqueness of Signature Creation Data) implements the requirement of
practically unique SCD as laid down in [R15], Annex III, paragraph 1(a), which is provided
by the cryptographic algorithms specified by FCS_CKM.1.
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp (Correspondence between SVD and SCD) addresses that the SVD
corresponds to the SCD implemented by the TOE. This is provided by the algorithms
specified by FCS_CKM.1 to generate corresponding SVD/SCD pairs. The security functions
specified by FDP_SDI.2/Persistent ensure that the keys are not modified, so to retain the
correspondence. Moreover, the SCD identifier allows the environment to identify the SCD
and to link it with the appropriate SVD. The management functions identified by FMT_SMF.1
and by FMT_MSA.4 allow R.Admin to modify the default value of the security attribute SCD
identifier.
OT.SCD_Secrecy (Secrecy of Signature Creation Data) is provided by the security
functions specified by the following SFRs. FCS_CKM.1 ensures the use of secure
cryptographic algorithms for SCD/SVD generation. Cryptographic quality of SCD/SVD pairs
shall prevent disclosure of SCD by cryptographic attacks using the publicly known SVD. The
security functions specified by FDP_RIP.1 and FCS_CKM.4 ensure that residual information
on SCD is destroyed after the SCD has been used for signature creation and that destruction
of SCD leaves no residual information.
The security functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/Persistent ensure that no critical data are
modified which could alter the efficiency of the security functions or leak information on the
SCD. FPT_TST.1 tests the working conditions of the TOE and FPT_FLS.1 guarantees a
secure state when integrity is violated and thus assures that the specified security functions
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are operational. An example where compromising error conditions are countered by
FPT_FLS.1 is fault injection for Differential Fault Analysis (DFA).
SFRs FPT_EMS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 require additional security features of the TOE to ensure
the confidentiality of the SCD.
OT.Sig_Secure (Cryptographic security of the electronic signature) is provided by the
cryptographic algorithms specified by FCS_COP.1, which ensures the cryptographic
robustness of the signature algorithms. FDP_SDI.2/Persistent corresponds to the integrity
of the SCD implemented by the TOE and FPT_TST.1 ensures self-tests ensuring correct
signature creation.
OT.Sigy_SigF (Signature creation function for the legitimate Signatory only) is provided by
SFRs for identification, authentication and access control.
FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1 ensure that no signature creation function can be invoked before
the Signatory is identified and authenticated. The security functions specified by
FMT_MTD.1/Admin and FMT_MTD.1/Signatory manage the authentication function. SFR
FIA_AFL.1 provides protection against a number of attacks, such as cryptographic
extraction of residual information, or brute force attacks against authentication. The security
function specified by FDP_SDI.2/DTBS ensures the integrity of stored DTBS, and
FDP_RIP.1 prevents misuse of any resources containing the SCD after de-allocation (e.g.
after the signature creation process).
The security functions specified by FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation and
FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation provide access control based on the security attributes
managed according to the SFRs FMT_MTD.1/Signatory, FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3 and
FMT_MSA.4. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/QSCD list these management
functions and the roles. These ensure that the signature process is restricted to the
Signatory. FMT_MOF.1 restricts the ability to enable the signature creation function to the
Signatory. FMT_MSA.1/Signatory restricts the ability to modify the security attribute SCD
operational to the Signatory.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE) ensures that the DTBS/R is
not altered by the TOE. The integrity functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/DTBS require that
the DTBS/R has not been altered by the TOE.
OT.EMSEC_Design (Provision of physical emanations security) covers that no intelligible
information is emanated. This is provided by FPT_EMS.1.1.
OT.Tamper_ID (Tamper detection) is provided by FPT_PHP.1 by means of passive
detection of physical attacks.
OT.Tamper_Resistance (Tamper resistance) is provided by FPT_PHP.3 to resist physical
attacks.
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Here below is the rationale for the security objectives borrowed from PP Part 4 [R11].
OT.TOE_QSCD_Auth (Authentication proof as QSCD) requires the TOE to provide security
mechanisms to identify and to authenticate itself as QSCD, which is directly provided by
FIA_API.1. The SFR FIA_UAU.1 allows establishment of the trusted channel before the
(human) user is authenticated.
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp (TOE trusted channel for SVD export) requires the TOE to provide
a trusted channel to the CGA to protect the integrity of the SVD exported to the CGA, which
is directly provided by:
 The SVD transfer for certificate generation is controlled by TSF according to
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer and FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer.
 FDP_DAU.2/SVD (Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor), which requires the
TOE to provide the CGA with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of the SVD
and the identity of the user that generated the evidence.
 FTP_ITC.1/SVD (Inter-TSF trusted channel), which requires the TOE to provide a
trusted channel to the CGA.
Here below is the rationale for the security objectives borrowed from PP Part 5 [R12].
OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp (TOE trusted channel for VAD import) is met by FTP_ITC.1/VAD,
which requires the TSF to enforce a trusted channel to protect the VAD provided by the HID
to the TOE.
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp (TOE trusted channel for DTBS import) is covered by
FTP_ITC.1/DTBS, which requires the TSF to enforce a trusted channel to protect the DTBS
provided by the SCA to the TOE, and by FDP_UIT.1/DTBS, which requires the TSF to verify
the integrity of the received DTBS.
Here below is the rationale for the security objectives added in this security target to those
defined in the PPs.
OT.AC_Init (Access control for the initialization of the e-Document) is covered by:
 FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1, which state that writing TOE initialization data requires
a previous authentication on the part of the Initialization Agent;
 FMT_MTD.1/Init (based on FMT_SMR.1/Init and FMT_SMF.1), which restricts the
capability to write TOE initialization data to the Initialization Agent;
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 FTP_ITC.1/Init, which requires the TSF to enforce a trusted channel for the import of
TOE initialization data, so as to ensure that the data actually written match those sent
by the Initialization Agent.
OT.AC_Pers (Access control for the personalization of the e-Document) is covered by:
 FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1, which state that writing personalization data requires a
previous authentication on the part of the Personalization Agent;
 FMT_MTD.1/Pers (based on FMT_SMR.1/Pers and FMT_SMF.1), which restricts
the capability to write personalization data to the Personalization Agent;
 FTP_ITC.1/Pers, which requires the TSF to enforce a trusted channel for the import
of personalization data, so as to ensure that the data actually written match those
sent by the Personalization Agent.
10.3 Satisfaction of dependencies of security requirements
Table 10-2 Satisfaction of dependencies of security functional requirements
Requirement Dependencies Satisfied by
FCS_CKM.1/RSA
FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1 FCS_COP.1
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/ECDSA
FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1 FCS_COP.1
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/RSA
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ACC.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACF.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACC.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3
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Requirement Dependencies Satisfied by
FDP_ACC.1/
SVD_Transfer
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1/
SVD_Transfer
FDP_ACF.1/
SVD_Transfer
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACC.1/
SVD_Transfer
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/
Signature_Creation
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1/
Signature_Creation
FDP_ACF.1/
Signature_Creation
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACC.1/
Signature_Creation
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3
FDR_RIP.1 No dependencies -
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent No dependencies -
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS No dependencies -
FDP_DAU.2/SVD FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FDP_UIT.1/DTBS
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1/
Signature_Creation
FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 FTP_ITC.1/DTBS
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies -
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_API.1 No dependencies -
FMT_SMR.1/QSCD FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FMT_SMR.1/Init FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FMT_SMR.1/Pers FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies -
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1/QSCD
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/Admin FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation
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Requirement Dependencies Satisfied by
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1/QSCD
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1/
Signature_Creation
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1/QSCD
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.2
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation,
FDP_ACC.1/
Signature_Creation
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.1/Admin,
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1/QSCD
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.1/Admin,
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1/QSCD
FMT_MSA.4 FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation,
FDP_ACC.1/
Signature_Creation
FMT_MTD.1/Admin
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1/QSCD
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1/QSCD
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/Init
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1/Init
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/Pers
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1/Pers
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FPT_EMS.1 No dependencies -
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies -
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Requirement Dependencies Satisfied by
FPT_PHP.1 No dependencies -
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies -
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies -
FTP_ITC.1/SVD No dependencies -
FTP_ITC.1/VAD No dependencies -
FTP_ITC.1/DTBS No dependencies -
FTP_ITC.1/Init No dependencies -
FTP_ITC.1/Pers No dependencies -
Table 10-3 Satisfaction of dependencies of security assurance requirements
Requirement Dependencies Satisfied by
EAL5 package
Dependencies of the EAL5 package are not
reproduced here (cf. [R9])
By construction, all
dependencies are
satisfied in a CC EAL
package
ALC_DVS.2 No dependencies -
AVA_VAN.5
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_ARC.1130
ADV_FSP.4 ADV_FSP.5
ADV_TDS.3 ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1 ADV_IMP.1
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1
ATE_DPT.1 ATE_DPT.3
10.4 Rationale for security assurance requirements
The assurance level for this security target is EAL5 augmented. EAL5 permits a developer
to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial
development practises, supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering
130 This assurance component and the subsequent ones are all included in the EAL5 package.
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techniques. Such a TOE will be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require
a rigorous development approach, without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques (cf. [R9]).
The TOE described in this security target is just such a product. Augmentation results from
the selection of:
 ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures”;
 AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis”.
The selection of component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance on the security of the
development and manufacturing of the TOE.
The selection of component AVA_VAN.5 ensures that the TOE be resistant to penetration
attacks performed by an attacker possessing a high attack potential, which is necessary to
meet security objectives OT.SCD_Secrecy, OT.Sigy_SigF and OT.Sig_Secure (cf. section
5.1).
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11. TOE summary specification
Table 11-1 describes how each Security Functional Requirement claimed in this Security
Target is satisfied by the TOE.
Table 11-1 Implementation of the security functional requirements in the TOE
Security functional requirement Implementation
FCS_CKM.1/RSA
FCS_CKM.1/ECDSA
The SCD/SVD key pairs are generated using specific
cryptographic features of the platform (cf. [R39]).
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic keys are destroyed by calling a dedicated
interface of the Crypto Library.
FCS_COP.1/RSA
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA
The digital signature creation is performed using specific
cryptographic features of the platform (cf. [R39]).
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
The generation of SCD/SVD key pairs is restricted to
Administrator and Signatory by means of GAP.
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer
The export of SVD keys is restricted to Administrator and
Signatory by means of GAP.
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation
FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation
The digital signature creation is restricted to the
Signatory by means of PIN verification (VAD) after
successful GAP.
Moreover, signature creation is forbidden unless the key
is activated.
FDP_RIP.1
Any volatile copy of a private key meant for signature
creation is overwritten with zeros upon the completion of
either the generation of the key or the creation of a
signature with the key.
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent
The private/public key objects contain a CRC, which is
checked whenever the keys are used for signature
creation or public key export. In case such a check fails,
an exception is raised, so to inform the user about the
integrity error.
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS
The volatile data structure storing the DTBS/R contains a
CRC, which is checked upon signature creation. In case
such a check fails, an exception is raised, so to inform
the user about the integrity error.
FDP_DAU.2/SVD
As a means to generate evidence that can be used by
the CGA as a guarantee of the validity of SVD, as well as
of the identity of the corresponding legitimate Signatory,
the TOE supports GAP.
FDP_UIT.1/DTBS
DTBS/R import must be executed over the trusted
channel opened by means of GAP.
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Security functional requirement Implementation
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.1
The TOE provides user identification and user
authentication prior to enabling access to authorized
functions. For the trusted channel between CGA or HID
and the TOE this is accomplished using GAP, whether
for Initialization Agent’s terminal and Personalization
Agent’s terminal and the TOE this is accomplished using
SCP03.
FIA_AFL.1
The thresholds for authentication failures with respect to
the RAD are set by the Personalization Agent.
The behaviour occurring if the thresholds are reached is
specified in the statement of the SFR.
FIA_API.1 Cf. section 2.2.1.
FMT_SMR.1/QSCD
The Administrator and Signatory roles are distinguished
by the usage of specific certificates used in GAP.
FMT_SMR.1/Init
FMT_SMR.1/Pers
The Initialization Agent and Personalization Agent roles
are implicitly identified via the corresponding
authentication key.
FMT_SMF.1 Cf. section 2.2.
FMT_MOF.1
The Signatory alone can activate the signature creation
function for each single private key, as specified for SFR
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory.
FMT_MSA.1/Admin
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
FMT_MSA.2
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.4
The management of SCD/SVD key pairs is restricted to
Signatory by means of GAP and PIN verification.
FMT_MTD.1/Admin The Administrator cannot create the RAD.
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory
The ability to create, modify and unblock the RAD are
restricted to the Signatory role, as specified in SFRs
definitions, according to the usage of specific certificates
used in GAP.
FMT_MTD.1/Init
The command APDUs available for the writing of TOE
initialization data (cf. section 2.3.2) require user
authentication with respect to the initialization key.
FMT_MTD.1/Pers
The command APDUs available for the writing of
personalization data, including the RAD, (cf. section
2.3.3) require user authentication with respect to the
personalization key.
FPT_EMS.1
Leakage of confidential data through side channels is
prevented by the security features of the Platform, in
accordance with the security recommendations contained
in the Platform guidance documentation [R39].
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Security functional requirement Implementation
FPT_FLS.1
In case self-test fails or a physical attack is detected, the
Applet enters an endless loop, so that all cryptographic
operations and data output interfaces are inhibited.
FPT_PHP.1
FPT_PHP.3
Detection of physical attacks is ensured by the security
features of the Platform, in accordance with the security
recommendations contained in the Platform guidance
documentation [R39].
FPT_TST.1
During initial start-up, the Applet automatically is
selected, and it checks that it is running on the expected
platform JCOP 4 P71, using a specific function provided
by the platform. The attack logger is checked too.
Furthermore, at the initial start-up the platform performs
self-checks as described in [R39]
FTP_ITC.1/SVD Cf. Application Note 35.
FTP_ITC.1/VAD Cf. Application Note 36.
FTP_ITC.1/DTBS Cf. Application Note 37.
FTP_ITC.1/Init Cf. Application Note 38.
FTP_ITC.1/Pers Cf. Application Note 39.
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12. References
12.1 Acronyms
AA Active Authentication
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange
BAC Basic Access Control
CC Common Criteria
CGA Certificate Generation Application
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSP Certification Service Provider
DF Dedicated/Directory File
DFA Differential Power Analysis
DTBS Data To Be Signed
DTBS/R Data To Be Signed Representation
EAC Extended Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EF Elementary File
FID File Identifier
GAP General Authentication Procedure
HID Human Interface Device
IC Integrated Circuit
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
LDS Logical Data Structure
MAC Message Authentication Code
MF Master File
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
OS Operating System
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
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PUC Personal Unblocking Code
QSCD Qualified Signature Creation Device
RAD Reference Authentication Data
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCA Signature Creation Application
SCD Signature Creation Data
SCS Signature Creation System
SDO Signed Data Object
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMT Signature Management Terminal
SPA Simple Power Analysis
SSCD Secure Signature Creation Device
ST Signature Terminal
SVD Signature Verification Data
TDES Triple DES
TOE Target Of Evaluation
TR Technical Report
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VAD Verification Authentication Data
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12.2 Technical references
[R1] ACSIEL: Technical Report - Signature creation and administration for eIDAS Token,
Version 1.0, July 2015
[R2] BSI: Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-V3-2022 for NXP Smart Card Controller
N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library (R1/R2/R3/R4) from NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH, 7 September 2022
[R3] BSI: Technical Guideline TR-03110-1, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token, Part 1: eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2
and EACv1, version 2.20, February 2015
[R4] BSI: Technical Guideline TR-03110-2, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token, Part 2: Protocols for electronic
IDentification, Authentication and trust Services (eIDAS), version 2.21, December
2016
[R5] BSI: Technical Guideline TR-03110-3, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token, Part 3: Common Specifications,
version 2.21, December 2016
[R6] BSI: Technical Guideline TR-03111, Elliptic Curve Cryptography, version 2.10, 2018-
06-01
[R7] CCMB: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and general model, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, ref. CCMB-2017-
04-001
[R8] CCMB: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security functional components, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, ref. CCMB-2017-
04-002
[R9] CCMB: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security assurance components, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, ref. CCMB-2017-
04-003
[R10] CEN: Protection profiles for secure signature creation device, Part 2: Device with Key
Generation, version 2.0.1, EN 419211-2:2013 (certificate BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-
MA-02)
[R11] CEN: Protection profiles for secure signature creation device, Part 4: Extension for
device with key generation and trusted communication with certificate generation
application, version 1.0.1, EN 419211-4:2013 (certificate BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012-MA-
01)
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[R12] CEN: Protection profiles for secure signature creation device, Part 5: Extension for
device with key generation and trusted communication with signature creation
application, version 1.0.1, EN 419211-5:2013 (certificate BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012-MA-
01)
[R13] European Parliament: Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament
and of the Council, 23 July 2014
[R14] European Parliament: Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/650, 25 April
2016
[R15] European Parliament: Directive 1999/93/EC on a Community framework for
electronic signatures, December 1999
[R16] GlobalPlatform: GlobalPlatform Card Specification 2.3, GPC_SPE_034,
GlobalPlatform Inc., October 2015
[R17] GlobalPlatform: GlobalPlatform Card Technology, Secure Channel Protocol ’03’,
Card Specification v 2.2 - Amendment D v1.1.1, July 2014.
[R18] HID Global: Security Target for HIDApp-eDoc suite – ICAO Application – Basic
Access Control, v. 1.5, ref. TCAE210001
[R19] HID Global: Security Target for HIDApp-eDoc suite – ICAO Application – EAC-
PACE-AA, v. 1.5, ref. TCAE210002
[R20] HID Global: Security Target for HIDApp-eDoc suite – eIDAS eSign Application, v.
1.5, ref. TCAE210003
[R21] HID Global: Initialization Guidance for HIDApp-eDoc suite, v. 1.4, ref. TCAE210007
[R22] HID Global: Personalization Guidance for HIDApp-eDoc suite – ICAO Application, v.
1.6, ref. TCAE210008
[R23] HID Global: Personalization Guidance for HIDApp-eDoc suite – eIDAS eSign
Application, v. 1.6, ref. TCAE210009
[R24] HID Global: Operational User Guidance for HIDApp-eDoc suite – ICAO Application,
v. 1.5, ref. TCAE210010
[R25] HID Global: Operational User Guidance for HIDApp-eDoc suite – eIDAS eSign
Application, v. 1.5, ref. TCAE210011
[R26] HID Global: Secure Delivery Procedure for HIDApp-eDoc suite, ref. TCAE210012
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[R27] ICAO: Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 10: Logical Data
Structure (LDS) for Storage of Biometrics and Other Data in the Contactless
Integrated Circuit (IC), Eighth Edition, 2021
[R28] ICAO: Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 11: Security
Mechanisms for MRTDs, Eighth Edition, 2021
[R29] ICAO: Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 12: Public Key
Infrastructure for MRTDs, Eighth Edition, 2021
[R30] IETF Network Working Group: Request for Comments 2119, Key words for use in
RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels, March 1997
[R31] ISO/IEC: International Standard 14443, Identification cards - Contactless integrated
circuit cards - Proximity cards, 2008
[R32] ISO/IEC: International Standard 7816-2, Identification cards – Integrated circuit cards
– Part 2: Cards with contacts – Dimensions and location of the contacts
[R33] ISO/IEC: International Standard 7816-4, Identification cards – Integrated circuit cards
– Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange
[R34] JIWG: Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices, version 1.5.1, May 2018
[R35] NIST: FIPS PUB 180-4, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication,
Secure Hash Standard (SHS), March 2012
[R36] NIST: FIPS PUB 186-4, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication,
Digital Signature Standard (DSS), July 2013
[R37] NXP: JCOP 4 P71, Security Target Lite for JCOP 4 P71 / SE050 Rev. 4.11 – 03
January 2023
[R38] NXP: NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and
Crypto Library (R1/R2/R3/R4), Security Target Lite Rev. 2.6 – 13 June 2022.
[R39] NXP: JCOP 4 P71, User manual for JCOP 4 P71, Rev. 4.3, DocNo 469543, 08
September 2022, NXP Semiconductors.
[R40] Oracle: Java Card 3 Platform, Application Programming Interface, Classic Edition,
Version 3.0.5, May 2015
[R41] Oracle: Java Card 3 Platform, Runtime Environment Specification, Classic Edition,
Version 3.0.5, May 2015
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[R42] Oracle: Java Card 3 Platform, Virtual Machine Specification, Classic Edition, Version
3.0.5, May 2015
[R43] RSA Laboratories: PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, version 2.2, October
2012
[R44] TUV: Certification Report NSCIB-CC-180212-5MA1 for JCOP 4 P71 from NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH, 23 January 2023
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Appendix A Platform identification
The platform on which the TOE is based (cf. [R34]) is the NXP JCOP 4 P71.
The platform includes:
 The certified microcontroller NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC
Dedicated Software and Crypto Library (cf. [R2])
 The Security IC Dedicated Software, composed by:
o MC FW (Micro Controller Firmware) [R38]
o Crypto Library [R38]
 The Security IC Embedded Software, composed by
o JCOP 4 P71 OS, consisting of:
 JCVM, JCRE and JCAPI implemented according to Java Card
Specification Version 3.0.5 Classic
 GP framework implemented according GlobalPlatform Version 2.3
and Amendment D, Secure Channel Protocol ’03’ Version 1.1.1
 Additionally proprietary APIs, described in the document [R39]
The TOE configuration used for the TOE HIDApp-eDoc is the Configuration Banking &
Secure ID, JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.01.4.
The platform has obtained a Common Criteria certification at Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL6 augmented by ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1:
 Certification ID: NSCIB-CC-180212-5MA1
 Security Target: [R37]
 Certification Report: [R44].
END OF DOCUMENT